Hamas and Ideology

Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī is regarded as the most influential contemporary Muslim religious
figure. His best-selling book, Al-Ḥalal wal-Ḥaram fi al-Islam (The Forbidden and the
Permitted in Islam), is perhaps one of the most widely read Islamic works, after the Qurʾān.
The subject of jihad in Palestine is a salient feature of Qaraḍāwī’s thought and is addressed
frequently in his books. His views on Israel and on the Jews shape those of many Muslims
throughout the world.
This book paints al-Qaraḍāwī’s portrait within the context of the subject of the struggle for
Palestine and assesses why he is committed so fervently to the Palestinian course. It also sheds
light on another important aspect of al-Qaraḍāwī’s thought, namely the marked contrast
between his ideas regarding the Muslim world and his views on relations with other religions
and countries. Whereas al-Qaraḍāwī is considered to be a moderate in Islamic matters, his
attitude toward the Jews and to Israel is one of abiding hatred and uncompromising struggle.
The book aims to classify Qaraḍāwī’s thought along the axis of moderation and extremism by
drawing comparisons between Qaraḍāwī’s teachings and those of other Muslim jurists.
Furthermore, it compares the features of antisemitic writing with that of Qaraḍāwī in order to
answer the question as to whether Qaraḍāwī’s teachings actually constitute an expression of
anti-semitism.
Despite the subject of jihad in Palestine being so central to Qaraḍāwī’s thought, there has
not been a comprehensive and systematic academic study of this to date. The book therefore
represents a major contribution to the field and will appeal to anyone studying the Israel–
Palestine Conflict, Islamic Studies, Jewish Studies, Terrorism and Political Violence.
Shaul Bartal is a teaching associate in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan
University. He is a specialist on Palestinian affairs and Islamic fundamentalism.
Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer is Assistant Professor in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies
at Bar-Ilan University. Her research focuses on classical Islamic law and the relations between
Islam and Judaism.

Israeli History, Politics and Society
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62 Israel, the Arabs and Iran
International Relations and Status Quo, 2011–2016
Ehud Eilam
63 The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1956–1975
From violent conflict to a peace process
Moshe Gat
64 Hamas and Ideology
Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on the Jews, Zionism and Israel
Shaul Bartal and Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer
Israel: The First Hundred Years (Mini Series)
Edited by Efraim Karsh
1 Israel’s Transition from Community to State, edited by Efraim Karsh
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3 Politics and Society since 1948, edited by Efraim Karsh
4 Israel in the International Arena, edited by Efraim Karsh
5 Israel in the Next Century, edited by Efraim Karsh

Hamas and Ideology
Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on the Jews, Zionism and Israel

Shaul Bartal and Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer

First published 2018
by Routledge
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© 2018 Shaul Bartal and Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Bartal, Shaul, author. | Rubinsten-Shemer, Nesya, author.
Title: Hamas and ideology : Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi on the Jews,
Zionism and Israel / Shaul Bartal and Nesya Rubinsten-Shemer.
Other titles: Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi on the Jews, Zionism and Israel |
Cass series—Israeli history, politics, and society ; 64.
Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge,
2018. | Series: Israeli history, politics and society ; 64 | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017037921 | ISBN 9781138300392 (hbk) | ISBN
9780203733554 (ebk)
Subjects: LCSH: Qaradawi, Yusuf. | Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah. |
Zionism. | Antisemitism. | Jewish-Arab relations—Religious aspects—
Islam. | Arab-Israeli conflict.
Classification: LCC BP80.Q357 B37 2018 | DDC 320.55/7—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017037921
ISBN: 978-1-138-30039-2 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-73355-4 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Introduction
1 Qaraḍāwī’s ties to Palestine
1. The landscape of Qaraḍāwī’s youth
2. First visit to Palestine
3. Second visit to Palestine
4. The last visit to Palestine, May 2013
5. A role model
Conclusion
2 Spiritual forefathers: Ḥasan al-Banna, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini, Sayyid Quṭb
1. Ḥasan al-Banna
2. The Mufti, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseinī
3. Sayyid Quṭb
Conclusion
3 Religious sources of the Israel-Palestine conflict
1. Islamic ties to Palestine
2. The roots of the conflict: Muhammad and the Jews of Medina
3. Deeper roots: Isaac and Ishmael
4. Ishmael as the spiritual successor of Abraham
5. The story of the binding of Isaac (the ‘Aqedah’, ‫)עקדת יצחק‬
6. Canaanites vs. Khazars
7. The purchase of the cave of the Patriarchs
Conclusion
4 What is Zionism?
1. Know the enemy

2. The character of the Jews
3. Zionism: a conspiracy against the Muslim world
4. The reasons for the conflict and hatred between Muslims and the Zionist state
5. The Judaization of the world
6. The Judaization of the Arab mind (Tahwῑd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabῑ)
7. The Freemasons: the long arm of world Jewry
8. Learning from the enemy: unity; faith; democracy
Conclusion
5 Sheikh Qaraḍāwῑ: spiritual leader of Hamas and the Islamic Movement in Israel
1. Successor to Aḥmad Yāsīn
2. Hamas activism according to Qaraḍāwī
3. Qaraḍāwī and acts of sacrifice
4. The difference between Al-Qaeda and Hamas
5. Wither Hamas?
6. Support for the Islamic Movement and the judaization of Jerusalem
7. Like pupil to his master: Sheikh Raed Salah and Qaraḍāwī
Conclusion
6 A true partnership: Qaraḍāwī, Hamas and the Islamic Movement
1. Legal subordination and financial aid
2. The perpetuation of the legacy of Qaraḍāwī by Hamas
3. Qaraḍāwī’s place in the military and organizational writings of Hamas
4. Qaraḍāwī and the Islamic Movement headed by Raed Salah
5. Qaraḍāwī in the service of Hamas and the trade in the tunnels
6. The question of visiting Jerusalem
7. Qaraḍāwī’s support for Hamas during the wars in Gaza
8. Gaza: the most important Jihad
9. Jihad in Palestine: an obligation for every Palestinian
10. Hamas is not a terrorist organization
11.Islamic solidarity
Conclusion
7 Qaraḍāwī: between anti-Zionism and anti-semitism
1. Is it only anti-Zionist thought?
2. Features of the new anti-semitism

3. Political anti-semitism
4. Ideological anti-semitism
5. Religious anti-semitism
6. Cultural anti-semitism
7. Economic anti-semitism
8. Holocaust denial
9. Justifying terror against Jews
10. Discrimination against Israel
11. The historical background of Qaraḍāwī’s work
12. “Am I an antisemite?”: Qaraḍāwī assesses himself
Conclusion
Epilogue
Bibliography
Index

Introduction

Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926) is an extremely popular Egyptian-Qatari Muslim legal
authority who wields great influence upon large swaths of the Muslim public. Many scholars
regard him as the most influential Muslim jurist of our time.1 Qaraḍāwī owes his popularity
and influence mainly to successful use of the media, namely, television, internet and the
circulation of his books. His weekly program on the Al Jazeera network, Al-Sharīʿa wal-Ḥayāt
(Islamic Law and Life), attracted some 60 million Muslims worldwide.2 Therefore, Qaraḍāwī
has become the topic of numerous studies by Western scholars. These may be divided into
several categories, according to subject, as follows:
There are many works about the nature of Qaraḍāwī’s thought. These deal with deciphering his complex and
controversial persona. Some have attempted to dwell upon the nature of his thought and categorize it by asking whether
it is modern, moderate, liberal or Islamist. Among the scholars who have written about Qaraḍāwī and Modernism are
Samuel Helfont 3 and Wendelin Wenzel-Teuber. 4 Wenzel-Teuber regards Qaraḍāwī as a modernist and a moderate, while
Helfont presents a more complex picture and shows the different aspects of Qaraḍāwī’s thought. According to Helfont,
his thought is basically Islamist and the fact that he uses modern arguments does not make him into a moderate. The
reason why Qaraḍāwī is considered a moderate in the West derives from the fact that he perceives himself as belonging
to the school of Wasaṭiyya (literally, the center) – the centrist path between religious extremism and secularism.
Qaraḍāwī, however, objects to both of them. Sagi Polka,5 Raymond W. Baker6 and Bettina Gräf7 have written studies
about Wasaṭiyya. Gudrun Krämer has written about Qaraḍāwī’s perception of secularism and argues that he is relatively
moderate according to radical Muslims, but not liberal enough for Westerners.8 In contrast, basing himself upon
Qaraḍāwī’s opinions about radicalism, Charles Kurzman9 argues that he actually is liberal. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy
that Qaraḍāwī has expressed conservative views on subjects such as secularism and attitudes toward minorities and
homosexuals. These studies only provide a partial picture because they are based upon different writings of Qaraḍāwī. As
the individual studies are based only on a part of his work, each one reveals a different aspect of his complex personality.
Beside these works there are also some researches dealing with Qaraḍāwī’s Personal Biography.10

Qaraḍāwī is one of the inventors of the new doctrine in Islamic law entitled Fiqh alAqalliyyāt, laws for Muslim minorities living in the West. Thus, there are several studies about
this new system of legal rullings and its place in Muslim life in Europe.11
Qaraḍāwī is known for his support in the Islamic revival in the Arab World and the West.
Scholarly works have been written regarding his political outlook concerning the Islamic
revival.12
Different studies analyze Qaraḍāwī’s methods of making legal decisions and rulings. There
are studies about Qaraḍāwī’s methods of making legal decisions on specific issues such as
Islamic banking or the status of women.13 Some focus upon his rulings (fatāwā).14
Qaraḍāwī Global activity is also a case study. There are studies about Qaraḍāwī’s

intervention in establishing various institutions, such as the European Council for fatwa and
research (ECFR), the International Union of Muslim scholars (IUMS), etc. In addition, there are
works about the globalization of Islamic knowledge through Qaraḍāwī’s use of the media.15
The attitudes of Arab scholars toward Qaraḍāwī’s rulings and his legal status gravitate
between the polar opposites of admiration and criticism. Several monographs, written in
Arabic, are full of admiration for him.16 There is also a book which analyzes Qaraḍāwī’s
poetry.17 A voluminous work that summarizes the different aspects of Qaraḍāwī’s personality
was published in 2012. It treats Qaraḍāwī as a jurist, a poet, and, above all, as a fighter for the
Palestinian cause. The book actually is a summary of a conference that took place in Gaza in
2010, convened by the Hamas government for the purpose of honoring Qaraḍāwī for his
efforts on behalf of the Palestinians.18 Needless to say, it is full of admiration for Qaraḍāwī. On
the other hand, however, Salafists, secularists and Shiites have attacked him in a variety of
Arabic works.19
The subject of Jihad (literally, the effort that a believer must undertake for the sake of God,
either in war or in faith) in Palestine is a salient feature of Qaraḍāwī’s thought and is
addressed frequently in his books. He has devoted sermons, articles and television programs to
this topic. The following are some of his major works on Jihad in Palestine: Fiqh al-Jihād
(Laws of Jihad); Al-Quds Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim (Jerusalem: The Problem of Every Muslim); A
ʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmi (Enemies of the Islamic Solution); Dars al-Nakba al-Thāniya (Lessons
about the Second Nakba), the fifth volume of his series of sermons entitled, Khuṭab al-Sheikh
al-Qaraḍāwī (Sermons of Sheikh al-Qaraḍāwī); Min Hady al-Islām; Fatāwā Muʿāṣira (From
the Guidance of Islam: Contemporary Legal Rulings) and additional writings. Despite the fact
that this theme is central to Qaraḍāwī’s thought, there has not been a comprehensive and
systematic study of the subject to date. Some of the scholarly works mention the subject
briefly. For example, in his book: War, Peace and International Relations in Islam: Muslim
Scholars on Peace Accords with Israel, Yitzhaq Reiter treats the dispute between Qaraḍāwī and
Ibn Bāz about peace with Israel.20
Samuel Helfont devotes relatively few pages in his chapter on Jihad to Qaraḍāwī’s attitude
toward Israel. Bettina Gräf points out that, along with the status of women and Islamic
banking, the subject of the struggle for Palestine is one of the three most important topics in
Qaraḍāwī’s thought. Nonetheless, she chose not to include this major topic in the volume on
Qaraḍāwī, which she edited.21 In her second book, Medien- Fatwas@ Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Die
Popularisierung des Islamischen Rechts,22 Bettina Gräf discusses briefly some of Qaraḍāwī’s
rulings that deal with the Israeli – Palestinian conflict.23
Sami Baroudi discusses Qaraḍāwī’s concept of Jihad in a global perspective in which he
integrates the Jihad against Israel.24 While the two other issues have been the focus of many
scholarly studies, the struggle in Palestine and the role of Qaraḍāwī as the unofficial spiritual

leader of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, whose institutions are recipients of his
substantial financial support, have not received sufficient attention.
This book treats Qaraḍāwī’s teachings on Jews, Judaism, the State of Israel and his support
of the Islamic struggle against Israel and against secular trends in Palestinian society. We have
chosen to paint his portrait within the context of the subject of the struggle for Palestine.
Nevertheless, we also shall present the broader context of Qaraḍāwī’s thought as opposed to
his attitude toward Palestine and we shall dwell upon the differences between them. For
example, we shall point out his attitude toward women and to Jihad in general as opposed to
his position regarding the same issue within the Palestinian context. By means of such
comparisons, we shall endeavor to classify Qaraḍāwī’s thought along the axis of moderation
and extremism. Qaraḍāwī himself presents his idea of Jihad as moderate striving toward a
centrist stance between the exaggerated pacifism of Christianity and the merciless cruelty,
oppression and violence of Judaism.25 We shall compare the features of antisemitic writing
with that of Qaraḍāwī in order to answer the question as to whether Qaraḍāwī’s teachings
actually constitute an expression of anti-semitism.
Qaraḍāwī’s worldview may not be regarded simply as the ideological aspect of the struggle
against Israel. Evidence supports the fact that Qaraḍāwī actively supports Hamas and the
Islamic Movement and has diverted money for the Zakāt (literally, “charity”) that he collects
from charitable organizations and funds under his auspices to the groups mentioned above.
These monies find their way to Islamic activists in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the
Palestinian interior (to members of the Islamic Movement).26
Organizations under the auspices of Qaraḍāwī, such as the International Jerusalem Institute
(Muʾasasat al-Quds al-Dawliyya), located in Beirut, play an active role in the ongoing
incitement against the State of Israel and the Jewish people by presenting the conflict as a
legitimate Islamic struggle against the Judaization of Jerusalem. It is difficult to quantify the
contribution of Qaraḍāwī to the tension in Jerusalem and the continuous fights between
Muslim demonstrators and Israel security forces on the Temple Mount. It appears that hitherto
there has not been a serious examination of the practical side of Qaraḍāwī’s thought and
activism regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, this study also will cover the
dynamics of the relations between Hamas, the Islamic Movement led by Raed Salah and Yūsuf
al-Qaraḍāwī, and the influence of the latter’s teachings on events on the ground. Hence, it is a
pioneering study that we hope will be pursued further by other scholars.
As far as transcription is concerned, we have used the accepted Arabic transcription for
English texts. Only in few cases, we prefer to use the common English way of writing, like
Khaled Mashal and not Khālid Mashʿal All citations from the Qurʾān are based upon the
translation of Yūsuf ʿAli.27
In this study, the term “Palestine,” according to Qaraḍāwī, refers to the area called by that
name during the British Mandate, namely the land west of the Jordan River to the

Mediterranean Sea. From the period after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 until
the Six-Day War in 1967, former British Palestine consisted of the State of Israel, the West
Bank of the Jordan River (Biblical Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza Strip. The West Bank was
ruled by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and included the Old City of Jerusalem. Since
1967, it is under Israel rule. Since the Oslo Accords of the mid-1990s, most of the West Bank,
with the exception of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and IDF (Israel Defense Forces) bases
areas are under the control of the Palestinian Authority. Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip from
the end of the war in 1948 until June 1967. From 1967 until 1994, it was under Israel’s control.
From 1994 until 2007, the Gaza Strip was part of the Palestinian Self-rule Authority. In August
2005, Israel withdrew from all of her Army bases and settlements from the Gaza Strip. Since
the summer of 2007, it is ruled de-facto by Hamas organization only. When Qaradawi refers to
“Palestine,” he means the entire area of British Mandate Palestine, namely, the State of Israel,
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Old City of Jerusalem. Qaraḍāwī visited Palestine – the
West Bank and Jordanian Jerusalem in 1952 and in 1966 and visited Gaza in the 1950s when it
was under Egyptian rule. His last visit to Palestine was in 2013, when he entered Gaza Strip
under Hamas rule.
We would like to thank the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem for their assistance in the publication of the
study.

Notes
1 See, for example: Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. ix.
2 On al-Qaraḍāwī’s succesfull use of the media, see; Bettina Gräf, Medien-Fatwas@ Yusuf al-Qaradawi; Die
Popularisiterung des Islamischen Rechts (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2010), pp. 177–374.
3 Samuel Helfont, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī: Islam and Modernity (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and
African Studies, 2009).
4 Wendelin Wenzel-Teuber, Islamische Ethik und Moderne Gesellschaft im Islamismus von Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (Hamburg:
Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2006).
5 Sagi Polka,“The Centrist Stream in Egypt and Its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping of the Country’s
Cultural Identity,” Middle Eastern Studies, 39/3 (2003), pp. 39–64. On the Centrist position regarding Sunna-Shiʿa
relations, see: Sagi Polka, “Taqrib al-Madhahib – Qaradawi’s Declaration of Principles regarding Sunni-Shiʿi Ecumenism,”
Middle Eastern Studies, 49/3 (2013), pp. 414–429.
6 Raymond W. Baker, “Invidious Comparisons: Realism, Postmodern Globalism and Centrist Islamic Movements in Egypt,”

in: John Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Cairo: AUC Press, 1977), pp. 115–133. See also:
Raymond W. Baker, Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University
Press, 2003).
7 Bettina Gräf, Islamische Gelehrte als politische Akteure im globalen Kontext: Eine Fatwa von Yusuf Abdallah alQaradawi, Dieter Weiss and Steffen Wippel, eds. (Berlin: Diskussionspapier der FU, 2003), p. 93. Bettina Gräf, MedienFatwa@yusuf al-Qaradawi: Die Popularisierung des Islamischen Rechts (Berlin: Klaus-Schwarz-Verlag, 2010).
8 Gudrun Krämer, “Drawing Boundaries: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on Apostasy,” in: Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke (eds.),
Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 213–214.
9 Charles Kurzman (ed.), “Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī,” in: Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998),
pp. 196–204.
10 See, for example: Ana Bélen Soage, “Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī: Portrait of a Leading Islamist Cleric,” MERIA Journal,
12/1 (2008), 51–68; Janet Kursawe, “Yūsuf Abdullah al-Qaraḍāwī,” Orient, 44/4 (2003), pp. 523–530; Krämer, “Drawing
Boundaries: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on Apostasy,” pp. 181–217.
11 See, for example: Shammai Fishman, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities (Washington: Hudson
Institute, 2006); Khaled Abu al-Fadl, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities
from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries,” Islamic Law and Society, 1/2 (1994), pp. 87–141;
Alexandre Caeiro, “The Power of European Fatwas: The Minority of Fiqh Project and the Making of an Islamic
Counterpublic,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 42 (2010), pp. 435–439; Sarah Albrecht, Islamisches
Minderheitenrect: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī s Konzept des fiqh al-aqalliyyāt, Band 17 (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2010);
Alexandre Caeiro and Mahmoud al-Saify, “Qaraḍāwī in Europe, Europe in Qaraḍāwī? The Global Mufti’s European
Politics,” in: Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) pp. 109–148; Mahmoud al-Saify, Fiqh for Muslim Minorities: A New Era in
Islamic Jurisprudence, unpublished M. A. thesis, (Leiden: University of Leiden, 2004); Sagi Polka, “Shaping Islamic
Identity in Western Society: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī’s Rulings for Muslims in the West,” in: Eli Rekhess and Arik Rudnitzky
(eds.), Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim Majority Countries: The Islamic Movement in Israel as a Test Case (Tel Aviv:
The Tel Aviv University, 2013), pp. 43–58 (Hebrew).
12 Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997); Gräf, Islamische
Gelehrte als politische Akteure; Weiss and Wippel (eds.), Diskussionspapiere der FU Berlin, p. 93; Gräf, MedienFatwa@yusuf al-Qaradawi; Peter Mandaville, “Toward a Virtual Caliphate,” Yale Global Online, 27 October 2005,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/toward-virtual-caliphate.
13 See, for example: Barbara Stowasser, “Old Shaykhs, Young Women and the Internet: The Rewriting of Women’s Political
Rights in Islam,” The Muslim World, 91, (March 2001), pp. 99–119; Stowasser, “Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on Women”; Moʿtaz alKhateeb, “Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī as an Authoritative Reference (marjiʿiyya),” in: Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen
(eds.), Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 239–250;
Armando Slavatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997).

14 Gräf, Medien-Fatwas@Yusuf al-Qaradawi; Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and
Fatwas of the Dār al-Iftāʾ (Leiden: Brill, 1997); Alexandre Caeiro, “The Shifting Moral Universes of the Islamic Tradition
of Iftāʾ: A Diachronic Study of Four Adab al-Fatwa Manuels,” The Muslim World, 96 (2006), Special Issue: Authorizing
Islam in Europe, pp. 661–685. Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer, “Islamic Law and Political Ideology: Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī
Renewed Interpretation of Islamic Prayer Laws,” in: American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 33/1 (Herndon: The
International Institute of Islamic thought, 2016), pp. 52–66; Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer, “Larger Than Life: Prayer during
Wartime in Islamic Law,” in: Studia Orientalia (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 2012), vol. 112, pp. 103–126; Nesya
Rubinstein-Shemer, “Islamic Law’s Flexibility for Muslim Minorities in the West: Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwῑ on Friday
Prayer and the Concept of wasaṭiyya,” The Maghreb Review, 42 (London, 2017), pp. 48–59.
15 Ermete Mariani, Islam et Globalisation: Médiation, Mobilité et Religion: L’example de Yussef al-Qaraḍāwī, unpublished
M.A. thesis, (Venice: University of Venice, 2001; Ermete Mariani, “The Role of the States and Markets in the Production of
Islamic Knowledge On-Line: The Examples of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and Amru Khaled,” in: Göran Larsson (ed.), Religious
Communities on the Internet: Proceedings from a Conference (Uppsala: Swedish Science Press, 2006), pp. 131–149; Ehab
Galal, “Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and the New Islamic TV,” in: Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Global Mufti:
The Phenomenon of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 149–181; Bettina Gräf, “Sheikh
Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī in Cyberspace,” Die Welt des Islams, 47/3–4 (2007), Special Issue, Abdulkader Tayob, ed., pp. 403–423;
Bettina Gräf, “In Search of a Global Islamic Authority,” ISIM Review (Spring 2005), p. 47.
16 For example, see the books by his former pupil and secretary: ‛Iṣām Talῑma, Al-Qaraḍāwῑ Faqῑhan (Cairo: Dār al-Tawzῑ‛
wal-Nashr al-Islāmiyya, 2000); ‛Iṣām Talῑma, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwῑ: Faqῑh al-Duʿāt wa-Dāʿiyat al-Fuqahā’ (Beirut: al-Dār
al-Shamῑyya/Damaskus, Dār al-Qalam, 2001). Ḥassan ʿAlῑ Dabbā, al-Qaraḍāwῑ wa-Dhākirat al-Ayyām (Cairo: Maktabat
al-Wahba, 2004); Muḥammad ʿAmmāra, al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwῑ: Al-Madrasa al-Fikriyya wal-Mashrūʿ al-Fikrῑ
(Cairo: Nahḍat Miṣr, 1997); Muḥammad Sayf al-Anṣārῑ, Fῑ Ẓilāl Kutub al-‛Allāma al-Qaraḍāwῑ (Tanta: Dār al-Bashir,
2005).
17 Muḥammad Akram al-Nadwῑ, Kifāyat al-Rāwῑ ʿan al-ʿAllāma Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwῑ (Beirut: Dār al-shāmiyya, 2001).
18 Ismā‛ῑl Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī fi Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya alFilasṭῑniyya (Gaza: Markaz al-Iʿlām al-ʿArabῑ, 2012).
19 Ṣāliḥ Ibn Fawzān ibn Abdallāh al-Fawzān, al-I‛lām bi-naqd Kitāb al-Ḥalāl wal-Ḥarām (Riyadh: al-Maṭābi‛ al-Ahliyya lilUffsit, n.d.); Aḥmad Rāsim al-Nafῑs, Al-Qaraḍāwῑ: Wakῑl Allāh ʾam Wakῑl Banī Umayya? (Beirut: Dār al-Mῑzān, 2006);
Sulaymān ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Kharāshi, Al-Qaraḍāwῑ fil-Mῑzān (Riyadh: Dār al-Jawāb, 1999); Muqbil bin Hādῑ al-Wadi‛ῑ, Iskāt
al-Kalb al-‛āwῑ yūsuf bin ‛abd allāh al-Qaraḍāwῑ, (Ṣanʿāʾ: Dār al-Ᾱthār, 2005).
20 Yitzhak Reiter, War, Peace and International Relations in Islam: Muslim Scholars on Peace Accords with Israel (Portland,
OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), pp. 120–142.
21 Bettina Gräf, “State of Research,” in: Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of
Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 19. For a review of Global Mufti, see: Wolfgang G.
Schwanitz, “Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī: Disputes on a Global Mufti,” http://sehepunkte.de/2010/11/16198.html.

22 Gräf, Medien-Fatwas@Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
23 See for example: Gräf, Medien-Fatwas@Yusuf al-Qaradawi, pp. 325–327, 334–336, 366–368.
24 Sami E. Baroudi, “Sheikh Yūsuf Qaraḍāwī on International Relations: The Discourse of a Leading Islamist Scholar
(1926–),” Middle Eastern Studies, 50/1 (January 21, 2014), pp. 2–26.
25 Ibid., p. 4; Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Wasaṭiyya al-Islāmiyya: Ma‛ālim wa-Manārāt (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2010), pp. 54–
56.
26 Alex Averbuch, “Ha-Maavak be-Mimun Terror be-Yisrael: Hebetim Mispatiyyim,” Mishpat ve-Tzava, 17/183 (2004), pp.
193–199 (Hebrew). Averbuch’s claims are based partly upon Criminal Case 04\2637, the State of Israel vs. Raʾed Salāḥ
Maḥājnah, et al. Activists of the Islamic Movement, under the leadership of Raed Salah, the head of the Northern branch,
were charged with having received monies from various groups linked to Qaraḍāwī. Israel General Security Service
(Shabak), “Coalitziyat ha-Tzedakah: Mipui ve-Nituah Ma’arach Kaspei Terror,” September 2009 (Hebrew),
www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/coalition_he.aspx?webid=a3db3c16-25d8-423d-98dfeb1b9253ab93. Likewise,
the sentence of a Hamas activist from East Jerusalem, Khalīl Ghazzāwī, who was convicted of receiving monies from the
“Charity Coalition” headed by Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī in order to finance Hamas activities in East Jerusalem, Criminal Case,
34138–1–14, the State of Israel vs. Khalīl Ghazzāwī; Judicial decision by His Honor Judge Moshe Drori, District Court of
Jerusalem, 14 December 2014.
27 Islamicity.com site, www.islamicity.com/mosque/SURAI.H TM, viewed on 1 December 2015.

1
Qaraḍāwī’s ties to Palestine

1. The landscape of Qaraḍāwī’s youth
In 2010, a special conference in honor of Qaraḍāwī was held by the Hamas government as a
tribute for all of his efforts, activities and his staunch support of the Palestinians in their
struggle against Israel. After the event, a large volume was published, entitled, The Efforts of
Dr. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī in the Service of Islam and of Victory in the Palestinian Cause.1 The
book contains summaries of all of the lectures presented at the conference that dealt with the
different aspects of the persona of Qaraḍāwī: Qaraḍāwī, the poet; Qaraḍāwī, the legal
authority; and, of course, Qaraḍāwī the fighter for the Palestinian cause. Throughout the work,
Qaraḍāwī is referred to as the “Sheikh of Palestine,” especially by his disciple, Ismail Haniyeh,
former head of the Hamas government, and chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau.2
Therefore, we must ask why Qaraḍāwī is committed so fervently to the Palestinian cause and
why is it so close to his heart.
To answer this question, we shall present a brief biography of Qaraḍāwī in order to review
the events during his lifetime that bound him to Palestine and made a lasting impression upon
him. Qaraḍāwī’s memoirs are the major source for this chapter. There he describes personal
experiences that had a lasting impact on the formation of his worldview. Qaraḍāwī
supplements the personal content in his memoirs with ideological and educational material,
such as quotations from the Qurʾān, the Ḥadīth and statements by Muslim thinkers who
influenced him.
Yūsuf Abdallah al-Qaraḍāwī was born in 1926 in the village of Ṣaft al-Turab in the Delta
region of Egypt. His family was poor and his father died when he was two years old, leaving
him an orphan. Qaraḍāwī was educated in the local religion class (Kuttāb). An outstanding
pupil, he knew the Qurʾān by heart at the age of nine.3 Qaraḍāwī’s early education was of a
religious Islamic character and the Qurʾān was its guiding principle. The latter explains the fact
that religion was so important in his life and that he looks at the world and interprets reality
from an Islamic perspective.
At the age of fourteen, he left the village for the Al-Azhar Institute in the city of Tanta,
Egypt. There he first became acquainted with Ḥasan al-Banna and decided to join the Muslim

Brotherhood Society. He formed a special bond with the Muslim Brotherhood in general and
to Ḥasan al-Banna in particular. Qaraḍāwī was profoundly influenced by his personality and
became loyal to his way of Wasaṭiyya.4 He regarded Ḥasan al-Banna as his revered teacher
and master. On a visit to Tanta, when al-Banna preached a sermon to the high school students,
Qaraḍāwī recited a lengthy encomium that he had written in his honor.5 According to
Qaraḍāwī, Ḥasan al-Banna was more aware than others of the Jewish peril and of schemes of
Jewish expansion in Arab countries and regarded him mission as rousing the Arabs from their
indifference to events in Palestine.
Al-Banna explained to the Arabs that the Palestinians did not willingly sell their land to
Jews and that they never abandoned the obligation of Jihad despite the fact that the British
prevented them, though not the Jews, from possessing weapons. He spoke extensively about
the uprisings of the Arabs in Palestine against British rule and against Jewish plots in 1929 and
in 1936–1939. Al-Banna did everything he could in order to open the eyes of the Arabs to the
enormity of the impending danger and to encourage them to enlist on behalf of the
Palestinians.
Al-Banna was associated with Palestinian leaders and their chief Al-Mujāhid al-Kabīr (“the
great fighter of Jihad”), Amīn al-Ḥuseini,6 the Mufti of Palestine. The latter would encourage
the masses to protest against British policy toward Zionism, especially against the Balfour
Declaration, and claim that “Palestine is not a land without a people to be given to a people
without a land.”7 Qaraḍāwī repeats this statement throughout his sermons and in his many
books on Palestine. Thus, for example, in his description of the terror of colonialism (Irhāb alIstiʿmār) in his book, Fiqh al-Jihād (Jurisprudence of Jihad), Qaraḍāwī wrote:
And the Zionist Jews did this when they came to establish their state in Palestine when they say: a land without a
people for a people without a land! This is a lie, without a doubt, because Palestine is not a land without a people waiting
to receive a people without a land. The Palestinian people have lived here for thousands of years.8

Ḥasan al-Banna preached extensively about the violent struggle for Palestine and even
wrote an article entitled “The Industry of Death” (Ṣināʿat al-Mawt) in his newsletter AlNadhīr in which he emphasizes the obligation of Jihad and readiness to die the death of a
martyr, coining the phrase: “he who longs for death will be granted life” (man ḥaraṣa ‘alā almawt wuhibat lahu al-ḥayāt). Life is important, but death for the sake of Allāh, especially in
the war against his enemies, is the highest goal, which a Muslim must fulfill as part of the
commandment of Jihad. This message forms a part of the ideological legacy of Ḥasan alBanna.9 The sermons of Qaraḍāwī frequently reiterate this expression. Therefore, he would
later be called “the Sheikh of Death” because of his support for suicide bombings for the sake
of the struggle on Palestinian soil.10 This expression is often repeated in the publications of
Hamas that emphasize the longing for death for the sake of God and the pleasurable rewards
in Paradise.11 As a follower of Ḥasan al-Banna, Qaraḍāwī approves of suicide attacks (“acts of

sacrifice”) executed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad without any connection to the amount of
damage inflicted upon the enemy by such attacks.12
In 1948, when Qaraḍāwī was 22 years old, war broke out in Palestine. His sermons fondly
recall memories of Ḥasan al-Banna’s inflammatory speeches to young men urging that they
enthusiastically enlist in the Jihad in Palestine. “Only the Islamists understood the depth of the
tragedy and the enormity of the catastrophe in Palestine. Ḥasan al-Banna, of blessed memory,
was the one who broadened the people’s horizons, who motivated them to act on behalf of
the Palestinian cause. Until 1948, when the establishment of the State of Israel was declared, he
sent his supporters to the Jihad in Palestine.
The volunteers trained in camps that were set up in every city in Egypt. “I also was one of
those young men who underwent training in those camps”, writes Qaraḍāwī.
Afterward, the volunteers left to fight in Palestine. Our imam, Sheikh Ḥasan al-Banna, did not allow high school
students to go to fight, with the exception of one pious brother, the shahīd, Abd al-Wahhāb al-Batānūni. We had
requested permission for this exception from Ḥasan al-Banna because he always dreamed about going to Palestine. He
thought of Palestine day and night. At that time, there were exceptional acts of heroism that should be recalled for the
next generations and written about in the pages of history and we should teach them by heart to our children. How
many of those young men wished to die in the path of Allāh! How many of them competed among themselves for the
Shahāda!

In his book, The Brothers and the War in Palestine, Kamāl al-Sharīf wrote about the young
lads who were with him:
If requested three or four volunteers for a mission, tens more would come. All of them wanted to be chosen and he would
have to draw lots among them! There was no other solution. If one of them was wounded in battle, he would smile and
say: ‘I am quickly coming to you, my master, so that you will be satisfied.’13

Ḥātim Yūsuf Abū Ziyāda noted 102 Muslim Brotherhood activists who met heroic deaths in
battles against the Jews.14
In his memoirs, Qaraḍāwī longingly recalls memories of those days. He relates the story of
his best friend several times, referring to him in his memoirs and sermons as “My friend, my
brother, my beloved, the pious Shahīd” – Abd al-Wahhāb al-Batānūni, whom we have
mentioned above.15 He recounts the special spiritual qualities of the friend whom he deeply
loved. Throughout his life, Abd al-Wahhāb dreamed of going to fight in Palestine. There was
only one obstacle on his path – his mother. Since he was an orphan, as his father had died, his
mother raised him and his brothers. How could she allow him to go and die on the soil of
Palestine? Together with two other friends, Qaraḍāwī could not endure the sorrow of Abd alWahhāb and took it upon themselves to go with him in order to help him persuade his mother.
They traveled to his village where they sat and talked with her at length, telling her about the
mothers of heroes throughout Islamic history and about the desire of Abd al-Wahhāb to take
part in Jihad. They added that going into battle does not necessarily bring one closer to death,
that he who does not die in battle will die in another way and that life and death are in the

hands of Allāh. They stayed with her until she overcame her natural feelings of mercy toward
her son and said, ‘If that is the wish of Abd al-Wahhāb, I shall not stand in his way. I shall
leave the matter in the hands of Allāh and I shall pray for his victory and for that of his friends
and that Allāh will bring them back home in peace.’ Abd al-Wahhāb was extremely pleased. A
smile spread across his face. He kissed his mother’s hand and head and asked her permission
to continue on his way.16 The motif of the mother who enables her son to fulfill the Jihad
occurs later on in tales of shahīds and has been co-opted by the Hamas.17
Another obstacle in the way of Abd al-Wahhāb was official approval to leave for Palestine
since Ḥasan al-Banna did not allow youth of high school age to fight. Qaraḍāwī points out that
he was one of the young men who trained at training camps in preparation for departure for
Palestine. He and three friends traveled to Cairo especially in order to request approval from
the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood to go to fight in Palestine.18 Unfortunately,
Qaraḍāwī did not succeed in becoming one of the brave mujāhidīn (“fighters in the holy war”)
who fought in Palestine. On 23 December 1948, he was arrested during the riots following the
assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Al-Nuqrashī and served time in jail until 1949.19
Qaraḍāwī praises the acts of heroism in Palestine on the part of Batānūnī and his friends
“who went to the land of the Isrā’ and the Mi ʿ rāj, the land of the first direction of the prayer
(Qibla) and the land of the location of Islam’s third most important mosque, in order to fight
against the enemies of Allāh, slayers of the prophets, the Jews, who stole the land and
besmirched its honor.”20 Batānūnī and his wounded comrades escaped from the Jews and hid
inside a weapons factory. When they knew that they were mortally wounded, they sacrificed
their lives and blew themselves up with all of the armaments in order that it would not fall to
the Jews. Qaraḍāwī carefully kept the letter sent by Abd al-Wahhāb until he lost it while
Egyptian security forces went through his possessions following his arrest. He ends the story
of Abd al-Wahhāb as follows: “Abd al-Wahhāb’s death fulfilled the words of our teacher alBahī al-Khūlī: ‘Whenever one looked at Abd al-Wahhāb one saw the blood of the Shahāda
(Martyrdom) splattering from his face. May Allāh have mercy upon him and may it come to
pass that he will be an intercessor for his family and for us.’”21
Qaraḍāwī recalls another story that praises the devotion to Palestine of that generation.
Whoever was not able to go to fight contributed all of his possessions for this sublime
objective.
I remember that in one of the villages which I used to visit in order to collect contributions and light weapons for
Palestine, one of the [Muslim] Brothers approached the head of the Brotherhood in Basyoun and said: ‘I would like to go
to fight in Palestine and I am even prepared to sell my buffalo in order to purchase arms in its stead.’ The head of the
Brotherhood told him: ‘O, Brother Hasan, leave your buffalo to your children and you go to fight. You do not have
money but rich men will arm you. As the Ḥadīth says, whoever arms a fighter, it is as if he himself is fighting.’ Hasan
answered him: ‘Hajj Ahmad, why don’t you quote the words of Allāh in the Qurʾan: Allāh hath purchased of the
believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise).’ (Qurʾān 9:111) Did Allāh wish to
sacrifice only the soul or both the soul and the goods?’ Hajj Ahmad answered: ‘Indeed, Allāh purchased both the soul

and the goods from the believers.’ Hasan said: ‘If that is so, I want to get to Paradise and wish to sacrifice my life and my
goods to Allāh may He be exalted.22

Qaraḍāwī also longingly cherishes memories of those times and the stories about simple
folk who did not have much money or goods but possessed a spiritual richness and strong
faith that made them wish to dedicate all their energy, their money and their lives for the
cause in which they believed. He writes: “This is the spirit that prevailed throughout the nation
– at that time.”23
Qaraḍāwī’s stories do not differ essentially from other accounts that glorify the participation
of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the battles in Palestine in 1948. Thus, for example,
the book by Ḥātim Yūsuf Abu Ziyāda describes the dispatch of 10,000 Muslim Brotherhood
fighters (a doubtful number) by Ḥasan al-Banna with details of their acts of heroism.24
However, despite the fact that there is no doubt that Muslim Brotherhood activists fought in
battles against the Jews, their impact upon the course and results of these battles was
negligible.25

2. First visit to Palestine
Qaraḍāwī’s first visit to Palestine was extremely important in forming his personality and his
attitude toward the struggle for Palestine. During his stay, he had several jarring experiences
that left a lasting impression upon him. He described the impressions of his visit in his official
biography, which he wrote by himself.26 Qaraḍāwī left Egypt for the first time in 1952. His
destination was Greater Syria (Arabic, al-Shām), Lebanon, Syria and Jordan on a mission for
the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Huḍaibī. The purpose of his trip was
to strengthen the link between the Muslim Brotherhood movements in that region and to the
movement in general. Qaraḍāwī’s description of his visit in Palestine includes an interesting
story that exemplifies his devotion, despite experiencing hardships.
When Qaraḍāwī left Syria for Jordan, he faced a problem that he had not anticipated. The
man in charge of the border crossing did not allow him to enter Jordan because he did not
have a Jordanian visa. Qaraḍāwī argued that because Jordan did not have an embassy in
Damascus, he could not take care of the matter in Syria. He was told that he should have done
this in Cairo. Qaraḍāwī replied that perhaps, when he left Egypt, he had no intention of going
to Jordan, but because he was so close to Jerusalem he wished to pray at the Al-Aqsa Mosque,
about which the Prophet said: “One ties the saddles of camels only in order to make a
pilgrimage to the three mosques: my mosque (in Medina); the holy mosque (in Mecca) and the
Al-Aqsa Mosque.” 27 He asked: “Will you prevent me from doing so?’ The official at the border
replied: “Sir, we see that you are a sheikh from Al-Azhar, a learned man. Don’t you

understand that one cannot enter a foreign country without an entry visa?” Qaraḍāwī
responded with a fiery speech: “Come and I shall tell you what they taught me at Al-Azhar!
There I learned that Jordan is not a foreign country for me, that all Muslims are one nation
(Ummah) and that all Muslim countries are one country that is called Dār al-Islām. When the
famous traveler, Ibn Baṭṭūta, went on voyages away from his home in Tangiers that is in
Morocco, he traveled the length and breadth of Muslim countries and no one stopped him and
requested an entry visa!” After hearing this fiery and naïve speech, the man laughed and
contacted one of the senior officials in the Ministry of the Interior and told him that there is a
student from Al-Azhar who does not have an entry visa and he is arguing: how can I prevent
him from praying at Al-Aqsa? The senior official answered: ‘Let him enter.’ Thus, Qaraḍāwī
entered Jordan giving thanks to Allāh that removed the obstacles in his path.28
Qaraḍāwī visited and gave lectures in Amman and other cities in Jordan. Afterward, he
visited a training camp of the Brotherhood west of Amman. There young men received
training in various combat skills in order to prepare for Jihad in Palestine. He stayed with the
young men during their training period in the camp and encouraged them with speeches and
by acting as a personal example by undergoing their harsh training along with them. He
enjoyed his stay at this camp and has fond memories even today. This story illustrates how
Qaraḍāwī regretted that he did not join the missions of the Brotherhood that fought in
Palestine in 1948 and that his great dream did not come true. Therefore, whenever he could
fulfill even a small part of that dream, he seized his opportunity. In a speech broadcast on the
Al Jazeera network on 28 January 2009 and later published on the Hamas website that
represents the ʿIzz a-Dīn al-Qassām Brigade, Qaraḍāwī stated as follows:
I pray that Allāh will grant me, even at the end of my life, the opportunity to reach Palestine, the land of struggle and
Jihad, even in a wheel-chair, in order that I can shoot the enemies of Allāh – the Jews. And then, when they will react by
throwing a bomb, I shall end my life as a Shahīd on the soil of Palestine and I shall praise Allāh for this.29

Qaraḍāwī then visited Hebron and wrote as follows: “Hebron is a town in which one finds
respite for the soul and senses the Islamic fragrance emanating from it everywhere one
turns.”30 The reason is that Abraham is buried in Hebron and the town is named after him
(Hebron in Arabic is called Al-Khalīl “the companion” named after Abraham who was “the
companion of Allāh”). Qaraḍāwī then compares Abraham and Muhammad whose graves are
known, Muhammad’s in Medina and Abraham’s in Hebron, with the all the other prophets
whose places of burial are not known.31 In addition to the place of burial, Islam teaches that
Abraham is the first Muslim and that Muhammad and the Muslims are the true followers of
Abraham through his son Ishmael.32 The subject of Abraham linking Muslims and Palestine
receives much attention in Qaraḍāwī’s thought, as will be shown below. The young Qaraḍāwī
received hospitality from Hebron’s leading families, such as al-Tamīmī and al-Natshe.
Qaraḍāwī also points out that his stay in Hebron was beneficial because he gave several

lectures. The high point of his visit, however, was his passionate arguments with members of
the Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī (Party of the Islamic Liberation). The Islamic organization, Ḥizb
al-Taḥrīr, was established officially in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqī al-Dīn Nabahānī. Its purpose
was to unify all the Islamic countries into a single caliphate ruled by the Caliph and to enforce
Sharīʿa law.33 Before 1948, Taqī al-Dīn Nabhānī was active in the Haifa branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Palestine and well-acquainted with its ideology.34 While the Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr
and the Muslim Brotherhood share the same aspirations, they are divided as to the methods of
achieving and implementing them. Hebron was the major stronghold of the Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr.
From there, they expanded to Jerusalem. In Hebron, the members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr were
more dominant than the Muslim Brothers. They weakened the Brothers with ideological
arguments in which they prevailed. The Brotherhood did not have anyone who could answer
their rivals. Hence, the young Qaraḍāwī came to their aid and his decisive rebuttals bolstered
their esteem among the members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr. The discussion shows Qaraḍāwī’s
dedication to defending the ideology of the Brotherhood and the enthusiasm of his defense of
the Hebron Brotherhood’s treatment of issues dealing with the struggle against Israel.
The first topic of debate between Qaraḍāwī and the members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr concerns
the correct way of reaching their common goal. The latter argue that the propaganda of Ḥasan
al-Banna’s circle was ineffective because, with the passage of time, attaining the objective is
not even looming on the horizon. Therefore, the tactics must be changed. Qaraḍāwī then asks
that they furnish proof for their assertions. In turn, they reply that they base their statements
upon the conduct of the Prophet (who often used a variety of tactics and, occasionally, even
contradictory methods in order to achieve his objectives). Qaraḍāwī refutes them by arguing
that the biography of the Prophet does not show any evidence that one must conduct oneself
in that manner. Sometimes goals are achieved quickly and occasionally it takes longer
according to prevailing conditions. Qaraḍāwī continues by asking them their opinion of the
prophet, Noah. They responded that he was one of the first prophets and apostles. Qaraḍāwī
then asks how long Noah preached to his people. They answer: 950 years. His next question is
whether Noah achieved his objective even after so many years. The members of Ḥizb alTaḥrīr became silent and did not answer. Qaraḍāwī told them that he will prove that he is
right from the Qurʾānic stories, that deal with Noah preaching to his people, as follows: “Don’t
you see that even Noah’s wife and his sons did not believe him. Does that mean that he was
mistaken? Did he stop his preaching as a result of this? No. Noah preached and did what he
was obliged to do as an apostle, and Allāh will do what he is obliged to do, namely to spread
love and to reward those who walk in his ways. This is the work of a preacher.” The members
of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr were silent and had no answer.35
Qaraḍāwī and the members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr also held a debate about the fact that the
Muslim Brothers were active in state institutions and were engaged mainly in preaching and
in social action such as setting up hospitals and caring for orphans. They were so busy with

these activities that they had no time for the main goal, namely the establishment of the
Islamic caliphate. Qaraḍāwī refutes this argument at length, as follows: First, social action is
part of the obligation of Muslims. Allāh does not only command one to pray but also to do
good for society. Second, the fuqahā’ (Islamic clerics), agreed that Muslims are obliged to help
fellow Muslims and alleviate hardships in their lives such as poverty and hunger. If they do not
do so, they are committing a great sin. A Muslim who goes to sleep with a full stomach while
his neighbor’s stomach is empty is not a good Muslim. In addition, the Brotherhood first
strives to win over the hearts of the people and turn them into faithful and believing Muslims.
Therefore, they invest in preaching and in building institutions that benefit the public, such as
schools and hospitals. The Muslim Brotherhood has both short-term and long-term goals that
are not contradictory. The first is repairing society and the more distant objective is the
establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Qaraḍāwī compares this to the farmer who cultivates
date and olive orchards. Every farmer knows that patience is necessary and that there will be
fruit only after many years. Therefore, he does not wait in suspense to see results, but enjoys
the process itself. Qaraḍāwī’s final argument is that in order to achieve all of the above
objectives Muslims need God’s help and Allāh helps Muslims who help each other. The above
summarizes Qaraḍāwī’s arguments during his debate against the members of Ḥizb alTaḥrīr.36 Years later, Hamas attracted members through acts of Daʿwa (literally, a call or an
invitation) and would undertake genuine acts of Jihad against the Zionist enemy while the
members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr continued preaching.37
Among the members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr present at the debate was the preacher of the AlAqsa Mosque, As‛ad Bayyūḍ al-Tamīmī. Convinced by Qaraḍāwī’s arguments, he left the
service of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr and eventually founded the Islamic Jihād – Bait al-Maqdis group
that took part in terror attacks during the early 1980s.38 Qaraḍāwī notes that Allāh helped him
with his argument and gave him assistance in refuting the members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr with
decisive answers that left them speechless. He adds that his visit in Hebron encouraged the
Brotherhood and revived them. The Muslim Brothers praised him and even recited a quote
from the Qaṣīda (poetry) comparing him to Moses, as follows: “When Moses came and cast
his staff, he abolished the acts of sorcery by Pharaoh’s conjurors.”39 Such descriptions of the
debates between Qaraḍāwī and the Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr in his autobiography show that Qaraḍāwī
regarded himself as the devoted ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the
enthusiastic disciple of Ḥasan al-Banna and a dedicated fighter who felt obliged to help and
encourage his Palestinian brethren. The comparison between Qaraḍāwī and Moses is not
coincidental. Moses shut the mouths of his opponents through his miracles so that even
Pharaoh’s conjurors acknowledged that he was right. Moses was a devoted leader who
dedicated his life to his people and his mission to bring them to the Promised Land – Palestine.
After his visit to Hebron, Qaraḍāwī went to Nablus and Jenin. He describes the large
audience that attended his lectures and the gracious hospitality he received from leading

families. Afterward he wrote:
From Nablus and Jenin, I went to the first Qibla, the honorable Jerusalem, after continued longing for the Al-Aqsa
Mosque, whose environs were blessed by Allāh. It is only proper that I should have begun my trip there, but I was tied
down by the schedule arranged by the Brothers in Amman who made my visit to Jerusalem the last stop of my tour of
the towns on the West Bank.40

Qaraḍāwī describes the excitement of his first visit to Jerusalem, noting that a very large
audience was present at his lecture and that he was privileged to pray at the Al-Aqsa Mosque
for the first time in his life. He also wrote about his visit to the Dome of the Rock and his
amazement at its artistic design. While at the area of the mosque, he met with Sheikh
Abdallah Ghosha, the head of the Islamic Scholars Organization. The latter was glad to meet
the young Qaraḍāwī. Afterward, he prayed two rakʿas (genuflections) at the Mosque of Umar
Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and visited the Church of the Holy Sepulcher.
Qaraḍāwī noted the barbed wire fence that separated East Jerusalem from West Jerusalem.
According to Qaraḍāwī, despite the negligible physical distance between them, there was an
enormous gap between their respective residents as far as awareness, consciousness of danger
and future plans were concerned. Qaraḍāwī explained that the Palestinians of East Jerusalem
continue their daily routine, engage in business and do not pay any attention to the danger
taking place under their very noses and to the schemes of the enemy that surround them on
all sides. In contrast, the Jews, residents of West Jerusalem, are occupied day and night with
fervent efforts to build their future on the ruins of Palestine, while the Palestinians are fast
asleep. The Jews, to whom Qaraḍāwī refers as “robbers of the land,” worked systematically in
order to achieve their goals in a plan of stages while the Palestinians were not paying
attention. Therefore, they were surprised by the Jews who occupied Jerusalem and took the
Al-Aqsa Mosque so that the Palestinians may pray there only with the permission of the
Jews.41
This description is based upon Qaraḍāwī’s feelings toward Jews and not on actual historical
facts. It is history as he sees it. Qaraḍāwī does not convey any arguments against the
Jordanians who did not develop East Jerusalem, but accuses them of closing their eyes to
Jewish ambitions. The Jews developed West Jerusalem and took care to plan their rule over
the eastern part of the city. The Palestinians were “surprised” by the occupying Jewish forces
who stole the Al-Aqsa Mosque from them during the Six Day War. Qaraḍāwī, however, does
not state that the Arabs initiated the war. He also conveniently forgets that Moshe Dayan
returned the keys to Al-Aqsa to the Waqf and granted them autonomy in administering it,
which continues to this day.42
After his trip to Jerusalem, Qaraḍāwī visited the refugee camps in Karameh and in Aqbat
Jaber. Qaraḍāwī refers to the refugees as “those who were forced to leave their homes and
were removed from them without rights.” This is a paraphrase from the Qurʾān. These verses

discuss the permission given to the Muslims of Medina to go to war against the Quraish tribe
of Mecca who expelled them, as follows:
To those against whom war is made, permission is given [to fight], because they are wronged; – and verily, Allāh is most
powerful for their aid; [They are] those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right,– [for no cause]
except that they say, ‘our Lord is Allāh’… Allāh will certainly aid those who aid his (cause); – for verily Allāh is full of
Strength…, Exalted in Might, [able to enforce His Will].43

The historical parallel between the ancient Muslims and the Palestinians is clear. Just as the
war of the former was just in light of the aggression of the other side, the war of the
Palestinians is also just. And, just as the Muslims eventually were victorious, the Palestinians
will triumph.
Qaraḍāwī notes that during his trip to the Karameh Refugee Camp, a boy was born and
given the name Yūsuf. Later on, when he met Qaraḍāwī, he reminded him of his visit to
Karameh in 1952 and even told him that he was named after him. Qaraḍāwī describes his
profound shock upon seeing the terrible suffering of the Palestinians in refugee camps, the
shortage of food, the poor sanitary conditions, the wretched housing and the lack of
educational opportunities. He states that life in the refugee camps does not even reach the
minimal standards for human beings in this age that regards human rights as a priority.44
Descriptions of the suffering of Palestinians are commonplace in the writings of the Muslim
Brotherhood. A booklet published by the Islamic Movement in Israel (the northern branch) –
headed by Raed Salah – explicitly compares their suffering with that of European Jewry
during the Holocaust.45
The visits to the refugee camps left a lasting impression upon Qaraḍāwī. He declares that “I
left with two items in my bag from the visit to the camps: first, a strong desire to participate in
helping these Brothers and their families, and second, the fact that there I began to suffer from
a high fever, a symptom of malaria, which got worse when I returned to Amman.”46 The
shock of the first visit is described at length and inspired Qaraḍāwī to become heavily
involved in the cause of the Palestinian refugees and of Palestinians in general. The connection
between his high fever and the visit to the camps leaves the reader with the impression that
the visit was so powerful that he became ill. Qaraḍāwī was transferred to a hospital in
Amman where he was treated. While at the hospital, he was honored by an unexpected
visitor, the leader of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr, Sheikh Taqī al-Din al-Nabhānī. Qaraḍāwī considered it a
compliment that his greatest opponent came to see him and that Nabhānī had heard about the
young man from Al-Azhar who debated with the members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr who were left
speechless and therefore, wished to see him in person. The visit pleased Qaraḍāwī and left a
lasting impression.47 After his recovery, Qaraḍāwī took his first flight on an airplane, from
Amman to Cairo. Upon arrival in Cairo, he presented a report to the Supreme Guide of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Huḍaibī, who was greatly impressed by the results of his visit,

especially by his debate with the members of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr.48

3. Second visit to Palestine
Qaraḍāwī retained lasting memories of his first visit to Palestine. Therefore, in 1966, he
decided to visit again. He wrote at length about this trip in the third volume of his memoirs.
At the time, Qaraḍāwī lived in Qatar and was married with four daughters – the eldest not
even seven years old. After some hesitation and an invitation by several families in Hebron
whom he had met on his previous visit, he spent the summer vacation with his family in the
West Bank, along with several families who were friends from Qatar. The Qaraḍāwīs stayed in
a villa that belonged to the al-Natshe family, his hosts during his visit to Hebron in 1952, and
with whom he had excellent relations. They enjoyed their stay in the large house surrounded
by a vineyard and orchards with fruit trees. Qaraḍāwī relates that he and members of his
family picked grapes, peaches, plums and dates and ate heartily. As a final gesture, the alNatshe family gave them the rest of the grapes, which they dried and made into raisins as
provisions for their trip home.49
Qaraḍāwī and his family spent about two and a half months there. It was a relatively longer
stay than his previous visit and enabled him to strengthen his ties with people in Hebron. He
became acquainted with many people and was invited to weddings and other family
celebrations. People in Hebron who remembered his sermons from the previous visit asked
that he deliver sermons in the mosques and give lessons. Qaraḍāwī willingly obliged. He
points out that on family vacations elsewhere, for example, in Lebanon, they stayed with
Druze and Christian hosts and occasionally were not able to find a mosque for prayer. In
contrast, he was glad to be in Hebron with its Islamic atmosphere, surrounded by mosques on
all sides.50
Qaraḍāwī took trips to other towns on the West Bank and to refugee camps as well. During
a visit to the village of Dura, he went up a high hill and looked out upon “despoiled Palestine
that is now called ‘Israel’!” Copious tears flowed from his eyes. Naturally, the Al-Aqsa
Mosque was the most important site he visited. Qaraḍāwī brought his wife and his young
daughters to pray there in order to imbue them with the significance and value of this mosque
and to ensure that they would have permanent memories of this holy place.51
The Qaraḍāwīs visited friends in al-Bireh and Ramallah. While in Nablus, they were dinner
guests of the leading religious figure, Sheikh Mashhūr al-Ḍāmin, along with other notables of
the area. Their conversation focused upon the most important issue, the Palestinian cause.
Qaraḍāwī then went to the village of Ṣānūr in the Jenin district. There he was the guest of his
close friend, Ḥusnī Adham Jarrār, who worked with him at the Institute for Islamic Studies

that he had established in Qatar. Ḥusnī published several of Qaraḍāwī’s books. After two days
in Ṣānūr, they left for Jenin where Qaraḍāwī was invited for a lecture. There he also toured the
border with Israel in mount Gilboa where he saw “the great danger that threatens these
villages. The villages are not equipped with weapons for self-defense if they are attacked,
while they confront an enemy that is equipped with all types of armaments that are far
superior to those of the Arabs, both qualitatively and quantitatively”.52

4. The last visit to Palestine, May 2013
In May 2013, Qaraḍāwī finally accepted the invitation of Ismail Haniyeh to visit the Gaza
Strip. His arrival was celebrated with pomp and splendor. The different Hamas channels
competed with each other in praising and photographing Qaraḍāwī. Haniyeh himself served
as his personal chauffeur. Qaraḍāwī’s speech emphasized that Gaza was “the land of Jihad
whose sons bore the burden of its defense.”53 The regal nature of his visit in Gaza shows the
outstanding appreciation of Qaraḍāwī by the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements.
At the home of Sheikh Ahmad Yāssīn, they unfurled the flags of the resistance. Indeed,
according to the statement by Haniyeh at the press conference held there, Sheikh Yāsīn was
the symbol of Jihad and of resistance.54 Qaraḍāwī regarded this visit as especially important
because he had just arrived in Palestine as a well-known figure whom everyone wanted to
please.
In Gaza, Qaraḍāwī delivered a speech replete with encomia to the Muslim Ummah that is
engaging in Jihad and self-sacrifice. The different Hamas channels, among them the Al-Aqsa
Channel competed for viewers of the speeches of the leading Islamic figure of our time.
Qaraḍāwī referred to Ahmad Yassin as the “Martyr (Shahīd) of the Islamic nation (Ummah),
the martyr (Shahīd) of the Palestinian cause and the martyr (Shahīd) of the truth.”55 During
Qaraḍāwī’s statements about Sheikh Yassin and the importance of Jihad, there were steady
cries of “Allāh Akbar and li-llāh al-Ḥamd (“Allāh is great, praise to God”). The excitement of
the audience, mostly Hamas activists, is evident in the special broadcast of his speech on the
Al-Aqsa Channel. They obviously regarded Qaraḍāwī as their undisputed religious leader.
Qaraḍāwī continued: “Israel succeeded in killing this great man, Ahmad Yassin, but did not
succeed in killing his spirit.” The spirit of Yassin continues to influence and direct the
Palestinian Islamic revolution. Yassin was ‘the lighthouse of the Muslim Ummah and of
Muslim youth and a fighter (mujāhid) of Islam.’” Naturally, such heartfelt expressions and
compliments toward Sheikh Ahmad Yassin – the founder of Hamas – were answered with
cries of “Allāh Akbar and li-llāh al-Ḥamd” from the audience.56
Qaraḍāwī’s main address took place at the Great Al-Umari Mosque in the center of Gaza

and was broadcast live on the Al-Aqsa Channel, which is identified with Hamas. Among the
audience were young boys who eagerly imbibed the words of their spiritual leader.
Qaraḍāwī’s sermon notes the greatness of the Muslims who believe in the Qurʾān and the
religion of Muḥammad, and thus, have become the chosen people. “The Muslims are the first
nation in the world… the first nation in exact sciences and the arts… they are masters of the
world.”57 According to Qaraḍāwī, all of the Muslims in the world are one nation (Ummah).
“Our heart is the same. We are all one nation that prays to its Master.” Therefore, he expects
that “Allāh will grant the Ummah its wish and will liberate Palestine and Syria and all the
Muslims from their nightmarish enemies and from all the colonialists until God’s word will be
fulfilled.”58 According to Qaraḍāwī, the Alawite-Shiite regime in Syria and the Jewish regime
in the State of Israel are the same. Both are enemies of God and of the Muslim Ummah and
both are destined for destruction.
After his sermon at the Al-Umari Mosque, Qaraḍāwī confessed that it was his first trip to
the Gaza Strip since 1958. He did not relate to that visit in his book. At the time, Gaza was
under Egyptian rule and there were many ties between the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza
Strip and in Egypt. (Such ties between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt continue
today.) In his own words, his visit in Gaza is an expression of faith and he was pleased to see
that faith among the people of Gaza. According to Qaraḍāwī, his visit to Gaza simply proved
that the Islamic Ummah is alive. None can be compared with it – not the nation of Moses
(Judaism) and not the nation of Jesus (Christianity).59 Qaraḍāwī praised the people of Gaza for
“holding the sword of Jihad, all of them – large and small. All are committed to Jihad…
because of the martyrs (shahīds) who sacrificed themselves, beginning with Ahmad Yāsīn and
Rantīsī and others… a nation (Ummah) that can be proud of its people, of their spirit and
sacrifices for their rights. This is Gaza, the beloved.”60
According to Qaraḍāwī, the people of Gaza are proceeding on the path of Jihad for the sake
of God and therefore, they will succeed and be victorious against Israel despite its advanced
weaponry. It is a great privilege to lead a delegation of Islamic scholars from all over the
world as they visit the land of Jihād and Ribāṭ. “I ask that Allāh add strength to their strength
and patience to their patience.”61 At the end of his sermon, Qaraḍāwī called upon the people
of Gaza to continue their resistance and never stop, as follows: “Allāh is stronger than Israel,
therefore, eventually Allāh will succeed in breaking the weapons of Israel, but the Palestinians
must be united in their struggle.”62 Palestine cannot be two peoples and therefore, it cannot be
partitioned. This is Qaraḍāwī’s basic position, namely, that any compromise of partition
between a Jewish state and an additional Arab (Islamic) state is null and void.

5. A role model

Qaraḍāwī tries to act as personal example through his sincere efforts on behalf of the
Palestinian cause by practicing what he preaches, as follows: “All my life, I declare that Jihad
in Palestine against Israel that has been occupying and despoiling since 1948 is obligatory. To
this day, I have not ceased doing so when I can, and if I could, I would rush to fight in
Palestine. I have called for and have not stopped shouting for Jihad in Palestine. The
Palestinian cause is our utmost priority and will not be forgotten [by us].”63
According to Qaraḍāwī, Israel’s recent attacks in Gaza, of which Protective Edge Operation
(8 July–24 August 2015) is the latest, constitute part of an ongoing war. It is a fateful campaign
in which every campaign is a stage in the war for the liberation of Palestine, which began with
the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and continues to the present. The war will end
only when the fighters of jihad, the Muslims, will achieve success in destroying the Israeli
army and liberate Palestine. Indeed, Qaraḍāwī longingly recalls 1948 when troops of the
Muslim Brotherhood participated in the fighting in Palestine.64 Qaraḍāwī was supposed to join
those young men who trained for the war in Palestine. Unfortunately, however, he was not
privileged to do so.65
Qaraḍāwī further discusses the role of the ʿᾹlim (Islamic religious scholar) in the current
round of the Jewish-Islamic struggle taking place in Palestine. According to his system, the
role of the religious sage is an active role of leading the Ummah. This approach resembles that
of Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini who supported the principle of the rule of religious figures in
leading the Ummah on the right path.66 The task of Islamic scholars does not only consist of
interpreting the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth. Indeed, “they are obligated to rise up and stand with
the Palestinian resistance, help the resistance and guide the masses to help all the believers in
every part of the Islamic homeland.”67
Qaraḍāwī and other religious figures, who are members of the International Union of
Muslim Scholars (IUMS), have attacked and continue to attack Islamic scholars who oppose
them. There are Islamic scholars who disagree with Qaraḍāwī regarding the subject of suicide
bombing (see below) and those who support the current president of Egypt, such as Sheikh Ali
Gumʿa. They are maligned and Qaraḍāwī questions their religious authority.68 Thus, for
example, Qaraḍāwī castigated Islamic leaders who attacked Hamas for rejecting the Egyptian
initiative of General Abd al-Fattah El-Sisi on 15 July 2014, after a week of fighting, as follows:
“Those religious scholars who attack Gaza are mainly supporters of Hosni Mubarak and of
other corrupt organizations.”69 According to Qaraḍāwī’s world-view, Islam demands that all of
its religious leaders and scholars unite and support the people of Gaza in particular and of
Palestine in general. During Operation Protective Edge (summer, 2014), Sheikh Ali alQaradāghī (Qara Dāghī), Secretary-General of the IUMS, called upon governments of Muslim
countries to support Hamas and warned Islamic scholars and rulers that “God will punish
whoever commits treason and give him what he deserves.”70 Qaraḍāwī and the members of

the Union of Muslim Scholars maintain that any criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and
Hamas would be regarded as treason against the Muslim Ummah and as a type of heresy.
A conference held after Operation Protective Edge (20–22 August) devoted an entire session
to the role and responsibility of Islamic scholars at the present time. Seven panels were
devoted to the tasks of Islamic scholars. For example, the first session dealt with the role of
such scholars in providing the basis for and the renewal of Wasaṭiyya (the centrist school of
thought, the golden mean in Islam preached by Qaraḍāwī). The seventh session dealt with the
role of Islamic scholars in solving problems of the Ummah in accordance with international
law. In addition, a special session was devoted to Palestine and to Jerusalem. It emerged that
the task of Islamic scholars not only involves giving guidance to believers in matters of Sharīʿa
but also to teach them to support and assist in finding a solution to the problems of the
Ummah, including the most difficult and complex of them, namely Palestine.71
Qaraḍāwī emphasizes that all of his actions and statements derive from his authority as an
Islamic leader and as the chairman of the IUMS which includes many Egyptians. He stresses
that it is incumbent upon him to criticize the ruling powers in Egypt or in any other Muslim
country, including the Palestinian Authority, if they deviate from the path of the struggle
against Israel. Asserting that he belongs to the people and is one of the people, Qaraḍāwī
declared: “[I am] a fallāḥ the son of a fallāḥ” and that “all the people in Egypt love me.”72 He
adds that an Islamic leader has a responsibility, especially during the present time, and that he
must speak in accordance with Sharīʿa and without fear. His trips to Palestine during the 1950s
and 1960s bound him inextricably to the Palestinian cause and to the suffering of the
Palestinian people. Qaraḍāwī’s worldview is an expression of the ideology of the Muslim
Brotherhood from the 1930s to the present and of their ties to Palestine.

Conclusion
The present character of Qaraḍāwī was formed during his youth and is the product of the
accumulated experiences of his lifetime, among them: an Islamic religious education that
shaped his world view; a deep emotional bond with his admired teacher and master, Ḥasan alBanna (upon which we shall elaborate further in this study); tales of the heroism of his friends
and an atmosphere of intense faith and accompanying sacrifice that prevailed at the time. All
of the above have left their imprint upon him and made him into what he is today.
Qaraḍāwī’s memoirs are full of the history of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, to which
he has devoted his entire being. He had dreamt of joining the fighters and heroes of the
Brotherhood who fought in Palestine in 1948. Unfortunately, however, he could not fulfill this
dream because he was imprisoned. In order to compensate for the fact that he did not die for

Palestine, he decided to devote his life and much of his literary output to the Palestinian cause.
His first visit to Palestine and the encounter with its landscape and the historical sites that he
had only heard about beforehand and the warm reception by the people made a formidable
impression upon him. Qaraḍāwī does not describe events objectively and does not stick to
historical facts. He writes about things as he sees them and includes his personal thoughts and
feelings. A reader of his work emerges with a portrait of an enthusiastic, God-fearing young
man who fervently believes in his mission. He does not hesitate to confront and present
arguments in order to achieve his goals and clarify his positions until even his ideological
opponents admit that he is right. And, he compares himself to the great leader and prophet,
Moses.
During his second trip to Palestine, when he brought his family along, he strengthened the
ties that he had made during his first visit. This lengthy stay enabled him to become more
knowledgeable about Palestine and its inhabitants. The respect of the local residents who
invited him and listened to his sermons gave him a stronger and more profound emotional
bond to Palestine. Whereas during his first visit, he was a young bachelor, he was now married
with a family. This trip had an additional educational value as it imbued the holiness and
importance of Palestine to the younger generation. The pleasure of visiting the West Bank was
juxtaposed with the great danger seen from Israel as preparation for the events that would
take place the following year, in 1967. In his memoirs, Qaraḍāwī depicts himself as one who is
inextricably bound to Palestine and feels the pain of the inhabitants of an occupied land.
During his third visit in May 2013, when Qaraḍāwī was in Gaza, he stressed that the path
toward a solution to the problem of Palestine had been found. Gaza, liberated from foreign
occupation, symbolized this path. The way of Jihad and sacrifice against the Jews eventually
would succeed in liberating all of Palestine and Al-Aqsa. In this visit, Qaraḍāwī entered
Palestine triumphantly, as a liberator, to a land ruled in the spirit of Islam, and by his disciple,
Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister of Hamas government.
The roots of Qaraḍāwī’s manifold activities on behalf of the Palestinian cause, the Al-Aqsa
Mosque and the problem of the refugees are embedded in those visits whose impressions he
remembers today. Qaraḍāwī regards his life’s mission to continue the war until final victory
against the Jews. He still hopes that he will live to see this after dedicating his entire life to
Palestine and that he will die as a Shahīd on Palestinian soil.

Notes
1 Ismā‛ῑl Haniyya (Haniyeh), et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī fī Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya
al-Filasṭῑnῑya (Gaza: markaz al-iʿlām al-ʿarabῑ, 2012). An earlier edition was published in Gaza in 2011.

2 Ibid.; A survey of the book by Ahmad Hasan Ali was published on the website of al-Qaraḍāwī,
www.Qaraḍāwī.net/library/77/5517-2012-01-17-12-51.html, viewed on 17 January 2012.
3 Sami E. Baroudi, “Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi on International Relations: The Discourse of a leading Islamist Scholar (1926–),”
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 50, issue 1 p. 3.
4 Hossam Tammam, “Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The Nature of a Special Relationship,” in: Bettina Gräf and
Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2009), pp. 69–71.
5 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya wal-Kuttāb: Malāmiḥ Sīra wa-Masīra (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2002), vol. 1, p. 287.
6 Ibid., pp. 260–261.
7 Ibid., p. 261.
8 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsa Muqārina li-ʾaḥkāmihi wa-falsafatihi fῑ ḍawʾ al-Qurʾān wal-Sunna (Cairo:
Maktabat Wahba, 2009), vol. 2, p. 1078.
9 David Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 92–93;
Charles Wendell, Introduction to: Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna: A Selection from the Majmuat Rasail al-Imam al-Shahid
Hasan al-Banna (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 17, 133–134.
10 Samuel Helfont, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi: Islam and Modernity (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and
African Studies, 2009), p. 12.
11 Rashmi Singh, Hamas and Suicide Terrorism: Multi-Causal and Multi-Level Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2012), p.
191.
12 Meir Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam: Piety, Power and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 191.
13 Khālid Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 2003), vol. 5, p. 180.
14 Ḥātim Yūsuf Abū Ziyāda, Jihād al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn ḥattā ʿᾹm 1970 (No place of publication listed: The
Muslim Brotherhood, 2009), pp. 152–158.
15 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 180; Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, pp. 263–265.
16 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, p. 264.
17 See for example the story of the woman Ṣabāḥ al-Qawāsma who lost her son Ḥamza, on the website: Katāʾib ʿIzz al-Dīn
al-Qassām, “Al-Shahīd al-Qassāmī Ḥamza ‘Awaḍ al-Qawāsma,” www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=258, viewed on
2 December 2012. See also: the Hamas website, al-Markaz al-Filasṭīnī lilʾ-Iʿlam which features the pictures of two shahīds
holding

M-16

rifles

against

the

background

of

the

al-Aqsa

info.com/arabic/hamas/shuhda/2003/kawasmy/syrah.htm, viewed on 12 December 2012.
18 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, p. 264.
19 Ibid., pp. 343–344.

