DDB-1100-197-78
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SOVIET
MOTORIZED RIFLE
BATTALION
SEPTEMBER 1978
THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION
DDB-1100-197-78
Information Cutoff Date:
20 December 1977
This publication supersedes
Soviet Tactics: The Motorized Rifle Battalion,
AP-1-220-3-4-64, November 1964,
which should be destroyed.
This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
Prepared by the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division,
Directorate for Intelligence Research, Defense Intelligence Agency
Author: Major Robert M. Frasche,
Tactics and Organization Section,
Ground Forces Branch
PREFACE
This study, a foilow-up to The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company
(DDI-1100-77-76), was written to familiarize the reader with the organization,
training, tactics, and equipment of the Soviet motorized rifle battalion (MRB). It
was especially written for troops, troop commanders, unit intelligence officers,
service schools, and others who require detailed knowledge of the Soviet MRB.
The study concentrates on the operations of those MRBs equipped with the
BMP (infantry combat vehicle). The organization, training, tactics, and equip-
ment of the BMP-equipped MRB are analyzed within the context of Soviet doc-
trine. Soviet tactical trends since the October I973 War are also considered. The
scope of the study is restricted to those operations (nuclear and nonnuclear) rele-
vant to northern and central Europe.
Studies which address in greater detail some of the subjects covered in this
text are as follows:
1.	Soviet Offensive Doctrine: Combined Arms Operations Versus Antitank
Defenses (U), DDI-1100-138-76, July 1976.
2.	Soviet Tactical Trends Since the October 1973 War (U), DDI-1100-160-77,
April 1977.
3.	The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company (U), DDI-1100-77-76, October 1976.
4.	Soviet Military Operations in Built-Up Areas (U), DDI-1100-155-77, July
1977.
5.	Soviet and Warsaw Pact River Crossing: Doctrine and Capabilities (U)
DDI-1150-7-76, September 1976.
6.	Evaluation of Soviet Night Combat Capabilities (U), DDI-1100-173-77,
February 1978.
7.	Soviet Amphibious Warfare Capabilities (U), DDI-1200-74-76, May 1976.
8.	Soviet Tactical Level Logistics (U), DDI-1150-0014-77, December 1977.
9.	Soviet Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques (U), (DDB-1130-8-78-to be
published).
Addressees are requested to forward information which will supplement or cor-
rect this report. Questions and comments should be referred in writing to the
Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-1B4), Washington, D.C. 20301.
SUMMARY
The Soviets stress the decisive nature of the offensive and emphasize the meeting engagement more than
any other type of offensive action. High rates of advance are anticipated from the actions of combined arms
units operating in conjunction with airborne, airmobile, and special operations forces in the enemy rear area.
Since the October 1973 War, the Soviets have placed even more emphasis on combined arms operations,
and have made numerous organizational and tactical adjustments to increase the survivability of their tank
forces. The tank remains the backbone of combined arms doctrine.
Though relatively small, the BMP-equipped MRB is highly maneuverable and possesses considerable
organic firepower, particularly in antitank weaponry. The MRB is often augmented by motorized rifle regi-
ment and/or divisional assets to form a heavily reinforced combined arms grouping to carry out a variety of
missions.
The battalion commander's age, education, and political awareness provide the theoretical basis for effec-
tive command. Frequent field training and lengthy peacetime command assignments partially offset his lack
of combat experience. Though technically well trained, the MRB commander often fails to exploit the strong
points of his men and equipment during field exercises. Moreover, his initiative is constricted within narrow
parameters by institutional and operational constraints.
Battalion-level training is highly centralized, stresses fundmentals, and results in effective battle drill.
"Moral-political" training, while boring for many, is probably effective. Training effectiveness is complicated
by the 2 year term of service.
The MRB is capable of conducting operations under special conditions, although the amount of such train-
ing varies according to geographic location and mission.
The BMP-equipped MRB normally operates as part of the regiment and is most effective when so
employed. Discrepancies between doctrine and practice have been noted in several types of MRB operations.
These discrepancies, along with constraints on battalion-level leadership, result in vulnerabilities which may
be exploited by Western commanders.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY................................................................................... V
CHAPTER!. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2.	DOCTRINE, TACTICS, TRENDS.................................................... 3
Section A	- Doctrine.................................................................... 3
Section В	- Tactics..................................................................... 7
Section C	- Tactical Trends Since The October 1973 War..................................12
CHAPTER 3.	THE MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION AND MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT....................13
CHAPTER 4.	THE MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION................................................25
Section A	- Operational Principles and Missions.........................................25
Section В	- Organization, Responsibilities, and Equipment...............................26
Section C	- Command and Control.........................................................33
Section D	- Battalion Rear Services.....................................................36
CHAPTERS. BATTALION LEVEL LEADERSHIP......................................................49
Section A	- Introduction................................................................49
Section В	- The Historical Perspective .................................................49
Section C	- The Present ................................................................52
CHAPTERS. BATTALION TRAINING AND SUBUNIT TACTICS..........................................57
Section A	- Training Philosophy and Objectives .........................................57
Section В	- Training Schedules..........................................................57
Section C	- Company and Section Training and Tactics ...................................59
Section D	- Battalion Tactical Training ................................................69
Section E	- Evaluation of Battalion Training ...........................................70
CHAPTER 7.	THE MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION IN COMBAT......................................71
Section A	- Offensive Operations .......................................................71
Section В	- Defensive Operations........................................................90
CHAPTER 8.	THE MRB OPERATING UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS..................................103
Section A	- General....................................................................103
Section В	- Combat in Built-up Areas...................................................103
Section C	- Heliborne Operations.......................................................109
Section D	- Water Barrier Operations ..................................................116
Section E	- Night Combat...............................................................124
Section F	- Seaborne Assault and Defense of a Coastline................................130
CHAPTER 9.	CONCLUSIONS.................................................................I37
APPENDIX
Soviet Symbols...........................................................................139
vii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
1.	Soviet Offensive Doctrine Is Based on Combined Arms Combat ................................3
2.	Airborne and Heliborne Troops Are Selectively Used To Maintain Offensive Momentum.........4
a.	Airborne Drop in the Enemy Rear Area ..................................................4
b.	Heliborne Forces Rush To Establish a Bridgehead........................................4
3.	Basic Forms of Maneuver....................................................................5
a.	Frontal Attack.........................................................................5
b.	Shallow Envelopment (Single) ..........................................................5
c.	Deep Envelopment (Double)..............................................................5
4.	The Meeting Engagement.....................................................................6
5.	Battalion Antitank Reserves Respond Directly to the Battalion Commander....................8
a.	Antitank Reserves in a BTR-Equipped Unit ..............................................8
b.	A BMP-Equipped Motorized Rifle Battalion Antitank Reserve..............................9
6.	Traffic Regulators Aid Commanders in Controlling Their Units...............................9
7.	The Regimental Chief of Artillery (on the right) Coordinates Regimental Artillery During
Phase One Fire...............................................................................10
8.	High Performance Aircraft in Support of the Main Attack .................................11
9.	The Motorized Rifle Division ............................................................13
10.	The Motorized Rifle Division's Principal Weapons.........................................14
a.	76mm Divisional Gun, ZIS-3 ...........................................................14
b.	100mm AT Gun, M-55/T-12 ..............................................................14
c.	122mm Howitzer, M-1938/D-30...........................................................14
d.	122mm Rocket Launcher ВM-21 ..........................................................15
e.	152mm Howitzer, D-1...................................................................15
f.	FROG TEL, FROG-7 .....................................................................15
g.	GAINFUL TEL, SA-6.....................................................................16
11.	The Motorized Rifle Division's Principal Equipment ......................................16
a.	Truck, Mine Detector, Dim.............................................................16
b.	Tracked Ferry, GSP....................................................................16
c.	Pontoon PMP on KRAZ ..................................................................16
d.	Tracked Amphibian, K-61 ..............................................................17
e.	Mine Clearer BTR-50PK, M-1972.........................................................17
f.	Minelayer, SP, Armored................................................................17
g.	Truck, Decon, TMS-65..................................................................18
12.	The Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped)..............................................18
13.	Principal Weapons in the Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped).........................19
a.	Medium Tank, T-62/64/72...............................................................19
b.	122mm SP Howitzer.....................................................................20
c.	23mm SP AA Gun, ZSU-23-4 .............................................................20
d.	SAM (SA-9) GASKIN.....................................................................21
e.	ATGM Launcher Vehicle AT-3 ......,....................................................21
*4 Principal Equipment in the Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped)........................21
a.	Truck, Decon, ARS-14..................................................................21
b.	Truck, Decon, DDA-66..................................................................21
c.	Bridge, Tank Launched, MTU............................................................21
d.	Bridge, Truck Launched, TMM...........................................................22
e.	Ditching Machine
(1)	MDK-2 ...........................................................................22
(2)	MDK-2 in Operation...............................................................22
f.	Dozer, BAT/BAT-M/PK-T.................................................................23
g.	Mine	Clearing Plow, KMT-4 ...........................................................23
h.	Mine	Layer, Towed, PMR-3 ............................................................23
i.	Mine	Roller, KMT-5...................................................................23
ix
15.	The Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP-Equipped) .............................................26
16.	Principal Weapons and Equipment of The Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP-Equipped) ..........
a.	120mm Mortar ...........................................................................
b.	BMP.....................................................................................
c.	Truck, UAZ-69 ..........................................................................
d.	Truck, GAZ-66 ..........................................................................
e.	Truck, ZIL130...........................................................................
f.	Truck, Van, ZIL (Maintenance)...........................................................
g.	Truck, POL (4,000 or 5,200 Liters)......................................................
h.	Truck, Field Kitchen, Van PAK-200 ......................................................
i.	Ambulance, UAZ-450 .....................................................................
j.	Trailer-Mounted Field Kitchen, KP-125...................................................
17.	Battalion Headquarters ....................................................................
18.	The Motorized Rifle Company (BMP-Equipped)................................................
19.	The Mortar Battery .......................................................................
20.	The Communications Platoon ...............................................................
21.	Representative Communications Net in a Motorized Rifle Battalion .........................
22.	The Use of Line Communications by a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense..............
23.	Motorized Rifle Battalion Rear Service Elements in an Assembly Area ......................
24.	Motorized Rifle Battalion Rear Service Support Elements During the March..................
25.	Rear Service Support During the Attack ...................................................
26.	Rear Service Support in the Defense.......................................................
27.	The Supply Platoon........................................................................
28.	Ammunition Resupply to the Companies in the Defense ......................................
29.	Refueling the Motorized Rifle Battalion's Combat Elements During the March................
30.	The Supply Platoon Delivering Food to Attacking Companies.................................
31.	Division Bakery Personnel ................................................................
32.	The Medical Aid Station ..................................................................
33.	Medical Evacuation During an Attack.......................................................
34.	The Repair Workshop ......................................................................
35.	Repair and Evacuation of Weapons and Equipment During an Attack ..........................
36.	Senior Soviet WWII Commanders Were Flexible, Energetic and Full of Initiative ............
a.	Marshal Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff in Early 1941 and Deputy Supreme Commander
Thereafter.................................................................................
b.	Front Commanders Eremenko, Konev, Rokossovsky, and Timoshenko...........................
37.	Until October 1941, The Unit Political Officer Had To Countersign The Commander's Orders..
38.	Battalion Commanders Are Young Men with Considerable Peacetime Command Experience.........
39.	The Regimental Commander and His Staff Exercise Tight Control Over
Subordinate Units..............................................................................
40.	A Representative Six-Month Training Schedule for a BMP-Equipped Unit......................
41.	A Typical Week-Day Training Schedule......................................................
42.	The Mortar Battery Commander at His Forward Observation Post..............................
43.	Flag Signals Used by the Mortar Battery ..................................................
44.	The Mortar Battery During the March ......................................................
a.	As Part of the Battalion Formation .....................................................
b.	Battery March Order.....................................................................
45.	Mortar Battery Deployment from the March..................................................
33358 8 8^3 S 3 3 8 8 S S 3 3
x
46.	Mortar Position in the Defense.............................................................64
47.	Operations of the Mortar Battery's Forward Observation Post................................65
48.	Moral-Political Training in a Combined Arms Unit Prior to an Exercise .....................68
49.	Combined Arms Combat.......................................................................69
50.	Tactical March Order of a Motorized Rifle Battalion........................................72
51.	Control Measures During the March..........................................................73
52.	Vehicles are Dispersed and Camouflaged During Long Halts ..................................74
53.	Security During the March..................................................................75
54.	SA-7 Gunners Are The Motorized Rifle Battalion Commander's Primary Means of Air Defense....78
55.	NBC Reconnaissance Is Conducted by Motorized Rifle Battalion Assets and/or by
BRDM-Equipped Specialists from Regiment ........................................................79
56.	Chemical Personnel Marking a Contaminated Area ............................................79
57.	Conditions Leading to a Meeting Engagement.................................................80
58.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Conducting a Meeting Engagement.....................82
59.	Soviet Figures for NATO Defensive Positions................................................83
60.	Artillery Support for First Echelon Battalions in the Breakthrough ........................84
61.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Deploying from the March to Participate in a Division
Breakthrough Operation .........................................................................88
62.	UZ-2 Bangalore Torpedo....................................................................  89
63.	Tanks Clear Breaches Through Mine Fields for Motorized Rifle Troops.........................89
64.	The Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense................................................94
65.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Acting as the Forward Area Security Force............97
66.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Acting as the Rear Guard During a Regimental Withdrawal ... 99
67.	Relief in Place ..........................................................................101
68.	The Urbanization Factor....................................................................юз
69.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Attacking a Built-Up Area..........................105
70.	Combat-in-Cities Exercises................................................................106
71.	Flamethrower Personnel Play an Important Role in Urban Combat.............................107
72.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Defending a Built-Up Area..........................108
73.	A BTR-Equipped Motorized Rifle Battalion Preparing for a Heliborne Operation...............no
74.	The FLOGGER Series Provide Air-Ground Support ............................................110
75.	Helicopter Gunship/Troop Carriers ........................................................111
a.	HIND .................................................................................. 111
b.	HIP......................................................................................in
76.	The HOPLITE Performs Tactical Reconnaissance..............................................112
77.	The HIP Can Conduct Aerial Minelaying.....................................................112
78.	The Heavy Transport Helicopter, HOOK ......................................................из
79.	Communications in the Assembly Area ......................................................114
80.	A Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Heliborne Assault........................................115
81.	Reconnaissance of Both River Banks Usually Precedes the Main Assault......................117
82.	The Senior Engineer Officer Controls the Crossing.........................................118
83.	Self-Propelled Artillery and ZSU-23-4s Supporting a River Crossing........................119
84.	T-62s Preparing for a River Crossing....................................................  119
85.	SA-7 Gunners Supplement Other Air Defense Weapons During a Water-Crossing Operation.......120
86.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Assaulting a Water Barrier and Establishing
a Bridgehead....................................................................................121
87.	Attached Armor Rejoins Motorized Rifle Troops As Soon As Possible in a River-Crossing
Operation.......................................................................................122
88.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Defending a River Line. .........................  123
xi
89.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Conducting a Night Attack ...................127
90.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Night Defense...........................129
91.	Naval Infantry on Parade in Moscow .................................................130
92.	Naval Infantry Often Form the First Echelon in a Seaborne Assault...................131
93.	Embarkation and Debarkation Points..................................................132
94.	Amphibious Ships....................................................................133
a.	ALLIGATOR Class .................................................................133
b.	ROPUCHA Class....................................................................133
c.	POLNOCNY Class...................................................................134
95.	Amphibious Assaults May Be Conducted With Air Cushion Vehicles......................134
96.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Conducting an Amphibious Assault.............135
xii
CHAPTER 1.	INTRODUCTION
1.	RELEVANCE
FM 100-5 examines the basic doctrinal concepts
of the United States Army and presents the prin-
ciples deemed necessary for winning the land bat-
tle. For those men tasked with directing and
fighting the battle (that is, for colonels and cap-
tains), The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion is par-
ticularly relevant. BMP-equipped MRBs are widely
distributed throughout the ground forces, possess
mobility and firepower superior to that of BTR-
equipped MRBs, and allow more flexibility in
employment. The MRB is the major maneuver
element of the motorized rifle regiment (according
to the Soviets, the most important unit in the
ground forces) and plays an important role in of-
fensive and defensive operations. Study of the
MRB reveals strengths to be countered and
weaknesses to be exploited, and provides an in-
sight into Soviet operational procedures at the
next higher level.
2.	CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
A straightforward analysis of MRB operations
per se would be misleading and dangerous, as the
MRB normally operates as part of the MRR and,
in addition, may receive additional support from
the motorized rifle division (MRD). Accordingly,
this study analyzes the MRB within the context of
regimental operations, and illustrates some of the
MRD's equipment which may also be in support.
3.	DIAGRAMS
The tactical diagrams are not templates and
should not be used as such. Moreover, while
illustrating Soviet tactical concepts, they are not
intended to portray rigidly how the Soviets will
conduct every operation.
1
CHAPTER 2.	DOCTRINE, TACTICS, AND TRENDS
Section A -- Doctrine
1. GENERAL
2. OFFENSIVE PRINCIPLES
Soviet doctrine stresses that the offensive is
the decisive form of combat. To achieve success,
the Soviets stress high average rates of advance
(30-50 kilometers per day in nonnuclear situations
and 50-80 kilometers per day when nuclear
weapons are used) by combined arms units
(figure 1).
To achieve such high rates of advance, the
Soviets advocate the concentration of numerically
superior forces and firepower within selected sec-
tors; the use of airborne, heliborne, and special
operations forces throughout the depth of the
enemy rear area; and the achievement of surprise
(figure 2). Should nuclear/chemical weapons not
be used, conventional artillery would be used to
achieve the desired density of firepower. Soviet
writings stress the critical transition from non-
nuclear to nuclear operations, and frequently ex-
ercise going from one mode of combat to the
other.
Defensive concepts are less frequently describ-
ed and practiced. Although they acknowledge
that a particular situation may dictate defensive
action, the Soviets stress that the primary pur-
pose of the defense is to prepare for the resump-
tion of offensive operations as soon as possible.
Soviet offensive doctrine is based upon com-
bined arms operations, that is the closely coord-
inated efforts of the missile, tank, motorized rifle,
artillery, and combat support units. This doctrine
does not separate fire and maneuver; it seeks
ways to improve their integration and effec-
tiveness.
In forming combined arms groupings, the
Soviets do not cross-attach units as in some
Western armies. Within a Soviet motorized rifle
regiment for example, one tank company may be
assigned to a MRB, but that MRB will not, in
turn, assign one of its MR companies to the tank
battalion. In the Soviet Army, units are often at-
tached or placed in support of other units.
Attachments are more responsive to the com-
mander of the unit to which they are attached,
while units placed in support are controlled
through their parent unit commander.
The Soviets identify three types of combat
action--the meeting engagement,* the offense,
and the defense. The offense is further subdivid-
ed into the attack and its exploitation, and the
pursuit culminating in encirclement. The offensive
is conducted by maximizing maneuver, firepower,
and shock action. Approximately 80 percent of a
Figure 1. Soviet Offensive Doctrine Is Based on Combined Arms Combat.
•АлтюидЬ the meeting engagement is offensive in nature, the Soviets, in order to emphasize its importance, recognize it as a
xarate form of combat.
battalion's tactical training is offensive in nature,
a bias also reflected in the Soviet press.
a. Airborne Drop in the Enemy Rear Area.
b. Heliborne Forces Rush To Establish a Bridgehead.
Figure 2. Airborne and Heliborne Troops Are Selectively
Used to Maintain Offensive Monentum.
The Soviets define maneuver as the movement
of a force into a favorable position (in relation to
the enemy), from which it can launch an effective
attack. The frontal attack and the envelopment
are the basic types of maneuver described by the
Soviets, who clearly favor the latter (figure 3).
Envelopment is often employed in the meeting
engagement and generally whenever the enemy
has an assailable flank. Envelopment is also often
conducted in conjunction with a frontal attack
designed to pin down enemy forces.
Because of their perceptions of the fluid nature
of modem war, the Soviets place more emphasis
on the meeting engagement (combat between op-
posing columns rapidly advancing toward each
other) than on any other form of offensive action
(figure 4). Meeting engagements require a high
degree of initiative because of their inherent
characteristics:
-	The need to seize and maintain the in-
itiative.
-	Freedom of maneuver, often with open
flanks.
-	Combat on a wide front.
-	Rapid troop deployment.
-	Mobile, high speed combat.
Although the Soviets believe that their
numerous intelligence gathering means will help
commanders prepare for the meeting engage-
ment, they acknowledge that planning must often
be conducted with incomplete data on enemy
forces. Soviet commanders are encouraged to ag-
gressively seek meeting engagements and to
make rapid decisions based upon available in-
telligence.
Nuclear and nonnuclear breakthrough opera-
tions may be conducted against hasty, prepared,
or fortified defenses. In the breakthrough, the
Soviets envision penetration, accompanied
whenever possible by envelopment, the relegation
of pockets of resistance for destruction to
second-echelon formations, meeting engagements
with advancing enemy reserves, and pursuit of
withdrawing enemy forces. Against a prepared
defensive position, and when nuclear weapons
are not used, the Soviets concentrate a reinforced
battalion and the fire of 60-100 artillery pieces per
kilometer of breakthrough sector, while exerting
pressure all along the remaining portion of the
enemy defenses.
4
In nuclear breakthrough operations, the Soviets
rely primarily on nuclear weapons and penetrate
enemy defenses in column. Pursuit operations,
conducted on frontal, parallel, or combined axes,
have the purpose of cutting off and destroying
enemy forces. Tactical heliborne and airborne
forces occupy and hold locations in the enemy's
rear and otherwise attempt to disorganize and
delay his withdrawal.
3.	DEFENSIVE PRINCIPLES
For the Soviets, the purpose of the defense is
to inflict maximum casualties, to hold the defend-
ed area, and to create favorable conditions for the
resumption of the offensive.
o. Frontal Atfock.
Soviet defensive concepts include:
Sfab/7/ty-Achieved by defense in depth, close-
ly coordinated fire and obstacle plans, and strong
mobile reserves.
Secur/ty-Provided by combat security forces
which give early warning, prevent enemy recon-
naissance of the main defensive position, force
the enemy to deploy prematurely, inflict max-
imum casualties, and coordinate long-range fires
on enemy formations.
Use of key te/ra/h-lncludes a fire and obstacle
plan which restricts the enemy's freedom of
maneuver and canalizes his forces into prepared
killing grounds.
Dispersion-AHows maximum protection from
nudear and chemical weapons by positioning
troops on a wide front and in great depth.
АН-round defense-Prepared alternate and sup-
plementary positions provide 360° defensive
capabilities. Battalion strongpoints, echeloned in
oepth with extensive barriers and fire planning,
provide the backbone of the regimental defense.
Defense in cfepth-Echeloned battalion strong-
points absorb the momentum of the attack and
provide time for mobile reserves to counterattack.
Antitank defense— Provided by the liberal
aftocation of antitank weapons down to all levels,
and the formation of strong antitank reserves at
battalion level and above.
Coordinated ffires-Planned to destroy the at-
tacker approaching the defended area, in front of
c. Deep Envelopment (Double).
Figure 3. Basic Forms of Maneuver.
flank security
ADVANCE GUARD
MAN BODY
REAR SECURITY
A Reconnaissance elements detect the enemy and герои cr - s . ♦»	’M engagement
enemy is too strong estat ve$ tco^g posaons (2), and supports the
Figure 4. The Meeting Engagement
B. The advance guard attempts to conduct the meeting engagement (1), or, if the
attack by the main body (3).
the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), on
the flanks, and in prepared killing zones within
the defended area. Nuclear strikes are planned by
division and higher units against the enemy's
nuclear weapons, major reserves, and command
and control posts.
Mobile counterattack /orces-Required to
launch counterattacks, Soviet commanders from
battalion and up maintain reserves for this pur-
pose.
Approximately 20 percent of the battalion's tac-
tical training concerns defensive operations.
4.	WITHDRAWAL
Withdrawal operations, initiated only by the
next higher commander, are conducted by the
Soviets to regroup, occupy more favorable ter-
rain, or to escape enemy pressure. Due to the
complexity and inherent danger of withdrawal
operations, particularly under enemy pressure, the
Soviets try to achieve surprise by conducting
them on multiple routes at night or during other
conditions of limited visibility.
The grouping of forces for a withdrawal in-
cludes convering forces, the rear guard, main
body, and flank security detachments (when
necessary). Normally, the Soviets leave one-third
of their forces in contact to deceive the enemy
and delay his advance.
Covering forces depart suddenly and, as a rule,
simultaneously. After the main body has passed
through, the covering force then withdraws
through the rear guard. Should the enemy press
the withdrawing forces, the rear guard withdraws
6
in a leapfrog manner, rendering mutual fire sup-
port. If the rear guard is successful, withdrawal of
the main body is unimpeded.
The rear guard occupies defensive positions
behind first-echelon defense forces. Subsequent
defensive positions are designated for the rear
guard, which conducts ambushes and erects bar-
riers as it withdraws to subsequent positions. The
rear guard moves to subsequent positions in a
leapfrog manner, rendering mutual support and
defending each position.
Prior to arrival of the rear guard in the newly
designated area of defense, reconnaissance
groups are formed. These groups conduct a
survey of the new area, determine the area to be
occupied by each unit, designate approach routes
to them, mark off any mined or contaminated
areas, and test the water. As the main body ap-
proaches the area, its subordinate elements are
met by guides from the reconnaissance groups
and are taken to their designated areas.
Security is organized as soon as the lead
elements close on the new defensive areas, and
engineering work is begun.
Section В - Tactics
1.	GENERAL
In spite of the superior qualities of the BMP vis-
a-vis the BTR, we are not aware of any new
regulations governing employment of BMP-
equipped and BTR-equipped units. Soviet com-
manders still seem to be debating the tactical
employment of the BMP in an effort to maximize
its principal strengths vis-a-vis the BTR: superior
firepower (particularly antitank) and cross-country
mobility, and better crew protection. Training is
also being conducted to determine the optimum
use of BMPs operating in close coordination with
tanks and artillery.
The BMP's superiority over the BTR makes it
likely that the BMP-equipped units of a motorized
rifle division (MRD) will be assigned these key
roles:
-	Reconnaissance.
-	Use in the forward detachment.
-	Positioning in the first echelon during
nuclear conditions, and/or if enemy defenses
have been sufficiently neutralized; otherwise
in the second echelon as an exploitation force
(The BTR-equipped regiment(s) would form
the MRD's first echelon).
-	Operating on the main axis of attack.
2.	ECHELONS AND RESERVES
a.	General
In the West, there has been an overdramatiza-
tion of the Soviet deployment system, as well as
confusion* over how the system, particularly
echelonment, works. Basically, the Soviet system
of echelonment with "two up" and "one back" is
similar to our own and seeks the same effects in
the attack:
-	Timely buildup of the attack effort.
-	Beating the enemy in the use of corres-
ponding reserves.
-	Preventing an overdensity of troops and
equipment (thereby denying the enemy
lucrative nuclear targets).
-	Achieving high rates of advance by attacks
in depth.
And in the defense:
-	Presenting the enemy with a series of
defensive positions.
-	- Preventing an overdensity of troops and
equipment. The difference between the
Soviet and US systems concerns exactness in
terminology and preparation.
b.	Definitions
The first echelon is the most important
echelon and normally consists of up to two-thirds
of the forces available. In the attack it comprises
the leading assault units; in the defense, it com-
prises the forward defense units on the FEBA.
By frequently writing "second echelon (reserve)," Soviet writers have contributed to the confusion.
7
The second echelon, normally consisting of
about one-third of the available forces, gives the
commander the capability to intensify the attack,
to shift rapidly the attack effort from one axis to
another, to repulse counterattacks, and to replace
heavily attrited first-echelon units.
The commanders of the first and second
echelons receive their missions prior to combat.
First-echelon commanders are assigned immediate
and subsequent objectives and an axis of further
advance, while second-echelon commanders
receive an immediate objective and an axis for
further advance. Commanders must get permis-
sion from the next higher commander to commit
their second echelon. A second echelon is not
committed in a piecemeal fashion.
Reserves clearly differ from echelons. When
the Soviets write "second echelon (reserve)/'
they are not equating the two; they mean that
sometimes a commander will have a second
echelon and at other times a reserve.
Starting at battalion level, commanders nor-
mally maintain reserves, usually consisting of less
than one-third of the forces available. Reserves
may be of several types (antitank, branch, com-
bined arms) and be employed separately or to-
gether. The commander of the reserve receives
no specific mission prior to battle, but must be
prepared to carry out a number of contingencies.
c.	Employment of Echelons and Reserves
The commander's decision for the employ-
ment of his force depends upon METT.* For ex-
ample, because a hasty defense does not have
well-coordinated fire and obstacle plans, speed in
the attack, combined with maximum combat
power forward, is preferred to echeloning. Ac-
cordingly, a single echelon and a reserve would
most probably be used to attack a hasty defense.
Moreover, unless a commander receives
augmentation, he must weaken his assault
elements in order to have two echelons and a
branch or combined arms reserve. For this
reason, units at regimental level and above may,
when attacking in two echelons, have chemical,
engineer, and antitank reserves, but no motorized
rifle, tank, or combined arms reserve. If suitably
augmented, they may have two echelons plus
branch, combined arms, and/or other reserves.
Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available.
The MRB is the lowest level where echelon-
ment occurs in the Soviet Army (the Soviets have
experimented with echelonment within com-
panies, but this practice has been discouraged by
general officers who wrote that such practice
dissipates the company's combat power and in-
creases the command and control problems of
the company commander).
When two echelons and a reserve are
employed, reserves for BTR- and BMP-equipped
battalions could consist of a designated MR unit
(normally a platoon), usually taken from the se-
cond echelon, or a platoon from an attached tank
company.
The antitank reserve of the BTR-equipped
MRB is normally its antitank platoon of manpack
SAGGERS and SPG-9s, while for a BMP- equip-
ped MRB it may be part of an attached tank com-
pany or an attached platoon of the MRR's an-
titank missile battery (figure 5). Both types of
reserves are usually under the battalion com-
mander's direct control.
Depending upon METT, the battalion's second
echelon (reserve) operates from 1 to 3 kilometers
behind the first echelon in order to avoid un-
necessary losses, while being close enough for
timely commitment to battle. When a second
echelon passes through a first echelon, the
former fights independently of the latter, and is
usually supported by fire from the first echelon.