Mosque,

www.palestine-

20 Ibid., p. 264.
21 Ibid., p. 265. According to Islamic tradition, the shahīd may bring 70 of his family members and relatives into Paradise.
See: Eitan Kohlberg, “Mot Kedoshim ve-Hakrava Islamit” (The Death of Martyrs and Islamic Sacrifice), Peamim, 75
(Spring 1998), p. 11 (Hebrew).
22 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 181.
23 Ibid., p. 182.
24 Ḥātim Yūsuf Abū Ziyāda, Jihād al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn, pp. 5–6, 33–109.
25 Singh, Hamas and Suicide Terrorism, p. 25.
26 This four-volume biography first appeared in Cairo in 2002. Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya wal-Kuttāb.
27 MeirJacob Kister, “‘You Shall Only Set Out for Three Mosques’: A Study of an Early Tradition,” Le Muséon, 82 (1969), pp.
173–196.
28 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, pp. 470–471.
29 “Yusuf al Qaradawi Praises Hitler and the Holocaust,” YouTube, 19 November 2009, www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VcB_DZ4YQYQ, viewed on 11 May 2017; “Al-Qaraḍāwī: ʾatamannā al-shahāda bi-ghazza, wa-law ʿalā kursī
mutaḥarrik” (“Al-Qaraḍāwī: I Wish for Myself the Death of Martyrs in Gaza and Even If I Will Be in Wheel-Chair”),
Website: Katāʾib al-Shahīd ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām, www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=7683, viewed on 29 January
2009.
30 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, p. 472.
31 Ibid.
32 Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, p. 81.
33 Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1982), pp. 209–226; Shaul Bartal, The Fedayeen Emerge: The Palestine-Israel Conflict, 1949–1956 (Bloomington:
Author House, 2011), pp. 187–189; Shaul Bartal, Jihad in Palestine: Political Islam and the Israeli-Palestine Conflict
(Abington: Routledge, 2016), pp. 153–181.
34 Ḥātim Yūsuf Abu Ziyāda, Jihād al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Filasṭīn, p. 28.
35 Al-Qaraḍāwī , Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, pp. 472–473.
36 Ibid., pp. 473–475.
37 Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas (Abington: Routledge, 2004), pp. 67–68; Matthew Levitt, Hamas:
Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 8–32, 229–249.
38 The Sheikh served as a preacher at the Al-Aqsa Mosque and was deported to Jordan in 1969. During the 1980s, he
established his organization and was active in coordinating the different factions of Islamic Jihad and Fatah. Meir
Hatina, Palestinian Radicalism: The Islamic Jihad Movement (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 1994), pp. 12, 24–25

(Hebrew); Anat Kurz (ed.), Maskit Burgin and David Tal, Islamic Terrorism and Israel: Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad and Hamas (Tel Aviv: Papyrus Press, Tel Aviv University, 1994), pp. 127–128 (Hebrew); Bartal, Jihad in Palestine, pp.
45, 86–87.
39 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, p. 475.
40 Ibid., p. 476.
41 Ibid., pp. 476–477.
42 Nadav Shragai, The “Al-Aksa is in Danger” Libel: The History of a Lie (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
2012), pp. 25–28; Moshe Dayan, Avnei Derekh (“Milestones”) (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1976), p. 13 (Hebrew).
43 Qurʾān, vol. 22, pp. 39–40.
44 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, p. 477.
45 Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya: Wathīqat ʿᾹʾid (Umm al-Faḥm: Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Muʿāṣira, 2008). This work was published
to commemorate 60 years since the Nakba. It describes the suffering of the refugee and its cover stresses the number, six
million, and additional statements that compare the situation of the Palestinian refugees to the Nazi Holocaust. See:
Shaul Bartal, “The Holocaust According to Sheikh Raed Salah,” Imago Magazine, 7 October 2010 (Hebrew), www.eimago.co.il/Editor/actual-3404.htm.
46 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, p. 477.
47 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Ila al-Quds al-Sharīf, kaifa faʿalahā al-Yahūd” (video #49), al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 16 January 2012,
www.Qaraḍāwī.net/life/8/5518–49.html.
48 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, pp. 478–480.
49 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 42–44.
50 Ibid., pp. 44–45.
51 Ibid., pp. 45–46.
52 Ibid., pp. 47–48.
53 Al-Aqsa Channel (Gaza), 8 May 2013, http://aqsatv.ps.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 “Al-Qaraḍāwī yanfī ṣiḥḥat taṣrīḥāt nusibat lahu ḥawla al-Jihād fī Filasṭīn,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 9 August 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/takareer/7417-2014-08-09-21-24-15.
64 Khālid al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Sheikh al-Qaraḍāwī, (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 2003), vol. 5, p. 180.
65 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, p. 264.
66 See: Ruhollah Khomeini, Wilāyat al-Faqīh (Beirut: Muʾassasat tanẓīm wa-nashr ʾāthār Imām Khomeini, 1969).
67 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Mawāqif Ahl Filasṭīn Rafaʿat Raʾs Al-Umma Kullahā,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 26 July 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwī.net/newtakareer/7406-2014-07-26-14-39-04; “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Lā yajūzu Tark al-Muqāwama Waḥdahā,” AlQaraḍāwī Website, 22 July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/takareer/7397-2014-07-22-07-35-.
68 “Al-Sharīʿa wal-Ḥayāt: al-Khawārij bayna al-dīn wal-taʾrīkh wal-siyāsa,” Al Jazeera, 25 August 2013,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=V12zCzozumQ. See also the statements by Dr. Aḥmad al-Rīsūni, presented in the AlQaraḍāwī Website and additional web-sites. According to al-Rīsūni, Islamic scholars who supported the Egyptian
measures exemplify corruption. “Al-Rīsūnī: Ṣurat Shaikh Al-Azhar wa-Bāba al-Kanīsa bi-jānib al-Sīsī tuʿākisu fasād alfiqh,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 9 July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwī.net/newtakareer/7374-2014-07-09-07-38-59.
69 Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Waṣf Ḥamās bil-ʾirhāb muṣība wa-taghyīr lil-waʿy,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Web-site, 21 July 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/takareer/7394-2014-07-21-23-35-05.
70 “Al-Qaradāghī li-ḥukkām al-Muslimīn: Allah Muḥāsibkum wal-taʾrīkh yalʿanu man yakhūnu,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 20
July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/takareer/7392-2014-07-20-23-08-58.
71 “Al-bayān al-khitāmī lil-jamʿiyya al-ʾumamiyya al-rābiʿa lil-Ittiḥād al-ʿālamī lil-ʿUlamāʾ, Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 24
August 2014, www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/takareer/7455-2014-08-24-20-46-26.
72 “Siyāsa Fī Dīn Maʿa al-Shaikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī,” Al-Jazeera, 21 July 2014, www.youtube.com.watch?v=pa9vLhNJcF8.

2
Spiritual forefathers
Ḥasan al-Banna, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini, Sayyid Quṭb

1. Ḥasan al-Banna
Along with the lasting impact of his first trip to Palestine, Qaraḍāwī mentions several figures
that he admires and regards as his teachers and masters. He writes extensively about Ḥasan alBanna, his beloved teacher and mentor. Qaraḍāwī had a strong emotional attachment to alBanna – hence his identification with him and with the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood.
According to Qaraḍāwī’s memoirs, Ḥasan al-Banna embodied the entire world for his students
and disciples. They regarded him not only as a teacher but as a commander whom they would
follow through fire and water and as warm father figure. His role embraced that of a scholar,
preacher, educator, reformer, fighter and politician. Qaraḍāwī notes that he never met anyone
of the stature of Ḥasan al-Banna and attests that he benefited from and was profoundly
influenced by his preaching.1
Ḥasan al-Banna also served as a source of spiritual growth. According to Qaraḍāwī, “he did
not have the opportunity to write great scholarly works, but he ‘authored’ great men who
filled the world with books and with beneficial research. His men are spread throughout the
world and his universal message has spread to all corners of the world.”2 The above seems to
include Qaraḍāwī himself since he regards himself as the successor of Ḥasan al-Banna. In his
book that commemorates seventy years since the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood and
fifty years since the assassination of Ḥasan al-Banna, Qaraḍāwī designates al-Banna as the
mujaddid (innovator) of the generation, the longed-for leader for whom all are waiting. He
compares him to exemplary Islamic historical figures such as Umar ibn Abd al-Azīz, Ṣalāḥ alDīn (Saladin) or Abū Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī.3
Thus, Qaraḍāwī does not differ from others in the Muslim Brotherhood, such as
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, who have placed Ḥasan al-Banna on a pedestal and called him
“only slightly lower than the Prophet.”4 The myth of al-Banna as a nearly divine figure
appears in the writings and interviews of many of his supporters. Umar al-Tilmisānī, who
served as the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood from 1973–1986, stated that while he was in

the presence of al-Banna “he felt like a dead man, like a vessel in the hands of someone
engaged in washing the corpse,”5 namely, he experienced a sense of absolute self-effacement
because of the inconceivable charisma of al-Banna over his supporters. Qaraḍāwī’s praises for
Ḥasan al-Banna are neither exceptional nor extraordinary in light of the mythical blind loyalty
to the figure of the founder and leader of the Brotherhood. It is not just lip service but his
sincere belief that he is his successor at present.
Qaraḍāwī argues that Ḥasan al-Banna was sent by Allāh to awaken the Arabs from the
slumber, to give them the spirit of life and to quicken their hearts. He devoted his entire life to
walking in the path of Allāh as his mission. Everyone who met him immediately loved,
honored and praised him. He, however, was modest and did not like those who praised him
excessively. Qaraḍāwī first attended a lecture by al-Banna during his first year at the Institute
for Religious Studies in Ṭanṭa. Afterwards, he traveled to different locations in order to hear
al-Banna’s lectures and he read all of his works. The words of al-Banna are engraved upon his
heart to this very day.6 Qaraḍāwī notes the enormous influence of Ḥasan al-Banna upon his
ideas, although he disagrees with him about issues such as the status of women, the
prohibition of translating the Qurʾān into foreign languages or the belief that demons may
control human beings. Qaraḍāwī contends that his disagreements with al-Banna stem from the
fact that al-Banna lived several decades ago and that if he were alive today, his opinions
would have changed.7 Qaraḍāwī describes his relationship with al-Banna as one of a trainee to
a guide, a student to a teacher and a soldier to an officer. At a gathering that commemorated
the 100th anniversary of the birth of Ḥasan al-Banna held in Amman, Jordan in 2006, he read a
statement blessing the memory of his beloved teacher and even designated his writings as
bearing a prophetic halo.8
Qaraḍāwī identifies Ḥasan al-Banna as the greatest shaper of the religious and political
consciousness of Islam in general and of the Palestinian issue in particular. The latter was
especially important to al-Banna. Qaraḍāwī writes as follows:
Ever since I was a student in lower classes at al-Azhar, we were preoccupied by the major problem among Muslims – the
issue of the land of prophecies and of the holy places, Palestine. I devoted all of my energy to dealing with this problem
as I studied under someone for whom this subject was his major occupation that he was his highest priority. This is the
legacy of Ḥasan al-Banna who was one of the pioneers that opened the eyes of people and kindled their passions for
Palestine and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. We went to vocal demonstrations, delivered fiery speeches and recited rousing poems
in order to enflame such passions and we motivated people to enlist all of their strength and energy for Palestine. We did
this especially each year on 2 November, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration that was given by someone who has
no right to make a promise to someone who is not deserving of a promise! And when we could send forces of volunteers
in 1948, on the one hand, we hastened to recruit an army, while on the other hand, [we hastened to recruit] the passions
of the masses.9

Years later, during the wars in Gaza in 2008, 2012 and 2014, Qaraḍāwī continued to preach and
enflame the passions of Muslims throughout the world and remind them that the problem of
Palestine is paramount.10

Qaraḍāwī states that Ḥasan al-Banna was one of the first who preached about the Zionist
peril in Palestine as follows: “One must learn the positions of Ḥasan al-Banna and thank him
for them. [These positions] derive mainly from his courageous and historic link to the Mufti of
Palestine and the great warrior of Jihad, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini.”11 Ḥasan al-Banna preached
that one must fight for the great Islamic homeland and oppose colonialism by any means. If
foreigners have conquered a part of the Islamic homeland, Muslims from all corners of the
world are obligated to render assistance to those in that land. Ḥasan al-Banna used to quote
the ruling of the Imam Mālik b. Anas, founder of the Malikite school of law that states that if a
Muslim woman is taken captive in the East, Muslims in the West are obligated to liberate her
and redeem her even if they must spend all of the money of the Muslims. Hence, al-Banna
concludes: “The Islamic homeland is one and cannot be divided and a hostile act against one
part of it is [considered] a hostile act against all of it.”12 Qaraḍāwī also cites this ruling in the
name of Ḥasan al-Banna.13
It is clear that the thought of Ḥasan al-Banna directly influenced that of Qaraḍāwī who
included it in his works. Ḥassan al-Banna preached that the Muslim Ummah is one nation that
is bound by faith, as is written in the Qurʾān, 23:52: “This is the nation (Ummah) you should be:
one nation. And I am your Lord so keep your obligations to me”. Based on this verse Hassan
al-Banna concluded that: “Any piece of land where there is a Muslim who declares that there
is no God but Allāh or where the flag of Islam has been raised, is a deposit in the hands of
Muslims.”14 According to al-Banna, Islam does not recognize geographical borders and
maintains that the Muslims are one Ummah and therefore, regards the Islamic homeland as a
single homeland.15 Therefore, “Palestine is the homeland of every Muslim as it is part of the
land of Islam as it is the cradle of the Prophets and the location of Al-Aqsa whose environs
God has blessed.”16 Therefore, we must demand that England fulfill its obligation toward the
Muslims, grant them the rights that are coming to them and cease their attacks against them
because they are innocent of any wrongdoing.17 Palestine must be liberated from the Jews.
The only way to do this is through Jihad. The Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in peace
with the Jews. Al-Banna preached that Jihad is the obligation of every Muslim who must
commit himself to the fighting during the time of crisis against the enemy who is invading the
lands of Islam. Al-Banna reiterated that there is clear indication of the obligation to fight the
People of the Book, and the fact that Allah doubles the reward of those who fight them.18 The
words of al-Banna about fulfilling the obligation of Jihad greatly influenced Qaraḍāwī who
included them in his rulings, as follows:
Allāh has obligated every Muslim to Jihad as a religions obligation in order to struggle forcefully [with every crisis].
There is no escape and no refuge from this. Therefore, [Allāh] awakens [in the believers] a strong desire for this and
thereby grants atonement to the Mujāhidūn (Jihad fighters) and to the Shuhadāʾ (Martyrs)… Allāh grants them extra
privileges, both spiritual and material, in this world and in the world to come that He has not granted to anyone except
for them. Their pure and clean blood is a guarantee of victory [of the believers] in this world”19

Thus, it will be for the Jews, and for the rest of the enemies of Islam who invade the land of
the Muslims. Therefore, according to al-Banna, the believer must work with all of their ability,
energy and effort for the success of Jihad.20
On 26 September 1938, Ḥasan al-Banna published an article in the journal, al-Nadhīr
entitled “Ṣināʿat al-Mawt” (literally, “The Industry of Death”), devoted to encouraging fighters
to join the Jihad in Palestine. The article argues that death is equal to any other craft in life.
People usually fear death and repress the thought of it. For this reason, they do not plan their
death in a worthy manner. Every day cowards die 1,000 small deaths to the point that their
actual death becomes unfortunate, meaningless and dishonorable. In contrast, one who knows
how to plan his death properly, at the right time and in an honorable manner, greatly benefits
from it and wins glory. Al-Banna quotes Qurʾān, Sūra 61 verses 11–12, that guide the faithful
toward the correct approach to death, among them: “You should believe in Allāh and His
Messenger, and strive hard in Allah’s way with your wealth and your lives. That is better for
you, did you but know. Then he will forgive you your sins and will enter your Gardens
wherein rivers flow, and goodly dwellings in paradise – that is the mighty achievement.”
An additional passage is: “Allāh purchased the souls and possessions of the believers in
exchange for Paradise. They fight on behalf of Allah; they kill and are being killed. This is the
true promise that is mentioned in the Torah, the New Testament and the Qurʾān” (Sūra 9:111).
Al-Banna argues that Palestine is the first line of defense and that Muslims must not abandon
it. What is taking place in Palestine is not only the problem of the Arabs, but of the entire
Islamic world. All Muslims must join as one in extending aid toward victory in Palestine.
Everyone must utilize the means that are available to him, whether through financial
contributions or actual participation in the fighting.21
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt rallied on behalf of Palestine in different ways. As early
as 1931, Ḥasan al-Banna sent a letter to the Mufti of Palestine, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini which
presented several proposals for solving the Palestinian problem. Ḥasan al-Banna mentions the
Mufti as a role model several times in his letters. For example, in the “Letter of the Fifth
Congress,” he writes as follows: “From this podium we are sending the most heart-felt
blessings of the Muslim Brotherhood honoring the Grand Mufti, and their warmest greetings.
We wish that His Honor will not be hurt and that no harm will be done to the al-Ḥuseini
family by placing them under surveillance or by arresting their free men.”22 The above
appeared in 1937 when Hajj Amīn was in Lebanon where he escaped from the British.
In 1931, the Muslim Brotherhood established the Jerusalem Fund (Ṣundūq al-Quds) in order
to collect contributions for the fighters in Palestine.23 In 1933, the Muslim Brotherhood
published numerous items and articles on Palestine. The Brotherhood held an annual
commemoration of the yawm al-Isrāʾ wal-Miʿrāj (the traditional anniversary of the Night
Journey of Muhammad from Mecca to Jerusalem and his ascension to heaven) devoted to a
discussion of the Palestinian cause.24 In March 1935, at the Third Congress of the Muslim

Brotherhood, a decision was made to establish a unit of scouts (Jawwāla) whose activities
included physical training.25 Afterward, Ḥasan al-Banna sent these young fighters to reinforce
the Palestinians under the leadership of Sheikh ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām. During the same year,
he sent Muḥammad Labīb to Palestine to represent the Brotherhood in order to settle the
conflict between two Palestinian organizations: Al-Najāda and Al-Futuwwa. Al-Najāda was
founded by Muḥammad Nimr al-Huwārī and al-Futuwwa by Jamāl al-Ḥuseinī. The Mufti, Hajj
Amīn al-Ḥuseini eagerly advocated the union of both groups, despite their quarrels.26 Labīb
eventually united the two into a group called the “Organization of Arab Youth” (Munaẓẓamat
al-Shabāb al-ʿArabī).27
In 1936, the Muslim Brotherhood founded the “General Central Committee for Aid to
Palestine” (Al-Lajna al-Markaziyya al-ʿᾹmma li-Musāʿadat Filasṭīn). Its purpose was to
increase the awareness of the people of Cairo and its environs to the Palestinian cause and to
collect financial contributions for the continued struggle in Palestine. Therefore, the Supreme
Guide of the Brotherhood issued a fatwā allowing contributions for Palestine from the zakāt
(obligatory charity fund). The Brotherhood collected the money by means of a major
propaganda campaign on behalf of the Palestinians and organized anti-British
demonstrations.28 Al-Banna even called for adding a prayer blessing the Mujāhidūn fighting
in Palestine (Qunūt). Thus, once again he showed the connection between religion and politics
in Islam.
In 1936, the Brotherhood began a boycott of Jewish businesses in Cairo arguing that they
support Zionism. In 1938, the Muslim Brotherhood began to circulate the book by Ḥasan alBanna entitled Al-Nār wal-Damār fī Filastīn (“Fire and Destruction in Palestine”) and devoted
to the Palestinian cause. The Brotherhood also began its annual commemoration on 2
November, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration that proclaimed a Jewish homeland as
Palestine, as protest against “the accursed Balfour Declaration” (Waʿd Balfūr al-Mashʾūm). The
first International Congress for Palestine was convened in Cairo in October 1938. The
Brotherhood invested much effort in organizing it and ensuring that it took place. Delegates
from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Sudan participated in the congress. In January 1939, the
Brotherhood, along with other Islamic organizations, founded the “Society of the Dime for the
Unfortunate of Palestine” (Jamāʿat al-Qirsh li-Iʿānat Mankūbī Filasṭīn). The “uniform dime”
was a uniform stamp that was circulated in place of the variety of stamps issued by the
different Islamic societies. The income from the purchase of these stamps was dedicated to the
war effort in Palestine. The ruling given to members of the Brotherhood was to circulate these
stamps as much as possible in order to raise money for Palestine.29
On 2 November 1945 (Balfour Day), massive demonstrations on behalf of Palestine,
organized by the Brotherhood, were held in Egypt for the first time.30 After the
demonstrations, there was a pogrom against synagogues and Jewish stores in the ancient

quarter of Cairo.31 The Brotherhood opposed the U.N. proposal for the partition of Palestine
and called for massive protests against it. On 15 December 1947, students from al-Azhar and
other universities and institutes, and many political figures, participated in a massive
demonstration. Ḥasan al-Banna addressed the crowd as follows: “I am at your service,
Palestine (“labbaiki”);32 our blood will redeem Palestine even if we do not have many
weapons. Soon we will be rid of our enemies. I declare here from this platform that the
Brothers already have dedicated the blood of tens of thousands of volunteers who will die the
death of martyrs on the soil of Palestine.” Afterward, he called upon kings and leaders:
“Separate us from the Jews. If you lose Palestine, hang me and my brothers in the public
square.”33
At the same time, the Brotherhood undertook the major project of arming the fighters
departing for Palestine. They collected enormous quantities of arms (mainly weapons from
World War II that were in the possession of Beduins), in order to give them to the mujāhidūn
in Palestine. They also set up workshops for producing weapons and explosive devices. In
November 1947, members of the Muslim Brotherhood joined “the Organization of the Nile
Valley for Saving Jerusalem” (Haiʾat Wādī al-Nīl li-Inqādh al-Quds).34 Those who
spearheaded these efforts on behalf of Palestine and lobbied for Egypt’s intervention were
members of the military wing of the “Special Array” (Al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ), or the “Secret
Apparatus” (Al-Jihāz al-Sirrī).35
In May 1948, when Britain announced the end of the Mandate in Palestine, Ḥasan al-Banna
proclaimed a general conscription of members of the Brotherhood. They came from all over
Egypt and gathered at the Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo where they were astonished to
hear that the Egyptian army was not joining the campaign and would prevent them from
doing so. They used various tricks to enter Palestine: some entered via Sinai claiming they
were on a study tour; others hitchhiked on trucks bringing goods to Palestine and others
crossed the desert on foot in a long and exhausting trek. The members of the Egyptian
Brotherhood were not alone. Others came from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan and Jordan. They
began to fight in Palestine two months before the invasion by regular forces from Arab
countries. The battles in which they participated include Kfar Darom; ʿ Aslūj; T āba and the
conquest of Ramat Rachel.36
After the invasion of the Arab armies, acts of terror were perpetrated against Jewish
businesses in Cairo. In June 1948, bombs exploded in the Cicurel and Oreco department stores,
and in the following months, the Gattegno and Ben Zion department stores suffered similar
attacks. In September, a bomb exploded in the Jewish quarter of Cairo. On 4 December 1948,
Egyptian students held a demonstration against armistice talks with Israel during which a
bomb exploded that killed the chief of police of Cairo.37
The work by Ḥātim Abu Ziyāda contains the final words of al-Banna – spoken close to his

death in February 1949 – during the war between the Jews and the Arab countries:
When the items of information from Palestine reached us, one after another, after Arab forces entered Palestine, it
became clear that their concentrated force could not bring about the purification of Palestine from the impurity of the
Jews and they did not have the strength to overcome the presence of the Jews, their forces and their formations in
Palestine. It must be noted that the armed groups of most of the mujāhidūn (holy warriors), sons of Palestine, were
removed from the fields of Jihad despite the fact that were there by right and were native sons. The policy of the Jews
contributed to this as it carefully created cracks between these mujāhidūn and the armies of the Arab countries. We
became aware, with God’s mercy, that there was a world conspiracy against the sons of Palestine and their cause. It was
revealed to us and to everyone that an English officer, Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Jordanian army had become
the general commander of all of the Arab armies that entered Palestine. He [Glubb Pasha] is a vengeful Crusader and
angry at Islam and the Muslims. It has been revealed how he and others were responsible for the poor quality of the
equipment of the Egyptian army.38

Palestine fell because of an international plot whose participants were the secular Arab
regimes of the time, Christian countries and the Jews. The army of al-Jihād al-Muqaddas
(“the holy Jihad”) comprised of native Palestinians and under the direction of the Mufti Hajj
Amīn al-Ḥuseini was removed in the context of the international conspiracy.39 Arguments of
this nature were circulated by the Mufti from his place of exile in Egypt and by officers of the
Jordanian army who deserted and told their stories, among them Abdallah El-Tell, who
explicitly blamed the Arab armies – and most of all the Jordanian army under the command
of the English officer Glubb Pasha – for the defeat in Palestine, handing it over to the Jews and
removing local forces from the fighting.40
According to al-Banna,
the Muslims at present, as is known, are humbled by foreigners, ruled by infidels; their land is trampled and their honor
is desecrated. Their enemies manage their affairs and their religious rites are abolished within their home. In addition to
their helplessness in spreading their teachings, it is a personal obligation upon every Muslim, from which one cannot
escape, to get ready to establish the intention in one’s heart of [waging] a holy war, to prepare the tools for it when the
opportunity comes, until God will issue the decree that it must be done.41

Al-Banna, who had close ties with the Mufti Ḥajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini, continued encouraging
fighters of Jihad in Palestine who had returned to Egypt, as follows:
“God is with them, they [follow] a straight path… they have faith in God and their Jihad. God is with them in
everything they do and when God watches them. Their great war will not cease from [confronting] the infidels and
those who act without restraint among the most cowardly rulers who fear the Jews. They will confront those [believers]
who do not acknowledge things that are known [regarding collaboration in the conspiracy against Palestine] and they do
not commit indecent acts [like the rulers]. They will confront [King] Farouk,42 the army of Farouk and the police of
Farouk and his followers who adopt all of the colonialist methods.… These despicable circumstances will not continue. It
is not strange that the blood of [the believers in] Islam will be spilled in Muslim countries. They will continue to sanctify
their blood for the sake of God in the campaign to grab the power from the group that lacks regard for Islam. They [the
foreigners] who have no regard and do not understand that their grasp is from God and because of Him. They are
foreigners… foreigners and it does not matter how long their presence will continue.”43

The fighters of Jihad among the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who fought in

Palestine returned to Egypt and understood that the source of the curse of Islam at that time
was the rotten government that committed treason against Islam. Ḥasan al-Banna paid with
his life because of his outcry against the corrupt rule of Farouk whom he accused of selling out
Palestine. His principles would continue to guide al-Banna’s successors, including Qaraḍāwī.
The legacy of Ḥasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood shaped the anti-Jewish
atmosphere during those years in Egypt when the young Qaraḍāwī received his formative
education. Qaraḍāwī continues on the ideological path of Ḥasan al-Banna as far as the struggle
in Palestine is concerned. He also identifies the Palestinian problem (Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn) as the
issue of highest priority for the entire Muslim world, not only for the Palestinians.44 The
problem with Israel lies in the fact that it exists on Muslim lands. However, there is a religious
factor as well, namely a war between Judaism and Islam.45 Since Qaraḍāwī identifies the
struggle in Palestine as more important than other problems in the Islamic world, he calls for a
boycott of American goods because of American aid to Israel, “its spoiled child.”46 He calls
upon Arab countries to cease supplying oil to the West as the Egyptians did in 1973 in order to
exert pressure regarding the Palestinian cause. Qaraḍāwī organizes special prayers during
times of crises, such as the “Cast Lead” Campaign in Gaza, and does everything he can in
order to arm the Palestinians. Qaraḍāwī maintains that only Jihad will liberate Gaza. It is the
only option: “What is the solution? And what is the cure? In the face of Israel’s arrogance,
boasting, haughtiness and heresy, there is no solution but Jihād.”47 Qaraḍāwī is opposed to
peace agreements with Israel because he views them as concessions.48
Qaraḍāwī is known as “the Sheikh of Terror” or “the Sheikh of Death,”49 because of his
fervent support for Jihad and self-sacrifice for the Palestinian cause. His sermons praise the
desire to die a martyr’s death (Ṭalab al-Shahāda) while fighting in Palestine. The words of
Ḥasan al-Banna still reverberate in his ears:
Where are the Brothers – the people (Ummah) that prefer the industry of death and know how to die an honorable death
– a death that God longs for and grants its perpetrators lives full of strength in this world and the eternal Paradise of the
next world. This is only the same weakness that is associated with th e lovers of pleasure in this world and those who
hate death. Strengthen your souls for a tremendous act [of death as martyrs] and long for the death that will grant you
life.50

Al-Banna concludes his letter, as follows: “Dying for Him [God] is an honorable death. Thus
you will merit the perfect light. God blessed us and granted you the honor of dying the death
of a martyr for His sake.”51
The Arab Ummah must render assistance to the struggle to the best of its ability. “Whoever
can go to fight in Palestine should do so. If it were possible to send fighters, there are many
young men everywhere who long for Jihad for the sake of Al-Aqsa.” 52 In contrast to other
sheikhs, who refer to such acts as suicide and therefore, forbid these acts, Qaraḍāwī allows
suicide bombers to blow themselves up even in Israeli civilians centers of population, despite

the fact that the Ḥadīth forbids the killing of anyone who is not involved in actual warfare,
namely, soldiers. The Prophet forbade the killing of innocent persons such as women, children,
the elderly, farmers and merchants.53 Because of this problem, Qaraḍāwī gave Israeli society a
new and unique definition: Mujtama ʿ ʿ Askarī, “a military society.” All sectors of Israeli
society serve in the army at some point in their lives. Children will serve in the future and the
elderly have served in the past. Even women serve in the army. Therefore, there is no problem
in killing them.54
Qaraḍāwī grants permission to suicide bombers only in the case of the Palestinian struggle.
It is because the Palestinians are in a situation of ḍarūra (“pressing need”) that permits what
usually is forbidden. The Palestinians are inferior to Israel as far as their military capabilities
are concerned, and therefore, they are permitted to make themselves into human bombs.55
The attempt by the Egyptian government headed by Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi to present
Qaraḍāwī as someone who generally encourages suicide bombing by using the analogy of
Qaraḍāwī’s statements on the Palestinians made him retract his approval of suicide bombings
on the part of Hamas activists during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This took place because Hamas and
other Palestinian groups were capable of launching missiles that landed deep into Israeli
territory.56
According to Qaraḍāwī, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad best fulfill the ideal of sacrifice and
martyrdom in the spirit of Ḥasan al-Banna. They are
the righteous sons of the [Muslim] Brotherhood movement, faithful to Allah and to their religion. They have devoted
their lives to the Jihad in Palestine in order to liberate the land of the Prophets from the Zionist impurity and to liberate
the honorable Jerusalem and the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque. They are the sons of the Hamas movement. They rob the
infidel and overbearing Zionists of sleep. Hamas are those who make their [the Zionists’] lives miserable and devote all
their efforts in order to get rid of the Zionists, despite the fact that Washington incites the Palestinian Authority against
them [Hamas] and calls upon it to fight against them as a common enemy.57

The Western world and Israel regard these movements as “terrorist movements,” and
Qaraḍāwī as a terrorist is not allowed entry into certain countries, such as the United States.
Israel demands that the Palestinian Authority curb the activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad
organizations. These fighters, in Qaraḍāwī’s eyes, however, are not terrorists. Israel is the real
terrorist as it has conquered a land that does not belong to it by force:
Hamas and Islamic Jihad are not terrorist movements. Hamas is defending its homeland, defending its land, defending
its people, defending its honor… the so-called terror of Hamas is justified by law. It actually is not terror in the accepted
definition of the word, but is more like deterrence of the enemy. This is the meaning of verse in the Qurʾān, 8:60: ‘plant
fear in (the hearts of) the enemies of Allāh and your enemies.’ The Jews are the real terrorists because they established
their state on the basis of terror that is not legitimate (ghair mashrūʿa); [the Jews are] oppressive terrorists, evil and
braggarts.58

In conclusion, in order to emphasize the strong ties between Qaraḍāwī and Ḥasan al-Banna,
we shall present the statements on the assassination of al-Banna from Qaraḍāwī’s memoirs:

On February 12, 1949, we left the jail in Ṭanṭa in order to see the light of day, after we had not done so for a long time.
But it was as if the sun had set before us again when we saw the newspaper headlines that announced the assassination
of Ḥasan al-Banna. It was as if the world closed in upon us after it had opened and we felt so suffocated that we wanted
to die.59

Thus, Ḥasan al-Banna fulfilled his dream of dying a fitting death, as he had stated in his
speech in Ṭanṭa: “This head must be separated from this body for the sake of the way of
Allah.”60
One of the strongest expressions of the admiration of Qaraḍāwī for his teacher Ḥasan alBanna can be seen in a poem written by Qaraḍāwī lamenting the death of Hassan al-Banna.
The poem opens the book of poetry written by Qaraḍāwī, called The Muslims Come. (alMuslimūn Qādmūn) The song opens with the following words: “To you my guide, my dearest
teacher” (laka yā Imām ī yā a‛azza mu‛alim).61

2. The Mufti, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseinī
After Ḥasan al-Banna, the greatest influence upon Qaraḍāwī was Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini.
Muḥammad Amīn al-Ḥuseinī (1895–1974) was the founder of the Palestine national
movement and served as Mufti of Jerusalem during the British Mandate.62 Their biographies
have much in common and it is clear that Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini serves as a role model for
Qaraḍāwī. For example, Hajj Amīn continues to enjoy enormous prestige both in Palestine
and elsewhere as “Grand Mufti” and as President of the Supreme Muslim Council (Al-Majlis
al-Islāmī al-Aʿlā), which he assumed in 1921. With the beginning of the Arab revolt in 1936
and the establishment of the Arab Higher Committee (Al-Lajna al-ʿArabiyya al-ʿUlyā), he
became the head of that organization as well. Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini was at the top of the
political pyramid, and this position enabled him to recruit international Arab and Muslim
support for the Palestinians as he portrayed the conflict between Jews and Palestinian Arabs as
an Islamic issue. The Mufti sent delegations to Arab kings and leaders of Arab countries that
warned them of the Jewish threat to mosques, and founded the “Fund for Repairing the
Mosques.” The latter, a charity, was headed by the Mufti and served as a conduit for monies
that were used in part for the struggle against the British and the Jewish communities (the
yishuv) in Mandate Palestine.63
Qaraḍāwī regards himself as a “global mufti” and aspires to become the leader of the
Muslim world. Therefore, he has established international Islamic organizations such as the
European Council for Fatwa and Research which is a pan-European, Islamic body whose
purpose is to bridge the gap between the demands of Sharīʿa for Muslims living in Europe and
Western lifestyles. Likewise, Qaraḍāwī serves as the head of several Islamic think tanks and

banks and as the chairman of the directorate of the “Coalition of Charity” that sends financial
contributions to the causes sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem.
Hajj Amīn greatly influenced political life in Palestine because he was extremely popular
with the Arab masses. His high position as president of the Supreme Muslim Council enabled
him to raise a lot of money for repairs of the mosques on the Temple Mount from Muslims
throughout the world. While the renovations were essential, behind this program was the
more important objective of making millions of Muslims aware of the mosques in Jerusalem,
and in turn, of the Palestinian cause; recruitment of Islamic countries for the national struggle
of the Palestinian Arabs and raising his personal status as the representative of the Palestinian
cause throughout the Muslim world.64 For similar reasons, the Mufti convened the “Islamic
World Congress for Jerusalem” from 6–17 December 1931. This impressive event hosted 240
Muslim delegates from 22 countries, including India, the Hijaz, Tunisia,65 Libya, Indonesia,
Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, China, Iraq, Persia, Nigeria, Ceylon, the Caucuses,
Russia, Turkey and Yemen. During the Congress, Hajj Amīn tried to ensure that this event
would take place every two years and accepted a string of decisions whose main thrust
consisted of defending Jerusalem and giving the city an Islamic character. In the wake of this
Congress, Hajj Amīn added another title to his name, namely, the “President of the World
Islamic Congress.”66
During World War II, Hajj Amīn collaborated with the Axis countries, Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy, after he escaped from Palestine to Syria, then from Lebanon to Iraq. On 14
October 1939, he arrived in Baghdad, which had become the center of Arab nationalism. The
Mufti’s continuous incitement against the Jews and his strong ties with Rashīd ʿAli al-Kailānī
led to riots and pogroms against the Jews of Iraq, called the Farhūd (literally, “plunder”) on 1
June 1941. 179 Jews were murdered and more than 50,000 were plundered.67 The leaders of
Nazi Germany and of Italy had heard of Hajj Amīn’s struggle in Palestine and Iraq against the
British authorities. The connections of the Grand Mufti and Hitler are well known. On 28
November 1941, a meeting took place between the Mufti and Hitler in Berlin where they
agreed upon cooperation between the Nazis and the Arabs as they shared the objective of
destroying the Jews.68 The Mufti was sent to the Balkans, where he established S.S. units
among the Bosnian Muslims.69 The Mufti had envisioned that the Luftwaffe bomb cities in
Palestine, beginning with Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and the port of Haifa. These plans did not take
place because the German air force had more urgent and important targets.70
From his residence in Germany, Hajj Amīn broadcast in Arabic and issued bulletins for the
Arab world. For example, there were pogroms in Tunisia that was under direct German rule
from November 1942 to May 1943, whose perpetrators urged the slaughter of the Jews,
looting of their stores and persecuting them. This was a direct result of the incitement by Hajj
Amīn al-Huseini. Pogroms took place in Tunis, Gabès, Nabeul and Hammam Lif.71

Nationalist groups in Tunisia offered similar arguments to those of Hitler that world Jewry
was responsible for the war and for the British-Zionist presence in Palestine.72 In January 1943,
the Mufti proposed the expulsion of the Jews of Tripoli when Axis forces evacuated Libya.73
The wide-ranging activism of the Mufti had an impact upon the lives of Jews and Muslims in
Palestine, the Balkans, the Maghreb and the entire Arab-Muslim world at the time. Therefore,
Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini became the source of authority for Muslims throughout the Arab world.
His radio broadcasts from Berlin frequently gave this message: “Kill the Jews wherever you
find them. This pleases God, history and religion. This saves your honor. God is with you.”74
Hajj Amin’s book, Islam and the Jews (Islam I Židovstvo),75 published in Zagreb, served as
German propaganda for Islamic countries. The book describes the conflict with the Jews as a
profound historic and cultural conflict. It is not about land. The work extensively describes the
Jews’ harassment of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina and their breaking of treaties that
they signed with him. It accuses the Jews of poisoning Muhammad.76 According to Boris
Havel, the Mufti pioneered this approach. Previously, Islam regarded the Jews as deserving of
death, degraded and inferior because of their sins, but not as threatening or cruel or as
instilling fear. The Mufti was the first who changed the idea about the Jews from humiliated
dhimmi to a powerful threat that constantly attempts to harm Islam.77 Sayyid Quṭb adopted
this approach later on in his book, Our War against the Jews, and by Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, as
will be shown below.
Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini embarked upon a campaign against the Zionist movement that
caused the “Palestinian holocaust.” The purpose of his book, entitled Ḥaqā ʾ iq ʿAn Qaḍiyyat
Filasṭīn (“The Truth about the Palestinian Problem”) was “to defend the facts and truths of the
Palestinian problem from liars and plotters and from Zionists, colonialists and their helpers
who are defamers who falsify facts and invent lies in their attempt to deceive public
opinion.”78 The Mufti’s ambition was that his book would become required reading about the
Palestinian issue: “a book that is easy to purchase and carry and also to give as a present. This
[is] in order to make its usefulness available to all.”79
Hajj Amīn used a variety of arguments in order get support for the Palestinians in the Arab
and Muslim world. He claimed that the Zionists intend to dominate Palestine and transform it
into a base from which they would expand into all the Arab countries. Similarly, he argued
that the Jews want to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque and build the third Temple on its ruins. The
domination of Palestine is a plot that was devised between the Zionist movement that is
supported by world Jewry and British colonialism that helped the Jews and prevented
assistance from the Arabs. The United States also supported the Jews and was hostile to the
Arabs.80 These arguments, invented by the Grand Mufti, are repeated verbatim in the writings
of Qaraḍāwī, as will be shown in the following chapters of our study.
The positions of the Mufti are described in Al-Qasāmiyyūn, the magazine of the ‛Izz al-Dīn

al-Qassām Brigades, as follows: “Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini preached that the war on British
colonialism and Zionist infiltration into Palestine is an obligation. His position was that one
must organize the methods of government and of legislative jurisprudence in accordance with
religion. The project of his lifetime was the strengthening of Islamic colleges and the
departments of the waqf (“religious trusts”) within the framework of the Sharīʿah Islamic
council. Similarly, he preached that the problem of Palestine is a problem for all Arabs and a
problem for the entire Muslim world. In light of this, one must emphasize his confrontations
with the speculators in land who sold land and properties to Jews. He made a legal decision
(fatwā) that those who perpetrate such acts [of selling land], have no part in the religion of
Islam. One may not pray for them and they should not be buried in Islamic cemeteries.81 This
legal decision became valid for all Muslims when the participants at an international
conference convened by the Mufti in 1931 approved it.82
Hajj Amin used his religious position and rhetorical talent to excite the masses and
encourage violence against Jewish communities (Yishuv) in Palestine. The Mufti was behind
the disturbances in Jaffa in 1921. He inspired the slaughter of Jews by Muslims during the riots
in 1929 by inciting the Arabs with the accusation that the Jews intended to disrupt the status
quo between Jews and Muslims at the Western Wall. Furthermore, he circulated false
photographs in mosques that showed a mosque that was torched by Jews. His sermons often
included quotations from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and he distributed copies of Arabic
translations of the Protocols in order to promote violence against the Jews.83 Orig inally
written in Czarist Russia, and presenting the model of a Jewish conspiracy against Christianity,
the Protocols were adopted by Arab leaders who argued that Jews definitely were planning to
take over the world and that the first stage of this plot would take place in the nearby
countries of the Middle East.84 Qaraḍāwī also cites the Protocols in his writings and speeches,
as will be shown.
Haj Amīn also organized the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. The revolt included a general strike
of Arab commerce, labor and transportation along with riots against Jews. The purposes of the
strike were to stop Jewish immigration to Palestine and to forbid the sale of land to Jews.85
The results of the revolt were disappointing because the Mufti did not achieve his goal of
establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in all of Palestine. Despite this, the Mufti regarded the
revolt as a great accomplishment that showed the heroism of the Palestinian Arabs and
convinced the British to change their plans regarding the Jewish National Home. According to
Hajj Amīn, even Adolf Hitler confirmed the heroism of the Palestinians.86
Qaraḍāwī currently is referred to as the most “popular preacher and most influential
religious figure in the world”.87 He achieved this position because of his skillful use of modern
media, especially his popular television program on Al Jazeera, Al-Sharīʿa wal-Ḥayāt
(“Islamic Law and Life”), his websites and his numerous books that circulate around the world

in many languages. His reputation enables him to raise money for fighting in Palestine via the
Islamic charitable funds (Zakāt) of which he is in charge.88
In his book, Jerusalem: The Problem of Every Muslim, Qaraḍāwi proposes establishing a
“popular world-wide Islamic organization” (haiʾa islāmiyya shaʿabiyya ʿālamiyya) for the
purpose of saving Jerusalem:
If there were a Caliph, agreed upon by all Muslims, who would unite and lead them as there had been over 1,300 years,
he would call upon Muslims: ‘Enlist for the sake of liberating Jerusalem!’ Then millions would answer his call and stand
up as one man in order to confront the strength of Israel and its arms. Then Muslims would kill thousands or even tens
of thousands, and Israel certainly would not be able to kill all the fighters and confront all of the Muslims. However,
because we do not have a Caliphate that can unite and command in these matters, the alternative is the International
Union of Muslim Scholars.89

As we have noted, the International Union of Muslim Scholars (Ittiḥād ʿUlamāʾ alMuslimīn) is an international Islamic organization founded by Qaraḍāwī in 2003. He is the
head of the organization. Its many activities include conferences devoted to the subject of
Jerusalem, “the uppermost problem for Muslims.”90 Qaraḍāwī’s parallel between the
institution of the Caliphate and the International Union of Muslim Scholars is clear. Since there
is no Caliph, he regards himself as if he were a Caliph. Therefore, he is the supreme Muslim
leader who will unite the ranks of the Muslims around the struggle for Palestine. He further
states that this organization is obligated to established a “Jerusalem Fund” (Ṣundūq al-Quds) to
which every Muslim must contribute
for rescuing Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque and for confronting Israel’s plans from hell (khuṭaṭ Isrāʾīl alJahannamīya) that include establishing settlements and the silent transfer of the residents of Jerusalem and archeological
excavations under the ground in order to bring about the collapse and systematic destruction of the blessed Al-Aqsa
Mosque.91

Qaraḍāwī also has written a basic work on the Palestinian problem. Its title, Al-Quds
Qaḍiyyat Kull Muslim (“Jerusalem: The Problem of Every Muslim”) exemplifies his hope that
this book will transform the issue of Jerusalem into the patrimony of the entire Muslim world,
not only of the Palestinians. In the introduction, Qaraḍāwī states:
Jerusalem is not only the patrimony of the Palestinians, despite the fact that they are most worthy of it. It is not only the
patrimony of the Arabs, despite the fact that they are most worthy of it because they defend it. Jerusalem is the
patrimony of every Muslim everywhere, east or west, north or south. Whether a Muslim is ruler or subject, educated or
ignorant, rich or poor, man or woman – all are committed to Jerusalem, each according to his place and ability. Oh,
Ummat al-Islām, rally your forces! the situation is grave, the hour of danger has arrived: Al-Quds! al-Quds! al-Aqṣa! alAqṣa!92

Qaraḍāwī’s book has the same objective as that of Hajj Amīn, namely to elucidate the
essence of the struggle between the Muslims and Israel and to correct common mistakes
concerning this issue.93 The book is popular mainly with members of Hamas.
Qaraḍāwī refers to the Mufti as Al-Mujāhid Al-Kabīr (“the great Jihad fighter”) and regards

him as a role model and an example of dedication to the Palestinian cause. In a poem written
by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, “The Muslims Come,” which is dedicated to the jihad in Palestine,
he presents the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini as a model for a figure who has invested
tremendous efforts in the struggle for Palestine. He writes: “The Jihad of Sheikh ‛Iz a-Dīn is
not lost, and so is the efforts of our sheikh, the Mufti of Freedom Muhammad Amin”.94 His
writings relate stories about Hajj Amīn that emphasize this point. There is also a story that
points out the Jewish influence on the Christian world. Once, when Hajj Amīn went to a
meeting with the British High Commissioner of Palestine, the latter told him that his elderly
mother wished to meet him. When the High Commissioner’s mother saw the Mufti, she told
him: “I ask that you do not act against the will of God!” Hajj Amīn answered: “Madame, and
who can stand against the will of God?” She then said: “You are acting against God’s will
because you do not wish to give the Jews the land that God promised them.” The Mufti
replied: “It is my country and my home. And how did God give it to them? Where will I go?”
She answered: “It is the will of God!” After the meeting was over, Hajj Amīn told her son, the
High Commissioner: “Your mother is extremely influenced by the Jews.” He answered: “No
we Protestant Christians believe this and the New Testament proclaims it.”95
Like the Mufti before him, Qaraḍāwī’s writings expose him as a sympathizer of Hitler and
of the way he dealt with the Jews. Qaraḍāwī states that
during the course of history, Allāh placed the Jews under the domination of other peoples in order to punish them for
their sins. The final punishment of the Jews was Hitler, who did what he did to them. Of course, their description of
what happened is highly exaggerated. However, he succeeded in putting them in a place that suits them. The next
punishment of the Jews, with the help of Allāh, will come from the Muslims.96

3. Sayyid Quṭb
Sayyid Quṭb (1906–1966) was born in the village of Mushāʿ in the Assiut district of Egypt. His
respectable family had lost their assets and had to sell most of their property and possessions
during the Depression from 1929–1933. Quṭb completed his degree in teaching at the College
of Dār al-ʿUlūm, an institution that integrated traditional Islamic instruction with modern
sciences. During the 1930s and 1940s, Quṭb became aware of the corruption of the government
of King Farouk and began to criticize the situation in Egypt. Therefore, wishing to become
acquainted with Western culture and its advantages, he was sent to the United States. There,
the exact opposite happened. Quṭb’s Islamic faith became stronger and in 1951, he joined the
Muslim Brotherhood.97
Quṭb’s secular and Western life style finds expression in his writings which, at the time,
were not permeated by strong Islamic faith. Even in his book, Al-Taṣwīr al-Fannī fil-Qur ʾ ān

(Artistic Representation in the Qurʾān), he took an aesthetic, not a religious, approach to the
Qurʾān.98 During those years, he also wrote novels and poetry.
Sayyid Quṭb’s career as an Islamic thinker only began in 1952 with his appointment as a
member of the leadership at the office of the Supreme Guide (Al-Murshid al-ʿᾹm), Ḥasan alHuḍaibī, and was in charge of spreading the message of Islam (Qism al-Daʿwa). In 1954, the
Supreme Guide appointed him editor of the periodical, Majallat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn.
Toward the end of the year, when Quṭb was arrested along with other Brotherhood activists,
including the young Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, he no longer could serve as editor.99 Quṭb’s positions
were highly significant and he probably earned the respect of many Muslim Brotherhood
activists. It is likely that Quṭb and Qaraḍāwī met each other at that time.
During this interim, Quṭb published a series of articles in Al- Daʿwa, a journal that he
edited. In 1954, they appeared as a book entitled Maʿarakatunā maʿa Al-Yahūd (Our War
against the Jews). The latter and Al-ʿAdāla al-Ijtimāʿiyya fil-Islām (Social Justice in Islam)
constitute Quṭb’s major works of this period.100 These two books and other works by Quṭb
come out against Western culture and reject it. They present Islam as the only true religion for
the faithful. The two works contain harsh criticism of international Zionism and of the Jews
and are replete with antisemitic tropes. According to Jeffrey Herf, the motifs used in depicting
the Jews in Our War against the Jews markedly resemble those in Mein Kampf. In Mein
Kampf, Jews appear as those who undermine the foundations of society; in Quṭb’s book, Jews
undermine the foundations of the Islamic faith. Hitler is the highest source of authority and
may not be challenged, just like Allāh, according to Quṭb. Killing Jews is regarded as a
contribution to society and humanity and so forth. Qaraḍāwī’s antisemitic approach does not
contradict that of Quṭb.101
The third stage of Sayyid Quṭb’s career began toward the end of 1954, a time of harsh
persecution and torture in the jails of Gamal Abdel Nasser. It ended in 1966 with the hanging
of Quṭb on charges of rebellion against the government. During this time Quṭb’s ideas became
consolidated and found expression in his commentary on the Qurʾān, entitled Fi Ẓilāl alQurʾān (In the Shadow of the Qurʾān)102 and in his well-known work, Maʿālim fi al-Ṭarīq
(Milestones).103 These books, especially the latter, gave a dimension of depth to the idea of
“Takfīr” that he had developed. According to Quṭb, any aspect of life or conduct that does not
conform to Islam must be considered heretical or unbelieving. Hence, he makes use of a
concept that he refers to as the new Jāhiliyya. According to view, the secular government of
Nasser’s Egypt represents a new heresy like that which existed during the time of the Prophet
Muhammad and the people of Mecca. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate to overthrow a ruler
who does not practice Islam in the correct way.104
Quṭb enjoys a special position in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. His importance is only
second to that of Ḥasan al-Banna.105 His idea of Takfīr has been discussed at length in

numerous studies. This study, however, focuses upon his attitude toward the Jews. Quṭb’s
approach toward the Jews inspired all Islamic groups that followed him, including his disciple
and member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī. According to
Quṭb, the source of hostility toward Islam is not to be found only among the Jews. However,
they are a major cause of such enmity.
Those who think that the influence of Jewish capital in America and the like causes the West to proceed in this manner
[in the hatred of Islam]; those who think that English ambitions or Anglo-Saxon craftiness are behind the position of the
West; those who think that the struggle against the Eastern bloc and Western bloc are the influence… all of them ignore
the true component of the problem, that we must add to those components together and that is the Crusader spirit… and
we do not forget the role of world Zionism in the unfair treatment of Islam and the concentration of forces against it in
the colonialist, Crusader world and in the materialistic, Communist world in equal measure! It is the eternal role that the
Jews have filled since the flight (Hijra) of the messenger Muhammad and the establishment of the state of Islam.106

According to Quṭb, the Jews and the West would not have succeeded to implement their
plans if there were not a Muslim “fifth column” that collaborated with them. “An army led by
collaborators made up of experts, philosophers, doctors and scholars – sometimes also writers,
poets, artists and journalists who have Muslim names because they are of Islamic origin! Some
of them (the army of collaborators) are also composed of Islamic ‘religious scholars’” (the
term “religious scholars” appears in quotation marks in the original text).107
Quṭb’s most well-thought-out work, Milestones, includes a strong anti-Jewish outlook.
The assertion that culture is a human legacy and has neither a national home-land nor a religion is correct only
regarding science and technology… beyond this limited meaning, the assertion that culture is one of the plots of world
Jewry to eliminate borders, especially those imposed by faith and religion, in order that the Jews can penetrate the world
body-politic while it is weak and paralyzed, and then they will be free to engage in their satanic schemes. First, taking
interest whose ultimate objective is to transfer the entire wealth of humanity to Jewish financial institutions that exist
because of taking interest.108

Sayyid Quṭb adopts the approach of Abū al-al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdi who regards the Jews as
servants of the Devil who oppose men of faith. The danger to “the house of Islam” comes
from the satanic evil of the Jews and of Judaism and, in turn, the State of Israel has a satanic
nature that influences its actions toward Muslims.109
In fact, the Jews are to blame for all of the evils of Islam and in Arab society from time
immemorial.
The Jews have related to Islam with hostility from the inception of the Islamic state in the city of al-Medina. They
concocted plots against the Islamic Ummah from the first day that the Ummah was formed. The Qurʾān contains
confirmations and signs of this hostility [of the Jews] and their schemes. This alone is enough in order to describe the
bitter war that the Jews have declared on Islam and on the messenger of God – may God’s prayer and blessing be upon
him – and on the Muslim Ummah throughout its long history. This is [a war] that has not ceased even for a single
moment, nearly 1,400 years up until this moment, when its fire is burning fervently throughout the entire world.110

The eternal war between Judaism and Islam is the central legacy of Quṭb that is relevant to
this study with regard to Qaraḍāwī’s thought which vacillates between anti-semitism and anti-

Zionism. According to Quṭb, the enmity of the Jews lies behind the Crusades and the rise of
atheistic Communism. The war of the Jews against the Muslims is the longest of all the wars
against Islam. Allāh, however, has always punished the Jews for their corruption and will
continue to punish them as he did when he sent the Arabs to expel them from the Arabian
peninsula and when he sent Hitler to rule over them, and it will be so when they will be
punished for dispossessing the Arabs with the establishment of the State of Israel.111
Qaraḍāwī holds Sayyid Quṭb in high esteem, referring to him as
a stupendous Muslim, a great preacher, a writer with impressive talent and an outstanding thinker. This is a man who
was liberated from the materialism of this world without any flaws. Islam was his sole path. He established his prayer
[as it should be] and lived ascetically. His life story and the circumstances of his death before the Master of the Universe
in a [special] way are not common to others. There is no doubt as to the devotion and faithfulness of Sayyid Quṭb to his
way of thinking in which he believed. There is not doubt of the enthusiasm of Quṭb that is reflected in his thought. He
sacrificed his head on the altar of his faith; he sacrificed his pure soul for the sake of Islam as he believed it.112

Qaraḍāwī discusses the three phases of the career of Sayyid Quṭb and what he endured. The
first phase of Quṭb’s life did not leave any Islamic imprint upon him. Qaraḍāwī regards him as
an important literary critic, a writer and poet. That phase of his life prepared him for the next
one, the phase of Daʿwa, the call to Islam.113 Qaraḍāwī appreciates the second stage of Quṭb’s
life, especially his book entitled, Al-ʿAdāla al-Ijtimāʿīya fil-Islām. According to Qaraḍāwī, it
presents a systematic didactic concept of social and economic justice in Islam from several
points of view. Qaraḍāwī states that Quṭb was influenced by the thought of the Egyptian
Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazalī (1917–1996), who wrote a series of articles on the subject.
Quṭb, however, was the one who knew how to present this material in a scholarly and didactic
form. “The publication of his new book [of Quṭb] filled the [Muslim] Brotherhood with joy.
This book joined the long Islamic line [of literature]. They regarded it as a reward for their
suffering after they left their detention at the Al-Tur and the Iksatib prisons.”114 While in
charge of Daʿwa, Quṭb was a prolific writer. Qaraḍāwī explicitly mentions that he included
Quṭb’s article “Ḥasan al-Banna wa-ʿAbqariyyat al-Banna” (Ḥasan al-Banna: The Genius of
Al-Banna) in his book, Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn – Sabʿūna ʿᾹman fī al-Daʿwa wal-Tarbiya
wal-Jihād (The Muslim Brotherhood: Seventy Years of the Call to Preaching, Education and
Jihad).115
Qaraḍāwī continues to praise Quṭb and his impressive work, Ẓilāl al-Qurʾān. In his
memoirs, he points out that Quṭb was the companion of the Supreme Guide, Ḥasan al-Huḍaibī
during the years of the revolution in Egypt (1952–1954). He listened to the troubles of the
members of the Brotherhood and became convinced by the authenticity and truth of their
Islamic faith and their sincerity. Furthermore, Quṭb accompanied them to the courthouse and
even was sentenced along with them to 10 years in prison because of his membership in the
Muslim Brotherhood. According to Qaraḍāwī, at this point Quṭb reached the third phase of his
life – the stage of Islamic revolution” Marḥalat al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya. Qaraḍāwi does not

agree with Quṭb’s idea, which was formulated at this third stage – the concept of the new
Jāhiliyya, namely that Jihad must spread throughout the entire world.116 Despite these
reservations, Qaraḍāwī states that Quṭb “lived totally for the sake of Islam and died for the
sake of Islam; he fulfilled his obligations before God; he will rest in Paradise and he is one of
the righteous mujāhidūn (Jihad fighters).”117
Likewise, Qaraḍāwī does not accept Quṭb’s idea of Takfīr that was formulated during the
third stage of his life – the Islamic revolution. Qaraḍāwī argues that “one cannot blame society
for collective unbelief and unbelief includes those who overthrew the Kingdom of God, may
He be exalted, and the Caliphate with something that is not a true government, but a system
of human governance and human legislation.”118 Quṭb’s assertion that every society, with the
exception of Islamic society, is a Jāhiliyya society means that all societies which exist at
present, including Islamic societies, are Jāhiliyya societies. According to Quṭb, this is valid
even though they may worship only one God and even though they do not practice worship of other gods, with the
exception of the one God. They do not apply the rule of only one God in organizing their lives, even if they acknowledge
the unity of God, they grant the attributes of divinity to one who is not God and accept the laws, values, standards,
customs and traditions and form of government. In fact, almost all of the aspects of their lives are government by those
whom they have appointed.119

Therefore, Quṭb’s solution is uncompromising Jihad against everything that stands in the way
of the establishment of an Islamic society based on Islam as a religious way of life.120
Qaraḍāwī judges peoples and societies favorably and argues that it is possible that people
do not have a proper understanding of Islam out of ignorance and because they seek
nonbelief. Therefore, he rejects Quṭb’s idea of Takfīr because nonbelief may apply to
individuals such as Islamic rulers who act in contravention of Islamic law.121 Thus, Qaraḍāwī
adopts the position of Ḥasan al-Huḍaibī, who argues against and rejects Quṭb’s idea of Takfīr
and the new Jāhiliyya in his book, Du ʿ āt, Lā Quḍāt: Abḥāth fī al- ʿ Aqīda al-Islāmiyya waManhaj al-Da ʿ wa ila Allāh (Preachers, not Judges: Studies on the Islamic Faith and
Preaching for God). Despite the controversy as to whether the book was written by al-Huḍaibī
or whether he was forced to write it by the Egyptian authorities while in prison, there is no
doubt that it expresses a rejection of some of Quṭb’s revolutionary ideas.122
Quṭb wrote these statements while in prison and in the background of the persecutions and
torture that he and his comrades suffered in the Egyptian prisons during the 1950s. Albert J.
Bergesen argues that it is clear that the cumulative effect of solitary confinement in an
Egyptian jail, the cruelty of Nasser’s regime along with the hanging of 21 Shahīds – members
of the Muslim Brotherhood – in 1956, and beforehand, the assassination of Ḥasan al-Banna in
1949 – brought about the radicalism of Quṭb’s ideas regarding changing the government from
within. Here the seeds were planted that led to his concept of the new Jāhiliyya and the call
for rebellion against the secular Egyptian regime and its replacement by the establishment of a

just Islamic government.123 Qaraḍāwī mentions that he is full of admiration of, love for and
wonderment at the old Sayyid Quṭb who wrote works such as Social Justice in Islam, Our
War against the Jews and In the Shadow of the Qurʾan, but he is against the vengeful and
rebellious Sayyid Quṭb of his later period.124
Qaraḍāwī is perturbed by Quṭb’s ideas of the expansion of the area of Jihad, which
allegedly are based upon an original interpretation of Islamic law (Ijtihād). The meaning of
Quṭb’s idea is that “Muslims will be their own enemies and will fight against the entire world
until they will subdue everyone or the Jizya [poll tax] will be paid by them [their subjects]
when they are humbled.”125 Accord ing to Qaraḍāwī, the arena of Jihad today should be
limited only to the regions where there is conquered Islamic land, such as Israel. It is
legitimate to use terror (Al-Irhāb al-Mashrū ʿ) there.126 Therefore, Qaraḍāwī opposes moving
the war to the United States or to Europe.
This idea affects Qaraḍāwī’s attitude toward the Jews. He accepts Sayyid Quṭb’s conclusions
that the Jews killed Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and that they caused the great Fitna (“civil war”)
between the Shiites and the Sunni Muslims and obstructed the path of Islam even during the
time of Muhammad. In Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī (The Enemies of Islamic Solution), Qaraḍāwī
repeats Quṭb’s statements of years ago almost word for word in Our War against the Jews.127
According to Qaraḍāwī, the problem of Palestine could be solved peacefully if the Jews would
leave Palestine and move to other countries.128 In contrast, Quṭb maintains that since Jewish
society is a Jāhiliyya society, the conflict between the Jews and Islam is eternal and therefore,
it must be destroyed.

Conclusion
Qaraḍāwī’s works and thought on the Jews definitely were greatly influenced by the three
figures discussed above. Qaraḍāwī regards himself as an outstanding disciple of Ḥasan alBanna, who invented the principle that the problem of Palestine was the most important issue
for Muslims. This dictum is repeated and emphasized by Qaraḍāwī innumerable times in his
books and articles.129 The Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini, is the source of
Qaraḍāwī’s belief that the Jews are about to destroy the mosques on the Temple Mount and
replace them with the Third Temple, called Al-Haikal al-Maz ʿ ūm.
They are building underneath Al-Aqsa [Mosque] and are laying siege over Al-Aqsa,” thereby preventing the entry of
Muslims worshippers. The threat to Al-Aqsa is a constant, fixed threat. Therefore, he proclaims that “the problem of
Palestine and the problem of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa are the problem of the highest priority for the Muslims. 130

The above pronouncements show that Qaraḍāwī continues the legacy of the Mufti who

consistently preached against the destruction of the mosques on the Temple Mount and the
presence of Jewish plots there and elsewhere. Qaraḍāwī continues the Mufti’s teachings, which
are presented in the introduction to his book – Jerusalem: The Problem of Every Muslim – first
written in 1998. There he writes about Jewish plans for building the Temple and the plan to
establish a greater Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile.131 The book recycles almost all the
arguments of Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini dating back to the British Mandate.
Further influence of the Mufti upon Qaraḍāwī lies in the globalization of his ideas. This is
accomplished by publishing and using the entire range of media available in order to spread
his message throughout the Muslim world. Just as the Mufti addressed Muslims throughout
the Arab world via his broadcasts from Radio Berlin and in leaflets that called for attacks
against Jews everywhere and warned Muslims of Jewish plots, Qaraḍāwī uses the internet and
the Al Jazeera satellite network in his weekly program. Just as the Mufti convened
international Islamic congresses as the president of the World Islamic Congress and appointed
himself as its head, Qaraḍāwī established the International Union of Muslim Scholars.
Sayyid Quṭb also exerted great influence upon Qaraḍāwī regarding his concept of social
justice in Islam and his views on the character and essence of the conflict between the Jews
and Islam. Quṭb imparted the historical dimension of that conflict to Qaraḍāwī. The expression
of this historical depth may be found in his book, Lessons on the Second Nakba, published in
1968, as follows:
Israel’s avarice knows no limits and everything that it has despoiled cannot satisfy its desire. Israel still has not ceased
from dreaming about [conquering] the lands of Iraq, Egypt and the Hijaz, including Medina where there is the grave of
God’s messenger and his mosque and the place where Jews lived, the Banū Qainuqāʿ, Banū Quraiẓa and the Banū Naḍīr
and other Jews from amongst the Jews of Khaibar and others.132

However, Qaraḍāwī’s most recent and profound work on the Jewish-Islamic conflict is The
Enemies of the Islamic Solution.133 The chapter that deals with the Jews completely
corresponds with Sayyid Quṭb’s chapter in Our War against the Jews. Both Quṭb and
Qaraḍāwī confuse Jews, Zionists and Sons of Zion and use these terms interchangeably
without any real distinction between Jews and Zionists. Quṭb’s book discusses the Jewish
question along with other essential questions such as the obligation of Jihad and the lack of
faithfulness to Islam on the part of Arab governments. Published in 1954, it represents the old
Quṭb, head of the Daʿwa department of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and admired by
Qaraḍāwī.

Notes
1 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya wal-Kuttāb, vol. 1, pp. 346–349.

2 (H98) Ibid., p. 368.
3 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn: Sabʿūna ʿᾹman fī al-Daʿwa wal-Tarbiya wal-Jihād (Cairo: Maktabat
Wahba, 1999), p. 41.
4 Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power (London: Saqi Books, 2013), pp. 19–20.
5 Ibid., p. 20.
6 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, pp. 49–50.
7 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, pp. 349–350.
8 Meir Hatina and Uri M. Kupperschmidt (eds.), The Muslim Brotherhood: Religious Vision in a Changing Reality (Tel Aviv:
Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuchad, 2012), “Introduction,” p. 22.
9 A. Muḥammad Taḥsīn ʿAṭṭāʾ Rajab, “Juhūd al-ʿAllāma al-Qaraḍāwī fī Nuṣrat Qaḍiyyat al-Quds,” in: Ismā‛ῑl Haniyya, et
al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī fi Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya al-Filasṭῑniyya (Gaza: Markaz
al-Iʿlām al-ʿArabῑ, 2012), p. 221.
10 Shaul Bartal, “Religious War: Al-Qaradawi during the Wars in Gaza,” International Relations and Diplomacy, 3/2
(February 2015), pp. 103–107.
11 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, pp. 211–212.
12 Hasan al-Banna, “The Letter from the Fifth Congress,” in: Efraim Barak (ed. and trans.), Islam Is Our Message, Jihad Is
Our Way: Hassan al-Banna – Anthology of Letters (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African
Studies, 2012), p. 156.
13 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, p. 212.
14 Aḥmad Baḥr, “Thalātha wa-sittūna ʿāman ʿala istishhād al-imām Ḥasan al-Banna,” http://iumsonline.org/ar/3/i53/,
viewed on 11 May 2017. See also: Efraim Barak, The Crusaders Are Still Here: A History of Islamic Fundamentalism (Tel
Aviv: Resling, 2013), pp. 118–119.
15 Al-Banna, “The Letter from the Fifth Congress,” pp. 148–149.
16 Ibid., p. 156.
17 Ibid., p. 157.
18 David Bukay, From Mohammad to Bin Laden, Religious and Idiological Sources of the Homicide Bombers Phenomenon
(New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2008), p. 208.
19 Anonymous, Thalāth Rasāʾil fī al-Jihād fī Sabīl Allāh \ Abu al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdi, Ḥasan al-Banna, Sayyid Quṭb (Amman:
Dar Umar lil-Nashr, 1992), p. 69.
20 Ibid., pp. 70, 102–103.
21 Ibid.
22 Barak, Islam Is Our Message, p. 157.

23 Aḥmad Baḥr, “63 ʿᾹman ʿala istishhād al-imām Ḥasan al-Banna,” http://iumsonline.org/ar/3/i53/, viewed on 11 May
2017.
24 ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Kinānī, “Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn,” www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?

title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%
viewed on 23 May 2014.
25 Barak, Islam Is Our Message, p. 122.
26 Yuval Arnon Ohana, The Line of Plowing and of Fire: 100 Years of Conflict over the Land of Israel (Tel Aviv: Ahiasaf,
2013), pp. 470–471. According to Arnon Ohana, the union of the two groups took place only in May 1947 with the direct
intervention of the Mufti.
27 Baḥr, “63 ʿᾹman ʿala istishhād al-imām Ḥasan al-Banna”.
28 Barak, The Crusaders Are Still Here, p. 123.
29 Barak, Islam Is Our Message, p. 157.
30 ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Kinānī, “Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn”.
31 Barak, Islam Is Our Message, p. 27.
32 This formula is originally the words of the talbiya – the Muslim prayer invoked by the pilgrims as a conviction that they
intend to perform the Hajj only for the glory of Allāh.
33 Baḥr, “63 ʿᾹman ʿala istishhād al-imām Ḥasan al-Banna”.
34 ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Kinānī, “Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn”.
35 Barak, The Crusaders Are Still Here, p. 123.
36 Baḥr, “63 ʿᾹman ʿala istishhād al-imām Ḥasan al-Banna”.
37 Barak, Ha-Islam Hu Besoratenu, p. 27.
38 Ḥātim Yūsuf Abu Ziyāda, Jihād al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn, p. 134.
39 Muḥammad Amīn al-Ḥuseinī, Ḥaqāʾiq ʿAn Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn, 3rd edition (Cairo: Maktabat al-Hayʾa al-‛Arabiyya
al-‛Ulyā li-Filasṭin, 1956). For an English translation, see: Zvi Elpeleg, Through the Eyes of the Mufti: The Essays of Hajj
Amin, Rachel Kessel, trans. (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2009), pp. 13–14.
40 Abdallah al-Tell, Kārithat Filasṭīn: mudhakkirāt ‛Abdallāh al-tall qāʾid maʿrakat al-quds, 2nd edition (Cairo: Dār alHudā, 1990), pp. 238–240, 247–249, 252–254, 359–366.
41 Barak, The Crusaders Are Still Here, p. 116.
42 King Farouk I ruled Egypt from 1936–1952 when he was overthrown by the Free Officers Corps in the revolution of 1952.
43 Ḥātim Yūsuf Abu Ziyāda, Jihād al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn, pp. 134–135.
44 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, pp. 144, 149.