Reserves and the second echelon are recon-
stituted as soon as possible following their com-
mitment.
a. Antitank Reserves in a BTR-Equlpped Unit.
Figure 5. Battalion Antitank Reserves Respond Directly
to the Battalion Commander.
8
Ь A BMP-Equipped Motorized Rifle Battalion Antitank
Reserve.
Figure 5. Battalion Antitank Reserves Respond Directly to
the Battalion Commander. (Continued)
3.	COMMAND AND STAFF
a.	Command
In the Soviet Army, position and branch are
more important than rank. It is not unheard of for
a commander to be junior to his chief of staff
and/or one or more subordinate commanders. A
Soviet major commanding a regiment could have
lieutenant colonels as his deputies. Moreover, the
combined arms commander commands attach-
ments, regardless of whether or not the com-
mander of the attached unit is superior in rank.
Should an artillery or tank battalion commanded
by a major or lieutenant colonel be attached to a
MRB commanded by a captain, the MRB com-
mander would command both battalions.
b.	Chain of Command
To reconstitute a destroyed command ele-
ment, the Soviets first attempt to utilize the unit's
available assets. Should the battalion commander
&e incapacitated, he would normally be succeed-
ed by his chief of staff and the first MR company
commander (who is normally the senior company
commander), respectively. The battalion com-
mander may designate his political officer to be
his successor, since this man is well trained
militarily. The regimental commander may appoint
one of his staff officers to temporarily command
the battalion.
c. Staff
The battalion's chief of staff, the deputy com-
manders for political affairs and technical affairs,
and the heads of the various rear service elements
communicate with their counterparts at regiment,
thus relieving the battalion commander of many
administrative and supply details and allowing him
to concentrate on implementing regimental tac-
tical orders.
4.	TRAFFIC REGULATORS
Extensive use of traffic regulators (figure 6) by
the Soviet ground forces is often interpreted as
indicating a weakness in mapreading skills.
Though mapreading seems to be a problem at the
lower levels due to a number of factors (see The
Soviet Motorized Rifle Company, DDI-1100-77-76,
October 1976, paragraphs 51-53), the extensive
use of traffic regulators may aid the achievement
of high rates of advance. Traffic regulators move
out with the advance guard battalion, and their
placement at key locations speeds up the move-
ment of Soviet columns by aiding commanders in
the control of their subordinate elements.
Because the Soviets move under virtual radio
silence during the march (preceding enemy con-
tact), traffic controllers are particularly useful.
They are also vulnerable. Moreover, if they are in-
capacitated, advancing columns may have dif-
ficulty.
£“Safi»k>’SSb
v '. - I
Figure6. Traffic Regulators Aid Commanders in Con-
trolling Their Units.
5.	ATTACK TIME AND OBJECTIVES
In the Soviet Army the attack time (H-hour) is
the time the first man reaches the enemy FEBA,
whereas in most Western armies the attack time
refers to crossing the line of departure.
A unit is given intermediate and subsequent ob-
jectives and a direction for further attack. The
depths of these objectives depends upon METT
and whether or not nuclear weapons are used.
The unit's immediate objective includes the
enemy's forward positions; the subsequent objec-
tive, his reserves. The battalion's subsequent ob-
jective is included in the immediate objective of
the regiment; the subsequent objective of the
regiment is within the immediate objective of the
division, etc.
6.	COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
Soviet emphasis on combined arms operations
has increased over the last 5 years. Motorized rifle
regiments and divisions and tank divisions are
units with an excellent mix of motorized rifle, ar-
tillery, tank, and engineer troops. Recently,
motorized rifle companies have been added to
tank regiments within tank divisions. These com-
panies may be the precursors of MR battalions
becoming organic to tank regiments. Combined
arms concepts and how they affect the MRB are
described below:
a.	Tanks
A tank unit(s) is usually attached to or in sup-
port of a MRB. Normally, however, tanks are
placed in support, thus allowing the tank com-
mander to maintain control over his subunits.
Such an arrangement facilitates massing of pla-
toon and company fires on particular objectives.
When centralized control of tanks is not prac-
tical (for example, in combat in built-up areas and
in forests), however, tank platoons may be
decentralized and respond to MR company com-
manders.
b.	Artillery
To achieve desired fire support in a
breakthrough, the Soviets form regimental, divi-
sional, and army artillery groupings (respectively
RAG, DAG, and AAG). An artillery grouping is
temporary in nature and consists of two or more
artillery battalions. When a RAG is formed it does
not include the MRR's organic artillery battalion.
The battalion is, however, normally placed in sup-
port of the MRR's subordinate motorized rifle bat-
talions. In some cases each of the artillery bat-
talion's batteries may be attached to a MRB. In
such cases, coordination of artillery fire is
accomplished by the artillery battery commander
(working with the MRB commander) under the
close supervision of the artillery battalion com-
mander (working with the MRR commander).
Artillery support for an offensive may be divid-
ed into three phases: preparatory fires (phase
one), fires in support of an attack (phase two),
and fires in support of operations within the
depths of the enemy's defenses (phase three).
The battalion commander's control over his
organic mortars and attached artillery varies with
each phase.
The MRB commander, though responsible for
the training and employment of his organic mor-
tar battery, does not always have control over
this unit. The regimental chief of artillery plans
and supervises the training of the mortar batteries
(as well as the regiment's antitank means) in the
regiment's subordinate battalions and supervises
execution of the fire plan by organic regimental
artillery, to include mortars (figure 7). Artillery fire
planning is centrally coordinated with flexibility
built in to allow for close support of maneuver
elements.
Figure 7. The Regimental Chief of Artillery (on the right)
Coordinates Regimental Artillery During Phase
One Fire.
During phase one, all artillery, including mor-
tars, and all weapons (tanks and antitank guns)
firing in the preparation, are centrally controlled
by means of a fire plan. During phase two, the
MRB's organic mortars are controlled by the
MRB. The attached artillery battery, while less
centralized, is responsive to requests for fires
from the MRB, while still being controlled by
higher headquarters. During phase three, attach-
ed artillery, with the senior commander's ap-
proval, could advance with the MRB to provide
close support. In the attack, the mortar battery
displaces according to the tactical situation (see
chapter 6 for details). Firing outside a maneuver
10
unit's boundaries is not permitted without ap-
proval from higher authority.
During training, when employed in an indirect
fire role, Soviet artillery (depending upon the type
of artillery being fired) will not fire within 300
meters of friendly troops mounted in APCs or
within 200 meters of friendly tanks. Artillery will
not fire within 400 meters of dismounted troops.
Artillery fired in the direct fire mode will fire much
closer. Peacetime fire restrictions would be con-
siderably reduced in wartime.
During the pursuit, attached artillery would
provide close support and on-call fires. Owing to
the speed of pursuit operations, a continuing bar-
rage of fire forward of the maneuver units is not
deemed practical.
c.	Engineer
The proliferation, types, and quality of Soviet
engineer equipment complement their doctrine
stressing. high rates of advance. River-crossing
equipment, mineclearers, and minelayers are par-
ticularly impressive (see chapter 3).
There are two types of Soviet engineers: Sap-
per, or combat engineers found at regiment and
division, and more skilled engineers organized and
trained for specific missions. The latter type of
engineer is normally organic to army and front.
From his senior commanders, the MRB com-
mander receives engineer support to enable his
unit to cross natural and manmade obstacles, and
to construct defensive positions and barriers.
MRB troops are trained to perform some engineer
tasks such as building weapons emplacements
and trenches, emplacing and clearing mines by
hand, and camouflaging weapons and equipment.
d.	Air Support
Direct air support to an MRB commander
would be a rarity, since the MR division com-
mander normally directs supporting air assets
through air liaison staffs. Forward air controllers
could, however, be assigned to a regiment attack-
ing on a division's main axis.
This is not to say that Soviet tactical air assets
would not be used to "prep" an area prior to an
MRB attack. For example, Soviet high- per-
formance aircraft (such as the FLOGGER series)
and or helicopter gunships often "prep" areas
prior to a river crossing, on the main axis of at-
tack, and in other selective operations (figure 8).
The MRB commander has no direct organic com-
munication with high-performance aircraft or at-
tack helicopters.
Figure 8. High Performance Aircraft in Support of the Main Attack.
11
Section С — Tactical Trends Since the October 1973 War
1.	GENERAL
The October 1973 War had considerable impact
on the tactical doctrine of some Western coun-
tries, but did not cause any radical changes in
Soviet doctrine or tactics, in spite of a rigorous
examination of basic doctrinal principles. These
principles for the most part go back to World War
II, and remain the primary origin of current Soviet
doctrinal thinking. Soviet offensive doctrine, built
around the tank and envisioning high rates of ad-
vance, remains basically unchanged.
2.	SOVIET ANALYSIS OF THE WAR
While impressed with the increased complexity
of modern defenses, the high expenditure of
munitions, and the lethality of antitank weaponry,
the Soviets were equally impressed by the
enhanced offensive capabilities presented by
mobile air defense systems and well-coordinated
combined arms operations built primarily around
the tank. It should be noted that in the 1973 war,
tank gunnery destroyed three to four times as
many tanks as did antitank missiles.
3.	TRENDS SINCE THE WAR
Since October 1973, the Soviets have taken
numerous steps to increase the viability of their
tank forces and to allow for anticipated losses of
armored vehicles. They have increased the
numbers of tanks and artillery pieces (especially
self-propelled artillery! within the MRD, and are
stressing the use of combined arms units even
more than previously. Moreover, there are clear
indications that helicopters will be assigned a
greater role in offensive operations.
Nowhere are these trends more apparent than
in the operations of Soviet battalion and regimen-
tal combat groupings.
12
CHAPTER 3. THE MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION
AND MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT
1.	GENERAL
Although the MRB has considerable firepower,
it lacks sufficient organic combat and combat
support elements for many types of operations.
For this reason it usually operates as part of the
MRR. Since the MRB is normally reinforced or
supported by regiment, and sometimes by divi-
sion, the organizations and equipment of the
MRD and the MRR will be covered in this
chapter.
2.	THE MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION
The MRD is a well-balanced unit possessing
sufficient combat, combat support, and combat
service support units to enable it to conduct a
variety of offensive and defensive operations
under conventional or nuclear conditions.
Although it normally operates as part of corps or
army, the MRD is fully capable of conducting in-
dependent operations. The MRD is organized as
shown in figure 9. The MRD's principal weapons
and equipment are shown in figures 10 and 11.
3.	THE MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT
Though capable of independent action, the
motorized rifle regiment normally operates as part
of a division. The division commander allocates
additional support to his regiments as required.
Regimental artillery, for example, may be reinforc-
ed with units from the division's artillery and
multiple rocket launcher battalions, forming a
regimental artillery grouping (RAG). The regimen-
tal commander requests nuclear fire support from
division.
The BMP-equipped MRR is organized as shown
in figure 12. Some of the regiment's principal
weapons and equipment are shown in figures 13
and 14.
*This unit I* only in a few MRDs.
Figure 9. The Motorized Rifle Division.
13
о. 76mm Divisional Gun, ZIS-3.
г
 //>’
b. 100mm AT Gun, M-55/T-12.
c. 122mm Howitzer, M-1938/D-30.
FigurelO. The Motorized Rifle Division’s Principal Weapons.
14
d. 122mm Rocket Launcher BM-21.
e. 152mm Howitzer, D-l.
f. FROG TEL, FROG-7.
Figure 10. The Motorized Rifle Division’s Principal Weapons. (Continued)
A
15
g. GAINFUL TEL. SA-6
Figure 10. The Motorized Rifle Division's Principal Weapons. (Continued)
c. Pontoon PMP on KRAZ.
Figure 11. The Motorized Rifle Division's Principal Equipment.
16
d. Tracked Amphibian. K-61.
e. Mine Clearer BTR-50PK, M-1972.
f. Minelayer, SP. Armored.
Figure 11. The Motorized Rifle Division’s Principal Equipment. (Continued)
17
g. Truck, Decon, TMS-65.
Figure 11. The Motorized Rifle Division’s Principal Equipment. (Continued)
Figure 12. The Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped)
18
a. Medium Tank, T-64 •
a. Medium Tank, T-72 *
Figure 13. Principal Weapons in the Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped).
19
c. 23mm SP AA Gun, ZSU-23-4.'
Figure 13. Principal Weapons in the Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped). (Continued)

20
d. SAM (SA-9) GASKIN. *
NOTE
• Also found in other units in the motorized rifle division.
Figure 13. Principal Weapons in the Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped). (Continued)
a. Truck, Decon, ARS-14.
b. Truck, Decon, DDA-66.
c. Bridge, Tank Launched, MTU.
Figure 14. Principal Equipment in the Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped).
21
d. Bridge, Truck Launched, TMM.
e. (1) MDK-2 Ditching Machine.
e. (2) MDK-2 Ditching Machine (in operation).
Figure 14. Principal Equipment in the Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped). (Continued)
22
f. Dozer, BAT/BAT-M/PK-T.
g. Mine Clearing Plow, KMT-4.
i. Mine Roller. KMT-5. .
NOTE
All of the above equipment is also found in other units in the motorized rifle division.
Figure 14. Principal Equipment in the Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP-Equipped). (Continued)
23 .
CHAPTER 4. THE MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION
Section A - Operational Principles and Missions
1.	OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES
Although it normally operates as part of the
regiment, the MRB may also be designated the
division reserve. In the latter role, the battalion
operates under the division commander. In addi-
tion to their normal operations, MRBs may also
participate in operations under special conditions
(see chapters).
Because it is relatively "light" in combat and
combat-support elements, the battalion is normal-
ly reinforced by regiment and/or division. This
augmentation may occur when the battalion acts
as a forward detachment, advance, flank, or rear
guard; when it attacks or defends in the first
echelon of the regiment; or when it conducts in-
dependent operations. For such operations, a
Soviet battalion commander could be allocated, in
addition to his own assets, one tank company* a
122mm howitzer battalion, an antitank guided
missile platoon, an antiaircraft missile and artillery
platoon, an engineer platoon, and a chemical pla-
toon.
2.	MISSIONS
The mission of the MRB depends upon the role
it has been assigned within the regimental combat
formation. It may attack or defend as part of the
first echelon, be placed in the second echelon, be
designated as part of the division reserve, or be
assigned special missions. As part of the regi-
ment's first echelon in the attack, the battalion
would have the mission of penetrating enemy
defenses, neutralizing enemy troops and equip-
ment, and seizing and consolidating the enemy's
defensive positions. First-echelon battalions would
also take part in repelling enemy counterattacks
and pursuing a withdrawing enemy force. In the
defense, first-echelon battalions have the mission
of defeating or wearing down the enemy's initial
assault elements.
A second-echelon battalion may be given any
of the following missions:
-	Assuming the mission of severely attrited
first-echelon units.
-	Exploiting the success of the first echelon.
-	Eliminating bypassed pockets of enemy
resistance.
-	Counterattacking.
-	Destroying enemy forces on the flanks and
in the intervals between axes of attack and in
the rear of attacking troops.
-	Attacking in a new direction.
As a division reserve, the MRB would be given
no mission prior to combat, but would be
prepared to execute a number of contingencies:
-	Repulsing enemy counterattacks.
—	Combatting airborne landings.
-	Replacing weakened first-echelon units
(rarely done).
-	Intensifying the attack effort.
—	Exploiting success.
The MRB may also be assigned a number of
special missions: forward detachment or recon-
naissance element (the MRB would be the basis
for a reconnaissance group) for division, advance
guard of the regiment, and flank or rear security
guard for the division (see chapter 7, section A,
paragraph 4 for further details). It may also be
given a variety of missions in heliborne operations
and, on occasion, in ship-to-shore operations.
•As part of the regiment's first echelon in a breakthrough operation, the MRB commander may be given more tank support.
25
Section В - Organization, Responsibilities, and Equipment
1. THE MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION
The organization and principal weapons and
equipment of the BMP-equipped MRB are shown
in figures 15 and 16. For a detailed list and photos
of weapons and equipment at company level, see
The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company,
DDI-11Q0-77-76.
NOTES
1.	The battalion communications officer is a member of the battalion staff and the communications platoon leader.
2.	The supply platoon loader, usually a Pnponhchik. Is also a member of the battalion staff.
3.	The weapons and equipment of each subordinate sub-unit are listed in the appropriate paragraph
Figure 15. The Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP-Equipped)
o. 120mm Mortar.
Figure 16. Principal Weapons and Equipment of the Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP-Equipped).
26
b. BMP.
с. Truck. UAZ-69.
Figure 16. Principal Weapons and Equipment of the Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP-Equipped). (Continued)
27
d. Truck. GAZ-66
e. Truck, ZIL 130.
Figure 16. Principal Weapons and Equipment of the Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP-Equipped). (Continued)
28
f. Truck, Van, ZIL (Maintenance).
g. Truck, POL (4,000 or 5,200 Liters).
h. Trucks, Field Kitchen, Van PAK-200.
Figure 16. Principal Weapons and Equipment of the Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP-Equipped). (Continued)
29
i. Ambulance, UAZ-450.
j. Trailer-Mounted Field Kitchen, KP-125.
Figure 16. Principal Weaponsand Equipment of the Motorized
Rifle Battalion (BMP-Equipped). (Continued)
2.	SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS
a.	The Battalion Headquarters
The battalion staff consists of six officers and
eight enlisted men (figure 17). Officer personnel
include the battalion commander, the battalion
chief of staff, the deputy battalion commander for
political affairs, the deputy battalion commander
for technical affairs, the battalion communications
officer (who is also the communications platoon
leader, and the supply platoon leader (a prapor-
shchik -roughly equivalent to warrant officer).
BATTAUON
HEADQUARTERS
4	8
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
9mm pistol, PM 4
7.62mm rifle. AKM 8
Armored personnel carrier
BMP-A.........................................................  1
ACV, BRDM/BTR-60/BMP 1
General purpose trucks
UA2 69/469 1
Truck. GAZ-66 1
Radios:
R-104m 2
R-106/107/147 2
R-123 2
R-126 _______________________________________________________— 1
R-311 1
NOTES
1.	The communications platoon leader is also the battalion communi-
cations officer and is not reflected in the figure above.
2.	The Praporshchik in charge of the supply platoon and the fald'scher
are also part of the battaRon staff, but are not listed above in order
to avoid confusion.
Figure 17. Battalion Headquarters.
(1)	The battalion commander is responsible
for his unit's mobilization readiness, combat and
political training, education, military discipline,
and morale. He is also responsible for the unit's
equipment and facilities.
(2)	The battalion chief of staff is the com-
mander's 'Tight arm." He has the authority to
give orders to all subordinate elements and in-
sures compliance with orders from the battalion
commander and higher commanders. The chief of
staff draws up the combat and training plans
(based upon the regimental plan and the battalion
commander's guidance) for the unit and insures
that they are carried out. He also insures that re-
quired reports are prepared and dispatched on
time to regimental headquarters. He is principal
organizer of rear service support for the battalion.
(3)	The deputy battalion commander for
political affairs organizes and conducts political
training designed to rally the battalion's personnel
around the Communist Party and the Soviet
Government. He reports through the battalion
commander to the regimental political officer.
30
(4)	The deputy battalion commander for
technical affairs supervises the battalion's
maintenance service element and reports directly
to the battalion commander or chief of staff. The
technical affairs officer is responsible for the com-
bat, political, and specialized training of rear ser-
vices personnel, and for the technical condition of
their equipment.
(5)	The communications officer is a battalion
staff officer and the communications platoon
leader. It is his responsibility to train battalion per-
sonnel in signal procedures and to supervise com-
munications training of the battalion, to include
the conduct of classes for radio operators and
periodic inspections of communications equip-
ment. In combat, the battalion signal officer
receives instructions from the senior regimental
signal officer, as well as from the battalion com-
mander and chief of staff.
(6)	The supply platoon leader may be a
praporshchik or senior NCO. He works closely
with the battalion chief of staff on all aspects of
battalion supply.
(7)	Enlisted personnel in the battalion head-
quarters include a sergeant major and his driver, a
chemical instructor/dosimeter operator, a senior
medic (the feld'sher, who heads the medical sec-
tion, is a medical assistant whose skills fall
somewhere between those of a nurse and a
physician), two clerks, a driver and gunner for the
battalion commander's BMP, and a driver for the
chief of staff's APC.
b.	The Motorized Rifle Company
The battalion's primary maneuver elements are
fts three motorized rifle (MR) companies. The
BMP-equipped MR company is organized as
shown in figure 18. For detailed information on
this unit, the reader should refer to The Soviet
Motorized Rifle Company, DDI-1100-77-76,
October 1976.
c.	The Battalion Mortar Battery
The mortar battery contains six 120mm mor-
tars and is organized and equipped as shown in
figure 19.
The mortar battery commander is assisted by
the headquarters battery platoon leader, who also
functions as the head of the forward observer
(FO) /reconnaissance section.
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
9mm pistol, PM 28
7.62mm rifle. AKM-----------------------------------------— 56
7.62mm sniper rifle, SVD------------------------------------ 3
7.62mm general purpose MG, PKM ------------------------------20
Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-7V--------------------—— 9
SAM. SA-7 GRAIL (gripstock) --------------------------------- 3
Armored Infantry combat vehicle, В MP-A----------------------10
Radios:
R-106/R-107  1
R-123____________________________________________________Ю
R -126 -----------------------—-------------------------- <
Figure 18. The Motorized Rifle Company (BMP-Equipped).
Each mortar platoon contains two squads,
each of which contains a crew chief, a gunner,
one telephone operator, a loader, one ammo
bearer, and a vehicle driver.
d. The Communications Platoon
The communication platoon's organization and
equipment are depicted in figure 20. The com-
munications platoon leader has an NCO assistant
and two section leaders.
e. Battalion Rear Service Support
The deputy battalion commander for technical
affairs is assisted in supervising rear service sup-
port elements by the supply platoon leader, the
NCOs responsible for the repair workshop, and
the medical aid station.
31
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
•mm pistol. PM___________________________________14
7.62mm rifle. AKM<7
Antitank grenade launcher. RPG-7V_________________6
120mm mortar 6
Truck. GAZ-69/469 1
Truck. GAZ-66 7
Stereoscopic range finder, DS-1 or DM-09/DAK-1--- 1
Periscope aiming circle, PAB2A 1
CoIla meter (aiming stakes)6
Radios:
R-106/107/106 ___________________________________	4
TA1-43 field telephone--------------------------- 5
Figure 19. The Mortar Battery
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
9mm pistol, PM ___________ 
7.62mm rifle. AKM 13
ACV, BRDM/BMP 1
Motorcycle. M-72 2
Truck. GAZ-66 1
Truck. UAZ 69/469 1
Radios:
R-104m_1
R-106/R-147 2
R-113/R-123 ---------------------------   2
R-114 1
R -126  1
TA-57 field telephone Ю
P-193m switchboard 1
Figure 20. The Communications Platoon.
32
Section С - Command and Control
1. COMMAND
The Soviets regard command as the exercise of
constant and effective control. The battalion com-
mander relies primarily upon his chief of staff, but
is reluctant to delegate authority, preferring to
make most decisions himself. Company com-
manders and the commanders of other organic
and attached units are closely supervised by the
battalion commander and/or the chief of staff.
2. CONTROL
In the offensive, the primary means of control
of the MRB is radio, although messengers, per-
sonal contact between commanders, signal flares,
flags, and a variety of other methods are also
used. Prior to contact, radio silence is strictly
observed, excepting reports from reconnaissance
elements and the crossing of phase lines. A type
of battalion radio net is shown in figure 21.
In the defense, the battalion relies primarily on
wire, although messengers, signal flares, and
radios are also used extensively. A battalion in the
defense would employ a wire system as shown in
figure 22.
33
ATTACHED TANK COMPANY
MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION ELEMENTS
REGIMENTAL
\	BATTALION
COMMANDER
SUPPLY
PLATOON
KEY
Command Nets
Dismounted Nets
Fire Support Nets
Rear Services Nets
NOTES
1.	Radios used may be the R1O5/1O7, R113/123.
2.	Although the company commanders and the battalion commander have R126s for dismounted control, they would attempt to control their subordinate
elements from their BMPs.
3.	The battalion chief of staff would control the battalion rear services. The battalion technical officer is responsible for the maintenance section
4.	The antitank platoon in the BTR>equipped motorized rifle battalion would be part of the fire support net
5.	The battalion chief of staff's R-311 receiver is used to receive NBC warnings.
Figure 21.	Representative Communications Net in a Motorized Rifle Battalion.
34
ENEMY
Observation post
Telephone monitoring or control station
Battalion boundary
MRC
Motorized rifle company.
NOTES
1	Wire would also be laid from company commanders to their platoon leaders, from platoon leaders to squad leaders, and from the mortar FDC
to individual mortar positions.
2	. Dugouts are made every 50-70 meters along wire in open terrain to provide shelter for wire teams checking the lines in combat.
Figure 22.	The Use of Line Communications by a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense.
35
Section D - Battalion Rear Services
1. GENERAL
Prior to the march, the MRB normally occupies
an assembly area. For operational convenience,
reliable defense, and protection of the rear service
elements, the latter normally occupy the center of
the MRB area (figure23).
During offensive and defensive operations, the
MRB's rear service elements are positioned to
enable them to provide rapid material, technical,
and medical support. In order to maintain
freedom of maneuver during the march^ combat
1ST MRC\
3RD MRC
2ND MRC
Battalion food supply point
Repair workshop with trailer
Battalion ammunition supply point
Battalion medical point
Battalion commander com ma nd-observation post
Battalion refueling point
Company commander command-observation post
Figure 23. Motorized Rifle Battalion Rear Service Elements in an Assembly Area.
36
MRC Motorized rifle company
and combat service support elements have normal
spacing between vehicles in the column (figure
24). During the attack (figure 25), and in the
defense (figure 26), the rear services are position-
ed closely behind the combat units.
The battalion's administrative and logistics
responsibilities are purposely minimized to allow
the battalion commander to concentrate on his
primary mission-defeating the enemy in combat.
The regiment assumes most of the battalion's ad-
ministrative burden and augments the battalion,
as required, logistically.
5 WOODS J
PEAR SERVICES
SUPPLY PLATOON
KEY
Motorized nfle battalion, reinforced with
tanks and artillery in march column
UK
"J тг Truck with field kitchen trailer
Battalion ambulance with trailer
Field kitchen (van pack 170/200)
Battalion ammunition truck
Fuel truck
и u nr Truck with water trailer
| PM
и о Hr Repair workshop with trailer
Fuel truck with trailer
NOTES
1	When there is no enemy threat, fuel trucks are often placed at the head of the rear service elements
2	Distances between rear service vehicles in the march are normally the same as those separating other vehicles (15to5O meters during road movement and 50
to 200 meters during tactical cross-country movement)
Figure 24. Motorized Rifle Battalion Rear Service Support Elements During the March.
37
KEY
MRC Motorized rifle company
Battalion technical observation point
Motorized rifle company reinforced
by tanks m the attack
Regimental commander's
com ma nd-observation post
Battalion medical point
Battahon commander's
command-observation post
Battalion refueling point
Reg*menta boundary
Battalion food supply point
Batla>hor. covnaar,
Battalion ammunition supply point
Figure 25. Rear Service Support During the Attack
38
KEY
MRC Motorized rifle company
Battalion ammunition supply point
Battalion technical observation point
Battalion medical point
Company medical evacuation point
Company ammunition supply point
Battalion refueling point
Depression
Battalion food supply point
Mixed mine field (a nt (personnel and antitank)
Mortar {120mmi in firing position
Figure 26. Rear Service Support in the Defense.
39
2. ADMINISTRATION
The regimental assistant chief of staff for per-
sonnel is responsible for maintaining all personnel
records, such as officers' leaves of absence (bat-
talion keeps records of enlisted personnel on
leave), daily strength reports, and personnel
awards. In combat, he is also responsible for ad-
ministration regarding POWs, captured materiel,
and processing of personnel replacements.
Forms and reports maintained at battalion in-
clude strength reports, training schedules, supply
and maintenance requisition forms, and political
reports. The battalion commander is assisted in
his administrative responsibilities by his principal
staff officers and clerical personnel.
3. SUPPLY
a. Genera!
Normally the regiment, using its organic
assets, delivers supplies to the battalions. This
principle is flexible, however, and when
necessary, the battalion's supply platoon (figure
27) picks up supplies from regiment. Priority for
resupply is ammunition, POL, technical supplies
(repair parts), rations, and nontechnical supplies.
Resupply normally takes place prior to battle and
at the end of the day. The Soviets try to resupply
at night or during other periods of limited visibil-
ity. Empty vehicles returning to battalion and regi-
ment are used to evacuate personnel and equip-
ment casualties.
The battalion chief of staff, assisted by the
battalion technical officer, the supply platoon
leader, and the battalion feld'sher, has the overall
responsibility for coordinating the battalion's
logistic requirements.
There is no formal rear service element at
company level, where the company commander,
assisted by his technical officer and first sergeant,
handle all logistics functions. Normally, the bat-
talion delivers supplies to its subordinate
elements.
WEAPONS ANO EQUIPMENT
9mm pistol, PM 1
7.C2mm rifle, AKM_____________________________________________________________1>
Truck. GAZ-06__________________________________________________________________4
Truck. ZIL 130/131/151/157 or	URAL	375____________________________________4
Truck. POL 4000 liter or URAL 5200	liter  2
Truck, Reid kitchen, ven рек	170/200______________________________________1
Trailer. POL 1
Trailer, water  1
Trailer, field kitchen. KP-125 3
Radio»: R-105/107 1
Figure 27.	The Supply Platoon.
40
b. Ammunition
The chief of the battalion ammunition supply
point (BPB) is usually an NCO from the supply
platoon. He signs for the ammunition delivered by
regiment, delivers requested amounts to the com-
panies, and keeps the remainder on trucks
(thereby facilitating rapid delivery) at the battalion
BPB. Additional excess ammunition may be
stored on the ground, particularly when the bat-
talion is occupying a defensive position.
During a high-speed offensive, platoon guides
lead the battalion ammunition carriers to in-
dividual combat vehicles. In the defense, com-
pany ammunition supply points (RPBs) may be
established (figure 28). This procedure reduces
the exposure of supply vehicles to enemy fire.
The battalion's support platoon leader and
company first sergeants maintain ammunition
status reports.
NOTES
1	Regiment delivers ammunition directly to the battalion ammunition supply point, the mortar battery and, on occasion, to company ammunition supply points and
individual combat vehicles.