45 ʿIṣām al-Abd Zahd, “Al-Jihād al-Filasṭīnī fī Fiqh al-Qaraḍāwī,” in: Ismā‛ῑl Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf
al-Qaraḍāwī fi Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya al-Filasṭῑniyya (Gaza: Markaz al-Iʿlām al-ʿArabῑ, 2012), p. 145.
46 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 140.
47 Ibid., p. 99.
48 Ibid., p. 94; Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim (Beirut: Al-Risāla, 2001), p. 42.
49 Helfont, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi: Islam and Modernity, p. 12.
50 Anonymous, Thalāth Rasāʾil fī al-Jihād fī Sabīl Allāh, p. 104.
51 Ibid., p. 105.
52 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 144.
53 Al-Qaraḍāwī , Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 1, pp. 23–24, 591.
54 ʿIṣām al-Abd Zahd, “Al-Jihād al-Filasṭīnī fī Fiqh al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 148; Singh, Hamas and Suicide Terrorism, p. 115.
55 www.youtube.com/watch?v=i15xam68ams, viewed on 19 May 2014; Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, p. 1092. The film
was uploaded on 21 March 2013 in his program “Sharīʿa and Life” that was broadcast on Al Jazeera on that day. In July
2015, it was removed from YouTube following strong protests by supporters of Qaraḍāwī. They objected to the fact that
the Egyptian authorities made use of it in a manipulative fashion in order to claim that Qaraḍāwī also allows suicide
attacks in Egypt as part of the struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood against the government.
56 “Bayān tawḍīḥī ḥawla raʾy al-ʿAllāma al-Qaraḍāwī fi-l-ʿamaliyyāt al-istishhādiyya,” Al-Qaraḍāwi Website, 27 July
2015, http://Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takreer/8086-2015-07-27-13-42-39; “Sheikh al-Qaradawi: The Palestinians Do Not Need
Suicide Attacks as They Have Missiles,” MEMRI Website, 29 July 2015, www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal/pl?
lang=he&ID=875141_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dat aid=3931.
57 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, p. 217.
58 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 144.
59 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, pp. 344–345.
60 Ibid., p. 345.
61 Yūsuf, Al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Muslimūn Qādmūn (al-Manṣūra: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 1994), p. 1. See also: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya,
vol. 1, p. 351.
62 There are many works about the Mufti. Among them, see: Eliyahu Eilat, Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini: Former
Mufti of Jerusalem (Tel Aviv: Bureau of the Prime Minister, Advisor for Arab Affairs, 1968); Philip Mattar, The Mufti of
Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin Al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Columbia University, 1992); Zvi
Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement, David Harvey, trans.,
Shmuel Himmelstein, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Zvi Elpeleg, Through the Eyes of the Mufti: The Essays of Hajj
Amin, Rachel Kessel, trans. (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2009); Ilan Pappe, The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty:

The Hosaynis, 1700–1948, Yael Lotan, trans. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010).
63 Eilat, Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, pp. 50–53, 78–82.
64 Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti, pp. 15–16.
65 With the return of the delegates of the Al-Dustūr (Constitution) party to Tunis, there was a pogrom against the Jews
there. See: Irit Abramski-Bligh, Pinkas Ha-Kehillot – Encyclopedia of Jewish Communities: Libya and Tunisia (Jerusalem:
Yad va-Shem, 2008), p. 249.
66 Ibid., pp. 31–34; Jennie Lebel, Hajj Amin and Berlin (Tel-Aviv: Technosdar Ltd., 1996), pp. 31–38. The Congress also is
referred to as the Pan-Islamic Congress.
67 Official website of Yad va-Shem, “The Outbreak of World War II and the Policy toward the Jews: The Fate of the Jews of
North

Africa

and

the

Threat

to

the

Middle

East”

(Hebrew),

www.yadsvashem.org/yv/he/holocaust/about/02/middle_east.asp, viewed on 7 January 2015.
68 Lebel, Hajj Amin and Berlin, pp. 107–116.
69 Ibid., pp. 179–188, 215–221.
70 Ibid., pp. 129–130.
71 Abramski-Bligh, Pinkas ha-Kehillot, pp. 16, 262–263, 313, 365, 421.
72 Ibid., pp. 1–2, 262–263.
73 Ibid., p. 2.
74 This quotation may be found in: Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, p. 96.
75 The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husseini, Islam I Židovstvo (Zagreb: Hrvaski tiskarski zavod, 1943).
76 Boris Havel, “Hajj Amin Husseini’s Anti-Semitic Legacy,” Middle East Quarterly, 3 (Summer 2015), pp. 1–11.
77 Ibid., pp. 10–11; Boris Havel, “Haj Amin al-Husseini: Herald of Religious Anti-Judaism in the Contemporary Islamic
World,” Journal of Middle East and Africa, 3 (2014), pp. 221–243.
78 Muḥammad Amīn al-Ḥuseini, Ḥaqāʾiq ʿAn Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn, p. 6; Elpeleg, Through the Eyes of the Mufti, p. 4.
79 Ibid.
80 On Amīn al-Ḥuseini’s views, see: Elpeleg, Through the Eyes of the Mufti, pp. 82–94; Eilat, Hajj Muhammad Amin alHuseini, pp. 74–82.
81 “Al-Ḥajj Amīn al-Ḥusainī: 1895–1975,” Al-Qassāmīyūn, 1 (Spring 2007), p. 6.
82 Ibid., p. 7.
83 Lebel, Hajj Amin and Berlin, p. 25.
84 Hadassa Ben-Itto, The Lie That Wouldn’t Die: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (London and Portland, OR: Valentine
Mitchell, 2005), pp. 367–368.

85 Lebel, Hajj Amin and Berlin, pp. 54–55.
86 Muḥammad Amīn al-Ḥuseini, Ḥaqāʾiq ʿAn Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn, pp. 10–11, 15–17; Elpeleg, Through the Eyes of the Mufti,
pp. 6–12.
87 (H184) Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Global Mufti, p. ix.
88 It is similar to the Charity Coalition (Iʾtilāf al-Khair) that finances Hamas. See: Bartal, Jihad in Palestine, pp. 71–73;
Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali: Koalitziyat ha-Tzedakah: Mipui ve-Nituah Maʾarakh Kaspei ha-Terror; Israel General
Security Services, “The Charity Coalition: Mapping and Analysis of the Financial System of Terror,” September 2009
(Hebrew), www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/calition_he.aspx?webid=a3db3c16-25d8-423d-98df-eb1b9253sn93.
Likewise, see the verdict against East Jerusalem Hamas activist, Khalīl Ghazāwi, charged with receiving monies from the
Charity Coalition for the purpose of financing Hamas activities in East Jerusalem. File of Criminal Case, 14–1–34838, the
State of Israel vs. Khalīl Ghazāwi, decision of His Honor Judge Moshe Drori, Jerusalem District Court, 14 December 2014.
89 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 150–151.
90 For example, see: “Al-Quds wal-Aqṣa baina al-Muʾāmara wal-Muwājaha,” Website of the International Union of Muslim
Scholars, http://iumsonline.org/ar/default.asp?menuID=26&contentID=7889, viewed on 12 May 2014.
91 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 151.
92 Ibid., p. 6.
93 Ibid., p. 35.
94 Al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Muslimūn Qādimūn: Shi‛r, (Alexandria: Dār al-Wafāʾ li-ʾlṭibāʿa wa-ʾlnashr wa-ʾltawzīʿ, 1994), p. 147.
95 Qaraḍāwī’s citation comes from: Abd al-Muʿizz Abd al-Sattār, Iqtaraba al-Wa ʿ d al-Ḥaqq Ya Isrāʾīl, Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʿdāʾ
al-Ḥall al-Islāmī (Beirut: Risāla, 2001), p. 75.
96 “Yusuf al Qaradawi Praises Hitler and the Holocaust,” YouTube, 19 November 2009, www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VcB_DZ4YQYQ, viewed on 11 May 2017.
97 Itzhak Weisman, “Sayyid Quṭb – mi-Mevaker Sifrut le-Radikal Islami,” (Sayyid Quṭb – From Literary Critic to Radical
Muslim), in: Shosh Ben Ari (trans.), The Manifesto of Radical Islam: Milestones (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2011), pp. 8–9; Barak,
The Crusaders are Still Here, p. 128.
98 Ibid., p. 9.
99 Barak, The Crusaders Are Still Here, pp. 128–129.
100 Sayyid Quṭb, Maʿrakatunā ma ʿ a al-Yahūd, 12th edition (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1993); Sayyid Quṭb, Al-ʿAdāla alIjtimāʿiyya fi al-Islām, 13th edition (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1993).
101 Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 256.
102 Sayyid Quṭb, Fī Ẓ ilāl al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1971).
103 Sayyid Quṭb, Maʿālim fi al-Ṭarīq (No city named, Palestine: Hamas, 2004).

104 Barak, The Crusaders Are Still Here, pp. 139–142.
105 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power, p. 22.
106 Quṭb, Al-ʿAdāla al-Ijtimāʿiyya fi al-Islām, pp. 201–202.
107 Quṭb, Maʿarakatunā maʿa al-Yahūd, p. 25.
108 Quṭb, Maʿālim fi al-Ṭarīq, p. 132.
109 Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, pp. 89–91.
110 Quṭb, Maʿarakatunā maʿa al-Yahūd, p. 31.
111 Uriya Shavit and Ofir Winter, My Enemy, My Teacher: Zionism and Israel in the Teachings of Islamist and Liberal Arabs
(Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuchad and the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies, 2013), p. 67.
112 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya wal-Kuttāb, p. 51.
113 Ibid., pp. 52–53.
114 Ibid., p. 54.
115 Ibid., p. 55; Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, pp. 52–55.
116 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya wal-Kuttāb, pp. 55–56.
117 Ibid., p. 62.
118 Ibid., p. 56.
119 Quṭb, Maʿālim fi al-Ṭarīq, p. 94.
120 See Quṭb’s letter, entitled: “Al-Jihād fī Sabīl Allāh,” in: Thalāth Rasāʾil fi al-Jihād fī Sabīl Allāh, pp. 109–151.
121 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Dars al-Nakba al-Thāniya – limādhā inhazamnā, wa-kaifa nantaṣiru (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1993), pp.
21–22. These conclusions also find expression in Qaraḍāwī’s legal decisions (fatāwā) during the “Arab Spring.”
122 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power, pp. 35–36.
123 Albert I. Bergesen, The Sayyid Quṭb Reader (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 4–6.
124 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn al-Qarya wal-Kuttāb, p. 57.
125 Ibid., p. 59.
126 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, pp. 1082–1083. See also: Barak, The Crusaders Are Still Here, p. 211.
127 Quṭb, Maʿrakatunā maʿa al-Yahūd, pp. 20–38. For an English translation, see: Ronald L. Nettler, Past Trials and Present
Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), pp. 72–89.
128 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, p. 1099.
129 For example, see: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, p. 1093; “Al-Qaraḍāwī yanfī ṣiḥḥat taṣrīḥāt nusibat lahu ḥawla alJihād fī Filasṭīn,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 9 August 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7417-2014-08-09-21-24-15. See

also: “Qaraḍāwī: Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn hiya Aʿdal Qaḍiyya fil-ʿālam,” Katāʾib al-Shahīd Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām Website, 23
January 2013, www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id+30352.
130 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Al-Masās bil-Aqṣā sa-yufajjiru Habbatan Jamāhīrīyatan lā Yatawaqqa ʿuhā Aḥad,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website,
10 July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7324-2014-06-10-15-36-13.
131 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 3–4.
132 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Dars al-Nakba al-Thāniya, p. 6.
133 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 61–93.

3
Religious sources of the Israel-Palestine
conflict

1. Islamic ties to Palestine
Qaraḍāwī presents the familiar argument that the Israel-Palestine conflict stems from Israel’s
occupation of Palestine, which is part of Dār al-Islām. According to Qaraḍāwī, “the war
between us and the Jews comes from one reason, and no other: they have conquered our land
– the land of Islam – Palestine.”1
The Islamic connection to Palestine not only is based upon the fact that Muslim forces
conquered the land in 638 AD, but it also antedates the Islamic conquest. According to Islamic
tradition, Jerusalem was regarded initially as the direction for prayer (ʾŪlā al-Qiblatain),
toward which Muslims prayed. Later on, it was changed to Mecca. The second reason for the
connection between Islam and Jerusalem is Muhammad’s Night Journey. According to Islamic
tradition, in 620 AD Muhammad flew from Mecca to Jerusalem on top of his winged horse,
Al-Burāq. The traditions about the holiness of Jerusalem date from the Umayyad period and
were met with considerable reservations on the part of Islamic scholars outside of Syria and
al-Shām who regarded them as a type of Bidʿa (an innovation contrary to Islam). However,
during the period of the Crusades, these traditions became entrenched and were exploited
intelligently by Saladin and his successors for political reasons and thus became accepted by
mainstream Islam.2
Why did Muhammad have to fly on top of al-Burāq from Mecca to Jerusalem in order to
ascend to Heaven? Why did he not fly directly from Mecca? Qaraḍāwī answers these
questions by stating that the Night Journey forms an unbreakable bond between Islam, born in
Mecca, and Palestine that is called Arḍ al-Isrāʾ wal-Miʿrāj. Furthermore, there is no difference
in the degree of holiness between the Holy Mosque in Mecca and Outermost Mosque in
Jerusalem.3 According to Qaraḍāwī, in addition to the desire to link Jerusalem to Islam, there
is another, deeper reason why Jerusalem served as a station before Muhammad’s ascent to
Heaven, as follows:
The second reason for the importance of Jerusalem in Muslim consciousness lies in the fact that Jerusalem was the

earthly destination where the Prophet Muhammad arrived on his Night Journey and the point of departure for his ascent
to Heaven. God wanted Muhammad’s Night Journey to begin from Mecca and end at the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This is not a
random link. It was undertaken by divine plan and heavenly wisdom, namely that Muhammad, the seal of the Prophets
would meet all of the Prophets that preceded him and will lead them in prayer as an Imām. This occasion symbolizes the
transfer of the spiritual leadership of the world from the Children of Israel to the new Ummah, the new prophet and the
new book – a universal Ummah, a universal prophet and a universal book, as is stated in the Qurʾān, 21:107 and 25:1.4

Qaraḍāwī maintains that Judaism can no longer act as the spiritual leader of the world
because it supports the idea of the particular, national God of the Children of Israel. Therefore,
it is necessary that Islam take its place in leading the world because Islam regards itself as a
universal religion.
Jerusalem is the third holiest city in Islam, after Mecca and Medina, according to the Ḥadīth,
entitled “The Three Mosques,” as follows: “You shall only set out for three mosques: the
Sanctified Mosque (in Mecca); the mosques (of al-Medina) and the Al-Aqsa Mosque (in
Jerusalem).”5 The reason that Islam added Jerusalem as its third holiest city is that
Islam came in order to build, not to destroy; to complete, not to break down. Jerusalem is regarded as the land of
prophecy. Muslims are the most worthy of all of humanity for the prophets of Allāh and his messengers. As the Prophet
Muhammad said to the Jews of Medina, ‘we are more worthy of Moses than you are.’6

The statement above expresses the idea that Islam adopts the prophets of Judaism and
Christianity that preceded it. Nevertheless, Islam did not come to live alongside the other
religions but to replace them. According to Qaraḍāwī, this approach is exemplified by the Fast
of the ʿĀshūraʾ. When Muhammad arrived in Medina he saw the Jews fasting on the tenth day
of their first month of the year (the Day of Atonement). He asked them about the meaning of
the fast and they replied that it marks the day that Allāh saved Moses from Pharaoh.
Muhammad answered: “We are more worthy of Moses than you are.” He then commanded
Muslims to fast on the tenth day of the first month as well.7 The Egyptian Muslim thinker, Dr.
Ṣalāḥ Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Khālidi has written about the “Islamization” of the history of the
prophets of Israel in an article entitled, “We and the Prophets of the Children of Israel,” as
follows:
We believe in the prophets of the Children of Israel that are mentioned in the Qurʾān. We love them and pray for their
welfare. We adopt their history and support their positions. Their history is Islamic… the messenger of Allāh has taught
us this approach toward the prophets of the Children of Israel and has called upon us to believe in them and view them
as belonging to us and to divest the Children of Israel from their affiliation with them, or from the argument that they
are emulating them. We must regard ourselves as most worthy of those same respected prophets, may they rest in peace.8

If Muslims are indeed the most worthy successors of the prophets of the Children of Israel,
then they are also the most worthy of the place in which prophecy was given to those same
prophets, namely Palestine. The latter is called “the Land of Prophecies and Blessings” (Arḍ alNubuwwāt wal-Barakāt). Palestine is blessed because the Al-Aqsa Mosque is located in its
center. It spreads its blessing on the land, as stated in the Qurʾān, Sūra 17: 1: “The Al-Aqsa

Mosque whose environs we have blessed.” Qaraḍāwī also explains that wherever the Qurʾān
uses the expression al-Arḍi-llatī Bāraknā fīhā (“the land whose environs we have blessed”) it
means Palestine.9 According to the interpretation of Islamic tradition promulgated by the
Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters throughout the world, including the Islamic
Movement in Israel, Jerusalem is designated ʾŪlā al-Qiblatain, Thāni al-Masjidain wa-Thālith
al-Ḥaramain (“the first direction of prayer in Islam, the second mosque built in Islam and the
third place most important in its holiness”).10
Jerusalem is also called Arḍ al-Ribāt wal-Jihād (“land of defense and holy war”). The
mention of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Qurʾān and in the Ḥadīth indicates that eventually
Jerusalem will be conquered by the Muslims. This took place during the reign of Caliph Umar.
However, along with the prophecy of the conquest of Jerusalem, there is another prophecy in
the Ḥadīth that predicts that the Holy Land will be conquered by enemies. Muslims are
commanded to fight a holy war against the conquerors of the land. This is the meaning of the
term Arḍ al-Ribāt wal-Jihād. While the Ḥadīth states that the land will be conquered by the
enemies of the Muslims, the Jews, it also predicts that eventually the Muslims will triumph,
when all of creation, including trees and stones will be conscripted to help them.11 Qaraḍāwī
hints at this anti-Semitic Ḥadīth, known as The Ḥadīth of the Trees and Stones, as follows:
“The hour [of resurrection] will not arrive until you fight the Jews. The Jew will hide behind
stones or trees and the stones and trees will cry out: ‘O Muslim! O servant of Allāh! There is a
Jew behind me, come and kill him.’”12
Therefore, the liberation of Palestine from the Jews that will be accomplished by killing
them constitutes a precondition for the existence of the Islamic ideals of the End of Days and
the Resurrection of the Dead. Qaraḍāwī cites another apocalyptic Islamic tradition that deals
with one of the signs that predict the End of Days. A group of courageous Muslims by the
name of al-Ṭāʾifa al-Manṣūra (“the group that is crowned with victory”), who fight fearlessly
against their enemies, will appear in Jerusalem at the End of Days.13 On his weekly program
on Al Jazeera in 2002, Qaraḍāwī identified the “community that is crowned with victory” and
claimed that it is to be found in Jerusalem even at present. “I say unto you that “the
community” already may be found in the Beit al-Maqdis: there is Hamas, Islamic Jihād, the
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the divisions of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine.”14
According to Qaraḍāwī, the fact that Jerusalem is the center of the struggle for Palestine
holds great religious significance because it is one of the signs that predict the coming of End
of Days. Therefore, he maintains that there is great importance in the Muslim world joining to
struggle for Jerusalem as the Muslim conquest of this city will herald the imminent
redemption. This idea gradually has received support in the Muslim world, especially among
Islamic thinkers from Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islamī and the Muslim Brotherhood. In The
Anticipated Messiah and the Second Caliphate according to the Ways of the Prophets,

Muhammad al-Shuweiki, a Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr activist explains why the prophecy of killing the
Jews in the Ḥadīth of the Trees and Stones refers specifically to our own times. This Ḥadīth
appears as authentic in the traditions of al-Bukhāri (b. 821) and of Muslim (b. 810). The Jews
have not had an army for many years, since they were expelled from Medina and during their
wars with the Prophet. However, the Prophet Muhammad prophesied that the Jews would
return and establish a state with an army and therefore prophesied the way he did in this
Ḥadīth regarding the position of the Jews at the End of Days.15
In 2001, Qaraḍāwī founded and became the head of the international organization,
“International Jerusalem Institute” (Muʾassasat al-Quds al-Duwaliyya), as part of the struggle
for Jerusalem. The purpose of this institute is to actively oppose Zionist programs for the
Judaization of Jerusalem and to help Palestinian residents of Jerusalem maintain their struggle
steadfastly. Muʾassasat al-Quds has initiated a number of annual projects. Thus, for example,
between 2002 and 2004, over six million dollars were collected in order to finance these
projects. Their council holds an annual convention, usually in Beirut, in which prominent Arab
and Islamic figures participate.16
The website of “Al-Quds Online” contains material on Jerusalem of varying levels of
incitement. Biased news items present the allegedly aggressive actions of Israel’s government
of “occupation” against the Al-Aqsa Mosque, or the killing of innocent Palestinian civilians by
cruel soldiers of the occupation. In contrast, murderous acts by terrorists are described as
sacrifices undertaken by freedom fighters. The website offers a variety of cartoons that deal
mainly with the Al-Aqsa Mosque as sacred Islamic territory that imbues all of Palestine with
its holiness and with the struggle for the liberation of this area from the aggressor, namely
Israel. A selection of biased photographs presents the alleged domination of the Al-Aqsa
Mosque by Jewish settlers. The website boasts groups on Facebook and Twitter and a group
on WhatsApp. Those who join the latter are asked to become “ambassadors of Al-Aqsa and to
take photographs that attest to Israel’s aggression against the mosque.”17 The website
encourages acts of terrorism in Jerusalem. For example, the difficult problems of security in
Jerusalem in October-November 2014, and in the last months of 2015, which included running
over Jews, shootings and the slaughter of Jewish worshippers were referred to as the “Third
Intifada”.18 The purpose was to avenge Operation Protective Edge in Gaza that took place
during the summer of 2014. Its motto was: “The intifada in Jerusalem will bring about victory
in Gaza.” Islamic history also is enlisted in the struggle and one may find film clips that deal
with Saladin’s liberation of Jerusalem from the Crusaders.19 It is no wonder that in 2012, the
government of Israel declared the International Jerusalem Institute (Muʾassasat al-Quds alDuwaliyya) an illegal organization.20
The International Jerusalem Institute works in close cooperation with the International
Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) which also is headed by Sheikh Qaraḍāwī. For example, in
January 2015, two delegations of these two organizations met in Beirut in order to discuss the

necessary steps in confronting the clear and present danger to the Al-Aqsa Mosque from the
Israel Occupation authorities. They argue that Israel is plotting to change the status quo in the
Al-Aqsa Mosque compound by turning into a common space for prayer for Muslims and Jews,
like that in the Cave of the Patriarchs (Machpelah) in Hebron. Their updated website features
an organization called “Yishai” headed by Rabbi Shlomo Eliyahu who proclaims that he
wishes to set up a synagogue in the Al-Aqsa compound as a prelude to building the Temple. 21
Sheikh Ayman Masʿūd, vice manager of the “International Al-Aqsa Institute,” declared at a
meeting that “confronting this reality, we at the International Al-Aqsa Institute are working
toward uniting the efforts of the Islamic Ummah toward the victory of Jerusalem and its
inhabitants and for Muslim and Christian holy places. We stand opposed to the nefarious plans
of the Occupation that aspires toward the total Judaization of the city.”22
Sheikh Qaraḍāwī frequently holds conferences that deal with the struggle for Al-Aqsa. For
example, in November 2014, he sponsored a conference in Doha entitled, “Al-Quds and AlAqsa: Between Plot and Attack.” Qaraḍāwī called for a general mobilization of Muslims
throughout the world for the liberation of Al-Aqsa from the Zionist occupier. He gave his
blessing to the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas movements and called upon all
Palestinian factions to unite their forces to ensure that “the Al-Aqsa Mosque must remain
solely for Muslims, as opposed to the Zionist plans for dividing the site by separate times or
compounds.” In order to confront the Occupation, Qaraḍāwī called upon the Islamic Ummah
to take up Jihad for the sake of Al-Aqsa, as follows: “The Islamic Ummah is ready for Jihad
with its soul and possessions for the sake of Palestine. These days shall pass and Palestine will
revert to its original inhabitants because Palestine is an Arab land for thousands of years.”23
Khaled Mashʿal, head of the political bureau of Hamas, and Sheikh Ikrima Sabri, former chief
Mufti of Jerusalem, appointed by the Palestinian Authority, attended that conference.24
Furthermore, Sheikh Qaraḍāwī has established another international organization, “Waqf alUmmah,” for soliciting contributions from Muslims throughout the world in order to finance
the struggle for Al-Aqsa.25 Raed Salah, head of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement
in Israel, known as the “Sheikh of Al-Aqsa” and close to Qaraḍāwī is another major figure
among the leaders of this organization.26
There is also a role for children in the struggle for Jerusalem. The website airs film clips,
which also appear on YouTube, that show how the children of Al-Quds take part in the
struggle. For example, there is a film clip that features an 8-year-old girl who provokes Israeli
soldiers in English, as follows: “We are not afraid of you, you are terrorists, this is our land –
get out of here!”27 Another item, aired in June 2014, related that a 12 year-old girl was barred
from entereing Al-Aqsa for 15 days after she was severely beaten. According to the authors of
this report, it is part of the policy of the Israeli Occupation toward Palestinian women and
children at Al-Aqsa. 28

On 5 November 2014, a Hamas activist, Ibrahim al-ʿAkkāri, drove his car and ran over a
Border Patrol policeman in a terror attack in the Sheikh Jarrāḥ neighborhood in Jerusalem.
The perpetrator sped his car toward a group of police officers, murdered Officer Jidʿān Asʿad
and wounded 12 others. The terrorist was shot and killed. On 7 November, the website of the
International Al-Quds Institute published a filmnclip that featured Al-Akkārī’s two children,
16 year-old Ḥamza and the younger Anas, lifted up on a background of Hamas flags at a
procession in their village. They were shooting in the air, accompanied by cries of “Allāhu
Akbar.” The caption beneath the film clip read: “Rest in peace, Abu Ḥamza [the Shahīd,
Ibrāhīm al-Akkāri], we shall continue in your stead, we shall continue the struggle, we shall
redeem Al-Aqsa with spirit and blood.” 29
According to Qaraḍāwī, the future war between Muslims and Jews is the reason why the
Qurʾān devotes so much space to stories about the Children of Israel. Why does the Qurʾān
present so many details about the Children of Israel and does not deal with the histories of
other nations, such as the Persians or the Romans? “It is only because Allāh knows that there
will be a war between us and them in the future. Therefore, we must know them well in order
to know how to contest them on the basis of reality and not on the basis of imagination.”30
Such statements have been accepted by members of Hamas in the book entitled, A Third
Chapter of Life Between this World and the World to Come. The work was written by Fahmī
al-Mashāhra, a Hamas activist, who calls himself Abū ʿUbaida the Jerusalemite.31 In his
introduction, al-Mashāhra writes as follows:
The idea for this book came to me because of the oppression in which Arab Islamic Palestine finds itself. It is our
obligation to defend our land through legal resistance [according to (our) religion], to get rid of the oppressor and the
cruelty and to liberate the blessed land from aggressors and corrupters. The Jews have corrupted the land, first in Medina
and in Hejaz before the mission of the Prophet. The Prophet and his companions arrived and got rid of this corruption.
The second time of their corruption took place in our land, the land of Palestine, according to the interpretation of Sūrat
Al-ʾIsrāʾ.32 After the loss of hope from Arab and Islamic rulers and governments, there is nothing left but individual and
collective Jihad until help from Allāh will arrive. Israel is not like [it was] in the past and tomorrow it will be weaker.
Despite the fact that Arab rulers and governments guard all the borders of Palestine from the outside and some guard
[them] from the inside with security coordination [i.e., the Palestinian Authority] another axis puts up resistance. This is
the axis of resistance represented by a minority that has popular support that acts to stabilize the Ummah – keeping this
issue alive, acting for an honorable life, getting rid of the cruel occupation, preaching Jihad against the occupier by all
means and capabilities – mobilization and education – and illuminating the road ahead. This minority is the hope for
liberation and for paving the way toward it.33

Qaraḍāwī preaches and Hamas acts accordingly.

2. The roots of the conflict: Muhammad and the Jews of
Medina

Qaraḍāwī gives the Israel-Palestine conflict an eternal historical dimension, as he argues that it
is a continuation of the war that began with Muhammad and the Jews of Medina. The war
was fought against “the descendants of apes and pigs and worshippers of the Ṭāghūt” (epithets
for Jews according to the Qurʾān 5:60). Qaraḍāwī claims that from the outset, Judaism was
hostile to Islam, whereas Islam was not hostile toward Judaism. On the contrary, the Qurʾān
refers to Jews and Christians as “people of the book,” because they merited divine revelation.
According to the Qurʾān, 2: 285, the belief in all of the Prophets and in Scripture that was
brought down by Allāh is obligatory for every Muslim. Therefore, belief in Moses and the
Torah as a holy book is part of the Muslim faith. In light of the above, when Muhammad
arrived in Medina, he settled the relations between the Muslims who had come with him from
Mecca and the residents of Medina, including three tribes of Jews. This arrangement is known
as ʿAhd al-Ummah (“the treaty of community of Medina”). However, shortly afterward the
base nature of the Jews took over and they broke the treaty with Muhammad, one tribe after
another. The tribe of Banū Quraiẓa made a treaty with the Quraish who put Medina under
siege at the Battle of the Trench in 627. At the Battle of Khaibar, the Jews also preferred an
alliance with the infidel Quraish to loyalty to the Muslims who believe in one God, as attested
in Qurʾān, 4: 51–52. These circumstances compelled the Muslims to fight against the
treasonous Jews in order to impose the true religion. The war between Muslims and Jews,
therefore, is not only a military-political war but an ideological, religious and moral war as
well.34
Qaraḍāwī uses Qurʾānic material about the sins of the Children of Israel in order to show
the base character of present-day Jews. According to Qaraḍāwī, there is no difference between
the Jews depicted in the Qurʾān and today’s Israelis. For example, the Qurʾān reveals the
Jewish preference for unbelief. Even during the time of Moses they sinned by worshipping
idols and requested to build the Golden Calf. Their cowardice and lack of belief appear in
Qurʾān 5: 24–26 when the Jews refused to enter the Holy Land even though Allāh had
promised it to them. Their insolent request that Allāh and Moses fight the peoples who dwelt
in the land brought about their punishment of not entering the land and wandering in the
desert for 40 years. Their claim that Allāh is poor and his hands are tied is even more serious
(Qurʾān 3: 181; 5: 64). Because they are without faith and dissolute, they killed the prophets
that Allāh sent in order to urge them to turn from their evil ways, such as Zechariah and
Yaḥya (Qurʾān 2:87). Therefore, the Qurʾān (5: 82) mentions the Jews, along with the
unbelievers, as the greatest enemies of the Muslim believers.35
Throughout history, from the time of Muhammad until the present, the Jews are engaged in
a variety of covert and overt plots against Islam.36 The Jews were responsible for the deaths of
the second and third caliphs, Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and Uthmān Ibn Affān. During the latter’s
reign and later, under Ali, a Jew named Abdallāh Ibn Sayya, brought about the Fitna, the split
between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims, which continues even in present times. In addition, the

Jews defiled the pure Muslim tradition, especially the interpretation of the Qurʾān, by
introducing stories that are full of lies and falsifications.37
The accusation that the Jews intentionally poisoned the Prophet Muhammad appears as an
archetype of the evil Jew, killer of the Prophets. First propagated by Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseini, it
was adopted enthusiastically by Qaraḍāwī. Boris Havel argues that the tradition that the Jews
as an identifiable group were guilty for the death of the Prophet was not generally accepted.
The Mufti first published it as a consensus view. Early Islamic tradition may have claimed that
the Prophet was poisoned and died as a shahīd. It appears either in the work of the great
historian and commentator on the Qurʾān, Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) or of the
biographer of the Prophet, Muḥammad Ibn Isḥāq (d. 761). The purpose of the claim that the
prophet of Islam died from poison administered by a Jewish woman was to grant him the
exalted status of shahīd and not to justify Jew-hatred.38 Likewise, the biography by Ibn Saʿd
(d. 845) mentions that in Khaibar a Jewish woman named Zainab prepared poisoned meat for
the Prophet. Although he had tasted a poisoned morsel of meat, he remained alive for three
years afterward. Muhammad asked the woman why she poisoned him and she replied that
she did so in order to find out whether he was really a prophet of God. The poisoning was
intended to justify Muhammad’s death as that of a shahīd for the sake of Allāh.39 According to
the biographical tradition, a Jewish woman indeed “caused” the poisoning of Muhammad, but
it came not from an eternal hatred nor a bitter struggle between Islam and Judaism.
Despite the enmity between Jews and Muslims, Jews and other minorities lived in safety
under the protection of Islam and played an active role in the development of Muslim
civilization. Muslim tolerance toward Jews enabled them to flourish and to attain high
positions in the country. When Jews were expelled from Christian countries, especially from
Spain, the Islamic countries opened their gates to the Jews and made it possible for them to
live in safety for centuries.40 Qaraḍāwī ignores the murder of 40,000 Jews in Caesarea during
the Islamic conquest in 640 and the slaughter and pogroms over the centuries until recent
times, before the establishment of the State of Israel. Pogroms took place in North Africa,
Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Baghdad. Five thousand Jews were killed in Granada in 1066. There
were blood libels in Hama (1829), Beirut (1824), Antioch (1826) and the Damascus blood libel
(1840). These persecutions occurred in Islamic countries and they attest to the fact that Jews
were not free from religious persecution in Islamic lands, despite the fact that they were less
frequent than in Europe.41
Qaraḍāwī presents an incomplete review of the historic enmity between Muslims and Jews.
He does not relate to the role of Muslims in persisting in this hostility, to the killing of Jewish
poets by Muslims, to the attempts to forcibly convert them to Islam and finally, to the
expulsion of the Banū Qainuqāʿ and Banū Naḍīr tribes, and the slaughter of the Jews of Banū
Quraiẓa. As we have shown, this enmity shaped the negative weltanschauung of Qaraḍāwī
and other Muslim thinkers toward the Jews.42

3. Deeper roots: Isaac and Ishmael
Qaraḍāwī posits that the roots of the Israel-Palestine conflict are deep and extend far beyond
the period of Muhammad and the Jews of Medina to the time of Abraham. The beginnings of
the conflict may be found in the complicated relations between Abraham’s two wives: Hagar
and Sarah. As we know, Sarah was barren. When she had despaired of giving birth, she gave
her handmaid, Hagar, to Abraham. Hagar gave birth to Ishmael. When Ishmael was thirteen,
Isaac was born. At that time, Sarah commanded Abraham to banish Hagar and Ishmael.
According to the Muslim version of the story, Abraham took Hagar and Ishmael to the region
of Mecca. Abraham, who missed his son, went to visit him. On one of his visits, they built the
Kaʿba in Mecca as a house of worship to the one God. Abraham was the first monotheist
(Ḥanīf) and the Arabs are descendants of his son, Ishmael.43
The Biblical image of Abraham and God’s promise to him, that “unto your seed I have
given this land,”44 served as a major argument of the Zionist movement. For example, when
David Ben Gurion was asked by the Peel Commission why he, who was born in Poland,
demands possession of the Land of Israel, he answered:
Our right to the Land of Israel is not given by the British government or the Balfour Declaration. It is much older. I say
on behalf of the Jews that the Bible is our Mandate, the Bible which was written by us, in our language, in Hebrew in
this very country. That is our Mandate. It was only recognition of this right which was expressed in the Balfour
Declaration.45

Qaraḍāwī further explains that
the Jews argue that they possess the land by virtue of the divine promise in the Torah. This right rests upon three
principles: first, that the Jews are the chosen people; second, that the divine promise of Palestine to the Jews is eternal by
virtue of God’s promise to Abraham; and third, that they believe that the Messiah will come when the Jews have been
gathered in Palestine. These are the three principles of Messianic Zionism that “links religion with nationality and
denigrates messianic religious faith in order to gain Jewish profits.46

Qaraḍāwī asks belligerently: “Why did the Jews limit the concept of ‘the seed of Abraham’
only to Isaac? Did they forget the first-born son of Abraham, Ishmael?”47 According to
Qaraḍāwī, this Jewish interpretation runs counter to the concept of divine justice. It is not
possible that Allāh, the righteous judge, would prefer the Children of Israel to the Children of
Ishmael. Qaraḍāwī explains that the Jews determined that Isaac would be the heir of Abraham
because Ishmael was the son of the handmaid and Isaac, the son of the mistress of the house.
According to Judaism, the son of the maid is regarded as lower than the son of the mistress of
the house. Qaraḍāwī answers this Jewish argument with several rebuttals, as follows: “It is
known that one’s personal status is determined by the father, not by the mother. Do not the

sons of the father inherit their father despite who their mothers were? Were not both Isaac
and Ishmael prophets?”48
Qaraḍāwī continues with his casuistry. Jacob had four wives. Rachel and Leah were the
mistresses of the house who gave their handmaids, Bilhah and Zilpah, to Jacob in order that he
would have more sons. Therefore, half of the Jewish people are descendants of handmaids.
Nevertheless, they make up an integral part of the Jewish people and there is no prejudice
against them. Furthermore, the Bible relates that marriage to concubines was a common
practice. Qaraḍāwī claims that David had 100 wives and 200 concubines49 and that David’s
son, Solomon, had 300 wives and 700 concubines. Each of these concubines had offspring and
there is no doubt as to whether they were part of the Jewish people. Thus, Qaraḍāwī
concludes, by asking how the Jews explain the harsh discrimination against Ishmael, the son of
the handmaid, and the treatment of the sons of other handmaids mentioned in the Bible?50

4. Ishmael as the spiritual successor of Abraham
In Genesis, God appears before Abraham (then called Abram) and promises the land to him
and his descendants, as follows: “Unto your seed I will give this land.”51 Qaraḍāwī interprets
this verse by stating that
the fact that the land has been occupied by Arab Muslims from the period of Umar until the present, for over fourteen
centuries, is proof of the fulfillment of God’s promise to Abraham, ‘unto you I will give this land.’ Is not Ishmael of the
seed of Abraham? Are not the sons of Ishmael from the seed of Abraham?52

In fact, the idea of the “seed of Abraham” does not have a purely biological meaning. Those
who continue on the path of Abraham must do so in the spiritual sense. Spiritual continuity is
far more important than biological continuity, as far as the ideas of prophecy are concerned.
Indeed, according to the Biblical narrative, not all the sons of the Prophets continued in their
ways. Qaraḍāwī presents the Qurʾānic version of the story of Noah and his sons as an example
of the’ latter. According to the Bible, Noah had three sons. The Qurʾān, however, adds a fourth
son. This son, who is not named, refused to enter the Ark.53 Noah prays to God to save his son,
but since his son expressed his unbelief and refused his father’s plea to enter the Ark, it is clear
that Noah’s biological son no longer is considered his son.54 Thus, Qaraḍāwī concludes that the
question of the legacy of Abraham does not only treat biological inheritance but the spiritual
legacy as well. In order to prove his point, he cites the Qurʾān 3:68: “The people who are
worthiest of Abraham (awlā al-nās bi-Ibrāhīm) are those who followed him, together with
the Prophet and his believers. Allāh is the guardian of the believers.”
The verse noted above is the concluding passage of a long debate in the Qurʾān about

Abraham between Muhammad and the People of the Book. After Muhammad clashed with
the Jews of Medina, Abraham became the most important prophet in Islam and, in effect, its
founder. Muhammad argued that “Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but a Ḥanīf
[i.e., a true monotheist] and a Muslim. And he was not one of the polytheists.”55 The term
“Muslim” in this verse does not refer to the religion of Islam brought by Muhammad, but to
the fact that Abraham was devout and submitted to God. Indeed, Abraham actually was the
first Muslim, long before the coming of Muhammad. According to the Qurʾān, Abraham and
his son Ishmael built the Ka ʿ ba that eventually would become the center for Muslim
pilgrimage and the holiest site in Islam. Thus, it emerges that Islam preceded both Judaism and
Christianity through its practical incarnation in the persona of Abraham. The Qurʾān presents
this argument against the Jews and the Christians, as follows: “O People of the Book, why do
you dispute concerning Abraham, when the Torah and the Gospel were only revealed after
him? Do you have no sense?”56 Ishmael clearly is the spiritual heir of Abraham because it is he
who continues upon his father’s “Islamic” path. Muhammad and the Muslims are descendants
of Ishmael and therefore, continue the way of the true members of the house of Abraham.
Hence, Qaraḍāwī’s statements about Abraham repeat the motif that “we are more worthy
than you,” that appears in his discussion of Moses. If Muslims are the sons of Ishmael, the true
spiritual successor of Abraham, it is clear that they have the right to the land, as follows:
We are the most worthy of this land in every regard: as far as the right of precedence is concerned, this was the land of
the Arabs and the Canaanites and because the land was conquered by Muslims, it is their country. The Jews have no
right to it because they conquered it by force. The Jews conquered the land with arms, iron and fire, with violence and
blood. That is the character of the Jews: if they have the capability, they do not show mercy. If they can, they bomb. If it
is possible for them to act, they act. This is their history and what their Torah says: ‘If you enter a city, destroy its
inhabitants by the sword.’ Yes, these are the Jews who claim that they have the right to Palestine.57

Such statements by Qaraḍāwī reiterate the motif – “we are more worthy than you.” By
adopting the Biblical prophets, Abraham and Moses, Muslims divest the Jews from their right
to the Land of Israel. The Muslims conquered the land in the seventh century, thereby making
it part of Dār al-Islām. The conquest of the land has given them the right of ownership.
Qaraḍāwī continues his argument by claiming that the Jews have conquered the land by force
and with violence and therefore, they have no right to it. His statements contain a paradox:
The conquest by the Muslims gives them the right to the land, while the conquest by the Jews
does not. This contradiction reflects his previous statement, namely that the Muslims are the
descendants of Ishmael, the son of Abraham, who has the legal right to the land. Therefore,
the Muslim conquest constitutes the application of the right of Ishmael. In contrast, the Jews
do not have the patrimony over the land. Thus, their conquest is not legitimate and does not
give them any right of legal ownership of the land.
The Jews are described in a demonic fashion, as cruel, barbaric and murderous. Their base
nature derives directly from the Torah. Here, Qaraḍāwī introduces a quotation from the Torah,

as it were, without authentication that instructs the Children of Israel to destroy the
inhabitants of the cities of the land by the sword. Perhaps Qaraḍāwī meant Deuteronomy 13:
13–16, a passage that deals with the laws of a remote city whose inhabitants, who are from
the Children of Israel, have decided to worship other gods, as follows:
If you shall hear concerning one of you cities, which the Lord your God gives you to dwell there, saying: Certain base
fellows are gone out from the midst of you, and have drawn away the inhabitants of the city, saying: ‘Let us go and
serve other gods’, which you have not known. Then you shall inquire and make a search, and ask diligently; and behold,
if it be truth, and the thing certain, that such abomination is wrought among you; you shall surely smite the inhabitants
with the edge of the sword.

The alleged quotation introduced by Qaraḍāwī resembles the Biblical verse cited above. He
probably has garbled it. If that is so, then Qaraḍāwī has taken the statement out of context.
While the Biblical passage speaks of the destruction of a city that belongs to the Children of
Israel because of the sin of idol worship, Qaraḍāwī has linked this teaching to the fate of cities
of inhabitants of the land. The parallel between the conquests by the Children of Israel
mentioned in the Bible and the Zionist conquest of Palestine is clear. Both include acts of
cruelty and barbarism.

5. The story of the binding of Isaac (the ‘Aqedah’, ‫)עקדת יצחק‬
Qaraḍāwī subsequently attempts to prove how the Jews distort the stories in the Torah in
order to present themselves as the sole chosen people. The preference for Isaac over Ishmael is
conspicuous in the Biblical narrative of the Aqedah (the binding of Isaac). According to the
Torah, God commands Abraham to take “your son, your only son, whom you love, Isaac,”58
and “offer him for a burnt sacrifice.” Qaraḍāwī argues that because of their envy of the Arabs,
the Jews interpret the words “your only son” as referring to Isaac despite the fact that the
name “Isaac” is not mentioned explicitly. The Jews wanted their forefather bear to that title
and the rights that come from being the son who withstood the trial of the Aqedah. Therefore,
they falsified the story for their benefit. The discrimination against Ishmael derives from the
fact that he is the son of a servant and therefore, bereft of rights.
Qaraḍāwī gives a new interpretation to the story of the ʿAqedah. He argues that it is
impossible that the son who was bound was Isaac because, according to the Qurʾān, Abraham
had expelled Hagar and Ishmael to the region of Mecca. After their expulsion, he visited
Ishmael several times. On one occasion, Allāh commanded him to bind his son. It is
noteworthy that the Qurʾān does not mention the identity of this son explicitly. Most classical
commentators of the Qurʾān argue that it is Isaac, in accordance with the Jewish narrative.
Qaraḍāwī presents the interpretation of a minority of Muslim commentators and concludes

that the son in question is Ishmael, that the ʿAqedah took place in Mecca and that Isaac never
had been to Mecca. According to this narrative, Ishmael, the first-born son, was chosen for this
role. The final verse of the chapter on the Aqedah in the Qurʾān contains the blessing that God
gave to Abraham and Isaac, as follows: “We have blessed him and Isaac and from their seed
have come beneficent people and also people who have caused themselves definite harm.”59
Qaraḍāwī interprets the passage as follows: “From the seed of Abraham and Isaac came those
Jews – oppressors, predators, murderers and spillers of blood. Their relationship to Abraham
and Isaac will not help them, and not to Jacob, may peace be upon them, because he whose
deeds are evil will not be helped by his ancestry.”60 This interpretation enables Qaraḍāwī to
confront the problem that arises from to his method of interpretation. According to Qaraḍāwī,
Ishmael is first born and chosen son. However, this claim does not negate the fact that Isaac is
the second son of Abraham. Therefore, Isaac also has a right to inherit the land. In order to
deny this inheritance to contemporary Jews, heirs of Isaac, Qaraḍāwī argues that biological
ancestry is not an absolute. Their negative behavior causes them to lose their ancestral rights.
Contemporary Jews have harmed their right to descend from Abraham and Isaac because of
their brutal occupation and their killing of Palestinians. Thus, Qaraḍāwī rejects Jewish
patrimony regarding the land and leaves it to those who perform good deeds, namely the
Muslims.
The images of Abraham and Isaac have been subject to Islamization and Palestinianization.
There is a direct link between Ishmael, Muhammad and contemporary Muslims. And, there is
a direct connection between Isaac, the Jews of Medina and the Zionists of today. Qaraḍāwī
regards the 1,400 years of Muslim rule in Palestine as the fulfillment of Allāh’s promise to
Abraham, giving Muslims the sole claim to the land, as follows:
The Islamic Ummah is the most worthy heir to the land of prophecies because it has fulfilled the promise of Allāh to
Abraham to give the land to his seed, if that promise is correct. The Muslims are the sons of his [Abraham’s] son Ishmael.
Moreover, they are the spiritual sons of Ishmael, the son of Abraham and are the most worthy of all people to inherit him
because they walk in the path of his legacy. They already have realized their right to inherit the land and have
established justice and goodness for 1,400 years. They are the owners of the land and will remain there until Allāh will
dispossess those who are in this land. The presence (of Muslims) in the land is the only legal presence (al-Wujūd al-Sharʿī
al-Waḥīd)… in contrast, the presence of the Zionists is the existence of oppression, sin and crime and it should cease to
exist. Eventually it will vanish from the world, as is written in the Qurʾān in the Sūrat Al-Shuʿarāʾ (“The Poets”), 26:
227.61

Qaraḍāwī makes extensive use of Qurʾānic verses and gives them a contemporary
interpretation. For example, he quotes Qurʾān 49:13: “O people, we created you from a male
and a female and made you into nations and tribes so you may be distinct from each other.
The most honorable among you in the sight of Allāh is the most God-fearing from among
you.” Qaraḍāwī uses this verse in order to prove that the criterion for inheriting the land is
fear of God and faith. The believers have rights of ownership of the land and not any nation
that inherits the land arbitrarily without any connection to its deeds. In order to bolster his

argument, he quotes Qurʾān 26:105: “We already have written in the Zabūr (the Book of
Psalms) after the statements of admonition that my righteous servants will inherit the land.”
This passage is a quotation from Psalms 37: 29, “the righteous shall inherit the land and dwell
therein forever,” as is attested in the Qurʾān. Qaraḍāwī interprets “my righteous servants” as
referring to the Muslims and “the land,” to Palestine.
The logic of the Qurʾān (Manṭiq al-Qurʾān) maintains that Allāh bequeaths the land to his servants who do right and not
to a particular nation or a race. Allāh does not relate to people according to their race or their ancestry, but according to
their faith, deeds and fear of god. The ‘doers of right’ are those who will inherit the land from its unbelieving
inhabitants, the oppressors who deny the Prophets and harm them and distance themselves from the way of Allāh.
(Qurʾān, 14:13–14:) ‘The unbelievers say to the messengers that were sent to them: We surely will drive you from our
land, unless you return to our religion. So their Lord revealed to them, saying: We surely will destroy the wrongdoers and
we shall settle you in the land after they are destroyed.’

In his conclusion, Qaraḍāwī quotes Qurʾān 14: 13–14 out of context. The original verse
speaks of the messengers sent to the ʿᾹd and Thamūd tribes who did not believe their
message. Here, the unbelievers have become the Zionists who threaten Muslims with
expulsion from the land. However, there is no need for concern. In the future, Allāh will
intervene on behalf of the Muslims, destroy the wrongdoers and settle Muslims in the land in
their stead.

6. Canaanites vs. Khazars
In addition to the right of the Arabs to the land in their capacity as those who continue the
way of Abraham, Qaraḍāwī introduces the claim of their ancient right to the land as
descendants of the Canaanites. The myth that the Arabs are descendants of the Canaanites and
Jebusites and the other ancient peoples of Canaan is extremely popular among the
Palestinians.62 This myth was created in order to confront the theological arguments of
Zionism regarding the Jewish right to the land that is based upon the promise of the land to
Abraham and his heir who is identified as Isaac in the Bible. The myth that the Palestinians are
descendants of the Canaan-ite developed as a consequence of this theological struggle, in
order to imbue the Palestinians with a history of being more rooted in the land than the Jews.
In fact, the Bible states that when Abraham arrived in the land, it was inhabited by Canaanites: “And Abram passed through the land to the place of Shechem, to the terebinth of Moreh.
And the Canaanite was then in the land.”63 Qaraḍāwī comments that “the Jebusite Arabs and
the Canaanite Arabs were those who lived in this land thousands of years before Abraham
and children entered it.” In his desire to create a historic Islamic right to Palestine, Qaraḍāwī
uses any available argument. At first, he based the entire historic right to land upon the
personae of Abraham and his heir, Ishmael, as we have shown above. However, in order to

give Islam earlier roots than Abraham, he uses the Canaanite argument. The Arabs possessed
the land long before Abraham’s arrival. It gives them the right to the land today.
Statements in this vein that give precedence to the Palestinian Arabs living in the land from
time immemorial have become popular in Arabic-Islamic literature in recent times. For
example, according to Ḥasan Al-Bāsh, a Palestinian activist in the Muslim Brotherhood, “the
Canaanites, the Palestinians, the Amalekites and others came from the heart of the ancient
Arab people that lived in this region from the dawn of human history on the earth.”64
Qaraḍāwī’s simultaneous use of both arguments is complicated because, on the one hand,
he claims that the Islamic right to land comes from the right of Abraham, the first monotheist
and the first Muslim. This right apparently belongs to the Jews as well. On the other hand, he
argues that the right to the land is based upon the genealogical relationship of the Arabs to the
Canaanites, the inhabitants of the land before Abraham. A systematic overview of his works
reveals this complexity. According to Qaraḍāwī, the Children of Israel who received the Torah
and the Jews of Medina are not the Jews of today. Thus, he may reject the Jewish right to the
land, as many Palestinian thinkers have done before him.65 In contrast, there is no proof that
the Palestinians are descendants or related to the Canaanites and even Palestinian nationalists
have opposed the idea of Canaanite roots.66 Another example that demonstrates this type of
thinking is that of Qaraḍāwī’s interpretation of the purchase of the Cave of the patriarchs
where he maintains that only Ishmael has right of ownership of this site, and not the
descendants of Isaac.

7. The purchase of the cave of the Patriarchs
Qaraḍāwī argues that the Jews claim their right to the Land of Israel on the basis of God’s
promise to Abraham and his seed. According to the Jewish claim, the land was promised to
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. However, Qaraḍāwī asserts that actually neither Abraham, nor
Isaac, nor Jacob owned even a centimeter of the land.67 He proves Abraham’s lack of
ownership of the land by discussing the story of the purchase of the Cave of the Patriarchs.
When his wife Sarah passed away, Abraham wished to purchase a plot of land for her grave
from an inhabitant of the land. He bought the cave, known as the Cave of the Patriarchs, in
Hebron. The man from whom he wished to buy the cave offered it Abraham as a gift, out of
respect. Abraham, however, insisted upon paying for it. Therefore, according to Qaraḍāwī, the
purchase of the cave proves that Abraham was not the owner of the land, as follows:
If this land were his, would he have purchased it? Is there anyone who buys his own property? No one buys his own
property. Abraham was not one of the owners of the land, as Allāh had promised him. If that promise were at all correct,
then also neither Isaac would be the owner of the land, nor Jacob, who went to Egypt with his family and lived there for

nearly 430 years.68

In contrast with the deep Canaanite-Islamic roots of the Arabs in Palestine, the Israelis appear
as lacking an authentic tie to the land and as a mixture of peoples that came to the country as
a consequence of a Zionist plot to settle the land. Qaraḍāwī argues that contemporary Jews
have no connection to the Children of Israel. He mentions the works of Western scholars,
without actually noting the sources that allegedly prove that 92%of the Jews are descendants
of the Khazars who converted to Judaism. As Judaism is a universal religion, like Christianity
and Islam, many peoples became Jewish throughout history. He concludes that most
contemporary Jews are not the original descendants of the Biblical Children of Israel, and
therefore, they are not entitled to inherit the land.69 Here Qaraḍāwī does not differ from other
thinkers who have published similar arguments that appeared in Nazi teachings about Jews in
letters written by Nazis to the Mufti, Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseinī, during World War II, and even in
books by Israeli scholars, such as Shlomo Sand.70
This argumentation is an attempt to grapple with the passages in the Qurʾān that also
present the promise of the land to the Children of Israel. In chapter 5 of the Qurʾān (“The
Table Spread”), there is a version of the story of the spies sent by Moses to scout the land.
According to Qurʾān 5:22, Moses said to the Children of Israel: “My people, enter the holy land
that God has written for you and do not retreat lest you get lost.” The verse means that the
Land of Israel was promised to the Children of Israel and that they have rights of ownership.
Furthermore, in the Qurʿān the verb “[God] has written” means an immutable divine decree.71
Qaraḍāwī attempts to find support for his argument in these very verses in order to restrict
the validity of the promise of the land to the Children of Israel. The Qurʾān continues with the
reaction of the Children of Israel who refused to enter the land and had the gall to enter it
only on condition that the giants would leave it. Hence, Qaraḍāwī asks: “Is there a nation that
freely chooses to leave its land in order that another people conquer it? It is not possible, but
this was exactly the condition they made.”72 Moreover, the Children of Israel refused to enter
the land despite the encouragement offered by the two righteous spies, and they spoke to
Moses, as follows: “So you and your Lord go and fight, while we are remaining right here”
(Qurʾān 5: 24). Qaraḍāwī continues: “What nerve! ‘So you and your Lord go.’ For this reason,
Allāh forbade them to enter the land for the forty years that they wandered in the desert in
order that a new generation would be born and would enter the land afterward.”73 Even after
they entered the land, it did not mean they were living there unconditionally. According to
Qaraḍāwī’s interpretation of the chapter on the spies, the promise to inherit the land is not
eternal and is linked closely with the behavior of the Jews there. In reality, the proof that they
were exiled from the land because of their sins invalidates the divine promise to the Jews.74
Qaraḍāwī continues with a survey of the subsequent period and states that eventually the
land was conquered by Moses’s disciple, Joshua the son of Nun, and that Israelite rule

continued during the reigns of David and Solomon. He is not historically accurate and reaches
the conclusion that the Israelites ruled the land less than 200 years. Therefore, present-day
Jews cannot possibly claim that are entitled to the land.75 In another sermon, Qaraḍāwī argues
that a people that did not live in the land continuously, even for 50 years, has no right to claim
ownership.76 In contrast, the Palestinians have lived in the land continuously for thousands of
years, as they are descendants of the Canaanites and because of the Muslim domination of
1400 years as opposed to less than 200 years of Israelite presence.77
In another sermon, Qaraḍāwī rejects even the limited right to land deriving from the period
of David and Solomon. He states that Israel aspires to Judaize Jerusalem (Tahwīd al-Quds) by
building more Jewish neighborhoods and turning the Arabs into a marginal minority in the
city. This process also includes archeological excavations in the area of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in
order to find ruins of the Temple of Solomon and thereby justify the present occupation of
Muslim Jerusalem. “This is the reason that they are excavating, in order to find the ruins of the
imaginary Temple of Solomon (Haikal Sulaimān al-Mazʿūm). Where is this Temple of
Solomon and what is its historical value and how is it possible to prove its existence?”78
Later on, Qaraḍāwī argues against the right of the Jews to claim descent from David and
Solomon. As has been noted above, he presented a similar argument against the Jewish claim
that Abraham and Moses were their forefathers. He declares that “we are more worthy of
David and Solomon than they are.”79
Here, Qaraḍāwī uses theological arguments in order to prove his point. The Jews are not
worthy of claiming David and Solomon as their ancestors because they invented stories about
them that are implausible and wrote them down in their fabricated Torah. Thus, according to
the Bible, David is guilty of the grievous sins of adultery and murder in the affair of Bathsheba
and Solomon is guilty of not believing in the One God and worshipping idols. In contrast,
these sins do not appear in the Qurʾān because the Prophets mentioned in the Qurʾān are not
capable of committing any sins.80 This theological concept, called “the immunity of the
Prophets,” constitutes one of the reasons for the Muslim argument that the Jews falsified the
Torah, namely that they wrote it by themselves and therefore, what it states has no value at all
and it is nullified by the Qurʾān.81
Qaraḍāwī reaches his desired conclusion, as follows:
We are more worthy of Moses than they are and more worthy of David than they are and more worthy of Solomon than
they are. We worship God the way that David and Solomon wished and how do they worship God? By spilling blood?
By hostility to Creation? By taking lives and property? By stealing land without any right to do so?… They took the
lands of Palestine; they took the lands of the Muslim consecrated trust that is forbidden to take because it is consecrated
to Allāh, may He be exalted forever and ever. They allow themselves to do all of this because no one dares to place
limitations upon them.82

It is clear that the writings of Qaraḍāwī are full of internal contradictions. On the one hand,
contemporary Jews are directly related to the Biblical Children of Israel as far as their sins and

punishments are concerned. On the other hand, however, regarding their rights, particularly to
the land, present-day Jews have no link to the Biblical Children of Israel because most of them
are really Khazars. The Bible is not an authentic document and the same holds true for recent
archeological discoveries if they prove a Jewish presence in Jerusalem.
Since the Jews have no right to the land, Qaraḍāwī proposes an original solution to the
problem of the existence of the State of Israel. Every Jew must return to the country from
which he emigrated. As a result, Israel will be open for the Palestinians who were expelled
from the land. Qaraḍāwī argues that it is not logical that Jews who come from Eastern Europe
and elsewhere occupy a land that does not belong to them by force and then argue that they
have rights of ownership.83 The idea that Islam is the perpetual victim of Europe is not new in
Islamic, especially Egyptian historiography. Israel is perceived as a later reincarnation of
European imperialism, reminiscent of the Crusades.84
What should be the law regarding the current “European” invaders, namely the Jews?
Should the Jews not wish to leave voluntarily, an uncompromising holy war (Jihād) must be
declared against them.
The war between us and them [the Jews] is because they are plunderers and oppressors. It is our obligation to return
enmity with enmity. It is forbidden for us to give up our land; it is forbidden to give up even one centimeter of soil of the
land of Islam. No one has any right to do this and if someone does so, he is an unbeliever.85

As this fateful war is taking place on Palestinian soil, Qaraḍāwī has declared the duty of
Jihad as a personal obligation for every Muslim (Farḍ ʿAyn) as opposed to the classical
definition of Jihad as a collective obligation (Farḍ Kifāya). Men, women and even children are
commanded to take part in the battle for Palestine.86
Since the option to recognize the State of Israel and to make peace is rejected out of hand,
all the international conferences, initiatives and proposals are worthless and one should not
take part in them. Furthermore, regime change in Israel has no real significance because the
Jews are the same Jews, and it does not really matter whether they belong to the Left or the
Right. According to Qaraḍāwī,
these imaginary peace talks will not bring any result, neither with the Likud party nor the Labor party. They are all the
same. He who approved the construction of ten settlements in Jerusalem before Netanyahu was [Shimon] Peres. They are
all the same regarding this issue. Therefore, we stick to our right and will never give it up, whatever will be.87

While Qaraḍāwī rejects readiness for any type of compromise regarding the Palestinian
question, he suggests that there may be a temporary truce in the fighting should Muslims
think that they cannot continue their efforts at a particular moment. Muslims are allowed to
sign a temporary armistice agreement (Hudna) with the Jews. This solution is based upon
Islamic tradition and history. The Prophet Muḥammad signed the Treaty of Ḥudaibīyya, a tenyear armistice agreement with his enemies of the Quraish tribe,88 and Saladin signed similar

agreements with the Crusaders. Therefore, present-day Muslims are permitted to sign
temporary armistice agreements with the Zionists. Signing such treaties may take place only
in circumstances when one absolutely is forced to do so. The Islamic legal term for this is
Ḍarūra (literally, a necessity). There is a ruling in Islamic law that Al-Ḍarūrāt Tubīḥu alMaḥẓūrāt (“necessity permits forbidden acts”). According to this rule, in extremely difficult
cases, acts that are forbidden by Sharīʿa are permitted. In this case, it is forbidden to make
concessions regarding Palestine. However, if Muslims find themselves in extremely difficult
circumstances because of their military and technological inferiority in the wake of fighting
against Israel, they are permitted temporarily to waive the prohibition against making peace
for their own benefit and in order to get organized. Nevertheless, they are forbidden to
abandon the commandment of Jihād. Here, Qaraḍāwī invokes another legal principle called
Maṣlaḥa (“the public interest”), namely the benefit of the public also permits forbidden acts
according to Sharīʿa.89
This is an important legal decision in both Sunni and Shiite Islam, as Maṣlaḥa constitutes a
time-bound ruling according to which an Islamic scholar may permit acts that are against
Sharīʿa in cases of danger or when there is a proven benefit for the Muslim community. Thus,
for example, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989) argued that an Islamic state even has
the authority to destroy mosques under extenuating circumstances for the public good.90

Conclusion
Evidently, Qaraḍāwī presents the Palestine-Israel conflict in a theological-polemical manner.
As a religious scholar, he looks at the situation through religious sources. A battle between the
representatives of Judaism and of Islam is being fought on the soil of Palestine. The conflict is
not merely a local territorial conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. It affects the entire
Muslim Ummah. The current conflict between Jews and Muslims essentially is the
continuation of the struggle between the two sons of Abraham, Ishmael and Isaac, because the
Muslims are descendants of Ishmael, and the Jews are descendants of Isaac.
Qaraḍāwī challenges the veracity of the Biblical narrative and reinterprets it by giving the
patrimony and birthright to Ishmael. In order to deny any semblance of the right of the Jews
to the land, he divests them of any link to their Biblical forefathers by arguing that their past
and present sins nullify any such relationship. A long line links contemporary Jews (Israel) to
the Jews of past generations (the Children of Israel and the Jews of Khaibar and of Medina) as
far as obligations and punishments are concerned, but not with regard to rights. The decisive
majority of Israelis are descendants of the Khazars, not of the Biblical Children of Israel.
Judaism is a universal religion and therefore, it cannot claim ownership of territory. The Jews

must return to their countries of origin. Should they not wish to do so, Muslims must wage an
uncompromising Jihad until victory. According to Qaraḍāwī, political considerations are based
upon religious faith. Thus, it is forbidden to give up any piece of Palestinian land, for it is a
religious trust for Muslims alone. One may sign armistice agreements with Israel only if it
serves Muslim interests. The existence of Israel prevents the redemption of the world.
Therefore, Muslims, as faithful messengers of God, must do everything in their power to
destroy Israel.
The annihilation of the Jews is not a goal in itself, but the product of acts of Jihad and of the
struggle to restore stolen Palestinian lands to their legal owners. As the Jews act in accordance
with their treasonous and cruel nature, and do not want a peaceful solution that will return
them to Poland, Russia and their other places of origin, there is no choice but to kill them
while fulfilling the commandment of Jihād in order to correct what is distorted and to restore
Palestine to its “original” inhabitants.

Notes
1 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 41.
2 Emmanuel Sivan, Arab Political Myths (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1988), pp. 85–120.
3 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 9–10.
4 Ibid., p. 9.
5 For the different versions of this Ḥadīth, see: M.J. Kister, “You Shall Only Set Out for Three Mosques: A Study of an Early
Tradition,” Le Muséon, 82/1–2 (1969), pp. 117–131.
6 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 11.
7 Khāled al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Sheikh al-Qaraḍāwī, (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 2003), vol. 5, p. 68.
8 Reuven Paz, “The Positions of Radical Islamic Movements toward the Jews and Zionism in Our Generation,” in: Ilan
Pappa (ed.), Islam and Peace, Islamic Attitudes towards Peace in the Contemporary Arab World (Givʿat Ḥaviva: Institute
for Peace Research, 1992), pp. 46–66.
9 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 11–12. These statements were conveyed to Shaul Bartal personally by
Khālid Abū Arafa, a senior Hamas activist from Jerusalem and Minister for Jerusalem Affairs in the first Hamas
government in 2006 in an interview on 1 February 2012. The statements of Abū Arafa that represent Hamas comprise
additional evidence of the enormous theological influence by Qaraḍāwī upon those loyal to the movement.
10 On this subject, see for example: Aḥmad Fatḥi Khalīfa, Dalīl ʾŪlā al-Qiblatain, Thāni al-Masjidain wa-Thālith alḤaramain (Umm al-Faḥm: Muʾassasat Al-Aqṣa, 2012).

11 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 13–14.
12 This Ḥadīth appears in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (41: 6985) and Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhāri (4:56:791) and also cited in Article Seven of the
Hamas Charter.
13 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 15.
14 Dore Gold, The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West and the Future of the Holy City (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2008), pp.
236–237 (Hebrew).
15 Muḥammad Al-Shawqī, Al-Mahdī al-Munta ẓ ar wal-Khilāfa al-Thāniya ʿ Ala Manhaj al-Nubūwa (Jerusalem: Anṣār alʿAmal al-Islāmī al-Muwaḥḥad, 2007), pp. 82–83.
16 Ismā‛ῑl Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī fi Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya alFilasṭῑniyya (Gaza: Markaz al-Iʿlām al-ʿArabῑ, 2012), pp. 211–212.
17 See the official title page of the Madinat Al-Quds Website, www.alquds-online.org/index.php?s=18&id=3&skw=what,
viewed on 17 February 2015.
18 Shaul Bartal, “Lone-Wolf or Terror Organization Members Acting Alone: New Look at the Last Israeli – Palestine
Incidents,” Middle Eastern Studies, 53 (2017), pp. 211–228.
19 “Ḥiṣār wa-Taḥrīr al-Quds,” Madinat al-Quds Website, 10 October 2014, www.alquds-online.org/items/80, viewed on 17
February 2015.
20 See: State of Israel Publications, No. 6534 (2012–2013). It appears on the official website of the Israel Ministry of Defense,
www.mod.gov.il/Defence-and-Security/Fighting_terrorism/Pages/default.aspx.
21 “Mukhaṭṭaṭāt wa-Qawānīn Mutaṭarrifa li-Tahwῑd al-Quds wal-Aqṣa,” Madinat al-Quds Website, 25 February 2015,
www.alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&cat=87&id=16 48&skw=%D9%83%D9%86%DD9%8A%D8%B3, viewed on 17
February 2015.
22 Anonymous, “Muʾassasat al-Quds al-Duwaliyya wa-al-Ittiḥād al-ʿĀlamī li-ʿUlamāʾ al-Muslimīn yattafiqān ʿalā balwarat
ruʾyā mushtaraka li-nuṣrat al-Quds,” Madinat al-Quds Website, 28 January 2015, www.alquds-online.org/index.php?
s=news&id=1353, viewed on 17 February 2015.
23 “Al-Qaraḍāwī yadʿu al-ʾUmma al-ʿArabiyya wal-Islāmiyya li-daʿm ṣumūd al-Maqdisiyyīn,” Madinat al-Quds Website,
12 May 2014, www.alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&id=140, viewed on 17 February 2015.
24 “Nadwa Maqdisiyya fī Al-Doḥā bi-mushārakat al-Qaraḍāwī wa-Mashʿal wa-Ṣabrī,” Madinat al-Quds Website, 5 May
2014, www.alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&id=110, viewed on 14 May 2017.
25 “Al-Quds al-Duwaliyya: Al-mashārīʿ al-istithmāriyya al-waqfiyya li-khidmat al-Quds fī taṣāʿud wa-nadʿū ʾilā al-ibtikār,”
Madinat al-Quds Website, 25 May 2014, www.alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&id=190, viewed on 14 May 2017.
26 The link to the film-clip appears on the Facebook page of the Waqf al-Ummah organization, where Sheikh Raed Salah
calls for contributions for the continuation of the struggle for Al-Aqsa. See, www.facebook.com/video.php?
v=633170103434966&set=vb. 622390311179612&type=2&theater. Furthermore, see the item about this organization by:

Samīr Abū Al-Haijāʾ, “Mashrūʿ Waqf al-Ummah li-khidmat al-Quds wal-Masjid al-Aqṣa,” PLS48 Website, 23 May 2014,
www.pls48.net/?mod=article&ID=1181454, viewed on 17 February 2015.
27 “Shāhidū: Ṭifla Maqdisiyya tukhāṭibu al-Ṣahāyina bil-lugha al-Inkilīziyya: naḥnu lā nakhāfu minkum fa-ʾantum
irhābiyyūn wa-hādhihi arḍuna wa-ʾirḥalū ʿanhā,” Madinat al-Quds Website, www.alquds-online.com/index.php?
s=19&id=1571. See also the link to YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPNBvwE8jCs, viewed on 14 May 2017.
28 “Ibʿād ṭifla Maqdisiyya ʿan al-Aqṣa li-muddat 15 yawm,” Madinat al-Quds Website, 26 June 2014, http://alqudsonline.com/index.php?s=news&id=293, viewed on 14 May 2017.
29 See: Facebook page of the International Jerusalem Institute, 7 November 2014, www.facebook.com/Qii.media?pnref=story,
viewed on 9 July 2015.
30 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 2003), vol. 5, p. 112.
31 Fahmi Mashāhra from Jabel Mukabber was imprisoned because of his participation in the organization and his assistance
in a suicide bombing perpetrated by the Izz aL-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades in Jerusalem, which took place in the Gilo
neighborhood of Jerusalem in June 2002. Nineteen passengers on the bus were murdered. See: Hillel Cohen, The Rise and
Fall of Arab Jerusalem: Palestinian Politics and the City since 1967 (Abington: Routledge, 2011), pp. 44–45.
32 See: Qurʾān 17:4: “We conveyed to the Children of Israel in the Scripture saying that you will cause corruption on the
earth twice and you will become very haughty.”
33 Fahmī Eid Ramaḍān al-Mashāhra, Al-Ḥayāt al-Thālitha mā Baina al-Dunyā wal-ʾākhira (Official Hamas publication, no
details), p. 3. Apparently, this book was written while the author was in prison and was smuggled outside for publication.
At the end of the book, the author thanks many people, referring to them only by their noms de guerre. He also
acknowledges Hamas for helping him publish the work.
34 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 61–62.
35 Ibid., p. 63.
36 Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, p. 86.
37 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, p. 64.
38 Boris Havel, “Hajj Amin Husseini’s Anti-Semitic Legacy,” p. 10.
39 Quoted in: Ronald L. Nettler, “Islamic Archetypes of the Jews: Then and Now,” in: Robert Wistrich (ed.), Anti-Zionism in
the Contemporary World (New York: New York University Press, 1990), pp. 64–65.
40 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 64–65.
41 Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, pp. 86–88.
42 Martin Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House: A History of Jews in Muslim Lands (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 8–
26; Efraim Karsh, “The Long Trail of Islamic Anti-Semitism,” in: Efraim Karsh and Kumaraswamy P.R. (eds.), Islamic
Attitudes to Israel (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 2–10.

43 Qurʾān, vol. 2, pp. 125–127.
44 Genesis, vol. 15, p. 18.
45 Minutes of the Peel Commission, January 7, 1937; quoted in Conor Cruise O’Brien, The Siege: The Saga of Israel and
Zionism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 225. See: http://benyehuda.org/ben_gurion/maaraxa14.html.
46 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 65–66.
47 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 176.
48 Ibid.
49 The Hebrew Bible (II Samuel 3: 1–6) mentions David’s seven wives by name, along with ten concubines – far fewer in
number than claimed by Qaraḍāwī.
50 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 65–66; Khalid al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 164,
176.
51 Genesis, vol. 12, p. 7.
52 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 125.
53 Qurʾān, vol. 11, pp. 42–46.
54 On Noah and his sons, see: Batsheva Grasiel, Scripture, Midrash and Qurʾān (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuchad, 2006),
pp. 69–71.
55 Qurʾān, vol. 3, p. 67. For translation and discussion, see: Jon D. Levenson, Inheriting Abraham: The Legacy of the
Patriarch in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 199–200.
56 Qurʾān, vol. 3, p. 65; Levenson, Inheriting Abraham, p. 199.
57 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 126.
58 Genesis, vol. 22, p. 2. For a discussion of the ʿAqedah in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, see: Levenson, Inheriting
Abraham, pp. 65–106.
59 Qurʾān, vol. 37, p. 113.
60 Ḥalīma ʿAwaḍ, “Silsilat al-aḥādiīth al-ḍaʾīfa wal-mawḍūʿa lil-Albānī,” Muntadayāt al-Nīlīn Website, January 2015,
http://vb.alnilin.com/showthread.php?t=70370&page=2.2015, viewed on 16 August 2015.
61 Ibid.
62 See: Ifrah Zilberman, The Canaanite Founding Myth of Palestinian Society (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute, 1993). This
study deals extensively with the origins of the myth and its development as a founding myth in Palestinian society.
63 Genesis, vol. 12, p. 6.
64 Hasan Al-Bash, Al-Tarbiya al-Ṣahyūniyya: min ʿUn ṣ uriyyat al-Tawrāh ʾila Damawiyyat al-Iḥtilāl (No details on
publisher and place of publication, 2002–2003), p. 24.