2	Designated combat vehicles and ammunition bearers from subordinate companies deliver ammunition from the company ammunition supply points to platoons
and individual combat vehicles.
Figure 28.	Ammunition Resupply to the Companies in the Defense.
41
c. POL
d. Rations
The deputy battalion commander for technical
affairs is responsible for allocating fuel to the bat-
talion's subordinate elements. The motor trans-
port squad leader of the supply platoon normally
runs the battalion refueling point (BZP).
To decrease the need for refueling, vehicles
have supplementary POL containers which are
refilled after use. Only in extreme emergency are
vehicles refueled in combat. The Soviets make
every effort to refuel prior to an engagement, at
the end of the day, after the combat mission, and
prior to a river crossing. When on the march, the
preferred method of refueling is to simultaneously
refuel vehicles positioned on both sides of the
POL tankers (figure 29).
In combat, Soviet soldiers are supposed to
receive at least two hot meals per day. When this
is not possible, they eat dry rations and bread.
Four hundred grams of bread and 3 dry combat
rations provide over 4,000 calories per day.
The MRB has 4 mobile field kitchens which
prepare hot meals and transport them to subor-
dinate units (figure 30). Sealed thermos con-
tainers for each platoon are picked up by platoon
representatives when soldiers cannot individually
pick up their rations. The division bakery provides
fresh bread (figure 31), which may be baked on
the move.
42
ROAD
KEY
Battalion food supply point
Field kitchen (van pak 170 2001
Truck with trailer field kitchen
О Po'nts where company escorts meet the kitchens
MRC Motorized rifle company
Platoon food distribution point
Motorized rifle platoon in the attack

Motorized rifle company reinforced by tanks m the attack
NOTES
1.	Whenever feasible, kitchens move as close as possible to platoons, and food is distributed directly to personnel, as with the 1st MRC
2.	In less favorable circumstances, company and platoon distribution points are established
Figure 30. The Supply Platoon Delivering Food to Attacking Companies.
43
Figure 31. Division Bakery Personnel.
The battalion food supply point (BPP) is run
by the head of the supply platoon's ration sec-
tion. A water supply point is constructed near the
BPP or, when this is not practical, a central water
distribution point is used. Water is delivered with
food to the companies. Individual water
consumption is figured on the basis of 10 liters of
water per day (15 liters in hot climates).
It is the responsibility of the chief engineer at
regiment to establish water supply points, which
are then maintained by subordinate units. Rubber-
ized material which protects the water from con-
tamination is used for storage.
e. Clothing
In combat, the battalion requests replacement
clothing on the basis of worn-out, lost, or con-
taminated. The clothing supply chief at regiment
is responsible for the distribution of clothing and
for bath and laundry services. Soviet regulations
specify that active duty personnel must bathe and
change their underwear at least once a week, a
period extended to every 10-12 days during com-
bat operations.
f. Medical
The battalion medical aid station (figure 32) is
the lowest level of organized medical support in
the Soviet Army. The section of four men is
headed by the feld'sher. The aid station's func-
tion is to provide first aid and to prepare
casualties for evacuation to the regimental aid
station (figure 33). Although subordinate to his
battalion commander, the feld'sher takes instruc-
tions from the regimental medical officer.
Medical aid at battalion level is rudimentary
and includes bandaging, splints, morphine injec-
tions, and simple operations to prepare wounded
for evacuation. The two medical orderlies in the
section are aided by regimental orderlies in
collecting the wounded from the battle area and
carrying them to the battalion aid station.
MEDICAL AID
STATION
0	4
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
7.62mm rifle, AKM 4
Ambulance. UAZ-450/452______________________________________________ 1
Trailer, 1-axle --------------------------------------------------   1
Radio: R-105 1
Figure 32. The Medical Aid Station.
44
Battalion medical point
Regimenta' ampu'ance
Ambulance »elay pom!
Mecica earner
Medical instructor
Meaic bearer umt
Regimentai medical point
Motorized rifle company in the attack (dashes within
this symbol denote subsequent positions)
KEY
Motorized nfle company
Group ol wounded in a shelter (Figure is me number wounded)
Figure 33. Medical Evacuation During the Attack.
45
4. MAINTENANCE
For some time, the Soviets have had a field
maintenance doctrine stressing rapid battlefield
repair as close to the frontlines as possible. Dur-
ing World War II, 75-80 percent of the disabled
Soviet vehicles returned to combat; of these,
80-90 percent were repaired in 1 to 2 days (the
Israelis enjoyed a similar high repair rate in the
October 1973 War). Such rapid repair is of critical
importance, particularly in a war with high rates
of attrition. This emphasis on rapid repair is an
essential element of Soviet offensive doctrine
with its anticipated high rates of advance.
The deputy battalion commander for technical
affairs directly supervises the repair workshop
(figure 34). A repair or repair-evacuater group
(RG, or REG) may be created by augmenting bat-
talion assets with regimental vehicles. Battalion
REGs normally only conduct repairs which can be
completed in a very short time (5 hours or less).
The deputy battalion commander for technical
affairs controls repair and evacuation of damaged
equipment from a technical observation point.
This observation point, normally located 1 to 1
kilometers from the frontline, includes a radio
operator and attached maintenance personnel.
If a vehicle cannot be repaired in place, or is in
danger of capture, it is evacuated by regimental
assets to previously designated locations (figure
35).
REPAIR
WORKSHOP
0	7
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
7.62mm rifle. AKM 7
Truck, van. ZIL maintenance 1
Trailer, generator----------------------------------------- 1
Figure 34. The Repair Workshop.
46
Repair workshop
Damaged mortar
Battalion repair and evacuation group iRFG:
( ii ‘ within diamond denotes a reg mental REG'
Damaged antitank gun
Damaged BMP
Damaged tank
(The figure in the numerate-' >s tne number of the damaged
vehicle The letter m the denommator is the type о» repair
 T ' for routine C for medium “K" <or major and нВ tc
nonrepayable. and the number indicates the estimated
number of hours to affect repair i
Tank compan, .n the attack
Motorized rifle company m the attack
Damaged mortar to*ec b, ’ruck
Q Damaged kitchen
MRC Motorized rifle company
Figure 35. Repair and Evacuation of Weapons and Equipment During the Attack
47
CHAPTER 5. BATTALION-LEVEL LEADERSHIP
Section A — Introduction
1. GENERAL
It is difficult to generalize about an army's
leadership. It cannot be neatly wrapped in a box
and labeled "outstanding," "average," or
"mediocre." Wide variations in education, train-
ing, personalities, experience, operational con-
cepts, as well as numerous other factors, make
generalizations concerning leadership both dif-
ficult and dangerous. For example, it has been
the practice of some Western analysts to depict
Soviet military leadership as lacking flexibility and
initiative, and as suffering from institutional
restraints and lack of recent combat experience.
Usually such analyses concentrate on the nega-
tive aspects of Soviet military leadership without
differentiating between various leadership levels,
and without considering the framework within
which leadership is exercised in the Soviet Army.
This chapter, which begins with a brief
historical perspective, analyzes the Soviet MRB
commander and the operational and institutional
factors which affect his leadership.
Section В -- The Historical Perspective
1. WORLD WAR II
World War II provides particularly relevant data
on the combat performance of Soviet com-
manders. Although the importance of this his-
torical perspective can be overemphasized, it
must be realized that in spite of Soviet lessons
learned from the Vietnam War and the last two
conflicts in the Middle East, World War II remains
by far the primary origin of current Soviet doc-
trinal and leadership concepts. World War II doc-
trinal concepts were carried out by junior com-
manders who today constitute the senior leader-
ship in the Soviet Army.
2. THE EASTERN FRONT (1941-1945)
a.	Higher and Lower Level Soviet Leadership
Campaigns on the eastern front are replete
with examples of a striking lack of initiative
displayed by Soviet commanders, particularly
those at division level and below, as opposed to
the flexibility evidenced at higher levels. The Ger-
mans had a high regard for the senior Soviet
commanders (army and front level), characterizing
them as flexible, energetic, and full of initiative
(figure 36). At division level and below, however,
Soviet Leadership was for a long time considered
by the Germans to be inflexible and indecisive, as
well as desirous of avoiding responsibility:
Spirited application to a task, bom of the
decision of an individual, was a rarity. . . The
Russian small unit commander's fear of doing
something wrong and being called to account
for it was greater than the urge to take
advantage of a situation. -
The reasons for this dichotomy of responsibil-
ity, flexibility, and initiative which separated the
senior Soviet commanders (army and front level)
from their subordinates (division level and below)
may be primarily attributed to two factors: (1) the
Soviet theory of command and (2) the high losses
of officers (particularly division level and below)
suffered in the first year of World War II. These
factors often resulted in better qualified higher
commanders being flexible and exercising init-
iative, while restricting less experienced subor-
dinates.
Soviet field orders were not of the American
"mission" type, but specified in considerable
detail how a mission was to be accomplished.
Overcentralization of command and highly detail-
ed orders had a predictable effect on the lower
level leadership; initiative was stifled, and com-
manders were very reluctant to do anything with-
out an order-preferably a written order.
Soviet commanders at division level and below
were primarily implementors rather than
innovators/planners. The battalion commander's
duties were clearly and narrowly prescribed.
Orders were usually followed without any devia-
tion and under the closest control of the next
higher commander.
b. Front Commander Eremenko-
о. Marshal Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff in Early 1941
and Deputy Supreme Commander Thereafter.
b. Front Commander Konev.
Figure 36. Senior Soviet WWII Commanders Were Flexible, Energetic and Full of Initiative.
b. Front Commander Rokossovsky.
50
b. Front Commander Timoshenko,
Figure 36. Senior Soviet WWII Comanders Were Flexible.
Energetic and Full of Initiative. (Continued)
b.	Soviet Regulations
Soviet field service regulations of the late
1930s and early war period also contributed signi-
ficantly to the lack of initiative and responsibility
at the lower levels. These regulations tried to
have it both ways; they paid lipservice to the
need for exercising initiative while making clear
the dangers of failure when exercising initiative. If
a battalion commander exercised initiative within
the context of the regimental commander's plan
and was successful, he (the battalion com-
mander) was safe. On the other hand, initiative
exercised outside the established plan and which
resulted in failure, left the battalion commander
open to severe punishment.
c.	Training and Discipline
German officers also concluded that the rigid
pattern of Soviet training and severe discipline
resulted in lethargy, as well as lack of initiative
and flexibility at the lower levels. The Germans
also noted, however, that as the war progressed,
Soviet lower level leadership improved somewhat.
Significantly, German writers do not criticize
the Soviet lower level leadership for lacking ex-
pertise in the technical aspects of their trade.
Soviet leaders were in fact well trained along
technical and tactical lines, but often failed to
grasp the spirit of doctrinal concepts and there-
fore often acted in a stereotyped manner rather
than in response to circumstances.
d.	The Political Officer and the Commander
From 22 June 1941 (the date the Germans- in-
vaded the Soviet Union) to October 1942 (when
Stalin decreed that military commanders were to
be solely responsible for the conduct of battles),
the political officer often complicated decision-
making, for he had to countersign the com-
mander's orders (figure 37). This dual command
system was inefficient and often tactically
disastrous in the war's initial stages.
The October 1942 decree eliminated the dual
command system by subordinating the political
officer to the military commander. It should be
added, however, that the role played by the
political officer was an important one, and con-
tributed to ultimate Soviet victory. In general, the
political officer was a fanatical and brave man
who set an inspiring example for troops. Often,
the political officer was more prone to act in a
critical situation than the commander.
The question is, how-much have conditions
changed since World War II? Do Soviet command
procedures, regulations, discipline, and training
continue to stifle the leadership at battalion level,
or has this leadership improved?
Figure 37. Until October 1941, The Unit Political Officer
Had to Countersign The Commander’s Orders.
51
Section С -- The Present
1.	THE SOVIET MRB COMMANDER
a.	Age and Rank
Today's Soviet MRB commander is between
the ages of 27 and 39 and varies in rank from
senior lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. A senior
lieutenant commanding a battalion would prob-
ably be 25-28 years old and be on the list for pro-
motion to captain. While few senior lieutenants
command battalions, the Soviets have for some
time been attempting to place younger, more
energetic men in command (figure 38). Most bat-
talion commands seem to be held by captains and
majors, although the authorized rank is lieutenant
colonel (at regimental level and below, over 65
percent of the officers are under 30 years of age).
Figure 38. Battalion Commanders Are Young Men with
Considerable Peacetime Command Experience.
b.	Education
The battalion commander today is much bet-
ter educated than his World War II predecessor.
At the outbreak of World War II, about 7 percent
of the Soviet officer corps had received a higher
education; today, the figure is well over 50 per-
cent (excluding reserve officers, the figure would
be much higher). Almost all the current junior of-
ficers (lieutenant-captain) received their commis-
sions from commissioning schools (somewhat
similar to West Point). Other sources of commis-
sion include reserve officer training programs and
direct commissions; the former produce junior
lieutenants who are commissioned in the re-
serves, while the latter are probably not exten-
sively used in peacetime. Therefore, the majority
of Soviet battalion commanders would be grad-
uates of 3- to 5-year commissioning schools.
Graduates of the 4- and 5-year training schools
are most prevalent, and receive more detailed and
higher level training than graduates of the 3-year
schools. Both systems prepare personnel for com-
mand as well as technical-specialist positions.
Battalion commanders in the rank of captain,
major, and lieutenant colonel may have also at-
tended the junior or senior advance course of 10
months' duration. Normally, the former are at-
tended by captains and majors; the latter by
majors and lieutenant colonels. The junior course
is primarily geared to tactical and staff training at
the battalion level, whereas the senior course is
concerned with regimental operations. Upon com-
pleting these courses, officers return to their
units.
c.	Political Awareness
The battalion commander is politically aware,
and is probably either a candidate member or
member of the CPSU. Nonparty affiliation is a
real detriment to an officer's career.
d.	Experience
Although it is probable that no Soviet bat-
talion commanders have had combat experience,
this factor can be overemphasized when judging
the capabilities and limitations of battalion-level
leadership. Lack of combat experience may be
offset to a certain degree by extensive peacetime
command and field training. The majority of bat-
talion commanders have probably had lengthy
platoon and company command. It would not be
unusual for an officer to be a platoon leader for 3
years and a company commander for about the
same length of time prior to becoming a battalion
commander.
Battalion field training exercises are numerous,
particularly within those units in a high state of
readiness. The battalion commander participates
in a minimum of two field training exercises of at
least 2 days' duration per year, and may parti-
cipate in as many as six FTXs; that is, two bat-
talion exercises, two as part of the regiment, and
two as part of the division.
e.	Responsibilities
The battalion commander is responsible for his
unit's combat readiness, its combat and political
training, and the education, military discipline,
political awareness, and morale of the personnel
under his command. His principal assistants in
fulfilling these responsibilities are his chief of
staff, deputy commander for political affairs, and
deputy commander for technical affairs.
f.	Assessment
Despite periodic complaints in the Soviet press
concerning instruction in the service schools and
relations between the military and the party's
representatives within the battalion, the com-
mander's age, education, and political awareness
provide the theoretical basis for effective
battalion-level leadership. Soviet battalion com-
manders must be considered educated, politically
aware men who have dedicated their lives to the
military profession. Lengthy periods of platoon
and company command and frequent field exer-
cises provide a good foundation for technical and
tactical proficiency. Let us now examine the
operational and instructional framework within
which the battalion commander operates.
2.	SOVIET COMMAND THEORY
The Soviets regard command as continuous
control and direction of units and the organization
of their combat activities. Centralized control at
the highest possible level is an important element
of Soviet command theory as is the principle of
one-man command, which will be discussed in
the section dealing with the MRB commander
and the party.
The concept of centralized control at the
highest possible level and how it affects battalion-
level operations becomes clear when examined
within the framework of Soviet operational con-
cepts and procedures.
3.	OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND PRO-
CEDURES
Because the Soviets, in the event of war, an-
ticipate deploying a force of great magnitude,
they apparently believe that highly centralized
control may be the only effective method. Soviet
operational procedures seem centered around the
regiment, which is described as the most impor-
tant maneuver unit in the Soviet army. The regi-
ment is the lowest level unit with a full planning
staff and combined arms and rear service units.
Whereas the regiment has the capability to plan
operations, its subordinate battalions do not and,
subsequently, implement regimental orders.
Accordingly, virtually all aspects of battalion-
level training are closely controlled by the
regimental commander and his staff (figure 39).
The political, artillery, communications, and rear
service officers on the regimental staff are respon-
sible for the training, supervision, and often the
control of their counterparts at battalion level.
Soviet regimental commanders get minutely in-
volved in the handling of their subordinate
elements. Although the regimental order contains
generally the same data found in the combat
orders of most Western armies, the implementing
instructions issued by Soviet regimental com-
manders are more detailed, and illustrate the pen-
chant for close control over battalion operations.
The Soviet regimental commander will sometimes
designate a specific subelement within a sub-
ordinate battalion to perform a certain task.
Rather than order that the first battalion provide a
company or a platoon to guard the left flank,
Soviet regimental commanders have been known
to designate which commander or platoon should
accomplish the task. The regimental commander
also states where each battalion, company, pla-
toon, and squad will deploy into columns and
final attack positions.
Having received the regimental commander's
order and guidance, subordinate battalion com-
manders draw up plans to implement them. Prior
to issuing these plans to their subordinates, bat-
talion commanders are required to get final ap-
proval from the regimental commander.
53
Figure 39. The Regimental Commander and His Staff Exercise Tight Control Over Subordinate Units.
During the attack, control is so centralized at
regiment that there is little direct lateral coordina-
tion between two attacking first-echelon bat-
talions (coordination is done at regiment).
Moreover, using all of his communications capa-
bilities, regimental commanders will, on occasion,
address specific companies rather than go
through the battalion commanders. The degree to
which this is done varies with the personalities in-
volved, but it does occur.
During the attack, the battalion commander has
the authority to allow his subordinates to bypass
an enemy position, but he needs the regimental
commander's approval for the battalion to bypass
a position or to commit the battalion's second
echelon (reserve). Should the battalion com-
mander be unable to talk to regiment, he would
be expected to commit his second echelon
(reserve) on his own initiative and inform regi-
ment as soon as possible.
This highly centralized control by regiment over
battalion operations pertains in normal offensive
and defensive operations. The situation is some-
what more flexible in the hasty defense because
the regimental commander does not have time to
give lengthy, detailed orders. Battalion com-
manders are given the forward edge of the battle
area and have more latitude in positioning their
men and conducting the battle within their
assigned area of responsibility.
Not surprisingly, the battalion commander ex-
erts the same close control over his subordinates.
In the field, company commanders are told what
to do and how to do it. Fire planning and coord-
ination, and logistics resupply are handled at bat-
talion level. While centralized control at battalion
level simplifies problems of command at company
level, it is more difficult and time consuming for
companies, platoons, and squads to receive time-
ly fire support. A squad request for artillery fire
would go up the chain of command to the bat-
talion commander, who would then coordinate
the request with attached or supporting artillery.
Such a system makes high casualities at the
lower levels probable and could adversely affect
rates of advance.
4.	THE MRB COMMANDER AND THE
PARTY
Although one-man command is an important
principle of Soviet command theory, disagree-
ment between the military and the party has been
noted, and centers around the latter's interpreta-
tion of one-man command. Whereas the profes-
sional military believes in one-man command, the
party inforces the concept of one-man command
on a party basis.
The party's representatives at battalion level in-
clude the deputy battalion commander for poli-
tical affairs; a party group headed by an elected
soldier, NCO, or officer; a komsomol organiza-
tion; and a people's control group. The missions
of these individuals and organizations are to in-
sure party control over the battalion, to aid the
battalion commander in unit training, and to help
maintain discipline and political awareness among
battalion personnel. While it is difficult to
measure the full impact of the party on the bat-
talion commander's leadership, a few observa-
tions may be made:
-The most important criteria for officer promo-
tion is a high degree of political awareness and
the fulfillment of political duties, not military and
technical proficiency. As an article in Red Star
made clear, an officer lacking "party passion and
firmness" will not make a good commander no
matter how brillant his knowledge of military af-
fairs. The importance of ideology and party
loyalty has resulted in the incursion of political
objectives and criteria into the battalion com-
mander's nontactical work (it is doubtful that par-
ty representatives interfere in the tactical deci-
sions of the battalion commander).
-The number of party representatives and the
zealous manner in which they attempt to carry
out their duties is irritating to some battalion and
company commanders. Recommendations made
by these party representatives may be closer to
orders, as commanders have been criticized by
higher political organs for not carrying out recom-
mendations made by party representatives. On
the other hand, some battalion and company
commanders assign duties to their political
deputies which hinder their political work. Fre-
quent transfer of political deputies from one com-
pany to another, with the apparent aim of render-
ing them more innocuous, is also a frequent prac-
tice.
-The battalion political officer, at present
subordinate to the battalion commander, has the
right to issue orders to others in the battalion.
Moreover, the deputy regimental commander for
political affairs may issue orders to subordinate
battalions. This dual chain of command could
complicate the battalion commander's job.
-On the positive side (from the Soviet view-
point), it should be noted that in addition to his
political skills, the battalion political officer is a
trained military man and probably capable of lead-
ing the battalion in military operations. Further-
more, by handling political and other duties
assigned by the battalion commander, he frees
that individual to concentrate on other matters.
-Also on the positive side, the party's
representatives at battalion level may aid the com-
mander by assisting him in maintaining unit readi-
ness, training, and discipline. It would, therefore,
be inaccurate to depict the influence of the party
representatives as strictly negative.
Nevertheless the basis for conflict between the
party and the military exists and should not be
dismissed. The often strident and bitter disagree-
ment between the military and the party in the
1960s continues today albeit at a much lower
level of intensity. Should either the party or the
military gain in authority at the expense of the
other, latent resentment could surface with sub-
sequent impact on combat readiness-a situation
which has occurred throughout Soviet history.
5.	REGULATIONS
The 1975 Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed
Forces of the USSR are remarkably similar in tone
to those they replaced:
Exact, timely and incontrovertible fulfill-
ment of orders is the fundamental com-
bat activity of the commander. (The
1942-1945 Infantry Combat Regulations.)
An order from a superior is law to the
subordinate. An order must be fulfilled
absolutely, exactly, and immediately.
(1948 Disciplinary Regulations of the
Armed Forces of the USSR.
The superior's order is a law for subor-
dinates. The order must be carried out
without demur, exactly and on time. (The
1975 Disciplinary Regulations of the
Armed Forces of the USSR. I
These new regulations emphasize the necessity
for strict compliance with orders and regulations
and restrict command choices by spelling out pre-
scribed actions in great detail. While demanding
full obedience and compliance with orders, the
regulations at the same time give lipservice to the
importance of initiative. Battalion commanders
and their subordinates are continuously urged in
the Soviet press to use their initiative and to be
flexible. This is easier said than done, however,
within a system which preaches subordination to
authority, conformity, and exacts severe penalties
for not obeying orders. Marshal Grechko, while
urging more initiative and flexibility by Soviet
commanders, also wrote, "The display of in-
itiative as a rule is connected with risk." A variety
of sources indicates that battalion and lower level
commanders associate initiative with career
jeopardy and prefer to act accordingly; that is,
within the narrow confines of regimental orders.
6.	TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE
The narrow parameters within which the bat-
talion commander operates are expecially impor-
tant when examined within the context of opera-
tions which place a premium on flexibility and
initiative. The meeting engagement is a case in
point.
The early phase of the meeting engagement
(that is, before the regimental commander can
come forward and control the battle) places con-
siderable stress on the battalion commander's
ability to respond quickly to rapidly changing cir-
cumstances. To be successful, he must be flexi-
ble and be able to exploit success achieved by in-
itiative and surprise while maintaining momentum
through high-speed maneuver and correctly ap-
plied firepower. And yet the Soviet press contains
numerous examples of battalion commanders
methodically planning for the meeting engage-
ment and trying to foresee every possible con-
tingency, only to fail when something unforeseen
occurs.
Combat in built-up areas and forrested regions,
river crossings, and retrograde operations also de-
mand a high degree of initiative and flexibility at
all levels. Moreover, in nuclear war the disruption
and destruction of command and control
echelons would be far greater than under conven-
tional circumstances and would place even
greater demand on tactical initiative and flexibility.
The operational and institutional framework
within which the battalion commander operates
hardly encourages the initiative and flexibility re-
quired in independent operations. To the con-
trary, it emphasizes operating under close regi-
mental supervision and control. Although it can-
not be definitively stated how Soviet battalion
commanders would react, they would probably
perform well when under the direct supervision of
regiment, but less effectively when acting in-
dependently. Tactical opportunities should, there-
fore, exist for more flexible Western commanders.
In the meeting engagement these Western com-
manders, through initiative and daring, could
"pile up" Soviet forward detachments and ad-
vance guards, and force regiments, and possibly
divisions, to deploy prematurely or in confusion.
Many Soviet military men seem worried over
the lack of flexibility and initiative at the battalion
and lower levels and have, particularly in the last
few years, pressed for greater initiative at these
levels. Concrete results from these efforts have
yet to be seen. Because initiative and flexibility
have political as well as military implications, the
problem of instilling these traits has been espec-
ially difficult. It should be noted, however, that
the Soviets have made progress in this area. In
accordance with their post-World War II opera-
tional concepts, they have allowed more flexibility
and initiative at division and regimental levels than
was the case during the war.
56
CHAPTER 6. BATTALION TRAINING AND SUB UNIT TACTICS
Section A - Training Philosophy And Objectives
1. PHILOSOPHY
Training is centralized at the highest level possi-
ble and stresses, to a degree unparalleled in the
West, the closest supervision by superiors over
subordinates. This philosophy is clearly reflected
at battalion level.
While the battalion commander has some say
as to how his unit will be trained, a great deal of
battalion-level training is planned and controlled
by the regimental commander and his staff.
Within the battalion, supervision is very close,
even for junior officers:
The lieutenants feel the experienced guiding
hand of their seniors at every step-mastering
a combat skill, preparation for instruction, ex-
ercises, and the organization of their life and
leisure time.
2. OBJECTIVES
Broad training objectives are designed to insure
political reliability and to achieve a high state of
combat readiness. Another objective seems to be
to keep the troops fully occupied under the
closest possible supervision, even during so-called
free time.
Although there are some notable discrepancies,
training reflects Soviet doctrine in that it concen-
trates on offensive combat organized around
combined arms operations, with tanks providing
the backbone within combined arms groupings.
Section В	- Training Schedules
1.	GENERAL
Training programs vary in accordance with the
unit's readiness status, the weather, geography,
and with troop rotation (May and November).
There are two training periods (summer and
winter) which are each of 6 months' duration.
The yearly training program for the ground
forces is established at Ministry of Defense
(MOD) level and subsequently refined and
elaborated upon by the Military Districts, the
Groups of Forces, and division commanders. For
a typical 6-month schedule for a BMP-equipped
unit, see figure 40.
The regimental commander and his staff break
down the number of hours for each broad subject
(political training, tactical training, etc.) to be
taught by the battalion. Prior to informing his bat-
talion commanders of what they will teach during
a training phase, the regimental commander
checks with the division commander for approval.
The regimental commander is responsible for
the training of his battalion commanders and their
deputies, while the first deputy regimental com-
mander is responsible for the training of the bat-
talions' company commanders. Moreover, the
political, artillery, communications, and rear ser-
vice officers on the regimental staff are responsi-
ble for the training and supervision (and often the
control) of their counterparts at battalion level.
Training programs for many battalion subelements
and individuals are accordingly drawn up by the
regimental staff.
57
NUMBER OF HOURS TAUGHT PER SUBJECT
/ /, / / & / / <3 / / ^ / & / & / /£ / PARTICIPANTS	/ £ ///J? //// */£/£7# * % $ / /	$ i//J //// //// // / / / / /‘v /V / Z*/ /	*/													
RPG-7 GUNNER	330	40	138	18	30	95	13	45	7	57	0	18	
RIFLEMAN	330	40	138	18	30	95	13	45	7	57	0	18	
MACHINE GUNNER	330	40	138	18	30	95	13	45	7	57	0	18	
BMP GUNNER	256	30	138	18	30	95	13	45	7	57	10	60	
DRIVER MECHANIC	256	30	36	18	30	95	13	45	7	57	48	127	
NOTES
1 in addition to the above, a number of hours are set aside for commander s time, inspections, maintenance, and instruction on military regulations
2 Special training schedules are established for the battalion mortar battery and battalion rear service elements
3 Medical instruction is rudimentary, while map reading is inhibited by the nigh classification of Soviet maps
Figure 40. A Representative Six-Month Training Schedule for a BMP-Equipped Unit.
2.	THE BATTALION TRAINING SCHEDULE
Although the regimental commander plans and
supervises much of the training of his battalions,
a battalion commander may (with the regimental
commander's approval) change the number of
hours designated within a particular block. He
may, for example, want his companies to spend
less time on reconnaissance and more time on the
meeting engagement and request approval from
his regimental commander.
The battalion commander also trains and cor-
rects his subordinates on a daily basis, concen-
trating primarily on his MR companies. Twice a
year, for 4 to 5 days at a time, he conducts
classes for his platoon leaders. In addition, and
usually prior to the beginning of a winter or sum-
mer training period, he gathers his officers and
NCOs and explains the training program, its
goals, and instructional techniques to be used. To
his company commanders he gives the total
number of hours per subject. Company com-
manders organize their weekly training plans bas-
ed upon specific guidance from battalion.
The semiannual training plan is the battalion
commander's basic training document. He checks
with the regimental commander to insure that the
latter's goals will be met. Figure 41 represents a
typical day within a weekly (Monday-Friday)
schedule. Although new regulations reduced the
amount of military training (exclusive of PT,
maintenance, and sports) per day from 7 hours to
6, the length of the duty day remained about the
same, because unlike the old system, political
training (up to 4 hours per week) is not counted
as part of military training.
Sixty to sixty-five percent of the training time is
supposed to be spent on field training and prac-
tical exercises with weapons and equipment.
Moreover about 40 percent of the tactical firing
and tactical exercises are supposed to be con-
ducted at night.
Soldiers normally work half a day on Saturday
(maintenance and/or organized sports) and have
the rest of the weekend off. This time off is,
however, usually supervised, particularly for
forces stationed outside the USSR.
58
0600		REVEILLE
06000610	PERSONAL HYGIENE AND DRESSING
0610-0640	PHYSICAL TRAINING
0640-0700	PERSONAL HYGIENE AND CLEANING THE BARRACKS
07000715	IN-RANKS INSPECTION AND ROLL CALL
07150745	BREAKFAST
07450800	PREPARATION FOR TRAINING
0800-1350	TRAINING PERIOD
1350-1400	PERSONAL HYGIENE
1400-1440	DINNER
1440-1500	AFTER DINNER BREAK
1500-1830	CARE AND CLEANING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
1830-1940	INDIVIDUAL STUDY TIME
1940-2010	SUPPER
2010-2140	FREE TIME
2140-2155	ROLL CALL AND EVENING WALK
2200	LIGHTS OUT
Figure 41. A Typical Week-Day Training Schedule.
Section C	- Company and Section Training and Tactics
1.	THE MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY
Company commanders draw up their training
schedules based upon detailed guidance by the
battalion commander and the battalion chief of
staff. Company training may be divided into four
categories: individual (to include leadership train-
ing for sergeants), weapons and equipment,
moral-political, and tactical.
Because of the semiannual troop rotations in
May and November, it is difficult for training at
the company level to proceed logically from
squad and platoon up to company level. Probably
most of May and November are spent in an at-
tempt to assimilate the new recruits (who have
completed 4 weeks of basic training in the regi-
ment's ad hoc training company) and get them
ready as quickly as possible for field exercises,
which may or may not be in logical sequence.
The company annually conducts, at least five
company-level field exercises of 1 to 11Л days
each under the direct supervision of the battalion
commander.
For further details on MR company training and
tactics, see The Soviet Motorized Riffe Company,
DDI-1100-77-76.
2.	THE MORTAR BATTERY
a.	General
The mortar battery, normally commanded by a
captain, is supervised in its training by the
regimental artillery commander, the battalion
commander, and the battalion chief of staff. Mor-
tar battery training is designed to achieve profi-
ciency in assigned duties, familiarization with
other-than-assigned duties (cross-training), and
tactical proficiency of the battery operating as the
battalion's primary means of indirect fire support.
b.	Individual Duties and Training
(1)	The battery commander
The mortar battery commander is the prin-
cipal fire controller of his unit. From his forward
observation post he computes fire data and relays
other fire missions received from his battalion
commander and the regimental fire control center
(figure 42). He directly supervises the training of
his battery.
(2)	The headquarters and headquarters pla-
toon leader
This platoon leader has administrative and
tactical functions. He assists the battery com-
mander in administrative tasks and heads the bat-
tery's forward observer/reconnaissance section.
This latter responsibility gives the battery the
capability to establish two forward observer
posts, although normally there is only one. The
headquarters platoon leader trains the forward
observer/reconnaissance section in target acquisi-
tion and fire mission techniques. He also trains
the radio-telephone section, with the help of the
battalion communications platoon leader.
59
Figure 42. The Mortar Battery Commander at his Forward
Observation Post.
mal, over, or under weight-necessitating correc-
tions by the fuze setter), placing the correct
charge on the round, and setting the fuzes for in-
stant or delay action; loaders and carriers, in addi-
tion to their normal function, receive cross-
training as gunners. The driver of the section's
GAZ-66 truck is trained in vehicular maintenance
and digging in his vehicle in the defense, as well
as antitank tactics (the driver is armed with an
RPG-7 and is responsible for providing his section
with antitank protection). Battery personnel are
also trained in the use of flag signals (figure 43).
"ATTENTION"	START VEHICLES" "STOP VEHICLES"
DIRECTION OF
BATTERY POSITION
(TO THE RIGHT IN
THIS CASE)
"FIRE-
"GUN COMMANDERS
REPORT TO ME"
(3)	The mortar platoon leader
In addition to supervisory responsibilities
regarding his own platoon, the first platoon leader
normally is in charge of the battery on the march
(the battery commander, with his forward
observer/reconnaissance section, during the
march precedes his battery looking for suitable
deployment positions and an observation point),
and is the designated replacement should the bat-
tery commander be incapacitated. Platoon leaders
receive fire commands from the battery com-
mander and pass them directly to their gun crew
commanders. Platoon leaders are trained in all
aspects of mortar equipment and fire computa-
tion, and as replacements for the battery com-
mander should the need arise.
(4)	The mortar crew
Members of the mortar crew, headed by an
NCO, receive their primary specialty training and
some cross-training. The NCO is trained to per-
form each function of his section, to include the
technical aspects of the mortar and its ammuni-
tion, setting up, fire commands, and low-level
tactics. Gunners receive training in sighting and
sight corrections. Fuze setters are trained in
checking the shell weight (mortar rounds have
markings indicating whether or not they are of nor-
GAS ATTACK
TANK ATTACK
AIR ATTACK
Figure 43. Flag Signals Used by the Mortar Battery.
c. Tactics
(1)	General
Mortar battery training concentrates primarily
on offensive operations of the MRB and MRR.
Positioning during the march and deployment
from the march, battery fire positions, and types
of fires are particularly emphasized.
(2)	Mission
The mission of the battalion mortar battery is
to provide the battalion with close-in indirect fire
support, to include high explosive, illumination,
and smoke.
(3)	The march
On the march, the mortar battery com-
mander is at the head of his eight-vehicle column
60
within the battalion formation (figure 44). Normal-
ly, the headquarters and headquarters platoon
leader, the forward observer/reconnaissance per-
sonnel, and communications personnel ac-
company the battery commander. The first pla-
toon leader rides in the second vehicle and is in
actual charge of the battery column. Within the
battery, orders on the march are normally
transmitted by flag signal.
(4)	Deployment from the march
Whenever possible, the battery commander
selects the battery positions and the observation
post (OP) prior to the march, and proceeds
directly to the OP, leaving battery deployment to
his first platoon leader. When unexpected and
rapid deployment from the march is called for,
the battery commander first selects the deploy-
ment area and then occupies his OP.
Individual mortar positions are designated by
the battery commander (or first platoon leader) by
using a red flag which indicates the direction and
line the mortars are to occupy. Unless otherwise
ordered, gun commanders position their mortars
along the indicated line at 20-meter intervals
(figure 45). After detaching their mortars, vehicle
drivers offload ammunition and (time permitting)
revet their vehicles.
In the offensive, individual mortar positions
usually consist of a small pit for proper setting of
the base plate. In the defense, more elaborate
positions are constructed (figure 46). In both the
offense and defense, the mortars are normally
deployed in a straight line.
The OP, normally located on an elevated
position (figure 47), is occupied by the battery
commander, the forward observer/reconnaissance
section, designated radio telephone operators,
and possibly the headquarters and headquarters
platoon leader. If a second OP is tactically
desirable, the headquarters and headquarters pla-
toon leader, aided by an RTO, could establish
one.
(5)	Communications
Although radios are the primary method of
sending fire missions from the OP(s) to the guns
during the offensive, wire is also used, time and
tactical situation permitting. In the defense, wire
is the primary means of communication between
the OP and gun positions. Two R105/107 radios
are with the OP and two are at the battery posi-
tion, in addition to telephones and several
kilometers of wire, providing a sufficient com-
munications capability.
(6)	Types of fires
Mortar crews practice blocking fires against a
hostile assault, opening corridors through mine-
fields, destruction of fixed targets, and zonal bar-
rage fires as part of regimental artillery prepara-
tion. Although the range of the 120mm mortar is
about 5,700 meters, optimum distances for
engagement lie between 4,000 and 4,500 meters.
(7)	Antitank protection and battery defense
The battery's primary antitank protection lies
in the RPG-7 fires of the vehicle drivers. All other
battery personnel are armed either with the 9mm
pistol (Makarov) or the 7.62mm modernized
assault rifle (AKM). No lookout posts or other
special security measures are known to exist for
the battery.
(8)	Displacement
Displacement of the battery varies. If the bat-
talion has attached artillery (or can be supported
by regimental artillery) the mortars normally
displace together; otherwise, the battery would
displace one platoon at a time, so that two pla-
toons are providing continuous fire support.
61
Ch
Ю
В BATTERY MARCH ORDER,
KEY
Reconnaissance patrol
 Artillery battalion (minus one battery) in march column
Motorized rifle company m march column with attached tanks and artillery
** О 0 Motorized rifle company in march column.
"0U Battalion commander's location dining the march
Antitank battcy in march column
Tank company (minus one platoon) in march column
Antiaircraft battery in march column
Mortar battery (]20rnm) m march column
Truck moving forward
BMP (patrol vehicle)
Mortar (120mm) towed by truck.
Figure 44. The Mortar Battery During the March.
KEY
Truck (dotted lines denote subsequent position) moving forward
Mortar (120mm) towed by a truck
Mortar (120mm) in firing position
Oft-loaded ammunition
Observation post
NOTES
l.The mortar battery commander, in the lead GAZ-66, establishes the observation post for the battery.
2The three mortar platoons deploy on hne with 20 meters between mortars Some ammunition is oft-loaded behind the mortars, while the remaining ammunition
stays in the trucks.
3.The extra GAZ-66 carries additional ammunition, spare parts, and other equipment
Figure 45.	Mortar Battery Deployment from the March.
63
KEY
Mortar (120mm) in firing position
Off-loaded ammunition
NOTES
1	. In the defense, mortars, ammunition, and vehicles are reveted, with connecting trenches between mortar positions. Vehicles
are located to the rear of each position
2	The trench is approximately 8 meters deep
3	Given enough time, mortar crews would deepen the trench and construct overhead cover
Figure 46.	Mortar Position in the Defense.
64
KEY
Motorized rifle battalion reinforced by tanks m the attack
Defensive position
Mortar battery (120mm) in firing position
Mortar battery observation post
Tank
Battalion commander
Target-mortar
Lme terminating m a telephone set

-Xsk Target-antitank gun
NOTES
1	The mortar battery forward observation post (OP) is used for reconnoitering the enemy and terrain, for observing friendly forces, and for directing battery fire
The location of the OP depends upon the situation, tactical requirements and the time available
2	. In addition to personnel designated by the battery commander, the OP consists of a range fmder.target detection device, plotting board. I wo R 105 radios and a
field telephone
3	The mortar battery commander communicates with the MRB commander and the regimental fire control center by radio, and with his mortars by radio and
telephone.
4	The senior firing officer, normally the platoon leader of the first platoon. with a radio operator and fire direction man. runs the equivalent of a fire direction center
and relays firing orders to the mortars.
Figure 47.	Operations of the Mortar Battery's Forward Observation Post.
65
3.	THE BATTALION COMMUNICATIONS
PLATOON
Communications personnel receive specialist
training prior to reporting to their assigned unit.
Such training lasts 6 months and is divided into
basic, specialized, and general military subjects,
with specialized training accounting for most of
the instruction.
In addition to supervising his platoon's training,
the battalion communications officer, in conjunc-
tion with the battalion chief of staff and the
regimental communications officer, draws up a
signal training program for the battalion. This pro-
gram concentrates on the operation, care and
cleaning of radios and telephones, and on com-
munications security measures and procedures. In
training and combat, personnel from the bat-
talion's communications platoon operate the
radios of the battalion commander, chief of staff,
the company commanders, medical point, and
supply platoon, as well as lay wire and perform
messenger services. The platoon is also responsi-
ble for the care, cleaning, and storing of the bat-
talion's NBC equipment.
4.	BATTALION REAR SERVICES
a.	Genera!
The battalion chief of staff has the respon-
sibility of supervising the training of battalion
headquarters personnel. His primary assistants are
the deputy battalion commander for technical af-
fairs, who supervises the technical training at
company level (the company technical officer pro-
vides the training), the supply platoon leader
(responsible for the battalion's materiel support),
and the battalion feld'sher, responsible for sanita-
tion and medical training of battalion personnel.
b.	Supply
The supply platoon leader trains his ammuni-
tion, POL, and ration personnel. In the field he is
primarily an implementor of his superiors' instruc-
tions regarding the locations of the battalion
distribution points for ammunition, rations, and
POL, and supervises the activities at these loca-
tions.
Special supply platoon exercises normally
precede battalion exercises. While the supply pla-
toon leader may provide input for exercise
scenarios to test his men, the exercises are ac-
tually planned and conducted under the close
supervision of the deputy regimental commander
for rear services. When the battalion wants to use
some of its organic rear services equipment, it
must request permission from regiment.
c.	Repair
The deputy battalion commander for
technical affairs is responsible for the technical
training of his repair workshop personnel and for
supervising the technical training within the MR
companies. In this latter task he is assisted by the
company technical officers.
After induction, personnel designated to
become mechanics and drivers are trained either
on the job or in training units within the in-
ductee's division or military district. In addition,
each man is required to attend a 1 %- to 2-month
course on repairing military vehicles. Drivers are
designated "driver-mechanics," and as such, are
authorized to go beyond those first-echelon
maintenance procedures allowed their counter-
parts in many Western armies.
On paper, approximately 35 percent of unit
training is devoted to specialty training. Each
motorpool is supposed to have classrooms replete
with training aids to conduct this training, as well
as cross-training in certain skills. Evidence sug-
gests, however, that cross-training is seldom
practiced and that classroom maintenance in-
struction is often perfunctory.
Field maintenance training, however, is often
more thorough and realistic. Driver-mechanics
and the battalion repair workshop actively par-
ticipate in field training exercises and have been
known to take inoperable equipment with them
for repair under field conditions.
Driver-mechanics take periodic proficiency
tests. Those who do well receive a specialty
rating and increased pay. These ratings are
transferable to civilian occupations, resulting in
better-than-average salaries.
Battalion training for vehicle operators in-
volves periodic classes on maintenance and
vehicular components. The quality of this training
varies widely and in some units is frequently ig-
nored. The requirements, however, for vehicle
operators to remain with their vehicles and assist
66
maintenance personnel in effecting repairs pro-
vides additional on-the-job training for drivers and
increases the driver's mechanical knowledge. The
difficulty of keeping adequately trained full-time
mechanics is aggravated by the 2-year term of
service in the ground forces. Most of the
mechanics are 2-year conscripts who often
become proficient just in time to rotate back to
civilian life.
d.	Medical
The primary organizer of medical training at
battalion level is the chief of the regimental
medical service. In addition to organizing the bat-
talion's medical training, he also supervises it,
working closely with the battalion fdd'sher and
his three-man section.
At battalion level, medical training is
rudimentary and stresses first aid and evacuation
procedures as well as personal hygiene and
sanitation. MRB personnel receive approximately
12 hours of medical training per year.
5.	MORAL-POLITICAL TRAINING
a.	Genera!
Heavy emphasis is placed by the Soviets on
what they term "moral-political" training in order
to help maintain party control over the armed
forces and to prepare men for the increased
demands placed upon them in modern war (figure
48).
Moral-political training attempts to ac-
complish the following tasks:
(1)	Promote solidarity around the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and support for
the objectives of the Soviet state.
(2)	Explain recent CPSU and government ac-
tivities, as well as certain international events.
(3)	Increase the discipline and political
awareness of personnel.
(4)	Insure proper understanding of security
procedures.
(5)	Inculcate personnel with hatred for the
enemies of the USSR.
b.	Instructors
The deputy battalion commander for political
affairs receives training guidance and supervision
from the deputy regimental commander for poli-
tical affairs. The battalion political officer then
supervises the efforts of the company political of-
ficers. Though political indoctrination is often
presented by the political officers at company and
battalion level, commanders at these echelons
also present political instruction.
c.	Instruction
MRB personnel receive up to 4 hours of
moral-political training per week. Subject matter
includes the unit history, selected foreign and
domestic news items and their impact on the
CPSU and Soviet policies, NATO membership
and policies (with heavy emphasis on the United
States and West Germany), The People's
Republic of China, and ideology. The last- men-
tioned classes focus on Marxism-Leninism and its
principal "corrupters"—The People's Republic of
China, Albania, and occasionally the Yugoslavs,
depending upon the political climate at the time.
Movies, usually of World War II vintage and
which glorify the Soviet Army, are often shown.
General themes which pervade these lectures
are as follows:
(1)	The West, generally described as the
villain, ringed the USSR with hostile alliances,
and forced the peace-loving Warsaw Pact coun-
tries into a strong defensive posture, thereby
necessitating large defense expenditures. The
USSR and its allies want peace; China and the
West do not.
(2)	China, once a peace-loving Socialist
country like the USSR, is now an enemy of
socialism and covets Soviet territory.
(3)	Warsaw Pact nations are friendly to the
USSR, equal in rights, and voluntarily linked
politically and economically to the USSR.
(4)	The eventual decline of the West and
capitalism and the worldwide victory of socialism
are inevitable.
67
Figure 48. Moral-Political Training in a Combined Arms Unit Prior to an Exercise.
d.	Attitude Toward Moral-Political Training
Since the MRB's members have no access to
foreign publications, they are taught in an in-
tellectual vacuum and are therefore unable to
form objective opinions about the actual state of
affairs abroad. Because of these constraints, they
probably believe most of the information pre-
sented on foreign affairs, while perhaps being
more skeptical about domestic matters.
For the professional officers, praporshchiki,
and NCOs, moral-political training must be taken
seriously, since their careers depend on being
politically aware. For the 2-year draftees, many of
whom do not want to serve in the first place, the
attitude is far less intense, and often depends
upon the topic and the manner in which the poli-
tical officer presents his lectures. While movies
are usually enjoyed, the stereotyped and all-too-
often repetitious presentation of moral-political
lectures (especially those on Marxism-Leninism)
often induces sleep among those forced to at-
tend.
6.	OFFICER AND NCO TRAINING
Although the Soviet press emphasizes the train-
ing of junior officers and noncomissioned officers
(NCOs) within units, the training of NCOs seems
more organized and formalized, and with good
reason. The Soviet NCO is 18-19 years old (that
is, the same age as the men he leads), has had 6
months of specialized NCO training, and little or
no leadership experience. The junior officers have
received far more training prior to commissioning.
Soviet reluctance to delegate authority
manifests itself in the treatment of NCOs.
Evidence indicates that Soviet NCOs are misused
and overly supervised, In reality, lip service is paid
to the grade of NCO, while more experienced
praporshchiks and officers carry out NCO as well
as officer duties. More training and a higher NCO
retention rate (the majority of NCOs leave the ser-
vice upon completing their 2-year service require-
ment) may not alleviate the problems with NCO
leadership, due to the Soviet penchant for control
at the highest possible level.
In keeping with Soviet belief in command and
control centralized at the highest level practical,
much of the battalion officer and NCO training is
conducted by regiment. This is particularly true
regarding the officers and NCOs of the battalion's
communications, mortar, and rear service units,
as well as the political officers.
Training is provided through methodological
training courses, independent study, and exer-
cises conducted by omnipresent senior com-
manders. The training is very detailed, even for
the most basic subjects. Quite often the training
precedes drill and training exercises.
Company commanders and platoon leaders
train their NCOs. In some units company first
sergeants receive leadership training twice a
month. Battalion-level NCO training is conducted
about once a month.
68
Section D - Battalion Tactical Training
1.	COMMAND AND CONTROL
In the field, all available means of communica-
tions are used to insure centralized command and
control at the highest level possible and also to
insure command and control if a command post
is "knocked out."
Battalion operations are conducted under the
close supervision of the regimental commander.
This supervision is such that on occasion the
regimental commander will bypass his battalion
commanders and give orders to their subordinate
companies. Battalion commanders, often bypass-
ing their subordinate commanders to give orders
to individual vehicle commanders, exercise the
same degree of supervision.
2.	FREQUENCY OF TRAINING
The MRB in a high readiness status conducts a
minimum of two battalion field training exercises
of at least 2 days' duration per year. A battalion
could be involved in as many as six field exercises
(two battalion, two as part of the regiment, and
two as part of the division) a year.
3.	FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES
Battalion field training concentrates primarily on
offensive combat with combined arms groupings.
Normally, the battalion commander will have at-
tached tanks and artillery, in support. Air defense,
chemical, and engineer units are provided as re-
quired (figure 49). Attachments may be further
allocated to the MR companies in order to pro-
vide company commanders and platoon leaders
with combined arms experience.
Tactical drills repeatedly practiced include the
march, the meeting engagement, water-crossing
operations, negotiation of minefields, antiair (with
increasing emphasis on antihelicopter tactics)
defense, and operations in an NBC environment.
The battalion may also receive heliborne training
(at least one battalion per MRD is trained to con-
duct heliborne operations). Combat in cities,
while not particularly stressed, is practiced.
During defensive exercises, the battalion com-
mander also practices with combined arms group-
ings. He may also receive more engineer support
to help his unit dig in, and to place minefields and
other obstacles.
Over the past 3 or 4 years, there has been more
emphasis on dismounted attacks and on air
ground support, primarily by FLOGGER Ds and
the HIND assault helicopter. Air support seems to
be largely preplanned and primarily employed on
a division's primary direction of attack, in support
of a river crossing, and in support of heliborne
operations.
Live-fire exercises and demonstrations and ex-
tensive use of field training aids are also
characteristic of battalion exercises.
Figure 49. Combined Arms Combat.
69
Section E -- Evaluation of Battalion Training
1. STRENGTHS
With the caveat that the quantity and quality of
battalion field training varies considerably in the
Soviet Army, those battalions in a high readiness
status spend a lot of time on practical exercises.
Battalion field training stresses offensive com-
bat with combined arms groupings and is, for the
most part, consistent with Soviet doctrine, which
envisions high rates of advance by combined
arms units in both nuclear and nonnuclear situa-
tions. The critical transition between nuclear and
nonnuclear operations is particularly stressed.
Though often stereotyped and repetitious, bat-
talion training stresses fundamentals and results
in effective battle drill.
Battalion officers must be considered politically
reliable and well trained in the technical aspects
of their trade.
2. PROBLEM AREAS
Battalion and company-level officers are having
problems coordinating MR-tank attacks and effec-
tive use of the BMP. Frequently, tanks out-
distance their MR support or the MR troops will
dismount too far to the rear to adequately sup-
port the tanks. In addition to these tactical pro-
blems, the Soviets are still trying to determine op-
timum employment of the BMP.
While technically well trained, Soviet battalion
and company commanders often fail to exploit
the strong points of their men and equipment in
field situations. They experience problems when
faced with the unexpected.
In at least one area there is a clear discrepancy
between what is supposed to be done and what
is actually done. Doctrinally, the Soviets maintain
that night time and other conditions of reduced
visibility are no impediment to operations. Bat-
talions are accordingly supposed to conduct
about 40 percent of their firing and tactical exer-
cises at night. During their field training, bat-
talions often use the night to prepare for daylight
exercises; that is, they conduct administrative
moves by road to position men and supplies for
an attack the next day. Night firing is conducted,
but actual tactical training involving cross-country
movement appears to be seldom conducted.
When it is, vehicle headlights and flashlights are
often used as orientation aids, despite a variety of
excellent night vision devices in the battalion.
These problem areas must be weighed within
the context of Soviet doctrinal concepts. Rigid
and stereotyped drills do teach basic fundamen-
tals, but when combined with centralized control
at the highest level and lack of initiative at the
lower levels, will probably initially result in high
casualties. It should be noted, however, that
quantitiative superiority has often outweighed
qualitative superiority in past campaigns.
70
CHAPTER 7. THE MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION IN COMBAT
Section A - Offensive Operations
1. FORMATIONS
The three basic formations used by the Soviet
ground forces are the march, approach march,
and combat formations.
The march is organized to insure high speed
and rapid unit deployment into the approach
march and combat formations. It involves task-
organized units. This formation is used when con-
tact with an intact enemy force is not imminent,
to penetrate gaps in enemy defenses, and to con-
duct the exploitation and pursuit.
When contact with the enemy is imminent,
Soviet units deploy from the march to the ap-
proach march formation; that is, division-size
units deploy successively into regimental-,
battalion-, and company-size formations. These
formations are dispersed laterally, in depth, and
with means of reinforcement. They may be in
line, echelon (right or left), wedge, or inverted
wedge. While possible to penetrate disrupted or
overly extended defenses in the approach march
formation, Soviet units will deploy into combat
formation to overcome stronger defenses.
The combat formation is formed when Soviet
columns deploy into linear formations echeloned
in depth. These formations include first and se-
cond echelons, reserves (combined arms, tank,
engineer, chemical), and artillery groupings.
Should the attack be successful, Soviet units
would redeploy into march formation for more
rapid conduct of the pursuit and exploitation.
2. THE MARCH
The Soviets describe the march as an organized
troop movement conducted in column formations
on roads or cross-country (figure 50). Troops are
trained to be ready for action at any time. If
possible, the march is conducted at night or
under conditions of limited visibility. The speed at
which the march is conducted depends on many
factors: enemy, terrain, weather, makeup of the
column, condition of vehicles, the level of driver
training, etc.
Average speeds for a BMP-equippped battalion
by day are 30 to 40 km/hr and by night and dur-
ing other conditions of limited visibility 25 to 30
km/hr. If tanks, and artillery are attached, the
average speed for day marches is 20 to 30 km/hr
at night, 15 to 20 km/hr.
The interval between vehicles is up to 50
meters during road movement and 50 to 100
meters during tactical cross-country movement.
Both the interval and the speed of the vehicles
are increased when crossing a contaminated area
or when under air attack.
Control measures along the route of advance
include initial start points and easily recognizable
control (phase) lines (figure 51). The number and
spacing of these control measures is dependent
upon the length of the march, the condition of
the roads, and the weather.- Communications dur-
ing the march are accomplished by messengers,
flags, and radio (when phase lines are crossed).
In a motorized march, halts of up to 30 minutes
occur every 2 to 3 hours. During the second half
of a motorized march, a long halt of 2 to 4 hours
is held. Such long halts are not held at night so
as to make maximum use of the hours of dark-
ness. During short halts, distances between
vehicles in column formation are not changed;
men and vehicles maintain the proper march in-
tervals. During long halts, vehicles are dispersed
and camouflaged (figure 52).
The Soviets divide the march into two distinct
elements: the movement organization and march
security. Movement organization is designed to
insure high speed, rapid combat deployment, and
effective control. Tanks and artillery are usually
toward the front, and antiaircraft weapons are
distributed throughout the column(s).
All-round security is provided during the march
(figure 53) to insure uninterrupted movement, to
prevent surprise attack, to keep enemy recon-
naissance units from observing the main body,
and to create the most favorable conditions for
deployment of the main body in a meeting
engagement. Advance, flank, and rear guard
units insure all-round security during the march.
In addition, stationary flank outposts often oc-
cupy critical terrain until the main body has pass-
ed.
71
1st Pit/ 1st MRC	1st MRC (Minus 1st Pit)	MRB Commander
1 Engineer Squad	1st Tank Plt/2nd Tank Co.	Artillery Battalion Commander
1 NBC Team	1 SP Howitzer Btry	MRB Signal Pit
1 Engineer Plt(-)
(Minus 1 Btry) 2nd Plt/2nd	3rd Plt/2nd
Tank Co.	Tank Co.
« f U (j FLANK SECURITY
2nd Plt/2nd MRC
Figure 50.	Tactical March Order of a Motorized Rifle Battalion.
KEY
Motorized nfle battalion reinforced with tanks and artillery m ma^cn column
Short nan area for the battalion
NOTES
1.	The initial line (point) is selected on an easily recognizable terrain feature and at a distance from the assembly area which enables the MRB to begin the march on
time and to allow tor proper speed and spacing of vehicles
2.	Control lines (points) are also selected on easily recognizable terrain features and are used to help maintain proper speed and spacing of vehicles.
3.	During short halts, the column formation is not disturbed During long halts, vehicles leave the road and disperse along the march route
4.	To aid in march planning, commanders normally mark the route in five to ten kilometer increments
5.	Road guides may also be placed at key points along the route
Figure 51.	Control Measures During the March.
73
Figure 52. Vehicles are Dispersed and Camouflaged During Long Halts.
74
KEY
•••	Motorized rifle battalion reinforced by tanks and artillery in march column
ф q Motorized rrfie company reinforced by tanks and artillery m march column
Motorized rifle platoon in march column

Flank security positions established by the forward detachment
Mixed minefield (antipersonnel and antitank)
NOTES
1	All- round security lor the battalion is provided by its own assets, forward detachments sent out by regiment and/or division and by reconnaissance formations
sent out by higher headquarters
2	Attached engineers, acting alone or in conjunction with helicopters, may lay hasty minefields on avenues of approach into the march route
Figure 53. Security During the March.
75
3.	ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT
Based upon METT, the regimental commander
allocates tank, artillery, air defense, antitank,
engineer, and chemical units to his battalions.
Battalion commanders then organize their units
for the march. Whenever feasible, attachments
are made prior to the march.
Because of the need to act decisively and
quickly, and because the meeting engagement
may be conducted against a force equal to or
greater then their own, Soviet battalion com-
manders normally place attached tank, artillery,
and antitank forces near or at the head of their
march formation.
4.	MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
a.	Missions
(1)	For the march, the MRB may be given
the mission of advance or flank guard, forward or
rear detachment, or be designated part of the
main body of the regiment.
(2)	As the regiment's advance or flank
guard, the MRB has the mission of insuring the
uninterrupted movement and the security of the
main body. It must also prevent enemy recon-
naissance elements from reaching the main body,
and most important of all, insure favorable condi-
tions for the main body to deploy.
(3)	When acting as a forward detachment,
the MRB has the mission of conducting recon-
naissance or to seize and hold key terrain until the
arrival of the main body.
b.	Planning the March
(1)	The MRB commander and his chief of
staff begin planning for the march after receiving
a regimental warning order. The battalion com-
mander studies the mission, briefs his chief of
staff and technical deputies, calculates movement
tables (or directs his chief of staff to do so), and
issues (through the chief of staff) a warning order
to his subordinate elements. The MRB com-
mander meets his attached artillery commander
and coordinates his movement plan with the ar-
tilleryfire plan.
(2)	The battalion commander's warning order
to his unit describes the conditions under which
the march will be made, its length, actions to
prepare personnel and equipment, designation of
security elements, information regarding attach-
ments, and the time and location for receiving the
march order.
(3)	The regimental commander's march order
to his battalion commander includes:
-	Information on enemy and friendly forces.
-	- Topographical and meteorological data.
-	The mission.
-	Execution of the mission (start time and
location, coded reference and control points,
security information, and coordination).
-	Administration and logistics data.
-	Command and signal information.
(4)	After reading the regimental com-
mander's march order, the battalion commander
completes his estimate of the situation and deter-
mines:
-	Column formation and composition of
security elements.
-	Actions to be conducted by security
elements and the main body where contact
with the enemy is possible.