65 For example, see: Muḥammad Muṣbaḥ Ḥamdān, Al-Istiʿmār wal-ṣahyūniyya al-ʿālamiyya (Sidon: Al-Maktaba alʿAṣriyya, 1967), pp. 94–112.
66 Hunaida Ghanem, To Build the Nation Anew: Palestinian Intellectuals in Israel (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2009), pp. 140–
143; Azmi Bishara, “Min jadaliyyat al-wujūd ʾila jadaliyyat al-jawhar,” Al-Karmel, 53 (1997), pp. 11–35.
67 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 124.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p. 134.
70 Shaul Bartal, “Shlomo Sand: The Arabs’ Darling,” Middle East Quarterly, 22 (Summer 2015), pp. 2–12; Jennie Lebel, The
Mufti of Jerusalem Haj-Amin el-Husseini and National Socialism, Paul Münch, trans. (Belgrade: Ĉigoja štampa, 2007), pp.
237–245; Shlomo Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People, Yael Lotan, trans. (London: Verso, 2009), pp. 65–123, 218–238.
71 On the meaning of the verb, “k.t.b.” in the Qurʾān as a fated decree, see: Qurʾān, vol. 58, p. 21 and Qurʾān, vol. 59, p. 3.
72 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 125.
73 Ibid.
74 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 88–89.
75 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 125.
76 Ibid., p. 68.
77 Ibid., p. 125.
78 Ibid., p. 67.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., pp. 67–68.
81 Moshe Pearlman, “The Medieval Polemics between Islam and Judaism,” in: S.D. Goitein (ed.), Religion in a Religious Age
(Cambridge, MA: Association for Jewish Studies, 1974), pp. 103–138.
82 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 68.
83 Ibid., p. 135.
84 Sivan, Arab Political Myths, pp. 15–52.
85 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 122.
86 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihad, vol. 1, p. 125.
87 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 135.
88 The treaty was broken two years later, in 630, when Muhammad conquered Mecca. Yitzhak Reiter shows how Muslim
thinkers regard Ḥudaibīya even today as an expression of Muhammad’s wisdom, as he signed the Treaty of Ḥudaibīya in
order to reorganize his army and conquer Khaibar while neutralizing the threat of the treaty between them and the

people of Mecca. He later broke the Treaty of Ḥudaibīya and conquered Mecca. See: Reiter, War, Peace and International
Relations in Islam, pp. 4–6, 46–47, 54–58.
89 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, pp. 122–123.
90 Katerina Dalacoura, Islamic Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011),
pp. 168–169.

4
What is Zionism?

1. Know the enemy
The previous chapter dealt with the importance of Palestine in the thought of Qaraḍāwῑ.
Palestine, the land of prophecies, whose center is the holy city of Jerusalem, is a land that is a
sacred Islamic trust. Palestine, however, is in the hands of illegitimate occupiers who stole it
from the Muslims. In order to retrieve it, Muslims first must be aware of the nature of the
enemy against whom they are fighting:
Knowing the enemy, who has despoiled our land and threatens our existence, is a religious and national obligation. We
must know the dangerous characteristics of the Zionist mentality in depth – they are constructed from the dangerous
teachings of the Talmud as an excuse for the dangerous ambitions of Zionism.1

Qaraḍāwῑ argues that Muslims suffer from military and technological inferiority as opposed to
Israel. Israel has excellent intelligence regarding the Arab world, while the Arabs lack
information about Israel:
In Qaraḍāwῑ’s view, it is clear to all of us that Israel and the Western powers that provide it with aid, specifically the
Americans, have exposed us to the bone. In most cases, they know more about us than what we know about ourselves. In
addition, they have the means and the technologies by which they are able to know this easily. There is no doubt that all
the vast knowledge of the Western powers is transferred to Israeli personnel. Do we know our enemy, as we are obligated
to in accordance with our religion, our interests and our very existence2

As far as knowledge is concerned, Qaraḍāwῑ doesn’t mean intelligence, but rather
psychological knowledge. Muslims are failing in their struggle against Israel because they do
not know the nature of the Israeli enemy in depth:
We are not performing well in our confrontation with our enemy because we do not recognize the focal points of his
strength so that we may protect ourselves from them or compete against them by similar or even stronger means, if we
are able. We also do not know his weak points so that we may attack him through them. This is because we have not
really tried to know his character, to examine it closely, to know his sensitivities and how to cope with them. What is his
world view regarding religions, values, people? We have not learned what really influences the character of the enemy in
order to know how he thinks, how he makes plans and carries them out. We do not know what he wants and how he
achieves what he wants. Perhaps at present we know something of what was hidden in the past, but we still have not
attained the knowledge that we should have attained, as far as knowledge of the enemy is concerned.3

In order to get to know the real nature of the enemy, Qaraḍāwῑ provides an extensive
description of the character of the Jews. In his view Zionism stems out of Judaism. So, in order
to know the nature of the Israeli enemy, he delves deeply into various sources: the Hebrew
Bible; the Qurʾān; Rabbinic works; and the writings of prominent Zionist thinkers. All of the
above undergo a reworking in accordance with Qaraḍāwῑ’s religious and political outlook.
When Qaraḍāwῑ attempts to survey the history of Zionism, he begins with Jewish-Muslim
relations at the beginning of Islam, as he maintains that there is no difference between
Judaism and Zionism. Qaraḍāwῑ’s writing on Zionism is not systematic. He uses various
quotes without explanation of the context in which the comments were made. He does not
specify the sources from which these quotes were taken, so it is very difficult to track the
origin of his quotations.4

2. The character of the Jews
The hardheartedness and violence of the Jewish nature
According to Qaraḍāwῑ, Jews possess hereditary traits, an eternal and unchanging nature that
is mentioned in the Bible and in the Qurʾān. The paramount and most reliable source is the
Qurʾān. The Qurʾān provides ample information about the Children of Israel and their nature:
The primary source is the honorable Qurʾān – the Qurʾān that dedicated much space to a discussion of the Children of
Israel: It explained their characteristics, removed the veil over the description of their soul and the qualities that they
inherited from their ancestors until they became second nature to them.5

The reason why the Qurʾān contains so much about them is to make Muslims aware of how to
deal with them in the past and in the present:
The Qurʾān is full of stories about the Children of Israel to the extent that some of its commentators argued that it
should be the book of Moses and the Children of Israel. Why did the Qurʾān dare to relate stories about the Children of
Israel and their characteristics? Why does it tell us about the hardness of their heart and say: ‘Because they have broken
their covenant, we have cursed them and have hardened their hearts,’ (Qurʾān, 13:5). It also says: ‘And afterward, their
hearts became as hard as stone, and even harder than that,’ (Qurʾān, 74:2), in order that we know with whom we are
dealing.6

The first character fault of the Jews is hardheartedness. The Qurʾān contains several verses,
such as the verses mentioned above, that describe the Jews’ heart of stone that was created as
a consequence of Allāh’s curse after they broke their covenant with Him. It is clear, writes alQaraḍāwῑ, that this character fault has not changed even in our times with the frequent killing
of Muslims by Jews in Deir Yassin (April 1948), Sabra and Shatila (September 1983), the Cave

of the Patriarchs massacre in Hebron (February 1994), the village of Qana in Lebanon (April
1996), etc.7 According to Qaraḍāwῑ, hardheartedness and cruelty may be found throughout the
Zionist movement.
The character that represents more than any other figure the hardheartedness and the
violent nature, which is the main ingredient in the character of the Zionist person, is the
character of Menachem Begin.8 Qaraḍāwῑ calls Begin ‘The Philosopher of violence.’ He cites
the title of the second chapter of Begin’s book, The Revolt9: “We fight, therefore we exist,”
which is a paraphrase of Descartes’ famous saying. In Qaraḍāwῑ’s eyes this title expresses: “a
statement that indicates that one’s very existence is not thought, deed or faith, but war.”10
Qaraḍāwῑ did not select the figure of Menachem Begin in vain. The figure of Begin as the
commander of the Irgun symbolizes the Jewish struggle against the British and the Arabs and
is associated with well-known events, such as the explosion of the King David Hotel in
Jerusalem and “the slaughter” at the village of Deir Yassin. Qaraḍāwῑ chose to quote from
Begin’s memoirs that were written while he served as the commander of the Irgun in order to
paint a stereotypical portrait of the Israeli Zionist figure as a hawk and a fanatic. Qaraḍāwῑ
relates to Begin selectively and does not mention the fact that Begin signed a peace treaty
with Egypt and, as a result, received the Nobel Peace Prize. Qaraḍāwῑ purposely does not
quote from the works of more moderate political figures in order to show the Muslim reader,
who is not an expert in the variety and diversity of views in Israeli society, that as a whole this
society is a militant society. According to Qaraḍāwῑ, “the Jews generally admire the figure of a
leader who is a ‘warrior-prophet,’ such as Moses or Joshua, the son of Nun.”11

The Jews didn’t keep their covenant with God
In addition to being hardhearted, Jews are stubborn. They ceased being the chosen people
because they broke their covenant with God. They do not believe and they are not loyal. They
are characterized by treachery and insolence, which they displayed toward their prophets, and
even toward God. Thus, the Jews dared to claim that “Allāh is poor and they are rich,” (Qurʾān,
3:181) and “the hand of Allāh is clenched” (Qurʾān, 5:64).12 Qaraḍāwῑ exhibits his expertise in
the Torah and proves that, even according to their own sources, the Jews ceased to be the
chosen people. While the Biblical book of Exodus repeats and stresses the obligation to fulfill
the commandments of God who made the covenant, there are innumerable examples that
prove the opposite.13
Qaraḍāwῑ quotes the verses of the biblical story of the Golden Calf, which The Children of
Israel created and worshipped at Mt. Sinai, the event that was supposed to symbolize their
obligation to the covenant with God. Qaraḍāwῑ analyzes the seriousness of this act:

The Children of Israel worshipped idols, in addition to the One God who made a covenant with them. Thus, they
reverted to idol worship and (with the leadership of Aaron, brother of Moses!), from their part, they desecrated the
conditions and principles of the covenant.14

Qaraḍāwῑ reaches the conclusion that it is because this nature of the Jews that nullifies their
being chosen and their right to the land as well:
Besides the breaking of the covenant with God, have there remained some rights that derive from the Torah for
independent states such as Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan? [Are such rights] for groups such as the
Ethiopian Falash Mura or citizens of Russia and the Ukraine or Americans or Argentinians? And all of this in the name
of a covenant that the Children of Israel transgressed many times throughout the generations. Do the demands that
derive from ‘rights’ such as these have one iota of logic at all?15

Interestingly, the same idea is found in the writings of Rabbi Kook.16 In his book Orot
(‘Lights’), he writes:
Were it is not for the sin of the Golden Calf, the inhabitants of the land of Israel would have been reconciled with the
people of Israel, For the name of God called upon them would have aroused awe. No war would have been necessary, and
the influence would have proceeded peacefully as in the days of Messiah. Only sin intervened and the thing has been
delayed thousands of years. All the causes of the world are interlocked to bring the light of God into the world; the sin of
the Calf will be totally erased, and thereby all will recognize the Jewish people as seed blessed by God. The world will be
perfected in a way of peace and feelings of love. The pleasantness of God will be felt in every heart as a spiritual pleasure
and delight, and all in whom there is a soul will be revived.17

Is Qaraḍāwῑ influenced by Rabbi Kook’s works? Perhaps he is. In this case we do not believe
that Qaraḍāwῑ took this idea from the writings of Rabbi Kook. The Golden Calf is a famous
story mentioned in the Qurʾān and is one of the most famous examples of the sins of the
children of Israel. However, Qaraḍāwῑ is familiar with the writings of Rabbi Kook, since he
quotes from Orot in another chapter of his book: Al-Quds Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim.
Qaraḍāwῑ argues that Zionism is based upon Jewish sources and therefore, there is no
difference between Zionism and Judaism. Zionism posits three major principles: the people,
the Torah and the land. Geographically speaking, the holy land is the center of the world, and
the history of the rest of the world revolves around that of the Jews because of their professed
mission to the nations.18 To support this view, Qaraḍāwῑ quotes from Orot in order to prove
the sacredness of this “holy trinity” of Zionist thought, as follows:
The Zionist Rabbi Kook says: The Land of Israel is not something external, not an external national asset, a means to the
end of collective solidarity and the strengthening of the nation’s existence, physical or even spiritual. The land of Israel is
an essential unit bound by the bound-of-life to the people, united by inner characteristics to its existence. Therefore, it is
impossible to appreciate the content of sanctity of the land of Israel and to actualize the depth of love for her by some
rational human understanding- only by the spirit of God that is in the soul of Israel. This spirit radiates natural hues in
all avenues of healthy feelings.19

The Jews expressed their disloyalty to God also by persecuting and killing the prophets, that
God sent to them in order to reclaim them. Moses, Elijah, Nehemiah and even God rebuked

them many times in vain. In addition, Qaraḍāwῑ introduces quotations from the Bible that
illustrate this concept.20
Qaraḍāwῑ also uses quotations from the New Testament that show proof of the
contemptible character of the Jews: they are children of snakes and slayers of prophets.
Therefore, their status as a chosen people was taken from them and given to others.21
The Jews are disloyal not only to God, but also to people. One can learn it from the history
of Jewish-Muslim relations. Muslims must recall how the three Jewish tribes in Medina broke
their treaty with Muhammad. Muhammad made an agreement with them (the Pact of the
Ummah), gave them rights and included them as part of the Islamic state. They repaid him by
making a treaty against him with the tribe of Quraish, who were idol-worshippers (Qurʾān,
4:51).22

The Jewish racism
Qaraḍāwῑ argues that there are many studies of the Torah and the Talmud that prove that the
Jews consider themselves a chosen race and therefore they treat other peoples with superiority
and contempt:
The Jews think that all peoples except them are inferior to animals and more humble than dogs, while they alone are the
only people chosen by God… and all of humanity must serve them.23

Jewish racism also may be found in the laws of the Torah. The Torah forbids a Jew to lend
money on interest to another Jew, while he may do so to a Gentile (non-Jews). Jews behave
according to a double standard toward different peoples, whereas, according to Islam, what is
forbidden is forbidden and what is permitted is permitted to all.24
From this discussion, Qaraḍāwῑ concludes that because of their sins and their treacherous
nature, the Jews have lost the right to be God’s chosen people. God’s promise of the land is a
promise whose existence is conditional upon their [the Jews’] fulfillment of the terms of
covenant:
Is this promise to give them this land – if it indeed is correct – absolute or conditional? If it is conditional, then have the
conditions been fulfilled? Whoever reads the New Testament of the Christians, and especially, the Old Testament, will
discover that God’s promise to the Children of Israel is incumbent upon observing the commandments and keeping the
covenant and obeying God’s commandments and prohibitions so that the people of God will work toward His victory.
This logic suits divine justice and law because Allah does not relate to people according to their pedigree but according to
their deeds.25

If the Jews do not deserve to inherit the land, then who does? “The Muslim Ummah is the
nation that is most deserving of inheriting the land of prophecies.”26 According to the Qurʾān,
the Muslims are the righteous worshippers of God who deserve to inherit the land from its

inhabitants who do not fulfill the commandments of God. Islamic rule in Palestine is the sole
legitimate rule that is permitted, whereas the Zionist presence is sinful and will soon be
destroyed.27

Qaraḍāwῑ writes on the founders of Zionism
In order to acquire some more knowledge about contemporary Jews, Qaraḍāwῑ reviews the
teachings of the founders of Zionism. Qaraḍāwῑ is not familiar with the primary sources of the
Zionist thinkers themselves. He quotes from a book titled “The Zionist Ideology;”28 he does
not give any references, so it is hard to track his quotations.
Qaraḍāwῑ mentions a letter written by the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (1878–1965) to
Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) in reply to Gandhi’s argument that Zionism is an immoral
movement because it dispossesses another people from their land. In his letter, Buber presents
Zionism as a movement with a moral mission. According to Buber, Zionism is part of the
Jewish historical continuum that focuses upon the link between the Land of Israel and the
moral essence of the people of Israel. Therefore, it is not possible for the people of Israel (the
Jews) to give up their land because without it, it cannot fulfill its mission as a people and to
humanity. The people and the land are linked jointly as a husband and his wife. Qaraḍāwῑ
argues that Buber took the image of a husband and wife from the Torah, where the link
between God and the Children of Israel is likened to that between husband and wife. He
concludes that Zionism regards the link between the people and the land as one that cannot be
severed.
He bolsters his claim with additional quotations from the writings of Shmuel Haim Landau
(1892–1928), a Zionist thinker and one of the leaders of Hapoel Hamizrachi movement: “There
is no room for the spirit of the nation without a revival of the nation in its land because ‘the
divine spark’ is effective for His people in His land”.29 Similarly, he cites Zionist thinker A.D.
Gordon (1856–1922) who argued that the “national connection will be fulfilled only by
returning to the fields of our national homeland and beneath its skies”.30
Since Zionism needs the land in order to fulfill its mission, it is natural for it to use all means
possible to acquire it, including violence. Apart from Menachem Begin, another violent Zionist
leader was David Ben Gurion. Qaraḍāwῑ relates to a story, without giving the circumstances
of the event, of how David Ben Gurion and his soldiers rejoiced when they received weapons
and were as delighted as children are when they play games. According to Qaraḍāwῑ, the
image of the fighting Jew was reshaped by Ben Gurion and Moshe Dayan. It has deep roots
based upon the figure of Moses the great prophet who also was the first military leader of the
Children of Israel, “hence the link between the prophet Moses (in Hebrew, Moshe) and Moshe
Dayan is logical and obvious.”31

Qaraḍāwῑ maintains that Ben Gurion believed the army to be the most faithful interpreter
of the Torah because it would enable the Jews to settle both banks of the River Jordan, thereby
fulfilling the vision of the Torah. Hence, the army reshaped the image of the Jew into that of
the Jew as a fighter. The importance of the army, however, is not its role in defending the
country. According to Qaraḍāwῑ, first and foremost, the army serves an important cultural
purpose as it is the melting pot of Israeli society. The army shapes the immigrants who come
to Israel from different parts of the world and gives them a Jewish-Israeli identity.32
Zionism is based upon Judaism. In Qaraḍāwῑ’s writings, there is no distinction between
Jewish and Zionist identity. He quotes the Jewish philosopher Jacob Klatzkin (1882–1948) who
argued that the Jews of the Diaspora do not identify at all with the countries in which they
live. As final proof, Qaraḍāwῑ gives as an example the first president of Israel, Chaim
Weizmann (1874–1952), the great chemist who discovered a method of producing acetone
from corn flour during World War I. Acetone was used for the production of explosives in
bullets and cannon balls. Weizmann sold his patent to the Allied forces that desperately
needed it. When asked what he wanted in exchange, Weizman did not request anything for
himself, but asked Britain for the Balfour Declaration regarding a Jewish National Home in
Palestine.33

3. Zionism: a conspiracy against the Muslim world
In his book “Enemies of the Islamic Solution,” Qaraḍāwῑ argues that there are three major
enemies of the Islamic solution: colonialism, Zionism and Communism. Qaraḍāwῑ defines
Zionism as “world Jewry” that is opposed to the Islamic solution, Islamic practices and
everything Islamic with all its might. In fact, while Zionism is included in the definition of
imperialism, it is worthy of special attention as it has its own particular characteristics that
make it the worst kind of imperialism.34 Qaraḍāwῑ’s definition of Zionism as the arm of
imperialism and his way of presenting the enemies of Islam recall Sayyid Quṭb’s Our War
against the Jews written 50 years ago.35
In the introduction to his discussion of the Zionist movement, Qaraḍāwῑ presents a
historical overview of the relations between Jews and Muslims in order to answer the question
of why Judaism is hostile to Islam. In his view, there is no difference between Judaism and
Zionism. Early Islam was not hostile toward Judaism. The opposite is true. The Qurʾān refers
to Jews and Christians as “People of the Book,” because they received divine revelation.
According to Qurʾān (2:285), belief in all of the prophets and sacred scripture that were given
by God is obligatory for Muslims. Therefore, the belief in Moses and the Torah as a holy book
is part of the Islamic faith. By virtue of this attitude, when Muhammad arrived in Medina, he

established the relations between the Muslims who came with him from Mecca and the
residents of Medina, including the three Jewish tribes, in a treaty that is referred to as “the
Treaty of the Ummah” (also known as the Charter or Constitution of Medina). Shortly
afterward, however, the contemptible character of the Jews overcame them and tribe after
tribe broke the treaty with Muhammad. Most egregious were the Jewish tribe Banū Quraiẓa
that made a treaty with the infidel Quraish tribe rather than remaining loyal to the Muslims
that believe in one God, as attested in the Qurʾān, 4: 2–51. Therefore, the Muslims were forced
to fight against the treasonous Jews in order to impose the true religion. Thus, the war of the
Muslims against the Jews is not only a military-political struggle but also an ideological,
religious and moral struggle.36 Qaraḍāwῑ presents the historic enmity between Muslims and
Jews only in part. He does not relate to the expulsions of the Jewish Banū Qainuqāʿ and Banū
Naḍīr tribes of Medina by the Muslims and the slaughter of the Banū Quraiẓa.
The Qurʾān prefers the Jews over unbelievers. Even during Moses’ lifetime, the Jews
requested that he make them an idol, like those of other peoples. Their wish eventually was
fulfilled by the Golden Calf. Qurʾān, 5: 6–24 exposes the cowardice and lack of faith on the
part of the Jews who refused to enter the Holy Land even though Allāh had promised it to
them. Their impertinent request that Moses and Allāh fight on their own against the peoples
who dwelt in the land resulted in their punishment of not entering the land and wandering in
the desert for forty years. Their lack of faith and dissolute character caused the Jews to kill the
prophets, such as Zakariya and Yaḥya, that Allāh sent them in order to turn them from their
evil ways (Qurʾān, 2: 87). Therefore, the Qurʾān describes Jews, along with unbelievers, as the
greatest enemies of the Muslims (Qurʾān, 5: 82).37
Throughout history, argues Qaraḍāwῑ, from the time of Muhammad until our own day, the
Jews have been engaged in various plots against Islam both clandestinely and openly. At the
Battle of Khaibar, a Jewess served Muhammad poisoned mutton, traces of which remained in
his body, and eventually caused his death. The Jews were responsible for the deaths of the
second and third caliphs, Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and Uthmān Ibn ʿAffān. The Jew Abdallah Ibn
Siya started the Fitna between Muslims during the reign of Uthman and continued to do so
with greater enthusiasm under Ali. In fact, he caused the rift between Shiites and Sunni that
continues in the Islamic world even today. Furthermore, Jews sullied the pure Islamic
tradition, especially regarding interpretation of the Qurʾān, by introducing stories that are full
of lies and falsifications.38 Despite their hostility toward Muslims, Jews, along with other
minorities, lived securely under the aegis of Islam and played an active role in the
development of Islamic civilization. Muslim tolerance toward the Jews enabled them to rise
and attain high offices in the land. When Jews were expelled from Christian countries,
particularly from Spain, Islamic countries opened their doors to them and made it possible for
them to live among them securely for centuries.39
The period of idyllic relations between Muslims and Jews lasted until the advent of the

Zionist movement whose objective was to establish a national home for the dispersed Jews
who were in exile. Exile was the divine punishment of the Jews for disobeying God’s
commandments, as attested in the Qurʾān, 7: 167–168. Qaraḍāwῑ concludes that since the exile
of the Jews was a divine decree, the establishment of the Jewish state contradicts the will of
God. Theodor Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement, examined several locations for the
Jewish homeland, such as South America and Africa. Eventually, however, he decided to
establish a state for the Jews in Palestine because of the Jewish religious connection. Jews
regard Palestine as “the Promised Land” and they are linked to it through the Bible. Herzl
hoped to encourage the Jews to favor the Zionist idea by appealing to their religious
sensibilities. The Jews tried to purchase Palestine from the Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Ḥamīd with
great sums of money. The Sultan, however, adamantly refused. Therefore, he was ousted from
his throne.40 Thus, the Zionist movement is responsible also for the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire.
A new phase of the struggle between international Zionism\World Jewry and Islam began
with the English conquest of Palestine in 1917 and the decision of the Allies to give Britain the
mandate for Palestine. This decision, writes Qaraḍāwῑ, led to the “accursed Balfour
Declaration,” which allowed the Jews to establish a National Home in Palestine, as if Palestine
were a land without people so it could be given to a people without a land. The old pent up
hatred of the Jews toward Muslims resurfaced along with their wish to establish a state in
Palestine. The Jews conspired to found their state in Palestine – of all places – the land of the
Isrāʾ and the Miʿrāj, the first direction of prayer for Muslims, the blessed land of the location
of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, in the heart of the Islamic world. They planned to establish their state
by expelling or killing the authentic inhabitants of the land, who were flourishing. Thus, the
Jews founded their state, called Israel, with the support of powers that are hostile to Islam: the
Christian world that actually is a reincarnation of the Crusaders, the Shiites, unbelievers and
idol worship-pers. The Jews knew that when they would establish their state that Islam would
be the single obstacle on their path. Therefore, they oppose Islam and are fighting a war in
order to destroy everything Islamic, especially movements of Islamic revival.41 The Islamic
interpretation delineated above notes that “medieval colonialism has returned to them [the
Arabs] under a new cover, but with the very same strategy and the same methods of religious
propaganda.”42 It is the version of history regarding Israel that is accepted throughout the
Muslim world.
In order to weaken the power of Islam, the Jews engaged in plots to break up the Caliphate
from within and bring about the collapse of Muslim unity under the Qurʾān, belief in Allāh
and his messenger Muhammad. The Jews and the colonialist powers were responsible for
spreading the idea of regional nationalism among the Arabs. It was a disaster for Arab world.
Instead of unity under Islam, the Arabs split into groups under slogans such as “Egypt for
Egyptians” and “Syria for Syrians.”43 The disintegration of the Ottoman Caliphate was the first

step in the 50-year plan realized by the Jewish state,44 referred to by Qaraḍāwῑ’s followers in
the Hamas as a ‘satanic state.’45
In addition, the Jews have cast aspersion on the reputation of Islam through modern
Orientalist scholarship. Many great scholars of the Middle East, such as Ignaz Goldziher and
Joseph Schacht, desecrated the sanctity of Islamic sources with their scientific critiques.
Judaism and Zionism played a decisive role in the rise of Communism in Russia. The spread of
Communism in Asia, however, was defeated by the Islamic world. International
Zionism/World Jewry continued to proclaim its ambitions of expansion in works such as The
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, whether they wrote the book or it was attributed to them, and
by the establishment of institutions that operate clandestinely. These organizations, such as the
Freemasons, are active in countries and among peoples like germs in an organism and work as
a cancer taking over healthy cells. Thus, the Jews accomplish their conspiracies silently
throughout the world, like the silencer on a pistol.46
Qaraḍāwῑ’s statements mentioned above are based upon those of Sayyid Quṭb47 who
preached for years about Orientalists, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the establishment
of organizations, such as the Freemasons, and the overthrow of the Islamic Caliphate as part of
a world conspiracy. These ideas are basic to the Hamas Covenant published on 18 August
1988.48 Israel is the leader of World Jewry and part of a diabolical plot to dominate the world
and harm Islam.

4. The reasons for the conflict and hatred between Muslims
and the Zionist state
Qaraḍāwῑ offers his explanation of the real reasons for the conflict between Muslims and
Jews, in other words, between Muslims and the Zionist state. Noteworthy is the absolute lack
of distinction between Judaism and Zionism in Qaraḍāwῑ’s thought. He relates to the current
struggle between Islam and Israel as a continuation of the conflict between Muhammad and
the Jews. Furthermore, Israel spreads lies throughout the world, especially in the West. Among
them is the claim that Muslims fight against Israel because it is Semitic and Jewish. The Jews
argue that Muslims are anti-Semites.
According to Qaraḍāwῑ, the latter is not true for two reasons: first, Arabs are Semites as
well. The origin of the Arabs is from Ishmael and contemporary Jews claim they are related to
the Children of Israel, namely they are descendants of Jacob, the son of Isaac, the son of
Abraham. Therefore, Jews and Muslims are cousins. Israel uses the argument of anti-semitism
against anyone who opposes its policies and its immoral aggression. Muslims cannot be anti-

Semites because they are Semites themselves.49 The second reason is that Muslims cannot be
racists because of their faith. The Qurʾān and the Sunna teach that all of humanity originated
in one family, that of Adam. The criterion for preferring some people to others is their fear of
God and not their ethnic origin (Qurʾān, 13: 49). Present day Jews who boast that they are
“Semites” are not necessarily Semites because throughout history many peoples converted to
Judaism, such as the Khazars. Hence, the Jewish world is composed of different races. This is a
natural process because Judaism is a religion, not a race.50
Hence, the struggle against Israel does not come from the fact that Muslims are antiSemites. Is religion a reason for this conflict? Do Muslims hate Israel because it is a Jewish
state? That is not the reason for the hatred. According to Islam, Judaism is a heavenly religion
that the prophet Moses led when he was privileged to a true revelation from God and gave
Israel the Torah that contains light and guidance for humanity. Therefore, the Qurʾān refers to
Jews and Christians as People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb) because originally their religions
were based upon a true revelation, even though over time they falsified and forged this
revelation.51
Furthermore, Jews are much closer to Muslims than to Christians because they have many
similar fundamentals regarding faith and law that are based upon the legacy of Abraham.
Jews do not believe in the Holy Trinity, and they did not transform Moses into a divinity as the
Christians did to Jesus. Jews, however, commit a sin because they engage in
anthropomorphisms when they refer to God, as is evident in the Torah. Christians also believe
in the Hebrew Bible but add the divinity of Jesus. As far as law is concerned, Jews circumcise
their sons just as Muslims do, while Christians are not circumcised. Jews require the ritual
slaughter of animals and birds while Christians do not. Like Muslims, Jews do not eat pigs,
whereas Christians do. Jews and Muslims forbid statues of the prophets and angels, while
churches are full of statues of every size and color. Therefore, if Muslims were engaged in a
religious war, it would be more logical that they would fight against Christians or unbelievers,
not against Jews.52
In Qaraḍāwῑ’s view, whoever thinks that Muslims are engaged in a religious war against
the Jews because they deny the prophecy of Muhammad, falsified the Torah or killed the
prophets is mistaken. Islam regards Jews as members of the People of the Book. The Qurʾān
permits Muslims to eat their foods and marry their women. The Jews lived under the
protection of the Muslims for centuries, after they were expelled from Christian lands that
fought a religious war against them. Muslims accepted the Jews into their lands and it never
occurred to them to engage in a religious war against them.53 Qaraḍāwῑ’s legal decisions
emphasize the tolerant aspect of Islam by virtue of the holiness of its teachings toward
protected peoples that could receive help even if they were harmed by Muslims. That, of
course, was dependent upon the payment of the jizya and the kharāj (poll tax and land tax).54
Ignaz Goldziher asserts that Islamic tolerance toward Jews finds expression in the Qurʾānic

verse, 2: 256: “There is to be no compulsion in religion.” It was invoked when the authorities
avoided punishing those who returned to their former religion after forced conversion to
Islam. In addition, legends and traditions attest to the fact that caliphs such as Umar Ibn alKhaṭṭāb showed tolerance toward adherents of other religions, Christians and Jews.55 Bernard
Lewis describes the condition of Jews in Islamic countries, as follows: “[Jews] were never free
from discrimination, but only rarely subject to persecution; that their situation was never as
bad as in Christendom at its worst, nor never as good as in Christendom at its best.”56
Qaraḍāwῑ notes that Jews in Islamic countries were not victims of religious persecution as
long as they conduct themselves as a protected people (Dhimmῑ) and were loyal subjects. This
statement contains some truth, as shall be shown below.
What has changed? Jews began a war against Muslims in Palestine and expelled them from
their homes. Here, Qaraḍāwῑ quotes the Qurʾān, 2: 246: “Why should we not fight in the cause
of Allāh when we have been driven from our homes and from our children?” The subject of
this verse is the Children of Israel who requested that the prophet Samuel appoint Shaul as
king.57 Qaraḍāwῑ interprets it out of context as referring to the Palestinians who were
expelled from their homes in Palestine by the Jews. The Jews who argue that Islam is at war
with them are those who are fighting against Muslims in Palestine in a systematic and preplanned manner. The conflict between Islam and World Jewry revolves around three axes: the
Judaization of the world, the Freemasons and the State of Israel.58

5. The Judaization of the world
Qaraḍāwῑ argues that International Zionism aspires to Judaize the world. It does not mean
that the Jews would like everyone to convert to Judaism. In fact, the opposite is true. By
nature, Judaism is not a universal religion, but a national one whose beliefs, ceremonies and
vision are concerned with the people of Israel and the Kingdom of Israel. Indeed, Jews refer to
God as the “God of Israel” and not the God of humanity (Rabb al-ʿālamῑn), as Muslims do. If
that is the case, then what do we mean when we speak of “judaizing the world?” This term
means the Jewish plot to turn the entire world toward their ideas and plans. The Jews want to
impose their state of mind and their thought on the world, as attested in the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion that has appeared in many languages. Many doubt the authenticity of this work,
but a reality check has proved that it is correct. This Judaization occurs in different areas.59
Qaraḍāwῑ maintains that Jewish thought has influenced the world through the spread of
Communism. Here, Qaraḍāwῑ does not differ from the Nazis, who argued that the Jews of
Eastern Europe were emissaries of the Bolsheviks that wished to establish an international
socialist republic.60 According to Qaraḍāwῑ, the Jews hope to Judaize Christianity by enlisting

Protestants to support Israel. Hundreds of millions of Protestants throughout the world believe
in the Hebrew Bible which they call the Old Testament. By virtue of this belief, they have
profound emotional links with the land where the stories of the Torah took place – in
Palestine and to the people of Israel. That is the reason for the support for Israel of many in
Britain and the United States. All classes of society support Israel – from the common man to
the leaders. This clearly influences the policies of these countries toward Israel. Qaraḍāwῑ
gives as an example to that, the policy of Britain toward the establishment of National Home
for the Jews in Palestine as reflected in the Balfour Declaration in 1917. According Qaraḍāwῑ,
this declaration was the result of Balfour’s personality, who was brought up on Bible stories
and always admired Jewish philosophy. He used to say that Christian culture owes a lot to
Judaism and believed in the right of the Jewish people, the chosen people, to the Land of
Israel. As a consequence of the return of the Jews to their land, the redemption would take
place.61 Some historians argue that Balfour was more Zionist than Herzl, as far as
understanding Zionist aspirations was concerned.62
The second example is America’s policy toward Israel. Qaraḍāwῑ argues that President
Jimmy Carter wrote in his memoirs that the establishment of modern Israel is the fulfillment
of Biblical prophecies. In his speech at the Knesset in 1979, he asserted that America and Israel
have profound connections to religion, morality and conscience. Likewise, U.S. Presidents
Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Bill Clinton all have given military, political, and financial
assistance to Israel and support in the media as well.63
This policy is not simply the result of the activities of the Zionist lobby in America. The
Zionist lobby is assisted by the deep religious feelings of the Christian world toward Israel and
knows how to exploit them. The Jews have penetrated Christian minds with their ideas to the
point that Christians believe that those ideas are part of their faith. The Jews do this in order to
make the Christians serve the interests of the State of Israel. Many Christians have displayed
hostility toward Islam because Muslims are hostile to Israel. The view that Muslims are acting
against the will of God because they oppose the State of Israel is common among hundreds of
millions of Protestants throughout the world.64
Protestant Christianity teaches the following tenets: the Jews are the Chosen People; God
has given the Jews the land by virtue of his promise to Abraham and this promise is valid and
exists until the End of Days; Jesus of Nazareth will return as Messiah after the Jews are
gathered in their land. These three principles are the bases of Messianic Zionism that
maintains that there are three signs that indicate the coming of the Messiah: first, the
establishment of the State of Israel, which took place in 1948; second, the capture of Jerusalem
by Israel in 1967, an event that had enormous influence upon Messianic Judaism; and third, the
building of the Temple of Solomon in place of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. In order to accomplish
this, Israel conducts archeological excavations on the Temple Mount underneath the Al-Aqsa
Mosque for the purpose of finding ruins of the imagined Temple (Al-Haikal al-Mazʿūm). It is

common knowledge that the Temple was destroyed a long time ago and, despite all their
efforts, the Jews have not discovered any artifact that can prove its existence. According to
Qaraḍāwῑ, the purpose of the excavations under the Al-Aqsa Mosque is to bring about its
collapse. This is the Jewish plan, and they know exactly what will happen and anticipate this
accursed day.65
Qaraḍāwῑ claims that the Radical Right in America is working toward the victory of Israel
and the expulsion of the Palestinians from their lands. It gives Israel money, arms and support
in the media. This results from the Judaization of the Christian state of mind (Tahwῑd alʿAqliyya al-Masῑḥiyya). The Jewish influence on the Catholic Church is even stronger, as is
evident in the Jewish efforts to change the position of Pope John Paul II regarding the
responsibility of the Jews for the killing and crucifixion of Jesus. For 2,000 years the Church
maintained that the Jews killed Jesus and therefore, they are people cursed by God, who
punished them with exile. Under Jewish influence, the Church reversed this stance completely.
During his visit to the Holy Land, Pope John Paul II not only absolved the Jews from the
accusation that they killed Jesus but also apologized for the persecutions of the Jews by the
Church. The Pope, however, did not apologize to the Muslims for the slaughter during the
Crusades, despite frequent requests to do so.66 Despite the fact that perhaps the Church
forgave the Jews for the death of Jesus and acknowledged its error, Qaraḍāwῑ refuses to
forgive. On his program, Al-Sharīʿa wal-Ḥayāt (“Islamic Law and Life”), recorded in February
2005, he stated: “There is no doubt that the Jews played an extremely important role in the
crucifixion of Jesus… we believe that Jesus was not crucified but that a crime was committed…
and we believe that the Jews were the ones who committed the crime.”67
Zionism, Communism and the ‘Crusading’ Christians that support the Jews comprise an
anti-Islamic union that works toward the defeat of Islam. Qaraḍāwῑ’s position, which is
considered relatively moderate, as far as his legal decisions are concerned, is close to that of
Muḥammad Abd al-Salām Faraj, whose book, Jihād: The Neglected Commandment identifies
these enemies as a single organization acting against the Muslim world.68
Zionism is working systematically and in an organized manner in order to impose its ideas
on the world. America, regarded as the leader of the world, is heavily influenced by Zionist
ideas. Qaraḍāwῑ has designed an active program to cope with this threat. In his book
regarding Muslims in the west, In Minorities Shariʿa Jurisprudence, he writes that it is
incumbent upon Muslims to create a strong Muslim presence in the West by establishing
united Muslim communities that will influence the Christian environment and spread Islam
within it by means of Daʿwa (“preaching”), in order to provide a counterweight to the Jewish
message.69

6. The Judaization of the Arab mind (Tahwῑd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabῑ)
In Qaraḍāwῑ’s view, the Judaization of the Arab mind is even more serious than the
Judaization of the world or of Catholics and Protestants. Israel, an aggressive and hostile
country, tries to convince the Arab-Islamic world that it must make peace with those who
have conquered their land and expelled their people. The State of Israel calls for peace in
accordance with its understanding of the world view. It dictates the terms and all the countries
of the region must comply. The peace process is a new Israeli narrative that Israel is
introducing to the Muslim world, just as the Jews introduced their distorted stories into the
Qurʾān and into Islamic tradition (al-Isrāʾīliyyāt al-Jadīda). Israel wishes to exploit the
economic advantages of the peace process only for its own sake. It argues that since we have
fought for so long and nothing came of it, let us now make peace. The Israelis do not even
hesitate to make use of “proofs” for the Qurʾān in order to justify their arguments. Thus, they
quote Qurʾān 8: 61, known as “the verse of peace,” as follows: “If they incline to peace, you
incline to peace as well and trust in Allāh because He is the hearer and the knower.” The
Israelis interpret this verse out of context because they do not incline to peace at all. They still
occupy Palestine which includes Jerusalem, and they ceaselessly build settlements. It does not
matter whether the government is rightist or leftist, headed by Ehud Barak or Binyamin
Netanyahu. They are equally terrible. Qaraḍāwῑ’s conclusion is: “There is not a decent man
among them, may the curse of Allāh be upon them.”70
Some Egyptian intellectuals call for the breaking of barriers between Muslim countries and
Israel and for erasing the past. They are interested in building a common future with the
Zionists as neighbors and cousins. In order to do so, they wish to eradicate the ancient hatred
between Muslims and Jews and nullify the verses of the Qurʾān that emphasize the evil
characteristics of the Jews, especially the fact that they killed their prophets and they hated the
Prophet Muhammad. According to these intellectuals, nearly half of the Qurʾān must be
abolished in order not to offend the sensibilities of the Jews. Perhaps, we should also delete all
of the historic heroes of Islam such as Saladin, Nūr al-Dīn, and Saif al-Dīn Quṭuz71 and no
longer speak about Jihad? asks Qaraḍāwῑ. After all, Qaraḍāwῑ cynically argues, we are the
generation of peace! The intellectuals who promote this process have opened their arms
embracing Israel and seek to end our hatred of Israel.72 As the leading Islamic legal authority
of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qaraḍāwῑ represents the resistance of all of the organizations
linked to the Brotherhood and stands for opposition to any peace agreement with Israel, such
Camp David, especially in Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian territories.73

7. The Freemasons: the long arm of world Jewry

According to Qaraḍāwῑ, the Jews use the organization of the Freemasons in order to achieve
their program of world domination. The Freemasons are not hostile to Jews. They can joint it
just like others. In fact, there are a large number of Jewish Freemasons. The Freemasons were
established for the purpose of fulfilling the Jewish plot of destroying other religions. The
history of the Freemasons is as long as that of the Jews – five thousand years, since the time of
Creation. The goal of the Jewish Freemasons is to rebuild the Temple of Solomon. They wish
to destroy other religions so that Judaism remains the only religion. There were no Jews
among the Freemasons until the 18th century. Since then, however, Jews began to join the
organization while exploiting the good will of other peoples that allowed them to belong to it.
Thus, they took over the leading positions of the organization and introduced the spirit of
Judaism into Masonic ceremonies. They took advantage of the Freemasons in order to attain
their objectives. There are many important persons who claim that 100% of the Freemasons
are Jews.74
While the Freemasons openly act as a body whose purpose is world domination, they
actually constitute a number of secret organizations as well. For example, the New York based
B’nei Brith and the ‘Alliance’ in Paris that runs Europe. These organizations exert a major
influence throughout the world. They were established in order to impose the Jewish idea
upon the world. Therefore, World Jewry is fighting against Islam secretly, through the
Freemasons, while it is fighting against Muslims openly via the Jewish and Zionist state called
Israel, established from the outset upon the principles of enmity, hatred and slaughter. The
State of Israel – ‘the poisoned dagger in the heart of the Arab world’ – actually is the open
arm of the Freemasons.75
Qaraḍāwῑ’s idea that the Freemasons are rooted in the Jewish experience is a common antiSemitic trope that finds expression in the Hamas Covenant of 198876 and in the sermons of
Palestinian preachers, such as Sheikh Khālid al-Mughrabῑ of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
The latter argues that:
Jews sacrifice those who are close to them in order to advance incrementally within the Freemason organizations. The
lodges of the Freemasons are gatherings of witchcraft for the Children of Israel. If one wants to be accepted as a new
member, or to rise in rank… he has to somehow bring one of sons or daughters or his wife or one of his male or female
relatives, put them on a table and slaughter them with his own hands as a sacrifice to Satan, in order to rise in the ranks
of the Freemasons. My brothers, it exists until today.77

The description of the Jews as a satanic octopus whose tentacles encompass the world and
who desire world domination according to a secret program outlined in the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion is very common. Its purpose is to transform the Jews into the devil and to
increase Jew-hatred to irrational proportions.78
Zionism or World Jewry uses the racist and hostile State of Israel that was established on
our land as its foremost weapon in its war against Islam, writes Qaraḍāwῑ. Israel has nuclear
bombs and trained soldiers and unlimited support by America and Western countries. After

Israel conquered the land, trampled upon the honor of the Arabs and that which is sacred to
them and expelled them from their land, it wants peace. Is it peace or surrender (Salām aw
Istislām)? It is peace on its own terms through the logic of force and not the force of logic. It is
a peace that serves and protects its own interests and places the domination of the entire
region in its hands. It is astonishing how Palestinians and Arabs are misled by this imaginary
peace (al-Salām al-Mazʿūm). It is fortunate that there are still those who are faithful to Allāh
in Palestine and in Lebanon (a hint at Hamas and Hezbollah). They are the faithful soldiers of
Allāh who confront the enemy and resolutely say no. They pay the price of their resistance in
pure blood, but they are the last of those that hold their own. In contrast, it is the lack of action
on the part of the Arabs that strengthens Israel.79
According to Qaraḍāwῑ, it is no wonder that Muslims are hostile to Israel. Israel devises
plots against them and turns all its power against them. Israel demonizes Muslims by
describing them as violent, murderers and terrorists. Israel persecutes anything associated with
the religion of Islam and does not distinguish between a terrorist and one who is faithful to his
religion. According to Israel, every believing Muslim is a terrorist, violent and a murderer.
Indeed, Zionism is the worst kind of colonialism, is embodied by Israel. In modern times, the
world has known many types of colonialism: British, French, and Italian. The Zionist
occupation, however, is worse than all of them because it is a racist, terrorist and oppressive
occupation.80

8. Learning from the enemy: unity; faith; democracy
Despite his overwhelming hatred of Israel, Qaraḍāwῑ notes its positive attributes. He does so
in order to ascertain the secret of Israel’s strength, to understand the reasons for Arab defeats
time after time and to learn lessons for the future. The first advantage of Israel is that the Jews
are working according to an orderly program. The founders of Zionism planned a vision of a
greater Land of Israel from the Euphrates to the Nile River and from Lebanon to Saudi
Arabia. Since then, the Jews have been working systematically in order to achieve their goals.
They are advancing incrementally. While the Jews have defined their objective, and are
focused upon its implementation, the Arab world is in a state of stagnation lacking definitive
goals and a unified leadership that would bring about their implementation.81
The fact that the Jewish state is both the source of evil and a model worthy of imitation
seems like a contradiction in terms. Uriya Shavit and Ofir Winter explain this paradox by
pointing out that this type of dualism is typical of the approach that the Muslim Brotherhood
took from the founders of apologetic Islamic Modernism, such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī,
Muhammad Abdu and Rashīd Riḍā.82

In addition, Qaraḍāwῑ admires Israel’s unity. Israeli society is composed of a mosaic of
identities: Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews; Ethiopian and Russian Jews; and religious and
secular Jews. This multiculturalism does not lead to anarchy because Israeli society has
managed to achieve unity via democracy. In contrast, while Arabs and Muslims have a great
numerical advantage over Israel, they cannot translate it into action because of their internal
divisions.83 For example, after the election of Binyamin Netanyahu as prime minister in 1996,
Qaraḍāwῑ proclaimed his admiration for democracy in Israel, as follows:
O Brothers! Before I get up from my seat, I wish to say a word about the results of the elections in Israel. The Arabs
placed all their hopes upon the success of Peres. But Peres failed. This is one of the things that I like about Israel. We wish
that our countries would be like that country. Thanks to a small majority [of voters] [Shimon Peres] fell and the people
prevail. There is no number of 99.99 or 99.999 percent that we know [from elections] in our country. What is that? If
Allāh had presented his candidacy before the people, he would not receive an amount [of support] like this. [The elections
in Arab countries] are simply a lie, a fabrication and a fraud. We congratulate Israel on the way it conducted itself.84

Qaraḍāwῑ praises Jewish unity, as follows:
Allāh described the Jews in the Qurʾān as those who only appear as if they are unified, but their hearts are divided from
each other. This description actually suits us better than them… They have managed to unite around the idea of
democracy – majority rule – while we have not managed to unite around a single political doctrine. They are united and
we are divided; it is clear that those who are united will triumph over those who are divided.85

Qaraḍāwῑ adds that Israel’s unity “as one man with one heart” is the secret of the strength of
Israel. Differences of opinion between the various political parties are superficial, while there
is unity as far as essential issues are concerned, such as the status of Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel. He sadly concludes that “the Jews are united and unfortunately we are divided. This
divisiveness weakens the majority while unity strengthens the minority.”86
Qaraḍāwῑ cynically asserts that in order to achieve their goals, the Jews have overcome
their inherent evil traits such as stinginess and cowardice. The latter have become
characteristics of the Arabs more than the Jews. He writes:
The Jews invest and we do not invest. Jews are the stingiest people and the most fearful of death (Qurʾān 2: 96).
Nevertheless, they have invested their money and sacrificed their lives. We must be frank and admit it. The Jews invested
millions in establishing their state. In one hour, they raised millions from Jews throughout the world. What have the
wealthy Arabs invested? Little of what was given them by their Master. The Jews whom we describe as cowards have
advanced without retreating and have defeated us in more than one war. They mobilized their men and their women
and when we were defeated in 1967, their prime minister was a woman (Golda Meir) [sic]. The Jews invest and we do
not invest. They do things and we do not. The Jews know that their country is an island in a sea of hatred and therefore,
they act in order to keep it day and night. Where are we and where are our deeds? Clearly we are not in the place where
we should be.87

Qaraḍāwῑ published a fatwā that permits Muslims who already have donated their annual
contribution to charity (zakāt) to give their contribution for the following year earlier in the
form of aid to the Palestinians. The Palestinians are most worthy of contributions to charity
because they fight heroically against the enemy that has conquered their land. They have

reached the point of starvation. Qaraḍāwῑ calls upon Muslims wherever they are to contribute
the money of the zakāt to the Palestinians. He concludes by urging the Muslims to learn from
the behavior of the Jews throughout the world who help Israel in every way possible, as
follows: “The Jews throughout the world helped Israel before it was established and they do
not cease helping it even now. Aren’t the Arabs able to act like them for the sake of this holy
matter, the Palestinian cause?”88 In another fatwā, Qaraḍāwῑ permits Palestinian refugees to
accept reparations from Israel, not in exchange for land, which can never be given up, but for
the suffering that they endure. Qaraḍāwῑ justified his legal decision as an imitation of the
Jewish model. Do not Jews receive reparations from the Germans for their suffering (real or
imagined) during the Holocaust?89
Another sermon of Qaraḍāwῑ points out that the traditional character of the Jews has
changed. In the Qurʾān, Jews are described as fanatics regarding the sanctity of life because of
their fear of death (Qurʾān, 2:96) and as fighting behind fortresses and fences for the same
reason (Qurʾān, 59:14). They are slaves of materialism and lack faith, as is demonstrated in the
episode of the Golden Calf. Nevertheless, the Jews have succeeded in overcoming their
inherent genetic evil traits and have managed to change themselves for the sake of achieving
their objective – the establishment and development of their state. They invest their energy
and their money and even give their lives for it, as is evident in the strong position of the
settlers(!) Qaraḍāwῑ concludes by stating that “they have changed and we have changed. They
have changed for the better, whereas we have changed for the worse and we have lost our
faith in Allāh.”90 If that is the case, it is Muslim society that must change and adopt the Israeli
model. However, the weakness of Arab societies, some of which have adopted foreign
ideologies, is not proof of the weakness of Islam.91
The Jews also have overcome their lack of faith in order to establish their state. Qaraḍāwῑ
generally describes the Jews as secular. However, despite the fact that their leaders are secular,
they are conscious of the importance of religion in this campaign. They used the power of
religion in order to bring the Jews to the land and they still make use of religious ideas in
order to engage the Jews throughout the world.92 Qaraḍāwῑ is astonished that Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir refused to participate in the sessions of the Madrid Conference on the Sabbath.
He describes the Jews of Israel as acting from religious faith for two reasons: first, in order not
to present the enemy as helpless wrecks; and second, in order to imbue the conflict with a
religious dimension and to turn it into a religious war between Judaism and Islam:
They embarked upon their campaign and their Torah was with them, while we did not do so with the Qurʾān. They
argue (to their credit) in the name of the Temple, but we do not argue (to our credit) in the name of the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

They call out in the name of Judaism, and we do not call out in the name of Islam. The say the
Talmud but we do not say the Sunna of Muhammad. They cheer the name of Moses but we
do not cheer in the name of Muhammad. They act in accordance with the Protocols of the

Elders of Zion, but we do not act according to our straight-forward ancestors. They respect the
Sabbath but we do not respect Friday.93
Qaraḍāwῑ maintains that victory will be achieved through the power of religious faith.
Therefore, if Muslims wish to win, they must be true believers and strictly follow their
religion:
Weapons alone will not achieve victory. The believing warrior must fight for a purpose; he must be imbued with a
consciousness of his mission. When this fighter is found, even if he is a lad in the full bloom of his youth and even if his
weapon is stones that are under his feet – it is sufficient. The enemy will be frightened and hide and ask himself what
can be done against the weapon of this determined warrior. This is similar to the stones that the Prophet cast in the faces
of the unbelievers at the Battle of Badr. There was not a single unbeliever that did not have stones and sand in his eyes,
nose and mouth to the point that he could not function. Allāh, may He be exalted, said: ‘You did not fight them, it was
Allāh who fought them; you did not throw sand, it was Allāh who threw [it].’ Allāh threw [it] via his Prophet and Allāh
stoned the Jews through these lads.94

The purpose of the comparison between the Jews and the unbelieving Quraish tribe is to
further intensify the struggle. In any case, according to the Qurʾān, the Jews have the status of
Ahl al-Kitāb (People of the Book) and are protected subjects. At this point, Qaraḍāwῑ displays
an extremist attitude toward them by comparing them to the infidels, against whom one must
wage a war of destruction – a war of the forces of light against the forces of darkness, of truth
against lies, a just war of God. Qaraḍāwῑ, however, is well-acquainted with the fact that the
religious faith of the Jews has elements of truth and therefore, if the Jews follow their religion
while Muslims abandon the true religion then the Jews will triumph, as they did in the SixDay War.95
Israel has great military power and nuclear weapons and receives financial, military and
political support from America. What can the Muslims do in the face of such power? Despite
the fact that Israel is strong, Muslims have a stronger weapon – their faith: “We believe that
we are right. We have faith in our Master and faith in ourselves. May Allāh Live so we can do
many things and stand as one and defend Al-Quds.”96
According to Qaraḍāwῑ, the cure for Arab divisiveness lies in the renewal of the Caliphate:
If we had a caliph, or an imam who is believed by all of the Muslims and would call to the Muslims, ‘O Muslims, stand
up for the rescue of Al-Aqsa!’, Muslims from everywhere would gather at Al-Aqsa and stand up against the Jews. They
would kill thousands and tens of thousands… the problem is that we are divided and we do not have one leadership.97

It is the Zionists who are guilty of the split among the Muslims and of the fact that they do not
have a unified leadership. Theodor Herzl, founder of the world Zionist movement, tried to
bribe the Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Ḥamīd with millions in cash to sell him Palestine. However,
Abd al-Ḥamīd stood firm like a rock in the face of all of these attempts and refused to sell the
land of his forefathers. When Herzl realized that he would not succeed in getting what he
wanted because of the Sultan’s stubbornness, he tried to break him in a different way. The
Zionist movement joined secular Turkish forces in a plot to bring about the collapse of the

Ottoman Caliphate. They founded the secular “Party of Union and Progress” in order to crush
the Arabs, Arabism and Islam.98

Technological superiority
Qaraḍāwῑ devotes an entire sermon entitled “The Israeli Satellite” to the subject of Israel’s
technological superiority. Israel develops technological means that enable the launching of spy
satellites into space while the Arab world is mired in ignorance and does not even come close
to this capability. Qaraḍāwῑ states that “Israel launched a satellite into space in order to
photograph our countries and our homes and we are still arguing whether photography is
forbidden or permitted according to the laws of Islam!?”99
He continues:
We are not progressing at a desirable pace. We are straining and racing to catch up with the world only to discover that
the gap is not narrowing but over time is growing. We are riding a donkey while they are riding a horse. If we ride a
horse, they travel by train or car. If we drive a car, we find out that they are flying in a plane. If we have planes, they
have rockets and space ships and can reach the moon. Then we ask ourselves whether it is true that they reached the
moon. And one of the sheikhs even says that we should not believe that they reached the moon – it is a fairy tale!100

Explaining the failure of the Muslims, Qaraḍāwῑ argues:
The Jews studied while the Muslims were ignoramuses; the Jews innovated while the Muslims remained behind; the Jews
united their forces while [the Muslims] abandoned each other; the Jews invested knowledge and blood whereas the
Muslims were satisfied with pouring out tears.101

The source of the backwardness of the Arab world derives from the fact that Arab societies
are not industrial societies. They depend upon imports from the West and do not develop
products on their own; they simply purchase them. The Arab world has a lot of money that
flows from the earth. Therefore, the Arabs neglect the development of manufacturing because
they place all their security in their money. Arabs buy everything from industrial tools to
weapons:
Unfortunately, Muslim countries are agricultural countries, but they produce only half of what non-Muslim countries
produce. If the West stopped their support for us, we would die of starvation. The machinery and products are imported.
Even the weapons with which we defend ourselves are not produced by us. While Egypt manages to produce some things,
heavy industry remains in the hands of others. ‘How is it that Israel is able to be a creative country while we are not
capable of producing anything?’102

In light of the dire situation of the Arab countries, their envy of Israel has increased. The Arabs
possess natural resources, money, people and much land. In contrast, Israel is a small country;
half of it is desert. It is attacked continuously. It has neither oil nor other natural resources.
Nevertheless, it remains at the forefront of science and technology, triumphant and

undefeated:
As Muslims, we can fill the gap and not let Israel be superior to us. Why should Israel lord it over us? There are over 200
million Arabs and a total of one billion Muslims. We have human resources that we can use. We have material and
economic capabilities. Our lands are vast, fertile and rich in sources of waters and quarries. As far as spirituality is
concerned, we bear the great mission of Islam that has the power to help the world.103

According to Qaraḍāwῑ, Muslim religious leaders of the older generation played a decisive
role in the backwardness of the Arab world because they did not understand the importance
of science and technology. They have a narrow worldview that focuses solely on issues related
to rituals. Qaraḍāwῑ states that he heard one of those sheiks praise God for creating Western
unbelievers to engage in the development of science in order that Muslims may be free to
worship God. That Sheikh thinks that it is a blessing, but it actually is a curse because the
Muslims have become a burden upon the West. Qaraḍāwῑ defines the study of the sciences as
a farḍ kifāya, a general religious obligation for all Muslims, as follows:
There is no escape from the fact that Muslims should be experts in all fields of science and technology that would enable
them to rise above the others. This is what Islamic scholars call Farḍ Kifāya (“a commandment for the entire
community”). There is no escape from the fact that the Ummah must have engineers, physicians, chemists, astronomers,
geologists, physicists and all other kinds of sciences [sic]. They must be experts at all types of manufacturing, both
civilian and military production. This will narrow the gap and supply all needs, and thus, the Muslims will not be the
needy beggars. This is the general obligation for all of the Ummah.104

The sources of Qaraḍāwῑ’s teachings are the founders of Islamic Modernism, such as Jamāl alDīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad Abdu who argued that there is no contradiction between
religion and science. In fact, the opposite is true – the integration of science and religion
embodies authentic Islam. According to Qurʾān 3: 110, Muslims are “the best nation produced
for mankind.” Therefore, they have the duty to bring mankind forward. However, they are not
able to do so as long as they remain backward. Qaraḍāwῑ concludes his sermon as follows:
“Israel’s victory over us is the victory of knowledge over ignorance; industry over laziness;
organization over disorder; solidarity over divisiveness and unity over controversy.”105

Conclusion
The starting point of Qaraḍāwῑ in his writing about Zionism is from a position of “Know your
enemy.” Muslims suffer from military and technological inferiority as opposed to Israel, for
this reason they must know the real nature of their enemy in order to overcome him. When
Qaraḍāwῑ speaks about Zionism, he provides an extensive description of the character of the
Jews. In his view Zionism stems out of Judaism, and there is no difference between a Jew and
a Zionist. In order to know the nature of the Israeli enemy, he delves deeply into various

sources: the Hebrew Bible; the Qurʾān; Rabbinic works; and the writings of prominent Zionist
thinkers. All of the above undergo a reworking in accordance with Qaraḍāwῑ’s religious and
political outlook.
According to Qaraḍāwῑ, Israel promotes Western ideas in the Middle East, represents the
West and its cultural values and its existence constitutes an ideological attack against the
values of Islam. These arguments find expression in the conspiracy theories that claim that
Israel is plotting to undermine Arab unity and that Israel is responsible for the division of the
Caliphate and sowing hatred between Sunni and Shiites, etc. The octopus-like tentacles of
Israel encompass the world and activate a variety of organizations motivated by Israel’s
ambition to impose its agenda on the world, as is written in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
The location of Israel is like a “poisoned dagger” stuck in the heart of the Arab world. Its goal
is to break the territorial integrity of the Arabs and spread Western ideas throughout the
Muslim World in order to bring about its liquidation. Israel is so dangerous that Qaraḍāwῑ is
fearful of any sign of normalization between Israel and the Arabs.
Qaraḍāwῑ mentions the achievements of Israel and does not hesitate to criticize Arab
societies and calls upon them to learn the secret of Israel’s strength. However, his purpose is to
not to create a dynamic for peace and acceptance of the ‘other’ but the opposite, to learn how
to overcome Israel and defeat it. According to Islamists such as Qaraḍāwῑ,
the very existence of an independent Jewish state called Israel constitutes a contradiction of the major tenets of the
Qurʾān. On the most basic level, the mere existence of an independent political entity run by the Dhimmῑ, particularly on
a land claimed by Islam is a profound challenge and affront to Islam’s claim for supremacy that is political not only
religious in essence. Thus, modern-day Israel, just like the Crusaders’ state in medieval times, is unacceptable under any
circumstances.106

The integration of clear antisemitic motifs in Qaraḍāwῑ’s thought, and the presentation of
the Jews as the enemies of humankind and of Islam, makes it extremely difficult to undertake
any conceptual change regarding Israel or accepting Israel.107

Notes
1 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 117.
2 Ibid., pp. 76–77.
3 Ibid., p. 77.
4 The approach of knowing the Jewish character and delving into the commandments of Judaism and the nature of the
Jews is common in the writings of members of the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, in 2009, a substantial encyclopedia
compiled by Dr. Tāriq Al-Suwaidān, a Brotherhood activist, was published. It includes pictures with captions that provide

illustrations and explanations for the statements of Al-Qaraḍāwῑ. The encyclopedia is entitled: Al-Yahūd, al-Mawsūʿa alMuṣawwara: al-Taʿrῑkh, al-ʿAqῑda, al-Kutub al-Muqaddasa, al-Sharῑʿa, al-Ṭawāʾif, al-Munaẓẓamāt, al-Iqtiṣād, al-Taʿlῑm,
al-Jaish, al-Aḥzāb, al-Shakhṣiyyāt, al-Nufūdh [The Jews: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of History, Faith, Sacred Works,
Law, Communities, Organizations, Economy, Information, Army, Political Parties, Personalities and Influence] (Kuwait:
Sharikat al-Ibdāʿ al-Fikrῑ lil-Nashr wal-Tawzῑʿ, 2009).
5 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Al-Quds, p. 78.
6 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 127.
7 Ibid., pp. 127–128.
8 Menachem Begin (1913–1992) was an Israeli political figure and statesman, founder of the Likud party and the sixth
Prime Minister of Israel. Before the creation of the state of Israel, he was the leader of the Zionist militant group Irgun,
the Revisionist breakaway from the larger Jewish paramilitary organization Haganah. As head of the Irgun, he targeted
the British in Palestine. Later, the Irgun fought the Arabs during the 1947–48 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine. Begin’s
most significant achievement as Prime Minister was the signing of a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, for which he and
Anwar Sadat shared the Nobel Prize for Peace. On Begin’s biography see: Ofer Grosbard, Menachem Begin: A Portrait of a
Leader-a Biography (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2006) (Hebrew).
9 Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun (New York: Steimatzky Agency Ltd, 1977).
10 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 128. See also: Qaraḍāwῑ, A῾dāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmῑ, pp. 86–87.
11 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 128.
12 Ibid., p. 127.
13 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Al-Quds, p. 70.
14 Ibid., p. 71.
15 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 74.
16 Abraham Yitshak ha-Kohen Kuk (1865–1935) was the first Ashkenazi chief rabbi of British Mandatory Palestine, the
founder of Yeshiva Mercaz HaRav Kook (The Central Universal Yeshiva), Jewish thinker, Halakhist, Kabbalist and a
renowned Torah scholar.
17 Abraham Issac Kook, Orot, Translated and with an introduction by Bezalel Naor, Kook: Orot: The Annotated Translation
of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook’s Seminal Work (NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1993), pp. 96–97.
18 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Al-Quds, p. 89.
19 Rabbi Kook quoted in Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Al-Quds, p. 90. The English translation of this paragraph from Orot is from: Naor,
Kook: Orot, p. 89.
20 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Al-Quds, pp. 71–73.
21 Ibid., pp. 73–74.

22 Ibid.
23 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, p. 129.
24 Ibid.
25 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Al-Quds, p. 70.
26 Ibid., p. 75.
27 Ibid., pp. 74–75.
28 Qaraḍāwῑ refers to the book written by Abd al-Wahhāb al-Masῑrῑ, Al-Aidyūlūjiyya al-Ṣahyūniyya: Dirāsat Ḥāla fῑ ῾Ilm alIjtimā῾ wal-Ma῾rifa (Kuweit: ῾Ᾱlam al-Ma῾rifa, 1982).
29 Qaraḍāwῑ does not mention the source, but this quote is taken from: Shmuel Hayim Landau, Writings (Jerusalem:
Mesilot, no date), p. 38.
30 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Al-Quds, p. 91.
31 Ibid., p. 92.
32 Ibid., p. 93.
33 Ibid., pp. 93–94; Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 178.
34 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, A῾dāʾ, p. 61.
35 Sayyid Quṭb, Ma῾rakatunā ma῾a al-Yahūd (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1993). See the section on Sayyid Quṭb in Chapter 2 of
this study.
36 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, A῾dāʾ, pp. 61–62.
37 Ibid., p. 63.
38 Ibid., p. 64.
39 Ibid., pp. 64–65.
40 Ibid., pp. 65–66.
41 Ibid., p. 66. Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, “Al-ḥalqa (13): Qiyām Dawlat al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnῑ Akhṭar Aḥdāth al-Qarn,” Qaraḍāwῑ Website,
2 December 2011, www.Qaraḍāwῑ.net/life/8/5394-13.html, viewed on 15 December 2012.
42 Item in: Tishrῑn (Damascus), 14 July 1987, cited in: Sivan, Arab Political Myths, pp. 50–52 (Hebrew).
43 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, A῾dāʾ, p. 67.
44 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, “Al-ḥalqa (13): Qiyām Dawlat al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnῑ Akhṭar Aḥdāth al-Qarn”.
45 Aḥmad Hasan Ali, “Juhūd al-Qaraḍāwῑ fῑ Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya al-Filasṭῑniyya,” Qaraḍāwῑ Website,
17 January 2012, www.Qaraḍāwῑ.net/library/77/5517-2012-01-17-12-00-51.html.
46 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aaʿdāʾ, p. 68.

47 Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, pp. 218–219.
48 Hamas Covenant, Articles 22, 28 and 32, in: Abdallah Yūsuf Azzām, Hamas: al-Judhūr al-Taʾrῑkhiyya wal-Mῑthāq
(Peshawar: Markaz al-Shahῑd al-῾Alamῑ, 2009), pp. 65–66, 69, 71. This is a special issue of the Propaganda Ministry of the
Izz al-Dῑn al-Qassām Brigades on the 20th anniversary of death of Sheikh Abdallah Azzām. For an English translation,
see: Hamas Covenant, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School Site, 1988,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp, viewed on 9 July 2015.
49 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aʿdāʾ, p. 68.
50 Ibid., p. 69.
51 Ibid., p. 69.
52 Ibid., pp. 69–70.
53 Ibid., pp. 70–71. These subjects were raised during an interview of Sheikh Aḥmad ʿAṭṭūn, Hamas representative in
Jerusalem, by Shaul Bartal on 25 September 2011. According to ʿAṭṭūn, “when the Jews were expelled from Spain, only
Muslims agreed to receive them under their protection.” He added that “it is true that Jews who lived in Islamic countries
paid a poll tax and lived under restrictions made by Islamic sages, however they enjoyed relative freedom to practice
their religion.”
54 Uriah Forman, Islamiyyūn (Tel Aviv: Ma῾arachot-Israel Ministry of Defense, 2002), pp. 255–256, 253–260 (Hebrew).
55 Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, Andras and Ruth Hamori, trans. (NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1981), pp. 33–35.
56 Bernard Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), p. 121.
57 I Samuel 8:4–6.
58 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aʿdāʾ, p. 71. Aḥmad ʿAṭṭūn was asked why the Hamas Convent mentions the Protocols of the Elders of
Zion. He answered that the Jews wrote the Protocols and Hamas simply quotes them. He could not be convinced that the
Protocols were a forgery: Interview with Sheikh Aḥmad ʿAṭṭūn by Shaul Bartal, 25 September 2011.
59 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aaʿdāʾ, p. 72.
60 Itamar Levin and Shlomit Lin, Re: Extermination, the Wansee Conference and the Final Solution (Ben Shemen: Modan
Publishers, 2012), pp. 53–58, 214–215 (Hebrew); Shaul Friedländer, The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the
Jews (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), p. 180.
61 In his sermon, Qaraḍāwῑ cites Yūsuf Ḥasan, Al-Buʿd al-Dῑnῑ fῑ al-Siyāsa al-Amrῑkiyya tujāh al- Ṣ irāʿ al-ʿArabῑ al-Isrāʾῑlῑ
(Beirut: Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-῾Arabiyya, 2000), p. 32.
62 Ḥasan, Al-Buʿd al-Dῑnῑ, p. 22.
63 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aaʿdāʾ, pp. 72–74.
64 Ibid., pp. 75–76.

65 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aʿdaʾ, pp. 76–77; See also: Anwar Maḥmūd Zῑnatῑ, Tahwῑd al-Quds: Muḥāwalāt al-Tahwῑd wal-Taṣaddῑ
Lahā (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al ῾Arabiyya, 2010), pp. 63–89.
66 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aʿdāʾ, p. 78.
67 Robert S. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad (New York: Random House,
2010), pp. 809–810; Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, p. 81.
68 Muḥammad Abd al-Salām Faraj, Al-Jihād, al-Farῑḍa al-Ghāʾiba (No publication details available), Abd al-Salām Faraj
was one of the leaders of Islamic Jihad in Egypt that was behind the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in
1981. His book constitutes an important milestone in the development of radical Islamic ideology and confronting the
proximate enemy, namely Muslim rulers. On the thought of Faraj, see: Barak, The Crusaders Are Still Here, pp. 173–178.
69 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Fῑ Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt al-Muslima: Ḥayāt al-Muslimῑn wasaṭ al-Mujtamaʿāt al-ʾUkhrā (Cairo: Dār AlShurūq, 2001), p. 33.
70 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aʿdāʾ, p. 79.
71 Saladin the Ayubid (b.1193) captured Jerusalem from the Crusaders after his victory at the Battle of the Horns of Hettin.
Mahmud Ibn Imad ad-Din Zangi (b.1174), known mainly as Nur ad-Din was a capable ruler who founded the Islamic
state that united Syria and northern Iraq. Saif ad-Din Qutuz (b.1260) was a Mameluk ruler and commander of the
Muslim forces at the victorious battle against the Mongols at ῾Ain Jalut.
72 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aʿdāʾ, pp. 79–80.
73 Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, pp. 59–60; Dalacoura, Islamic Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East, pp. 71–
76, 126; Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 198–204; Shavit and Winter, My Enemy, My Teacher, pp. 67–70.
74 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aʿdāʾ, pp. 80–83.
75 Ibid.
76 Hamas Covenant, Articles 17, 22 and 28.
77 Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik, “Jews Make Matzah Bread from Blood, Sacrifice Humans to Satan, According
to a Lesson in Religion in the Al-Aqsa Mosque,” Palestinian Media Watch, June 2, 2015, based upon the anti-Semitic
preaching of Sheikh Khaled al-Mughrabi, according to his appearance on You Tube chanel of the Al-Aqsa Mosque
Website,

29

May

2015,

www.palwatch.org.il/main.aspx?=157&doc_id=

14984&sa=U&ved+0CAgQFjAAahUKEwin08TbpuDGAhWIOxQKHQCoALU&
sig2=BiIig6kGFPCB5JJMkRBqTg&usg=AFQjCNFIfmtcrRFAxGm6N3WNpy3wFb CRIQ.
78 On demonizing the image of the Jew in ancient and modern antisemitism, see: Robert S. Wistrich, “The Devil, the Jews
and Hatred of the ‘Other’,” in: Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), Demonizing the Other: Antisemitism, Racism and Xenophobia
(Studies in Antisemitism) (Singapore: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 1–15.
79 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Aaʿdāʾ, p. 82.
80 Ibid., pp. 82–83.

81 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 131.
82 Shavit and Winter, My Enemy, My Teacher, pp. 82–87.
83 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab al-Sheikh al-Qaraḍāwῑ, vol. 5, pp. 131–132.
84 “Al-Qaraḍāwῑ yuḥayyῑ Isrāʾil wa-yatmannā lil-Arab al-iqtidāʾ bihā,” Youtube Web-site, 30 September 2011,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ToRjXx3Spo&spfreload=10. A Hebrew translation of this film- clip may be found in:
Shavit and Winter, My Enemy, My Teacher, p. 10.
85 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 132.
86 Ibid., p. 96.
87 Ibid., pp. 132–133. Israeli Prime Minster in 1967 was Levi Eshkol and not Golda Meir.
88 Ḥammād, Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, pp. 190–191.
89 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam wal-Tawzῑʿ, 2003), vol. 3, p. 497.
90 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 96.
91 Shavit and Winter, My Enemy, My Teacher, pp. 86–87.
92 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 133.
93 Ibid., p. 133.
94 Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab, vol. 3, pp. 227–228.
95 Shavit and Winter, My Enemy, My Teacher, p. 89.
96 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 96.
97 Ibid., p. 97. See also Qaraḍāwῑ’s statements cited in the previous chapter from Al-Quds, pp. 150–151.
98 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 97.
99 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 129.
100 Ibid., p. 130.
101 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Min Ajl Ṣaḥwa Rāshida: Tajdῑd al-Dῑn… … wa-Tanahhūḍ bil-Dunyā (Cairo and Beirut: Dār alSharūq, 2001), p. 159.
102 Al-Sa῾d, Khuṭab, vol. 5, p. 132.
103 Ibid., p. 134.
104 Ibid., p. 133.
105 Ibid., p. 138.
106 See: Yossef Bodansky, Islamic Anti-Semitism as a Political Instrument (Shaarei Tikva: Ariel Center for Policy Research,
1999), p. 5. The religious aspects include the Islamic idea that Jews represent a religion of the past, a lie that was made

obsolete in contrast with the religion of truth, namely Islam.
107 Shavit and Winter, My Enemy, My Teacher, p. 70.