-	- Use of attachments.
-	- NBC, air defence, and cover and conceal-
ment measures.
(5)	The battalion commander and his staff
then draw up the march order. Since recon-
naissance of the route is usually impossible, the
battalion commander makes a detailed map
analysis of the terrain through which his unit
must pass. Prior to issuing the combat order to
his unit, the battalion commander has his march
order approved by the regimental commander.
(6)	The march order is a highly detailed plan
in which the battalion commander attempts to
foresee and pre-plan for actions with the enemy
along the march route, and to control the actions
of his subordinate commanders as much as possi-
ble. Along with the regimental order, the MRB's
march order forms the basis for the battalion
commander's combat order to his subordinate
elements. The march order states the battalion's
mission, control measures, command and signal
instructions, the information listed in paragraph
4.b.(4) above, and detailed instructions to each
subordinate unit on actions to be taken in the
event of enemy action at the most critical points
along the march route. This detailed approach
often becomes mechanical in nature and is indi-
cative of the battalion commander's efforts to
control the actions of his company commanders.
He not only tells them what to do, but when and
how to do it. When the "enemy" does the unex-
pected, Soviet company commanders often fail to
react.
The battalion march order gives the regimen-
tal commander a clear indication as to whether or
not his order was understood. Once the regimen-
tal commander has confirmed the MRB com-
mander's march order, the latter is then free to
issue verbal combat orders (which are recorded
for the record by the battalion chief of staff) to
his subordinate elements.
(7)	The verbal combat order from the MRB
commander to his unit commanders is a combina-
tion of data derived from the regimental order and
the battalion commander's march plan. It in-
cludes:
-	- Enemy and friendly forces.
-	- The mission.
—	Detailed instruction for each of the bat-
talion's subordinate elements, coordinating in-
structions, actions upon enemy contact and
antiaircraft and NBC defense.
-	- Command and signal.
-	Logistics details.
(8) Often, however, the battalion commander
must organize the march under more difficult cir-
cumstances. During the defense, for example, he
may be assigned a counterattack mission by regi-
ment or division, and may have considerably less
time to plan for the march and meeting engage-
ment. His actions are accordingly abbreviated. He
is aided in rapid dissemination of orders by his
communications net, which includes every vehicle
in the battalion; therefore, data concerning the
enemy and the mission passed to the battalion
commander on his frequency would not have to
be relayed individually to platoon and company
commanders.
c.	Command and Control
(1)	The battalion commander and the attach-
ed artillery commander are normally located well
forward in the march, either with the advance
detachment (when the battalion acts as the ad-
vance guard of the regiment) or at the head of
the battalion's main body. His position with the
advance detachment enables him to best observe
enemy action, formulate his plans, and deploy his
unit.
(2)	To control his unit during the march the
battalion commander relies upon messenger,
flags, traffic controllers, and to a lesser degree,
radio. While the battalion generally stays on radio
listening watch, the passing of phase lines and
other checkpoints are reported by radio. NBC and
air warnings are also transmitted by radio.
d.	Conduct of the March -
(1)	The march is controlled as tightly as
possible, with the starting times, passage of con-
trol points, and the speed and spacing of vehicles
rigidly supervised. If a vehicle falls out due to
technical difficulty, the commander or driver gives
the designated signal to prevent following
vehicles from slowing down. If the vehicle can be
repaired by the crew and/or the battalion main-
tenance section, it will rejoin the column, resum-
ing its correct place at a designated rest area;
otherwise the vehicle will be evacuated by regi-
ment.
(2)	Gorges, bridges, built-up areas, river-
crossing points, and other such potentially
hazardous areas for the column are crossed
without halting and at maximum speed. Special
effort is made to bypass built-up areas. Attached
engineer support, usually part of the combat
reconnaissance patrol when the battalion acts as
the advance guard of the regiment, supervises the
removal of obstacles.
(3)	During short halts, the column halts in
order and at intervals established in the battalion
commander's order. Crews of air defense
weapons and designated air sentries remain on
alert.
(4)	During long halts, companies disperse to
assigned areas, but are prepared to move out on
short notice. These areas are selected to take ad-
vantage of natural terrain features for protection
77
against nuclear weapons. Hot food is prepared
while the men check their equipment and rest.
(5)	Higher headquarters or an element within
the MRB may inform the battalion commander of
approaching enemy aircraft. The battalion's reac-
tions depend upon the terrain it is in; if cover is
sufficient along the route of march, the battalion
halts and attempts to conceal itself from aerial
observation; otherwise, vehicles increase their
speed, lengthen the interval between vehicles and
engage the aircraft with every available weapon,
to include attached air defense weapons, organic
SA-7s (figure 54), tank machineguns, and small
arms. ATGMs mounted on the BMP may be used
against attacking helicopters. At night, vehicular
night vision devices are used, and personnel fire
at enemy aircraft only on order of their company
or battalion commander.
(6)	NBC reconnaissance is conducted con-
tinuously throughout the column (figure 55).
Although warning of an NBC attack normally is
received from higher headquarters over the NBC
warning net, the battalion commander may re-
ceive biological/chemical warnings from attached
chemical personnel (dosimeters are organic to the
battalion as are personnel trained in monitoring
NBC effects). When the battalion acts as the ad-
vance guard of the regiment, attached chemical
personnel from the regimental chemical defense
company are normally located with the recon-
naissance patrol. Contaminated areas are marked
accordingly (figure 56).
NBC warnings are transmitted at once using
all available communications means. Personnel in
closed vehicles put on their gas masks, while all
others put on protective capes, leggings and
gloves in addition to their masks. If it is not feasi-
ble to bypass a contaminated zone, the battalion
passes through as quickly as possible.
Personnel exposed to toxic agents begin
preliminary treatment immediately; equipment is
decontaminated when decontamination points
can be established.
(7)	Actions taken during the march by bat-
talion personnel reacting to a nuclear attack de-
pend upon the status of the battalion (whether it
is moving or in a rest area, and in the latter case,
whether personnel are mounted or dismounted),
and the time of day, and the location of the
nuclear burst. For example, if during movement
the battalion is alerted to a nuclear burst upwind,
personnel would don protective gear and increase
speed in an effort to cross as rapidly as possible
that section of the route threatened by radio-
activity; if the battalion is "nuked" during the halt
and personnel are outside their vehicles, personal
protective measures are taken. After the shock
wave passes, protective equipment is put on and
aid provided to casualties. The battalion com-
mander assesses the damage, attempts to re-
establish contact with subordinates and regiment,
and issues orders for rescue and recovery opera-
tions. As a rule, the aftereffects of a nuclear
strike are dealt with by the battalion commander's
own resources. If the battalion sustains heavy
casualties, it is replaced.
e.	Termination of the March
By properly organizing and conducting the
march, the battalion commander sets the stage
for the meeting engagement, the first phase of
destroying the enemy's forces.
Figure 54. SA-7 Gunners Are The Motorized Rifle Battalion Commander’s Primary Means of Air Defense.
78
Figure 55. NBC Reconnaissance Is Conducted by Motorized Rifle Battalion Assets and/or by BRDM-
Equipped Specialists from Regiment.
Figure 56. Chemical Personnel Marking a Contaminated
Area.
5. THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT
a.	Characteristics
The meeting engagement is described by the
Soviets as combat between two rapidly advancing
columns, resulting in an intense struggle designed
to seize and maintain the initiative. The rapidly
changing situation, the presence of gaps and
open flanks, and freedom of maneuver allow the
more able and aggressive commander to defeat
forces of equal and even superior strength. In-
complete intelligence regarding the enemy's
forces is no excuse for the Soviet battalion com-
mander, who is trained to anticipate the meeting
engagement at likely locations along his march
route. The meeting engagement (figure 57) may
occur:
-	In a surprise attack when the enemy is at-
tempting to occupy forward defensive posi-
tions.
-	During a breakthrough when approaching
enemy reserves are encountered.
-	During the pursuit.
79
-	In the defensive, when a counterattack is
ordered to destroy an enemy penetration.
To achieve success in the meeting engagement,
the Soviets stress:
-	Continuous reconnaissance.
-	- Immediate reactions of battalion com-
manders.
-	Beating the enemy to the punch with fire
and maneuver.
-	Well-organized combat support.
b.	Objective
The objective of the meeting engagement is
the destruction of the enemy's forces and con-
tinuation of the march, or the seizure of terrain
which will insure favorable conditions for subse-
quent operations. From the point of contact, the
depth of the objective could theoretically be up to
8 kilometers, the length (computed by the
Soviets) of an enemy battalion column in march
formation. In actuality, the depth of the objective
would probably be less, as enemy forces would
be moving rapidly forward upon contact. If it is
unable to achieve this objective, the advance
guard of the regiment is tasked with delaying the
largest possible enemy force, and giving the rest
of the regiment the time and intelligence data to
enable it to enter the battle effectively.
c.	Command and Control
The battalion, acting as the regiment's ad-
vance guard, operates 5 to 10 kilometers ahead of
the regimental main body. The battalion com-
mander cannot be as tightly supervised as is
usually the case. Moreover, the fluid, dynamic
nature of the meeting engagement imposes addi-
tional strain on the battalion commander in his ef-
forts to control the actions of his subordinates.
The increasing mobility of his forces and those of
the enemy continually reduce the limited amount
of time a commander has to organize a meeting
engagement.
Once contact has been made, radio is the
primary means of control. Instructions by the bat-
talion commander are, of necessity, brief. Tactics
are based on well-rehearsed battle drill.
C IN THE DEPTHS OF THE ENEMY DEFENSES
D COUNTERATTACK OF AN ENEMY PENETRATION
KEY
Motorized rifle regiment in march column
Motorized rifle battalion reinforced by tanks and
artillery in march column
Motorized rifle company reinforced by tanks in
march column
Motorized rifle battalion reinforced by tanks in the
attack
Figure 57. Conditions Leading to a Meeting Engagement.
80
d.	Conduct of the Meeting Engagement
(I)	Initial stage
The meeting engagement commences when
the advance guard's advance detachment clashes
with enemy security forces (figure 58). The ad-
vance detachment attempts to destroy the enemy
and continue its mission, or, if forced on the
defensive by a superior enemy, to hold its posi-
tion and support the attack by the main body.
(2)	Deployment
The battalion commander moves forward as
quickly as possible, makes an estimate of the
situation, and issues orders to his attached ar-
tillery to support the advance detachment. The
artillery deploys from the march, supports the ad-
vance detachment by fire, and prepares to sup-
port the deployment and attack of the main body.
Having formulated his plan, the MRB commander
gives any necessary changes regarding attach-
ments and orders the deployment of his unit.
Normally, he attacks in one echelon, retaining
one or two platoons in reserve. To facilitate rapid
resupply, the battalion rear service elements are
moved well forward. The battalion commander’s
coordinating instructions include:
-	Mission of the advance detachment of the
advance guard.
-	Artillery (to include mortar) fire support
plan.
-	- Sequence of deployment for the tank and
MR units.
-	Combined arms coordination.
-	Coordination signals (made originally prior
to the march, they are given last minute
refinement).
The regimental commander is notified of his
advance guard commander's plans for the
meeting engagement, and supports him with ar-
tillery fires when within range.
(3)	The attack
In most meeting engagements, the enemy
may not have had time to properly prepare the
terrain, to create a complete fire plan, or to
deploy his antitank weapons. In order to take
maximum advantage of these factors, as well as
the characteristics of the BMP, the battalion nor-
mally attacks mounted, with tanks preceding the
MR troops and supported by artillery and mortar
fire. Should enemy antitank fire be heavy, the
MRB would attack dismounted. When attacking
dismounted, the infantry attempts to stay within
200 meters of the tanks in order to render effec-
tive mutual support. BMPs support the armor- in-
fantry attack by fire. If antitank fire is exceptional-
ly strong, attached tanks would stay back with
the BMPs and support the attacking dismounted
infantry by fire.
The final deployment line is selected as close
as possible to the enemy in order to reduce his
opportunity for using nuclear weapons. Whenever
possible, a concealed approach to the deployment
line is used.
Specific attack frontages depend upon METT
and whether nuclear or nonnuclear conditions
prevail. In a nonnuclear situation and with two
companies in the first echelon and one acting as
second echelon or reserve, the battalion frontage
would be about 1 kilometer. Under nuclear condi-
tions, the frontage would be about 2 kilometers.
When all three companies attack abreast, these
frontages would be increased with the following
guidelines; in nonnuclear conditions, 500 meters
per company front with 200 meters lateral interval
between companies; under nuclear conditions,
800 meters per company front and 400 to 500
meters between companies.
Terrain restraints may not allow the bat-
talion's subelements to attack on line; companies
are accordingly echeloned (right, left) or attack in
wedge formation. The attack is developed into
the depths of the enemy formation as rapidly as
possible. There is no mopping up of small enemy
groups; this task is handled by the regimental
main body.
(4)	Termination
The meeting engagement at battalion level
terminates when the enemy has been destroyed,
forced to retire, or when the MRB has to assume
the defensive. In the first two situations the MRB
resumes the march or launches pursuit opera-
tions. If forced on the defensive, the battalion at-
tempts to inflict maximum casualties and buy
time for the regiment to deploy. In the latter case,
the advance guard MRB supports the attack of
the main body by fire.
A. INITIAL STAGE Reconnaissance patrols from a reinforced motorized rifle battalion, acting as the advance guard of the regiment sight an enemy unit moving
laterally across its front The patrols notify the advance detachment and the advance guard commander and continue observation and icporting
to support the attack of the mam body of the advance guard Artillery from the mam body deploys and -’itu.ly supports the advance detachment Sub elements
C. ATTACK. The advance guard s tank-reinforced motorized rifle companies, using smoke to conceal their movement, advance and. supported by attached artillery
and organic mortars, attack the enemy flank Reconnaissance patrols continue to observe approaches into the battle area Regimental artillery, if within range, also
supports the advance guard's attack
D TERMINATION A successful Soviet meeting engagement ends with the destruction (or pursuit) of the enemy force
KEY
Motorized rifle battalion reinforced
by armor and artillery
л 1 A Motorized rifle company reinforced
/*•*--^4 by tanks m the attack
Mortar battery (120mm) in firing position
Motorized rifle battalion reinforced
Reconnaissance patrol
Battalion commander
Motorized rifle company reinforced
by armor and artillery
Artillery battery m firing position
н OCT
Motorized rifle battalion reinforced
by armor
Mortar battery (120mm) on the
march
Figure 58. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Conducting a Meeting Engagement.
82
6.	THE BREAKTHROUGH
a.	Characteristics
The Soviets only reluctantly conduct
breakthrough operations, preferring instead to ex-
ploit gaps in the defenses and defeat the enemy
in a series of meeting engagements. Break-
through operations are often time-consuming and
attritional. They are conducted against three
types of defenses: hasty, positional, and fortified.
The hasty defense is the easiest to breach since it
lacks closely coordinated fire and obstacle plans.
The difference between positional and fortified
defenses is one of degree, with the latter being
better prepared, more complex, in greater depth,
and therefore more difficult to breach. Whether
or not nuclear weapons are employed also affects
Soviet attack frontages and formations in a break-
through operation. When nuclear weapons are
employed, they are directed against the strongest
part of the defense, through which the attacking
force proceeds as rapidly as possible, often in
battalion columns. Thus, in nuclear conditions the
breakthrough may more closely resemble a pur-
suit, since nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction can so disrupt defenses that units in
column formation may penetrate them. When
nonnuclear conditions prevail, large amounts of
conventional artillery are concentrated to support
the breakthrough effort, which is usually directed
at the weakest point in the enemy's defenses.
The breakthrough, regardless of the type of
defense it is directed against, attempts to concen-
trate numerical superiority in men and equipment
on a narrow sector, while pressure is maintained
along nonbreakthrough sectors as well.
b.	Objective
The objective of the breakthrough is threefold:
to split and disperse the enemy's defense, to con-
duct the pursuit, and to complete the destruction
of enemy forces. The assigned depth of the
MRB's immediate and subsequent objectives is, in
part, based upon Soviet calculations of NATO
defenses (figure 59), and on whether or not
nuclear weapons are used. In nonnuclear opera-
tions, the MRB is assigned an immediate objec-
tive of 1,000 to 1,500 meters; that is, a distance
just beyond the depth of the enemy's forward
defending companies but short of his reserve
positions. The MRB's subsequent objective en-
compasses enemy reserves to a depth of up to 4
kilometers from the FEBA. In nuclear operations,
the MRB's immediate objective is up to 2,500
meters; its subsequent objective is up to 8
kilometers.
UNIT	FRONTAGE	DEPTH
PLATOON	up to 400m	200m
COMPANY	up to 1500m	1100m
BATTALION	3 km+	2500m
Figure 59. Soviet Figures for NATO Defensive Positions.
c.	Organization for Combat
The Soviets achieve desired superiority in men
and equipment for the breakthrough by concen-
trating (for a relatively short period of time) on a
narrow frontage. The MRB is heavily reinforced
with up to two tank companies, one or more ar-
tillery battalions, a platoon of combat engineers
(equipped with flame throwers, obstacle-clearing
equipment, etc), and alchemical detachment. As
described in chapter 2, when attacking on a 1-
kilometer frontage, the MRB commander could
have 60-100 mortar and artillery tubes in support
(figure 60).
d.	Attack Frontages and Formations
The MRB may attack as part of the regiment's
first or second echelon. As part of the first
echelon, it normally attacks with three heavily
reinforced companies: two in the first echelon (or
with all three companies in the first echelon
against a hasty defense) attacking on a frontage
of about 1,000 meters, and one in the second
echelon (reserve). If the enemy's defenses, par-
ticularly his antitank defenses, have been suffi-
ciently neutralized, the battalion would attack
mounted-otherwise dismounted. METT deter-
mines the battalion formation, although for con-
trol purposes, an attack on line is preferred over
echelon (left, right) formations.
83
KEY
л 1л
0 Q Motorized rifle battalion reinforced
<	by tanks in the attack
0 ф 0 Motorized rifle company reinforced
r"	by tanks in the attack
Division boundary
Regimental boundary
Artillery battalion in firing position Groupings
of artillery are designated "regimental artillery
group" (RAG) and "division artillery group" (DAG)
NOTES
1. In addition to the RAGs and DAG supporting a division’s two regiments m the penetration area, artillery support from adiacent divisions is provided as required
2. Although 60-100 mortar and artillery pieces per kilometer of frontage are required by doctrine for the penetration, actual numbers of artillery may vary, depending
upon the nature of the enemy positions (depth, numbers of weapons to be neutralized, etc).
Figure 60. Artillery Support for First Echelon Battalions in The Breakthrough.
84
e. Attack Planning
- Antiaircraft defense.
— Other types of support.
f. Command and Control
The battalion commander exercises control
personally and through his chief of staff, and at
all times is supposed to be within 500 meters of
his first echelon. The battalion chief of staff is
located with the battalion commander. When an
artillery unit is attached to the MRB, the artillery
commander will normally accompany the MRB
commander; the mortar battery commander will
also be close by, while forward observers (from
the attached artillery) will accompany the first-
echelon companies. When the MRB leaves the
assembly area, the battalion commander, with the
attached artillery and mortar battery commanders,
is located where he can best control his unit.
Company and platoon leaders are at the head of
their respective elements. Guides are also
employed to insure speed and aid in control of
the battalion.
Though radio is the primary means of control
in the attack, flags, flares, and messengers are
also used.
The command post (CP) is located on terrain
from which the commander may best observe the
attack. The CP is rarely moved during a
counterattack, upon commitment of the reserve,
during a transitional phase (i.e., switching from
the attack to the defense), or during heavy enemy
air attack.
g. Breakthrough from the March
Normally, when the MRB, acting as part of
the regiment, attempts a breakthrough from the
march, it will first occupy an assembly area to
make final preparations for the assault. When
properly chosen, the assembly area provides
dispersion, offers security from enemy observa-
tion and fire, and makes it more possible to
achieve surprise.
Attempting a breakthrough from the march
entails strict coordination of deployment times
with nuclear and/or conventional fire support,
engineer support, and movement control. It may
also be conducted through forces in contact, thus
involving a passage of lines. This type of opera-
tion involves extensive coordination with the unit
to be passed through.
85
Whether he is attacking from the march or
through friendly forces in close contact with the
enemy, the battalion commander performs
basically the same planning tasks:
-	Analyzes the mission.
-	Disseminates the warning order.
-	- Makes an estimate of the situation.
-	- Conducts reconnaissance, (with subor-
dinate commanders whenever possible).
-	- Formulates his plan.
-	Checks his plan with the regimental com-
mander.
-	Issues the attack order.
-	Supervises preparations.
-	Notifies the regimental commander of
readiness status.
The battalion commander's plan, while not in
NATO format, covers basically the same informa-
tion.
-	- Enemy and friendly situation.
-	Mission
-	Fire support.
-	- Readiness time (for the battalion attack).
-	- Command and signal instructions.
-	Resupply.
It is given orally and recorded by the battalion
chief of staff. After the order is given, sup-
plementary instructions are issued. These instruc-
tions are highly detailed, and involve every aspect
of the operation:
-	- Mutual support.
-	Political work.
-	- Reconnaissance.
-	Protection against NBC weapons.
-	- Rear service support.
In addition to METT, the determinant for the
battalion's attack frontage is the necessity to
create the required superiority in men and equip-
ment from the enemy FEBA all the way to the
battalion's subsequent objective. The depth of the
battalion's immediate and subsequent objectives
also varies according to METT; under nuclear
conditions, these objectives are deeper than dur-
ing conventional operations.
The MRB's formation also depends on METT.
Line formation is usually used in open terrain and
when the enemy FEBA is comparatively straight.
The line formation allows maximum firepower to
the front and facilitates command and control. In
other situations, the battalion commander may
echelon (right or left) his companies. The wedge
is commonly used in the depth of the enemy's
defenses, after the breakthrough has been achiev-
ed. Normally the battalion attacks from the march
mounted in BMPs, although enemy fire may force
a dismounted or "mixed" attack. In the latter
case, part of the MRB fights from BMPs, while
the other part fights dismounted.
When the MRB leaves the assembly area, it
moves as rapidly as possible to the enemy FEBA,
and deploys according to the regimental com-
mander's order. Guideline figures are that bat-
talions deploy into columns 8 to 12 kilometers
from the FEBA; companies form columns 4 to 6
kilometers from the FEBA, and platoons 1 ’Л to 4
kilometers from the FEBA. Squads form assault
lines as close as possible to the enemy (usually
within 300 to 1,000 meters of the FEBA-see
figure 61).
A 30-45 minute artillery preparation is planned
to inflict maximum damage on the defender up
until the time that the assault line is reached; ar-
tillery and mortar fires are then shifted into the
depths of the enemy's defenses. Breaches are
made through minefields by a combination of ar-
tillery fire, tanks, and sappers. Tanks (equipped
with KMT-4 mine plows and KMT-5 mine roller
assemblies) of the leading battalion in the main
attack, with supporting infantry and sappers,
clear one path per attacking platoon (three per
company). BTR-50 PKs, hurling explosive line
charges, clear paths several meters wide and a
few hundred meters long, and are supplemented
by sappers armed with the UZ series of bangalore
torpedoes (figure 62), each of which can clear a
lane 2-to 3-meters wide.
MR troops follow tanks through breaches
made in minefields (figure 63) and then deploy in
line behind the tanks and assault the enemy's for-
ward positions. The actions of the battalion
change most dramatically after the forward
defenses have been breached. Tank supported
first-echelon companies attempt to exploit suc-
cess and widen the gaps in the defenses as rapid-
ly as possible. Efforts are made to prevent the
enemy from reestablishing his defenses, or with-
drawing in an orderly fashion. Strongpoints
established in the depth of the defenses are
bypassed whenever possible.
The reinforced second-echelon (reserve) com-
pany would be committed to aid a faltering first-
echelon unit, to exploit the success of the first
echelon by continuing the attack into the depths,
or to deal with a counterattack.
h. Breakthrough from a Position in Close
Contact
Factors increasing the complexities of this
type of attack are:
-	- The constant threat of nuclear and conven-
tional fire, necessitating the dispersal of person-
nel. Assault positions must, therefore, be only
briefly occupied.
-	The difficulty of concealing attack prepara-
tions; elaborate ruses must be devised to achieve
surprise.
-	The threat of sudden enemy counterattack dur-
ing the passage of lines.
-	Elaborate engineer preparation of the assault
line.
In addition to the problems he dealt with
when organizing an attack from the march, the
battalion commander also determines the follow-
ing:
- The assault position his battalion will occupy,
and the routes they will use to occupy it.
-- BMP locations and procedures for using them
in support of the dismounted attack.
Ideally, the MRB occupies the assault position
during darkness or other periods of reduced
visibility. BMPs are initially left in the rear (moving
up to revetments when given the signal), while
86
dismounted infantry move to their assault posi-
tions by way of concealed routes and com-
munications trenches. To achieve surprise, the
MRB's first-echelon assault companies will oc-
cupy the second trench of the defending forces.
During preparatory fires, the first-echelon assault
companies occupy the first trench, while the
second-echelon company (reserve) occupies the
second trench; attached tanks occupy a desig-
nated assembly area and are given a start line,
normally located 1-2 kilometers from the FEB A;
attached engineers are located in communications
trenches close to the companies they will sup-
port; the battalion mortar battery and attached
and supporting artillery occupy positions prior to
the time the MRB occupies its assault positions;
the battalion medical point is located just behind
the second-echelon (reserve) company; the re-
maining battalion rear service elements are further
back, but generally within 4 kilometers of the
FEBA.
Forces relieved by the MRB during the
passage of lines will do one of three things: retire
to the rear, support the attack by fire, and/or join
in the attack. In the first case, they may be form-
ed as a reserve or sent further to the rear for rest;
in the second, their organic and attached
weapons would participate in the preparatory fires
in support of the attack; in the third case, they
would support the initial assault by fire and par-
ticipate in one of the regiment's attacking
echelons.
When given the attack signal, first-echelon
assault companies, following clos.ely behind their
attached tanks and supported by BMP fires,
penetrate the enemy's forward defenses and at-
tack his reserves. The battalion commander and
his staff follow closely behind the first echelon
and, in turn, are followed by the battalion's se-
cond echelon (reserve). Mortars, attached ar-
tillery, and air defense forces move on order to
support the attack into the depth of the defenses.
87
KEY
Artillery battalion in firing position
(two or.more battalions form a RAG)
—i—(кг Motorized rille platoon in march column
Regimental boundary
Motorized rille battalion reinlorcod by
tanks and artillery in march column
. D BMP
Motorized rifle company reinforced by
-♦•О-ди tanks in march column
-mo- Tank platoon in march column
• Mixed minefield (antipersonnel and antitank)
Battalion boundary
Regimental commander’s command observation post
Battalion commander
NOTE
Only one of the regiment’s battalions is shown in detail.
Figure 61. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Deploying from the March to Participate in a Division Breakthrough Operation.
Figure 62. UZ-2 Bangalore Torpedo.
Figure 63. Tanks Clear Breaches Through Mine Fields for Motorized Rifle Troops.
89
7.	THE PURSUIT
a.	Objective
The objective of the pursuit is to prevent an
organized withdrawal and complete the destruc-
tion of enemy forces as rapidly as possible. The
MRB attempts to achieve these objectives by ex-
ploiting nuclear and/or nonnuclear strikes, and by
the mobility and firepower of the battalion and its
attachments. The MRB normally conducts the
pursuit (as part of the regiment) frontally, on
parallel routes, or by a combination thereof.
b.	Conduct of the Pursuit
Aware that the enemy is withdrawing, the
MRB commander reorganizes his forces as
necessary, maintains close contact with the
enemy (thereby making it more difficult for the
enemy to use nuclear weapons against the MRB),
and informs regiment of his actions.
The regimental commander then radios his
orders to the MRB commander for the conduct of
the pursuit. A battalion is usually assigned a pur-
suit axis, told what enemy forces are to be
destroyed, and given objectives to be seized and
the sequence in which to act. The battalion com-
mander, personally or through his staff, radios
missions to his organic and attached units while
on the move. The depth of objectives depends
upon the situation.
The battalion, attacking initially in its former
formation-a first and second echelon (reserve)-
first attempts to destroy the withdrawing enemy's
covering force. Having done so, the MRB either
deploys into a single column in march formation
or conducts the pursuit on parallel axes. In the
former case, a company reinforced with tanks,
engineers, and chemical troops forms the forward
patrol of the advance guard, and a series of
meeting engagements take place. In a pursuit on
parallel axes, the battalion sends out stronger
security elements to the threatened flank(s).
These elements consist of reinforced mobile
patrols and reconnaissance personnel.
Attached engineer and artillery units play a
key role in pursuit operations, as do heliborne and
or airborne troops. Engineers remove obstacles,
help prepare detours around damaged parts of
the route, and lay mines on the enemy's with-
drawal routes and probable counterattack axes.
Artillery fires up to maximum range, deploying
from columns into often, less-than-ideal firing
positions. Artillery must be able to quickly come
out of action and rejoin the march formation.
Prompt receipt of target data largely determines
the success of the artillery during the pursuit. The
new self-propelled artillery units are especially well
suited for pursuit operations. Heliborne and/or
airborne forces seize key terrain in the enemy
rear, thereby disrupting enemy withdrawal.
Rear service personnel of the battalion also
play a key role during pursuit operations. They
follow closely behind the combat formations, and
keep their counterparts at regiment informed re-
garding the medical, supply, and maintanance
status of the MRB and its attachments.
Section В - Defensive Operations
1.	GENERAL
The Soviets view the defense as involuntary
and temporary. It is resorted to when offensive
operations are not possible or advisable. The aim
of the defense is to defeat the enemy at the
FEBA and create favorable conditions for renew-
ing the offensive.
2.	CONDITIONS FOR THE DEFENSIVE
Usually the battalion goes on the defensive
when in close contact with the enemy and under
the following conditions:
-	During an advance in order to repel
counterattacks by superior forces.
-	To secure the flanks of the main body.
-	- To consolidate previously won gains prior to
further advance.
-	As a temporary measure to "mask''
reorganization prior to a withdrawal.
-	As a result of an unsuccessful meeting
engagement.
90
3.	POSITIONING OF THE MRB IN THE
DEFENSE
The MRB in the defense may be positioned:
-	In the division's forward area security zone.
-	- As part of the regiment's first or second
echelon in the primary or secondary area of
defense.
-	- Independently of the regiment.
-	- As part of the division reserve.