5
Sheikh Qaraḍāwῑ
Spiritual leader of Hamas and the Islamic Movement in
Israel

1. Successor to Aḥmad Yāsīn
The death of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin (Aḥmad Yāsῑn) on 22 March 2004 during the Second
Intifada resulted in a spiritual vacuum among the leaders of Hamas. Ahmad Yasin had enjoyed
undisputed status of an admired legal authority and teacher. This vacuum was filled by Sheikh
Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwῑ. Even before the death of Yasin, Qaraḍāwῑ frequently expressed his
support for Hamas which he regards as the major force in conducting Jihad against the Jews.
Since the 1990s, Qaraḍāwῑ has served as the inspiration for and has played an important role
in establishing a vast network for financing the Da ʿ wa (“preaching”) of Hamas through a
variety of charitable funds. Hence, Hamas has acted according to the three stages conceived by
Hasan al-Banna founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas originated.
The three stages are as follows: first, Da ʿ wa, namely spreading the ideas of the
Brotherhood by preaching to the people; second, recruiting members, supporters, examining
their loyalty and mobilizing activists; third, practical work in the community.
Hamas adopted these three stages that Hasan al-Banna had designed for the purpose of
establishing an Islamic society in which the laws of the Qurʾān would be implemented in a
literal fashion.1 In other words, Hasan al-Banna did not dismiss the use of violence as a means
of attaining power and as part of the legitimate Islamic struggle. As far as Israel is concerned,
however, only Jihad will solve the problem. Indeed, the following quotation from Hasan alBanna appears in the opening passage of the Hamas Covenant: “Israel will exist and will
continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it just as it obliterated others before it.”2 Since
Imam Hasan Al-Banna has commanded this, all of his disciples, including Sheikh AlQaraḍāwῑ, must give their full support to the organization that fulfills his legacy
The Da ʿ wa activism of Hamas includes subsidizing kindergartens, schools, health facilities
and the like, whose purpose is introducing civil society to its teachings by means of spreading
the doctrine of Jihad along with social welfare extended to families. Thus, for example, the

summer camps of Hamas that are financed by charitable funds (Zakāt) also involve training in
the use of firearms, physical fitness and recitation of chapters of the Qurʾān that deal with the
essence of the struggle against Israel. The above constitutes the civilian aspect of the charitable
funds. These funds have an additional purpose, namely supporting Hamas members who are
serving time in prison and the families of Shahīd s, with a subsidy of up to 5,000 dollars for a
Shahīd who has killed many victims. These monies finance the military wing of Hamas, the
Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades.3
According the report of the Israel General Security Services (the Shabak), from 2001–2008,
Hamas charity associations were financed mainly by the Charity Coalition (Iʾtilāf al-Khair), at
the time headed by Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī. Working from his residence in Qatar, he was
responsible for pouring millions of dollars from a network of non-profit charities throughout
Europe, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and even, the United States. Eventually, the Charity
Coalition was made illegal.4 Contributing to Hamas is based upon the fatwā of the Sheikh that
states: “If there is a war in a region [that is part of the Islamic lands], it is permitted [to collect
money from the believers] in order to achieve the goal of liberating occupied territories from
the laws and tyranny of infidels. This is undoubtedly Jihad for the sake of God and it must be
financed by the monies of the Zakāt.”5 Since every believing Muslim is obligated to give to
charity, the money may be directed toward the Jihad organizations of which Hamas is the
leading group. Many of the non-profit associations that Hamas established in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip were presented as charity committees (Lajnat al-Zakāt) and were part of
this network. For example, the charity committees in Ramallah, Jenin, Tul Karem, etc., were
declared unlawful along with the Charity Coalition.6
A great amount of money solicited by Qaraḍāwī and his supporters was transferred to
members of Hamas via activists of the Islamic Movement, its branch in Israel, especially
through its prominent activist, Sheikh Raed Salah Mahajneh (Rāʾed Ṣalāḥ Maḥājna), head of
the Islamic Movement in Israel. They were accused of working for the Charity Coalition
headed by Qaraḍāwī, when it was declared an illegal association as early as 25 February 2002.
According to the charge sheet, they received and kept monies that belonged to the Charity
Coalition and saw that they were transferred to other Hamas activists in the territories. The
money also financed Hamas activism on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Thus, according to
sources in Israel’s defense establishment, Hamas headquarters received close to one million
shekels in cash.7 In September 2015 the Islamic movement headed by Raed Salah have been
declared also as terrorist organization under Israeli law.8
After the assassination of Sheikh Yasin, Qaraḍāwῑ called upon all Muslims to engage in
activities against Israel with all means at their disposal. He assumed that the assassination
spelled the end of peace initiatives. “They are useless. Israel does not care about any such
initiatives and [Ariel] Sharon and his thugs only understand force.”9 Qaraḍāwī’s visit to

Ahmad Yasin’s house on his trip to Gaza and his fiery speech against Israel at the time were
not futile gestures. Qaraḍāwῑ knew him personally and appreciated his activism, despite the
fact that Yasin had not written about Islamic law. During his speech at Sheikh Yasin’s home in
the presence of Ismail Haniyya, former prime minister of the Hamas government in Gaza, the
audience treated Qaraḍāwῑ with the utmost respect. They imbibed his words, cheered him in
the middle of his speech and shouted “Allāhu Akbar.” Haniyya himself volunteered to serve as
Qaraḍāwῑ’s personal chauffeur during his stay in Gaza.10 The visit clearly symbolizes the
continuity of Sheikh Yasin’s spiritual leadership on the part of Qaraḍāwῑ.
On 1–2 July 2006, few months after the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority
elections, an important gathering took place in Istanbul. Entitled the “Muslims of Europe
Conference,” it included many leading Muslims. Qaraḍāwῑ was among the delegates of the
Muslim Brotherhood at the conference. The attendees declared their support for Hamas and
their commitment to continue to contribute to the organization. The British Foreign Office
financed Qaraḍāwῑ’s visit.11 Qaraḍāwῑ’s long-term support of Hamas and his pro-Hamas
activities definitely helped increase financial contributions to Hamas before and after the
elections in the Palestine Authority. Hamas achieved a stunning victory of some 60% of the
votes and defeated the Fatah movement whose financial reserves were limited.12 Qaraḍāwī
and Hamas supported each other regarding every issue where Hamas differed from Fatah.13
Qaraḍāwī presented the victory of Hamas as the democratic expression on the part of the
Palestinian people that have returned to Islam.
These people were elected freely in free and direct elections that were conducted by the ruling power. No one can
challenge these elections. A decisive majority elected the party that professes to use its power for the public good. We
thought that the other parties would respect the results in accordance with what takes place in all advanced democratic
countries.14

Qaraḍāwī gave this statement, despite his reservations about socialist, democracy and
anything that is not Islamic.15 His position does not prevent him from using Western concepts
when it serves his purposes.16 However, the ongoing crisis between Fatah and Hamas restricts
Qaraḍāwī from finding solutions that would force Fatah and the Palestine authority to accept
Hamas, make its positions compatible with Hamas and cease mutual strife in order to focus
upon their common enemy – the Zionist entity. For example, Qaraḍāwī gave his blessings to
the government of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, headed by Muhammad Morsi because
of its efforts to bring unity between the two Palestinian factions.17
Qaraḍāwī’s world view extends unqualified support for Hamas and for the Shiite
movement Hezbollah, and it is part of a general “party line” that includes the Al Jazeera
network whose purpose is to glorify the phenomena of Jihad. Sheikh Qaraḍāwī represents the
support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements. The Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sheikh
Hasan Nasrallah (Ḥasan Naṣrullāh) represents his organization’s commitment to Jihad against

Israel and the United States. Qaraḍāwī and Nasrallah represented the ideological line of Sunni
Muslim Brotherhood including Hams and Shiite Hezbollah, respectively. Together they
embody the Islamic unity against Israel. Thus, for example, in October 2000, when members of
Hamas demonstrated against Egypt and burnt a portrait of President Hosni Mubarak seated on
a donkey which they dressed up, the Al Jazeera network, based in Qatar, broadcast these
irreverent images. Similarly, during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Qaraḍāwī and
Muḥammad Mahdī ʿᾹkif, the seventh Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, called for
support for Hezbollah in their common struggle against Israel, despite the position of some
Sunni Islamic scholars who oppose any association with Shiite Hezbollah.18 Qaraḍāwī supports
efforts toward reconciliation between the differing opinions and the different schools of Islam.
Even his organization, the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), includes Shiites,
such as Sheikh Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Tash kh īrī, who wish to improve Shiite-Sunni relations.19
However, Qaraḍāwī’s inclusive approach toward Hezbollah radically changed when it joined
Bashar al-Asad in repressing the revolt in Syria during the Arab Spring, especially in 2013,
after the fall of Al-Qusayr to Hezbollah forces. At that point, Hezbollah became “the evil
rulers” of Asad who slaughters Syrians “seeking their freedom.”20
According to Qaraḍāwī, Western countries tend to regard all Islamic liberation movements
as terrorist movements. Qaraḍāwī differentiates between terror that is permitted according to
Islamic law, namely Muslim activism against the enemies of Allāh and despicable terror that
includes acts perpetrated by the enemies of Allah, first and foremost by the Zionist entity,
against Muslims. Qaraḍāwī argues that the term Irhāb (terror) is not a despicable term in
Islam. In the Qurʾān, its meaning is to instill fear among the enemies of Allāh (Qurʾān: 8:60).
The concept of terror in Islamic Sharīʿa differs from its meaning today. The use of the term
“terror” when applied to Muslims fighting to defend their homeland and their holy places
from their enemies is a blessing, a religious obligation and one of the principles of Islam. This
means that terror on the part of Islamic movements is sanctified terror.21
Until 2011, Qaraḍāwī considered Hezbollah positively, along with Hamas and Islamic Jihad
movements. Qaraḍāwī regrets that there are Islamic regimes that comply with lowly methods
of the West in defining terror, such as the Mubarak regime in Egypt which fell on 25 January
2011 or Abd Al-Fattāḥ Saʿīd Ḥusein Al-Sīsī (Abd al-Fattah Al-Sisi) regime that took over on 3
July 2013.22 Qaraḍāwī describes the pragmatic approach of Arab countries toward the West
and Israel as “an expression of humiliation, weakness and helplessness on their part.”23 These
regimes define activist Islamic movements as terror in order to subdue them and to act against
them.24

2. Hamas activism according to Qaraḍāwī

Jihad against Israel is part of the Islamic revival in the Arab world that began in the 1970s. It
has found its expression in many ways and has greatly influenced the Palestinian Jihad
organizations.
Thus, the First Intifada began and afterward, the Second Intifada. At first, it was called the revolution of the mosques
because it began in the mosques of Gaza. Its motto was ‘Lā ʾIlāh illā Allāh, wa-Allāhu akbar’ (there is no god but Allah
and Allah is the greater). The banner of the intifada is the Qurʾān. The youth cried out: Khaibar, Khaibar Yā Yahūd,
Jaish Muḥammad Sawfa Yaʿūd (“Khaibar, Khaibar, O Jews, the army of Muhammad will return”). This took place in the
wake of the Islamic revival.25

Qaraḍāwī does not mention the role of the Palestine Authority (PA) headed by Yasser Arafat,
at the outbreak of the intifada intentionally because he maintains that secular governments,
including the Palestine Authority, follow what happens in Islamic revival movements, but are
not leaders. The Islamic revival in Palestine is presented as the work of all of the branches of
the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine: Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya fī al-Dākhil (the Islamic
Movement in Inside Israel), led by Sheikh Raed Salah Mahajneh; Hamas: Ḥarakat alMuqāwama al-Islāmiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement). Neither the First nor the Second
Intifada would have taken place without Hamas. Hence, Qaraḍāwī’s emphatic statements that
the Second Intifada began in the mosques of Gaza that are controlled by Hamas and in the
demonstrations initiated by the Palestine Authority in Jerusalem. Here, he openly expresses his
support for the Hamas narrative regarding the Second Intifada.
According to Qaraḍāwī, “one who reads modern history will note that Islamists are behind
all of the daring resistance movements that are fighting against colonialism. It is true in every
part of the world within the borders of the House of Islam (Dār al-Islām).”26 This happened in
Kashmir and also in Palestine. To prove this point, Qaraḍāwī cites The Middle East and the
West by Bernard Lewis.27 These citations show that “the strongest revolutionary movements
that excite and control the public (namely, Hamas) are originally based on existing popular
religion.”28 In conclusion, Islamic movements embody the most popular expression of the
feelings of the Islamic nation (Al-ʾUmma al-ʾIslāmiyya).

3. Qaraḍāwī and acts of sacrifice
Qaraḍāwī is regarded as one of the leading supporters of what he refers to as “acts of
sacrifice,” that also are called “suicide terror attacks.” The perpetrators of such acts believe that
they are sacrificing themselves by simultaneously harming and murdering the civilians and
soldiers of their enemies. Ostensibly, an attack against innocent civilians is contrary to the laws
of war in the Qurʾān, as follows: “Fight for Allah’s sake those who fight you, but do not be
aggressors. Allah does not like aggressors” (Sūra 2: 190). Most commentators tend to interpret

this commandment as a prohibition against harming women and children that are not active
combatants.29 Qaraḍāwī supports the ruling of Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1328) that Jihad against
unbelievers who invade Islamic land is second in importance to reciting the Shahāda (the
Islamic obligatory recitation that bears witness that there is no God but Allāh and Muḥammad
is his messenger).30 Sheikh Abdallah Azzām, a founder of al-Qaeda, gave a similar ruling
regarding Jihad against Israel.31
According to Qaraḍāwī, the enemy is defined as encompassing all Israelis. There is no
distinction between women, adults and children. As early as 1996, he referred to suicide
attacks by Hamas activists in Israel as Jihad and the perpetrators who killed in such actions as
Shahīd s. Thus, he continues the teachings of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin who granted the approval
of Islamic law to those who carry out suicide attacks while in an Israeli prison in March 1995.
Sheikh Yasin argued that Jihad against the State of Israel constitutes defensive Jihad and that
participation in such acts is the personal obligation of every Muslim (Farḍ ʿ Ain). Therefore,
one who sacrifices himself may be called a Shahīd and not a suicide. Sheikh Yasin justified
permission to harm women and children during such actions despite the fact that Islam forbids
harming innocent civilians by stating that Israelis harm women and children intentionally and
accidentally through collateral damage. Therefore, Muslims are permitted to intentionally kill
women and children.32
Qaraḍāwī expands upon Yasin’s statements. Based on the Qurʾānic verse that asserts that
one must be prepared “to instill fear into the enemies of Allah and into your enemies” (Sūra
8:60), Qaraḍāwī contends that
calling such actions ‘suicide attacks’ is wrong and misleading because they actually are acts of heroism which is selfsacrifice that has no connection at all with suicide. Whoever carries out such acts has nothing to do with the mentality
of one who commits suicide.”33

Furthermore, Qaraḍāwī adds that such acts are permitted even when those who are injured
are civilians because
Israeli society is a military society. Both men and women [serve] in the army and can be mobilized in an instant.
[Nevertheless,] if a boy or an old man is killed in such an act, he is not killed intentionally but accidentally, as a result of
military constraints. This [is the] necessity [that] permits acts that are forbidden.34

Therefore, according to Qaraḍāwī, it is permitted to attack Israeli civilians indiscriminately.
He maintains that anyone who differs from him regarding this matter probably is not a
certified legal expert, and that is the reason why there are several opinions on this issue.35
With the passage of time, Hamas developed and eventually took over the Gaza Strip, in
June 2007. Israel and Hamas have had several violent confrontations over the years, the last
one in July-August 2014. In July 2015, Qaraḍāwī decided to update his fatwā and to forbid
suicide attacks in which Palestinians are killed. This decision was partly the result of pressure

from Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi who presented Qaraḍāwī as a supporter of suicide terror attacks
including those carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Therefore, Qaraḍāwī
responded by explaining when such attacks were necessary and why he was changing his
position according the Ḍarūra (necessity). Moreover, ending permission to carry out suicide
attacks does not include “acts of sacrifice” when the perpetrator does not blow himself up
during the act itself or firing missiles indiscriminately aimed at a civilian population, as
follows:
I have allowed our brothers in Palestine to carry out such acts because of the special circumstances concerning defending
their lives… [These circumstances] are what have forced them to be assisted by such acts that cannot be substituted. And
I do not allow those acts anywhere else, with the exception of Palestine, because of the lack of necessity that would
obligate or allow that prohibition [to do so]. Therefore, making an analogy [regarding this matter] concerning Palestine
to another country… is not acceptable.

Then Qaraḍāwī explains why he change his fatwā:
[At present, in July 2015] Allah has abolished the necessity for our brothers in Palestine for such acts, after it became
possible for them to acquire missiles that strike deep into the territory of Israel… Therefore, there is no longer justification
for acts of sacrifice, as there was in the past. Every situation has its own law and its suitable statement and the fatwā
changes according to changes in time, place and circumstance.36

Qaraḍāwī uses this ruling according to the principle of Islamic law that was issued by the
jurisprudence (Fiqh) of the Ḥanafī school by Ibn Nujaim al-Masri (d. 1562),37 “Necessity
(Ḍarūra), permits that which is forbidden,”38 namely that dire necessity allows a Muslim to
ignore what usually is forbidden. Qaraḍāwī defines “acts of self-sacrifice” as a necessity that
permits acts that are usually forbidden such as harming civilians.39 Hence, he refers to such
acts as “the most sublime type of Jihad in our generation” and as “heroism.” According to
Qaraḍāwī, because of the asymmetrical balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians
and Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, the only weapon that Israel cannot withstand is the
weapon of the suicide terrorists. This is the strength of the Palestinians and the weakness of
Israel. For Jews always have been known for their exaggerated love of life, whereas, in
contrast, Muslims are known for their desire to die for their beliefs.40
During an interview, Qaraḍāwī recalled how Sheikh Al-Banna discussed the character of a
worthy death with young men of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hasan Al-Banna stated that
thousands of Muslims are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their homeland. AlBanna asked them if a worthy death is death near one’s wife, children and relatives. He
replied that a worthy death is when the head is severed from the body – and pointed to his
head – for the sake of God.41 Such were Al-Banna’s words about fighting against the Jews in
Palestine. The war against the Jews is either victory or a martyr’s death. Both Al-Banna and
his disciples, among them, Qaraḍāwī, support this idea. According to Qaraḍāwī, Jihad
constitutes a complete system of belief and morality and a commitment to struggle against the

injustice of those who oppose this belief, including Muslim rulers, if need be.42
Israel gives a false impression as a strong country. However, the Qurʾān presents the truth
about the Jews. They are cowards that hide behind fortified fences and are divided among
themselves.43 Therefore, Muslims definitely must continue their “acts of sacrifice.” The affect
of these attacks on Western societies, such as America and Israel, is enormous. It spreads fear
in their hearts and feeling of insecurity about what tomorrow will bring. Qaraḍāwī is correct
that acts of terror have repercussions mainly in democratic societies such as America, Israel,
Spain, etc. In fact, Katerina Dalacoura has written about several scholarly studies regarding the
connection between democratic governments and terrorist attacks whose purpose is to
influence policy by means of violence.44 According to Hamas spokesman in Gaza, Dr.
Mahmoud al-Zahhar, Israel is no different. Surveys conducted in Israel after suicide attacks
indicate that 86%of Israelis have expressed feelings of extreme insecurity.45
Qaraḍāwī cites many verses from the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth in order to prove his point.
One of them is his original interpretation of Sūra 9: 111: “Allah has purchased from the
believers their lives and their possessions; in return, they will have Paradise. They will fight for
the sake of Allah and they will kill and be killed.” According to the accepted interpretation,
Muslims engaged in fighting kill their enemies, and eventually, they are killed. Qaraḍāwī reads
this passage in reverse, as he who sacrifices himself while committing “acts of sacrifice” first
kills himself, thereby killing others as well.46 He gleans from Islamic tradition that the
punishment that Muhammad gave to the Jewish Banu Quraiẓa tribe should be the same for
the Jews of Israel. The Banu Quraiẓa suffered the death penalty because they collaborated
with the Quraish tribe against the Muslims. This should be all the more valid regarding the
Israelis who stole land that does not belong to them and expelled its inhabitants.47
In addition to authoritative proofs from the earliest sources of Islamic law, namely the
Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth, Qaraḍāwī also refers to a third source – Qiyās (inference) – in order to
dismiss the argument that innocent civilians are harmed. Islamic sages have dealt with the
question of whether it is permitted to kill other Muslims who serve as human shields for the
enemy and have answered in the affirmative. Qaraḍāwī argues that if such is the case, it
definitely is permitted to kill non-Muslims in order to liberate Muslim land.48 Besides Islamic
rulings, Qaraḍāwī also compares Judaism and Islam regarding the issue of harming innocent
civilians. He states that while Islam forbids harming the elderly and children, the Torah
commands that all males, including old men and boys, be killed by the sword. Qaraḍāwī
points out that this principle serves as the basis for the alleged ruling of former Chief Rabbi
Ovadia Yosef that permits the killing of Palestinian children, especially nursing infants, if they
endanger the lives of Israeli soldiers.49
It is noteworthy that Qaraḍāwī qualifies his enthusiastic support for suicide attacks with two
important warnings. First, suicide attacks may only be carried out in the case of Palestinians in

their war against Israel. The special circumstances of military inferiority on the part of the
Palestinians allow them to commit suicide attacks. He is afraid that Muslims throughout the
world may infer that the permission granted to Palestinians would give them the right to
commit such attacks against fellow Muslims. Secondly, if Palestinians possess an alternative
weapon that can cause panic among Israelis, such as Qassām rockets, it is preferable to suicide
attacks because of the harsh Israeli reaction to suicide attacks. Qaraḍāwī is aware of this and
therefore, he does not want such acts to serve as a double-edged sword against the
Palestinians.50 Essentially, he permits Hamas and other Palestinian factions to launch rockets
against civilian population centers, despite the fact that it is considered a war crime according
to the International law. This was also the conclusion of the inquiry commission of the United
Nations after Operation Protective Edge.51
Sheikh Ahmad Yasin opposed the active participation of women in the war effort because,
according to Sharīʿa, they are exempt from Jihad because the task of women is to care for the
next generation. Likewise, women serving alongside men in the army might violate their
modesty, particularly in the case of women suicide bombers whose bodies are exposed while
carrying out such attacks. Women can help the war effort by treating the wounded and
supporting the fighters.52 Qaraḍāwī goes beyond Sheikh Yasin. He has ruled that, at present,
the obligation of Jihad also includes women and that there are no problems regarding female
modesty or family obligations. The reason for the previous exemptions for women from
participating in combat is that it demands great physical strength usually typical of men, not of
women. Furthermore, female physiology is governed by menstruation, pregnancy and nursing
that render her unsuitable for combat. Similarly, a woman’s obligations toward her husband
and child rearing prevent her from participating in warfare.
Qaraḍāwī’s innovation is that he accepts the fact that the situation has changed. Modern
warfare does not necessarily require physical strength but involves using technological
methods that require the ability to think, not simply just exhibit physical prowess. Women can
perform such tasks. As for the argument that participation in the war effort affects a woman’s
duty toward her family, Qaraḍāwī claims that single women or those who have no children
can and must play an active role in Jihad. One must learn from the Israelis who draft women
into the army.53
Despite all of the limitations upon women, Qaraḍāwī regards Palestinian women who
“sacrifice themselves” in suicide attacks as role models.54 Thus, he provides the rationale for
suicide attacks that have been carried out by women of Hamas and other organizations. He
has responded to a question concerning the role of women in such attacks in a fatwa that he
issued, as follows:
The sacrifice attacks are the greatest type of Jihad for Allāh. An act of sacrifice is carried out by a man who sacrifices
himself, for whom the value of his life is less than striving for Allāh, for the return of the land and the preservation of
honor… When Jihad becomes a personal obligation, such as when the enemy holds Muslim territory, a woman is

authorized to take part in it alongside men. Jurists have decided that when an enemy attacks a given Muslim area, all of
its inhabitants are obligated to fight up to the point when a woman must take part in the fighting, even without the
approval of her husband. A son may go out [to carry out Jihad] even without permission from his parents; a slave
without the consent of his master and a worker without release from his employer. This is a case when one should not
obey anyone as it concerns disobeying Allah. According to a famous legal ruling… even if need be, a woman may remove
her veil in order to carry out this task because she is going to die for the sake of Allāh and not to show her beauty or
expose her hair. I do not see any problem in removing the veil in this case.55

Nothing resembles this far-reaching permission as far as other wars between Muslims and
non-Muslims are concerned. This leniency has found expression only in the acts of terror
against Jews in the State of Israel. The above statement embodies the most far-reaching
permission for women to carry out Jihad and reflects a type of feminism. It exists only
regarding the war against the Jews and no one else. In the struggle against the Jews, a woman
is allowed to disobey her husband, remove her traditional veil and sacrifice herself and her
modesty for the sake of Allah.56
This ruling made it possible for Hamas to dispatch a female suicide terrorist, a mother of
two little children, three years and eighteen months old, respectively, in order to carry out an
“act of sacrifice.” Reem Saleh al-Riyashi (Rīm Ṣāliḥ al-Riyāshī), from Gaza, was chosen for the
task and detonated herself at the Erez Checkpoint on 14 January 2004. Hamas activists
photographed her beforehand holding a rifle and a Qurʾān and declaring that she would be
happy to enter Paradise with the skulls of Zionists. She killed four Israelis.57 At a ceremony
held shortly afterward, Qaraḍāwī explained: “There is death that we bless and accept, such as
that of our sister, Reem al-Riyashi, who blew herself up in order to kill a number of Israeli
robbers and aggressors. This is a death that we bless.”58 The fact that Riyashi carried out an act
of terror after a rumor that she was unfaithful to her husband with another Hamas activist, did
not change Qaraḍāwī’s position or lessen the impact of what she did.59
Qaraḍāwī’s importance as an expert in Islamic law found expression during the Second
Intifada in 2001. During a confrontation between Qaraḍāwī and the Saudi Mufti Abd al-Aziz
Ibn Abdallah ʿAl al-Shaikh – who argued that ‘acts of sacrifice’ within enemy lines are a type
of suicide and do not constitute part of Jihad – Qaraḍāwī mocked him in rebuttal: “Since when
has fighting against armed colonial settlers become a crime and an act of terror according to
several sheikhs?”60 Qaraḍāwī even expressed doubts as to whether those sheikhs were capable
of making legal decisions:
Legal rulings that have been issued against those heroes, whom they have called ‘terrorists,’ have not been issued by
authorized scholars of religion, but rather by a group of people who are strangers to [Islamic] law and religion. It is
possible that these scholars are in the service of governments or are agents of the police.61

According to Qaraḍāwī, “whoever expresses doubt or makes conditions or has reservations
regarding ‘acts of sacrifice’ is tantamount to a collaborator with unbelievers that include
Mushrikūn [those who practice syncretism], Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians (literally,

Majūs).”62
Islamic scholars associated with Hamas, including Sheikh Hamed al-Bitawi (Ḥāmid alBītāwī) from the village of Beita near Nablus, who served as the head of the Union of Islamic
Scholars of Palestine, determined that Jihad in Palestine is an expression of Farḍ ʿAin, namely
a personal obligation. Therefore, suicide attacks are permitted. Dr. Abd al-Aziz Rantisi (ʿAbd
al-ʿAziz al-Rantīsī) who served as the spokesman of Hamas and, after the death of Ahmad
Yasin, as the leader of Hamas until he was also eliminated by Israel in 17 April 2004, supported
that position as well. Both based their opinions on a ruling (fatwā) of Qaraḍāwī that was
expressed on 25 April 2001, according to which even a child may carry out a suicide attack
without the permission of his parents if the purpose of the attack is to kill Jews.63
On his program on Al Jazeera, Qaraḍāwī boasted about the weapon that “breaks the parity”
achieved by the Palestinians headed by Hamas under his leadership, as follows: “Perhaps the
Israelis have nuclear weapons but we have the children who are bombs and the human bombs
that must carry on until the liberation [of Palestine].”64 As we have noted above, since Jihad in
Palestine is a personal obligation, it is the duty of everyone, including women and children, in
accordance with their strength and capabilities. The war against Israel is unique as far as
methods are concerned. It is a struggle against the Jews, for their “hatred toward believers is
greater than all [of the others]” (Sūra 5:82). Qaraḍāwī insist that this is not simply a struggle
against an occupier such as the Americans in Iraq or the Russians in Chechnya, but a struggle
against the enemies of Allāh. Qaraḍāwī wrote fatwas that calls for the killing of Americans in
Iraq and poems of incitement that preach the killing of unbelievers, Christians and all of the
Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya in the name of Islam.65
The ideology of dying in the course of “acts of sacrifice,” developed by Qaraḍāwī, is the
direct successor to the concept of the struggle against the Jews advocated by the Muslim
Brotherhood. Qaraḍāwī’s fatāwā (Islamic legal rulings), that permit Muslims to kill the
infidels and the enemy of Allāh – even by use of suicide operations, make him the religious
father of the homicide bombers.66
As early as 1948, his teacher, Ḥasan al-Bannā, the founder of the Brotherhood in Egypt,
wrote an article praising acts of self-sacrifice against the Jews in Palestine for the sake of “the
industry of death’ (Ṣināʿat al-Mawt), as follows:
The industry of death: Death is an industry like any other industry. There are those who do it better and know how to
die honorably and to choose death in an honorable arena and at the right time. He sells his drops of blood at the highest
price thereby winning the greatest profit that one can describe… Palestine is the first line of defense. It is not the problem
of an Arab country and not the problem of the Arab Umma. It is the problem of Islam and for all Muslims.67

Qaraḍāwī’s statements resemble those of other Muslim Brotherhood thinkers. Saʿīd Ḥawwā
(d. 1989), one of the greatest thinkers of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, maintains:
The struggle between us and the Jews will last forever and it will end only with elimination of the Jewish state in our

land. First, the elimination of the Jews – this comes first and nothing else. It depends upon the existence of a generation
that longs for death. Only a generation like that can undermine the expansion of Israel and that will be the beginning of
eliminating it. Anything else is a secondary preference. The only thing that will cause the Jews to weigh their steps a
million times before any military action is the existence of such a generation.68

For its part, Hamas also enthusiastically praises its greatest spiritual leader. A book that
appeared in honor of a conference held in 2010 showcases the efforts of Qaraḍāwī on behalf of
the Palestinian cause. Ismail Haniyya, former prime minister of the Hamas government in
Gaza (2006–2014) and the head of the Hamas political bureau since 2017, gives a detailed
description of the importance of Qaraḍāwī for the Palestinian cause. According to Haniyya,
Qaraḍāwī deserves the title of “Sheikh of the Palestinian Cause” for his complete devotion and
activities on behalf of Palestine throughout his entire life. Haniyya is well aware that
Qaraḍāwī’s sermons “manage to stimulate the feelings of all Muslims toward Jerusalem and to
see to it that the problem will be present in the hearts of all Muslims.”69
The book presents Qaraḍāwī’s contributions to six aspects of the Palestinian cause in
general and to Hamas, in particular. These appear in a review on the Qaraḍāwī website, as
follows:
1. The material basis – the establishment of the Charity Coalition (Iʾtilāf al-Khair) that
activates the Al-Quds (Jerusalem) International Institut e (Mu ʾ assasat al-Quds alDuwaliyya) that assists in covering the damage incurred from Israeli attacks. The
organization provides funds, via Arab and Islamic banks, for Palestinian residents
against the ongoing Jewish threat against the region and the continuing siege against
the Palestinians. It is the same charitable organization that was declared illegal by
Israel’s Minister of Defense and the government of Israel as early as 2002. The fund
has transferred millions of dollars to the accounts held by Hamas and, after the
Islamist revolution in the Gaza Strip, it financed and continues to finance the Hamas
government in Gaza.70
2. Political activism: Qaraḍāwī makes frequent visits to Muslim countries in order to
place the Palestinian cause on the agenda. His sermons contain harsh criticism of the
silence of Arab rulers regarding what is taking place in Palestine. Qaraḍāwī includes a
call to Arab countries to give political assistance and military aid to the Palestinians.
He not only expresses criticism of Arab governments but also actively supports the
Islamic parties that have won elections in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia and even has
called for completing the revolution in Syria and in the rest of the Arab states.71
3. Communication: Qaraḍāwī works tirelessly to spread his message to Muslims and
non-Muslims. His objective is to make
an authentic public statement regarding the essence of the battle on the soil

of Palestine. Jihad [in Palestine] is defending the land. It is a personal
obligation on the part of its inhabitants until this Jihad will include and
encompass all Muslims. [The reason for this is that] since we are speaking
about Islamic land that is the first Qibla (i.e., a name for Jerusalem as the
first praying direction in Islam) and the third most holy place of the
Ḥaramain (i.e., the two holy mosques: in Mecca and in Medina), Jihad for
liberating it is an obligation and an honor.72
Here, there is a dispute against the Palestinian factions, such as the
“liberation party” (Ḥizb al-Taḥrir) that view Jihad as a general, but not a
personal, obligation, and argue that one must continue to win over hearts
and minds before sharpening the swords, that should be accomplished by the
Caliph.
4. Delegitimizing Israel: Qaraḍāwī is at the forefront of the campaign to delegitimize
Israel by distinguishing between resistance and terror. In Fiqh al-Jihād (“Laws of
Jihad”), he argues that
Israel is clearly the most terrorist state. Israel was established [through the
use of] much terror from its first day, by the means used by the gangs of the
‘Haganah.’ The slaughter carried out in Deir Yasin and elsewhere and all the
other activities that Israel carried out in order to remove the Palestinians
from their homes against their will [enabled it] to establish the state on
those ruins. Therefore, what the Palestinians are doing constitutes Jihad,
resistance and defense of the land and a struggle for the rights of the
oppressed. If resistance is called terror, then let them call us terrorists.73
The message is clear. Jihad against Israel is a type of defensive war on
Islamic soil. This is the definitive legal justification for the activities of
Hamas. According to Qaraḍāwī, the fact that Muslims attack and explode
themselves in public places and among the Israeli population is only the
reaction to the terror that has been inflicted upon the Palestinian people.
According to Qaraḍāwī and his disciples in Hamas, there is no moral
problem regarding such acts, even if they are referred to as terror. On the
contrary, this terror is a blessing and is permitted by Sharīʿa. Israel is the
aggressor and the Palestinians are the victims. The Israeli soldiers are
terrorists in contrast with the Palestinians who are fighters for national
liberation.
5. Devotion to the Palestinian Cause: Qaraḍāwī writes unceasingly about the Palestinian
cause and encourages others to do so by publishing their works on the subject.

According to Qaraḍāwī,
there are one thousand books that present the nature of the conflict with the
enemy that is basically a religious conflict. Furthermore, [there are] qaṣāʾid
(odes – rhymed verses in Arabic meter) that bring home [to the reader] the
rights of the Palestinians. This is accompanied by sermons and articles that
are broadcast and written.74
The circulation of his books, articles and poems on the Palestinian cause
actually promote the worldview of Hamas.
6. Leading Authority of Islamic Law for Sunni Muslims: Qaraḍāwī is regarded as the
most influential and important authority of Sunni Islam today. His book, Modern
Legal Rulings (Fatāwā Muʿāṣira), includes a long and detailed chapter on legal
matters deriving from the condition of the Palestinians. The guiding principle of
Qaraḍāwī’s worldview is that Israel is an illegitimate occupier that has taken over
Muslim holy land. Therefore, everything possible must be done to wipe it off the face
of the earth. One must refuse any expression of normalization with Israel. For
example, Qaraḍāwī ruled that
no Palestinian leader has the authority to give up even one furrow of the
land of Palestine in any kind of agreement. Likewise, it is forbidden to sell
Palestinian land to Jews or for Palestinian refugees to receive compensation
for land from Israel. Qaraḍāwī states that receiving such compensation is
“treason against Allāh, his Messenger and the Islamic Ummah,”75 thereby
acknowledging the permanence of the problem of the refugees and the fact
that it will be impossible to make to any arrangement. In another fatwa on
the subject, he asserts that receiving compensation for land is Akbar alKabāʾir (“a most grievous sin”) because it involves handing the enemy land
that is a holy Islamic trust. He also argues that he who is prepared to
surrender Palestinian land is tantamount to one who denies Allāh. One must
never give up land, not for all the gold in the world because no one has the
right to give up the property of the Islamic Ummah till the end of time. Jihad
is the only option against Israel until it will be eliminated and the land
transferred to Islamic rule. Qaraḍāwī is prepared to allow Jews and
Christians to worship at their holy places, as protected subjects
(Dhimma)76

Qaraḍāwī, however, is prepared to allow Palestinian refugees to receive reparations for their

suffering. Nonetheless, he expresses reservations because the very act of receiving reparations
is a tacit agreement to Israeli occupation. In fact, his model is an Israeli ruling about receiving
reparations from Germany for the suffering of the Jews during the Holocaust (if it really
occurred, according Qaraḍāwī). Just as Israel received reparations, Palestinian refugees also
can be compensated for decades of continuous suffering, but not in exchange for land.77 This
means that the act of receiving reparations is not allowed in any way to affect the right of
return of the refugees to their land.
Qaraḍāwī vehemently opposed the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh ʿAbd alʿAziz Ibn Bāz (Ibn Baz), who allowed Palestinians to give up territory in exchange for an
agreement with Israel. This dispute took place in 1995, before the Oslo II Accords that
transferred all of the cities in the West Bank to the rule of the Palestine Authority. Qaraḍāwī
conducted his sharp dispute in the pages of his book where he argues that Ibn Baz errs in his
interpretation of the sources which he cites as proof for his ruling. Ibn Baz refers to two major
sources: Qurʾān 8: 61, “if they incline toward peace, then you incline to it as well,” and the
precedent of the Treaty of Al-Ḥudaibiyya, the 10-year ceasefire agreement between
Muḥammad and the Quraish tribe. Ibn Baz not only supported a limited ceasefire but also a
permanent agreement on the basis of the sources noted above, if it would benefit the
Palestinians and would enable them to recover some of their rights and their lands. In contrast,
Qaraḍāwī adamantly opposes this and claims that every agreement implies recognition of
Israel and granting legitimacy to the rule of the occupation. Likewise, the transfer of some of
the territories to the Palestinians does not solve the other problems that Israel avoids
discussing and proves that Israel is not willing to admit the truth and make peace, namely to
solve the issues of the refugees, the settlements and final borders.78
The absolute lack of recognition of Israel is the source for Qaraḍāwī’s ruling that Arab
citizens of Israel are forbidden to vote in Knesset elections or to establish political parties to
represent them in the Knesset. “Any cooperation grants this occupying entity the right to exist,
to legitimacy and to continuing the occupation.” 79 Thus, the Islamic Movement in Israel faced
an internal crisis between the Knesset elections of 1992 and 1996. There was a conflict
between those who favored participation in the elections to the Knesset and those who
opposed it. Eventually, the Islamic Movement split between the southern faction, headed by
ʿAbdallah Nimer Darwīsh, who established the United Arab List (Al-Qāʾima al-ʿArabiyya alMuwaḥḥada) that took part in the elections, and the northern branch, headed by Sheikh Raed
Salah Mahajneh and Kamal Khatib (Rāʾed Ṣalāḥ Maḥājna, Kamāl Khatīb) who opposed such
participation. Both sides consulted with Qaraḍāwī. While they were trying to make a decision,
Hamas issued a fatwa supporting the position of Sheikh Raed Salah. 80 Nevertheless, Sheikh
Nimer Darwish, leader and founder of the Islamic Movement in Israel in 1979, decided in
favor to participating in the elections of the Islamic faction. Qaraḍāwī did not criticize him in
public and argued that Arab citizens of Israel may be permitted to elect their representatives

to the Knesset in order to secure their interests only this one time. He based his ruling again
upon the principle of ‘necessity (Ḍarūra) that permits what is forbidden.’ 81 The ruling does
not indicate a change in his original objection.
Qaraḍāwī also has issued rulings regarding proper relations between Egypt and Israel. Thus,
he expressed harsh condemnation of the meeting between the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and Israel’s
Chief Rabbi, Yisrael Meir Lau. He asserted that there is no room for a discussion of religious
matters between the Chief Rabbi and Mufti of Egypt, as long as the land is under occupation.82
Qaraḍāwī also decided that it is forbidden for the poor people of Egypt to take part in the
Ifṭār, the meal that breaks the daily fast during Ramadan that is organized on their behalf
because it is financed by the Israel embassy. Indeed, it is unconscionable for a country that
engages in the murder of Palestinian Muslims to provide food for Egyptian Muslims. Not even
the poorest Egyptian should depend upon the dubious generosity of a “descendant of apes and
pigs.” It is not proper for Muslims to humiliate themselves before the enemy, especially during
the month of Ramadan. At that time, in the past, Muslims celebrated their greatest military
victories, the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, and the conquest of Mecca in 630 AD.”83 In addition,
Qaraḍāwī has issued a far-reaching ruling that forbids non-Palestinian Muslims from visiting
the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site of Islam, because their passports would be stamped
by the Israel occupation authorities, thereby granting an indirect form of legitimacy to the
government of Israel.84 In addition, Qaraḍāwī has called upon Palestinians and all Arab
countries to boycott Israeli and American goods in order to harm Israel’s economy.85
Hamas regards Qaraḍāwī as the foremost authority of Islamic law. He has issued a series of
fatwās in response to questions sent by Hamas prisoners in Israeli prisons. These responses
deal with performing rituals under the harsh conditions in jail. Qaraḍāwī’s books are studied in
consecutive order in different courses offered in prisons where members of Hamas serve their
sentences, according to the program published by the cultural committee of the command
center of Hamas.86 For example, there is a question of what a prisoner must do in order to
purify himself before prayer, if his hands and feet are bound, his head is bandaged and he does
not have water and therefore, cannot pray as required. Qaraḍāwī permits the prisoner to pray
to the best of his ability at the time, namely without purification, without knowing the correct
time or direction for prayer and without any movement, but by mumbling. If that is not
possible, then one’s intention to pray will suffice.87 The subject of strict observance of the fast
of Ramadan raises the dilemma of what a Muslim prisoner must do if he cannot keep the food
that he is served throughout the day and save it for the night, when he is allowed to eat during
the month of Ramadan. In this case, Qaraḍāwī has ruled that prisoners are considered as if
they are held by force and therefore, they are released from fasting (maʿdhūrūn).88
Qaraḍāwī has also issued rulings for Hamas prisoners regarding particularly difficult
questions of life and death. For example, regarding torture in prison, he has been asked how

much torture – occasionally to the point of near death – a prisoner must suffer in order not to
disclose information to the enemy and incriminate other activists. Qaraḍāwī has ruled that if
someone feels that he is able to withstand torture without revealing important information, he
is obligated to do so and not to incriminate his comrades, even if it may cause his death.
Whoever dies because of such torture merits the highest distinction of a martyr’s death.
Another question concerning torture is what happens if someone breaks down and discloses
information that causes the imprisonment of his comrades. Is it considered a sin that must be
atoned for? Qaraḍāwī responded by ruling that if someone cannot withstand the suffering and
breaks down in prison as a result of torture, it is not a sin, because he did so under compulsion.
He offers the example of one of the first Muslims, ʿAmmār Ibn Yāsir, who broke down as a
result of torture by the Quraish tribe and confessed the truth of idolatry and condemned the
Prophet. It was not considered as a sin because it occurred under pressure and was only
spoken aloud, while in his heart, he remained a believer. Therefore, a Hamas prisoner who
incriminates his comrades while under pressure of torture is not regarded as a sinner and does
not have to atone for what he says. Nevertheless, he should recite many prayers. That is
always recommended.89
Since 1967, hunger strikes among Palestinian prisoners have become common. However,
apparently Hamas and Islamic Jihad have developed this method of protest in order to force
the Israel Prison Services to address issues such as living conditions and to grant favors such as
family visits, separate wards, less supervision of content in courses offered to the prisoners, etc.
Otherwise, prisoners would die because of hunger strikes, as has occurred in the past.
According to Palestinian organizations, Israel would be responsible for the death of the
prisoner and for the revenge attacks in reaction to his death. On 17 April 2012, there was a
general hunger strike on the part of 1600 prisoners for 28 days, led by Sheikh Khaḍar ʿAdnān
Mūsa (b. 1978), a prominent activist of Islamic Jihad.90
Qaraḍāwī has ruled that it is permissible and even desirable for prisoners to torture
themselves by means of hunger strikes. The experience of hunger strikes has shown that
pressure exerted upon prison authorities results in putting the cause of Palestinian prisoners on
the public and international agenda. Qaraḍāwī exhorts prisoners to carry out hunger strike
until they reach the point between life and death and then to stop, because Islam forbids
suicide.91 This line of reasoning is of interest due to Qaraḍāwī’s enthusiastic support for suicide
attacks. However, the difference between the two is clear. When a Hamas activist blows
himself up among Israeli civilians, his death achieves the desired result of killing the enemy.
However, when a Hamas prisoner starves himself to death, he only harms himself, not the
enemy. That is not desirable and therefore it comes in the category of the Islamic prohibition
against suicide.
Qaraḍāwī has been asked to make legal decisions regarding the wives of prisoners who,
because of their husbands’ life sentences, have the status of deserted wives for their entire

lives. He enthusiastically recommends that they wait for their husbands as part of the
steadfastness (Ṣumūd) required of Palestinian women. The struggle is not only for men.
Therefore, women should wait for their husbands even for as long as twenty years, especially
if they have children. Moreover, the fact that a prisoner knows that his wife is waiting for him
will give him strength to continue coping with life in prison. Thus, it is important as far as
morale is concerned. It is possible that in light of changes in the political situation, even those
who have life sentences eventually will be released from jail. In such cases, a woman who has
remarried will suffer terrible distress upon seeing her husband. Their children will suffer as
well. Qaraḍāwī is more liberal regarding young women, who have recently married and have
no children, who wish to request a divorce from their husbands and recommends that their
husbands do not exert pressure on them and to allow them to decide for themselves.92
Qaraḍāwī has been asked to answer a series of questions about the obligation of pilgrimage
to Mecca (Ḥajj) for prisoners. The basic question is how such prisoners can perform the Ḥajj if
they are incarcerated. The commandment of the Ḥajj differs from other religious requirements
of Islam, such as prayer and fasting, because one may empower someone else to perform it in
his stead. For example, if one cannot undertake the journey, because of illness or old age, he
may designate someone else to perform the Ḥajj in his place. Qaraḍāwī was asked whether a
prisoner may do the same, as he is healthy, but not free. His response is that one may not
make an analogy between the permission granted to an old or sick person and to a prisoner
because it implies giving up hope of release from jail. A prisoner who designates someone else
to perform the Ḥajj in his place actually is acknowledging that there is no hope of release so
that he can perform the Ḥajj himself. Therefore, one may not perform the Ḥajj in place of a
prisoner. Likewise, there is no obligation for a prisoner to order the customary slaughter of
lamb after the Ḥajj, because most Islamic scholars regard this as a custom and not an
obligation. Nevertheless, Qaraḍāwī has ruled that the relatives of a Shahīd perform the Ḥajj
on his behalf, if he has not yet done it in his life, in order to enhance his favorability.93
Qaraḍāwī has ruled that the most deserving recipients of the annual obligatory charity
(Zakāt) are the prisoners and their families. Therefore, Muslims throughout the world must
first contribute to the prisoners and to their families that suffer economic hardship because of
their imprisonment and afterward, to Palestinian refugees.94 Muslims everywhere must do
whatever they can to redeem the prisoners by every means possible. Leaders of the struggle
are permitted to conduct negotiations with the enemy in order to release them and it is even
permitted to delay the continuation of the struggle if it will result in the release of prisoners.95
Hence, Islamic law permits negotiations for the release of prisoners, such as the case of Gilad
Shalit, even if it means that the Israeli captive would remain alive and not pay for his sins
against the Palestinian people.
In his book Fiqh al-Jihād, Qaraḍāwī discusses the question of killing innocent civilians
during a war. In conventional wars where Jihad is offensive, namely when Muslims are

fighting in order to conquer more territory, it is forbidden to kill those who are not engaged in
fighting, such as civilians, women, children, merchants and the elderly.96 However, in the case
of Israeli society, Qaraḍāwī has ruled that it is permitted to kill civilians, including the elderly,
women and children because Israelis are a society of invaders who have occupied Muslim land
(Mujtamaʿ Ghuzāt). In order to get rid of them, all means are allowed. Jihad against Israel is a
war of no choice (Jihād Iḍṭirār). As such, it is permitted to use all means in order to expel the
Jews and send them back to the countries where they came from. The Jews have changed
their classical status as a “People of the Book,” who enjoyed the protection of Muslims
throughout history, to the status of “children of death” (Ḥarbīyūn). This new definition allows
for the killing of Jews and for abandoning their lives and property. “Muslims are not obligated
to protect the property and life of one who is considered hostile to them (Ḥarbī).”97 If that is
the case, then killing enemy civilians, even innocent civilians, is permissible. Qaraḍāwī also
issues rulings regarding the Palestinian population that Hamas uses as human shields when it
places rocket launchers in mosques, schools and the yards of private homes, with or without
consent. Leaders of Hamas hide themselves in the basement of a hospital in Gaza, thereby
abandoning the most unfortunate of the civilian population to death by enemy fire.98 Hamas
does so because it knows that Israel refrains from harming its image in the international media
that would publish photographs of dead and wounded civilians. How then does Hamas cope
with the moral problem of turning the civilian population into human shields? Here, we must
recall that Hamas is first and foremost a religious movement that acts according to Islamic
law. In that case, where does Hamas derive the permission to do so?
The answer may be found in Fiqh al-Jihād, where Qaraḍāwī deals with this problem in his
discussion of the law for a Muslim civilian population during war with an enemy. Qaraḍāwī
introduces the discourse of scholars of classical Islam, as follows: During a war, when the
enemy captures innocent Muslim civilians, it places them as human shields in order that they
would be the first to be hit by the arrows of their fellow Muslims and thus enable enemy
soldiers to advance. In this case, what should Muslim soldiers do? If they will fight as usual,
they would be killed by their brethren. If they do not fight, the enemy will achieve its
objective and may win. Medieval Islamic jurists allowed Muslim armies to fight the enemy as
usual, even if while doing so, they would kill innocent Muslim captives. The reasoning behind
this is that the objective of the war is to win the war. If Muslims will not use all means
available to achieve victory, they will be defeated and destroyed by the enemy. Furthermore,
there is a ruling of the Sharīʿa that is called “a ruling according to the gravity [of the
situation]” (Fiqh al-Muwāzanāt), namely that one must undertake a cost-benefit analysis and
rule accordingly. In this case, sacrificing some is the price that one must pay in order to
preserve all of society. If it is permitted to kill innocent Muslims for the benefit of all Muslims,
it certainly is permitted to kill enemy civilians in order to liberate occupied Muslim land.99
While scholars of classical Islam discussed the case of Muslim civilians who have been

captured by the enemy, Qaraḍāwī’s ruling goes a step further and adds another rubric. Not
only may the enemy use the civilian population as a human shield, but Muslim forces may do
so as well. He explains that as opposed to wars in the past when only soldiers were fighting,
during modern times, the entire society is mobilized, must bear the burden and invest most of
its material and human efforts. The highest goal of Muslim society is to defeat the enemy. It
involves the efforts of every citizen, be he an industrialist, a worker, a woman, etc. Everyone
plays a role in achieving victory, even those who do not bear arms. We must learn from Israeli
society and see how, during wartime, the entire society – its military and civic institutions – is
mobilized to achieve a successful outcome.100 Because all of society is mobilized for a great
objective, it pays the price of fighting both in persons and in property. Indeed, this is the legal
underpinning for the legitimization of Hamas use of civilians as human shields. Qaraḍāwī’s
rulings comply with his legal concept of “necessity permits the forbidden.” Since Palestine is
under a state of emergency, necessity permits laws of warfare that are not necessarily
acceptable in classical Islam, such as inflicting harm to women and children while fighting.
This principle also is valid regarding “acts of sacrifice” by individuals when it is clear that the
physical damage is minimal but they instill considerable fear among the enemy. This approach
runs contrary to that of classical scholars of Islam who maintain that such cases should be
regarded as suicide, which is forbidden by Islam, if they result in little damage. Thus,
apparently Qaraḍāwī displays a flexibility in matters of law that is not characteristic of
classical Islamic scholars when he deals with the wars against the Jews in Palestine and his
attitude toward “acts of sacrifice.”101

4. The difference between Al-Qaeda and Hamas
Qaraḍāwī strongly disagrees with what he considers an infuriating comparison between
Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements and Al-Qaeda, regarding the terror attacks of September
11, 2001 that shook the world. According to Qaraḍāwī, “we have rejected this action from the
outset. It is antithetical to any law or faith.”102 His condemnation was regarded as political in
nature and issued under pressure, as far as its language is concerned. Apparently, it was made
in order to go through the motions and was not a sincere expression of sorrow. Indeed,
Qaraḍāwī has no problems with the slaughter of Americans, as is evident in his other rulings.
Nevertheless, there is a difference between him and Al-Qaeda. Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid,
head of the Al-Arabiya Television Network, published an article in the London newspaper, AlSharq al-Awsat attacking Islamic murderousness in Qaraḍāwī’s sermons. He writes as follows:
Listen to what Sheikh Al-Qaraḍāwī said, when he stated in public that it is permitted to murder all American citizens in
Iraq. Imagine for yourselves a religious figure who preaches to murder civilians while his two daughters study in Britain

under the protection of the British Defense services.103

A major principle of Qaraḍāwī’s thought is that suicide attacks are “acts of sacrifice… the
highest form of Jihad on the path of Allah and a form of terror that is permitted by Allah.”104
Therefore, the attacks against American civilians on September 11, 2001 fill all criteria of
legitimate terror according to God. Then, what is the difference? How can one compare what
he asks in his book if
the acts in Palestine are acts of those who are defending their homeland – people who defend themselves from the
invasion of occupiers who came from outside their homeland and expelled them [the Palestinians] from their land to all
the ends of the earth. Therefore, they are resisters. It is their right – the right of people to defend their homeland even
through sacrificing their life. Defending the homeland is a settled matter and an obligation according to the laws of the
heavenly Sharīʿa, natural laws that are known in international jurisprudence.105

As far as sacrifice is concerned, Qaraḍāwī argues that the Palestinians have no choice “since
the invaders and occupiers are a militaristic society. All of [Israeli] society is military – men
and women. Palestinians sacrifice themselves for their homeland and carry out the act of
killing in the midst of the country of the occupiers.” However, those who are responsible for
the attacks on September 11 are essentially like invaders of another country. The suicide
attackers in the United States not only sacrificed their lives but also those of the passengers on
the four airplanes against their will. For the passengers did not come to the suicides and tell
them: ‘we are ready to sacrifice ourselves.’ The sacrifice of the passengers on those planes is
forbidden because it is possible that they were not involved in politics at all and are not
associated with it. Besides, some among the [the victims] were Arabs and Muslims. Therefore,
Qaraḍāwī states that “we of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, of which I am the
head, have condemned this act from the outset.” This is the essential difference between the
activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements and those of Al-Qaeda in America.106
Qaraḍāwī’s condemnation, however, is not complete because he adamantly opposed the
reaction of the United States in Afghanistan to the acts of terror committed on September 11.
He condemns the world war against terror and the American campaign in Iraq. It is a general
condemnation, and he does not mention Osama bin Laden at all. According to Qaraḍāwī,
there is no conclusive evidence that bin Laden actually carried out the attacks on September
11. He adds that if the United States wished, it could have presented conclusive evidence to the
government of Afghanistan, which would have placed bin Laden before a Sharīʿa court,
where he would have received his punishment. Qaraḍāwī rejects all of the claims that were
presented by the U.S. that show that Al-Qaeda and bin Laden were responsible for these acts.
Even the cassette that supposedly contains Bin Laden’s admission of directing those acts of
terror due to American policy in the Middle East does not constitute conclusive evidence.
Qaraḍāwī argues that there is no proof that bin Laden is connected to the dispatch of the
nineteen men who were involved in those attacks and they bear sole responsibility for

them.107 Qaraḍāwī goes farther and even condemns America for involvement in acts of
murder against the Afghani people and for its support for Israel that is stealing the land of the
Palestinians. To be sure, Qaraḍāwī issued a fatwa that forbids Islamic countries and all
Muslims to extend any type of assistance to the Americans in their struggle against Osama bin
Laden and Al-Qaeda who may have not really carried out the attacks on September 11.108
After the events of September 11, Qaraḍāwī reiterated his position. In his program on Al
Jazeera, he announced that while “one must fight against the United States, as it is not possible
to do so militarily, we must fight them [the Americans] by diplomatic and economic
means.”109 His condemnation is such that it seems as if the United States is guilty for the
massive terror attack that took place on its soil. However, his words were sufficient for the
British government and especially, for Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London at the time. This
partial condemnation enabled Sheikh Qaraḍāwī to visit England. Previously, he was denied
permission to enter the country. His visit took place in 2004.110
There is also support for Qaraḍāwī’s position regarding the distinctions between Jihad
against the forces that occupy Islamic countries, such as the Americans in Iraq and the Israelis
in all of Palestine (namely, the territories that Israel conquered and has held since 1967, and the
area of the State of Israel proper since 1948). According to Qaraḍāwī’s distinction, like in
Israel, Muslims have a personal obligation (Farḍ ʿAin) to attack American soldiers and
civilians. Nevertheless, the attack by Al-Qaeda in the United States, which is not yet a part of
Dār al-Islām, is wrong. That is the reason why Qaraḍāwī opposes the activities of Al-Qaeda in
Europe and in America. His condemnation of the attacks in the U.S. and in Europe is not
because of the methods used by the murderers but is based upon his interpretation of Islam. It
is the Caliph who must declare that Jihad against American infidels is a universal obligation,
not spectacular acts in the name of Islam on the part of individuals. Moreover, according to
Qaraḍāwī, probably other countries with large Muslim populations, such as France, eventually
will become Islamic states as a result of the intensive efforts at Daʿwa taking place there.111
Qaraḍāwī repeats his arguments that there is no comparison between terror in America and
in Palestine. There must be a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate terror.
The United States supports Israel and Israel is the greatest terrorist in the world… we must differentiate between two
types of terror: the terror of those who are defending their homeland and their rights, as is written in the Qurʾān, as
follows: ‘Prepare against them the power and the horses that you are able to gather in order to terrify the enemies of
Allāh and your enemy.’112 (In Arabic, the word for terror is “Irhāb” as appears in the text.) Such terror is legitimate.
Therefore, Palestinian factions that defend their land, such as Fatah, Hamas or Islamic Jihad must not be called terrorists.
For this is the best terror and it is Jihad for the sake of Allāh… Terror that is not legitimate is the terror by which Israel
unjustifiably kills and harms holy sites.113

Responding to a question sent by one of the audience who accused Qaraḍāwī’s calls for
universal Jihad as being responsible for the murderous attacks of 9/11, Qaraḍāwī replied that
his statements were taken out of context and repeated that terror is blessed when it is against

the Zionists who actually benefited from the attacks in the U.S. Qaraḍāwī further argues that
he who levels such an accusation and asks that question is not a true Muslim as
a Muslim would not permit an Islamic homeland such as Palestine and Jerusalem to be in the hands of the Zionists who
stole it and have harmed the holy places without the owners of the land having the right to protect themselves. All that I
have said is that this oppressed people that has been banished from its home has the right to defend itself. Everyone has
the right to become a human bomb and to explode in the midst of this military society [Israel].114

The Mufti of the Pentagon, Sheikh Muhammad Abd al-Rashid, was originally asked
whether Muslims serving in the United States Armed Forces could take part in the fighting in
Iraq or Afghanistan, because of the attacks by bin Laden. This led to a dispute between the
ruling by Qaraḍāwī and some of the members of Hamas. Despite his criticism of America as a
supporter of a terrorist state, i.e., Israel, he did not forbid Muslim soldiers in the U.S. Armed
Forces to participate in the fighting. According to Qaraḍāwī, taking part in the fighting is
compulsory, albeit problematic as far as Islamic law is concerned. Muslims who live in the U.S.
and serve in the army must obey the orders of the commanders in the army or act as
conscientious objectors. Bassām Jarrār, one of Hamas’ leaders in the West Bank, disagreed
with Qaraḍāwī and argued that American soldiers must refuse to obey orders. In any case,
they would be in a military prison for only a few months. Jarrār publicly objected to
Qaraḍāwī’s ruling “that the force of circumstances may allow what is forbidden.”115
The legal permission granted to American [Muslim] soldiers by Qaraḍāwī represents a type
of moderation on his part because his basic position regarding the U.S. is essentially negative.
He made this clear in an interview on Al Jazeera, as follows:
What does America want?… [It wants], for example, to eradicate several things. To eradicate the word “Jihad”; doing
good deeds and avoiding sin; changing sin by force, and not by word or by the heart; the struggle against oppression and
not surrendering to the oppressors; and standing up to oppressors… these things, they wish to eradicate… they do not
wish that we use the word “unbelievers” at all, even when it means aggressive unbelievers… the West has invaded us in
several ways, mainly by what we refer to as an ideological invasion or cultural colonialism. One can fight easily against
colonialism and against the occupation of land. However, the conquest and invasion of minds by means of foreign ideas
is much more dangerous… ideological and cultural war is undoubtedly a more dangerous type of war.… They want to
make us their slaves, to direct us with a stick and to pull our ears, like one pulls the ears of sheep.116

Eventually American policy must change and we Muslims must not surrender to it.
Qaraḍāwī is extremely apprehensive as far as American policy in the Middle East is
concerned, especially the war on terror that it declared. This war is directed against Muslims
and Arabs and attempts to label Islam as the new enemy of the West after the Cold War.
America makes pronouncements against terror, but avoids Zionist terror which is infinitely
worse.117

5. Wither Hamas?

Under the spiritual leadership of Qaraḍāwī, Hamas has become a fighting Jihadist movement
that does not make any compromises with Israel.
The Ummah is forbidden to become weak or depressed and to accept the tyrannical peace that the Zionists wish to
enforce. Allāh said that you should not humble yourselves in order to seek peace because you are superior to your
enemies in power and Allāh is with you, and He will not ignore your deeds.118

This is the source of Hamas’ idea of being prepared only for a temporary ceasefire with Israel,
in the best of cases. Qaraḍāwī supports this approach since no generation has the right to
surrender any part of Islamic territory in the name of future generations out of temporary
weakness.119
In the meantime, they must continue in the path of Jihad that has brought them many accomplishments. Ceaseless
pressure on Israel will bring about a balance of terror that will lead to the expulsion of the enemy… what happened in
Lebanon will take place in Palestine as well.120

According to Hamas leader, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Rantisi (d. 2004), “what the [Palestinian]
Authority regards as a distant objective, we see as a stage in our struggle. We believe that we
must not give up one iota of our land.”121 Indeed, Hamas considers Israel’s withdrawal from
Gaza as a great victory for the Palestinians and as proof that the path of resistance that
Qaraḍāwī preached is the right way.
Killing for the sake of defending Islam is a necessity, and there is no escape. Thus, Qaraḍāwī
opens the seventh section of his book, Fiqh al-Jihād (Laws of Jihad) by quoting a verse from
Sūra 2 (Al-Baqara), 216: “It is written in the book [the Qurʾān] that it is a commandment to
fight even though it may be repulsive to you.”122 History proves that Jihad is the only way
which the enemy retreated before the Muslims and gave Muslims their rights to land and the
possessions as is written in the Sūra 33 (Al-Aḥzāb), 25–27:
And Allāh repelled those who disbelieved, in their rage, not having obtained any good. And sufficient was Allāh for the
believers in battle, and ever is Allāh Powerful and Exalted in Might. And He brought down those who supported them
among the People of the Scripture from their fortresses and cast terror into their hearts [so that] a party you killed, and
you took captive a party. And He caused you to inherit their land and their homes and their properties and a land which
you have not trodden. And ever is Allāh, over all things, competent 123

All the conquests of the Muslims, including the Land of Israel, are eternal and they are part of
the divine reward for the believers.
According to Qaraḍāwī, Hamas is not an independent movement, but part of the network
of Islamic movements. It is part of the association of the Muslim Brotherhood of which
Qaraḍāwī was a member for many years. His goal is that Hamas, along with Islamic
organizations such as the Islamic Jihad in Palestine (Al-Jihād al-Islamī fī Filasṭīn), the Islamic
Liberation Party (Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr) and others, will overcome the differences between them and
realize a united Muslim front against the Zionist enemy. According to Ḥasan Al-Bannā, this is

the purpose of the Muslim Brotherhood in general.124 In the Palestinian context, Hamas is the
foremost of these movements. All of them are fighting against the Zionists and Eastern and
Western European colonialism and are based upon Islam. They have acquired a vast
knowledge in many fields such as biology, chemistry, technology, engineering, etc. Only in this
way can these movements, especially Hamas, confront Israel for a long period of time and
eventually defeat Israel.125 The spokesmen of Hamas explain this approach as guiding them in
their struggle against Israel, and it finds expression in their covenant. While Hamas regards
itself as a Palestinian national liberation movement, it is also a partner of the Islamic
movements throughout the Muslim world. After they take over their respective countries,
these movements eventually will unite in order to establish the Islamic empire envisioned by
Hasan al-Banna.126

6. Support for the Islamic Movement and the judaization of
Jerusalem
The Islamic Movement in Israel, headed by Sheikh Raed Salah Mahajneh (Rāʾed Ṣalāḥ
Maḥājna), also is regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood, as is evident in published
statements by Hamas and in the websites of the Islamic Movement itself.127 The split within
the Islamic Movement inside Israel, began during the Knesset elections in 1996 when the
southern faction decided to ‫)מ”ער‬. Basing its position on a ruling by Sheikh Qaraḍāwī that was
accepted by Raed Salah and his supporters, the northern branch consistently has refused to do
so. Raed Salah refused to accept the ruling of Abdallah Nimer Darwish, chairman of the
Islamic Movement, who wished to run in Knesset elections. Salah and his associates argued
that it is forbidden by Islamic law because it would grant partial recognition of the State of
Israel and its laws. Accordingly, the very act of participation in the elections in the nation-state
of the Jews, given its clearly Jewish purpose and symbols, is absolutely disqualified, even as a
tactical measure.128
As we have noted above, Qaraḍāwī has consistently supported the approach of Sheikh
Salah and provides an explanation based upon Islamic law for non-participation in elections in
Israel. According to Qaraḍāwī, the issue of serving in the Knesset is not subject to the “law of
balance” (Fiqh al-Muwāzanāt) that he ruled concerning Muslim minorities that live in
Western countries. The law of balance enables a Muslim minority to take part in political life
in light of cost-benefit considerations. Qaraḍāwī defines Israel as “a foreign entity in the
region that forced itself by force of iron and fire and it is like a foreign limb in an Arab and
Muslim body and as such it is rejected by the rest of the limbs of the body.”129

In a series of articles in the newspaper of the Islamic Movement, Ṣawt al-Ḥaqq walḤurriyya (“The Voice of Justice and Freedom”), Raed Salah explains his position, without
referring to Qaraḍāwī’s ruling: “I am increasingly convinced that the apparatus of the Knesset
is an expression of the Zionist enterprise that has come to serve only the Zionist enterprise
both on a local and on an international level.”130 Salah continues to explain that the Zionist
Movement perpetrated the Nakba that led to the establishment of the Israel as a foreign entity
on the soil of Palestine.131 The land of Palestine is Muslim land and Islamic sacred trust (Waqf)
and the Jews who are not a people and whose religion is not relevant are not permitted to
take Islamic land of Palestine. The State of Israel as a state that represents foreign occupation
has no legitimacy to be here at all.132 Such statements remarkably resemble those of
Qaraḍāwī and are inspired by him. Indeed, Qaraḍāwī holds Raed Salah in great esteem. Both
he and many Hamas activists refer to Salah as “the Sheikh of Al-Aqsa” because he is more
identified with the struggle against the judaization of Jerusalem than any other Islamic
figure.133
Sheikh Raed Salah is identified with the struggle against the Jewish presence on the Temple
Mount more than any other Palestinian spokesman. In his sermons and on the many occasions
that he has been under arrest and released, he has clarified his position that Jews have no
connection with the Temple Mount and there must be forceful resistances against Jews
ascending the Mount.
“The Al-Aqsa Mosque is Islamic, Arab, Palestinian property and no one but them, no matter who it is, has any right to it,
and especially the Jews have no right there till the Apocalypse. He who agrees that they have rights to the stones or
antiquities or anything else there is a traitor. It is our obligation to tell that person that he is a traitor. This is treason
against Allāh, Muhammad and the believers, the Islamic Ummah, the Arab world and the Palestinian people. It is treason
against the first Qibla (direction of prayer) and the Second Mosque and the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent to Heaven. It is
treason against the Sacred Mosques in Mecca and Medina… Al-Aqsa is ours alone and no Jewish public figure has any
claim to it.”134

According to Salah, the Jews have no claim to Al-Aqsa at all, and furthermore, they defile the
holy place by their very presence. Hence, there is a strong objection to Jews even going up to
the Temple Mount, without any connection to what they do there.
Qaraḍāwī justifies the opposition to Jews ascending the Temple Mount and supports the
activities of the Islamic Movement, headed by Raed Salah, in defense of Al-Aqsa mosque. He
has even devoted his weekly program Al-Sharīʿa wal-Ḥayāt to the subject of the Jewish
takeover of Al-Aqsa and invited Raed Salah to speak and exchange greetings. The program
has an audience of millions of Muslims and is broadcast via Al Jazeera. It teaches us about
Qaraḍāwī’s position on Jerusalem and the Temple Mount and his unequivocal support for
Sheikh Salah and his struggle against Israel’s occupation and “Judaization of Jerusalem.”135
Qaraḍāwī’s unequivocal statement against Jews going up to the Temple Mount and his
pronouncement that it is the obligation of all Muslims to oppose it is still valid today, just as it

was on the Jewish Fast of the Ninth of Av (Tisha Ba’av) [15 July 2015], when confrontations
took place between Muslims from East Jerusalem and Israeli Security Forces regarding Jews
ascending the Temple Mount.136
A special program on Jerusalem on Qaraḍāwī’s regular television series, Al-Sharīʿa walḤayāt, opens with his message regarding the special connection between the three sacred
mosques: the Kaʿba Mosque in Mecca; the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina; and the Al-Aqsa
Mosque in Jerusalem. Referring to interpretations of Qurʾanic verses and the Ḥadīth as prooftexts, Qaraḍāwī shows that the three mosques have equal status as far as the obligation of all
Muslims to defend them is concerned. Certainly, Muslims must make a pilgrimage to all three
mosques, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque where one prayer is equal to 500 prayers elsewhere.
As a rule, Muslims must defend these sites, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque, as it is under
attack and in danger of demolition by unbelievers. The Al-Aqsa Mosque does not only belong
to the Palestinians but to Muslims everywhere. Qaraḍāwī unequivocally condemns the
attempts to judaize Al-Aqsa. It is not a coincidence that this program was broadcast during the
Jewish holiday season in October 2012 (Ḥagei Tisheri), when many Jews came to pray in
Jerusalem at the Western Wall and some ascended the Temple Mount. Therefore, Qaraḍāwī,
Hamas and Islamic Movement activists are afraid of a change in the status quo on the Temple
Mount.137
On the program, Qaraḍāwī was asked about recent visits of Jews on the Temple Mount. He
answered regretfully that “in our time, every day Jews commit atrocities in order to defile the
Temple Mount. Muslims are silent about it and it is forbidden that this should happen.”138
Muslims are forbidden from remaining silent about Jewish actions on the Temple Mount.
According to Qaraḍāwī,
Al-Aqsa is an Islamic mosque: one hundred percent; one thousand percent; one million percent – an Islamic mosque. The
Jews have no right even to one grain of it. They are trying to search for a place or any archeological remnant of their
imagined temple and they have not found a thing, despite the fact that they have undertaken more than fifty
excavations and have done what they have done, even underneath the Al-Aqsa Mosque. They want to judaize the place
and make it into a Jewish site. They wish to eradicate all that is Muslim and all that is Arab from this region and to try
to transform it into a place for Jews and Zionists. We absolutely reject this and claim that it is essentially a Muslim and
Arab mosque. The entire area and all of the Old City of Jerusalem is completely one hundred percent Arab.

Qaraḍāwī further argues that the Jews are removing local Arab residents, both Christians and
Muslims, and are building new settlements and neighborhoods, despite the fact that in the
Oslo Accords they made a commitment not to build they continue to build and have not
stopped, even for a single day. “We have the obligation to oppose this; a religious duty to resist
this settlement.”139 Qaraḍāwī does not only mention the settlements in Jerusalem but all over
Palestine. Indeed, any Jewish settlement is a sophisticated form of colonialism that expels the
original inhabitants and replaces them with foreigners. In fact, he devotes the second chapter
of his book, The Enemies of Islamic Solution, to this problem and the uniqueness of

Zionism.140
The only way to restore the rights of Muslims is the “Way of Resistance” (Al-Muqāwama),
namely military resistance. His position is consistent with that of the majority of Palestinians –
supporters of Hamas, Fatah and other organizations that maintain that Israel will be subdued
only by military force and violent and civilian resistance.141 The International Union of
Muslim Scholars (IUMS) Conference held in 2012, attended by Qaraḍāwī, dealt with the issue
of defending Jerusalem and the importance of contributing to the International Al-Quds
Institute (Muʾassasat al-Quds al-Duwaliyya) headed by Qaraḍāwī. Sheikh Raed Salah was
present after the discussion at the last IUMS Conference, where he praised Qaraḍāwī.
Afterward, Salah spoke about the attempts by Jews to establish a “greater Jerusalem” and
judaize the city by removing its Muslim residents. In addition, the Israeli occupation is trying
to divide the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, as it has done at the Cave of the Patriarchs in
Hebron. Salah strongly opposes such a plan and calls it Al-Taqsīm Tl-Bāṭil (the malicious
division). After Salah’s speech, Qaraḍāwī repeated his support for him and for his struggle to
prevent Jews from praying on the Temple Mount. Both Salah and Qaraḍāwī object the plan
for separate times for prayer that exists at the Temple Mount. They ask how it is possible that
Jews are allowed to pray on the Temple Mount, a site that they regard totally as an Islamic
mosque. Hence, there must be an orderly plan to confront the Zionist occupation.142
Yasin Hamoud (Yāsīn Ḥammūd), CEO of the Al-Quds International Institute, joined the
television program at this point. The Institute is the major organization for Muslim charitable
donations world-wide and, as we noted, it is headed by Qaraḍāwī. Hamoud describes its
current projects that are designed to strengthen the position of the Muslim residents of
Jerusalem, including the financial aid given to the Islamic Movement of Sheikh Raed Salah.
These funds pay for organizing conferences, legal support, prevention of demolition or sale of
houses and organizing protests against the Israeli forces in Jerusalem.143
The activities of Salah’s Islamic Movement are not local actions by Muslim residents of
Jerusalem and of Arab citizens of Israel against measures that showcase the Jewish aspects of
Jerusalem. They are part of a well-oiled network that is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and
to the charitable funds from all over the world that are run by Qaraḍāwī and find expression
in his program, Al-Sharīʿa wal-Ḥayāt, on Al Jazeera Television. It is not a coincidence that
Raed Salah is interviewed on a program that is watched by millions throughout the world.
The messages of Salah regarding Jews and Jerusalem in his speeches in Israel are the same as
those that Qaraḍāwī preaches in his programs and books.
In his book, The Enemies of Islamic Solution, Qaraḍāwī deals with the Islamic Movement in
Israel. He points out that in 1979, twelve Islamic activists among “the Arabs of occupied
Palestine” and Islamic scholars in Palestine of 1948 (i.e., the State of Israel) were arrested.
Qaraḍāwī also quotes the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, on the “phenomenon of increasing
Islamic revival in the 1948 villages of the Arab Triangle, meaning that Islam reaches the

villages of the Arab Triangle in [central] Israel.”144 He specifically states that every Friday
many Israeli Arabs go to prayers at Al-Aqsa mosque, including residents of the village of Baqa
al-Gharbiyye in the Arab Triangle. Qaraḍāwī points out that for the 30 years from 1947–1979,
the villages of the Triangle treated Fridays just like any other day of the week, “but now
Friday is given a more important meaning. Now the muezzin has begun to raise his voice
louder, so that all the residents [of the village] hasten to the mosque and prepare themselves
for prayer.”145
The Islamic Movement is flourishing as part of a general Islamic revival. The same is true in
Qalansuwa, Taibeh, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Kafar Qassem, Umm al-Fahm, Tira, Kafar Qara and
others. According to Qaraḍāwī, all these villages have returned to Islam and there is a strong
presence of the revival of the Islamic Movement there. Abdallah Nimer Darwish lives in Kafar
Qassem and Raed Salah, in Umm al-Fahm. Qaraḍāwī notes a similar tendency in Arab towns
such as Akko (Acre). The return to Islam on the part of the younger generation of Arabs
derives from the fact that they have given up on secular ideas and on wasting time in cafés
and nightclubs. According to articles in the press cited by Qaraḍāwī, the return to Islam
among the “Arabs of 1948” frightens Israel. The cultural renaissance of Islam is a blessing that
will eventually bring an end to the State of Israel and enable members of the Muslim-Arab
minority to act against Israel, where they are citizens, on behalf of the Muslim Ummah.146

7. Like pupil to his master: Sheikh Raed Salah and Qaraḍāwī
The existing hierarchy between Qaraḍāwī and Raed Salah is evident in a public statement
issued by the latter at the time of Qaraḍāwī’s visit to the Gaza Strip in May 2013.147 The visit
was the subject of much criticism by the Palestinian Authority that argued that the Palestinian
passport handed to Qaraḍāwī by Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyya is a fraudulent
document. Surprisingly, at first Raed Salah also criticized Qaraḍāwī’s visit to Gaza. His
condemnation was published by the Wafa News Agency, identified with the Palestinian
Authority, and appeared on several websites.148 Therefore, Salah had to explain his position
and that of the Islamic Movement toward Qaraḍāwī in an emotional public statement.149 He
was forced to do so because he was vilified. Salah declared that “no gossip was uttered by my
tongue, as if I had said: ‘If I were in Gaza, I would have refused to welcome Qaraḍāwī.’ Those
are basically shameful words and a blatant lie that was not upon my tongue.”150 He further
proclaimed that
it was not upon my tongue as if I had said: ‘Qaraḍāwī ruled that it is strictly forbidden for me to make a pilgrimage
(Arabic, shadd al-riḥāl) to Jerusalem, while he [Qaraḍāwī] goes on a pilgrimage to Gaza, which is under ‘occupation.’ This
is a cheap libel against me.151

Indeed, Qaraḍāwī ruled that it is strictly forbidden to visit Jerusalem while it remains under
occupation. This position was accepted with great understanding by Hamas that even
condemned the statements of the Palestinian Authority, including that of the PA Mufti
Muhammad Husein that opposed this fatwa and proposed that Qaraḍāwī do the opposite and
go to Jerusalem to strengthen the Palestinian people.152
Salah continues as follows:
It was neither on the tongue of the Islamic Movement nor on my tongue that ‘Qaraḍāwī does not represent Palestine and
that he has no authority to make rulings for the Palestinian people.’ This is a big lie that has no foundation.153

It is evident from Salah’s denial that Qaraḍāwī clearly is the legitimate legal authority for
the Palestinian people.
It has been attributed to me that I said: ‘Today I call upon every Arab to visit Al-Aqsa.’ And then I added: ‘How does
Qaraḍāwī forbid a visit to Jerusalem and permit a visit to Gaza.’ These are shameful words that are clear to all. I have
never said those things.”154 “I have made no mistake, and I emphasize that Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, may God
preserve him, is the head of all the Islamic sages in the entire world. He is the highest and most thorough
authority for the entire Muslim Ummah today for all Islamic issues of the Islamic scholars, its believers and the
public. [He is the authority] for the great men [of the Ummah] and for the simple folk, men and women [alike].”
(Authors’ emphasis)155

Sheikh Raed Salah declared explicitly that he accepts the authority of Sheikh Qaraḍāwī
absolutely as the greatest of the present generation of the Islamic Ummah. Those who libeled
him do not fear Allāh; they are thugs and gangsters.
On 23 August 2013, Raed Salah made an emotional appeal for people to come to Yawm alNafīr (the Day of General Mobilization) on behalf of Al-Aqsa. At a speech in Kafar Qara,
Salah gave the specific dates of Yawm al- Nafīr, as follows: the eve of Rosh Hashana (the
Jewish New Year – 4 September 2013) and Sukkoth (the Jewish Feast of Tabernacles – 18–26
September 2013). On 3 September, Salah was arrested on his way to a press conference in
Jerusalem. At the hearing at the Magistrate’s Court, Judge Hagit Mack-Kalmanovich stated
that there is a reasonable suspicion that his speech constitutes incitement. Therefore, the judge
accepted the position of the prosecution and ordered him released on bail on condition that he
not be near the vicinity of greater Jerusalem for 180 days and that he pay a sum of NIS
50,000.00 as a guarantee for the conditions of his release. The appeal against this decision in
the District Court was rejected by Judge Arnon Darel.156 Qaraḍāwī and the IUMS that he
heads issued a condemnation of this decision by an Israeli court. Qaraḍāwī’s statements show
his attitude toward the Islamic Movement.
The public statement by the Union of Muslim Scholars came out against the criminal act
directed at all of the Arabs and honorable Muslims throughout the world. Furthermore, the
statement contains an emotional appeal to all Arab and Muslim countries, groups and
international organizations against the deterioration of the situation and living conditions in

Palestine in general and in Gaza in particular. In addition, it mentions the Zionist injustice that
prevents Muslims worshippers from praying at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron during
the Jewish festivals of Rosh Hashana and Sukkoth and the fact that Jews were permitted to
ascend the Temple Mount during the fall holiday season. Despite the fact that restrictions
against Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount are alleviated during the holiday season, the
public statement argues that Israel is exploiting the events in Egypt and in Syria in order to
determine facts on the ground and take over the holy places of Islam. Sheikh Raed Salah is
presented as a hero of the Muslim Ummah as he attempts to prevent these things.157
Therefore the court of the oppressive occupation has ruled [thus] – a decision that distances the Sheikh, the Jihad warrior
(Mujāhid), Raed Salah, who is a symbol of a strong stance (Ṣumūd) and of defense of Al-Aqsa and prevented him from
entering the honorable Jerusalem for a period of six months.158

The public statement continues with a description of criminal collusion between Israel and
Egypt, under the leadership of General Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Sisi. Qaraḍāwī completely justified
Salah’s calls for violence in Jerusalem during the Jewish holidays in 2013. As a result, there
were harsh disturbances, and stones were thrown at Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall.
Action by the police force and the arrest of a number of rioters put a stop to these events.159

Conclusion
Qaraḍāwī takes advantage of his position as the senior Islamic legal scholar in the Sunni world
today in order to express his unqualified support for Hamas and the Islamic Movement inside
Israel. He does so in several areas. As far as finances are concerned, he channels monies to
Hamas and the Islamic Movement headed by Raed Salah. These contributions enable the
continuity of the activities of their organizations in all fields, including military wing of the
Hamas. Financial donations are collected via the Al-Quds International Institute (Muʾassasat
al-Quds al-Duwaliyya) or the Charity Coalition (Iʾtilāf al-Khair) and are transferred by
various means to activists of the Islamic Movement and of Hamas. Thus, for example, the
Islamic movement can finance its activity in Jerusalem, organize mass demonstrations and
transport its followers throughout the country to Jerusalem, etc.160 In January 2014, Khalil
Ghazawi, a Muslim Brotherhood activist in Jerusalem (acting within the framework of
Hamas), was accused of receiving monies from the Charity Coalition headed by Qaraḍāwī, for
Daʿwa activities on the Temple Mount. He was indicted, found guilty and sentenced to 46
months in jail.161
As far as ideology is concerned, Qaraḍāwī represents the most hard-line position among
Islamic scholars today regarding Israel – a strictly uncompromising line. In the 1990s, he

strongly opposed the Oslo Accords162 and continues to oppose any similar agreement in the
foreseeable future. The problem of Palestine is that of the Islamic Ummah and it is not able to
reach any compromise with the Jews at all. Therefore, all means, including “acts of selfsacrifice” (i.e., suicide terrorism) against women and children are legitimate in the conflict
against the Jews. The moderate views, such as those of the Saudi Mufti Sheikh Ibn Bāz, or his
successor, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abdallāh al-Shaikh, are met with derision that expresses doubts
about their positions as Islamic scholars, and their legitimacy is challenged. According to
Qaraḍāwī, those who make rulings against suicide attacks are “those who are ignoramuses in
religion and its laws.”163
In fact, as we have described above, Qaraḍāwī’s books, articles and weekly program on Al
Jazeera give ideological and religious justification for Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Islamic
Movements to continue the struggle against Israel. Qaraḍāwī does not distinguish between
Zionists and Jews. Hence, because of events in Palestine, he has initiated the unfair treatment
of Jews on a religious basis by Muslims throughout the world.164 According to Qaraḍāwī,
every Jew who lives in occupied Palestine is deserving of death. Therefore, he permits Hamas
to launch indiscriminate attacks against women and children in Israel. He calls it blessed terror.
Any means of attacking Israel is blessed, even using women as suicide bombers, a practice that
at first was opposed by Hamas. It was Qaraḍāwī who permitted it and influenced women such
as Reem Riyashi to take part in acts of terror and sacrifice against the Zionist enemy. He has
provided the theological basis for regarding Palestine as Muslim country that is under
occupation. Therefore, one must use all means to liberate it, including genocide of the Jews
who live there. In effect, Qaraḍāwī has given Jews who live in Israel the choice between death
and departure for Europe or the United States. According to Qaraḍāwī, Allāh has punished the
Jewish people via Hitler who did not complete his task. He hopes and believes that now it is
for the Muslims to fulfill Allāh’s will and punish the Jews for the crimes that they committed
in Palestine.165
As far as Muslims that live in Israel proper are concerned, Qaraḍāwī takes a position that is
essentially different from the laws for minorities (Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt) that apply to Muslims in
Europe. He has issued a fatwā that explicitly forbids the Muslim minority in Israel to elect
representatives to the Knesset. It is a religious interdict that appears in his book.166 Hamas has
adopted this fatwā.167 Non-participation in general elections to the Knesset is one of the
definite identifying marks of Sheikh Raed Salah and the activists in the Islamic movement. It
probably explains the marked decline in the number of voters among Israeli Arabs that
corresponds with the rise of the Islamic Movement since the 1980s. About 50%of the Arabs in
Israel did not cast their ballots in the elections in 2009 and 2013.168 Nevertheless, there is an
official estimate regarding the Islamic Movement and the range of its activities. Local elections
for municipal councils conducted over the past decade show that the Islamic Movement has

won in eight local councils in the Arab sector, including Umm al-Fahm and Kafar Qassem. The
total of those who voted for the lists of the Islamic Movement in those places was 28.6%of the
votes. This figure gives us an indication of the strength and influence of the Islamic Movement
inside Israel.169
Qaraḍāwī maintains that the Islamic revival in Palestine – among the Arabs in Israel and
those in the West Bank and Gaza – presents difficult challenges for Israel.170 Qaraḍāwī’s
statements have repercussions among a wider public because they are spoken by preachers
who are activists in Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement, include members of the
Qaraḍāwī’s International Union of Muslim Scholars, such as Sheikh Ismail Haniyya, Sheikh
Raed Salah, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, Sheikh ʿIkrima Ṣabrī, Sheikh Nājeḥ Bkeirāt and others who
obey his rulings. We may conclude from an examination of Qaraḍāwī’s writings, articles and
pronouncements in various forums that Qaraḍāwī is the most senior religious figure in Sunni
Islam. At present, he is accepted by millions of Sunni Muslims throughout the world, not only
by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and he effectively heads an Islamic “crusade” whose
purpose is the destruction of the Jewish state.

Notes
1 Ḥasan Al-Bannā, Majmūʿat Rasāʾil lil-Imam Ḥasan al-Bannā (Beirut: No publisher, no date), pp. 121–124, 352–353.
Yaakov Havakook and Shakib Saleh, Islamic Terrorism: Profile of the Hamas Movement (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense
Publication, 1999), p. 23.
2

Opening

passage,

Hamas

Covenant

(1988).

See

English

translation

by

Yale

Law

School,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
3 “Daʾawa, the Civic Infrastructure of Hamas and Its Role in Financing Terror,” Israeli General Security Agency (Shabak),
March 2009, www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/dawaa-report.aspx.
4 Israel Ministry of Defense Website, Proclamations and Orders concerning Terrorist Organizations and Forbidden
Associations, Proclamation 25 February 2002, by Minister of Defense Binyamin Ben Eliezer, www.mod.gov.il/Defenceand-Security/Fighting_terrorism/Pages/default.aspx.
5 “Daʾawa, the Civic Infrastructure of Hamas and its Role in Financing Terror”.
6 Israel Ministry of Defense Website, www.mod.gov.il/Defence-andSecurity/Fighting_terrorism/Pages/default.aspx. All the
proclamations were issued on 25 February 2002 after it was revealed that they were linked to the encouragement of
military and civic activity of Hamas; and linked to Qaraḍāwī and the Charity Coalition.
7 File no. 272/03 the State of Israel vs. Raʾed Salah Mahajneh, Mahmud Mahajneh (Abu Samra), Tawfiq Mahajneh, Nasser
Ighbariyya and Suleiman Ighbariyya. Indictment was submitted on June 24, 2003 in Haifa Central Court. See also:

Bartal, Jihad in Palestine, p. 67.
8 Israel Ministry of Defense Website. Associated Press, “Israel Outlaws Islamist Group Accused of Inciting Violence,” The
Washington Post, 17 November 2015. www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-outlaws-islamic-group-accused-of-incitingviolence/2015/11/17/d55ec60e-8d64-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html?utm_term=.b7da303f9d9b
9 Gideon Alon and Yoav Stern, “Religious Leaders: Yasin Has become the Leader of the Muslim Ummah,” Haaretz, 22
March 2004, www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.954015.
10 Al-Aqsa Channel (Gaza), 9 May 2013, http://aqsatv.ps.
11

Soner

Cagaptay,

“The

AKP’s

Hamas

Policy:

Us

vs.

Them,”

Hurriyet

Daily

News,

5

July

2010,

www.hurriyetdailynews.com.default.aspx?pageid=438&n+the-akp8217shamas-policy-8220us-vs.-them-2010-07-02.
12 Hamas received 76 seats (The List for Change and Reform, 74 seats; and 2 independent representatives), out of 132 seats
in the elections of the Palestinian Authority on 26 January 2006. Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for
Palestine (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), pp. 95–96.
13 Shaul Bartal, “Sheikh Qaradawi and the Internal Palestinian Struggle: Issues Preventing Reconciliation between Fatah
and Hamas and the Influence of the Qaradawi Era over the Struggle between the Organizations,” Middle Eastern Studies,
51 (July 2015), pp. 585–599.
14 “Live Sermon on Qatar Television from the Umar Ibn al-Khattab Mosque, Doha,” cited by: Helfont, Yusuf al-Qaradawi:
Islam and Modernity, pp. 109–110.
15 Yusuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ẓāhirat al-Ghulūw fi al-Takfīr (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1977), pp. 20–21.
16 Qaraḍāwī’s positions against concepts foreign to Islam, such as democracy, local nationalism and socialism appear in his
sermon on Eid Al-Aḍḥa (Festival of the Sacrifice). See: Al-Saʿd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 3, 17: “Sermon on the
Occasion of Eid al-Aḍḥa, given in Doha in 1995, p. 253.
17 Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Bayān lil-ʾIttiḥād al-ʿᾹlamī li-Ulamaʾ al-Muslimīn Yatanāwalu al-Shaʾn al-Islamī,” Qaraḍāwi Website, 5
December 2011, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/documents/5408-2011-12-05-10-22-03.html.2011.
18 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 147–148; The Palestinian
Intifada and the Red Lines of Egypt, MEMRI Website, 7 November 2000 (Hebrew), www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=875141_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=225;
mundhu

majīʾī

ila

Qatar

lam

uʾayyid

hākiman

ẓāliman,”

Qaraḍāwi

Aḥmad
Web-site,

ʿAlī,
24

“Al-Qaraḍāwī:

December

2013,

www.Qaraḍāwi.net/news/7064-2013-12-23-11-11-47.html.
19 Kramer, “Drawing Boundaries: Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwi on Apostasy,” pp. 196–197; ʿAlī, “Al-Qaraḍāwī: mundhu majīʾī ila
Qatar lam uʾayyid hākiman ẓāliman”.
20 Al-Sharīʿa Wal-Ḥayāt, “Ḥudūd Allāh” [The Boundaries of Allah], Al-Jazeera, 2 June 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?
v=cX7C3OkYzQ0; Aḥmad ʿAlī, op.cit.
21 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, pp. 1072–1073; Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aina al-Khalal? (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 2004), pp. 63–

64.
22 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Istiftāʾ al-Inqilāb Bāṭil,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 21 January 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/news/7113-2014-01-2004-42-21.html.
23 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Qirāʾa fī Wāqiʿ al-Umma fī al-Fatra al-Akhīra (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 2009), p. 34.
24 Ibid., pp. 33–34. According to Qaraḍāwī, such governments are regarded as governments of unbelief. Thus, Qaraḍāwī
adopts the position of Sayyid Quṭb. See: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ẓāhirat al-Ghulūw fi al-Takfīr, pp. 20–21.
25 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Qirāʾa fī Wāqiʿ al-ʿUlamāʾ fī al-fatra al-Akhīra, p. 24.
26 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Dīn fī ʿAṣr al-ʿIlm (Ammān: Dar Al-Furqān, 1996), p. 109; Al-Qaraḍāwi, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī,
pp. 26–28.
27 Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964). Qaraḍāwī does not cite the
book accurately but mentions it in a general way.
28 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Dīn fī ʿAṣr al-ʿIlm, pp. 109–110.
29 See: Uri Rubin (Hebrew trans.), The Qurʾan (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 2005), note 190, p. 26.
30 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Daʿwa, May, 1977, cited by: Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, p. 38.
31 Ibid.
32 Anat Berko, On the Way to Paradise: The World of Female and Male Suicide Terrorists and Those Who Send Them (Tel
Aviv: Miskal, 2004), pp. 74–81; Shaul Shai, The Shahīds: Islam and Suicide Attacks (Herzliya: Interdisciplinary Center,
2003), p. 29.
33 Interview with Sheikh Al-Qaraḍāwī on Al-Raya Newspaper (Qatar), 25 April 2001, cited in: “The Arab-Muslim Dispute
Regarding the Legitimacy of Suicide Attacks,” MEMRI Website, 4 May 2001, www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal.pl?
lang=he&ID=_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=352; Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, pp. 1071–1072. The word for
terror in Arabic is “irhāb”. The verse that is traditionally cited by Al-Qaraḍāwī speaks about permitted and approved
terror, as follows: “Turhibūna bihi ʿadūwa Allāh wa-ʾaʿdāʾukum,” (“Instill fear in the heart of the enemies of Allah and
your enemies.
34 Interview in: Al-Ahrām al-ʿArabī (Egypt), 3 February 2001, cited in: “The Arab-Muslim Dispute Regarding the Legitimacy
of

Suicide

Attacks,”

MEMRI

Website,

4

May

2001,

www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal.pl?

lang=he&ID=_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=35; Dr. Iṣām al-Abd Zahd, “Al-Jihād al-Filasṭīnī fī Fiqh alQaraḍāwī,” p. 153.
35 Al-Istiqlala, Bulletin of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization, 20 August 1999, cited in: “The Arab-Muslim Dispute
Regarding the Legitimacy of Suicide Attacks,” MEMRI Web-site, 4 May 2001, www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal.pl?
lang=he&ID=_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=35.
36 “Bayān tawḍīḥī ḥawla raʾy al-ʿAllāma al-Qaraḍāwī fi-l-ʿamaliyyāt al-istishhādiyya,” Al-Qaraḍāwi Website, 27 July
2015, http://Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/8086-201507-27-13-42-39. “Sheikh Qaradawi: The Palestinians Have No Need for

Suicide Attacks since They Have Missiles,” MEMRI Website, 29 July 2015, www.memri.org.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal.pl?
lang=he&ID=875141_memri&act=show&ddbid=articles&dataaid=3931.
37 Joseph Schacht, “Ibn Nudjaim,” in: B. Lewis, V.L. Ménage, Ch. Pellat and J. Schacht, (eds.), Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd
edition, vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1971), p. 901.
38 Yvon Linant de Bellefonds, “Ḍarūra,” in: P.J. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs,
(eds.), Encyclopedia of Islam, New edition, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1983), pp. 163–164.
39 Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Al-ʿAmliyyāt al-Istishādiyya fī Filasṭīn,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 23 February 2010, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/201002-23-09-38-15/4/700.html1089. See also: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, 1089.
40 Ibid.
41 Al-Ḥayāt, 19 February 2005, cited by: Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, p. 63.
42 Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, pp. 63–64; Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Tarbiya al-Islāmiyya wa-Madrasat Ḥasan alBannā (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1979), pp. 39–49.
43 See Qurʾan, 14:59; Al-Murshid al-Maidānī, “Al-Qaraḍāwī wa-Mawāqifuhu min al-Qaḍiyya al-Filasṭῑniyya,” in: Ismā‛ῑl
Haniyya (Haniyeh), et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī fī Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya alFilasṭῑnῑya (Gaza: markaz al-iʿlām al-ʿarabῑ, 2012), p. 165.
44 Dalacoura, Islamic Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East, pp. 26–37.
45 Matti Steinberg, Unending Quest: The Development of Palestinian National Consciousness, 1967–2007 (Tel Aviv: Miskal
and Yedioth Ahronoth, 2008), p. 284 (Hebrew).
46 Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Al-ʿAmliyyāt al-Istishādiyya fī Filasṭīn”.
47 Ibid.
48 Iṣām al-Abd Zahd, “Al-Jihād al-Filasṭīnī fī Fiqh al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 149.
49 Ibid., p. 135.
50 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, p. 1092.
51 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to HRC
Resolution S-21/1 (Geneva: United Nations, June 2015), p. 9, Nos. 33–34.
52 Anat Berko, The Smarter Bomb: Women and Children as Suicide Bombers (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), pp. 52–
64 in Hebrew version of the book. Dr. Berko’s interviews with Hamas activists in Jerusalem, Sheikh Muhammad Abu-Teir
and Ahmad Attun. See also: Hamas Covenant [Charter], Article Eighteen.
53 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 1, p. 124.
54 Iṣām al-Abd Zahd, “Al-Jihād al-Filasṭīnī fī Fiqh al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 129.
55 Fatwa of 2003, see: www.islamonline.net.eng, cited by Ephraim Herrera and Gideon M. Kressel, Jihad: Fundamentals and
Fundamentalism (Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense, 2009), p. 96 (Hebrew); “The Qaraḍāwī Fatwas,” Middle East

Quarterly, 11/3 (Summer 2004), pp. 78–80.
56 Qaraḍāwī is generally known for his liberal views and permits women to participate in politics, as opposed to the positions
of Hasan al-Banna. See: Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen, Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, pp. 58–59.
57 Robert Spencer, The Complete Infidel’s Guide to the Qorʾan (New York: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2009), p. 6; Chis McGrael,
“Human-Bomb

Mother

Kills

Four

Israelis

at

Gaza

Checkpoint,”

Guardian,

15

January

2004,

www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/15/israel; “The Qaraḍāwī Fatwas,” pp. 78–80.
58 BBC Monitoring: Near/Middle East: Round-Up of Friday Sermons, 16 January 2004, cited in: Helfont, Yusuf al-Qaradawi:
Islam and Modernity, pp. 74–75.
59 Berko, The Smarter Bomb: Women and Children as Suicide Bombers, pp. 59–60. Interview with Sheikh Muhammad Abu
Teir.
60 Helfont, Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Islam and Modernity, p. 74.
61 Anonymous, “The Arab-Muslim Dispute Regarding the Legitimacy of Suicide Attacks,” MEMRI Website,
www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&dbid=articles&act=show3&dataid=352, viewed on
19 February 2014.
62 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ẓāhirat al-Ghulūw fi al-Takfīr, p. 6.
63 Interview with Sheikh Al-Qaraḍāwī, in: Al-Raya (Qatar), 25 April 2001, cited in: “The Arab-Muslim Debate Regarding the
Legitimacy

of

Suicide

Attacks,”

MEMRI

Website,

4

May

2001,

www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?

lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=352.
64 Al-Jazeera Television, “Life and Religion: Al Jazeera Program Debates the Arab Stance on the Intifada and Suicide
Bombers,” 28 April 2002, BBC Monitoring, cited by: Helfont, Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwi, Islam and Modernity, pp. 75–76.
65 Tamam, “Yusuf Qaraḍawi and the Muslim Brothers: The Nature of a Special Relationship,” p. 63.
66 Bukay, From Muhammad to Bin Laden, pp. 294–303.
67 Ḥasan Al-Bannā, “Ṣināʿat al-Mawt,” in: Ḥasan Al-Bannā, Al-Imām al-Shahīd Yataḥaddathu ilā Shabāb al-ʿᾹlam al-Islāmī
(Beirut: Dar Al-Qalam, 1974), pp. 129– 132; Reuven Paz, Suicide and Jihad in Palestinian Radical Islam: The Ideological
Aspect (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, 1998), (Hebrew). p. 22
68 Paz, Suicide and Jihad in Palestinian Radical Islam, p. 22.
69 Ḥammād, Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī fi Khidmat al-Islām, pre-publication edition. For the
review by Ahmad Ḥasan ʿAli on the Qaraḍāwī Website, see: www.Qaraḍāwi.net/library/77/5517-2012-01-17-12-0051.html, viewed on 17 January 2012.
70 “The Charity Coalition: The Roof Organization for over Fifty Islamic Funds throughout the World That Direct Monies to
Hamas Institutions in the Territories,” Center for the Legacy of the Intelligence Community (Malam): Center for
Information

on

Intelligence

and

Terrorism,

no

date,

www.terrorism-

info.org.il/malam_multimedia/html/final/sp/12_04/cha.htm, viewed on 22 March 2012; Efrat Weiss, “Israel vs. the

International Charitable Funds of Hamas,” Y-Net, 7 July 2008, www.ynet.col.il/articles/0,7340,L-3565026,00.html; “The
Charity Coalition: Mapping and Analysis of the Financial Network of Monies for Terror,” Israel General Security Service
(Shabak), September 2009 (Hebrew), www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/coalition_he.aspx.
71 See: “Al-Qaraḍāwī Yastaqbilu [Rashīd] al-Ghanūshī wa-Wafdan min Ḥarakat al-Nahḍa wa-Firqat al-Shams alTūnisiyya,” Qaraḍāwi Website, 1 November 2011, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/news/5319-2011-11-01-14-41-03.html.
72 Aḥmad Ḥasan ʿAli, “Juhūd al-Duktūr Al-Qaraḍāwī fi Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya al-Filasṭῑniyya,” Qaraḍāwī
Website, 17 January 2012, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/library/77/5517-2012-01-17-00-51.html.
73 Ibid.; The article does not contain this citation as this particular quotation appears in the book, Fiqh al-Jihād. However,
similar statements that equate Israel and its actions with state terrorism and justify activities against Israel appear
elsewhere in the book, for example, in the sections that deal with state terrorism. See: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, pp.
1078–1080.
74 See: endnote No. 70.
75 Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, p. 451.
76 Ibid., p. 545.
77 Ibid., p. 497.
78 Ibid., pp. 465–478. See the discussion in: Reiter, War, Peace and International Relations in Islam, pp. 120–134.
79 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, p. 480.
80 Al-Shirāʿ, April 1995, cited by: Havakook and Saleh, Islamic Terrorism, p. 152.
81 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, p. 481.
82 Ibid., pp. 455–460.
83 Ibid., pp. 482–454.
84 Ibid., pp. 461–464. See the lengthy discussion in the Hamas bulletin, Filasṭīn al- Muslima (July 2012), pp. 40–51. It focuses
upon dubious trips to Jerusalem (Ziyārāt Mashbūha).
85 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, pp. 498–502.
86 Al-Lajna al-Thaqāfīyya al-ʿᾹamma, Al-Hayʾa al-Qiyādiyya al-ʿUlya, Ḥarakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya Hamas,
Manhaj al-Nahḍa al-Thaqāfī wal-Tarbawī, (Hamas: n.p., February 2013). pp. 26, 58–59, 82–85, 91–93.
87 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, pp. 485–487.
88 Ibid., pp. 487–488.
89 Ibid., pp. 450–488.
90 See: ʿAlī Rafīq Shawāhna, Iḍrāb al-Karāma, 2012: Maʿrakat al-ʿAhd wal-Wafāʾ wa-qiṣṣat al-Intiṣār… … Dākhil Sujūn alIḥtilāl (Gaza: Muʾassasat Muhjat al-Quds, 2013), pp. 13–22, 49–56. The book was written by this Hamas activist during

his incarceration in the Eshel Prison. It includes first-hand testimony regarding hunger strikes in Israeli prisons.
91 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, p. 490. Shawahana, Iḍrāb al-Karāma, pp. 22–32.
92 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, pp. 490–491.
93 Ibid., pp. 491–492.
94 Ibid., p. 493.
95 Ibid., pp. 493–494.
96 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 1, p. 725.
97 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1087.
98 The Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014
acknowledges eight cases where civilian homes that were shelled were used for unlawful military purposes and probably
served as the reason for Israeli attacks. Likewise, the authors of the report, headed by Justice Mary McGowan Davis,
stipulated that Hamas made extensive military use of buildings, such as schools and hospitals, including those belonging
to UNWRA that endangered UNWRA employees and other civilians who took shelter in them. Therefore, there was a
great loss of civilian life. Despite the above, they do justify Israel’s actions against these civilian institutions. See: United
Nations Human Rights Council: Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry, p. 10, Sections 39, pp. 63–65.
99 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, p. 1087.
100 Ibid., pp. 1087–1088.
101 Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, pp. 189–193.
102 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Qirāʾa fī Wāqi ʿal-Umma fī al-Fatra al-Akhīra, p. 27.
103 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 4 September 2004; also cited by: Herrera and Kressel, Jihad, p. 176.
104 David Zeidan, “The Islamic Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle,” Middle East Review of International
Affairs, 5 (December 2001), www.rubincenter.org/2001/12/zeidan-htm-2001-12-02/. Also in Herrera and Kressel, Jihad, p.
234.
105 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Qirāʾa fī Wāqiʿ al-Umma, p. 27.
106 Ibid., p. 28.
107 Ibid., pp. 29–32.
108 Al Jazeera TV, 16 September 2001, cited in: “Terror in America, Sheikh al-Qaradawi: The West Has Transformed Islam
into

the

Enemy,”

MEMRI

Website,

24

April

lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=447.
109 Al Jazeera TV, 16 September 2001.
110 Ibid., pp. 29–32.

2001,

www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?

111 “The Qaraḍāwī Fatwas,” pp. 78–80.
112 Qurʾan, vol. 8, p. 60.
113 Al Jazeera TV, 16 September 2001.
114 Ibid.
115 “Terror in America: An Islamic Legal Ruling: At the Request of the Mufti of the Pentagon, It Is Permitted for Muslim
Soldiers in the U.S. Armed Forces to Participate in the Fighting in Afghanistan,” MEMRI Website, 24 October 2001,
www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal..pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=473.

For

the

response of Bassām Jarrār, see the Palestinian newspaper: Al-Quds, 15 October 2001.
116 Al Jazeera TV, 13 January 2002.
117 Sami E. Baroudi, “Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi on International Relations: The Discourse of a Leading Islamist Scholar
(1926–),” Middle Eastern Studies, 50/1 (January 2014), pp. 10–11.
118 Sheikh Qaraḍāwī’s statement on 4 April 2004 on the Islamonline.net Website as cited in: Herrera and Kressel, Jihad, p.
176.
119 Helfont, Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Islam and Modernity, pp. 73, 77–78.
120 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s statement in January 2001 on the Hamas Website as cited in: Herrera and Kressel, Jihad, p. 175.
121 BBC Interview with Abd al-Aziz Rantisi on 20 May 2003 as cited in: Herrera and Kressel, Jihad, p. 176.
122 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 1, p. 781.
123 Ibid., pp. 783–784.
124 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aina al-Khalal, pp. 40–44.
125 Ibid., pp. 49–50.
126 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 108, 122–123. See:
Hamas Covenant [Charter], Articles 6–7 that point out that while the movement is a movement for the liberation of
Palestine, it is working within the universal framework of the Muslim Brotherhood. See also: Chapter Two, Part One of
this study which discusses Ḥasan al-Banna.
127 Bartal, Jihad in Palestine, pp. 65–75.
128 Ori Stendel, The Arabs of Israel: Between Hammer and Anvil (Jerusalem: Akademon, 1992), p. 274 (Hebrew); Dan
Schueftan, Palestinians in Israel: The Arab Minority and the Jewish State (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 2011), p. 450 (Hebrew);
Elie Rekhess (ed.), Arab Society in Israel: Information Folder (Neve Ilan, Israel: The Abraham Fund, 2009), pp. 30–31
(Hebrew); Mohanad Mustafa, “Political Participation of the Islamic Movement in Israel,” in: Elie Rekhess and Arik
Rudnitzky (eds.), Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim Majority Countries: The Islamic Movement as a Test Case (Tel Aviv:
Moshe Dayan Center, 2013), pp. 95–113. Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman, Israel’s Palestinians: The Conflict Within (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 83–84; Bartal, Jihad in Palestine, pp. 72–74.

129 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, pp. 479–481. Sagi Polka, “Constructing Muslim Identity in Western Society: The
Rulings (Fatawa) of Shaykh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi for Muslims in the West,” in: Elie Rekhess and Arik Rudnitzky (eds.),
Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim Majority Countries: The Islamic Movement as a Test Case (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan
Center, 2013), pp. 31–50.
130 Anonymous, “Toward an Independent Society,” Ṣawt al-Ḥaqq wal-Ḥurriyya, 30 March 2006, cited by: Mustafa, “Political
Participation of the Islamic Movement in Israel,” p. 105.
131 Ibid.
132 Mordechai Kedar, “The Future Vision of the Islamic Movement,” in: Elie Rekhess and Arik Rudnitzky (eds.), Muslim
Minorities in Non-Muslim Majority Countries: The Islamic Movement as a Test Case (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center,
2013), pp. 118–120. Similar arguments have been expressed by Raed Salah and his deputy, Kamal Khatib, in a series of
articles in the newspaper, Ṣawt al-Ḥaqq wal-Ḥurriyya.
133 This is the popular name for Raed Salah on Islamic websites and in Islamic periodicals. See, for example: Al-Qassāmiyun,
the periodical published by the Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades, No. 22 (September 2011). The editorial on the first page
and a hymn of praise for the Sheikh Raed by Ibrahim Abu al-Hawa appear against the background of the Temple Mount,
p. 33.
134 Ṣ awt al-Ḥaqq wal-Ḥurriyya, 25 January 2002 as cited by: Nimrod Luz, “The Islamic Movement and the Seduction of
Sanctified Landscapes: Using Sacred Places to Conduct the Struggle for Land,” in: Rekhess and Rudnitzky (eds.), Muslim
Minorities in Non-Muslim Majority Countries, pp. 74–75.
135 The program was first broadcast on the Al-Jazeera network on 7 October 2012. It may also be watched on:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxvQmXU68W4. A complete transcript of the program also appears on the Qaraḍāwī
Website, as follows: “Al-Aqṣā baina hājis al-taṭbīʿ wa-wājib al-nuṣra,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 31 October 2012,
www.qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/4/6296-2012-10-31-10-38-17.html.
136

“Al-Qaraḍāwī:

Al-Quds

Hiya

Qaḍiyyat

al-Umma

al-Kubrā,”

Qaraḍāwī

Website,

26

July

2015,

www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/8085-2015-07-26-16-13.
137 His views become popular in Jordanian and West Bank Muslim Brotherhood booklets like, Saʿadi Ḥusayn Jaber and
Samer Siam, Al-Aqsa al-Mubarak wa-al-ʾIhkam al-Khaseh bih fi al-Fiqh al-Islamiya (Amman, n.p. n.d.), pp. 5–21.
138

“Al-Aqṣā

baina

Hājis

al-Taṭbīʿ

wa-wājib

al-Nuṣra,”

Al-Jazeera,

Qaraḍāwi

Website,

7

October

2012,

www.qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/4/6296-2012-10-31-10-38-17.html.
139 Ibid.
140 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 61–62.
141 See the public opinion polls that are conducted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip every three months by Dr. Khalil
Shikaki. The polls indicate that in any future elections, it is likely that Ismail Haniyya will defeat Mahmoud Abbas. Poll
No. 54 in December 2014 shows that 79%support the path of resistance advocated by Hamas and that 80%support driveby terror attacks and stabbings of Israelis. See: Khalil Shikaki, “Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 54, Palestinian Center

for Policy and Surveys,” 15 January 2015, www.pcpsr.org/en/node/600.
142 “Al-Aqṣā baina Hājis al-Taṭbīʿ wa-wājib al-Nuṣra”.
143 Ibid.
144 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, p. 99.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., pp. 100–104.
147 Shaul Bartal, “The Visit of the Sheikh of Jihad,” Nrg News, 12 May 2013. www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/469/043.html
148 Shlomi Daskal, “Without the Fear of Allah,” Ha-Ayin ha-Sheviʾit, 20 May 2013, www.the7eye.org.il/63765. See also: “AlShaikh Ṣalāh: Al-Qaraḍāwī Yashuddu al-Riḥāl ila Ghazza bi-Muwāqafat Shabakat Firās al-Iʿlāmiyya,” 8 May 2013,

www.fpnp.net/ar/news/114298_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE_%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF_%D8%B5%D9%8
149 “Bayān min Shaikh Al-Aqṣā bishʾan al-Aqwāl al-Mansūba ilayhi Zūran ḥawla al-ʿAllāma al-Qaraḍāwī,” Qaraḍāwi
Website, 9 May 2013, www.qaradawi.net/documents/6615-2013-05-09-16-26-21.html.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 For a discussion of this issue, see: Filasṭīn al-Muslima, July 2012, pp. 36–51, especially articles by: Raʾfat Mura, “Suʾāl
liman yazūru al-Masjid al-Aqṣā al-Mubārak: limādhā lā Tuʿlinu daʿmaka li-Taḥrīrihi min al-Iḥtilāl?” (Questions to one
who visits the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque and why he does not declare his support for liberating it from the occupation), pp.
44–45, and, Mahā ʿAbd al-Hādī, “Silsilat Ziyārāt Mashbūha lil-Aqṣā taḥta Ḥimāyat al-Iḥtilāl Jarīma Siyāsiya lil-Ṣumud
al-Filasṭīnī,” (Caravan of Suspicious Visits to al-Aqsa under the Protection of the Occupation Forces, a Political Crime and
a Stab at the Strong Palestinian Stance), pp. 46–47.
153 See: “Bayān min Shaikh Al-Aqṣā bishʾan al-Aqwāl al-Mansūba ilayhi Zūran ḥawla al-ʿAllāma al-Qaraḍāwī”.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Elisha Cahen, “Raed Salah Arrested on Suspicion of Incitement to Racism,” Maʾariv, 3 September 2013,
www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/504/761.html; Raʾed Mahajneh vs. the State of Israel, Appellate Court File No. 13–09–
20317. The decision of His Honor Judge Arnon Darel, Jerusalem District Court regarding the appeal, on 15 September
2013, pp. 6–10.
157 “‘Ulamā’ al-Muslimīn Yunaddidūn bi-Ibʿād al-Shaikh Ṣalāḥ wa-iqtiḥām al-Aqṣā wa-Ighlāq al-Ḥaram al-Ibrāahīmī,”
Qaraḍāwī Website, 9 September 2013, www.qaradawi.net/component/content/article/6873.html. The public statement
was issued on 7 September and is signed by the Secretary General of the Union of Islamic Scholars, Ali Muḥyī al-Dīn alQaradāghī.
158 Ibid.

159 Ortal Ganon, Radio Yerushalayim, 4 September 2013, www.jerusalemnet.co.il/article/45605; Nir Hasson, “For the Second
Time in Two Days, the Police Have Broken into the Temple Mount in the Wake of Stone-Throwing,” Haaretz, 6
September 2013, www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.2114626; Moshe Nussbaum, Israel Channel Two News, Main Evening
Broadcast, 25 September 2013.
160 Yasin Hamoud, CEO of the International Al-Quds Institute, has acknowledged this in a program on Al Jazeera where he
was joined by Raed Salah and Sheikh Qaraḍāwī. See: Al Jazeera, 7 October 2012.
161 File no. 34138–1–14, the State of Israel vs. Khalil Ghazawi; Verdict and Decision by His Honor Justice Moshe Drori,
District Court of Jerusalem, 14 December 2014.
162 Tamam, “Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The Nature of a Special Relationship,” pp. 62–63.
163 Meir Hatina, “The Ulama and the Cult of Death in Palestine,” in: Efraim Karsh and P.R. Kumaraswamy (eds.), Islamic
Attitudes to Israel (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 42–43; Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, p. 201.
164 This is evident in Qaraḍāwī’s book, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 61–65, 93. Likewise, Safwat al-Sudaidfi, a Muslim
Brotherhood activist served as the editor of the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Majallat al-Tawḥīd and as the deputy chairman
of the Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadīya association in Cairo. The first chapter of his book points out that the Jews are
“the enemies of Islam in all times and everywhere.” See: Safwat Al-Sudaidfi, Al-Yahud: Inshāʾ wa-Ta ʾ rikh (The Jews:
History) (Cairo: Dar al-Taqwa lil-Nashar wa-al-Tawziʾa, 1998), pp. 8–11.
165 Zvi Mazel, “The Middle East: Back to the Old Regional Equilibrium?,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 14 July 2013
(Hebrew), www.jcpa.org.il/JCPAHeb/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=2&TMID=99&FID=925&1ID=27867.
166 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʿāṣira, vol. 3, pp. 479–481.
167 Al-Shirāʿ, April 1995, cited in: Havakook and Salah, Islamic Terrorism, p. 152.
168 Shaul Bartal, “Why They Do Not Vote?,”[please check title for correctness] Maraah: Magazine le- Inyenei Hevra veTarbut,

No.

228,

11

January

2013

(Hebrew),

www.maraah-magazine.co.il/show_item.asp?

itemId=27&katavald=3469&levelId=65450&archLev=1.
169 Muhsen Mohammed Saleh, A History of Palestine: A Methodical Study of the Palestinian Struggle (Cairo: Al-Falah
Foundation, 2005), p. 85. An indication of the influence of the movement may be the annual conference entitled “AlAqṣā fī Khaṭar” (Al-Aqsa in in Danger) which, according to the figures of the Israel Police, numbers at least 50,000 Israeli
Arabs in attendance.
170 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʿdāʾ al-Ḥall al-Islāmi, p. 99.

6
A true partnership
Qaraḍāwī, Hamas and the Islamic Movement

1. Legal subordination and financial aid
Both Hamas and the Islamic Movement in Israel hold Sheikh Qaraḍāwī in high esteem. Hamas
activists, including Prime Minister Ismail Haniyya, Khaled Mashal (head of the political
bureau) and Sheikh Raed Salah (head of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement)
regard him as the ultimate decision-maker in matters of Islamic law. An examination of
publications and websites of Hamas and of the Islamic Movement definitively show that
Qaraḍāwī is a highly respected figure. Likewise, Qaraḍāwī praises those loyal to Islam in
Palestine and those who follow his rulings. As they shower him with respect and bestow an
exalted spiritual status upon him, Qaraḍāwī’s devotion helps his supporters in their internal
struggles against their rivals:1 Hamas vs. Fatah, and the Islamic Movement, led by Sheikh
Raed Salah, vs. the Arab parties in the Knesset – Al-Jabha; Al-Tajammuʾ; Al-Qāʿima alMuwaḥḥada wal- ʾArabiyya lil-Taghyīr (Hebrew: Hadash, Balad and Raʿam-Taʿal; since 2015
they all form the Arab Joint List in the Knesset).
On 5 February 2015, Ismail Haniyya became a member of the International Union of
Muslim Scholars headed by Qaraḍāwī. Thus, Haniyya subordinated himself directly to Sheikh
Qaraḍāwī. Haniyya received a certificate of membership at a festive ceremony held in Doha,
the capital of Qatar. The document notes his name and the title, “President of the State of
Palestine.”2 The subordination of Hamas to Qaraḍāwī found expression at the Conference of
the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), held in Turkey on 20 August 2014. Among
the participants was Saleh al-Arouri (Ṣāliḥ al-ʾᾹrūrī), a senior Hamas activist, member of the
political bureau and a founder of the ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades in the West Bank. During
the conference, al-Arouri finally acknowledged the direct responsibility of Hamas for the
kidnapping of the three Israeli young men in the Etzion Bloc on 12 June 2014 and presented it
as “an act of heroism of our fighters in Palestine.”3
Sheikh Raed Salah is also a member of the IUMS as well and is highly esteemed for his
work on behalf of Al-Aqsa. Since May 2014, at conferences of the IUMS, headed by Qaraḍāwī,

Salah has organized the Waqf al-Ummah Fund whose purpose is collecting monies from
Muslims in order to support the Muslim struggle against a Jewish presence on the Temple
Mount. In a series of speeches, Salah has noted the importance of a unified struggle of the
entire Muslim Ummah against the cruel occupier and the responsibility of all Muslims in
supporting the fight for Jerusalem. The fund was established and works out of Istanbul and
receives the support of the Turkish authorities.4 Apparently, according to the Facebook page of
the fund, members of the IUMS have encouraged and continue to urge Muslims throughout
the world to contribute to it from charity funds, in order to continue the struggle on the
Temple Mount.5 The IUMS not only preaches but also contributes monies via the Waqf alUmmah lil-Murābiṭīn wal-Murābiṭāt (lit.: the Fund of the Ummah for the Defenders [of the
Al-Aqsa mosque]) to those who report for duty at the Temple Mount on a daily basis in order
to prevent and impede Jews from visiting the Temple Mount. This financial assistance, given
by the IUMS that is headed by Qaraḍāwī, enables the activities of the Islamic Movement and
its supporters among the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem and on the Temple Mount.

2. The perpetuation of the legacy of Qaraḍāwī by Hamas
An international conference with many participants took place in Gaza on 12–13 October
2010. Its purpose was to perpetuate the legacy of Qaraḍāwī in all of the fields in which he was
engaged, first and foremost the struggle in Palestine. The program of the conference also
included topics such as the principles of Wasaṭiyya (the path of moderation advocated by
Qaraḍāwī), the status of women in Islam, education, etc. Dr. Taleb Hammad Abū Shaʾr (Ṭālib
Ḥammād), Minister for Islamic Trusts of the Hamas government, served as head of the
conference and Ismail Haniyya, former Prime Minister of the Hamas government, was its
president. All of the organizers were members of Hamas who were well-known preachers in
their own right, such as Dr. Wāʿil Muḥy al-Din al-Zuhd, the preacher of Khan Yunis. No other
living religious figure has received so impressive a commemoration as Qaraḍāwī who was
referred to as “the honorable,” “the Imam,” “Shaikh al-ʿUlamāʿ,” “Shaikh al-Jihād,” and other
complimentary titles. Indeed, Qaraḍāwī is regarded as the greatest of his generation.
Only one session of the conference dealt with Qaraḍāwī’s efforts on behalf of the
Palestinian cause and his teachings on Jihad. That session, however, gave him great publicity
and attracted members of Hamas.6 The sessions of the first day of the conference dealt with
“Qaraḍāwī’s Efforts in the Service of the Honorable Qurʿān and the Ways of the Prophets.”7 As
we have noted, the second session treated Qaraḍāwī’s service on behalf of the Palestinian
cause. During the third session, participants delved deeply into the image of Qaraḍāwī as a
poet and author. During the second day of the conference, the fourth session featured a panel

devoted to Qaraḍāwī and the rules of Wasaṭiyya and his war against extremism. The fifth and
final session dealt with Qaraḍāwī as an intellectual, showcasing his pragmatic approach and
his innovations in the field of Islamic law. Leading lecturers at the University of Gaza and
prominent figures of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip were present in order to
praise Qaraḍāwī’s erudition. Two volumes of articles summarizing the two days of
deliberations have been published. This chapter will focus mainly upon the panel that dealt
with Qaraḍāwī’s contribution to the Palestinian cause.
The first speaker at this session was ʾIsām al-ʾAbd Zuhd, Professor of Qurʿān at the Faculty
of the Religion at the Islamic University of Gaza. The topic of his lecture was Jihad in the
thought of Imam al-Qaraḍāwī. Dr. Zuhd explained the importance of Jihad against tyrannical
occupiers according to Qaraḍāwī, as follows: “The purpose of civilian and military Jihad and its
urgency is to preserve the land from evil and from the continuity of the occupation of the
worshippers of God and of believers in Palestine and elsewhere.”8 After analyzing Qaraḍāwī’s
Fiqh al-Jihād, Zuhd concludes that “all young Muslims in Palestine are obligated to confront
the provocations of the occupation.”9 He then describes the following subjects in detail: the
principles of Jihad in Palestine; the meaning of the permission granted to Palestinian women to
engage in acts of terror; and educating children for Jihad and sacrifice. All of the above were
discussed in light of the personal obligation of every believer in Palestine. A Muslim in
Palestine who does not take part in Jihad may be regarded as someone who serves
colonialism.10 Using statements by Qaraḍāwī, Professor Zuhd enumerates the goals of Jihad
and analyzes them. The major purpose of military Jihad is to respond to aggression against
Muslims by using force that is equal to that used against them. The Muslim homeland includes
all of the Islamic countries. Therefore, an attack against Muslims in Palestine is like an attack
against all of the Muslims in the world.11 Furthermore, the purpose of this type of Jihad is to
punish those who have broken the covenant and the promise, namely, the Children of Israel.
Zuhd bases this statement upon Verse 100 of the Surat al-Baqara, concerning the inability of
the Children of Israel to keep a contract. He then argues that
the Jews cannot stop sowing destruction and devastation on earth, spreading oppression and committing crimes until
they will be punished for their crimes, for [robbing] the right of the Palestinian people that were expelled from their land
by force.12

The establishment of the State of Israel is part of the chain of Jewish wickedness and not
simply a national conflict. The latter is a fundamental antisemitic trope that accuses the Jews
of spreading evil from time immemorial and maintains that the struggle in Palestine is a
symptom of their wickedness, not a national conflict.
Dr. Zuhd links the fatwa of Qaraḍāwī with the Palestinian cause. He explains that the
statements of “our” sheikh are correct and that, as Muslims, we must act in accordance with
them, and gives the reasons for Qaraḍāwī’s correct observations regarding the Jews. For

example, Qaraḍāwī forbids using weapons of mass destruction as it is against the principles of
Islam. According to Islam, it is not permitted to kill women and children, who have not
sinned, in a single act. In contrast, he emphasizes that “the Zionist enemy has no problem with
threatening to use such [nuclear] weapons. After they received them [such weapons], they
[the Zionists] took over our land in the wake of the Balfour Declaration.” Furthermore, Dr.
Zuhd condemns America for supporting the Zionist entity by producing and maintaining such
weapons that threaten Muslim countries.13 In contrast, neither Qaraḍāwī nor his acolytes in
Hamas, including Dr. Zuhd, have any problem arguing that it is different as far as Jews are
concerned. They have no problem attacking Jews in acts of self sacrifice (suicide bombing) or
launching missiles against civilian populations as part of the struggle.
The double standard regarding Israel and the Jews and the duplicity of the concept of
“terror” is evident in Qaraḍāwī’s attitude toward targeted killings of leading figures of Islamic
terror organizations. Qaraḍāwī definitely refers to such killings as acts of terror:
This is terror that kills heroes of the resistance who have defended their land, their holy places and their families,
[perpetrated] by a state at the command of its leaders and officers, just as we saw with the assassination of [Fatḥi] alShiqāqi, [Yaḥyā] ʾAyyāsh and [Muḥy al-Dīn] Al-Sharīf and the attempted assassination of Khālid Mashʾal.14

On the other hand, Qaraḍāwī does not relate at all to acts committed by Al-Shiqaqi, leader of
the Islamic Jihad movement, prior to his death, or Yaḥya Ayyāsh and Muḥy al-Dīn al-Sharīf,
who served as “bomb engineers” for Hamas and were responsible for planning and carrying
out many attacks against Israelis. Their actions come in the category of legitimate resistance to
occupation while Israel’s actions, whose purpose is to stop the aggression on the part of of the
factions of the Islamic resistance, are considered acts of terror.
The reason for the different attitude toward Jews is that “the Jews conquered Palestine with
iron, fire and blood and expelled its inhabitants and forced themselves on the country.” At this
point, Dr. Zuhd presents full citations from Qaraḍāwī’s book, The Laws of Jihad that elaborate
upon the reasons for the duty to fight against the Jews in Palestine.15 According to Qaraḍāwī,
the reason for the war against Israel is not because they are Semites or Jews. Muslims are also
Semites as they are descendants of Ishmael. This argument, however, has been dismissed by
several scholars, most prominent among them, Bernard Lewis. Lewis states that “Antisemitism was never against anyone except Jews. Nazi Germany that could be consider the
authority of Anti-semitism did not find any contradiction between Jew-hate and Arab love.”16
The Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Huseini and others present similar specious arguments.
Furthermore, Dr. Zuhd repeats the argument of many in the Arab world that present-day
Jews are not really Semites, but rather a mixture of peoples. Contemporary Judaism is a
religion and not a race. Hence, the Jews have no right to self-determination.17 According to
Qaraḍāwī and members of Hamas, Jews are not authentic Semites but “foreigners,”
“Europeans” or descendants of tribes such as the Khazars who converted to Judaism. In

contrast, European anti-Semites maintained that Jews are “Semites” or “Orientals.”18
Therefore, according to Qaraḍāwī, the occupation of Palestine is a foreign occupation by an
external element. In fact, the Jews do not have any link to the Land of Israel despite their
continuous presence in varying numbers throughout history, even under Muslim rule.
If that is the case, what is the reason for the uncompromising war against the Jews which
borders on genocide? Dr. Zuhd stresses that
our sheikh [Qaraḍāwī] replies that the real reason for our war against the Jews is because they stole our land – the land
of Islam – the land of Palestine. [The land] from which they expelled its inhabitants and forced their disgusting presence
through violence, terror and killing. Therefore, the war between us and them will continue as long as the occupation
encamped on our land exists. In light of this, no peace can be established as long as it is based upon recognition of the
right of those who have robbed land that is not theirs! No ruler can give up the land of Palestine because this land is a
sacred trust (waqf) for Muslims from the time that it was conquered by Muslims who made it their home.19

Qaraḍāwī and his supporters in Hamas regard all of Palestine as occupied territory –
without any distinction between the territories of 1967 and those of 1948 – hence, there is an
inability to achieve an agreed-upon permanent solution, such as the two-state paradigm.
Dr. Zuhd expressed his opinion after reading the works of Qaraḍāwī and in his capacity as
lecturer at the Islamic University. Likewise, ideologically speaking, Hamas has adopted the
position of Qaraḍāwī and therefore, expressed its opposition to the Oslo Accords and has
worked toward abrogating them. Zuhd continues that
he [Qaraḍāwī] considers the principle of “land for peace” as odd. It forcibly applies the distorted logic of the enemy. The
land is our land. Therefore, he [the enemy] is ready to give it up in exchange for peace for himself! That is a lame
peace.20

If the entire land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf and the Jews have no right to it all, then the
Jews are prepared to give up a small part of it in order to steal the rest of the area. Qaraḍāwī’s
consistent approach finds expression among Hamas spokesmen and in various articles of the
Hamas Covenant (published in 1988). Dr. Zuhd continues: “Because our struggle with the Jews
is a religious struggle… it is a struggle for the sake of God.”21 Hence, Hamas spokesmen repeat
Qaraḍāwī’s statement that it is a religious obligation that is binding for every Muslim (Farḍ
ʾAyn) wherever he may be, if he is able to defend the land of Islam.22
If that is the case, then how has Qaraḍāwī assisted efforts on behalf of Palestine? How has
the exalted status of Qaraḍāwī as the leading expert of Islamic law in this generation found
expression in his support for the Palestinian cause? Dr. Zuhd answers as follows:
1. Qaraḍāwī has called for a boycott of American goods because the United States
supplies arms to and supports the Zionist army. A blow to the American economy
will put an end to its aid to Israel.
2. Qaraḍāwī raised the spirit of the Palestinians during the Intifada and demands that

3.

4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

they show patience and steadfastness (ṣabr wa-ṣumūd) until their ultimate victory.
At the beginning of Operation Cast Lead (first Gaza war, 27 December 2008 –
January 2009), Qaraḍāwī declared a Jihad against Israel and called upon all Muslim
and Arab countries to extend aid to the besieged residents of Gaza in the wake of
Israel’s aggression. He reiterated this position during the other rounds of war in Gaza,
as will be shown below. Qaraḍāwī organized mass prayers for the souls of the
Shahīds who fell in the war. Thus, he managed to mobilize senior religious figures
throughout the Muslim world in support of the Palestinian struggle.23
Qaraḍāwī has called for using the oil weapon in order to raise Western support for
the “righteous” Palestinian cause and to isolate Israel.
Qaraḍāwī has called on all of the Arab countries to aid and arm the Palestinians so
that they can fight as a single Jihadist movement. This applies both to the Palestinian
Authority and to the opposition. The writings and articles of Qaraḍāwī encourage the
fighting spirit among the members of Hamas as he states that they are continuing in
the path of Khaled Ibn al-Walid and Salah al-Din.
Qaraḍāwī legitimizes suicide attacks in Palestine. He justifies them as attacks of
“sacrifice” against Jews and Israel, including the killing of innocent civilians.
Qaraḍāwī gives four main reasons. Most prominent is his argument that all of Israeli
society is mobilized, whether on active or reserve duty. Therefore, citizens of Israel
are not normal civilians and it is permitted to attack all Jews who live in Palestine. An
additional argument is that the Jews comprise an invading force that must be stopped
by every possible means. Jews are not immunized from killing and other forms of
damage and they should be killed and injured until they die or leave Palestine. “Jihad
in Palestine is for the sake of religion, homeland, property, life, the dignity of women
and the preservations of rights [of Muslims].”24
According to Hamas, Qaraḍāwī makes a substantial financial contribution to its
activities. He has ruled that every Muslim must fulfill the Islamic commandment of
Zakāt (charity) by donating to funds that support Hamas. According to Dr. Zuhd, this
contribution is for the poor, the unfortunate and the holy warriors who embark upon
the path of Jihad, such as Hamas.25 As head of the Charity Coalition (Iʿtilāf al-Khair),
Qaraḍāwī transfers monies to Hamas via activists in the Islamic Movement in order
to finance its Daʾwa activities. They include Raed Salah who, among others, has been
indicted by an Israeli court for contacts with members of Hamas.26
Dr. Zuhd cites Qaraḍāwī’s role in calling for disturbances in Jerusalem during the
Jewish holidays in the fall of 2009, as follows:
Muslims from the entire Muslim Ummah must come from all over the world
on Friday, 9 October 2009, to make the effort and pray before God. [He

preached] strengthening the city of occupied Jerusalem and the holy
warriors (Mujāhidūn) and the defenders (Murābiṭūn) of the Al-Aqsa
Mosque at the time of the Zionist incursion into the courtyard of the AlAqsa Mosque. He demanded that the members of the Ummah go out and
demonstrate and cry out clearly, ‘our hearts are with Al-Aqsa.’ [Sheikh
Qaraḍāwī] warns that the occupation aspires to divide the mosque between
Muslims and Jews as it did in the case of the Cave of the Patriarchs (AlḤaram Al-Ibrāhīmī) [in Hebron].27
Sheikh Raed Salah made similar statements in a speech entitled “Al-Aqsa is in Danger,”
delivered on 2 October 2009 at a gathering in Umm al-Fahm. In the wake of the speeches of
Salah and of Qaraḍāwī, violent clashes that included throwing stones and boulders at police
officers took place on the Temple Mount in East Jerusalem.28 According to Hamas spokesmen,
it was Qaraḍāwī who called for riots. He exploited his status among the Arab countries in
order to block any step toward reconciliation with Israel because of Al-Aqsa. Furthermore,
after riots broke out on the Temple Mount under his inspiration and with his encouragement,
he called upon the Arab League to intervene immediately in order to save Al-Aqsa.29 In his
book, Jerusalem: A Problem for all Muslims, Qaraḍāwī notes that his position is based upon
data supplied by Raed Salah, dating as early as 1997, while the latter served as mayor of Umm
al-Fahm.30
Qaraḍāwī is active in the struggle against the judaization of Jerusalem and of Palestine in
general. Hamas spokesmen emphasize that “Jerusalem is Arab and Muslim just as all of
Palestine is Arab/Muslim.” Jews have no right there and they must give back the rights that
they stole from Muslims when they expelled them from their land. Dr. Zuhd repeats
Qaraḍāwī’s statements from the Fifth Conference of the International Jerusalem Institution,
which he heads, as follows: “It is the obligation of the Arab Ummah to participate in the
required activities and to support the Palestinians in defending the identity and cultural
character of the city of Jerusalem.” Qaraḍāwī calls upon the Arabs of East Jerusalem and of
Israel to undertake a civilian Jihad against the state. He does not specify the features of such a
Jihad.31 On 30 July 2015, in the wake of Jews continuing to ascend the Temple Mount and
curses leveled against the Prophet Muhammad by radical right-wing Israeli activists,
Qaraḍāwī again joined the calls by Hamas and the Islamic Movement inside Israel, for a day
of mobilization (al-Nafīr) and rage (Ghaḍab) against Zionist plans to divide the Temple Mount
and establish “the alleged [Jewish] shrine.”32
Qaraḍāwī’s works are cited in an official publication by the General Cultural Committee of
Hamas, headed by Yaḥya al-Sinwār and supported by the chairman of the Palestinian
parliament and member of Hamas, Dr. Aziz Duwaik. Published in 2013, it includes the
program of studies of Hamas, with courses that recommend several books for prisoners who

are members of Hamas. For example, Item 6 recommends the following books by AlQaraḍāwī: Fiqh al-Ṭahāra (Laws of Purity); a special course on the laws of Jihad in Palestine
excerpted from Fiqh al-Jihād; Fiqh al-Siyāsa al-Sharʾiyya (Politics according to the Sharʾīa); a
history of the Muslim Brotherhood and the founding of Hamas (a booklet prepared by the
Hamas Cultural Committee); and Qaraḍāwī’s book, Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn: Sabʾūn ʾᾹman
(The Muslim Brotherhood: Seventy Years).33 Within the framework of required courses, Hamas
prisoners in jail must read several books, prominent among them is Al-Quds Qaḍiyyat kull
Muslim (Jerusalem: A Problem for all Muslims) by Qaraḍāwī. The latter includes harsh
diatribes against the Jews and the State of Israel.34 Fiqh al-Jihād is mentioned many times and
is considered required reading because it contains the legal ruling required for killing civilians
and the link between politics and Jihad.35 Qaraḍāwī also is noted in the publication mentioned
above as the foremost religious figure of Hamas, along with Saʾīd Ḥawwā (d. 1989),
Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Rāshid and Fatḥi Yakan (d. 2009).36 Thus, Qaraḍāwī is the greatest
contemporary Islamic authority and the general guide in matters of faith, Jihad and Jewhatred.