Normally the battalion defends as part of the
regiment, although it may act independently in
very broken, woody, or swampy terrain, or in a
less important section of the defense.
4.	MISSIONS
An MRB assigned the forward area security
zone has the mission of delaying the enemy as
long as possible while inflicting maximum
casualities.
As part of the regiment's first'echelon defense,
the MRB has the mission of holding its assigned
area, and inflicting maximum damage on the at-
tacker. When located in the regiment's primary
area of defense, the MRB receives greater rein-
forcement and is assigned a smaller area of
responsibility. Operating in a secondary sector,
the MRB has a larger area of responsibility and
less reinforcement. In the regiment's second
echelon, the battalion defends its assigned posi-
tion and participates in counterattacks launched
by regiment and/or division.
As the division reserve, the MRB may be used
to reinforce forward defenses or as a counter-
attack force.
5.	ORGANIZING THE DEFENSE
a.	General
The Soviets believe that modern warfare often
allows little time to plan and organize a properly
coordinated defensive position. While it is
sometimes possible to organize a defense when
units are not in contact, more often the MRB
commander must quickly assume the defensive
while in contact with the enemy (hasty defense).
The circumstances under which the defense is
assumed determines the flexibility and initiative
allowed the battalion commander, the planning
sequence, and the initial nature of the defensive
position. Doctrine stresses the need to vary
defensive alignments to avoid presenting
stereotyped defenses to the enemy.
After receiving the mission for the regimental
commander, the battalion commander begins
organizing his assigned sector. The regimental
order will be as complete as possible. As a
minimum, it contains the battalion's mission, trace
of the FEBA, and battalion boundaries.
b.	The Hasty Defense
Due to necessity, the MRB commander is
allowed more initiative and flexibility in organizing
a hasty defense; there is no time for the regimen-
tal commander to issue an order with detailed
supplementary instructions and supervision.
The battalion first attempts to consolidate on
the line it has reached or tries to seize more ad-
vantageous terrain. Enemy counterattacks must
be repelled, reinforcements received from regi-
ment, and the position stabilized and organized
according to doctrine.
c.	The Positional Defense
Organization of a positional defense is central-
ized by regiment. Orders are detailed and
defenses prepared in a logical order and according
to doctrine. Positional defenses are characterized
by well-coordinated fire and obstacle planning, ex-
tensive field fortifications, great depth, and strong
mobile reserves.
d.	Formation, Frontage, and Depth
The battalion defensive area (figure 64) is up
to 2 ’/2 kilometers wide (5 kilometers under nuclear
conditions) and up to 2’/2 kilometers deep. It is
organized according to the principles outlined in
chapter 2.
Although the battalion's defensive alignment
depends upon METT, the MRB usually defends in
one echelon with all MR companies on line (minus
a platoon in reserve). Single-echelon alignment
permits the greatest simultaneous concentration
of firepower, but reduces the depth of the posi-
tion. When the MRB defends on a narrow fron-
tage and/or greater depth is required, the MRB
deploys in two echelons, with two reinforced MR
91
companies in the first echelon and one in the se-
cond. Reserves would be located further back.
The distance between the first and second
echelons is up to 2 kilometers. This gap makes it
more difficult for the enemy to destroy both the
first and second echelons with tactical nuclear
weapons, while enabling the second echelon to
rapidly reinforce the first echelon or to quickly
counterattack penetrations.
e.	Positioning of Subordinate Elements
(1)	The motorized rifle companies
Each MR company organizes a strongpoint
up to 500 meters in width (1,000 meters under
nuclear conditions) and 250 meters in depth (500
meters for nuclear conditions). Normally, all three
platoons defend in one echelon. For more infor-
mation on the company in the defense, see The
Soviet Motorized Rif1e Company, DDI-1100-77-76.
(2)	Attachments
Armor, artillery, engineer, and chemical
troops attached to the MRB are further allocated
to the MR companies, depending upon the
number and types of attachments received by bat-
talion, and according to the importance of the
sectors the companies are defending. Priority
would go to the company(s) defending in the
main sector. Though artillery may be assigned to
the companies for direct fire support, artillery is
usually positioned to provide indirect fire support.
(3)	Reserves
The MRB commander positions his reserves
where they can most rapidly and effectively
stabilize the defense. Key terrain, enemy avenues
of approach, and commitment calculations for the
reserves are key factors in determining where
reserves will be positioned within the battalion
area of operation (AO). Commitment time for the
reserves, when mounted, is based on speeds of
20-30 kilometers per hour in daytime and 15-20
kilometers per hour at night. Moving on foot, four
to five times the amount of time is required.
In addition to his regular reserve (usually a
platoon), the MRB commander often maintains
an antitank reserve. The size and composition of
the antitank reserve depends upon the following
factors:
-	The importance attached by the regimental
commander to the battalion's defensive area.
-	- The number of tank approaches within the
battalion's AO.
-	The regimental commander's antitank plan.
-	The assessment of the enemy's armor
capability.
(4)	Mortars
The battalion mortar battery is deployed in
accordance with the overall fire plan and is posi-
tioned to provide close-in support for the com-
pany strongpoints.
(5)	Rear services
The MRB's rear service elements are located
in covered and concealed positions within the
battalion area of operation (AO). Rear service
elements are responsible for their own security
and defense, and frequently change locations to
avoid destruction from enemy air and artillery fire.
f.	The Fire Plan
The fire plan is regarded as the principal
means of defeating the enemy and insuring the
stability of the defense. Indirect and direct (par-
ticularly antitank) fires are closely tied in with the
barrier plan, and given first priority in the defense.
Massed fires are organized in conjunction with air
strikes on the most dangerous avenues of ap-
proach in accordance with the regimental com-
mander's plan. The fire plan attempts to force the
enemy into killing zones and separate his infantry
from supporting armor. To confuse the enemy
and increase the survivability of crew-served
weapons, dummy positions are constructed and
roving crew-served weapons designated.
Defensive fires forward of the FEBA are
organized by the battalion commander's superiors
to as great a depth as possible. Fires are primarily
concentrated on tank approaches on previously
selected fire lines, usually under ground observa-
tion. The distance between lines is 400 to 600
meters on high-speed avenues of approach; on
less favorable avenues of approach, the distance
is less. Along a line 200 to 400 meters from the
FEBA, artillery fire is used to separate attacking
infantry from their tanks and to stop second-
echelon forces. Final protective fires are planned
within 100 meters of the FEBA, while concentra-
tions are planned throughout the battalion AO to
facilitate defeat of enemy forces which have
broken through the defenses. The battalion com-
mander has the authority to call for or switch
supporting fire in his area, while company com-
manders have the authority to do so only regar-
ding fire immediately in front of the FEBA.
The battalion's fire plan, including antitank, ar-
tillery, mortar, and small arms fire, is primarily
based on tank-defeating weapons. The plan pro-
vides:
-	Support for the first and second echelon
(reserve), with priority to the former.
-	- Destruction of enemy penetrations.
-	- Protection of flanks and gaps not occupied
by friendly forces.
-	- Coverage of barriers.
-	Overlapping concentrations of fire in front
of the FEBA, on the flanks, and in key areas
within the battalion's AO.
-	- Rapid maneuver of fire along the FEBA
and within the AO.
The battalion's antitank defenses are situated
to provide fire 2 to 3 kilometers forward of the
FEBA. The BMP's ATGMs are the primary
weapon for long-range antitank fires. On open
ground there may be up to 200 meters between
tanks in defensive positions and up to 100 meters
between antitank guns. Tanks and antitank guns
may be located up to 600 meters from the FEBA,
although terrain is an important determinant.
Each antitank weapon has a primary and secon-
dary sector of fire as well as primary and alternate
positions.
g. The Barrier Plan
Barrier and fire plans complement each other.
Engineer obstacles are constructed to restrict
enemy maneuverability and disrupt his combat
formations. Mixed minefields are laid forward of
the FEBA and throughout the depth of the defen-
sive position, particularly along tank approaches.
The outer perimeter of antitank obstacles is within
200 to 400 meters of the FEBA so that they may
be easily observed and covered by fire from anti-
tank weapons. Use of natural obstacles, such as
rivers, canals, lakes, swamps, ravines, dense
woods, high embankments, rocky ridges, and
deep snow, is stressed.
93
MRB Motorized rifle battalion
MRC Motorized rille company
Artillery battalion in firing position
A atgm
Mixed minefield
(antipersonnel and antitank)
Artillery concentration (numbered)
Artillery barrage (lettered)
Battalion commander s
command observation post
Company commander's
command observation post
Technical observation point
Battalion medical point
Battalion refueling point
Battalion food supply point
Battalion ammunition supply point
| рпр | Company ammunition point
Company medical point
____r\_ Battalion boundary
Mortar battery (120mm)
Figure 64. The Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense.
94
6.	CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE
a.	Genera!
Conduct of the defensive battle by the bat-
talion begins with the detection of enemy forces
and their advance within range of the battalion's
weapons. The battalion may conduct a defense in
the forward area security zone, in the regiment's
first or second echelon, or as the division reserve.
b.	Actions of the Battalion in the Forward Area
Security Zone
In assigning a battalion to a forward area
security zone, the division commander assigns a
larger-than-normal frontage. The MRB according-
ly normally defends in one echelon and retains an
MR platoon in reserve (figure 65). The battalion
commander is given his zone of responsibility,
told where he will establish company and platoon
strongpoints, the sequence in which he will
organize his positions, the obstacle and fire plans,
and the withdrawal plan.
The planning and conduct of the defense of a
forward area security zone may be divided into
two parts: the first encompasses the positions
and plans to defend them, while the second deals
with conducting a fighting withdrawal through
the main defenses on the FEBA.
Because of the extended frontages assigned,
the MRB is heavily reinforced with armor, ar-
tillery, engineer, chemical, and sometimes air
defense forces, particularly when defending in the
primary sector; in a secondary sector, reinforced
companies (rather than a battalion) are used. In
both cases, artillery fire from the main defenses is
"on call."
Companies and platoons occupy normal
defensive frontages (500 meters and 150 meters
respectively, under nonnuclear conditions) but
have larger gaps between companies. Such a
defense is made possible by greater decentraliza-
tion of the battalion's attached and organic
weapons; companies receive artillery, mortars,
and antitank weapons while platoons receive ad-
ditional antitank weapons. Attached tanks are us-
ed extensively in tank ambushes throughout the
security zone.
The division commander's long-range artillery
and supporting air begin the destruction of the
enemy on the furthest approaches to the forward
area security zone. These fires concentrate on
nuclear delivery systems and armor, and become
more intense as the enemy advances. Recon-
naissance elements from regiment and division,
augmented by special reconnaissance detach-
ments from the MRB in the security zone, report
on the enemy's size, location, and activities.
The MRB in defense of the forward area
security zone attempts to hold its positions and
force the enemy main body to deploy, while in-
flicting maximum casualties. Initial enemy probes
by reconnaissance elements are engaged from
alternate positions and by roving guns, with the
objectives of deceiving the enemy regarding the
true nature of the defenses and of forcing the
enemy's main body to deploy. When the enemy's
main body deploys, the MRB attempts to sepa-
rate attacking tanks from their, infantry, to prevent
penetration, and to buy time for the main
defenses. Penetrations are dealt with by the bat-
talion's reserves. The MRB withdraws on order of
the commander who is commanding the forward
area security zone.
c.	The Battalion Defense as Part of the Regi-
ment's First Echelon
After friendly reconnaissance forces and the
battalion which defended the forward security
area have passed through the first-echelon
defenses, enemy probes of the FEBA are handled
much the same way as already described. Unlike
the security area, however, the first echelon posi-
tions are to be held at all cost, for the entire
defensive position rests upon their retention.
The battalion commander and his staff and
subordinate commanders in the first echelon
observe the enemy's preparatory fires and try to
determine the direction of the main attack so that
men and equipment may be repositioned accord-
ingly. Final protective fires are used to stop the
enemy short of the FEBA. Penetrations are dealt
with within the individual company strongpoints
and/or by the MRB commander's infantry and
antitank reserves.
When defending as part of the regiment's first
echelon, the MRB's counterattack capability is
limited. Only when small numbers of the enemy
95
have penetrated, or when these penetrations have
resulted in heavy losses to the attacker, do the
battalion reserves, when launched independently
of regiment, have a good chance of success. If
such favorable conditions do not exist, the bat-
talion reserves engage the enemy from prepared
positions. The destruction of far-superior enemy
forces which have penetrated the battalion's AO
would fall mainly to the regimental commander
and his second-echelon and reserve forces.
The MRB commander first informs the
regimental commander of his counterattack deci-
sion. If the decision is approved, the battalion
reserves normally attac’ mounted and use con-
cealed routes to their attack positions (if they at-
tack dismounted, extensive use is made of
trenches, communications trenches, and other
concealed approaches). Antitank and other re-
serves may be employed separately or together.
The attack is supported by regimental weapons as
well as by the MRB's first-echelon companies.
When the battalion's defenses have been reestab-
lished, the MRB commander reconstitutes his
reserves, usually from units which have not been
seriously depleted.
If the defending battalion is subjected to
nuclear and/or chemical attack, ad hoc NBC
reconnaissance parties (formed from MRB per-
sonnel) are sent into the affected area to report
radiation/chemical readings. Command and con-
trol and the fire and obstacle plans are reestab-
lished as quickly as possible. Ammunition resupp-
ly and medical aid are also increased. Initially, the
battalion commander must rely on his organic
assets to conduct rescue and firefighting opera-
tions. Battalion reserves reinforce the stricken
area as soon as possible. The battalion may move
to alternate defensive areas only on order of the
regimental (or higher) commander.
d.	The Battalion Defending as the Regiment's
Second Echelon
In this role, the MRB is located near the
enemy's main avenue of approach into the regi-
ment's position and is organized in depth. The
battalion is assigned missions to destroy enemy
penetrations. The MRB may accomplish its mis-
sion from its fortified positions, by counterattack-
ing independently, with the division commander's
reserves, or in coordination with adjacent second
echelons. Regimental and divisional artillery would
support the second-echelon MRB in any
counterattack.
e.	The MRB as Division Reserve
As division reserve, the MRB would be ap-
propriately reinforced and assigned no specific
mission prior to combat; it is ordered to be
prepared to react to a number of contingencies,
but would most often be used as a counterattack
force. In this role it would be supported by the
tillery of division and army.
96
KEY
MRC Motorized rifle company

Mned minefield (anti personnel and antitank)
Artillery battalion in firing posit-or-s donee .mes
between positions indicate subsequent po$«t<onv
Battalion commander s command observation post
Mortar battery i120mmi
Withdrawal by a unit from an occupied position
Artillery concentration (numbered)
—'"'‘“Battalion boundary
I " H Artillery barrage (lettered ।
Fi	gure 65. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Acting as The Forward Area Security Force.
97
7.	DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL
The Soviets recognize that retrograde opera-
tions, particularly when forces are in contact, are
very difficult, and subsequently require con-
siderable planning, coordination, and control.
Withdrawal occurs on order of the senior com-
mander and, whenever possible, is conducted at
night or during other periods of reduced visibility.
Withdrawals are employed to buy time for the
main defenses, to occupy more favorable defen-
sive positions, or to consolidate the defense.
The regimental commander's withdrawal order
is detailed and includes the mission, routes, and
formation to be used, intermediate delaying posi-
tions, control measures, and specifics regarding
the new defensive AO. Withdrawal follows dis-
engagement, and involves a covering force, rear
guard, and main body.
The disengagement of the battalion main body
is covered by designated platoons reinforced with
tanks, artillery, mortars, and engineers that try to
present an unchanged defensive alignment to the
enemy. Counterattacks, air, artillery, and nuclear
fires as well as smoke, are employed by the
covering force to halt enemy attacks before the
main body withdraws. The covering force, under
command of the MRB commander, remains in
occupied positions and tries to delay and deceive
the enemy and prevent interference with the main
body. The main body withdraws in the following
order: rear services, designated mortar and at-
tached towed artillery, and mixed teams of
motorized rifle troops, SP artillery, and tank
troops (figure 66).
Acting as the second echelon of the regiment,
an MRB is usually designated the rear guard of
the regiment. It is heavily reinforced for this role
and occupies previously prepared positions. Its
mission is to delay the enemy and gain time for
the withdrawal of the main body. After the regi-
ment's main body has passed through the rear
guard, the covering forces attempt to break con-
tact with the enemy, pass through the rear guard,
and rejoin the main body. Rear guard operations
are conducted along a series of delaying posi-
tions. Maximum use is made of artillery, mortar,
and long-range ATGM fires to prevent enemy
interference with the withdrawal.
The main body commander organizes reinforc-
ed flank guards to counteract envelopment
forces. Flank guards lay antipersonnel and anti-
tank mines along likely avenues of approach and
delay the ene. у until the main body has passed.
Forward security detachments are also used to
occupy critical terrain along the withdrawal route
until passage of the main body. During with-
drawal, reconnaissance activities, particularly at
night, are intensified to ascertain the location,
size, and intentions of the enemy.
Withdrawals are also characterized by a "scor-
ched earth" policy; people, livestock, and equip-
ment are evacuated, while roads, bridges, com-
munications lines and supplies, and installations
are destroyed.
98
COVERING FORCE
Two MRCs
Two tank platoons
Four artillery batteries
REAR GUARD
One MRB
One tank company
One artillery battalion
REGIMENTAL MAIN BODY
AND SECURITY FORCES
Two MRBs
Two tank companies
One reinforced artillery
battalion
444
PHASE ONE
First echelon battalions of the regiment designate
heavily reinforced platoons to act as the covering
force (1).
PHASE TWO
First echelon battahons (minus their covering for-
ces) withdraw (2) through the rear guard (the
regiment's reinforced second echelon battalion) and
provide the nucleus of the regiment's mam body
during the withdrawal
PHASE THREE
The regimental commander orders the covering
forces to break contact (3), withdraw through
the rear guard, and tom the mam body
PHASE FOUR
The MRR(-), with all-around security,-withdraws
(4), and establishes new defensive positions (4).
PHASE FIVE
The rear guard conducts delaying actions along
predesignated successive control lines (5) and
rejoins the regiment m its new defensive positions
(4)
NEW REGIMENTAL
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
KEY
Motorized rifle company in the defense
Motorized rifle platoon m the defense
Artillery battalion in firing positions
0 Tank
Motorized rifle regiment in march column
Motorized nfie battalion reinforced by
-**o*w® tanks and artillery m march column
Motorized rifle company reinforced by
tanks and artillery in march column
Motorized rrfle company m march column

—ч/ — ^'-Division boundary
Regimental boundary
^“Battalion boundary
— —< Control line
Artillery battery m firing positions
Figure 66. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Acting as The Rear Guard During a Regimental Withdrawal.
99
8.	RELIEF IN PLACE
The relief of the battalion is normally ac-
complished at night (figure 67). In order to ac-
quaint himself with the dispositions and defense
plan of the MRB he is to relieve, the commander
of the relieving battalion analyzes the defenses
with his company commanders and platoon
leaders. He receives the available information
about the enemy and his dispositions and studies
the system of outposts, defense installations,
obstacles and passages, distribution of firing
points, roads, communications, security, and the
protection of the flanks and limiting points. In
coordination with the outgoing commander, he
plans the relief.
The MRB commander handing over the
defense indicates the following to his subor-
dinates:
-	Procedures for transferring the defense.
-	- Assembly area(s) after the relief.
-	Deception measures.
-	Designation of guides.
-	Designation of locations for traffic control
posts.
-	The. time for starting and completing the
transfer.
-	- The procedures to be followed in the event
of an enemy attack while the relief is in pro-
cess.
The commander of the battalion being relieved
exercises control until the relief is completed.
Should the enemy attack while the relief is in pro-
cess, the relieving battalion, under the command
of the outgoing commander, assists in repelling
the attack.
At the appointed time the battalion commander
who is taking over the defense moves his unit to
the relief area by concealed routes. The relief is
carried out successively by platoons. Guides from
the unit to be relieved meet their replacements at
designated locations and lead them to their defen-
sive positions. The commander of the outgoing
battalion turns over a sketch of the defenses,
defensive installations, permanent communica-
tions facilities, and reserve ammunition on hand.
The companies of the outgoing battalion, having
turned over their strongpoints, assemble in
designated areas. The outgoing battalion with-
draws after the new MRB has occupied the
defenses, confirmed the functioning of com-
munications, made liaison with supporting ar-
tillery, and manned security outposts. After the
relief, the new battalion maintains the same
routine and level of activities that existed prior to
the relief.
100

MR,
PLT
1STMRC/5THMRB
MR
PLT
MR
PLT
MR
PLT
MR
PLT
§
MR
PLT
3RD MRC/
5THMRB
ROAD
I ASSEMBLY
^I$6mRC (-)/
/5ffl_MRB
/jMR
' 1 PLT
MRB RESERVE
ST PLT/2NDMRC
ASSEMBLY
AREA :
3RDMRC-5
KEY
ASSEMBLY AREA
STH MRB
DEPARTURE AREA
4THMRB
MRB Motorized rifle battalion
dlOi Mixed minefield (anti-personnel and antitank)
MRC Motorized rifle company
MRPLT Motorized rifle platoon
Regimental boundary
Battalion boundary
_________Planned movement of 5th MRB elements
t Planned movement of 4th MRB elements
Artillery barrage (lettered)
Artillery concentration (numbered)
Company commander's command post
Battalion commander's command post
Artillery battalion m firing position
Mortar battery (120mm)
NOTES
1	Relief m place normally occurs at night.
2.	Guides from the 5th MRB (the unit being relieved) would establish traffic control posts to aid the relieving unit (the 4th MRB)
in accomplishing the relief as rapidly and noiselessly as possible.
3.	Relief is normally accomplished successively by platoons.
Figure 67. Relief in Place.
101
CHAPTER 8. THE MRB OPERATING UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS
Section A - General
This chapter will concentrate on the following
battalion offensive and defensive operations con-
ducted under special conditions which have par-
ticular applicability to Northern and Central
Europe: combat in built-up areas, heliborne opera-
tions, water barrier operations, night combat,
seaborne assault, and defense of a coastline.
The Soviet approach to conducting combat
operations under special conditions is to employ
regular units with as few TO*E modifications as
possible. Since the MRB is expected to operate
under various conditions of terrain and weather.
Soviet doctrine covers a number of operations
conducted under special conditions in which pro-
cedures, planning, and tactics differ from normal
operations.
The doctrine, special equipment, training, and
historical examples for these operations (except-
ing seaborne assault and defense of a coastline)
were discussed in The Soviet Motorized Rifle
Company, DDI-1100-77-76, which also contains
data on operations under extreme weather condi-
tions, mountain operations, and operations in
forests and swamps.
Section В — Combat in Built-up Areas
1. GENERAL
Urban combat differs from combat in the field
in several important aspects: higher-than-normal
ammunition expenditures and casualties, slower
rates of advance (5 to 15 kilometers per day anti-
cipated by Soviet planners), reduced centralized
control with correspondingly greater demands
placed on small unit leadership, restraints on
maneuver, observation, and weapons and equip-
ment usage, and limited reconnaissance op-
portunities.
Significantly, Soviet training for urban combat
is not commensurate with the rapid and continu-
ing urbanization of Western Europe (figure 68);
this training seems to be sporadic and conducted
primarily up through company level. The Soviets
seem to believe that, for the most part, they can
avoid urban combat by neutralizing urban areas
with chemical and/or nuclear weapons, rapidly
bypassing them, or quickly seizing them from the
march.
In both the offensive and defensive phases of
urban combat, frontages are considerably reduced
and combined arms combat strongly emphasized.
Supporting weapons and equipment are
decentralized more than normally, with some
tanks and artillery pieces being attached down to
squad level. Up to 50 percent of a division's ar-
tillery may be used in this manner and utilized
primarily in a direct-fire role. Flame thrower units
as well as other engineer and chemical personnel
are also attached down to the lowest levels.
Small, widely scattered,, lightly defended set-
tlements may often be attacked by company- or
battalion-size units acting as forward detach-
ments, thus freeing the main forces to continue
the march. Well-defended villages and towns,
however, which lie astride the regiment's axis of
advance and which cannot be otherwise neutraliz-
ed or bypassed, will be subjected to full-scale at-
tack.
I. SOVIET CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES
CLASSIFICATION	POPULATION
LARGE	100,000 or more
AVERAGE	50.000 - 100,000
SMALL	Less than 50,000
PERIMETER
Greater than 26 km
15-25 km
Less than 15 km
II. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT URBANIZATION OF
WESTERN EUROPE
1. One-to-two large cities would be encountered every 200-300 sq. km.
2. Smaller cities would be encountered every 40-60 km.
III. URBANIZATION PROJECTIONS FOR WESTERN EUROPE
(USSR EXCLUDED)
YEAR	URBAN POPULATION
(in millions)	(as a percentage of
total population)
1980	310	65
2000	375	71
Figure 68. The Urbanization Factor.
2.	OFFENSE
a.	Preparation
The battalion officers study large-scale maps
(to include city maps) of the urban complex,
analyze available intelligence, and number blocks
and objectives on their maps. Preparation is
103
hindered by the fact that effective prior recon-
naissance is difficult to obtain; normally recon-
nasissance elements must fight to obtain data on
the city's defenses-а slow and costly process.
Particular attention is paid to the direction and
width of streets, key buildings (communications
centers, train stations, utility buildings, factories,
etc.), and other areas whose seizure would aid
the attacker.
b.	Command and Control
Because of the decentralized nature of urban
combat, the MRB commander is given greater
authority than is normally the case to plan and
conduct the battle. Although allowed the flexi-
bility and initiative he is normally denied, the
MRB commander possesses a very small staff and
must often organize a very difficult operation in a
short period of time.
Command and control in urban combat is com-
plicated by the reduction of radio efficiency.
Although radio is the primary means of control,
considerable use is also made of messengers and
wire. Limited observation also affects command
and control. The battalion commander sets up his
command post (CP) where he can best control
the actions of his unit. The CP is situated closer
than normally to the first echelon due to the
problems imposed by reduced observation and
reduced radio effectiveness. Observation posts,
located in attics and other high places, are con-
nected by wire to the CP. After the attack begins,
the battalion commander and his staff advance
behind the company assault groups.
c.	Objectives, Frontages, and Formations
Depth of objectives, attack frontages, and for-
mations depend upon the forces available, the
nature and density of structures within the urban
area, and enemy defenses. As a planning guide,
however, the battalion attacks on a frontage of
up to 600 meters (200 to 300 meters for an MR
company). Its objective may be to seize one or
two city blocks. Main attack axes are located
along the major routes into the urban area to
facilitate the capture of key areas and the cross-
ing of the area as rapidly as possible (figure 69).
When it cannot rapidly seize the urban area from
the march, the battalion normally attacks dis-
mounted. When it has only one objective, the
MRB usually attacks in assault groups; when it is
given a subsequent objective prior to attack, two
(or more) groups may be used, with the second
having the mission of seizing the subsequent ob-
jective. In both cases, a platoon is normally re-
tained as a reserve force.
d.	Assault Groups
Due to the localized nature of urban combat,
supporting weapons and equipment are decentral-
ized to make possible the formation of combined
arms assault groups. Motorized rifle troops form
the basis for these groups. Within the battalion,
the MR company is the basis for an assault
group. Reinforcement is heavy. Typical assault
groups within the battalion would consist of:
-	A motorized rifle company.
— One or two tank platoons.
— One artillery battery (which may in turn be
subdivided among platoons).
-	A combat engineer (sapper) platoon.
-	Chemical and flamethrower specialists.
-	One bridge platoon or section (И a water
obstacle must be crossed).
e.	Conduct of the Attack
Direct and indirect artillery fire precedes the
battalion attack. The duration of the artillery fire
varies considerably and depends upon the nature
of the defenses and amount of structural damage
required. Too much artillery fire can create
obstacles for the attacker. Smoke is often used to
aid the attacker in reaching the first buildings. If
antitank fire is not too heavy, infantry and sap-
pers follow closely behind their attached tanks
(equipped with mine rollers or plows if minefields
are present). Sappers aid the tanks in mine clear-
ing. They also help clear barricades, eliminate
booby traps, destroy or create openings in build-
ings, and construct CPs, medical stations, and
storage areas. Sappers are well equipped with ex-
plosives and mine detection devices.
104
KEY
Regimental boundary
Battalion boundary
Motorized rifle company
reinforced by tanks in the attack
Motorized rifle platoon in the attack
Battalion commander's command post
Company commander's command post
Artillery battery in firing position
Mortar battery (120mm)
Truck-mounted bridge
Mine-sweeping tank equipped with mme-dearing roller
Battalion commander
Control line
Mixed minefield
(anti personnel and antitank)
Concertina wire obstacle
Mined barracade
Portable obstacle
Blockhouse
Destroyed bridge
Barbed wire barrier
Antitank hedgehogs
Figure 69. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Attacking a Built-up Area.
105
Once inside the town (figure 70), the assault
groups attack along parallel streets. Tanks may
lead the assault in wedge formation with one tank
in the middle of a road and two behind on each
side, with infantrymen on both sides of the street
firing at buildings on the opposite side. Flame-
thrower personnel (figure 71) assist in the
destruction of heavily fortified strong points.
BMPs remain farther back and support the in-
fantry and armor by fire.
Artillery attached to the companies follows
closely behind the infantry and tanks and provides
direct fire support. Indirect fire support is provid-
ed by the battalion mortars and regimental/divi-
sion artillery.
The MRB commander keeps any attached
bridging equipment under his control until an
assault group is ready to attempt the water cross-
ing. At that time, the bridging equipment is at-
tached to the assault group commander; it reverts
to the battalion commander's control upon com-
pletion of the crossing.
The battalion rear services, limited as they are
in manpower and equipment, have a particularly
difficult task in urban combat in keeping the MRB
supplied and maintained. Supply priorities are am-
munition, water, and food, with the first placing
especially heavy demands. Supply dumps are
established as far forward as possible, and regi-
mental rear services probably deliver supplies to
the battalion supply dumps once they are estab-
lished. Battalion mess areas, ammunition, water
vehicles and trailers, and the aid station are
established below ground level whenever possi-
ble. First aid treatment and evacuation stations
are established behind each MR company.
When the battalion's objective is seized, it is
fortified and either provides the basis for regimen-
tal defense along the line newly gained, or the
jump-off point for continuing the attack.
3.	DEFENSE
Not surpisingly, the Soviets have written
relatively little on defense of an urban area. Since
defense of an urban area restricts maneuver, it
takes fewer troops to defend it than to attack it.