3. Qaraḍāwī’s place in the military and organizational writings
of Hamas
Qaraḍāwī’s legacy is evident in the military writings of Hamas that deal with the planning of
suicide attacks. Indeed, it is Qaraḍāwī who permitted them, based the verse: “Allāh has
purchased from the believers their lives and their properties; in exchange they shall have
Paradise. They will fight on behalf of Allāh and they will kill and be killed.”(Qurʿān, 9: 111). Dr.
Zuhd presents Qaraḍāwī’s interpretation of the Qurānic passage as follows: “They will explode
themselves in the midst of the enemy and first they will be killed and they will kill others.”37
According to this interpretation of Hamas, the verse constitutes a definite permission to carry
out “sacrifice” attacks.
Qaraḍāwī’s view of the liquidation of Yaḥya Ayyāsh is further proof of his definition of a
terrorist and of the essence of terrorism. Ayyāsh, a leader of the ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām
Brigades, the military wing of the Hamas, was responsible for a large number of attacks
mainly in 1994–1995, in which more than 100 Israelis were murdered. In 1997, Hamas activist,
Ghassān Dawaʾr published a book entitled: The Engineer: The Shahid Yaḥya Ayyāsh, Symbol
of Jihad and Commander of the Resistance in Palestine.38 Qaraḍāwī contributed to its
introduction, which is cited frequently by Hamas members, as follows:
I think that among those who sold their souls in order to be pleasing to Allāh and committed themselves to Allāh with

an oath of truth, is the gifted engineer, the Mujāhid, the Shahīd Yaḥyā Ayyāsh who dedicated his soul, his talents, his
time and efforts and all that was in his power for the sake of a great and serious issue, the foremost problem of the
Muslims: the problem of the Land of the Prophecies to which Allāh has given his blessing for all of humanity, the Land
of the Isrāʿ and the Miʾrāj (the Night Journey to Jerusalem and the Ascension of the Prophet Muhammad), the Land of
the Al-Aqsa Mosque to which and upon whose environs Allah gave his blessing….
His brothers called him ‘the engineer of the generations’ because he used his talents and expertise in engineering and
planning for acts of heroic self-sacrifice against the violence and tyranny of the Zionist entity, acts that have caused
insomnia to Israel, that have made its day miserable and have caused it to sleep in fear and wake up with worry and
trepidation. He was among those young men who sold their souls to Allāh and did not pay attention to what did them
harm. ‘That is because they are not afflicted by thirst or fatigue or hunger in the cause of Allāh, nor do they tread on
any ground that enrages the unbelievers, nor do they inflict upon the enemy any infliction that is registered for them as
a righteous deed. Indeed, Allāh does not allow the reward of the doers of good to be lost.’
(Qurʿān, 9: 20)

Then Qaraḍāwī explained why this book and Yaḥyā Ayyāsh himself are so important for
Hamas and the Islamic Ummah.
In this book on the biography of the Shahīd Yaḥyā Ayyāsh and the stories of his extraordinary heroism, we feel the
influence of a proper education and early training for the straight path in the formation of Yaḥyā, a believing young
man, and afterward, a tough Mujāhid who aspires with rare dedication to two of the best things: victory or Shahāda…
beause God was with him and with God’s help, he triumphed and was strengthened.
We wish to say to the Zionist murderers: Yaḥyā did not die. He exists with his brothers who follow in his path and
work toward his goal. Every one of them is Yaḥyā Ayyāsh, if Allāh desires. The project created by the hero Yaḥyā
continues to produce heroes… It is Islam with its faith, its Sharīʾa and its superior values. It is Islam with its Qurʿān, its
Sunna and the biography of its pure men. Every time that the star of one of them is extinguished, another star or several
[stars] have shown… so may Allāh have mercy upon his beloved Shahīd, Yaḥyā, and may he be accepted as part of his
desired servants and bequeath victory to his brothers who follow in his path. Amen.39

The statements by Qaraḍāwī also appear on the website of ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām and
encourage the members of Hamas to continue to carry out acts of murder and terror against
Israel.40
Another book published by Hamas is The Memories of a Jihad Warrior: The Advantages of
Jihād and Ribāt, Their Prayers, Rules of Conduct and Their Importance. This work treats the
importance of the values of Jihad and fighting on behalf of God. In his dedication, the author,
Nāsiḥ Ibn ʾAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ghāzi, writes that “those who fight on behalf of God are the
army of God upon whom the world exists.”41 Two books by Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād (The
Laws of Jihad) and Fatāwā Muāṣira (Contemporary Legal Rulings) served as the inspiration
for al-Ghazi’s ideas. According to Nāsiḥ al-Ghāzi,
the spirit of Jihad that beats in the heart of people and helps them cope with oppression… and to make the soul of the
Mujāhidūn happy, to remove harm from their bodies and fear from their spirit and help them to carry out important
things to their satisfaction.42

The author bases his conclusions on quotations from Fiqh al-Jihād.43 Likewise, his approach
that the fighting commander does not have to be attracted to luxuries because of the military
life that he decreed for himself for the sake of God.44 He warns Jihad fighters not to be

tempted by the stratagems of the enemy that tries to present his lies to Muslim fighters and
distract them through propaganda and general education. The author states that he learned
this from another citation of Qaraḍāwī.45 Al-Ghazi also points out the positive role of the
ʾUlamāʿ that support the warlike activism of the army of God, thus encouraging them,46 in
contrast to the ʾUlamāʿ that Qaraḍāwī refers to as ignoramuses and expresses his doubts about
their authority in Islamic law.47

4. Qaraḍāwī and the Islamic Movement headed by Raed Salah
As we have noted in the previous chapter, Sheikh Raed Salah Mahajneh (Rāʿid Ṣalāḥ Maḥājna)
definitely regards Qaraḍāwī as his leader. Even the name of the newspaper of the Islamic
Movement, Ṣawt al-Ḥaqq wal-Ḥuriya (The Voice of Truth and Freedom) hints at following
the path of Qaraḍāwī who published Ṣawt al-Ḥaqq (The Voice of Truth) in Egypt in the 1970s
and eighties, an organ whose purpose was to promote an Islamic revolution and to preach to
the Egyptian masses.48 Sheikh Raed Salah is a member of the IUMS and a member of the
Board of Trustees of the Islamic University in Gaza, which is identified with Hamas. It hosted
the conference in honor of Qaraḍāwī in October 2012. Sheikh Salah has received monies from
funds that are identified with Hamas abroad and with Qaraḍāwī in order to circulate Ṣawt alḤaqq wal-Ḥurriya, the organ of the Muslim Brotherhood inside Israel, and to pay for trials
and court costs for members of Hamas.49
The common denominator between Qaraḍāwī and Raed Salah is the issue of Jerusalem.
Qaraḍāwī takes every opportunity to raise this matter to solicit contributions for Salah. The
influence of Qaraḍāwī is recognizable in Raed Salah’s speeches. The latter continuously
stresses that Israel is planning to divide Al-Aqsa as it has done in the Cave of the Patriarchs in
Hebron (Al-Ḥaram al-Ibrāhīmī). Likewise, he has claimed that Israel plans to destroy the AlAqsa Mosqe and build its “alleged shrine” in its stead. Therefore, Sheikh Salah called for the
masses to come and demonstrate during the Jewish Feast of Tabernacles (Sukkoth) in 2009 and
more recently, in 2013 and 2015. In the wake of his speech in 2013, he was arrested and
conditionally released as he is suspected of incitement and calling for violence.50
In an interview at the end of 2013, Qaraḍāwī repeated Salah’s statements verbatim and
claimed that there is a plan on the part of Israel. First, Israel would divide the Al-Aqsa Mosque
between Jews and Muslims during prayer times and afterward, the area of the Temple Mount
itself, as part of its program to judaize Jerusalem. Second, Israel would build the Temple on the
ruins of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. In the same interview, Qaraḍāwī stresses that it is important for
Palestinians to oppose the occupation and defend Al-Aqsa.51 He repeats the position in every
interview or reading that deals with Jerusalem.52

5. Qaraḍāwī in the service of Hamas and the trade in the
tunnels
In 2009, frequent incursions by Hamas into Sinai that violated Egyptian sovereignty and
international pressure against the government of Husni Mubarak to stop the smuggling of
weapons into the Gaza Strip forced Egypt to build a steel fence between Sinai and the Gaza
Strip. A major reason for the construction of the fence was that strong economic pressure on
Hamas would compel it to make an agreement with the government of Mahmoud Abbas
(Abu Mazen), in accordance with the wishes of Mubarak.53 The broader and more complex
reasons for this Egyptian policy are not the subject of the present study. It is clear, however,
that its consequences led Hamas to mobilize Arab and Muslim public opinion against Husni
Mubarak and against building the steel wall on the border between Egypt and Gaza. Sheikh
Qaraḍāwī lent his support to Hamas’ efforts to prevent the building of the fence by viciously
attacking the Egyptian government even before the start of the “Arab Spring” in Egypt on 25
January 2011.
In an article that appeared on the website of the military wing of the Hamas, the ʾIzz al-Dīn
al-Qassām Brigades, Qaraḍāwī emphatically declared that building the fence is contrary to
Islamic law.54 On 27 December 2009, he issued a public statement that building the Egyptian
fence is forbidden because “its intention is to tighten the blockade of Gaza in order to add
starvation and humiliation to their siege and pressure them to surrender and reconcile
[themselves] to the will of Israel.”55 According to Qaraḍāwī, Egypt has the right to defend its
sovereignty and has responsibility for its territory. However, this does not enable Egypt to
harm the rights of its Palestinian Arab Muslim brothers. “Whoever establishes fences in order
to isolate the Palestinians is an occupying country. Egypt does not have to construct a fence of
its own that eventually will benefit Israel.”56 Furthermore, Qaraḍāwī argues that Egypt not
only does not have to build a steel fence but also, in fact, should open the Rafah crossing
completely, as it is a legal and religious obligation to do so for the people of Gaza. Thus, he
explicitly blames Egypt for active collaboration in the death of Palestinians by building the
steel fence. The tunnels along the border fence separating Gaza from Egypt are a substitute for
the locked crossing points. Egypt’s closing the path of the tunnels means that “Egypt tells them
[the people of Gaza]: ‘Die and long live the Zionist entity.’”57
On 13 January 2010, a report appeared in the newspaper, Al-Quds, in the wake of sharp
criticism of Qaraḍāwī by several figures in Fatah who supported the Egyptian measures.
There, Hamas clearly expressed unequivocal support for its spiritual leader. Hamas
spokesman, Sāmi Abu Zuhri, called the Fatah delegation “a delegation of poisoned persons”
(al-ḥamla al-iʾlāmiyya al-masmūma) that expressed “slanderous words” against the chairman
of the IUMS, Yusuf Al-Qaraḍāwī. This attack was considered proof of the moral nadir of the

leaders of Fatah and of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.58 Abu Zuhri stressed that “the
positions of the Palestinian people, the Arab and Muslim nations all support and back Sheikh
Al-Qaraḍāwī.”59 According to Abu Zuhri, the anti-Qaraḍāwī statements by the Palestinian
Authority “do not represent our people but present an external agenda against which we are
struggling. The Sheikh will continue to condemn plots against the Ummah and the Palestinian
people that are lacking in regard for the rights of the Palestinian people.60
Sheikh Qaraḍāwī sharply attacked Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the Palestinian Authority,
for publicly supporting the plan of Egypt’s President Husni Mubarak to construct a steel fence
along the border between Egypt and Gaza. The purpose of the fence is to put an end to the
activities of the tunnels used for smuggling between Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Since the revolt
in Gaza in June 2007, the tunnels along the Philadelphia Route have served the interests of the
Hamas government. A large amount of goods – from sheep to war materiel – has been
conveyed through these tunnels. Hamas has made a substantial profit from issuing visas
controlling these routes for smuggling and the smuggled goods.61 Building a steel fence, as
proposed by the Mubarak government in its last year, would have inflicted considerable
damage to the Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip and significantly harmed their ability to
bypass Israeli and Egyptian restrictions against smuggling war materiel to Gaza.
Mahmoud Abbas did not oppose the construction of this type of fence, which would have
weakened the ability of Hamas to assert its authority in the Gaza Strip. This is a clear example
of how Qaraḍāwī was forced to defend the interests of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in the name of
Islam and the Ummah by dint of exploiting his exalted status. Qaraḍāwī expressed sharp
criticism of the Egyptian government and of the Palestinian Authority that were prepared to
carry out such a “criminal” action. When figures from the Palestine Authority attacked his
intervention in this sensitive matter, Hamas spokesman, Sāmi Abu Zuhri, had to publish a
strong official reaction against the affront to and critique of Sheikh Qaraḍāwī’s statements.
According to Hamas, those who attack Qaraḍāwī either are acting against the spirit of his
rulings or in accordance with foreign interests. The Palestinian Authority and Egypt under
Mubarak are actually motivated by a Western agenda that is contrary to Islam and they are
acting against the interests of the Islamic Ummah.
Palestinian prisoners also play a role in this issue as far as the conflict between Fatah and
Hamas is concerned. Palestinian public opinion is highly sympathetic toward prisoners in
Israel’s jails, whatever their factional affiliation. Prisoners who were members of Hamas
expressed their public support for Sheikh Qaraḍāwī in an article that appeared on the website
of the ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades, in light of the criticism leveled against Qaraḍāwī by the
Palestinian Authority. The Hamas prisoners issued a public statement that claimed that
apparently members of Fatah and the Minister of Religious Trust (Waqf) in the government of Salam Fayyad (Salām
Fayyāḍ) pretend that they forgot that the position emphasized by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī derives from the heart of
the Arab Islamic Ummah. They have forgotten the jihadist, material and moral tasks that they must fulfill for the sake of

Palestine and its problems and for the sake of Jerusalem and the resistance.62

According to this statement, “The attack that is being led by members of Fatah serves the
occupation that Qaraḍāwī has designated as the main target for liquidation.” Since Qaraḍāwī
openly supports the Islamic resistance of Hamas, Israel is trying to limit his activities and
prevent him from visiting various countries throughout the world. On the other hand,
members of Fatah have not gone out of their way to attack the decision to arrest Sheikh Raed
Salah for nine months and have not condemned the judaization of Jerusalem. The opposite is
true. Members of Fatah have resumed peace talks with Israel whose results are known.63
Qaraḍāwī’s criticism of Husni Mubarak did not prevent construction of the fence on the
Egypt-Gaza border. Despite the opposition of Qaraḍāwī and the representatives of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt who called for a cessation of construction, Egypt continued to build the
“steel wall” on its border. A year later, in late January 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood, along
with other groups, succeeded in overthrowing the Mubarak government and taking over the
Egyptian government. The revolt of the “Arab Spring” began. For two years, Qaraḍāwī
flourished and even returned to Egypt and gave an address at Al-Azhar. His stature rose
exponentially in all Arab countries and he was regarded as the herald of the “Arab Spring.”64
In July 2013, General Abd al-Fattah Al-Sisi deposed President Muhammad Mursi of the
Muslim Brotherhood. The relations between the Egyptian government and Qaraḍāwī and the
Muslim Brotherhood returned to their former hatred and hostility. Indeed, both sides slander
each other and call each other “Jew.” Qaraḍāwī and Hasan al-Banna have been described as
Jews by the Egyptian government and General Al-Sisi has been labeled as a Jew in Muslim
Brotherhood websites.65 The Jew represents the devil and the ultimate evil, and every event is
examined with this in mind.

6. The question of visiting Jerusalem
The issue of visiting Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and controversial topics between
Sheikh Qaraḍāwī and Hamas, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority,
Mahmoud Abbas, authority, on the other. It has been over a decade since Qaraḍāwī published
a fatwa that forbids non-Palestinian Muslims from visiting Jerusalem. Qaraḍāwī’s statements
were published in his book, Fatāwā Muʾaṣira (Contemporary Legal Rulings).66 The visit of the
Mufti of Egypt, ʾAli Gumʾa (Egyptian Grand Mufti, 2003–2013), on 18 April 2012, and of others
such as the Yemeni Sheikh Ḥabīb ʾAli Zain al-ʾᾹbidīn al-Jifrī and other lesser known
personalities increased the rivalry between Qaraḍāwī and Hamas against Fatah and the
Palestinian Authority.67 According to the supporters of Qaraḍāwī’s ruling, these visits caused

grave damage to Al-Aqsa and the Palestinian cause. Therefore, the July 2012 number of
Filasṭīn Al-Muslima, the organ of Hamas, devoted its entire issue to this burning topic. The
sharp rivalry between the two Palestinian factions is evident from their intense dispute.
Qaraḍāwī issued a fatwa that forbids non-Palestinian Muslims to visit and pray at the AlAqsa Mosque as long as it is under Israel’s occupation and one must have an Israeli visa in
order to go there. It is considered an extreme law because there is no precedent for
prohibiting Muslims to pray in one of the holiest places of Islam because it is occupied by nonMuslims. Qaraḍāwī claims that Muslim amd Palestinian scholars accepted this ruling because
they do not want to enable Israel to use the entry visas issued for prayer in Al-Aqsa for
propaganda purposes.68 Hence, it is no wonder that his ruling angered Mahmoud Abbas, the
chairman of the Palestinian Authority; the PA Mufti, Muhammad Ahmad Husein; and
Mahmoud al-Habbash, PA Minister of Religious affairs and Islamic Trusts. The latter was the
most vocal critic of Qaraḍāwī. Despite the benefits and importance of prayer at the Al-Aqsa
Mosque for all Muslims (according to the Ḥadīth, a prayer that is worth 500 regular prayers),
Hamas gave unequivocal support to Sheikh Qaraḍāwī and his ruling.69 In fact, through this
ruling, Qaraḍāwī has prevented and still prevents the visits of millions of Muslims to the
Temple Mount who wish to observe the commandments of their religion. It does not prevent
elements in the Arab world from accusing Israel of preventing Muslims from praying on the
Temple Mount.70

a. The position of the Palestinian Authority: doubting the authority of
Qaraḍāwī
Mahmoud al-Habbash (Maḥmūd al-Habbāsh), Minister of Religious Affairs and Islamic Trusts
of the Palestinian Authority, gave a statement within the framework of the discussion about
the issue of visiting Jerusalem. In an interview of the France-Persse Agency, Habbash
maintains that Qaraḍāwī’s fatwā is contrary to the position of President Mahmoud Abbas.
Such a ruling is completely opposed to the Qurʿān and the Sunna.
We shall continue to want to go up to Al-Aqsa according to religion, law, history and politics. Al-Qaraḍāwī has issued a
strange and suspicious fatwa. It is a ruling that has not been given by any Muslim scholar in all of known history. For
there have been different periods when Jerusalem was under occupation.

Habbash further adds that “the ruling of Qaraḍāwī only serves Israeli policy that seeks to
isolate Jerusalem and judaize it (Arabic: tahwīduhā). [His policy] is working toward emptying
Jerusalem of its Palestinian, Arab, Muslim and Christian residents.”71
In fact, Mahmoud Al-Habbash explicitly accuses Qaraḍāwī of cooperation with Israel’s
program of judaization of Jerusalem. According to a leading official of the Palestinian

Authority, this apparently is a harsh and unprecedented accusation, as it involves a scholar of
the status of Al- Qaraḍāwī, Chairman of the IUMS and a member of the committee of leading
scholars at Al-Azhar. Al-Habbash asks whether all Qaraḍāwī’s pronouncements against
Zionists and Jews are really a pretense and in fact, his rulings serve the Zionists? Apparently,
Mahmoud al-Habbash, Palestinian Minister of Religious affairs in the PA government, would
not have resorted to such harsh accusations if relations between Fatah, the Palestinian
Authority and Sheikh Qaraḍāwī were not so strained. In the same interview, Habbash states
that Qaraḍāwī issued this fatwā without authority, after President Mahmoud Abbas called
upon the Arab world to come and visit Jerusalem, at the Jerusalem Conference held in Doha.
It means that Qaraḍāwī issued his ruling not out of legal considerations but in order to inflict
direct harm to Abu Mazen and his status.72
Al-Habbash dismisses Qaraḍāwī’s excuses that the reason for issuing the fatwā is that visits
of Muslims on the Temple Mount increase the legitimacy of the occupation. Habbash’s
position is that a visit to Jerusalem and to Al-Aqsa at this time is like visiting a jail.
Visiting jails does not add to the legitimacy of the jail. On the contrary, visits of Muslims for all over the world improve
the morale of the Palestinian people and contribute to the Palestinian economy and to our people who remain steadfast
on their land. There has never been a precedent of this kind in Islamic matters, where there is a ruling against visiting
Jerusalem, even during the period of Crusader occupation that lasted ninety years.73

If that is the case, what is difference between the Crusader occupation and the Jewish
occupation of Jerusalem? Why was it permitted to go up to Jerusalem and visit Al-Aqsa at that
time and not today? Al-Habbash argues that the ruling is political and its purpose is to harm
the government of Abu Mazen. Therefore, Al-Habbash requests that Qaraḍāwī retract this
fatwā. Al-Habbash even invited Qaraḍāwī to take part in a public discussion at a location of
his choice in order to clarify the matter of visiting Jerusalem. Qaraḍāwī did not respond to his
proposal.
Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, also has expressed his opposition
to Qaraḍāwī’s fatwā. His statements were made at a summit meeting of the heads of Arab
countries held in March 2012 in Baghdad. According to Abbas, not only is it permitted to visit
Jerusalem, but there is an urgent necessity to do so at this time.
The prohibition of visiting Jerusalem is a command that is not in accordance with the wish of the honorable Qurʿān or in
the stories of the Ḥadīth about the honorable prophets… one must work toward creating a situation of a continuous
stream of visitors to Jerusalem and its residents in order to break the siege that has been placed upon it and to extricate it
from its continuing, unending isolation.74

According to Qaraḍāwī’s ruling, a visit to Al-Aqsa is a decree that is not obligatory according
to the law and, in addition, it harms the Palestinian people politically. Abbas wonders how
Qaraḍāwī came to the conditions that determine that it is forbidden to visit Al-Aqsa as it is
under occupation. Such conditions appear neither in the Qurʿān nor in the Sunna. Moreover,

Abbas argues that
since the Prophet, may God have mercy and blessings upon him, made the Night Journey, there has been no religious
figure or legal authority who has issued such a strict ruling. In fact, Jerusalem was under occupation many times,
including under British occupation, and no one got up and said what is forbidden and what is permitted.75

Abbas concludes “that now is the permitted time; now is the time to support Jerusalem
without looking at the presence or absence of the occupation.”76 While Abbas does not
mention Qaraḍāwī explicitly by name, it is clear to whom he is referring. His statements
support those of Mahmoud al-Habbash that assert that Qaraḍāwī’s ruling strengthens Israel’s
policy of isolating and judaizing Jerusalem. It is interesting that Abu Mazen chose to make his
explicit statements in favor of visiting Jerusalem in Qatar. Like Habbash, Abbas compared a
visit to Jerusalem at this time to a visit to a jail. “When someone visits a jail, it is not a sign of
normalization with the prison wardens but the victory of those who are imprisoned.”77
In order to complete our discussion on the position of the Palestinian Authority regarding
this topic, we must mention the view of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Ahmad Husein.
He holds this office because he is the leading Islamic jurist in the Palestinian Authority, head of
its Sharīʾa courts and a leading preacher at the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The Mufti Muhammad
Hussein is known for his critical stance toward Israel. He allegedly has made several
antisemitic statements about the end of the Jews at a conference held in January 2012
commemorating 47 years since the establishment of Fatah.78 The Mufti’s position is that visits
to Jerusalem and to Al-Aqsa are in the category of worshipping God and do not constitute
normalization with the State of Israel. He made these pronouncements in response to
Qaraḍāwī’s fatwā, stating that “particularly at this time we must strengthen our going to the
Al-Aqsa Mosque and defending it. We must protect it from ongoing violations of the law by
the Israelis.”79
Sheikh Husein gives both a nationalist and a religious reason for his response. These explain
why every Muslim who is able to do so should visit the Al-Aqsa Mosque that is a “prisoner.”
The first is nationalist and economic. A visit would show financial and moral support for the
Palestinians who live in the area of Jerusalem. Visits of Muslims and of Arabs to Al-Aqsa are
not those of the usual tourists. They include support for the Palestinian economy that includes
hotels, hostels and businesses. The second is a religious reason. “Indeed, the Prophet
Muhammad visited Mecca when it was under pagan rule and when there were idols
surrounding the Kaʾba. At the time, no one said that there was normalization with idol
worshippers [or recognition of them]. For it was the Messenger’s way of conducting a
pilgrimage to the house of God [in Mecca] under any condition. We must apply a similar
analogy to pilgrimage to the Al-Aqsa Mosque today as it is the house of God and is
mentioned in the Qurʿān, despite the fact that it is under occupation, and not give up this
commandment.”80

Apparently, the statement by Muhammad Husein is a definitive argument against
Qaraḍāwī’s ruling, namely the use of the Islamic principle of Qiyās (“analogy”) for
determining law. According to this principle, one may make an analogy between an act
attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and a similar, contemporary problem. The Mufti
Muhammad Husein does not need statements from the Crusader or British occupation of
Palestine, but may base his response directly upon Sunnat Al-Nabī, the Sunna of the Prophet
(i.e., the deeds and words of Muhammad that serve as guidelines for those who follow in his
path.)81 The Sheikh stressed that although Al-Aqsa is under occupation, it remains part of the
House of Faith (Dār al-Ῑmān). According to Muhammad Husein, “when the Tatars conquered
Baghdad, no Islamic scholar called for not visiting Baghdad that was under occupation. But
they all called to come to Baghdad in order to help liberate it.”82 Therefore, we must continue
to visit Jerusalem and support the steadfastness of its Palestinian residents against the Israeli
occupation.
It is noteworthy that it is not the first time that there has been an open confrontation
between Qaraḍāwī and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) or Mahmoud al-Habbash, former
Minister of Religious affairs and Islamic Trusts of the PA. On 9 October 2009, Qaraḍāwī called
for the stoning of Abu Mazen and the rest of the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, in Mecca,
for collaborating with Israel and the United States. He announced that “one must stone them if
they are found guilty, just like they stone the devil.”83 His statement relates to the
postponement of the discussion at the United Nations on the issue of the Goldstone Report.
The Palestinian Authority agreed to postpone it because of American and Israeli pressure. Abu
Mazen reacted to Qaraḍāwī’s words by demanding that he rescind the fatwā against him and
said that “he [Qaraḍāwī] wants to stone me in Mecca.”84 Consequently, there were sermons in
the Palestinian Authority against Qaraḍāwī and his fatwā that undermined his status as a jurist
and as a religious figure. In this case, members of Hamas expressed their unequivocal support
for the positions of their spiritual leader and justified his statements against Abu Mazen.85

b. The position of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood: supporting the
rulings of Qaraḍāwī
Sheikh Qaraḍāwī contends that visiting Jerusalem at present, which requires an Israeli visa, is
tantamount to recognition of and bestowing legitimacy to Israel. This position is clearly
formulated in his website where he harshly attacks the visit of the Mufti of Egypt, ʾAli Gumʾa,
and the Palestinian Authority for their conducting negotiations with Israel.86 The Hamas
monthly, Filasṭīn Al-Muslima, went out of its way to explain to its readers the reasons for
accepting Qaraḍāwī’s ruling that regards any non-Palestinian Muslim who visits the Al-Aqsa
Mosque as a transgressor. An article on the Hamas website refers to this act as a “political sin

of the highest order that opens the doors to a political hell.”87 Furthermore, there are two
major reasons for preventing visits of non-Muslims. First, a visit of a non-Muslim to occupied
Jerusalem under Israeli control further legitimizes the occupation. Second, if Muslims do not
visit Jerusalem, they will feel its absence more deeply and will make greater efforts to liberate
it. Hamas representatives have presented additional reasons and have expanded upon
Qaraḍāwī’s statements. Raʿfat Mara asks twelve rhetorical questions that justify and explain
Qaraḍāwī’s position against visiting Al-Aqsa, as follows:
1. Why does the [Israeli] occupation focus upon Islamic scholars (sheikhs) and not other
groups?
2. Why are visits allowed only from those from Arab countries that have officially
recognized the occupation and have diplomatic relations with [Israel]?
3. Why does Israel’s security personnel honor and accompany these visitors?
4. Why are such visits (of Islamic scholars at Al-Aqsa) regarded as a precious gift for
Israel’s diplomacy and a means for Zionist propaganda, if it does not serve them well
in fulfilling their objective?
5. Why are visits to the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque limited to collecting souvenir
photographs and they are prevented from going anywhere in Palestine?
6. Why are visitors prevented from meeting with ordinary Palestinian residents or at
least from meeting those who live in Jerusalem?
7. Why do the visitors not conduct press conferences at the Al-Aqsa Mosque where they
can express their support for the Palestinian people?
8. Why have such visitors not presented even a single declaration supporting
[Palestinian] resistance or supporting Ṣumūd (“steadfastness”) of the Palestinian
people, or at least rejecting the plans of Israeli aggression against the Al-Aqsa
Mosque and the programs for judaizing [Jerusalem] while they are at Al-Aqsa?
9. Why do such visitors not preach the Friday sermon at the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque
and arouse Muslims all over the world to [take part in the] Jihad for Al-Aqsa and to
liberate it from [Israel’s] occupation?
10. Why don’t the visitors proclaim their contribution to strengthening the blessed AlAqsa Mosque?
11. Why do the visitors focus only upon their love for the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque and
not at all upon its situation under [Israel’s] occupation since 1967?
12. Why did the occupation arrest Sheikh Raed Salah, a son of Palestine, and prevent his
visit to the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque and approve the visit of sheikhs from Jordan and
Egypt?88
The questions listed above clearly illustrate the position of Hamas. Hamas supporters present

religious figures who visit the Al-Aqsa Mosque, such as the Egyptian Sheikh Ali Gumʾa,
former Egyptian Grand Mufti and head of the Sharīʾa courts, whose visit revived the
discussion of this matter, as collaborators with Israel. Israel definitely practices discrimination
as far as issuing visas to go to Al-Aqsa mosque is concerned, and many Palestinians are
prevented from praying at the mosque. The treatment of Raed Salah Mahajneh, head of the
Islamic Movement in Israel, is an example of Israel’s discriminatory policy. He was issued a
judicial order removing him from the Temple Mount for several years. Therefore, visiting the
Temple Mount at this time is a political offense and constitutes stabbing the steadfast stance of
the Palestinians in the back. This is the title of an article on the subject published by Mahā Abd
al-Hādī of Jerusalem.89
According to Hamas, leading Egyptian and Jordanian Islamic figures – such as General
Husein al-Majalli, head of the Jordanian Defense Services – are allowed to visit Al-Aqsa only
because of their collaboration with Israel. Hamas propogandists stress that the first widely
publicized visit of a non-Palestinian Islamic figure was that of the “traitor,” Anwar al-Sadat,
who signed a peace treaty with Israel. It took place in 1977.90 These visits foster normalization
with Israel and, in effect, constitute recognition of Israel’s rule in Jerusalem. There is no
comparison with present-day visits to Al-Aqsa and those that took place under the Crusaders
and the British because of Israel’s plans to “judaize” Jerusalem. Furthermore, it is not possible
to compare going to Al-Aqsa to Muhammad’s visit to the Kaʾba when it was still under pagan
rule. The residents of Mecca were local, indigenous inhabitants. They were not a foreign
element that came from abroad, or oppressed and expelled the local population and
conquered its holy site. Therefore, the analogy, according to Islamic law that has been
proposed by Sheikh Husein, is out of place.91
Hamas spokesmen have derisively dismissed the arguments of the Mufti of Egypt, ʾAli
Gumʾa, that his visit is private and personal – that it does not represent any type of
normalization and that his passport does not have an Israeli stamp, but a Jordanian one.
Likewise, Hamas rejects out of hand his claims that he happened to have an opportunity to
visit and pray at the holy Al-Aqsa at the invitation of the Jordanian Waqf. In fact, it is not
logical for so important a figure as the Mufti of Egypt, who arrived in Jerusalem via Jordan, to
have done so without coordination with Israel. According to the Hamas website, the Israeli
daily, Haaretz, mentioned Israel’s preparations for his visit. As far as the Israeli stamp is
concerned, it is quite possible that the Israeli stamp at the Allenby Bridge was not in his
passport but on a separate page or on another passport issued for this purpose.92 The Mufti of
Egypt is not a private person, but, by dint of his position, he represents the religious
establishment of Egypt. “One may interpret his visit only as a departure from the straight
Islamic path that is preached by all the sheikhs at Al-Azhar, headed by Sheikh Yūsuf AlQaraḍāwī, who have condemned him for his visit.”93 His visit improved the image of Israel in
the world as an enlightened country that allows freedom of religion for every one. It did not

promote Jihad against Israel “the occupier,” and made Israel appear as the liberator of both
Western and Eastern Jerusalem. Therefore, the visit of the Mufti of Egypt was considered a
“poisoned visit.”94 The Hamas website also features interviews with residents of the West
Bank from Nablus and Ramallah who support their views and reject the position of the
Palestinian Authority.95
The issue of Filasṭīn Al-Muslima also presents the views of Sheikh ʾIkrima Ṣabri, former
Mufti of the Palestinian Authority, who was fired from his position by Abu Mazen and
replaced by Muhammad Husein. ʾIkrima Ṣabri received the honor of being called “Mufti of
Jerusalem” despite the fact that there is no such official position. Today Sheikh Ṣabri serves as
one of the preachers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque. He is known for his radically anti-Israel views.
Therefore, it is no surprise that he expressed his support for the position of Hamas and of
Sheikh Qaraḍāwī and viciously attacked the visit of the Mufti of Egypt, Dr. ʾAli Gumʾa.
According to Ṣabri, Israeli soldiers were present in the courtyard of Al-Aqsa during the entire
visit. The visit was fully approved by Israel and constitutes recognition of Israel’s authority
over the Temple Mount. It must be pointed out that Israel Security Services have removed
ʾIkrima Ṣabri from the Temple Mount on several occasions.96
In an interview, Qaraḍāwī emphasizes that despite the comprehensive prohibition of nonPalestinian Muslims engaging in prayers at Al-Aqsa, he does not forbid brethren from
Palestine to go up there and protect the mosque.
We require that Palestinians from the inside of the occupied lands (namely, Arabs who are citizens of Israel since 1948)
and from outside [those areas] visit Al-Aqsa and pray there and renovate it and protect it in order to prevent Israel from
taking it over.97

Here, he also means supporting the activity of the members of the Islamic Movement
headed by Sheikh Raed Salah who renovated Solomon’s Stables on the Temple Mount and
clashed with security forces on various occasions during the past few years. Qaraḍāwī is afraid
that the entry of Muslim visitors from other parts of the world would not help the Palestinians
resist Israel’s plans to judaize the city. Their visits would simply grant legitimacy to continued
Israeli rule over Al-Aqsa and would keep the Muslims in their deep sleep. This is the source
for his prohibition.98

7. Qaraḍāwī’s support for Hamas during the wars in Gaza
Since June 2006, the Israel Defense Forces have carried out military operations in the Gaza
Strip in order to inflict harm upon Hamas. The first campaign took place in the wake of the
kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006. Operation “Gishmei Kaitz”

(Summer Rain) was halted because the Second Lebanon War began two weeks later. On 31
October 2006, Operation “Annanei Stav” (Autumn Clouds), took place. The IDF entered the
areas of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia in the northern part of the Gaza Strip. It ended on 26
November 2006, after 400 Palestinians were killed in Gaza.99 These two military operations
took place when Fatah, under the leadership of Muhammad Daḥlān and as part of the
Palestinian Authority, played a role in governing the Gaza Strip. Fatah was engaged in a
struggle against its opponents and was the target of increasing criticism by Hamas. The
takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in June 2007 and the establishment of its control over the
area by expelling members of Fatah brought about recurring rounds of fighting between
Israel and Hamas and its supporters. Several experts have referred to this policy as “mowing
the lawn.”100
Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, there have been four Israeli military
operations in order to weaken Hamas’ control and to reduce the number of rockets launched
toward Israel as much as possible. Despite their limitations, Operations Warm Winter and Cast
Lead that took place in 2008 and early in 2009 brought about a period of relative quiet,101 For
the most part, Hamas has managed to recover, to renew its rocket-fire power and even to
increase the range of its targets in Israel. A substantial part of its success in preserving its
power derives from the financial support by Qatar that has assisted in the rehabilitation of
Gaza and has enabled the organization to purchase arms. In addition, financial, political and
public support for Hamas has come from charitable funds from all over the world.
In January 2009, after Operation Cast Lead, Sheikh Qaraḍāwī was active in collecting
considerable amounts of money for rehabilitating the Gaza Strip. He did so in his capacity as
the head of the Union of Muslim Scholars by diverting contributions from Iʿtilāf Al-khair, an
international charitable organization that he founded, to Hamas. Qaraḍāwī also was active in
persuading the ruler of Qatar at the time, Ḥamd Bin Khalīfa Ᾱl Thānī (in office, 2007–2013), to
give financial and political support to Hamas.102

a) Support for Hamas Operation Pillar of Defense (2012)
On 14 November 2012, the Israel Defense Forces began Operation Pillar of Defense (Hebrew,
Amoud Anan) with the purpose of reducing rocket fire on Israel from the Gaza Strip. The
operation started with the elimination of Aḥmad al-Jaʾabarī, Deputy Commander of the
military wing of Hamas, the ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades, who in fact served as acting
commander. Residents of Hamas-ruled Gaza suffered great losses during Operation Pillar of
Defense: 169 dead and 800 wounded. In addition, there was massive destruction of the
infrastructure and of public buildings. While Israel achieved much militarily speaking, the
Hamas government boasted considerable political accomplishments.103

This campaign took place at the height of the “Arab Spring,” when Islamist parties won
elections in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Yemen. Indeed, it seemed as if the Muslim
Brotherhood was about to take over the Arab world and finally fulfill its vision of an Islamic
empire, hence, Hamas’s great political achievements, such as recognition of its legitimacy by
the member-states of the Arab League, for the first time. Ismail Haniyya, head of the Hamas
government, began to receive Arab foreign ministers and heads of states who expressed
unequivocal support for and identification with the government in Gaza, thereby displeasing
Mahmoud Abbas.104 Qaraḍāwī also played a role in attaining these accomplishments. On the
second day of Operation Pillar of Defense, he began to seek aid for Hamas. At the time, during
the term of the later-deposed President Muhammad Mursi, Sheikh Qaraḍāwī served as a
member of the Committee of Muslim scholars at Al-Azhar. He used his visit to Egypt to
express his opinions of supporting Hamas. Qaraḍāwī took the opportunity of preaching
against Israel.
His sermons at Al-Azhar were broadcast to all Arab countries. Qaraḍāwī called for Arab
and Islamic unity against the common enemy of the Islamic Ummah and for strengthening the
morale of the Palestinians in Gaza. His statements were broadcast on 16 November 2012, on
the occasion of Egyptian Prime Minister Hishām Qandīl’s historic visit to Gaza. According to
Qaraḍāwī,
they must prove to the entire world that they are one [Islamic] Ummah that can confront any [aggression] against a
people of its peoples.”105 He added the following statement of condemnation “against those scholars in the Islamic
Ummah that are not rising up against Israel and its wicked and boastful deeds.106

The revolts in the Arab world that empowered Islamic movements associated with the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Yemen, and especially the revolution of
25 January (2011) in Egypt, encouraged greater readiness to support the Palestinian cause. In
his sermon broadcast from Al-Azhar throughout the Arab world, Qaraḍāwī called for a march
of the Arab masses for the liberation of Gaza and for aid to the Palestinians. His appeals to
Arab countries, particularly to the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, demanded canceling
the peace agreement, breaking diplomatic relations with Israel and returning Arab
ambassadors to their countries. His words did not fall on deaf ears. Several Arab countries
expressed their support for the Hamas government. There was a procession of Arab foreign
ministers to Gaza, thereby granting Hamas a major political achievement.107 In fact, in the
wake of Operation Pillar of Defense, Egypt also returned its ambassador to Israel. However, it
did not break relations with Israel and even played a significant role in ending the fighting.
Despite the strong influence of Qaraḍāwī upon the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood
throughout the world, especially in Egypt, and his political clout with the Brotherhood’s
regime in Egypt, he did not have the power to bring about the cancellation of the peace
agreement between Egypt and Israel. While his sermons encouraged open expressions of

support in a variety of Arab countries and in Europe, no Arab country went out of its way to
aid Hamas in its war against Israel. Leading figures in Hamas expressed their disappointment
with the reactions in the Arab world that were not as sufficiently effective in exerting pressure
upon Israel as they had hoped.108
Qaraḍāwī contributed significantly to the political gains of Hamas during the “Arab Spring”
in 2011–2013, when several Islamic movements rose to power. On 23 October 2012, the Emir
of Qatar, Ḥamd Bin Khalīfa Ᾱl Thānī, became the first Arab leader to visit the Gaza Strip after
its takeover by Hamas in June 2007. By going directly to Gaza and not visiting the Palestinian
Authority in Ramallah, the Emir of Qatar recognized the legitimacy of Hamas’s ideology and
rule. He also contributed 400 million dollars.109 He was criticized by the Salam Fayyad
government and by Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority. The head of the
Hamas government, Ismail Haniyya, then announced the building of a new city near Khan
Yunis in the Gaza Strip, to be called Madīnat Ḥamd, after the emir, in honor of the historic
visit that marked a turning point, as far as diplomatic recognition of the Hamas government is
concerned. Mahmoud Abbas had no choice but to protest against the visit and hope that it
would not harm the efforts to bring about reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.
Eventually, they signed an agreement in April 2014 (and still have problems with its
implementation)110
In an article that appeared on the website of the military wing of Hamas, Katāʿib ʾIzz al-Dīn
al-Qassām, Qaraḍāwī is quoted as saying that the historic visit to Gaza and the financial aid of
the Emir of Qatar during Operation Pillar of Defense were partly the results of his influence
upon the Emir Hamd Bin Khalifa and others in the government in Doha, Qaraḍāwī’s place of
residence since the 1960s.111 Qaraḍāwī described his close ties with the president of Qatar that
began immediately after the Gaza war (2009) in which there were 1415 killed and 5450
wounded. He met the president of Qatar as part of a delegation of Islamic scholars and
requested his intervention on behalf of Hamas government in Gaza, in the wake of the results
of Israeli aggression. According to Qaraḍāwī, he managed to convey the importance of the
Palestinian cause and of the hardship in Gaza to the emir. In turn, he made a commitment to
Qaraḍāwī that he would do all he could for Gaza.112 In fact, the Emir of Qatar first attempted
to bring about reconciliation between the Palestinian factions when he sponsored the Doha
Agreement between Fatah and Hamas.113 However, when the agreement did not bring about
the anticipated reconciliation, he eventually adopted an independent policy that opposed that
of the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League at the time. Hence, the Emir of Qatar was
the first Arab leader who came to Gaza on an official political visit since the takeover by
Hamas in 2007.

b) Support for Hamas during Operation Protective Edge (2014)

Operation Protective Edge began on 8 July 2014. There were several stages: aerial attacks;
limited entry of land forces; and elimination of leading figures of the military wing of Hamas.
There was also an attempt to eliminate Muhammad Deif, general commander of the ʾIzz alDīn al-Qassām Brigades.114 From the first day of the military campaign, Qaraḍāwī adopted a
position that supported and encouraged Hamas and other Palestinian factions to continue
resistance and Jihad against Israel. On 9 July, the second day of the war, the Union of Islamic
Scholars, headed by Qaraḍāwī, issued a public statement, which called upon Islamic
governments and organizations and human rights organizations to end the Zionist violence.
Similarly, Qaraḍāwī appealed to “the Palestinian people to continue its struggle with a third
intifada… and to continue its steadfastness on Palestinian land against the oppressive Zionist
occupier.”115
Qaraḍāwī’s messages during the Gaza wars consistently continue those of his speeches and
sermons regarding the obligation of waging Jihad in Palestine. Some echo those that he
iterated in different ocasions, during Operations Cast Lead in 2009 and Pillar of Defense in
November 2012. Since Operation Protective Edge lasted 50 days, there was ample time for
Qaraḍāwī to express his decisive support for Hamas and to emphasize the following principles.

8. Gaza: the most important Jihad
To those who struggle in the Land of Al-Shām [i.e., Greater Syria, including Jordan, Lebanon and Israel], to all those who
turn to Gaza for [waging] Jihad in Gaza, this is most important Jihad in the Land of Al- Shām. This is my ruling for
needs of this moment concerning everything that must be said for [the struggle on] the soil of Gaza. Gaza calls out to
you!! Where are the fighters of Jihad and the free men? O sons of Umar al-Farouq [a name for Umar Ibn al-Khattab, the
second caliph, during whose reign Jerusalem and the Land of Israel were conquered].116

The struggle in the Gaza Strip is part of the ongoing struggle between Zionist Jews and the
Islamic Ummah. This fateful struggle demands a decisive outcome in favor of the sons of the
Ummah who are defending themselves from the power of the anti-Muslim aggressor that has
attached himself to the ruler of Egypt, Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. Therefore, the mobilization of all
of the children of the Ummah is necessary at this time. In a declaration made at the start of the
fighting in 2014, Qaraḍāwī warns against false rulings and emphasizes his consistent position,
in accordance with Islamic law, that may be found in his books, writings and sermons that deal
with Palestine and demand fighting in Palestine with life and property.117
Qaraḍāwī mentions three of his major works that emphasize the importance of Jihad in
Palestine, which constitutes a defensive Jihad, and therefore, is a personal obligation (Farḍ ʾ
Ain): Dars al-Nakba al-Thāniya: Limādhā Inhazamnā, wa-Kaifa Nantaṣiru (Sermons on the
Second Nakba: Why We Lost and How We will Win), published immediately after the Six Day
War in 1967; Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat Kull Muslim (Jerusalem: A Problem for All Muslims); and Fiqh

al-Jihād (Laws of Jihad).118
In Qaraḍāwī’s thought on Islamic law, Jihad in Gaza has greater importance than fighting
on other fronts, such as Syria and Iraq, where an internecine struggle is taking place between
Muslims. Fighting against the Jews in Gaza even takes priority over the struggle against
unbelieving Christians in America and Afghanistan. The idea of “progressive Jihad” according
to the degree of an area’s importance for Islam also derives from Qaraḍāwī’s antisemitic
doctrine that maintains that the war against the Jews is a cosmic struggle between good and
evil that dates from the beginnings of Islam.119
According to Sheikh Kamal Khatib, deputy of Raed Salah of the Islamic Movement in Israel
(also member in IUMS), the major issue of the Ummah is and will continue to be Palestine.
The crisis in Iraq, in which the ISIS is involved, and the crises in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt are
not the main problems of the Islamic Ummah. The importance of Jihad in Palestine derives
from the place of Jerusalem and of Al-Aqsa in Islam. It was the first Qibla in Islam and it will
be restored as such. The task of Islamic scholars is to support the Palestinian struggle that will
signify the renewed importance of Jerusalem in Islam.120
The reason for Khatib’s defiant stance, as expressed at the General Conference of the IUMS
that met in Istanbul, is
that because of the rulings by Jewish scholars that permit settlers to break into the Al-Aqsa Mosque and prepare its
destruction in order to build their false temple (Al-Haikal al-Mazʾūm). How can it be that Jewish scholars issue such a
ruling and Muslim scholars are silent?121

Khatib’s position is not new. It is the message of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood that
appeared even prior to the First Intifada.
On 10 July 2014, during the month of Ramadan, after the murder of Muhammad Abu
Khdeir and the outbreak of Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Qaraḍāwī published his appeal
to come to defend Jerusalem. “Palestine and Jerusalem are the foremost Islamic problem.”122
An additional struggle in Jerusalem today is
the partition [of the Temple Mount] and expulsion, oppression and judaization of the city in order to transform it into a
Jewish capital. This [will be achieved] by the destruction of its Arab and Islamic character and the expulsion of
Jerusalem’s residents. The [Zionist] occupation is in a race against time and therefore it is trying to determine facts on
the ground.123

Israel is taking advantage of the fact that many regions of the Muslim Ummah are unstable
and have internal problems, in order to fulfill a dangerous program.
The dangerous program reported by Qaraḍāwī is the destruction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque
and building the Jewish Temple on its ruins. The plans of the enemy who takes advantage of
what is going on in Syria and Egypt are advancing gradually:
They are building underneath Al-Aqsa and creating a siege on Al-Aqsa by preventing the entry of Muslim worshippers.
The threat to Al-Aqsa is a long and ongoing threat. Therefore, I declare that the problem of Palestine and the problem of

Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa are the foremost problem for Muslims.

It is not a problem solely for Palestinians but for all Muslims. Thus, despite the fact that there
are difficult problems for Muslims in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, the most important place
for Jihad remains Palestine because of its holiness and the constant threat from the Jews. By
virtue of his position as Chairman of the Board of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) International
Institution, Qaraḍāwī calls upon Islamic scholars to be conscious of their role and their
responsibility and support the struggle for Muslim and Arab Jerusalem. All Muslims, wherever
they may be, must support Jerusalem and the Palestinian struggle for it. The struggle of
Hamas in Gaza constitutes part of the religious struggle between the community of Muslim
believers and the community of infidels.124 Part of Qaraḍāwī’s anti-Jewish worldview is his
absolute negation of any historical Jewish indication of presence in Jerusalem and in the Land
of Israel.
In light of the above, it is not surprising that Saleh al-Arouri addressed the Conference of
the IUMS, held in August 2014, immediately after Operation Protective Edge. Arouri is a
member of the political bureau of Hamas and a founder of its military wing in the West Bank.
Originally, from the village of Aroura in the Ramallah District, Arouri currently lives in
Turkey. He approved the kidnapping of three Israeli young men in June 2014. The kidnapping
led to the bloody war in Gaza. His statements, cited on the Qaraḍāwī Website, acknowledge
that
he updated the attendees [at the Conference] about what is happening in Palestine in general and in the Gaza Strip in
particular. He presented details about what took place in the course of the racist and barbaric [Zionist] wars [and] the
siege that is strangling [Gaza]. He described the oppressive settlements and the judaization of Jerusalem. The judaization
finds its expression in the changes in buildings and the partition of Al-Aqsa in accordance with a schedule [respective
prayer-times for Jews and for Muslims] and the division of the concourse of Al-Aqsa between both sides [between a
Jewish and a Muslim area].125

Finally, at the Conference, Arouri first admitted and was recorded as saying that Hamas
was responsible for kidnapping the three Israeli youths.126
Beyond the holiness of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa in Islamic tradition that justifies the fact that
Jihad in Palestine is the most important Jihad today, Qaraḍāwī argues that the war in Gaza is
existential, a war of no-choice.
It is Israel that began the war in Gaza. While the resistance will be saved and will behave heroically… [for the
Palestinians] the war is an existential question… the resistance is Ṣumūd and Allāh will grant it victory.127

According to Hamas spokesmen – such as Sheikh Khalīl al-Ḥayya, member of the political
bureau of Hamas and a resident of Gaza – the road to Jerusalem passes through the road of
the resistance in Gaza. Such statements were made after Operation Protective Edge.128

9. Jihad in Palestine: an obligation for every Palestinian
The events surrounding the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers and Israel’s military actions
against Hamas in June 2014 led to renewed fighting between Israel and the Palestinians,
including rocket salvos launched by Hamas at Israeli population centers, and, in turn, to
Operation Protective Edge. The mass demonstrations by Palestinians that took place in Dura
and Hebron, Qalandiya, Nablus, Jerusalem and in refugee camps, during the search for the
three kidnapped youths, were not lost on Qaraḍāwī who referred to them as a third intifada.
During the first days of the military operation against Hamas in Gaza, the IUMS called upon
Islamic and Arab countries and all of the Ummah to support the struggle of the Palestinian
people.129 Another public statement by Qaraḍāwī’s deputy, Sheikh ʾAli Al-Qara Dāghī, called
for an Arab and Islamic intifada for the sake of Palestine and Jerusalem.130
On 2 July 2014, the appalling murder of Muhammad Abu Khdeir from the Shoʾafat
neighborhood of Jerusalem took place. After an intensive police investigation, several Jewish
suspects were apprehended. They admitted to murdering Abu Khdeir to avenge the murder of
the three teenagers, who were abducted by Hamas on 12 June 2014. Media coverage of the
murder and the motives of the murderers resulted in a public statement, issued by the IUMS,
headed by Qaraḍāwī, on 6 July, calling for violent resistance against Zionists and Israel.
Qaraḍāwī’s fatwā also condemned the silence of the Arab and Islamic world along with that
of other countries and of the international community.
Extremist Jewish criminals murdered a Palestinian youth and burnt him in occupied Palestine… because of this, the
Palestinian people has the full right to defend its occupied land by all available means without any restrictions
whatsoever.131

Thus, Qaraḍāwī’s IUMS transformed a local event that was condemned by the entire Israeli
government and society into an act that justified the massive retaliation by Hamas that
launched a torrent of missiles and mortars against Israel.
After the murderers of Muhammad Abu Khdeir were apprehended and during the first day
of the war in Gaza, a more explicit and clear statement was issued, as follows:
We of the IUMS call upon the Islamic and Arab Ummah, peoples and governments, to wake up and support the
Palestinian people. The Palestinian problem must be solved and [we must] strengthen the Palestinian people that are
fighting for their just rights and for defending its sacred trusts that have fallen as prey to a cruel occupier. They must
bear the responsibility as God, may He be blessed, has commanded: ‘O believers, if you extend help to God, He will also
extend his help to you and will put you strongly on your feet.’132

In an interview published after the war, on 2 September 2014, Qaraḍāwī mentioned that
“Islamic law obligates us as Muslims to defend Gaza together.”133
In a fatwā issued by the IUMS, published on 27 July 2014, Sheikh Qaraḍāwī and ʾAli Muḥy

al-Din Al-Qara Dāghī, Secretary-General of the IUMS, stated that “supporting Gaza is an
obligation for all Muslims according to Islamic law (Wājib Sharʾī). Muslims must use all
available means in their power in order to remove the aggression upon the people of Gaza.”134
This is the great steadfastness and Muslims are obligated to support it. How will this support
find expression? Qaraḍāwī issued a public statement that delineates detailed steps to be taken
by Muslims. He is aware of the comprehensive nature of the struggle, and that Jihad not only
involves lives but also writing, money, demonstrations and consciousness.
a. In Palestine: Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem must demonstrate and
protest against Israel’s actions in Gaza. They must set fire to Palestinian cities until a
worldwide intifada will arise, especially an intifada in Arab countries, namely the
continuation of the revolts against Arab rulers.
b. The entire public must display the unity of the steadfastness of the people of Gaza.
c. We call upon all free countries throughout the world to work on behalf of the true
and just rights of the Palestinian people in Gaza. They include removing the blockade;
opening the crossing-points; giving all Palestinians the opportunity to pray at the AlAqsa Mosque; restoring Palestinians to their lands and bringing end of the Zionist
occupation.
d. We demand that the entire Arab and Islamic Ummah support the struggle of the
people of Gaza and become active in their respective countries and in the
international community in order to exert pressure on the occupation and stop the
aggression in Gaza.135
The public statement ends with the Qurʿānic verse: “God will not distract himself from that
which you do,” (Qurʿān, 2: 74). The explicit appeal to Muslims by Qaraḍāwī and the IUMS,
located in Europe, to take all steps, including encouraging “spontaneous” demonstrations
against aggression in Gaza, resulted in numerous demonstrations throughout Europe. Stormy
mass protests against Israel’s fighting in Gaza, mainly by Muslims living in Europe, took place
in Berlin, Paris, London and Belgium. The crowds screamed, “Israel is a Terrorist State,” and
called for boycotting Israeli products because support for Israel’s economy is tantamount to
support for the actions of its war machine. Demonstrators also shouted antisemitic slogans
such as “Death to the Jews” and there were numerous antisemitic incidents perpetrated mainly
by Muslim immigrants.136

10. Hamas is not a terrorist organization
A song that was broadcast many times on Al-Aqsa and Al-Quds Radio, associated with Hamas

in Gaza, dealt with the meaning of Jihad. The refrain of the song emphasized that Jihad is not
terror since the Egyptians had labeled the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.
Qaraḍāwī has vehemently opposed the definition of Hamas as a terrorist organization,
particularly by the Egyptian government. According to Qaraḍāwī, Hamas is an organization
that defends the Palestinian people and represents the Islamic Ummah. The political approach
of Egypt, Israel, the European countries and the United States that presents Hamas as a
terrorist organization is causing a catastrophe and is disrupting efforts at raising the
consciousness of the Islamic resistance. “For Muslims have the right to continue resistance
until the liberation of their land.”137 The argument that Hamas is a terror organization
constitutes “ongoing brainwashing, but the resistance will continue to stand fast and Allāh will
grant it victory.”138
The above statement explains the reason why Hamas spokesmen repeatedly have justified
the kidnapping of soldiers and settlers and have argued that it is not an act of terror. For
example, after the first kidnapping of a soldier, Staff-Sergeant Nisim Toledano in December
1992, Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz Rantisi (d. 2004) stated that it was not terrorism, as follows:
This action is not a terrorist action. The Hamas movement is characterized by actions against Israeli soldiers. If there is
something that may be called terror, they are the actions of the armed Israeli forces against defenseless civilians among
our people… actions against soldiers are not terrorist in any way.139

Khaled Mashal, head of the political bureau of Hamas, has made similar statements when
discussing the responsibility of Hamas for the abduction of the three Israeli teenagers at the
Etzion Bloc Junction. A Hamas squad from Hebron commanded by Ḥusām Qawāsme, who
was paid by the Hamas government in Gaza, kidnapped the youths.140 However, in order to
justify the kidnapping, Hamas argued that every settler is like a soldier and, therefore, is a
legitimate target for murder or kidnapping. Hamas websites, such as Shabakat Filasṭīn lilḤiwār, stressed that according to Mashal, “settler soldiers in the West Bank are aggressive and
live in a manner that is against [international] law on stolen land. Therefore, the Palestinian
people has the right to resistance [against them]… Netanyahu’s comparison of Hamas to
“extremist organizations” [such as ISIS] is a lie intended to influence general public opinion.
We are a liberation movement and not a violent organization.”141
In an interview on Al Jazeera, Qaraḍāwī explained that Hamas rejected the Egyptian
initiative on 15 July 2014 because Egypt regards Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood as
terrorist organizations. Qaraḍāwī expressed his astonishment and asked how Egypt could
regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization; remove Mohammed Mursi, a
president who was elected democratically; and arrest and torture over 40,000 Muslim
Brotherhood activists. Egypt collaborates with Israel in the blockade of Gaza and then presents
itself as an intermediary. How can one have confidence in the regime of al-Sisi?142

11. Islamic solidarity
The theme of Islamic solidarity recurs in every declaration of Qaraḍāwī during campaigns
against Israel. Qaraḍāwī used his position as head of the IUMS and ruled that it is Islamic duty
to support the people of Gaza. He described the conduct of the Arab countries as a “shameful
scandal.”143 According to Qaraḍāwī, “Muslims must come to the rescue and support the people
of Gaza however possible, with their persons, money and prayer.”144 He adds that “it is ḥarām
(a prohibition according to Islamic law) for the Muslim Ummah that dwells in both the East
and the Western [part] of the world that it sees Gaza under a ground, air and sea attack and
that it leaves it to its fate.”145 Every Muslim must help according to his ability even if adding
an extra supplication for the sake of the people of Gaza is desirable. During Ramadan, after
ten days of fighting, Qaraḍāwī noted that “at the beginning of the tenth night [of the war] we
shall turn to Allāh, believing that He will grant victory to our brethren in Gaza and will defeat
their enemies and our enemy, the Jewish oppressors.”146 Qaraḍāwī blames all Jews for the
situation in Gaza. All Jews are oppressors whose sentence is destruction. His statements show
that he has totally ignored the indiscriminate launching of missiles toward Israel.
The struggle of the people of Gaza has affected the honor of the entire Islamic Ummah.
Therefore, the success of the resistance in Gaza has a positive influence upon all of the
members of the Islamic Ummah, not only the residents of Gaza.
The heroic stance of the people of Gaza has lifted the heads of the entire [Islamic] Ummah. They are fighting with great
force against the Zionists and others. I am with them and strengthen the hand of the sons of Gaza and the [West]
Bank!!147

The force that is fighting against the sons of the Palestinian people is not only made up of
Zionists but also of those who support the Zionists. Qaraḍāwī does not tell who they are, but
Christian countries that support Israel immediately become the enemies of Islam with all that
this implies. Therefore, Islamic law justifies harming countries that support Israel, among
them, the United States and Canada.
Hence, it is clear that the Palestinians cannot be abandoned to their fate.
Islam places an obligation upon Arab and Islamic countries to support the resistance in Gaza with food, medicines and
arms. Islam demands the unity of the Ummah in all of the many countries that make up the Islamic home-land,
distances between them notwithstanding. It is unconscionable to abandon the resistance to itself [in this campaign].148

According to Qaraḍāwī’s teachings, the concept of the Islamic Ummah is not an amorphous
and meaningless idea. When part of the Ummah is harmed, it is the duty of the other parts of
the Ummah to defend it. Therefore, as far as the conflict is Palestine is concerned, the struggle
between Israel and Hamas must be considered in cosmic terms – as a struggle of the ZionistJewish nation, which is supported by the opponents of Islam throughout the world, against the

Muslim world. This struggle has no borders because, at the end of the day, it is a struggle
between life and death and between Judaism and Islam. Here, Qaraḍāwī adopts the view of
Sayyid Quṭb expressed in his book, Our War against the Jews.149 Furthermore, Qaraḍāwī
harshly criticizes Arab countries that do not give enough support to the resistance and have
abandoned it in its confrontation with Israel. According to his teachings, Arab and Muslim
countries must support the resistance just as Jews support the State of Israel.150
Qaraḍāwī’s deputy, Sheikh ʾAli al-Qara Dāghī (Al-Qaradāghī), Secretary-General of the
IUMS, expresses himself more bluntly. On 20 July 2014, after the alleged “slaughter in
Shujaʾiyya,” Al-Qara Dāghī condemned
the Arab and Islamic silence regarding these acts of slaughter that harm the right of our Palestinian brethren in Gaza…
condemning the Schadenfreude as far the Palestinians are concerned, and the continuation of coordination with Israel at
the expense of the Palestinians.151

Who is supposed to lead the Islamic nation in its ongoing struggle against forces that are
fighting against Islam? Egypt could lead the Islamic Ummah but not with the current
leadership. Qaraḍāwī’s harsh criticism of the leadership of Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi encompasses
many parameters of the state of affairs in Egypt. For example, Qaraḍāwī regards the Rafah
Border Crossing as an Egyptian-Arab-Islamic location. He questions the right of al-Sisi to
deny the natural right of the rest of the members of the united Islamic Ummah to use this
crossing point, since all Muslims constitute a single Islamic entity of 1.7 billion people.152
Neither countries nor Muslims exist in a vacuum. It is inconceivable that Muslims are killed
while other Muslims will act as if it does not affect them. Egypt is not alone, and neither is
Tunisia or any other Muslim country. While Egypt bears the brunt of Qaraḍāwī’s criticism for
remaining aloof and cooperating with Israel, other Arab countries are targets of his criticism
as well.153 This outlook finds expression in numerous cartoons and articles on various Hamas
websites.
Qaraḍāwī’s activist position regarding the conflict with Israel found expression at the
Conference of the IUMS that was held toward the end of Operation Protective Edge on 20–22
August 2014. The conclusions summed up at the conference included aid to Hamas and an
appeal for aid to the Palestinian people, as much as possible.
What took place in Gaza during the month of Ramadan and at present is raw aggression by the conquering Zionist
enemy. This enemy has carried out acts of slaughter and war crimes against innocent civilians by destroying their homes,
refugee camps, government buildings, educational institutions, mosques, and so forth.154

The United Nations Security Council did not do anything to help the refugees. They
supported the aggressor. Hence, the IUMS issued five practical decisions.
1. Jerusalem maintains its honorable religious and historical place. It is the heart of the
Islamic Ummah and represents its honor. None of the plans for judaization by the

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

occupation will succeed in altering this truth.
There is no substitute for the role of Jerusalem in the midst of the Islamic Ummah.
Therefore, it is not possible to give up even a centimeter of the holy city.
The IUMS declares its responsibility and loyalty to things holy to the Ummah. It takes
the way of security in order to defend its sacred trusts. The Palestinian people bear
the burden willingly, not because it is coerced.
The IUMS declares in the name of all parts of the Ummah, headed by the Islamic
scholars who are the head of the Ummah, that they will work toward preventing the
occupation from partitioning the Al-Aqsa Mosque or controlling it. Likewise, they
will work toward the cessation of the series of daily affronts to and outbursts at AlAqsa.
Resistance against the occupation is a legal right that is acquired as part of a divine
plan and international treaties. Therefore, the IUMS proclaims that one must preserve
the weapon of resistance in all of Palestine and especially in Gaza. The IUMS
proclaims and appeals with all its power that we must prepare the weapon of
resistance, which is one of the things that believers are commanded and what is
required of them. ‘And prepare whatever you can of your strength to meet them, and
your harnessed horses for battle in order that they will impose fear in the hearts of
the enemies of Allāh and of your enemies and in the hearts of others who are not
known to you, but God knows them.’
(Qurʿān, 8:60)155

The above are the proclamations on the Palestinian issue by the IUMS. The public statement
that sums up the Conference expresses the hope that the liberation of Al-Aqsa is close at hand
and that soon the day will come when all the Palestinians will come to pray at the blessed
mosque as “liberators and victors.” They express their full support of the joint delegation
conducting negotiations on the part of the Palestinians that is conducting negotiations and
represents the unity of the Palestinian people against the occupier and wishes them success in
achieving victory.156 Thus, Qaraḍāwī is not simply another Islamic leader but a practical
influence on Hamas whose actions and words affect events in the arena of the Israel-Palestine
conflict.

Conclusion
Over the past decade, especially since the elimination of Hamas leader, Ahmad Yāsīn in 2004,
Sheikh Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī has been conspicuous in his support for Hamas. At present, he is

regarded as one of the greatest legal authorities in the Sunni Muslim world. He has used his
position in order to influence what takes place in the Palestinian Authority and in the entire
area of Israel/Palestine. His sermons have helped in encouraging the Muslim population in
Palestine/Israel to adopt more extremist positions which are reflected in the activism of
Hamas and the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement inside Israel. In January 2006,
Hamas won an impressive victory in the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council. In
June 2007, Hamas carried out a military coup and, essentially, took over the Gaza Strip by
removing the apparatus and personnel of the Palestinian Authority. The rule of Hamas in Gaza
ostensibly continued until April 2014. At that time, Hamas and Fatah signed an agreement of
reconciliation. However, for all practical purposes, Hamas continues its sole control Gaza even
today (in 2017).
Qaraḍāwī’s support of Hamas served as an effective asset in the internal Palestinian struggle
between Hamas and Fatah regarding the legitimacy of the Hamas regime in Gaza. Similarly,
his support and influence on the Muslim street have enabled the Hamas regime in the Gaza
Strip to attain inter-Arab and inter-Islamic legitimacy and have defended Hamas’ interests.
For his part, Qaraḍāwī rejects such accusations and argues that members of Fatah are as close
to his heart as his brethren from Hamas. He claims that he is in favor of internal Palestinian
reconciliation against the common enemy and gives equal support to both sides.157 However,
we have noted that his arguments are not valid, if one examines his other declarations and his
confrontations with the Palestinian Authority. The agreement of Palestinian reconciliation,
signed at the end of April 2014, officially settled the relations between the Palestinian
Authority and Qaraḍāwī.
Qaraḍāwī’s opinions are highly esteemed by members of Hamas who praise his books,
flatter him for his wisdom and his strong stand, and rally to his defense when he is vilified. For
example, Sheikh Wāʿil al-Zuhd, Imam of the Al-Umari Mosque in Gaza and one of the leading
preachers in the Gaza Strip, lavishes praise upon Qaraḍāwī and his honorable positions on the
Palestinian issue.158 Ismail Haniyya, head of the Hamas government, edited a book in honor of
Qaraḍāwī and even invited him for an official visit to Gaza.159 The special and close relations
between the Hamas leaders and Sheikh Qaraḍāwī receive much publicity and are continuously
emphasized. For example, Hamas spokesmen, such as Rashād al-Madani who, at the
conference, presented a list of thirteen major religious figures, among them Sheikh
Muhammad al-Ghazali, who praise Qaraḍāwī enthusiastically and laud his greatness in the
field of Sharʾīa.160 All of the articles and anthologies in this book contain expressions of great
admiration of Qaraḍāwī and his method of Islamic law. They repeat the statement that
Qaraḍāwī is the outstanding pupil of leading figures in Islamic law among the Muslim
Brotherhood, especially Ḥasan al-Bannā and Sayyid Quṭb.161
We have described at length the many interfaces between Qaraḍāwī and Hamas and the
Islamic Movement headed by Sheikh Raed Salah. Qaraḍāwī’s position is consistent and

uncompromising. Recently, in the wake of the continuous ascent by Jews to the Temple
Mount, the curses against Muhammad by extreme right-wing activists and the appalling
murder of the infant ʾAli Dawabshe in the village of Duma, Qaraḍāwī has called for a new
intifada against Israel.162 This statement was issued after a particularly tense week during
which both Hamas and Qaraḍāwī officially declared a “day of rage” because of the desecration
of Al-Aqsa and continuous “acts of aggression” by Jews on the Temple Mount. The latter
include outbursts, desecration of the Temple Mount, unfair treatment of worshippers, acts of
destruction in Jerusalem and excavations underneath the mosques. Qaraḍāwī’s positions are
characterized by a vicious hatred toward Jews in general and Israel, in particular; absolute
non-recognition of any national rights whatsoever for the Jewish people (since Judaism is not
a people), and no recognition or reconciliation with any type of Jewish existence in any part of
Palestine.
Some scholars maintain that Hamas may be regarded as a Palestinian national movement
that is striving to build a state on the ruins of Israel (often referred to as “historic Palestine”)
using religious principles, and that nationalism and religion do not necessarily contradict each
other.163 However, an examination of the interfaces of Hamas with Qaraḍāwī shows that the
end-goal of the nationalism espoused by Hamas is not only Palestinian-Islamic nationalism but
a nationalism that embraces the entire Arab world as part of Hamas ideology as a movement
that emerged from within the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamic Ummah is fighting not only
against the Jews in Israel but also against world Jewry that supports it. Israel, as part of Dar alIslam, is the battlefield between Islam and Judaism. It is not a national struggle that will be
solved by adjusting the borders and negotiations, but a religious conflict that will end only
when one religion will destroy the other. The Jews as such, not only the Israeli army, appear as
the enemies of Allāh. Hence, the IUMS and the heads of the Muslim Brotherhood, including
Qaraḍāwī, have granted Hamas permission to attack Jews indiscriminately by launching
missiles or committing suicide attacks.
Qaraḍāwī, however, does not act alone in the Islamic realm. Not all Muslims accept his
rulings. For example, the former mufti of Egypt, Sheikh ʾAli Gumʾa visited Jerusalem, despite
Qaraḍāwī’s admonition, and likewise, members of the Palestine Authority. Furthermore,
during the wars in Gaza, Qaraḍāwī’s appeals did not result in support and in Arab and Islamic
unity against Israel in a total war. His activities on behalf of Hamas and his support of their
struggle against competing Palestinian organizations actually fulfill the principles of Hamas
that are based upon a wider Islamic circle and its link to the global struggle against Israel. In
conclusion, Qaraḍāwī is a major asset for Hamas and the Islamic Movement in Israel because
of his status as an accepted legal authority on Muslim minorities throughout the world,
particularly in Europe, and because he is one of the leading Muslim jurists whose rulings are
accepted by many different Islamic schools, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, who regard
him as the outstanding disciple of Ḥasan al-Banna.

Notes
1 Shaul Bartal, “Sheikh Qaradawi and the Internal Palestinian Struggle: Issues Preventing Reconciliation between Fatah and
Hamas and the Influence of the Qaraḍāwī Era over the Struggle between the Organizations,” pp. 585–599.
2 “Hamas Leader Haniya Joins Emerging Network of Islamists,” The Anti-Defamation League Website, 10 February 2012,
http://accessadl.blogspot.co.il/search?q=ismail+haniyah.
3 Orlando Crowcroft, “Hamas Official: We Were Behind the Kidnapping of Three Israeli Teenagers,” The Guardian, 21
August

2014,

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/21/hamas-kidnappint-three-Israeli-teenagers-saleh-al-arouri-

qassam-brigades; “Saleh Al-Arouri, Turkey-Based Senior Hamas Operative Who Handles Military-Terrorist Networks in
Judea and Samaria, Admitted That Hamas Was Behind the Abduction and Murder of the Three Jewish Youths from
Gush

Etzion,”

The

Meir

Amit

Intelligence

and

Terrorism

Center,

24

August

2014,

www.terrorism-

info.org.il/en/article/20706.
4 “mashrūʾ waqf al-umma li-khidmat al-quds wal-masjid al-Aqṣā,” PLS48 Website, 23 May 2014, http://pls48.net/?
mod=articles&ID=118154#.VbrHE81VjIU; “kalimat shaikh al-Aqṣā, al-shaikh Rāʿid Ṣalāḥ fī ḥafl iṭlāq waqf al-umma,”
(Istanbul) 16 August 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=XNEk6-8F1Fc.
5 Official Facebook page of Waqf al-Ummah, www.facebook.com/ummetvakf?fref=nf.
6 Ḥammād, Haniyya et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 1, pp. 129–286.
7 The following published articles based on their lectures at this session: Dr. Wāʿil al- Zarad, “Al-shaikh Al-Qaraḍāwī wajuhūduhu fī khidmat al-sunna al-nabawiyya,” (The Efforts of Sheikh Qaraḍāwī in the Service of Prophetic Sunna); Yūsuf
Friḥāt, “khidmat al-Qaraḍāwī lil-ḥadīth al-nabawī fahman wa-tawḍīḥan,” (Qaraḍāwī’s Service on Behalf of Prophetic
Hadith: His Insight and Interpretation); Ibrāhīm al-Kurd, “Juhūd al-Qaraḍāwī fi khidmat al-sunna al-nabawiyya,”
(Qaraḍāwī’s Efforts in the Service of the Prophetic Sunna).
8 Dr. ʾIṣām Al-ʾAbd Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” in: Haniyya Ismā‛ῑl, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf
al-Qaraḍāwī fī Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya al-Filasṭῑnῑya (Gaza: Markaz al-Iʾlām al-ʾArabῑ, 2012), vol. 1, p.
131.
9 Ibid., p. 132.
10 Ibid., p. 145.
11 Ibid., p. 146.
12 Tafsīr al-Baiḍāwī, p. 21, as cited by: Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-Imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 147.
13 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 1, p. 592, cited by Dr. Zuhd in order to explain Qaraḍāwī’s ideas.
14 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, p. 92.
15 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, pp. 1099–1100.
16 Bernard Lewis, “Antisemitism in the Arab and Islamic World,” in: Yehuda Bauer (ed.), Present-Day Antisemitism

(Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 1988), p. 58.
17 Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-Imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 150.
18 Robert Wistrich, “Anti-Zionism as an Expression of Antisemitism in Recent Years,” in: Yehuda Bauer (ed.), Present-Day
Antisemitism (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 1988), pp. 177–178.
19 Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-Imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 150.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 151; Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, pp. 1099–1100.
23 Dr. Zuhd mentions the statements of ʾAbd al-ʾAziz al-Zaidānī, a highly influential religious figure in Yemen and
elsewhere, who joined Qaraḍāwī’s call for Jihad against Israel. See: Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-Imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 152.
24 Ibid., p. 153. Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 2, pp. 1085–1086.
25 Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-Imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 153.
26 File 03/272: Indictment against Raed Salah Mahajneh, Mahmoud Mahajneh (Abu Samra), Tawfiq Mahajneh, Nasser
Aghabriyah, Suleiman, Aghbariya. Criminal Case File: 04/5601, District Court of Haifa, 24 June 2003. Criminal Case File:
04/2637, State of Israel vs. Mahmoud Mahajneh et. al and the decision of His Honor Supreme Court Justice Edmund
Levy, 24 June 2004.
27 Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-Imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” pp. 153–154.
28 Bartal, Jihad in Palestine, pp. 230–234.
29

“Demonstrators

in

Turkey

and

Jordan

Burned

Israeli

Flags,”

Haaretz,

26

October

2009,

www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1286989 (Hebrew).
30 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 17.
31 Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-Imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 154.
32 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Al-radd ʾalā al-iʾtidā ʾalā al-Aqṣā wa-ʿihānat nabī al-islām – ḍarb ʿamn al-iḥtilāl wa-ʿqtiṣādihi,” Madīnat
al-Quds Website, 30 July 2015, http://al-quds-online.org/index.php?s=19&id=3127; “Ḥamas tadʾu lil-nafīr naṣran lil-Quds
wal-Aqṣā fī Jumʾat al-ghaḍab,” Madīnat al-Quds Website, 28 July 2015, http://alquds-online.org/index.php?
s=19&id=3103; “Al-Shaikh Kamāl al-Khatīb yadʾū jamāhīr al-Shaʾb lilmushāraka fi Jumʾat al-ghaḍab,” Madīnat al-Quds
Website, 31 July 2015, http://alquds-online.org/index.php?s=19&id=3137. It is clear that the joint call for Jihad by the
three Islamic organizations on the website of the “International Jerusalem Institute” headed by Qaraḍāwī is not
coincidental and attests to cooperation between those groups.
33 Lajnat al-Thaqāfa al-ʾᾹmma, al-Haiʿa al-Qiyādiyya al-ʾUlyā, Ḥarkat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya, Ḥamās, Manhaj alNahḍa al-Thaqāfī wal-Tarabawī (n.p., February 2013), p. 26.
34 Ibid., p. 58.