Those principles already described regarding de-
centralized control and heavy reinforcement of
subordinate units apply to the defense.
Figure 70. Combat-in-Cities Exercises.
106
Figure 71. Flamethrower Personnel Play an Important Role in Urban Combat.
A battalion's frontage varies according to its
mission as part of the regiment, but normally it
will defend in two echelons, with two reinforced
companies forward and one back. The battalion
defensive area (figure 72) is based on company
strongpoints supplemented by ambushes through-
out the battalion's AO. The battalion CP is
located within the most important strongpoint.
The company strongpoint, containing infantry,
armor, artillery, sappers, and chemical personnel,
is organized for all-round defense and mutual fire
support with other strongpoints. It may consist of
one or more buildings.
Engineer support for the defense is greater than
in the attack. Extensive antitank and antiperson-
nel obstacles are established in the streets, in in-
tervals between strongpoints and on approaches
to barricades. A battalion defending in the regi-
ment's main defensive area could receive engineer
support from both regiment and division.
Because the defender can inflict greater losses
on the enemy from prepared positions (particular-
ly in a built-up area), counterattacks are rarely
launched below regimental level in urban combat.
Strong mobile reserves are maintained at both
regimental and division level for this purpose.
4.	VULNERABILITIES
Because of the major emphasis on field
maneuvers, a lack of large-scale urban training,
and a logistics effort geared for blitzkrieg war, it
is doubtful that Soviet ground forces are well pre-
pared for urban combat.
The MRB commander with his small staff
would have a particularly difficult task in urban
combat. Heavily reinforced with all-arms support,
he has relatively little time to f)lan a very difficult
operation and is suddenly given the flexibility and
initiative he is denied in other operations. This
pertains to his subordinate commanders and
NCOs as well.
During World War II, the Soviet Army gained a
formidable reputation for urban combat. While
current Soviet doctrine seeks to avoid urban com-
bat, the rapidly increasing urbanization of
Western Europe makes such combat almost in-
evitable with subsequent adverse effect on Soviet
rates of advance.
The MRB must be judged capable of con-
ducting urban combat operations. Due to limita-
tions already discussed, however, such operations
could be very costly and slow.
107


л
122mm howitzer
Mortar battery (120mm)
Company commander’s command post
Company medical point
Artillery concentration (numbered)
1 Battalion commander's command post
Дцц\
Battalion ammunition supply point
• Battalion refueling point
Battalion food supply point
A
7 x Battalion technical observation point
Artillery barrage (lettered)
Barbed wire barrier
Mined barracade
Portable obstacle
WtfbWtP Concertina wire obstacle
Mixed minefield
(antipersonnel and antitank)
Battalion medical aid station
Figure 72. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Defending a Built-up Area.
108
Section С - Heliborne Operations
1.	GENERAL
Over the past few years there has been a mark-
ed increase in numbers and types of helicopters
within the Groups of Soviet Forces Germany
(GSFG) with a corresponding increase in capa-
bilities for heliborne operations. The Soviets cur-
rently have the capability to conduct
simultaneously several battalion-size heliborne
operations in Central Europe with airborne,
special purpose, and/or motorized rifle troops.
This section addresses the use of the MRB in
heliborne operations.
In wartime, Soviet helicopter regiments, subor-
dinate to tactical air armies, are assigned to each
front. Some of these regiments seem specifically
tailored to lift motorized rifle battalions in a varie-
ty of combat operations. Although heliborne
operations in regimental strength are occasionally
described, the MRB is considered by the Soviets
to be most suited for a variety of missions. At
least one MRB per motorized rifle division is train-
ed to conduct heliborne operations.
2.	MISSIONS
Heliborne missions which are given to the MRB
include aiding in maintaining offensive momentum
by capturing key terrain, blocking enemy reserves
and resupply efforts, interdicting withdrawal
routes, aiding amphibious forces in the seizure of
a beachhead, and attacking command and control
sites.
3.	DEPTH OF OPERATIONS
The operational depth of an MRB heliborne
operation depends upon several factors: the im-
portance of the objective, whether the MRB acts
independently or as part of the regiment, the
amount of supporting artillery and/or close air
support assets available, the estimated time for
linkup, and the nature of enemy dispositions.
The importance of the objective is the over-
riding factor in determining the operational depth
of the mission. Acting as part of the regiment in a
heliborne operation, the MRB could operate up to
80 kilometers behind the FEBA. It could also
operate to the same distance acting independent-
ly, although a more normal operational depth is 1
to 10 kilometers-that is, within range of sup-
porting artillery. The Soviets want linkup by ad-
vance guard elements with the heliborne MRB
within a few hours, and prefer to conduct the
operation within range of friendly artillery. These
factors, however, will not preclude the MRB from
being inserted up to 80 kilometers beyond the
FEBA to seize an important objective. In such a
situation, the MRB could receive additional
helicopter gunship support and/or be reinforced
with artillery and/or additional mortars.
4.	FORCE ORGANIZATION
The organization and capabilities of BMP-
equipped forces and BTR equipped forces clearly
favor the latter (figure 73) for heliborne operations.
In addition to the tactical advantages possessed by
the BMP vis-a-vis the BTR (see Chapter 2, Section
B, paragraph 1), the BMP-equipped regiment's self-
propelled artillery cannot be transported by heli-
copter, while the towed artillery (minus its prime
movers) of BTR- equipped regiments is helicopter-
transportable. APCs are also not transportable by
helicopter. Because the Soviets are still formulating
doctrine for the optimum employment of BMP-
equipped units, and since these units also have the
capability to conduct heliborne operations, such
operations will be addressed here. Moreover,
principles of employment are generally the same for
BTR-equipped and BMP-equipped units.
Although METT determines the augmentation
an MRB receives in conducting a heliborne opera-
tion, the MRB normally operates with few
vehicles. In addition to sapper and NBC teams at-
tached from regiment, the MRB can receive an air
control element of three-to-five men from army to
coordinate air support from gunships and tactical
aircraft. Close air-ground support is provided by
helicopter gunships, while tactical air strikes are
preplanned.
109
Figure 73. A BTR-Equipped Motorized Rifle Battalion Preparing for a Heliborne Operation.
5.	AERIAL EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS
High performance aircraft such as the FLOG-
GER series (figure 74) and the HIND and HIP
helicopter gunships (figure 75) suppress enemy
defenses within the flight corridor and provide air
support for the MRB. HOPLITES perform tactical
reconnaissance (figure 76), while HIPS (figure 77)
can lay mines on likely enemy avenues of ap-
proach into the objective area. The MRB is trans-
ported by HIPs to the LZ(s) and receives rein-
forcements, supplies, and additional combat sup-
port (field artillery and antitank guns as required)
from HOOKs (figure 78).
Figure 74. The FLOGGER Series Provide Air-Ground Support.
110
a. HIND
b. HIP
Figure 75. Helicopter Gunship/Troop Carriers.
Ill
Figure 76. The HOPLITE Performs Tactical Reconnaissance.
Figure 77. The HIP Can Conduct Aerial Minelaying.
112
Figure 78. The Heavy I ransport Helicopter, HOOK.
6.	THE HELIBORNE ASSAULT
a.	Preparation
Planning is very thorough for a heliborne
operation, and is centralized at the highest levels.
Having received helicopter assets from front, the
army headquarters, in conjunction with air force
personnel, does the detailed planning regarding
the heliborne force, fighter support, coordination
of artillery fires, and control of friendly air defense
systems along the flight corridor. The operation
would probably be in support of a first-echelon
division on the army's main axis of attack. The
MRB would probably come from the division's
second-echelon regiment, or from the army's
second-echelon division, depending upon METT.
Army planning is further refined at division and
regimental level.
The MRB commander takes part in planning
the assault phase of the operation and supervises
his unit's preparation for the operation. The plan-
ning sequence for the commander and his staff is
essentially the same as organizing an attack under
normal conditions. A special feature of this plann-
ing, however, is the landing phase in which the
MRB commander gives the landing sequence of
his unit and coordinating instructions. Usually the
MRB commander conducts no prior reconnais-
sance of the landing area or objective. The MRB
commander and his chief of staff work closely
with regimental operations officers and the
helicopter force commander during the planning
phase of the operation. Helicopters remain
separate from the MRB until loading time.
b.	Command and Control
Special importance is attached to ensuring
secrecy and uninterrupted control. In the
assembly area, communications are conducted
primarily by wire and messenger, with radios on
listening silence (figure 79). During flight and in
the assault, radios are primarily relied upon.
The MRB commander rides with the com-
mander of the helicopter force, while his com-
pany commanders ride with the helicopter com-
mander's subordinate commanders. The MRB
commander lands and occupies a place in the
assault from which he can best control his unit.
c.	Assault
Once landed, the battalion often attacks in
one echelon, as this formation places maximum
combat power forward. One platoon is in reserve
(figure 80). In some situations, two echelons are
employed.
After landing the MRB in the landing zones
(LZs), the helicopter troop and equipment carriers
return to a safe area, prepare for a second lift, or
return to their base area. Gunships remain in the
objective area as long as possible to render close
air support.
113
The actions of the MRB during attack, in the
objective area, and during the reorganization
phase follow normal Soviet doctrine.
Mortar battery (120mm)
7.	DEFENSE
In the defense, the MRB has the mission of
holding its positions while inflicting maximum
casualties on the enemy. In addition to its at-
tachments, it can be aided in this task by
helicopters laying mines along likely enemy
avenues of approach, and by on-call gunship (and
possibly fighter) support. The MRB's defenses are
organized generally as described in Chapter 5.
Once linkup has been achieved with the ad-
vance guard, the MRB, from its defensive posi-
tions, supports the movement of the advance
guard. The MRB's vehicles are brought forward
by its parent unit and, after linkup, the heliborne
MRB remounts its BMPs and conducts mounted
operations as ordered.
8.	VULNERABILITIES
Although flexible (in that both BMP- and BTR-
equipped units may be used), Soviet heliborne
operations with motorized rifle troops have impor-
tant vulnerabilities. A heliborne MRB is (at least
initially) a relatively lightly equipped force with
restricted ground mobility and limited sustainabil-
ity, particularly against a mechanized opponent.
Perhaps for these reasons, Soviet heliborne
operations involving MRB troops are invariably
conservative in nature, usually taking place within
range of supporting artillery fire.
Basic symbol to indicate radio communication or
the direction ol radio communications.
Line terminating in a telephone set
Figure 79.	Communications in the Assembly Area.
114
Motorized rifle platoon in the assault (in the example,
acting as the MRB reserve)
Reconnaissance helicopter
Squadron (helicopter) inflight
Battalion commander’s
command-observation post
X—000
Aerial (helicopter) mine laying
Destroyed bridge
NOTES
1.	Distances between the helicopter base area, the departure area,and the objective(s) depend upon METT, As a planning guide, however,
the helicopter base area will be about 30 km from the departure area. The departure area will be beyond the range of artillery fire and
will provide concealment, suitable loading areas, security, etc.
2.	The troop-carrying helicopters normally return along the same flight path they followed into the objective area(s).
Figure 80.	A Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Heliborne Assault.
115
Section D -- Water Barrier Operations
1.	GENERAL
Whenever possible, the Soviets try to force a
water barrier from the march on a broad front, with
minimum delay in approaching and crossing the
obstacle. This type of hasty crossing is usually at-
tempted against nonexistent or weak defenses, and
when the current and condition of the banks on
both sides of the obstacle are favorable. Hasty
crossings reduce the attacker's vulnerability to
nuclear fires and enable him to rapidly continue the
offensive.
When a hasty crossing has failed due to enemy
defenses and/or unprepared or poor crossing
sites, the crossing is methodically planned and a
deliberate crossing attempted. Deliberate cross-
ings are time-consuming and costly. Moreover,
they slow offensive momentum and increase the
attacker's vulnerability to nuclear fires.
The BMP-equipped MRB is particularly well
suited to conduct a river crossing because of the
BMP's antitank capabilities. The BMP-equipped
MRB needs fewer tanks (and, therefore, less
engineer support) than a non-BMP-equipped unit,
and can, therefore, cross a water obstacle faster
than a BTR-equipped MRB with armor support.
2.	ROLES AND MISSIONS
The MRB may cross a water obstacle as a divi-
sion's forward detachment, as the advance guard
of a regiment, or as part of the regimental main
body.
Knowing that his unit must cross one or more
water obstacles, a division commander will nor-
mally task a regiment (most probably a regiment
in the division's main body during the march) to
provide an MRB to serve as the nucleus of a for-
ward detachment (in some circumstances, an en-
tire regiment could act as a forward detachment).
As the division's forward detachment, the MRB
would have the mission of linkup with a heliborne
or airborne force, or to seize and expand a
bridgehead from the march. The bridgehead
could be up to 7 kilometers deep on the far bank.
Forward detachments, in their race to seize and
expand bridgeheads, try to avoid contact with
withdrawing enemy forces.
If a forward detachment has been designated
and has accomplished its mission of establishing a
bridgehead, an MRB, acting as the lead regi-
ment's advance guard, would be given the mis-
sion of expanding the bridgehead (in conjunction
with the forward detachment) or passing through
the bridgehead and continuing the attack. If a
crossing cannot be accomplished, the advance
guard has the mission of clearing the near bank.
In the absence of a forward detachment, the
lead regiment's advance guard would be given
the mission of linkup with airbome/heliborne
forces and/or securing and expanding a
bridgehead.
Whether acting as the division's forward detach-
ment or the regiment's advance guard, the MRB
would be heavily augmented, containing up to:
-	- One artillery battalion.
-	Two tank companies.
— One air defense platoon (two ZSU-23-4s).
-	- One antitank platoon (BRDMs).
-	One bridge platoon (or section).
-	- One sapper platoon.
-	One chemical detachment.
Acting as part of the main body, the MRB
would approach crossing sites on a broad front
and in march formation.
The remainder of this section will discuss the
MRB acting as the advance guard of the divi-
sion's lead regiment making a hasty crossing and
establishing a bridgehead.
3.	THE CROSSING
a.	Planning
Planning for the crossing of a water barrier
begins as early as possible, preferably before the
march. Based upon all available intelligence and a
careful, detailed map study, the senior com-
mander designates the number and approximate
locations of crossing sites, develops a concept of
operations, and insures that prior to the march,
forward detachments, advance guards, and lead
116
regiments have adequate engineer support. In ac-
cordance with new intelligence and changes in
the tactical situation (often provided by combat
and engineer reconnaissance personnel-figure
81), the plan is refined and new instructions
issued during the march. No formal combat order
is issued for a hasty crossing. Regimental and
division commanders often exercise close supervi-
sion of the crossing from command posts located
near the water obstacle.
The regimental commander gives detailed in-
structions to his advance guard commander as to
how he is to prepare for and accomplish his mis-
sion. Though he carries out his mission separately
from the regimental main body, the MRB advance
guard commander is still closely supervised by his
senior commander. He maintains constant radio
communications with the regimental commander
and may have a regimental staff officer with him
to make sure that everything goes according to
plan.
To his organic and attached commanders the
advance guard commander gives the mission,
march order, reconnaissance data, location of
crossing sites, assault schedule, and order of
crossing. In addition, he gives fire missions for ar-
tillery and mortars in covering the assault and in
support of actions on the opposite bank,
assembly area for tanks to carry out snorkeling
(or ferry crossing) operations, details of logistics
support, and command and control instructions.
The advance guard is heavily reinforced for its
mission. The order of march of the advance
guard is organized to place the bulk of the com-
bat power and key engineer units and items of
equipment as far forward as possible.
b.	Command and Control
During the march, the battalion commander
and staff, along with the attached artillery bat-
talion commander, are well forward, situated
behind the advance party. During the assault
crossing, the battalion commander exercises close
personal control from a command post located
near the water barrier. The organization and con-
trol of the crossing sites are delegated by the
senior engineer officer present (figure 82). The
battalion commander and the attached artillery
battalion commander probably cross the obstacle
behind the first echelon companies.
Figure 81. Reconnaissance of Both River Banks Usually Precedes the Main Assault.
117
Figure 82. The Senior Engineer Officer Controls the Crossing.
c.	Securing the Near Bank
d. Assault
If the near bank has not been seized by a for-
ward detachment or heliborne force, the advance
guard accomplishes this task and establishs cross-
ing sites. Every effort is made by the advance
guard to seize the near bank quickly and to pre-
vent the enemy from organizing an effective
defense or destroying existing crossing sites. The
reconnaissance patrol crosses as soon as possible
and conducts active reconnaissance of the far
bank and bridgehead objectives.
Attached engineers establish and/or improve
crossing sites. Tracked amphibious ferries go into
assembly areas and wait until the far bank has
been seized before transporting the artillery bat-
talion. (Bridge-laying tanks go into position and
aid in getting the advance party across narrow
water obstacles up to 20 meters in width.) Ap-
proaches to the water obstacle are marked, and
control points are established to maintain move-
ment and prevent congestion.
The advance party crosses as rapidly as possi-
ble and continues its mission on the far bank. If it
is unable to cross, it takes the enemy under fire
and awaits the arrival of the advance guard's
main body. Smoke is used to conceal crossing
locations.
An MRB will normally cross a water obstacle
in one echelon with all three companies abreast
(two abreast if the advance party crosses earlier)
and 50 to 100 meters between vehicles. This for-
mation places maximum combat power forward
and allows for the most rapid crossing of the
obstacle. BMPs, while in the water, fire their
main armament and SAGGERS as required.
Attached artillery and mortars provide fire sup-
port (figure 83) and smoke, and displace by bat-
tery on order. Attached tanks go into an
assembly area and prepare for the crossing (figure
84) or, if the enemy fires from the far shore are
particularly heavy, they provide direct fire support
for the MRB. Air defense elements set up on
ground from which they can provide air defense
and direct fire support for the entire crossing. Air
defense fires are supplemented by the battalion's
SA-7 gunners atop the BMPs during the crossing
(figure 85).
Having crossed the obstacle, the MRB pushes
rapidly inland 5 to 7 kilometers and establishes a
bridgehead (figure 86). The MRB's attached tanks
and artillery cross as soon as possible (figure 87)
and take up assigned positions within the bridge-
head. The sapper platoon aids the MRB in im-
proving its defenses, while other engineer person-
nel remain behind to further improve the crossing
sites for the regimental main body.
118
Figure 83. Self-propelled Artillery and ZSU-23-4s Supporting a River Crossing.
Figure 84. T-62s Preparing for a River Crossing.
119
Figure 85. SA-7 Gunners Supplement Other Air Defense Weapons During a Water-Crossing Operation.
120
KEY
Motorized nfle battalion reinforced by
tanks and artillery in march column
Motorized rille company in the attack
Tank company m march column
ГRiver crossing site with number and type of
оч transport (in this case, a crossing site where
L-J 3xK-61 will operate)
Motorized rifle company in march column
PMP crossing site
Artillery battalion in firing position
c—inun Ponton bridge sections (PMP)
Assault crossing sue for BMPs
Destroyed bridge
F>
Battalion commander s command observation post
NOTES
1 The hills closest to the over are the MRB’s immediate objective the other hiiis the subsequent objective which, in effort, forms the MRB's bridgehead
2	. The crossing site(s) would be improved by each succeeding element behind the MRB
3	HOOKs could be used to carry in additional supplies and weapons to the bridgehead while HiPs could lay minefields along likely enemy avenues of approach
into the area
Figure 86. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Assaulting a Water Barrier and Establishing a Bridgehead.
121
Figure 87. Attached Armor Rejoins Motorized Rifle Troops as Soon as Possible in a River Crossing
Operation.
4.	DEFENSE OF A BRIDGEHEAD
When the enemy is too strong for the regi-
ment's advance guard to continue the march, it
defends the bridgehead and waits for the. regi-
mental main body. Normally the bridgehead has a
radius of 5 to 7 kilometers (depending upon
METT) and denies the enemy observation of the
crossing sites. Usually the MRB has the bulk of
its combat power on the enemy side of the
obstacle, but it leaves a small security force with
engineers on the friendly side of the river.
Special features of the MRB's defense of a
bridgehead are:
-	Flanks rest on the water barrier to increase
the stability of the defense.
-	Antitank, air defense, and artillery within
the bridgehead are greater than in normal
situations.
-	Large reserves of ammunition, rations,
POL, and other supplies are bought into the
bridgehead as rapidly as possible (helicopters
can play a key role here until the regimental
main body arrives).
-	Special camouflage measures are taken at
the crossing sites.
The defense of any bridgehead is expected to
be marked by particular determination. Acting on
its own, far in front of the regiment's main body,
the MRB conducts counterattacks as necessary to
preserve the integrity of the FEBA. Though con-
siderably augmented, the MRB is still stretched
pretty thin and, with its back to the water, con-
ducts a desperate defense.
5.	DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE
In organizing the defense of a river line on only
one bank, the Soviets normally designate the
FEBA as the water’s edge of the friendly bank
(figure 88). Regiment and division normally send
reconnaissance forces and combat security forces
to the far bank. Islands in the river are occupied
and fortified to prevent surprise enemy crossings
and to provide flanking fires against enemy
forces. Crossing sites on the far bank and fords
are mined, obstacles constructed in the water,
and banks scarped. Antitank and artillery fires are
closely tied in to the obstacle plan. Dams and
other installations which could be used to flood
the river are guarded and destroyed on order of
the regimental commander.
The MRB, as part of the regiment's first-
echelon defenses, has the mission of preventing
the enemy from establishing a bridgehead. The
organization and conduct of the defense is similar
to that already described in Chapter 5.
122
Mortar battery (120mm)
—v- — -zv— Battalion boundary
A
Company commander s command observation post
• -vz- Regimental boundary
ПТН
Battalion commander's command observation post
Battalion technical observation point
Artillery concentration (numbered)
Artillery barrage (lettered)
Battalion medical point

Obstacle in a river
Company medical point
Obstacles on a river bank
ВЗП
Battalion retuelmg point
Bridge prepared for demolition
ВПП
Mixed minefield
(antipersonnel and
Battalion food supply point
Figure 88. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Defending a River Line.
123
combat until after unsealing, which takes about
20 minutes. It may, however, fire after emerging
from a snorkel crossing.
-	Contrary to doctrine, the Soviets seldom
practice river crossings during night or other con-
ditions of limited visibility. It is more likely that
the Soviets conduct reconnaissance, resupply,
and engineering preparation under conditions of
limited visibility and conduct crossings during
daylight hours.
-	River crossings are very complex operations
requiring close timing and coordination. Some
lack of control, congestion at crossing sites, and
late arrival of crossing equipment is inevitable
(particularly during operations with high rates of
advance), with subsequent opportunities for the
defense.
-	Regardless of the Soviet's formidable array
of amphibious vehicles and their excellent
engineer equipment, water barriers are obstacles
which will slow down the tempo of attack, par-
ticularly when the barriers are well defended.
Night Combat
2. THE NIGHT MARCH
While the planning sequence and operations
order format are the same for night and day
movements, the MRB commander takes addi-
tional measures to cope with difficulties posed by
night operations. These measures primarily in-
volve command and control, and security, and in-
clude the following:
-	The march column is shortened, with 25 to
30 meters between vehicles, and reconnaissance
and security units operate closer than normal to
the main body.
-	Reconnaissance and security units are larger
and more numerous due to the greater threat of
surprise attack by enemy forces.
-	Speed is reduced to 15 to 20 kilometers per
hour for a mixed column of BMPs, tanks, and
wheeled vehicles (this speed also depends upon
the condition of the vehicles and roads, and on
the training level of drivers).
6.	VULNERABILITIES
While formidable, Soviet river crossing techni-
ques contain certain vulnerabilities:
- Intended crossing sites may be prematurely
revealed by reconnaissance personnel.
- Although heavily reinforced, the MRB, when
establishing and defending a bridgehead, is
vulnerable to counterattack, particularly in the
early stages, when it is separated from its attach-
ed tanks and rear services. In the absence of
bridges, the tanks must snorkel or be transported
by ferry, while the rear services must also be fer-
ried across.
-- Snorkels are vulnerable to fire and may be
damaged prior to crossing. While under water,
tanks are vulnerable to a number of defensive
measures, to include undercut banks, tetra-
hedrons, floating logs, and napalm (napalm
detonated on the water's surface would suck all
the air out of the tanks under water, causing suf-
focation). Moreover, once a tank is sealed for a
water crossing, it cannot engage in sustained
Section E -
1.	GENERAL
The Soviet view on the importance of night
operations is contained in this typical quote:
Under contemporary conditions, there is
an increase in the significance and expan-
sion of the night attack which requires
persistent training of troops for opera-
tions under night conditions.
In spite of this written emphasis on night
operations, actual practice of night combat
techniques is sporadic and often unrealistic.
Although this section concentrates on how the
Soviets say night operations should be con-
ducted, the vulnerabilities paragraph at the end of
the section illustrates the disparity between doc-
trine and practice.
Night attacks may be supported or unsup-
ported, illuminated or nonilluminated. Normally a
Soviet night attack occurs after an artillery
preparation and will involve extensive use of il-
lumination.
124
-	- Short halts of 20 to 30 minutes every 2 to 3
hours are planned to help reduce driver fatigue
(long halts are normally not allowed at night).
-	Observers with night vision devices are plac-
ed throughout the column.
-	The regimental commander's plan for traffic
control is augmented as necessary by the bat-
talion commander. Extra traffic controllers are
detailed and posted at road junctions and other
key features along the route.
-	Signals for control, warning, and target in-
dication primarily involve the use of light and
pyrotechnics. As during day marches, radios are
on listening silence, although NBC and air warn-
ings, as well as the crossing of important phase
lines, are reported.
If organized properly, the march formation pro-
vides for the rapid movement, security, and com-
mand and control of the column, while avoiding
the need to reform in the event of a night
meeting engagement.
3.	THE NIGHT MEETING ENGAGEMENT
Although generally conducted in the same
manner as in daylight, the night meeting engage-
ment is more complicated. Its success primarily
depends upon the initiative and flexibility of the
battalion commander and his subordinates, as
well as upon the skillful use of night vision
devices and illumination equipment.
While helping to conceal the battalion's ad-
vance, night also slows down the MRB's initial
deployment and complicates command and con-
trol due to observation and orientation difficulties.
More emphasis is placed upon reconnaissance
to the flanks, and guides may be detached from
reconnaissance groups and security forces to help
the MRB deploy.
4.	THE NIGHT ATTACK
a.	General
The MRB engages in night operations in all
phases of combat. Night operations may be a
continuation of a daytime operation or the precur-
sor of a new stage of combat. The MRB may be
expected to launch independent night attacks for
limited objectives or to attack as part of the regi-
ment.
b.	Preparation
When possible, preparations for night combat
are done during daylight. This allows the battalion
commander the time and visibility to point out the
objectives, control features, and targets to his
subordinate commanders. In addition to normal
attack preparations, the battalion commander
does the following:
-	Designates a guide company and compass
bearing for the advance.
-	Determines the method of employing night
vision equipment and plans to supplement his
superiors' illumination plans (see paragraph
d).
-	Issues instructions for mutual recognition,
target identification and coordination, and the
method of signaling when phase lines have
been reached and objectives taken.
-	Orders the checking of night vision equip-
ment and vehicle lights.
-	Requests additional illumination, signaling
equipment, and tracer ammunition as re-
quired.
c.	Augmentation
As in other types of operations, the MRB is
augmented with tank, artillery, engineer, and
chemical units. A typical battalion grouping
would, in addition to the MRB assets, contain:
-	- One tank company.
-	- One artillery battery.
-	- One sapper platoon.
-	One chemical detachment.
If enemy minefields have to be negotiated, at
least one tank per platoon would have a
mineplow or roller.
d.	The Illumination Plan
The regimental commander and his staff
prepare the illumination plan. This plan includes:
-	- Illumination of objectives, axes of attack,
obstacles and reference points.
-	Blinding of enemy night vision equipment.
125
-	- Illumination targets for air and artillery.
-	Designation of specific batteries to provide
illumination.
Illumination is planned so as to silhouette
enemy forces and to interfere with the enemy's
night-vision devices.
The battalion commander supplements the
regimental commander's illumination plan with his
own assets. White arm bands are used by the
companies for mutual recognition; luminous
designs are put on combat vehicles to identify
units; flares are used to signal the crossing of
phase lines and the capture of objectives; move-
ment routes and passages through minefields are
usually marked with luminous markers turned
towards the attacking troops.
e.	Command and Control
In the attack, the battalion commander con-
trols the advance of the guide company and
moves directly behind it.
f.	Objectives, Rates of Advance, Attack Forma-
tions and Frontages
Under favorable conditions, the depth of the
MRB's objectives will be the same as during day-
light operations. Under less favorable conditions,
for example, when the attack must occur over
broken terrain, the battalion objective may be
shortened. If enemy resistance is light or if
nuclear weapons are used, the MRB may attack
mounted and aim for deeper objectives and
higher rates of advance. The Soviets anticipate
night rates of advance of 1.5 to 2 kilometers per
hour, and faster rates over especially level,
treeless ground without extensive manmade
obstacles.
Usually, the MRB will attack dismounted in
one echelon, all three companies abreast, with a
platoon in reserve. This formation places the bulk
of the battalion's combat power forward and
facilitates command and control. When the MRB
commander is less sure of his flanks and the
enemy situation, he may attack with two reinforc-
ed companies in the first echelon and one rein-
forced company in the second echelon (reserve).
In night attacks the second echelon (reserve) is
closer to the first echelon than during daylight at-
tacks.
Battalion night attack frontages over moderate
terrain are the same as during daylight: 1 to 2
kilometers. In rugged terrain, however, intervals
between BMPs are reduced, and the MRB attacks
on a narrower frontage.
g.	Conduct of the Attack
An artillery preparation of 20 to 30 minutes
usually precedes the night assault. (When secrecy
outweighs other factors, there may be a silent fire
plan, i.e., artillery on call, or the artillery prepara-
tion may be of shorter duration.) Sappers, closely
followed by tanks and dismounted infantry, move
out to prepare passages through enemy mine-
fields. Under optimum conditions (i.e., good
trafficability of the ground, light and/or neutraliz-
ed enemy antitank defenses, and good illumina-
tion), tanks may preceed dismounted infantry by
150 meters. Normally, however, tanks and in-
fantry attack closely together, separated by only
10 to 20 meters, thereby facilitating close coord-
ination, command, and control. BMPs also move
closer behind their infantry than during daylight
and support the attack by fire (figure 89).
Organic mortars and attached artillery provide
illumination and direct and indirect fire support.
The attached artillery commander accompanies
the MRB commander in the attack.
The battalion commander reports to regiment
the crossing of phase lines and the seizure of ob-
jectives. It is the battalion commander's respon-
sibility to initiate pursuit of withdrawing enemy
forces. Should the enemy be too strong, the
MRB establishes night defensive positions and
prepares to repulse enemy counterattacks.
h.	Transition from Nighttime to Daytime Opera-
tions
The major factor in changing from nighttime
to daytime operations is continuing the attack.
Before daybreak, additional tasks are allocated
and ammunition replenished. The battalion re-
serve, if not committed during the night, is used
to maintain the momentum of the attack. Recon-
naissance is intensified, and antiaircraft defense
and camouflage measures increased as daylight
approaches. If his first-echelon battalions are
unable to immediately conduct the pursuit, the
regimental commander commits his second-
echelon battalion or reserve to continue the
momentum of the attack.
126
KEY
Motorized rifle company reinforced by
tanks m the attack (tf denotes tanks
with mine rollers or mine-clearing plows)
Artillery battalion in firing position
Mortar battery (120mm)
Battalion command group
Battalion technical observation point
Alignment lights for marking boundaries
Illumination by mortars or artillery
Fire started to illuminate ground and blind the enemy
О U MR platoon
Mixed minefield (antipersonnel and antitank)
Battalion medical point
Battalion refueling point
Battalion food supply point
> '< Passage through minefield
Illumination post (rocket/flare)
domination post (tracer bullets)
Battalion ammunition supply point
NOTES
l	.The principal method of conducting illumination is periodic illumination which is used to illuminate separate sectors, targets,and objectives for short periods of
time.
2	.Coordinated illumination and high explosives are employed during artillery adjustment Continuous illumination begins when fire-for-effect missions commence
З	.Опе artillery piece tiring three rounds per minute, can provide continuous illumination over a frontage of 750 1000 meters. A battery can provide continuous
illumination over а 4 V? kilometer area
Figure 89.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Conducting a Night Attack.
127
5.	NIGHT DEFENSE
Three major factors involved in a night defense
are security, illumination, and forward defenses
(figure 90). The MRB, in addition to normal
defensive measures, makes the following special
preparations:
-	- Listening posts and foot patrols to the
front and flanks are increased in order to
reduce the possibility of surprise attack.
-	- A larger percentage of personnel on the
FEBA are maintained at full combat readi-
ness.
-	- The manning of daytime defenses changes;
crew-served weapons are moved to alternate
firing positions and attached and supporting
artillery and tanks are moved closer to the
FEBA. The MRB's rear services also move
forward.
-	The availability and serviceability of night-
vision devices are checked.
-	- Periodic illumination of the terrain forward
of the FEBA is scheduled. The senior com-
mander's illumination plan is supplemented by
battalion assets, as in the offensive.
-	Guide posts are established within the
MRB's AO to aid counterattacking forces.
The MRB commander positions his second
echelon (reserve) on key terrain astride the
enemy's must likely avenue of penetration.
Counterattacks are launched by the battalion's se-
cond echelon (reserve) in accordance with the
regimental commander's defense plan. Counter-
attacking forces normally have a shallow objec-
tive. Upon elimination of the penetration, con-
solidation takes place along with further efforts to
improve defenses.
Prior to daylight, the MRB commander plans
for the transition to daytime defense; casualties
are evacuated, resupply is accomplished, person-
nel are fed, and the manning of defenses is again
changed, resulting in more depth to the defensive
position.
6.	VULNERABILITIES
The discrepancy between doctrine and practice
is considerable. Although they are supposed to
spend about 40 percent of their tactical firing and
tactical exercises at night, Soviet units often do
not meet the requirement. Frequently, night tacti-
cal exercises are unrealistic; despite a variety of
night vision devices, vehicular headlights and
flashlights are often used to help maintain control
and orientation.
As in World War II, the Soviets will probably
continue to use the night primarily for troop
movement, attack preparation, construction of
fortifications, and resupply. Night attacks in
greater than regimental strength will probably be
a rarity (at least initially) and be undertaken
primarily to take an objective which could not be
taken during daylight.
The complexities of night operations are par-
ticularly evident at battalion level and below.
Two-year conscripts, inexperienced NCOs, and
junior officers unaccustomed to flexibility and in-
itiative, make night combat a costly affair. Higher
commanders seem reluctant to commit their
forces at night. Soviet commanders are, however,
aware of their deficiencies in night operations and
are attempting to correct them.
128
A
8TH MRC
WOODS
^MRB'^
SERVICES
(5X331
DUMMY
POSITION
(DAYTI
DUMMY
POSITION
(DAYTIME)
MRB
MRC
Artillery battalion in firing position
Mortar battery (120mm)
7ТН MRC
9TH MRC
Motorized rifle battalion
Motorized rifle company

“MRB
... RESERVES'
/(DAYTIME
POSITION)
KEY
0
Tank
Battalion medical point
Battalion food supply point

Battalion refueling point
Battalion commander’s command-observation post
A
Company commander’s command-observation post
Battalion ammunition supply point
Battalion technical observation point
Combat vehicle with antitank missiles
Company ammunition supply point
Listening post
Ambush
Battalion boundary
Regimental boundary
Mixed minefield (antipersonnel and antitank)
Figure 90.	A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Night Defense.
129
Section F- Seaborne Assault and Defense of a Coastline
1.	GENERAL
Although relatively little has been written about
the MRB conducting seaborne assaults and de-
fending a coastline, these are probably current
missions of some motorized rifle troops. More-
over, there is sound historical precedent for using
army troops in this manner.
2.	HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
During World War II, the Soviets conducted
over 100 seaborne assaults. Twenty-five naval in-
fantry brigades of 3000 men each usually provided
the first-echelon assault forces in these opera-
tions. Special naval detachments (armed and
trained for land combat, but separate from the
naval infantry) and army units often comprised
the second echelon and reserves for these opera-
tions.
Five factors in World War II Soviet seaborne
assault operations have current relevance:
-	Soviet naval infantry, relatively few in
number, had to be augmented by naval
detachments and army units.
-	The naval infantry were usually withdrawn
once the beachhead was secured.
-	Seaborne assaults were rarely conducted
by units larger than a regiment. This was in
part due to a critical shortage of landing craft,
and the subsequent use of fishing boats,
launches, and whatever else was available.
Seaborne assaults were frequently conducted
at night and usually successful in spite of
high casualties.
-	The existence of seaborne assault forces
immobilized large numbers of German troops.
-	The naval commander was usually in com-
mand while forces were afloat, while the
senior landing force commander was in
change once the landing site was secured.
Today, the Soviet naval infantry (figure 91),
consisting of approximately 15,000 men organized
in 6 regiments, has the primary mission of
seaborne assault. In event of war, because of
their small numbers and light equipment, Soviet
naval infantry would probably be augmented by
specially trained army units. Due to relatively
small numbers of amphibious craft, sea assault
operations would probably be conducted in bat-
talion and regimental strength. Whenever possi-
ble, naval infantry would form the first echelon of
the assault force (figure 92), with motorized rifle
units comprising the second echelon and reserve;
in other cases, specially trained army forces might
comprise the whole assault force.
Figure 91. Naval Infantry on Parade in Moscow.
130
and transit phases to decrease the damage of
nuclear attack.
Figure 92. Naval Infantry Often Form The First Echelon in a
Seaborne Assault.
In addition to normal attack planning, the
MRB commander conducts reconnaissance of the
waiting area, embarkation point, and the alternate
sites, prepares men and equipment for loading
aboard ships, and conducts loading and beach
assault exercises with the navy.
b. Augmentation
As in most other operations, the MRB
receives reinforcement according to METT. In this
case, it has been reinforced as follows:
-	- One tank company (PT-76 amphibious
tanks).
-	- One artillery battery.
-	One air defense platoon.
-	- One sapper platoon.
3.	MISSIONS
The MRB in a seaborne assault could have the
following missions:
-	The capture of key terrain and installations
(islands, land areas bordering strategic straits,
ports, coastal airfields, etc).
-	The conduct of diversionary raids and
reconnaissance.
-	Securing a beachhead for the opening of a
new front.
These operations would be primarily designed
to aid land offensives already in progress or about
to start. Quite often, seaborne assaults involve
heliborne and/or airborne forces.
4.	THE ASSAULT
a. Planning
Strategic seaborne assault missions would be
planned primarily at front level by a joint opera-
tions group consisting of naval, air, and army per-
sonnel. The landing force is assigned a waiting
area, 10 to 15 kilometers from the embarkation
point, a main embarkation point with one or two
alternates, and a main debarkation point with one
or two alternates (figure 93).Unnecessary concen-
tration of forces is avoided during embarkation
- One ground-air-navy support team (to ad-
just naval gunfire and air support).
c.	Loading
Loading principles include unit integrity and
reverse loading (first off, last on). Logistical
elements load first, followed by the reserve, se-
cond echelon, and first echelon. The battalion
commander probably lands with (or immediately
behind) his first echelon. Whenever possible,
loading and moving to the objective area is done
at night.
d.	Transport Craft
The Soviet Navy uses three principle types of
amphibious ships: the ALLIGATOR Class LST,
the ROPUCHA Class LST, and the POLNOCNY
Class LSM (figure 94). The Soviets are also using
air-cushion vehicles which, because of their speed
and ability to operate over land and water, pro-
vide a new dimension to amphibious operations
(figure 95).
e.	Transit and Preassault Phases
Ideally, transit of the amphibious task force
occurs during darkness or other periods of limited
visibility. Missile and antisubmarine escort vessels
protect and provide cover for the assault forces.
Ships armed with missiles, guns, and rockets pro-
vide preparatory fire and naval gunfire support for
131
the assault troops during the latter's inland ad-
vance. Minesweepers, under cover of naval and
air bombardment, clear channels through mine-
fields and are followed by hydrographic and
hydrometeorological vessels, which provide
weather data, take soundings, determine the bot-
tom contours in approaches to landing sites, and
mark the cleared channels through minefields.
Navy underwater-demolition teams are trans-
ported by high-speed watercraft and/or helicopter
to clear water and beach obstacles. If possible, a
minimum of one channel is cleared for each MR
company.
f.	Assault
The assault may be preceded by a
heliborne/airbome operation in conjunction with
air attacks in the objective area (figure 96).
Helibome/airborne forces often have the mission
of blocking the arrival of enemy reinforcements
into the beachhead. In an unopposed landing or
against light resistance, the MRB in most cases
offloads on the beach.
In an opposed landing, BMPs, amphibious
tanks, and/or tanks equipped with snorkels leave
their landing ships at sea and swim ashore. Once
ashore, the MRB's attack is similar to that already
described.
Figure 93. Embarkation and Debarkation Points.
132
a. ALLIGATOR Class.
b. ROPUCHA Class.
Figure 94. Amphibious Ships.
133
c. POLNOCNY Class.
Figure 94. Amphibious Ships. (Continued)
Figure 95. Amphibious Assaults May Be Conducted With Air Cushion Vehicles.
134
KEY
Motorized nfie company (one platoon of
MRC amphibious tanks is attached to each company i
Escort craft
Missile ship
Amphibious tank (PT-76)
Light cruiser
BMP
Destroyer
Motorized rifle company (subsequent
location) reinforced by tanks in the attack
Small minesweeper
ги..t Landing craft
Motorized rifle platoon (subsequent location)
Drop zone for an airborne operation
NOTES
1. The motorized rifle battalion’s attached artillery, air defense, and rear service elements land as soon as possible after the assault wave(s).
2. The battalion is supported all the way to the objective (s) by naval gunfire and air (when available)
Figure 96. A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Conducting an Amphibious Assault.
135
5.	DEFENSE OF A SEA COAST
a.	Genera!
The defense of a sea coast is very similar to
the defense of a river line. Normally the MRB will
defend a coastline as part of the regiment,
though it may defend isolated sectors indepen-
dently.
b.	Mission
The MRB's mission is to prevent amphibious,
airborne, and heliborne landings within its area of
operations.
c.	Frontages, Depths and Formations
When the battalion is assigned its normal fron-
tage of 2.5 kilometers (5 kilometers in nuclear
conditions), it usually defends in two echelons;
when given a wider frontage, it defends in one
echelon, with all three companies on line and one
platoon in reserve. Depth of the battalion forma-
tion is up to 2.5 kilometers. The FEBA is located
as close as possible to the water's edge and is
usually not more than 500 meters from it. The
mission of the battalion reserve reflects a greater-
than-normal concern for enemy airborne, heli-
borne, and diversionary forces in the battalion's
rear area. The mission of the reserve is to combat
these forces, as well as to destroy penetrations by
amphibious forces.
d.	Augmentation
Along with the usual artillery, air defense,
armor, engineer, and chemical support, the MRB
can be supported by coastal batteries and
ground-based naval air power. In the latter case,
air-ground support liaison personnel are also
assigned to the MRB. Naval engineers, while not
attached to the MRB, construct water and beach
obstacles in front of the FEBA.
e.	The Battalion Defensive Position
As in normal operations, reinforced company
strongpoints form the basis of the battalion's
defensive position. Time permitting, alternate and
dummy strongpoints are also organized.
f.	Conduct of the Defense
The conduct of a coastal defense is practically
the same as defense of a river line. Every effort is
taken to destroy the enemy in the water and to wipe
out his airborne/heliborne forces before they move
out of their landing and drop zones.
6.	VULNERABILITIES
Amphibious landings are unlikely unless the
Soviets have local air and naval supremacy-a dif-
ficult task in some geographical areas in light of the
present lack of sufficient seaborne airpower. Naval
air and other air forces, when within range, support
most amphibious operations, but may not be as ef-
fective as air support provided by carrier-based air-
power of certain Western nations, due to the proxi-
mity of the carriers and specialized pilot training.
The relatively small number of amphibious craft
also limits Soviet seaborne assault capabilities,
although the large Soviet merchant marine partial-
ly offsets this problem.
13 6
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS
The Soviets recognize three types of combat
action: the offense, the defense, and the meeting
engagement, with the latest practiced most often.
Soviet doctrine stresses that the offensive is the
only decisive form of combat and that the main
purpose of the offensive is the complete destruc-
tion of the enemy’s forces. The Soviets hope to
achieve high rates of advance (30 to 50 kilometers
per day in conventional operations and 60 to 80
kilometers per day under nuclear conditions) from
combined arms units operating in conjunction
with airborne, heliborne, and special operations
forces in the enemy rear area.
Since the October 1973 War, the Soviets have
placed even more emphasis on combined arms
operations and have made numerous organiza-
tional and tactical adjustments to increase the
survivability of their tank forces. Numbers of
tanks and artillery pieces (especially SP artillery)
within the MRD have increased. The tank remains
the backbone of combined arms operations.
The BMP-equipped MRB is a highly maneu-
verable, but relatively small, combat unit with
considerable organic firepower, particularly in an-
titank weaponry. It normally operates as part of
the MRR. The MRB's size and limited organic
logistical assets make augmentation necessary for
many operations. The MRB is often augmented
by motorized rifle regiment and/or divisional
assets to form a heavily reinforced combined
arms grouping to carry out a variety of missions.
The battalion commander's age, education, and
political awareness provide the theoretical basis
for effective command. His field training and
peacetime command assignments partially offset
his lack of combat experience. Soviet command
theory and operational concepts, however, result
in highly centralized control at regimental level
and constrict the MRB commander's initiative
within the narrow parameters of highly detailed
orders. Though technically well trained, Soviet
battalion and company commanders often fail to
exploit the strong points of their men and equip-
ment during field training exercises. Training pro-
cedures indicate the limited flexibility of junior
officers and NCOs. More flexible Western com-
manders should be able to exploit these weak-
nesses, particularly during operations which place
a premium on initiative and flexibility.
Battalion-level training, technically thorough
and highly centralized, stresses fundamentals and
results in effective battle drill. Tactical training
which is repeatedly practiced includes the march,
the meeting engagement, water-crossing opera-
tions, negotiating minefields, antiair and anti-
helicopter tactics, and operating in an NBC en-
vironment. Moral-political training is stressed and,
while boring for many, probably succeeds in con-
veying the propaganda of the CPSU. Training ef-
fectiveness is complicated by the 2-year term of
service and the subsequent high turnover of con-
scripts.
The MRB is capable of conducting offensive
and defensive operations under special condi-
tions: combat in built-up areas, heliborne opera-
tions, water barrier operations, night combat,
seaborne assault, and defense of a coastline.
Training for these operations varies. Though the
MRB must be judged capable of conducting
urban combat operations, these operations could
be costly and slow. At least one MRB per MRD is
trained to conduct heliborne operations. These
operations are normally conducted within range
of Soviet artillery, due to the limited staying
power and mobility of the heliborne force.
Though formidable, Soviet river crossing capa-
bilities also possess limitations. Crossing opera-
tions are complex and would slow down the tem-
po of attack, particularly when the water obstacle
is well defended. When establishing a bridgehead,
the MRB is especially vulnerable to counterattack.
Battalion night combat training is not consistent
with doctrinal requirements, which call for more
night tactical training than is actually conducted.
Two-year conscripts, inexperienced NCOs, and
junior officers not accustomed to flexibility and in-
itiative would initially make night combat costly.
Very few MRBs receive training in seaborne
assault. In wartime, MR troops would probably
provide the second echelon for naval infantry
assault forces and secure the objective.
The MRB is most effective when operating as
part of the regiment. The institutional and opera-
tional framework within which the battalion com-
mander operates, however, is not conducive to
the flexibility and initiative required in independent
battalion operations and in other operations in
which the regimental commander and his staff are
not present. This would be especially true during
nuclear conditions.
137
APPENDIX
SOVIET SYMBOLS
1	Soviet symbols ere numerous and descriptive1 They are used in this study
to serve as a training aid.
2	The Soviets depict their forces in red and enemy forces in blue
3	Symbols
A) Ground
(1)	Motorized rifle
(a) Abbreviations2
MR	Motorized	rifle
MRR	Motorized	rifle	regiment
MRB	Motorized	rifle	battalion
MRC	Motorized	rifle	company
(b) Weapons
Antitank guided missile
Combat vehicle with antitank missiles
(c) Vehicles
BMP
A PC
Damaged BMP
(d) Units
1 Medical
Regimental medical point
Regimental ambulance
Battalion commander
(f) Command/Observation Posts
Regimental headquarters
Regimental commander’s command observation post
Battalion commander's command observation post
Company commander's command observatcn post
Platoon leader's command-observation post
Observation post
(g) Rear Services
^lllO—OU
Motorized rifle regiment m march column
Motorized rifle battalion reinforced by tanks and
artillery in march column
00
Ambulance relay poml
Battalion medical point
+ V U

Motorized rifle company m march column
Motorized rifle company reinforced by tanks and
artillery in march column
Motorized rifle platoon in march column
Motorized rifle battalion reinforced by tanks
in the attack
Motorized rifle company reinforced by tanks
m the attack
Motorized rifle company m the attack
Motorized rifle platoon m the attack
Battalion ambulance with trailer
Medical earner
Medic bearer unit
Battalion feld sher
Instructor on sanitary and medical matters
Company medical point
Group of wounded in a shelter
(figure ts the number of wounded)
Motorized rifle company m the defense
2 Supply
Battalion refueling point
Motorized rifle platoon in the defense
Fuel truck
Reconnaissance patrol
(e) Individuals
tj Battalion commander’s location during the march
Fuel truck with trailer
Regimental resupply vehicle
Battalion resupply vehicle
1 The mam source used for these symbols is (U) Soviet Armed Forces Military Symbols. DDI-268O-41-77. October 1977
2 These are not Soviet abbreviations
139
ьпг?
Battalion ammunition supply point
Company ammunition supply point
Battalion ammunition truck
шиш
WWW
Continuous standard trench or defensive position
in general
Concertina wire obstacle
Portable obstacle
Battalion food supply point
Barbed wire barrier or fence with barbed wire
Field kitchen (va । pak 170/200)
Mined barracade
Truck with field 'chen trailer
Ж t Ж Ж
Antitank hedgehogs
Truck with water trailer
Damaged kitchen
Platoon lood distribution point
Blockhouse
Obstacle m a nver
Obstacles on a river bank
3 Mamtenance/Evacuation
(2) Armor
(a) Vehicles
Regimental repair and evacuation group
Tank
Battalion repair and evacuation group
Battalion technical observation point
Repair workshop with trailer
Damaged tank
Mme sweeping tank equipped with mn -
Amphibious tank (PT 76)
Tank retriever
(b) Units
Truck tractor
Tank company in march column
Collection point tor damaged vehicles The upper
letter indicates the type of vehicle (tankinthe
example), while the lower letter indicates the unit
(regiment in the example)
Repairs accomplished by a repair and
evacuation group (REG) m a shelter
Tank platoon in march column
Tank company m the attack
(h) Structures/obstades
(3) Artillery
(a) Weapons
Destroyed bridge
Bridge prepared for demoiiton
Mixed minefield (antipersonnel and antitank)
122mm howitzer
Mortar (120mm) towed by a truck
Antitank gun
Mortar (120mm) in firing position
140
Target-mortar
telephone monitoring or control station
Damaged mortar
О	Target-antitank gun
Communication center
Basic symbol to indicate radio communication 01
the direction of radio communication.
(b) Units
(6) Boundaries3
IH -Z—	Artillery battalion in march column
Division boundary
Antitank battery in march column
Regimental or separate battalion boundary
Antiaircraft battery in march column
Battalion boundary
Mortar battery (120mm) in march column
Artillery battery in firing position
B. Air
Squadron (helicopter) in flight
Mortar (120mm) in firing position
------goo Aerial (helicopter) mine laying
Artillery battalion in firing position.
X-----s—I	Combat helicopter
X--------1 Reconnaissance helicopter
(ci Barrage/concentrations
Landing by a helicopter landing force
Artillery concentration
A| " ' I Artillery barrage
Missile ship
(4) Engineer
Light cruiser
Truck mounted bridge
Destroyer
3<K61
River crossing site with number and type of transport
(in this case, a crossing site where 3 x K61s will operate)
Small minesweeper
< дмп | Ponton bridge sections
Landing craft
PMP crossing site
Escort craft
Assault crossing site for BMPs
D. Miscellaneous
(5) Communications
Depression
Line terminating in a telephone set
3. The hoops in the boundary symbols are used to include (excluc )
terrain features and structures. There are no company boundat >.
141
Oft-loaded ammunition
Area designated for occupation by troops
Control line
Alignment lights for marking boundaries
Illumination by mortars or artillery
Fires started to illuminate the ground and blind
the enemy
Passage through an area
Withdrawal by a unit from an occupied position
Illumination post (rocket/flare)
Listening post
Ambush
illumination post (tracer bullets)
142
DISTRIBUTION LIST
DOD AND JOINT AGENCIES		B362 B575		DIA/DB-1B1 DIA/DB-1	1 1
A009	OASD ATOM ENERGY	1	B576	DIA/DB-1A	1
A010	AFSCOL	1	B591	DIA/DB-1 E	1
A015	DARPA	1	B734	DIA/DB-5E	1
A024	DEF NUCLEAR AGCY	1	B563	DIA/DB-1E2	2
A085	NAT DEF UNIVERSITY	1	B777	DIA/DN-2B1	1
A100	OSD	1	B552	DIA/RSS-2	15
A115	OASD ISA	1	B855	USD AO AUSTRIA	1
A117	OASD PA&E	1	B856	USDAO BELGIUM	1
A137	OASD A/MBFR-PP	1	B859	USDAO BULGARIA	1
A300	JCS	1	B862	USDAOCANADA	1
A315	JCS/SAGA	2	B871	USDAO CZECHOSLOVAK	1
A325	JCS/J-3	1	B872	USDAO DENMARK	1
A335	JCS/J-4	1	B876	USDAO ENGLAND	1
A340	JCS/J-5MILSEC	1	B878	USDAO FINLAND	1
A353	JSTPS	1	B879	USDAOFRANCE	1
A361	USLO SACLANT	1	В 880	USDAO GERMANY	1
A364	USR&DCOORD SHAPE	1	B882	USDAO GREECE	1
A096	NEACP	1	B886	USDAO HUNGARY	1
A097	DIAGRPANMCC	1	B893	USDAO ITALY	1
A104	OASD (CCC&I)	1	В 908	USDAO NETHERLANDS	1
A362	USDOCOLANDSOEAST	1	B912	USDAO NORWAY	1
A363	USNMR SHAPE	1	B917	USDAOPOLAND -	1
A368	USRMC/NATO	1	B918	USDAO PORTUGAL	1
A835	UNIT MM	1	B919	USDAO ROMANIA	1
A916	MAAGIRAN	1	B933	USDAO TURKEY	1
			B934	USDAO USSR	1
DIA			B939	USDAO YUGOSLAVIA	1
B040	DIA/DIO	2	NAVY		
B055	DIA/DT-4B	1			
B080	DIA/SWS	1	D008	NISC	1
B100	DIA/DB	1	D032	NAVPHIBSCOL	1
B132	DIA/DE-1	1	D150	CMC(INT)	25
B134	DIA/DE-2	1	D151	NAVEODFAC IND HEAD	1
B155	DIA/RDS-3A4 PP	1	D152	NISCCBD DET 0003	1
B159	DIA/DT-1A1	1	D159	NAVAIRDEVCEN	1
B162	DIA/DT-1A2	1	D202	NAVWARCOL	1
B169	DIA/DT-2D	1	D216	NAVWPNSUPPCEN	1
B322	DIA/DN-2G1	1	D217	NAVWPNCEN	1
B351	DIA/RDS-3D2	1	D246	NAVSURFWPNCEN DAHL	1
B363	DIA/DB-1B2	1	D247	NAVSURFWPNCEN WOAK	1
B364	DIA/DB-1B3	1	D249	NAVPGSCOL	1
B485	DIA/IS	1	D263	NOSC	1
B545	DIA/VP	1	D280	OP-098D	1
B565	DIA/DB-1F1	1	D492	NAVSCOLEOD	1
B566	DIA/DB-1F2	1	D507	COMINEWARCOM	1
B571	DIA/DB-4G1	1	D510	CHNAVMAT (MAT-091)	1
B573	DIA/DB-4E	1	D560	NMEDRSCHINST BETH	1
B574	DIA/DB-4G5	1	D766	NAVCOASTSYSLAB	1
B579	DIA/DN-2B2	4	D900	NFOIO	1
B580	DIA/DB-1B5	1	D971	OP-009F	1
B581	DIA/DB-1B	1	D972	OP-009U	1
B582	DIA/DB-1C	1	D058	OP-604	1
B583	DIA/DB-1D	1	D496	DIRSSPO	1
B584	DIA/DB-1 B4	30	D814	NAVSUPPACTTI	1
B586	DIA/DB-4D1	1			
B593	DIA/DB-1G2	1	AIRFORCE		
B594	DIA/DB-1F	2			
B597	DIA/DB-1G1	1	E016	AFIS/INC	1
B615	DIA/DN-2C	1	E017	AFIS/INSA-W	1
B722	DIA/DB-5B	1	E018	AFIS/INSA-C	1
B731	DIA/DB-5F	1	E046	7602 AINTELG/INOAA	1
B737	DIA/RDS-3B3 (LIB)	5	E053	AF/INAKA	1
B763	DIA/DB-4C3	1	E054	AF/INAKB	1
B787	DIA/DB-1 F3	1	E100	TAC (460 RTS/LDD)	3
B252	DIA/RSS-3B	1	E200	AAC	1
DL-1
E303	AF/INAP	1	J515	FICEURLANT	1
E408	AFWL	1	J517	COMNAVSURFLANT	1
E411	ASD/FTD/NICD	1	J576	COMPHIBGRU 2	1
E429	SAMSO (IND)	1	J991	FITCLANT	1
E436	AFEWC/EST	1	K005	CINCPAC	1
E437	AFIS/INI	1	K007	COMUSJAPAN	1
Б438	USAFSACS/TTVL	1	K020	COMUSTDC	1
E451	AUL/LSE	1 .	K100	PACAF548RTG	1
E500	3420TCHTG/TTMNL	1	K115	5TH AF	1
E552	6911 SCTYS (M)	1	K300	IPAC(CODE IC-L)	1
E553	6912 SCTYS	1	K408	COMLATWINGPAC (42B2)	1
Е5Б9	6931 SCTYS	1	K500	CINCPACFLT	1
E560	6944 SCTYW	1	K505	FICPAC	1
E563	6948 SCTYS (M)	1	K515	COMSEVENTHFLT	1
E565	6964 SCTYS	1	K650	COMNAVSURFPAC	1
E566	6981 SCTYS	1	K658	COMUSNAVPHIL	1
E567	6985 SCTYS	1	K679	FLTCORGRU1	1
E706	USAFSS/IN	1	L005	CINCSAC	1
E409	AMD	1	L040	SAC 544TMS/TGOML	1
E410	ADTC	1	N005	USREDCOM	1
U&S COMMANDS		(	>THER		
G005	CINCAD	1	P055	CIA/OCR/ADD/SD	14
H005	USCINCEUR	1	P085	STATE	7
H006	USEUCOM DEFANALCTR	1	P090	NSA	5
H010	SOTFE (J-3)	1	R145	ACDA	2
H101	USAFE 497RTG (IRC)	1	S030	FRD LIB OF CONG	1
H007	SILK PURSE	1			
		TOTAL DIA DISTRIBUTION			424
		ARMY DISTRIBUTION			
Active	Army, US AR: To be distributed	in accordance	with DA	Form 12-9A requirements for	Military
Intelligence-В (Qty requirement block No. 337). ARNG: None					... 7,900
MARINE CORPS DISTRIBUTION
Distribution code: L91......................................................................................1,475
DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY
DI A DISTRIBUTION....................................424
DI A STOCK...........................................551
DI A TOTAL ..........................................975
ARMY DISTRIBUTION .................................7,900
MARINE CORPS DISTRIBUTION........................  1.475
TOTAL PRINT ......................................10,350
DISTRIBUTION LIST (MICROFICHE)
DIA
B352	DIA/RDS-3A2C STOCK	5
B737 DIA/RDS-3B3 (LIB)	1
ARMY
C200	USAAGPUBCTR	50
NAVY
D584	FIRSTP AC 047.0	1
AIRFORCE
E408	AFWL	1
U&S COMMANDS
K408	COMLATWINGPAC (42B2)	1
TOTAL PRINT	59
DL-2