35 Ibid., p. 82.
36 Ibid., p. 91.
37 Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 155.
38 Ghassān Al-Dawaʾr, Al-Muhandis al-Shahīd Yaḥya ʾAyyāsh: Ramz al-Jihād wa-Qāʿid al-Muqāwama fī Filasṭīn (London:
Filastin al-Muslima Publishers, 1997).
39 Qaraḍāwī’s introduction appears before the 143-page introduction by the author that deals with the life of Yaḥya
Ayyāsh. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
40 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: ʾAyyāsh aghāẓa al-yahūd fī ḥayātihi wa-sayaẓallu dammuhu naqmatan ʾalaihim baʾda mamātihi,” The
Shahīd ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades Web-site, 5 January 2011, www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=19911.
41 Nāṣiḥ Ibn ʾAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ghāzi, Mudhakkirāt al-Mujāhid: Fī Faḍl al-Jihād wal-Ribāt (No information on publisher,
2010), p. 3.
42 Ibid., pp. 52–53.
43 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 1, p. 692.
44 Al-Ghāzi, Mudhakkirāt al-Mujāhid: Fī Faḍl al-Jihād wal-Ribāt, p. 59, based on: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 1, p. 692.
45 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, vol. 1, p. 615.
46 Al-Ghāzi, Mudhakkirāt al-Mujāhid, p. 70.
47 Hatina, Martyrdom in Modern Islam, pp. 200–202.
48 Tammam, “Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The Nature of a Special Relationship,” pp. 65–66.
49 Aviva Shabi and Roni Shaked, Hamas: Palestinian Islamic Movement (Jerusalem: Keter, 1994), pp. 28–29, 73 (Hebrew).
50 District Court of Jerusalem: State of Israel vs. Raed Mahajneh, Case 13–09–20137. Decision of His Honor Judge Arnon
Dorel regarding the appeal of 15 September 2013, pp. 6–10.
51 ʾAlī, “Al-Qaraḍāwī: mundhu majīʿī ʿilā Qatar lam ʿuʿayyid ḥākiman ẓāliman”.
52 For example, see: calls for demonstrations on the “Friday of Rage,” 31 July 2015. “Al-Qaraḍāwī: al-radd ʾalā al-Iʾtidā ʾalā
al-Aqṣā wa-ʿihānat nabī al-islām – ḍarb ʿamn al-iḥtilāl wa-ʿqtiṣādihi,” Madīnat al-Quds Website, 30 July 2015,
http://alquds-online.org/index.php?s=19&id=3127.
53 Zvi Barʿel, “When Egypt Clenches Its Iron Fist on Gaza, Egypt Is Not Trying to Help Israel or the U.S., But Is Sending a
Message to Hamas and Syria,” Haaretz, 7 January 2010, www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/when-egypt-clenches-itsfist-on-gaza-1.265614.
54 “Al-Shaikh al-ʾAllāma al-Qaraḍāwī: jidār miṣr al-fulādhī muḥarram sharʿan,” ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades Website, 28
December 2009, www.alqassam.ps/arabi/news1.php?id=1365.
55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Aninunimous, “Hamās Tusānidu Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī fī Muwājahat ḥamlat intiqādāt Fataḥ Lahu,” Al-Quds, 13 January
2010. www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/146885.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61

James

Verini,

“The

Tunnels

of

Gaza,”

National

Geographic,

December

2012,

http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2012/12/gaza-tunnels/verini-text.
62 “Asrā Ḥamās yastankirūna al-hajma al-iʾlāmiyya ḍidd al-Shaikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī,” ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Website, 19
January 2010, www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=14001.
63 Ibid. In fact, Raed Salah Mahajneh was sentenced to nine months in jail by Judge Yitzhak Shimʾoni in the Magistrate’s
Court. However, an appeal to the District Court resulted in shortening his sentence to a term of five months. See: Bartal,
Jihad in Palestine, pp. 69–70.
64 Raphael Israeli, From Arab Spring to Islamic Winter (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2013), pp. 159–161.
65 “In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and Their Opponents A Accuse Each Other: ‘You Are a Jew’,” MEMRI Website,
www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=875141_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataaid=3586,

viewed

on 16 August 2015.
66 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Fatāwā Muʾā ṣ ira.
67 Nūr al-Hudā Saʾd, “Al-ʿIjmāʾ al-islāmῑ al-masῑḥῑ ʾalā ḥurmat al-ziyāra yuʿakkidu al-makhāṭir al-mutawaqqaʾa ʾalā
mustaqbal al-ṣirāʾ,” Filasṭīn al-Muslima, 7 (July 2012), p. 48.
68 ʾAlī, “Al-Qaraḍāwī: mundhu majīʿī ʿilā Qatar lam ʿuʿayyid ḥākiman ẓāliman”.
69 “Wafd al-ʾUlama Yazūrūn Ghaza,” Al-Aqsa Channel (Gaza), 10 May 2013, http://aqsatv.ps/?section=details&id=19243.
70 Saleh, A History of Palestine: A Methodical Study of the Palestinian Struggle, pp. 63–64.
71 Hamas Jouranl, Anonymous, “Al-Habbāsh yuhājimu al-Qaraḍāwī ʾalā khalfiyyat taḥrīm ziyārat al-Quds taḥta al-iḥtilāl,”
Filasṭīn al-Muslima, 7 (July 2012), p. 40.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Hamas Jouranl, Anonymous, “ʾAbbas yantaqidu fatāwā taḥrīm ziyārat al-Quds,” Filasṭīn al-Muslima, 7 (July 2012), p. 41.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Barak Ravid, “PM Berates Abbas over Charge of Jerusalem Ethnic Cleansing,” Haaretz, 27 February 2012,

www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/pm-berates-abbas-over-charge-of-jerusalem-ethnic-cleansing-1.414968.
78 Shaul Bartal, “The Words of the Mufti Sheikh Muhammad Ahmad Hussein: Toward Judgment Day,” The Mideast Forum,
13 February 2012, www.mideast.co.il/p-2_a-442 (Hebrew).
79 Hamas Jouranl, Anonymous, “Al-Mufti Muhammad Husain: ziyārat al-Quds ʾIbāda wa-laisa taṭbīʾ maʾa [Israel],” Filasṭīn
al-Muslima, 7 (July 2012), p. 41.
80 Ibid.
81 Qiyās (analogy) is the third most important method for determining Islamic law, after the Qurʿān and the Ḥadīth’. For
example, the prohibition against drinking beer, an alcoholic beverage that was not known in the seventh century, derives
from the use of this type of analogy. See: Raymond Ibrahim, The al-Qaeda Reader (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 8.
82 “Al-Mufti Muhammad Husain: ziyārat al-Quds ʾibāda wa-laisa taṭtbīʾ maʾa [Israel],” p. 41.
83 Al-Rāya (Qatar), 10 October 2009, as cited in: “The Palestinian Authority Attacks al-Qaradawi against the Background of
His Call to Stone Mahmoud Habash,” MEMRI Website, 25 March 2010, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?
lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataaid=2330.
84 Al-Waṭan (Qatar), 6 January 2010.
85 See: “The Palestinian Authority Attacks al-Qaradawi against the Background of His Call to Stone Mahmoud alHabbash,”

MEMRI

Website,

25

March

2010,

www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?

lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataaid=2330.
86

“Hal

natbaʾu

al-Habbāsh

aw Rāʿid

Ṣalāh

wa-ʾIkrima

Ṣabri?,”

Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 30

April

2012,

www.Qaraḍāwi.net/articles/86-2009-12-12-10-35-10/5832-2012-05-01-08-31-22.html.
87 Samīr al-Ḥijāzī, “Ziyārat al-mufti al-masmūma lil-Quds,” Hamas Website, Al-Markaz al-Filasṭīnī lil-Iʾlām, 22 April 2012,
www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=113682.
88 Raʿfat Mara, “Suʿāl li-man yazūru al-Masjid Al-Aqṣā al-mubārak limādhā lā tuʾlinu daʾmaka li-taḥrīrihi min aliḥitilāl?,” Filasṭīn al-Muslima, 7 (July 2012), p. 45.
89 Mahā ʾAbd al-Hādī, “Silsilat ziyārāt mashbūha lil-Aqṣā taḥta ḥimāyat al-iḥtilāl: jarīma siyāsiya lil-ṣumud al-filasṭīnī,”
Filasṭīn al-Muslima, 7 (July 2012), pp. 46–47.
90 Hamas Jouranl, Anonymous, “Shakhṣiyyāt zārat al-Quds,” Filasṭīn al-Muslima, 7 (July 2012), p. 42; Hamas Jouranl, ʾAbd
al-Hādī, “silsilat ziyārāt mashbūha,” p. 47.
91 Al-Hudā Saʾd, “Al-ʿIjmāʾ al-islāmῑ al-masῑḥῑ ʾalā ḥurmat al-ziyāra yuʿakkidu almakhāṭir al-mutawaqqaʾa ʾalā mustaqbal
al-ṣirāʾ,” p. 48.
92 Samīr al-Ḥijāzi, “Ziyārat al-Mufti al-masmūma lil-Quds,” Hamas Website: Al-Markaz al-Filasṭīnī lil-Iʾlām, 22 April 2012,
www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=113682.
93 “ʾAkkada ʾalā Fatāwā bi-ḥurmat ziyāratihā wa-hiya taḥta al-iḥtilāl, al-ʾAllāma al-Qaraḍāwī yarfuḍu ziyārat Mufti Miṣr
lil-Quds,” Hamas Website, Al-Markaz al-Filasṭīnī lil-Iʾlām, 22 April 2012, www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newdetails.aspx?

ItemId=113682.
94 Samīr al-Ḥijāzi, “Ziyārat al-mufti al-masmūma lil-Quds,” Hamas Website, Al-Markaz al-Filasṭīnī lil-Iʾlām, 22 April 2012,
www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=113682.
95 “Muwātinū al-ḍaffa: nadʾū lil-Jihād li-taḥrir al-Quds wa-lā ṭaʿtaʿat al-ruʿūs ḥīna ziyāratihā,” Hamas Website, 1 March
2012, www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=110338; Samīr al-Ḥijāzi, “Ziyārat al-Mufti al-masmūma lilQuds,” Hamas Website, Al-Markaz al-Filasṭīnī lil-Iʾlām, 22 April 2012, www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?
ItemId=113682.
96 “Mufti al-Quds yuhājimu mufti miṣr li-dukhūlihi al-Aqṣā taḥta al-Iḥtilāl,” Filasṭīn al-Muslima, 7 (July 2012), p. 40.
97 ʾAlī, “Al-Qaraḍāwī: mundhu majīʿī ʿilā Qatar lam ʿuʿayyid ḥākiman ẓāliman”.
98 Ibid.
99 Yāsir Alī (ed.), Al-Majāzir al-Israʿīlīliyya bi-Haqq al-Shaʾb al-Filasṭīnī (Beirut: Markaz Zeitouna, 2009), pp. 85–87.
100 Efraim Inbar, “Hamas Was Defeated, Until the Next Time,” Middle East Forum, 1 September 2014,
www.meforum.org/4789/hamas-was-defeated-until-the-next-time.
101 For an assessment of Operation Warm Winter (27.2.2008–3.3.2008) and Cast Lead (27.12.2008–17.1.2009) in which over
1600 Palestinians were killed, see: Alī (ed.), Al-Majāzir al-Israʿīlīliyya bi-Haqq al-Shaʾb al-Filasṭīnī, pp. 85–87; Elia Zureik,
Israel’s Colonial Project in Palestine (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 170–174.
102 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: ʿatamannā al-shahāda bi-ghazza, wa-law ʾalā kursī mutaḥarrik,” (“Al-Qaraḍāwī: I Wish for Myself the
Death of Martyrs in Gaza and Even If I Will Be in Wheel-Chair”), Katāʿib ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Website, 29 January
2009, www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id+7683.
103 Shaul Bartal, “The Victory of Hamas,” Nrg News, 18 February 2012. www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/416/370.html.
104 ʾAdnān Abū ʾᾹmer, “Istiyā’ ṣahyūnī min natāʿij al-ḥarb al-akhīra ʾalā Ghazza: Ḥamās intaṣarat,” Filasṭīn al-Muslima, vol.
1, (January 2013), pp. 32–33.
105 “Al-Qaraḍāwī yadʾū al-ʾArab wal-Muslimīn li-tajmīʾ ṣufūfihim li-nuṣrat Ghazza,” Hamas Website, Al-Markaz al-Filasṭīnī
lil-Iʾlām, 16 November 2012, www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=124598.
106 Ibid.
107 Bartal, “The Victory of Hamas.”
108 Ephraim Kam, “After the Military Operation: The Balance on Both Sides,” in: Shlomo Brom (ed.), Operation Pillar of
Defense: The Gaza Strip, November 2012 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Institute for National Security Studies, 2013), pp.
17–18; Avner Golov, “Israeli Deterrence: Was That Goal Achieved?,” in: Shlomo Brom (ed.), Operation Pillar of Defense:
The Gaza Strip, November 2012 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Institute for National Security Studies, 2013), pp. 22–23
(Hebrew).
109 Israeli, From Arab Spring to Islamic Winter, pp. 159–160.

110 Avi Issacharoff, “Qatari Ruler’s Visit to Gaza Signals Turning Point for Hamas,” Haaretz, 24 October 2012,
www.haaretz.com/blogs/east-side-story/qatari-ruler-s-visit-to-gaza-signals-turning-point-for-hamas.premium-1.471898#;
“In Official Visit to Gaza, Qatari Emir Endorses Hamas, Slams Israeli Settlements,” Haaretz, 23 October 2012,
www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/in-official-visit-to-gaza-qatari-emir-endorses-hamas-slams-israeli-settlements1.471861.
111 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn hiya aʾdal qaḍiyya fī al-ʾālam,” Katāʿib ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Website, 23 January 2013,
www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=30352.
112 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: ʿatamannā al-shahāda bi-ghazza, wa-law ʾalā kursī mutaḥarrik,” Katāʿib ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Website,
29 January 2009, www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=7683.
113 The Doha Agreement was signed in Qatar on 6 February 2012. According to the agreement, a unity government, headed
by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), would be established. The emir of Qatar, Hamd bin Khalifa Al al-Thani was the main
sponsor of this agreement. Despite the declarations of both sides during the signing, at the end, the agreement was not
put into effect because of essential disagreements mainly regarding the attitude to Israel. Avi Issacharoff and Jacky
Khouri, “Abbas to Lead Palestinian Unity Cabinet following Hamas-Fatah Deal,” Haaretz, 6 February 2012,
www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/abbas-to-lead-palestinian-unity-cabinet-following-hamas-fatah-deal-1.411354.
114 The wife and son of Muhammad Deif were killed in the attempt to eliminate Deif. Elior Levy, Roi Kais and Attila
Somfalvi, “Only Deif Will Decide If the Gaza Belt Residents Will Return Home: His Wife and Son Were Buried in the
Gaza Strip,” Ynet, 20 August 2014. www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4560976,00.html.
115 “Wā-Qudsāh! Wā-Ghazzatāh!,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 9 July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net./new/takareer/7373-2014-07.
116 Cited in Qaraḍāwī’s Facebook Page, 23 July 2014, at 12:31, www.facebook.com/alqaradawy?fref=ts.
117 “Al-Qaraḍāwī yanfī ṣiḥḥat taṣrīḥāt nusibat lahu ḥawla al-Jihād fī Filasṭīn,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 9 August 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7417-2014-08-09-21-24-15.
118 Qaraḍāwī’s books are as follows: Dars al-Nakba al-Thāniya – limādhā inhazamnā, wa-kaifa nantaṣiru (Cairo: Maktabat
Wahba, 1993); Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim (Beirut: Al-Risāla, 2001); Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsa Muqārina li-ʿaḥkāmihi wafalsafatihi fῑ ḍawʿ al-Qurʿān wal-Sunna (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 2009), vol. 1 & 2.
119 This idea finds expression in: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 61–69.
120

“Al-Khatīb:

Filasṭīn

hiya

al-qaḍiyya

al-markaziyya

lil-ʿumma,”

Qaraḍāwī

Website,

21

August

2014,

www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7449-2014-08-21-13-34-36.
121 Ibid.
122 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Al-Masās bil-Aqṣā sa-yufajjiru Habbatan Jamāhīrīyatan lā Yatawaqqa ʾuhā Aḥad,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website,
www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7324-2014-06-10-15-36-13.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.

125 The Fourth Conference of the IUMS was held in Istanbul from 20–22 August 2014. Among the participants were Islamic
scholars from many countries, including: Rached Ghannouchi, head of the Islamic party, Al-Nahḍa (Revival) that won
the elections in Tunisia. The presence of Kamal Khatib, Saleh al-Arouri and Qaraḍāwī is proof of the link between
Hamas, the Islamic Movement in Israel and Qaraḍāwī. “Al-bayān al-khitāmī lil-jamʾiyya al-rābiʾa lil-Ittiḥād al-ʾᾹlamī liʾUlamāʿ al-Muslimīn”.
126 Orlando Crowcroft, “Hamas Official: We Were Behind the Kidnapping of Three Israeli Teenagers.” “Saleh al-Arouri,
Turkey-Based Senior Hamas Operative Who Handles Military-Terrorist Networks in Judea and Samaria, Admitted That
Hamas Was Behind the Abduction and Murder of the Three Jewish Youths from Gush Etzion,” The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism Center, 24 August 2014, www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20706.
127 Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Waṣf Ḥamās bil-ʿirhāb muṣība wa-taghyīr lil-waʾy”.
128 “Mudīr ʾāmm muʿassasat al-Quds al-duwaliyya Yāsīn Hammūd: Intiṣār Ghazza yumahhidu al-ṭarīq ʾilā al-Quds,”
Madīnat al-Quds Website, 5 September 2014, http://alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&id=461; “Khalīl al-Ḥayya,
ʾuḍwu al-maktab al-siyāsī li-ḥarkat Ḥamās: Intiṣār Ghazza sayamnaʾu al-iḥtilāl min farḍ siyādatihi ʾalā al-Quds,”
Madīnat al-Quds Website, 5 September 2014, http://alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&id=460.
129 “Wā-Qudsāh! Wā-Ghazzatāh!,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 9 July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net./new/takareer/7373-2014-07.
130 “Al-Qarā Dāghī yuṭālibu bi-Intifāḍa Islāmiyya wa-ʾArabiyya min ajl Filastin,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 7 July 2014; “WāQudsāh! Wā-Ghazzatāh!,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 9 July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7373-2014-07-09-07-30-56.
131 “Ittiḥād ʾUlamāʿ al-Muslimīn yastankiru al-ṣamt al-ʾālamī tujāh qatalat al-fatā al-Filasṭīnī Muḥammad Abu Khdeir,”
Qaraḍāwī Website, 7 July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7366-2014-07-07-14-30-22.
132 Ibid. This verse comes from the Qurʿān: 47:7.
133 Al-Sharq Network, 2 September 2014, http://elsharq.tv.
134 “Ittiḥād ʾUlamāʿ al-Muslimīn: Daʾm Ghazza, wājib sharʾī ʾalā al-Muslimīn Kāffatan,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 27 July 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/data/7410-2014-07-27-20-17-23.
135 Ibid.
136 Robert Wistrich, “Anti-Semitism and Jewish Destiny,” The Jerusalem Post, 20 May 2015. www.jpost.com/Opinion/AntiSemitism-and-Jewish-destiny-403703.
137 “Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Waṣf Ḥamās bil-ʿirhāb muṣība wa-taghyīr lil-waʾy”.
138 Ibid.
139 Shabi and Shaked, Hamas, p. 17.
140 Eli Lake, “Israeli Claim: Hamas Funded the Kidnapper Who Started the Gaza War,” The Daily Beast, 5 August 2014,
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/05/israeli-claim-hamas-funded-the-kidnapper-who-started-the-gaza-war.html.
141 “Mashʾal: Hamas-the Murder of the Three Teens Is a Legitimate Act,” Ynet, 23 August 2014 (Hebrew),
www.ynet.co.il/articles/0.7340.L-4562324.00.html; “What Surfaced in the Interview with Khaled Mashal in the Yahoo

Website?,”

Facebook

Page

of

Shabakat

Filasṭīn

Lil-Ḥiwār,

23

August

2014,

www.facebook.com/paldf/photos/pb.114312025247339.-theater&3=type?/866117693400098/2207520000.1409179086.
142 “Siyāsa fī Dīn maʾa al-shaikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī,” Al-Jazeera, 21 July 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=pa9vLhNJcf8.
143 Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Waṣf Ḥamās bil-ʿirhāb muṣība wa-taghyīr lil-waʾy”.
144 “Al-Qaraḍāwī yanfī ṣiḥḥat taṣrīḥāt nusibat lahu ḥawla al-Jihād fī Filasṭīn,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, Qaraḍāwī Website, 9
August 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7417-2014-08-09-21-24-15.
145 Ibid.
146 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Adʾū kull al-muslimīn an yahibbū li-nuṣrat ahlinā fī Ghazza,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 19 July 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7390-2014-07-19-12-14-15.
147 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Mawāqif Ahl Filasṭīn rafaʾat raʿs Al-umma kullahā,” Al-Qaraḍāwī Website, 26 July 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7406-2014-07-26-14-39-04.
148

“Al-Qaraḍāwī:

Lā

yajūzu

tark

al-muqāwama

waḥdahā,”

Al-Qaraḍāwī

Website,

22

July

2014,

www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7397-2014-07-22-07-35-53.
149 Quṭb, Maʾrakatunā ma ʾ a al-Yahūd, pp. 20–38. On page 38, Quṭb explains that throughout history, the Jews have proved
that they are the enemies of Islam in every period and everywhere. Recent events, prior to the writing of this book
(namely, 1948), provide further proof of the above.
150 Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Waṣf Ḥamās bil-ʿirhāb muṣība wa-taghyīr lil-waʾy”.
151 “Al-Qarā Dāghi li-ḥukkām al-Muslimīn: Allāh muḥāsibukum wal-taʿrīkh yalʾanu man yakhūnu,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 20
July 2014, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/7392-2014-07-20-23-08-58.
152 “Siyāsa fī Dīn maʾa al-shaikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī,” Aljazeera, 21 July 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=pa9vLhNJcF8.
153 Ibid.
154 “Al- bayān al-khitāmī lil-jamʾiyya al-rābiʾa lil-Ittiḥād al-ʾᾹlamī li-ʾUlamāʿ al-Muslimīn”.
155 The word, wa-ʿaʾiddū, (and prepare) appears only once in the Qurʿān, in this verse. This word frequently appears in the
symbol of the Muslim Brotherhood. It means to prepare a military force for holy war (Jihād) against the enemies.
156 “Al- bayān al-khitāmī lil-jamʾiyya al-rābiʾa lil-Ittiḥād al-ʾᾹlamī li-ʾUlamāʿ al-Muslimīn”.
157 ʾAlī, “Al-Qaraḍāwī: mundhu majīʿī ʿilā Qatar lam ʿuʿayyid ḥākiman ẓāliman”.
158 “Al-Zarad: al-shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī bi-ashadd al-mudāfiʾīn ʾan ḥuqūq al-Filasṭīnīyin,” Katāʿib ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām
Website, 24 January 2010, ww.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1. php?id=14072.
159 Cited in review of: Ḥammād, Haniyya et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, by Aḥmad ʾAlī, Qaraḍāwī
Website, 17 January 2012, www.Qaraḍāwi.net/library/77/5517-2012-01-17-12-51.html; “Haniyya yadʾū al-Qaraḍāwī liziyārat Quttāʾ Ghazza,” Katāʿib ʾIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām Website, 19 February 2011, www.alqassam.ps/Arabic/news1.php?
id=20589.

160 Rashād al-Madanī, “Al-Qaraḍāwī wa-mawqiʾuhu min al-qaḍiyya al-Filasṭῑnῑya,” in: Ṭālib Ḥammād, Ismail Haniyya et
al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī fi Khidmat al-Islām wa-Nuṣrat al-Qaḍiyya al-Filasṭῑniyya (Gaza: Markaz
al-Iʾlām al-ʾArabῑ, 2012), pp. 181–182.
161 Ibid., p. 178.
162 “Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī yadʾū al- ḥukkām,” Madīnat Al-Quds Website, 1 August 2015, www.alquds-online.org/index.php?
s=news&id=3163.
163 Singh, Hamas and Suicide Terrorism, pp. 4–7, 17–30; Dalacoura, Islamic Terrorism and Democracy, pp. 66–68.

7
Qaraḍāwī
Between anti-Zionism and anti-semitism

1. Is it only anti-Zionist thought?
Martin Luther King (d. 1968), leader of the struggle for civil rights for African-Americans in
the United States, answered a student who attacked the Zionist movement, as follows: “When
people criticize Zionism, they mean Jews. You are talking anti-semitism.”1 The statement best
describes the thought of Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, as examined in the previous chapters of
this study. There are two types of anti-Zionism: The first type is a political ideology whose
purpose is opposition to the existence of the State of Israel. It maintains that Israel is a state,
established out of nowhere, that expresses the aspirations for self-determination of the Jewish
national movement. The second type of anti-Zionism consists of political opportunism in the
service of definitive political objectives and accomplishments that are supported by opponents
of Zionism.2 Qaraḍāwī belongs to the first category. A thorough examination of his thought
shows that a profound hatred of Jews lies behind his anti-Zionism.
In The Enemies of the Islamic Solution, Qaraḍāwī refers to Zionism as the second most
important enemy after colonialism.3 However, his survey and attempted analysis of this
enemy begins with a discussion of the Jews of Medina, who lived in the Arabian Peninsula
many centuries before the presence of the Zionist movement in Palestine and without any
connection to Zionism. In a sermon commemorating the anniversary of the First Intifada,
Qaraḍāwī even stated that
all of them are Jews. I am not able to distinguish between a Jew and a Zionist. Every Jew is a Zionist because all of the
dreams in the Torah and the teachings of the Talmud transform every Jew into a Zionist”4

The lack of distinction between Judaism and Zionism is a motif that recurs throughout the
antisemitic writings of Arab and Muslim intellectuals and religious figures.5
The old anti-semitism accused the Jews of killing Jesus Christ – of deicide. Therefore,
Qaraḍāwī’s thought, as expressed in The Enemies of the Islamic Solution, belongs to the “old”
type of anti-semitism as it contains accusations that the Jews killed Jesus, Muhammad and the

Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab. It notes their complicity in the assassination of the Caliph
Uthman ibn Affan and their role in creating the schism of the Muslim Ummah between Shiites
and Sunni during the reign of the Caliph Ali Ibn Abu Talib.6 For Muslims, the latter accusation
is almost tantamount to the Christian claim that the Jews killed Jesus.7 Similarly, the Jews
poisoned the Prophet of Islam and fomented quarrels during the reigns of pious Caliphs.
Therefore, they are worthy of eternal damnation for sins for which there is no forgiveness and
they must endure sorrow and humiliation.

2. Features of the new anti-semitism
During the Middle Ages and until the Twentieth Century, anti-semitism, or Jew-hatred,
focused upon the Jew as an individual and upon Jewish communities. Since the late twentieth
century and in the twenty-first century, however, the “new anti-semitism” has transformed the
State of Israel, the Jewish State, into an object of hatred. Israel has replaced the individual Jew.
Israel has become the Jew among the nations.8 Irwin Cotler lists nine features of the new antisemitism, as follows:9
1. Genocide: Public calls for the destruction of the Jews and of the State of Israel.
2. Political Anti-semitism: Denying the rights of the Jews as a people to nationality and
to self-determination, thereby delegitimizing Israel as a state and attributing all the
evil in the world to Israel.
3. Ideological Anti-semitism: Comparing Zionism with racism and Israel to the Nazis.
4. Religious Anti-semitism: For the most part, it finds expression in the Muslim world
through a radical interpretation of Islam that derives anti-Semitic motifs from
classical Christian anti-semitism.
5. Cultural anti-Semitism: Anti-semitism of the intellectuals.
6. Economic Anti-semitism: Economic sanctions and boycotts.
7. Holocaust Denial: The argument that the Holocaust never took place or a
minimization of its proportions, or that it was planned by the Jews in order to
dispossess the Palestinians of their land.
8. Racist terrorism against Jews: Acts of terror against Jewish targets in Israel and
throughout the world.
9. Anti-Israel bias in the international arena: Double standards in judging Israel’s
actions.
We shall now examine whether these features occur in Qaraḍāwī’s writings about Jews and

the State of Israel.

Genocide
According to Sheikh Qaraḍāwī, Israel is not a legitimate state and, according to Islamic law,
even uttering its name is problematic.10 The establishment of the State of Israel was a
conspiracy perpetrated by elements hostile to Islam: the Christian (Crusader) world,
Communists and atheists. The Jews and the colonial powers connived to break up the Islamic
world from within by spreading the idea of regional nationalism throughout the Arab world.
Thus, they reshaped the Middle East into separate national states, instead of a unified Arab
Islamic state. The State of Israel constitutes a conspiracy of Zionism that is supported by world
Jewry. It was founded with the purpose of acting as a “poisoned dagger in the heart of Arab
and Muslim world.”11
According to Sigmund Freud and others, a major reason for anti-semitism is the need to
unify a community into a single “imagined” community. An example of such a community
would be the Islamic Ummah, which is divided into different tribes, clans and schools of
thought and is fraught with frequent internecine conflicts. Hatred of the ‘other,’ – in this case
the Jew – serves as the means for blaming divisions in the Muslim world on an external party,
and thereby, unifies the Islamic community against the ‘other’ and the foreigner.12
Israel has no legitimate right to exist because it was born in sin and the “accursed” Balfour
Declaration, which granted the Jews a national home in the Land of Israel is not legitimate.
According to Qaraḍāwī, this stems from the fact that Britain had no legitimacy in giving away
or taking Palestine. Palestine is defined as Muslim territory from the time of its conquest by
Muslim armies in the Seventh Century CE.13 Therefore, the State of Israel is not legitimate.
Qaraḍāwī does not relate to the legitimacy of the existence of Israel derived from the United
Nations decision of 1947.
Qaraḍāwī proposes the following solution to the Palestinian problem: that the Jews leave
Palestine and return to the countries from which they emigrated, such as Germany and
Poland, and the Palestinians return to Palestine.14 Jews who wish to remain in Palestine may
do so if they agree to accept the conditions of Muslim rule and live as a protected people (Ahl
al-Dhimma), as Jews have lived under Muslim rule throughout history.15 As long as the Jews
insist upon having their state on the territory of Palestine, one is not permitted to recognize it
and one must work toward its destruction by means of uncompromising Jihād.16 Qaraḍāwī
writes:
The only way for the Palestinians is resistance. It is the right of every nation to resist its occupier in all the power it has…
what is called ‘normalization with Israel’ must be opposed in all levels: political, economic, social and cultural.17

If Muslims find themselves in a weaker position than the Zionist enemy and need time to
renew their strength, it is possible to implement a temporary cease-fire (Hudna).18

3. Political anti-semitism
Qaraḍāwī proclaims that he is not hostile to Israel because it is a Jewish state, or because he is
antisemitic. On the contrary, Muslims are descendants of Ishmael, the son of Isaac, and Jews
are descendants of Israel, who is Jacob the son of Isaac. This means that they are cousins.
Furthermore, Qaraḍāwī states that, according to scholars, whose works he does not mention
by name, 92% of the Jews are not descendants of the Children of Israel. Indeed, Judaism is a
religion, and over the centuries, many peoples have converted to Judaism, such as Yemenites,
North Africans and Europeans who have no genetic affinity with the original Children of
Israel. Therefore, they have no right to Palestine. Qaraḍāwī mentions the Khazar kingdom as
proof of this theory and asserts that most Jews today are descendants of the Khazars, not of
the original Children of Israel, who have the sole right to the land. Judaism is a religion like
Christianity or Islam. As such, it cannot have any national or territorial rights. He concludes
that “the struggle which is being waged today between us and the Jews is a war that for the
land which they conquered by oppression, [from which] they exiled its inhabitants, and shed
their blood without any right [to do so].”19
The basis Of Qaraḍāwī’s argument is the religious-historical explanation of the right to the
land. According to Qaraḍāwī, the existence of Israel is legitimate only if its inhabitants are
indeed the authentic descendants of the Biblical Children of Israel to whom the land was
promised. Since the vast majority of Israelis are not direct descendants of the Biblical Children
of Israel, they must be regarded as illegitimate invaders, oppressors and conquerors. Qaraḍāwī
presents a one-sided, tendentious discussion of the issue of origins and rights that does not
treat the issue properly because it does not introduce different perspectives. He mentions only
anonymous authors who support his opinion without providing any details. Furthermore, he
does not present an objective discussion of the question of the origin of the Palestinians and
follows the assumption that today’s Palestinians are the indigenous inhabitants of the land
from the time of the conquest by Muslim armies in the seventh century, and even long
beforehand. In order to deny the right of the Biblical Children of Israel that derives from his
own arguments, Qaraḍāwī argues that contemporary Palestinians are actually the descendants
of Canaanite and Jebusite Arabs, as follows:
The Jebusite Arabs and the Canaanite Arabs are those who lived in the land for thousands of years before Abraham and
his children. Abraham was a foreign guest in the land to such an extent that when his wife Sarah died, he did not possess
his own cemetery plot in which to bury her. One of the Palestinians wished to give him a plot of land as a gift, but
Abraham refused to take the present and insisted upon purchasing it from him. That is to say that the land did not

belong to him, otherwise he would not have bought it. This is how things were in the past and when the Jews entered the
land, there were inhabitants living there and when they [the Jews] were exiled from it [the land], they left the
inhabitants there. Hence, from where is the historical right of the Jews?20

In his great enthusiasm to prove the historical and religious right of the Palestinians to
Palestine, Qaraḍāwī unwittingly contradicts himself. On the one hand, he argues in favor of
the historical right of the Palestinians by virtue of their Abrahamic ancestry. On the other
hand, he regards them as Canaanites who lived in the land before the arrival of Abraham and,
therefore, are the indigenous, rightful inhabitants of the land. Qaraḍāwī’s statements contain
nothing new at all.21 Arguments that the Palestinians are both descendants of Canaanites from
time immemorial and descendants of Ishmael, the son of Abraham, have been popular in
works by Palestinians and others for some time. The argument that the Jews are not really a
Semitic people but a mixture of various peoples of inferior stock was important in Nazi
teachings on race. It means that the Jews as a people have no right to exist because they do
not constitute a Semitic people in its own right. The Jews were defined as a conglomerate,
namely, a base mixture of races.22
Furthermore, Qaraḍāwī’s writings are rife with a tendentiousness libel that attributes all evil
in the world to Israel. He argues that Israel is responsible for every conflict and civil war,
mainly those between Muslims: “Isrāʿīl warāʿa kull Fitna.” According to Qaraḍāwī, Israel is
behind every conflict in the world and encourages them in order to serve its own interests. For
example, Israel was behind the long civil war in the Sudan because it wished to control the
sources of the Nile.23 According to Qaraḍāwī, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was organized by the
West and Israel in order to create a split among the Arabs so that Israel could continue to
carry out war crimes in the West Bank and in Lebanon while the attention of the world was
focused upon a different area.24 Israel and America brought about the downfall of Mohammed
Morsi, the deposed president of Egypt: “America and Israel do not accept that Egypt will have
a president who belongs to Islamic groups, who prays and fasts and judges people justly. We
are in [the midst of] a great war against Islam.”25 Qaraḍāwī also claims that the Mossad
threatens him.26 If that is true, then Israel is a political entity that supports terror, and
therefore, it has no right to exist.

4. Ideological anti-semitism
Qaraḍāwī presents a profile of Zionism in order to know the enemy. He argues that racism is a
salient feature of the State of Israel. In “A Racist Country,” he writes:
This is Zion and this is Israel and its nature. We are confronting a people without morality who embody the worst type
of colonialism. The characteristics and qualities of the Jewish and Zionist soul find expression in this colonialism. The

first of these features is racism: They believe that they are the Chosen People and that God belongs only to them.27

Once again, Qaraḍāwī blurs the distinction between Judaism and Zionism. He argues that
the Jewish claim to ownership of the land is based upon the Jewish concept of the Chosen
People. The idea that the People of Israel are chosen over all other peoples appears in the
Torah, but is mentioned as well in the Qurʿān, 2:122, as follows: “O Children of Israel
remember my favor which I bestowed upon you, that I preferred you over all of humanity.”
Islamic theology in the Qurʿān presents a list of sins, which explains how the Jews were
dispossessed of their status as the Chosen People. Qaraḍāwī further elaborates that this verse
was correct for its time since the Children of Israel proudly carried the message of the oneness
of God. Therefore, they were preferable to idol worshippers. However, later on, their
character and qualities changed for the worse and they abandoned their God, rejected and
falsified the Torah, refused to listen to the rebukes of the Prophets and even killed them.
Therefore, they no longer are worthy of the status of the Chosen People. At present, the
Muslims have superseded them, as is written in Qurʿān 3:110: “You are the best of the nations
that has even been given to humanity.”
Qaraḍāwī explains that this verse does not at all resemble the Jewish idea of the Chosen
People because the election of the Jews is based upon the preference of a particular nationality,
and therefore, it is racist. In contrast, Islam makes it possible for anyone who believes to join
it, without any restrictions of race, color or nationality.28 Qaraḍāwī defines Judaism as a racist
religion because the Jews believe in a particularistic God. Similarly, the commandments of
Judaism imply the difference between the Jews and other peoples. In contrast, the God of
Islam is a universal God and is called “Master of the worlds” and “Master of all humanity.”29
Therefore, according to Qaraḍāwī, the Jews are no longer capable of taking on the spiritual
leadership of the world. In contrast, Muslims are more suitable for spiritual leadership because
they believe in a universal God.30 According to Freud, the idea of the chosenness of the People
of Israel arouses antagonism among other peoples and religions and is the reason for antisemitism. Both Christianity and Islam have adopted the idea of chosenness and argue that
they, respectively, are the new chosen peoples.31
In addition to the argument that Zionism that is based on Judaism is racist, Qaraḍāwī claims
that Zionism actually is a new Nazi movement. He asserts that
the Jews who suffered from overbearing Nazi racism currently are actualizing a new Nazi racism, a fanaticism that only
sees itself and does not recognize the right of the other, especially if he opposes its position.32

Qaraḍāwī expresses astonishment at the fact that the victim has become the aggressor, as
follows:
I am astonished that the people who have suffered so much from persecutions and aggression by the Nazis and similar
movements, how they attack an entire people, steal its land, its rule and desecrate its holy places, while this people has

not sinned against it at all. Its only crime is that it holds on to its land and defends what belongs to it.33

The comparison between the acts of the Israel Defense Forces and the Nazis constitute a
type of Holocaust denial. Israel’s measures are undertaken in order to preserve security and
public order and not for the purpose of destroying the Palestinian people. Qaraḍāwī adopts the
radical worldview of the Palestinian National Covenant (1968) and the Hamas Charter (1988).
Both documents state that Israel uses Nazi methods against the Palestinian people.34
Qaraḍāwī argues that Jews exploit the religious motifs in the Bible concerning the promise
of the Land of Israel to the People of Israel in order to persuade the Christian West to assist
them in fulfilling their national aspirations. They use the Holocaust in a similar manner in
order to pluck at the heartstrings of the world. Such arguments have been convincing for
several important Western leaders, such as U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Qaraḍāwī cites
Carter’s memoirs, as follows:
Judeo-Christian morality and the study of Torah constitute covenants between Jews and Christians. I have transformed
these covenants into part of my life. Similarly, I am completely convinced that the Jews, whom the Nazis did not manage
to overcome, are deserving of their own state, and likewise, they deserve to live in peace with their neighbors. I think that
the national home-land of the Jews derives from the study of Torah and that it is the will of God. My religious and
moral ideas have brought about my absolute commitment to the security of Israel.35

This citation exemplifies Qaraḍāwī’s lack of objectivity. He selectively quotes arguments that
suit his position and ignores aspects that contradict it. Perhaps President Jimmy Carter’s
religious outlook found expression in his foreign policy and in its sense of mission. However,
he also emphasized the Palestinian problem, which had been marginalized by previous
American administrations. Carter maintained that the Palestinian problem is the heart of the
conflict and that Israel’s settlements are an obstacle to peace. According to Carter, the solution
should be a complete implementation of the Road Map and the creation of two states in the
spirit of the Geneva Initiative. It would demand greater flexibility on the part of Israel than on
the part of the Palestinians. For many years, Carter has sharply criticized Israeli governments,
as may be seen in his book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid.36
Qaraḍāwī argues that one may see the violent Jewish character in the history of JewishArab relations, especially in Israel’s aggression against the Palestinians, whose blood Israel
spills in a series of massacres. He presents a long list of massacres carried out by Israel, as
follows: Sabra and Shatila; the slaughter at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron by Baruch
Goldstein; the massacre of Kafar Qana in Lebanon and so forth. His descriptions of such
massacres are reminiscent of descriptions of atrocities committed during the Holocaust. Thus,
for example, he describes the events in Deir Yassin, as follows:
By virtue of the massacre that it carried out, Israel succeeded by means of horror, terror and fear that it instilled in the
hearts, when it mercilessly killed children, women and the elderly in Deir Yassin, and not only in Deir Yassin. The Israelis
argued among themselves and laughed when they seized a pregnant woman, and bet among themselves, whether she
had a boy or a girl in her belly. Afterward, they would slash her belly, remove the fetus, and then its sex would be

revealed to the winner of the bet. Afterward, they would kill the mother and her fetus together. Regarding such
slaughter, Begin stated that ‘without Deir Yassin, the State of Israel would not have come into being.’ Begin deemed this
massacre and the slaughter of innocent women and children as a victory.37

Furthermore, Israel carries out political warfare against the Palestinians as part of government
policy and the aggressiveness of the settlers. Israel carries out arrests on a daily basis, punishes
the families of Palestinian freedom fighters and destroys their homes.38 All of Israel’s
governments have murdered private citizens through the policy of “targeted assassinations.”
Among them are: Fathi Shiqaqi, leader of the Islamic Jihad movement and responsible for
numerous terrorist attacks in Israel; Yahya Ayyash, “the Engineer” of Hamas, who was
directly responsible for severe terrorist suicide attacks against Israeli civilians in the 1990s; and
the attempted assassination of Khaled Mashal, a leading figure of Hamas and head of its
political bureau. Qaraḍāwī concludes that: “Israel acts according to the logic of strength. The
only logic that Israel comprehends is the logic of violence and terror.”39 According to Phyllis
Chesler, a salient feature of anti-semitism is harsh criticism toward Jews when they refuse to
behave like dead Jews or good Christians. The “new antisemitism” refuses to recognize the
fact that, like other peoples, Jews have the right to defend themselves and insists on judging
Jews according to double standards in relation to other countries. According to this approach,
Jews must “turn the other cheek” and not react through military action against those who
organize acts of terror, killing and murder in Israel. Like other countries, Israel is engaged in
defending its citizens in accordance with the laws of war that are observed throughout the
world. Therefore, criticism of the very right of Israel to self-defense and not simply its use of a
particular tactic constitutes a type of anti-semitism.40
On 30 July 2015, Molotov cocktails were thrown at the houses of Palestinians in the village
of Duma. As a result, the toddler, Ali Dawabshe, was burnt to death and members of his
family were severely injured. All political factions in Israel condemned these acts harshly and
extraordinary efforts were undertaken in order to bring the murderers to justice. Qaraḍāwī
accused all the Jews of this murder. In his opinion, the character of the Jews is influenced by
Jewish law as expressed in the Talmud, which is behind this crime of infanticide – a
commandment to kill Palestinians and Arabs.41 In this case, the Jews are accused as a
collective, not as individuals who perpetrated this terrible crime. This differs from Qaraḍāwī’s
position regarding 9/11. In that case, he blames only the persons who destroyed the World
Trade Center and no one else. Therefore, he condemned the war on terror declared by
President George W. Bush. In contrast, according to Qaraḍāwī, the character of the Jews is the
cause of terror. It may be found in Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians. The very nature of
the Jews is racist and violent and it cannot be changed. Therefore, the solution is their total
disappearance from Palestine and the destruction of their political entity, namely, Israel. This
antisemitic outlook aspires toward politicide, the destruction of a political entity.42

5. Religious anti-semitism
In 2001, Qaraḍāwī published his book on Muslim minorities in the West.43 Its subject is the
new Islamic rulings for Muslims in the West, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt, literally, laws for minorities.
Its topics include proper relations between members of different religions. According to
Qaraḍāwī, despite the fact that religions differ from each other, one must work toward
rapprochement between them in a spirit of religious tolerance and respect for the individual.
Qaraḍāwī maintains that only radical Muslims argue that those who belong to the “Peoples of
the Book,” namely Jews and Christians, are unbelievers who have falsified the words of God.
Furthermore, he claims that Jews and Christians are not unbelievers but are in error, and that
one should not decide who is an unbeliever and who is a believer in this world, but should
leave it to the judgment of God. In fact, Islam respects all human beings.
Qaraḍāwī even quotes a tradition about the Prophet, that when a funeral procession passed
by close to him, he stood respectfully until the corpse no longer was in his presence. The
companions of the Prophet asked him in astonishment, “Why did you stand? He was a Jew.”
The Prophet replied, “Is he not a human being?” Therefore, Muslims must relate to others
without bias, but must hear the truth from whoever says it, be it a friend or a foe.44
Likewise, in October 2005, at a gathering of Muslim scholars that took place in Jedda, Saudi
Arabia, Qaraḍāwī spoke about the attitude of Islam toward non-Muslims. He opened with the
argument that all of humanity is like one family because all human beings descend from
Adam and Eve. He cited numerous quotations from Islamic sources in order to prove his point.
Afterward, he dealt with the negative image of Islam in the West and its attitude toward the
‘other.’ Qaraḍāwī argued that one must make every effort to change this negative image and
he presented a detailed program that included the following:
Think tanks must be established in order to distribute scholarly works about the attitude of Islam toward the ‘other.’
There must be courses on the subject and discussions in the media. Similarly, religious terminology must be modernized.
For example, in present-day Muslim discourse the word “citizens” should replace “subjects,” or “non-Muslims” should
replace “unbelievers.” This must be done in order to adopt the parlance acceptable in modern society and by democracies
governed by majority rule. Similarly, terminology must be revised to provide logical explanations for apparent Islamic
bias against minorities. For example, the Jizya, i.e., the poll tax levied upon subject peoples under Islamic rule and not
upon Muslims, must be presented as a tax in lieu of military service, not as evidence of religious prejudice. The fact that
Muslims are also required to pay taxes, such as the Zakāt, must be noted as well.45

A reinterpretation of quotations from the Qurʿān and the Ḥadīth that the West regards in a
negative context must be published. These include verses that speak of Muslim hostility
toward Jews and Christians or the Jihadist image of Islam. The new interpretations must
become embedded in the public consciousness. In this context, Qaraḍāwī provides many
detailed examples of how to interpret passages from the Qurʿān and the Ḥadīth in a manner
that differentiates between “good” Jews and Christians, believers – to whom the Qurʿān

relates in a positive manner – and “negative” Jews and Christians, who have fought and
continue to fight against Muslims. The latter groups are the subject of the pejorative verses in
the Qurʿān. Thus, he argues that today one should not use Qurʿānic epithets such as “sons of
apes and pigs’ that referred to Jews because of their sins.46 Many preachers in mosques
continue to do so. Qaraḍāwī provides a plethora of sources and citations that prove that the
specific Jews who were punished did not have descendants, and that sons do not perpetuate
the sins of their fathers. Therefore, one should not refer to present-day Jews as “sons of apes
and pigs.” Finally, he presents quotations from the Qurʿān, which are favorable toward Jews.
Qaraḍāwī contends that one must present a full and not a partial picture and that Muslims
should not curse.47
Inter-religious conferences must be convened in order to promote constructive discourse
between scholars of different religions. In this context, however, Qaraḍāwī expresses
reservations about the participation of Zionist rabbis and other Jews who support Israel.48
In a program on Al Jazeera, Qaraḍāwī was asked for his opinion about the meeting of the
late Sheikh Ṭanṭāwī, head of Al-Azhar University, and the Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Israel
Meir Lau. Qaraḍāwī states that such inter-religious meetings are forbidden. Responding to
Sheikh Ṭanṭāwī’s argument that there is no Qurʿānic text that prohibits meetings between
scholars of different faiths, and that even the Prophet Muhammad met with Jewish sages and
debated with them, Qaraḍāwī maintains that there is no room for debate with Israeli Jewish
rabbis. There is no room for discussing questions of religion and faith while another burning
dispute rages – the occupation of Palestine and the expulsion of its Palestinian residents. The
Jews have spilled blood, desecrated Muslim holy places and are judaizing Jerusalem, which is
an Arab-Islamic city. They are destroying the Al-Aqsa Mosque. He further emphasizes that he
is devoted to the Palestinian cause with heart and soul and has viewed it as his duty to support
it for over 70 years.49
According to such statements, his books and his speech at the Jedda Conference, it appears
that Qaraḍāwī is prepared to debate with Jewish religious figures who are not Zionists. His
opposition to the meeting between Sheikh Ṭanṭāwī and Rabbi Lau is based on the fact that the
latter is an Israeli Zionist. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians does not allow
dialogue with Zionists. Support for this position may be found in photographs that appeared
on Qaraḍāwī’s website that show him meeting with the anti-Zionist rabbis of the Neturei
Karta.50 In a speech in 2012, he explained the difference between his meetings with anti-Israel
Jewish scholars who desire its destruction and meetings with figures such as Rabbi Lau.51
Possibly, as a result of the criticism of his meetings with Jews, Qaraḍāwī did not participate
in an inter-faith conference held in Doha in 2013, after Reform Rabbi Reuven Firestone
received an invitation.52 Rabbi Firestone of New York is a philo-Islamic Jew and active in
rapprochement between the two religions. On his weekly television program on Al Jazeera

network, on 26 April 2014, Qaraḍāwī argued that he is not prepared to take part in a
conference that includes Jews, but he is prepared to participate only in a Muslim-Christian
dialogue. He further explained that he could not dirty his hands and shake the hand of Jewish
criminals and murderers whose hands are soiled by Palestinian blood.53 Qaraḍāwī spoke of
Jews and Zionists as a single entity and did not mention the fact that Rabbi Firestone is not an
Israeli citizen and sympathizes with Islamic traditions. Boycotting and canceling conferences in
which Israelis/Jews/Zionists participate is a feature of the new anti-semitism that advocates
boycotts of Jews, whatever their positions. Such antisemitic measures are presented in disguise
as anti-Israel positions.54
Despite the fact that Qaraḍāwī stipulates that one must not curse other religions, his
sermons often refer to Jews as “enemies of God and of Islam.” His sermons typically end with
a request to Allāh that he help Muslims “to triumph over your enemies, the enemies of Islam,
O Allāh, help us to defeat the Jews [who are] traitors and enemies.”55 In addition, Qaraḍāwī
refers to Jews with the derogatory epithet from the Qurʿān as “sons of apes and pigs,”56
despite his lengthy explanation against doing so in his speech in Jedda. His official website
includes his sermons, some of which state that the Jews, who are descendants of apes and pigs,
are defiling the holy places of Islam. He delivered such a sermon in the wake of Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2001.57 Furthermore, at a conference held
in Doha on 31 March 1997, commemorating “Jerusalem Week,” Qaraḍāwī gave a lecture
entitled “The Status of Jerusalem in Islam,” in which he argued that present-day Jews are not
the descendants of the Children of Israel whom the Qurʿān praises. In fact, they are the
Children of Israel who were cursed by God and were transformed into apes and pigs.
Therefore, they are called “a stiff-necked people” and they bear an eternal punishment. They
persist in their stubbornness even today through the crimes that they commit in Palestine.
Soon the Muslims, the servants of God, will punish them.58
His lack of distinction between Judaism and Zionism enables him to allow himself to
change accepted Islamic rulings. Thus, for example, according to Qurʿān 5:5, Muslims are
allowed to marry Jewish and Christian wives who are designated as women of the “People of
the Book” (Kitābiyyāt). Qaraḍāwī devotes a lengthy explanation of the reasons for not
marrying Jewish and Christian women at present, despite the earlier Qurʿānic ruling. While he
permits taking Christian wives under special circumstances, he is adamant against marrying
Jews and in effect, nullifies the Qurʿānic permission to do so, as follows:
In our generation, a Muslim is forbidden to marry a Jewish woman as long as a state of war exists between us and Israel.
The statements of someone who says that there is no difference between Judaism and Zionism are worthless. In reality,
every Jew is a Zionist. That is because the intellectual and mental components of Zionism derive from the sources of
Judaism: the Torah and its commentaries and the Talmud. Therefore, every Jewish woman is a soldier in the Israeli army
in spirit.59

Qaraḍāwī argues that, first and foremost, all Jews are loyal to Israel and not to the countries of
which they are citizens. According to Zionist teachings, every Jew who regards a foreign
country as his homeland is considered a traitor to the Jewish people.60 Muslims should learn
from the Jews:
Every Jew in the world considers Israel – as they call it and I’m sorry that I have to express this name, but Israel is a
reality that one cannot escape from – as his own country and consider Israel’s problems as his own problems. Therefore
every Muslim in the world should consider the issue of Palestine – the land of prophecies, the land of al-Aqsa mosque
and the land of the night journey of the prophet – as his own land and as his own problem.61

Qaraḍāwī’s view of the Jews is as a totality, without any real differentiation between
“Zionists,” “settlers,” “Jews,” “Sons of Zion,” “Children of Israel,” and “colonial-ists.” All of these
terms are interchanged throughout his sermons.

6. Cultural anti-semitism
Along with his status as Muslim religious authority, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī is a prolific writer and
poet. He has written on a variety of subjects, published several anthologies of poetry and
devoted some of his cultural and literary works to the Palestinian cause, which he considers an
important issue for the Muslim Ummah. Two of his major works on the subject are: Al-Quds:
Qaḍiyyat Kull Muslim (Jerusalem: A Problem of Every Muslim) and Fatāwā Min Ajl Filasṭīn
(Legal Rulings for Palestine).62 Furthermore, Qaraḍāwī has written poems encouraging the
Palestinian struggle against Israel and uses his Friday sermons broadcast directly from a
mosque in Doha and his long-standing, popular program on Al Jazeera, to express his views
on the Palestinian cause.63 In his writings on the Jews, Qaraḍāwī has openly adopted ideas
from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, including their antisemitic aspects. They have become
part of his anti-Zionist ideology. He adds an anti-Arab and anti-Muslim dimension to ideas in
The Protocols, such as the Jewish conspiracy against Christianity. Thus, for example, he writes
that:
We must pay attention to the truth that the Zionist Judaism that we confront today does not constitute a danger only to
Muslims or to Arabs, but is a danger for the entire world and for all of humanity. It conveys a spirit of fanaticism and
ideas that are destructive to all religions, particularly Semitic ones, and it is hostile to all peoples.64

Qaraḍāwī writes extensively about the hostility of Judaism toward Christianity and argues
that the Jewish religion allows Jews to lie to Christians and that Jews mock Jesus, whereas
Muslims respect him. In fact, the Jews conceal their condemnatory epithets of Jesus in secret
chapters of the Talmud. In addition, Jews send spies into the ranks of the Christian church and
are active in judaizing the Christian consciousness for Jewish purposes. For example, they

exert great influence on Protestants, as far as the Biblical right to Palestine is concerned.
According to Qaraḍāwī, nearly all of the presidents of the United States have been convinced
of the justice of the Jewish claim to Palestine. Furthermore, Jews have even succeeded in
influencing the Vatican to exonerate them from the historic accusation of killing Jesus.65
In his book, The Enemies of the Islamic Solution Qaraḍāwī argues that it is likely that the
Jews wrote The Protocols. He states that Zionism or “world Jewry” continues to spread
expansionist its ambitions via works such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, – whether
they really wrote the book or it only is attributed to them – or via the establishment of
institutions that they run behind the scenes. Organizations such as the Freemasons are active in
countries and among peoples in the manner that germs enter a body, or that cancer takes over
healthy cells. The Jews carry out their plots quietly throughout the world, like a silencer in a
pistol.66
He continues that an examination of the state of the world today is proof of the fact that the
Jews wrote The Protocols. It suffices to study how the Jews make efforts to impose the
Zeitgeist and their thinking on the world.67
According to Qaraḍāwī, Jews control the international media68 and the world economy.69
They are behind revolutions and wars and they stand behind ideas and organizations such as
the Freemasons; Communism; capitalism; the Alliance and B’nei Brith organization.70 These
arguments are not new and have appeared in many books, mainly of a religious-Islamic
nature, as early as the 1950s and 1960s. Such themes appear even earlier in the statements of
the Mufti Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseinī.71 Qaraḍāwī simply continues the anti-Semitic tradition of
presenting such ideas as an impetus for generating anti-Jewish activities among his audience
and supporters in Europe, America and the Middle East.
Qaraḍāwī ostensibly proves his arguments by presenting examples of well-known
international cultural tropes. Thus, he refers to Shakespeare’s play, The Merchant of Venice, as
proof of the parasitic Jewish character that sucks the blood of humanity.72 He also claims that
the “President” of the United States, Benjamin Franklin, warned against the Jewish peril at the
Constitutional Congress in 1789, as follows:
Here there is a great danger that threatens the United States of America and it is the Jewish peril. Wherever they are,
they cause damage and lower the moral level [of society] and they do not keep their commitments in business. They are
separate. They do not mingle with their surroundings. Since they were expelled from the land of their fathers, they plan
their steps for 1700 years… They are parasites… it should be written in the Constitution that they should be removed
from the United States… in two-hundred years, our descendants will be working in the fields in order to feed the Jews
who, in the meantime, will have taken control of all economic institutions. If the American people will not remove the
Jews absolutely, their children and their children’s children will curse their graves.73

Qaraḍāwī sums up as follows: “Indeed, these words that were spoken in the Eighteenth
Century suit contemporary Jews exactly. They have taken over the economy and politics of
the United States. The late Franklin’s prophecy has been fulfilled by the American people.”74

Unfortunately, these ideas have gained great support among anti-Semites all over the
world: rich Jews control the economy, Hollywood, international institutions, etc. Furthermore,
not only the Muslim Brotherhood spreads such ideas and cites the alleged words of Benjamin
Franklin, but the Islamic Liberation Party (Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī) does so as well.75
However, the fact that such a high-ranking, world-famous religious figure spreads anti-Semitic
ideas that appear in The Protocols in books that are published by respectable publishers lends a
stamp of religious approval to these ideas that have become part of mainstream Arabic
literature and culture.76

7. Economic anti-semitism
On his program on Al Jazeera, Qaraḍāwī argued that one must boycott the Jews and oppose
normalization with Israel. According to Islamic tradition, boycotts and excommunications are
an acceptable weapon even against Muslims, all the more so, against the enemy. Qaraḍāwī
brings an example from Islamic history: When the leaders of the Quraish tribe wanted to
overpower Muhammad, they hung a scroll of excommunication against Muhammad’s
paternal family, the Banū Hāshim, on the door of the Kaʾba. It stated that it was forbidden for
the Banū Quraish to have any contact or do business with them or to marry them. This
boycott inflicted considerable harm upon the Banū Hāshim to the point of starvation.
Qaraḍāwī uses this as proof that excommunication and boycotts are acceptable in Islamic
tradition.77 The legal precedent, noted by Qaraḍāwī, is problematic because, generally
speaking, legal precedents in Islam are taken directly from the Prophet and not from his
opponents. Apparently, Qaraḍāwī’s fervent desire to justify the boycott against Israel caused
him to refer to a precedent from the enemies of the Prophet.
Although Israel possesses nuclear weapons and the Arabs do not, they are able to conduct
an economic boycott against Israel. It is a powerful weapon and if they persist in using it, they
will triumph over Israel. Qaraḍāwī has issued a fatwā that calls for boycotting American and
Israeli goods. He argues that “every penny with which we purchase their goods eventually
becomes a bullet that shoots our brothers and sons in Palestine.”78
It is also forbidden to buy American goods because America is a second Israel and without
American support, Israel would not manage to exist. The Muslim world must take punitive
measures against the United States and a boycott of American and Israeli goods is a religious
obligation. Whoever buys American or Israeli goods, which he can substitute by purchasing
from other countries, definitely is committing a grievous sin against God and humanity.
Muslim merchants must find out where the goods that they sell originate because frequently
Israeli goods are concealed abroad and given other names.79

Qaraḍāwī discusses the problem of Muslims who live in Israel and in the U.S. who must buy
American and Israeli products on a daily basis. He is aware of their difficulties in
implementing his fatwā and refers to them as “Muḍṭarrūn” (those who are under compulsion).
Therefore, they are released from observing this fatwā. He cites passages from the Qurʿān and
Ḥadīth as the authority for this ruling that prove that someone who is forced to commit a
transgression when he is under compulsion will not be punished. Nevertheless, Qaraḍāwī
argues that such Muslims are not released from attempting to boycott Israeli and American
products to the best of their abilities, or at least to boycott businesses such as Marks and
Spencer, that are known to belong to Jews, and therefore, to Zionists.80
Qaraḍāwī designates an important role for women in implementing the legal principles that
he preaches. Because housewives are responsible for household purchases, they are obligated
to educate their young children in the spirit of the Islamic faith and of Jihad and to teach them
what is forbidden and what is permitted to buy. He also addresses leaders of the Christian
world to stand with the Muslims and implement the boycott in order to help Muslims fight
against lies and oppression on the part of Israel. Similarly, he addresses Arab leaders to accept
his boycott as official policy.81

8. Holocaust denial
Qaraḍāwī’s statements on the Holocaust usually consist of denying, excusing, minimizing or
diminishing it, or even justifying what transpired. He regards the Holocaust as proof of the
hateful character of the Jews and as a suitable recompense and a divine punishment for their
objectionable behavior. Qaraḍāwī quotes the Qurʿān, 7:167–168 as justification for his
statements. These verses note that God sent different peoples throughout the generations in
order to suppress and punish the Jews for their sins. Likewise, he quotes Qurʿān, 17:8 whose
conclusion states that the destructions of the First and Second Temples serve as divine
punishment for the sins of the Jews. The same passage notes that if the Jews will return to
their evil ways, God will punish them a third time. Their third punishment was the
Holocaust.82
He refutes the fact that six million Jews perished in the Holocaust and argues that it is a lie
spread by the Zionist movement in order to establish the State of Israel. Israel, which controls
the international media, has succeeded in imparting this lie to the world as a truth. Likewise,
Israel tries to silence academics throughout the world and prevent the publication of scientific
studies that oppose its views about the Holocaust.83 He cites the example of Roger Garaudy,
the well-known Holocaust denier, a French intellectual who converted to Islam.84 Garaudy,
who converted to Islam in 1982, wrote a book entitled, The Founding Myths of Modern

Israel85, which denies that the Nazis used gas chambers to destroy the Jews. He also claims
that only one million Jews perished and argues that the Jews exploited the myth of the
Holocaust in order to establish their state, conquer territory that does not belong to them and
slaughter the Palestinians. A court in Paris ordered Garaudy to pay a fine of 120,000 francs and
serve a jail sentence.86
Qaraḍāwī displays a sympathetic attitude toward Hitler and his way of dealing with the
Jewish problem. He explains that:
throughout history, Allāh placed the Jews under the rule of other peoples who would punish them for their sins. The last
punishment of the Jews was Hitler who did to them what he did and, of course, their description of what he did is
highly exaggerated. But he succeeded in putting them in the place that they deserve and that is the divine punishment
for them. The next punishment of the Jews, with the help of Allāh, will be by the hand of the Muslims.87

This statement exemplifies his conflation of the Jewish past and the Israeli present, and of
Judaism and Zionism.

9. Justifying terror against Jews
Qaraḍāwī calls for terror against Jews. He is regarded as “the father of the theology of suicide
bombers” because he grants approval to carry out suicide terrorist attacks against Israelis. The
victims include women, children and the elderly. According to Islamic law (Sharīʾa), it is
forbidden to kill civilians who are not associated with fighting, especially women and children.
Qaraḍāwī, however, has circumvented this prohibition by redefining Israeli society as a
“military society” (Mujtamaʾ ʾAskarī) whose sons have served in the army in the past, serve
today and will do so in the future. Women in Israel also serve in the army. Therefore, it is
permitted to attack everyone.88 We have noted that recently this position has changed, as
Qaraḍāwī has explained that at present the Palestinians may launch missiles at Israel’s
population indiscriminately. At this stage, however, suicide attacks should cease because the
temporary permission to do so, granted during the 1990s and the first decade of the twentyfirst Century, no longer is valid.89
Qaraḍāwī does not call for terror against Jewish targets outside Israel. While he suspects
every Jew of being a Zionist and advocates economic sanctions and other measures against
Jewish institutions, communities and companies throughout the world. He does not call for
killing Jews outside Israel. On the contrary, the desirable solution for the Palestinian problem
is that Israelis return to their countries of origin and live elsewhere. Here, Qaraḍāwī differs
from Al-Qaeda. For example, he condemned the attacks on the editorial board of the French
journal, Charlie Hebdo, and the Hypercacher supermarket in Paris, stating that one should
retaliate with force against anyone who spills innocent blood. On the other hand, he argues

that the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad was neither smart nor sensible and
that what happened at Charlie Hebdo was the inevitable result of the ongoing attack against
the Prophet Muhammad and the Muslims. Similarly, he called upon the Arab countries and
Islam to enact an international law prohibiting insulting the prophets and not allow it to take
place on the grounds of “freedom of speech.”90

10. Discrimination against Israel
All of the topics that we have described above show that Qaraḍāwī’s point of departure on the
subject of Israel is lacking in objectivity and is discriminatory. His writings constitute a
polemic against Israel. Therefore, any discussion is one-sided. Israel always is the aggressor,
while the Palestinians always are the victims. The Palestinians are defined as “freedom
fighters,” whereas the Israelis are “terrorists.” The murder of Jews is completely justified, while
there is widespread condemnation for the killing of Palestinians, without relating to Israel’s
position or to the motives and reasons for its attacking Palestinians. There is extensive
discussion of the exile of the Palestinians that was caused by the Jews who “stole” their land
by force. There is no reference to the historical circumstances that brought about Jewish
immigration to Israel, such as the pogroms in Arab countries.
In his treatment of the background, such as the Holocaust, Qaraḍāwī distorts the real data
and presents it in a manipulative fashion: The Jews have exaggerated the dimensions of the
Holocaust in order to convince the world to give them Palestine. There is no mention of the
fact that Israel was established on the basis of an international decision of the United Nations
and therefore, its existence is absolutely legal. All of the points noted above are the features of
what the late Robert Wistrich, a leading scholar of anti-semitism, has called “the religion of
Palestinism.” The latter is part of the new anti-semitism, which currently is supported by a vast
number of Europeans. An important tenet of this religion denounces Israel as the mother of all
evils. Wistrich also points out that, during the massive demonstrations against Operation
Protective Edge, there were shouts of “Death to the Jews!”91
On the one hand, Qaraḍāwī presents the Jews as licentious and unbelievers and therefore,
lacking any religious right to the land. On the other, he states that they demand the right to
the land for religious reasons, namely, that Israel is the “Promised Land” according to the
Torah. The Jews admire the image of the “warrior-prophet” in their history and therefore,
they sanctify wars and conquests. Qaraḍāwī does not relate to the image of the founder of
Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, in this context. Indeed, Muhammad personifies the “warriorprophet” and Islam took over half the world with the sword.
According to Qaraḍāwī, on the one hand, Judaism is defined only as a religion and

therefore, the Jews cannot have national claims to Palestine. On the other, he demands Islamic
ownership of the land by virtue of Palestine being part of Islamic territory (Dār al-Islām) since
he opposes the idea of the nation state and supports the revival of the Islamic Caliphate. Islam
constitutes a new nation – the nation of Islam (the Ummah) – that will return in glory and
renew its previous splendor. While his writings offer a wide range of ideas, the contradictions
in his thought attest to a single guiding principle: the Jews have no right to exist as a people
and hence, Israel has no right to exist as a state, and it must be destroyed.

11. The historical background of Qaraḍāwī’s work
Qaraḍāwī’s personality was formed in Egypt during the 1930s and forties. At the time,
antisemitic ideas imported from Europe spread throughout Egypt, mainly in nationalist, proFascist movements such as, “Young Egypt” (Miṣr al-Fatāt) and in religious movements like the
Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian press became saturated with the teachings of The Protocols
of the Elders of Zion. With the rise of Nazism in Germany, anti-semitism targeted the Jews in
Egypt, who also suffered from the presence of its European residents and German and Italian
diplomats. The latter were active in disseminating antisemitic and anti-Zionist ideas. Jews in
Cairo were described as agents of Communism and representatives of capitalism despoiling
the masses.92 At the time, public discourse in Egypt conflated the terms “Judaism” and
“Zionism” and there was no distinction between them. This blurring of concepts led to lively
discussions among Egyptian Jews on Judaism and on events in Jewish history, such as
Muhammad’s expulsion of the Jews, when they rejected his role as a prophet.93
As a young man, Qaraḍāwī absorbed the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Ḥasan alBannā, founder of the movement, was his revered teacher and master. In his memoirs,
Qaraḍāwī wrote that he was privileged to study with a teacher who was devoted to the issue
of Palestine and that only he understood the immensity of the tragedy that was taking place
there. He waxes with nostalgia about that time, about his friends who went to fight against
the Jews in Palestine in 1948 and about the spirit of volunteerism and unity that prevailed
among the people.94 Ḥasan al-Bannā maintained good relations with the Mufti of Palestine,
Hajj Amīn al-Ḥuseinī, who collaborated with the Nazis. Qaraḍāwī regards the Mufti as a role
model and his writings refer to Al-Ḥuseinī as “the great Jihad warrior” (Al-Mujāhid alKabīr).95 Qaraḍāwī’s antisemitic ideas in the spirit of The Protocols duplicate the ideology of
his third master and teacher, Sayyid Quṭb. In his book, Our War against the Jews (Maʾraktunā
maʾa al-Yahūd), Quṭb inserts many ideas from The Protocols along with the anti-Jewish
teachings in Islamic tradition.96

12. “Am I an antisemite?”: Qaraḍāwī assesses himself
We should ask what is Qaraḍāwī’s position regarding anti-semitism? How does he define
himself? Does he completely refute the argument that he is an antisemite, or that the struggle
between Muslims and Jews derives from anti-semitism? He writes:
Is the reason for the enmity and the war between us – Arabs and Muslims – and Israel because Israel is a Semitic
country? This is quite remote from the Muslim way of thinking and is not acceptable to Muslims for two reasons: The
first one is because we Arabs are also Semites and we are cousins of the Children of Israel since they are descendants of
Jacob, the son of Isaac, son of Abraham, while we are the descendants of Ishmael, the son of Abraham. Therefore, Israel
cannot accuse us of being anti-Semites – a position that Israel flaunts in the West against anyone who opposes its policy
or its hostile and immoral ways. The Qurʿān considers all Muslims as children of Abraham.97 The second reason is that
the Muslim way of thinking is universal, for all of humanity. They do not come out against any race or nation. Their
religion teaches them that all of humanity is one family and what links it together is belief in God and the prophecy
that He gave to the humanity, as the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘O people, your God is one; your father is one; you all
descend from Adam and Adam was created out of dust.’98

Robert Wistrich has correctly explained that the term “anti-semitism” originally was coined in
German in 1879 and, from the outset, it only has referred to Jew-hatred.99 In Semites and
Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice, Bernard Lewis argues that Arab writers
always claim that they cannot be antisemites because they themselves are Semites. According
to Lewis, it is a weak argument as it does not explain proliferation of editions of The Protocols
of the Elders of Zion and other hateful articles published in Arabic. Therefore, the argument
that since Arabs are of Semitic origin they cannot possibly be anti-Semites is disingenuous.100

Conclusion
This section has focused upon the question of whether the thought of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī is
antisemitic. Like other topics, which he discusses in his large corpus of works, there are
problems of internal contradictions. Scholars who have analyzed his thought, such as Gudrun
Krämer and Samuel Helfont, point out the lack of consistency in his writing and the difficulty
of defining his positions.101 His writings on Judaism and Zionism are conspicuous in their lack
of distinction between “Judaism” and “Zionism” and their conflation. Therefore, it is difficult
to determine whether he is anti-Jewish, anti-Zionist or antisemitic. Nevertheless, we shall try
to define his thought. The definition will be divided into two parts: how others view him and
how he views himself. According to the Western definition of modern anti-semitism which we
have described above, Qaraḍāwī undoubtedly is an antisemite. His writings contain all of the
parameters of antisemitic writing with the exception of the fact that he does not call for
attacks against Jews outside of Israel.

In contrast, Qaraḍāwī does not consider himself an antisemite because he also is of Semitic
origin. Similarly, he does not regard himself as anti-Jewish because Islam is not hostile to
Judaism as a religion. However, he does regard himself as anti-Zionist. He is opposed to what
he refers to as Israel’s conquest of Palestine by force, with neither historic nor religious rights.
He considers it a sacred religious duty to restore the stolen land to the Muslims, its legitimate
owners. It can be accomplished by peaceful means, if the Jews would willingly emigrate.
Otherwise, should the Jews insist on preserving their rule of occupation, it will be achieved
through war. By virtue of these ideas, Qaraḍāwī enthusiastically encourages terrorist attacks in
Israel or shooting its population, which he views as defensive Jihad. On the other hand, as we
have explained above, he generally opposes attacks in Europe and in the United States.
Indeed, one of the features of the “new anti-semitism” is that anti-Zionism conceals its true
character.102
According to Qaraḍāwī, Israel has no right to exist in any part of Palestine whatsoever. As
Jews constitute a religion, they are not a people and have no right to their own country.
According to Rosemary Radford Ruether, there is no doubt that anti-Zionism has become the
way of renewing the myth of the absolute evil of the Jews.103 In addition, according to David
Patterson’s study of anti-semitism, the denial of the right of Israel to exist negates the right of
the Jews to live.104
Qaraḍāwī does not distinguish between Jews and Zionists because of the religious prism
through which he views reality. Therefore, his writings conflate the Children of Israel, the
Jews of the Qurʿān and present-day Israelis. An additional reason for this lack of
differentiation comes from his background and the sources that he uses. Perhaps, his lack of
distinction between these concepts is intended to simplify things for the Muslim readers and
prevent them from being confused between Jews, Zionists and Israelis. According to
Qaraḍāwī, every Jew is suspected of supporting Zionism because Zionism is built upon the
fundamentals of Judaism. This represents the position of Hamas which regards Jews as the
most filthy and evil of all races without any distinction between Jews, Israelis and Zionists.105
Therefore, Qaraḍāwī is not eager to come into contact with Jews, even if they are not Israeli
citizens. He is prepared to meet and speak with Jews only if he is convinced that they are not
Zionists, such as the Neturei Karta. Nevertheless, he is well aware of the Western distinction
between “Jews” and “Zionists.” For the sake of his image and for the spread of Islam in the
West, that is so precious for him, he is prepared to alter classical Islamic terminology regarding
minorities, Jews and Christians, in order to make his religion appear more pluralistic and
modern. This is intended mainly for Christians, not for Jews, as we have noted in his pluralistic
sermon at the conference in Jedda and his tolerant approach in his book on Muslim minorities
in non-Muslim countries. The book was published after the attacks of 9/11 for sale in Western
countries. Therefore, his statements intended for a non-Muslim audience appear to be more
nuanced.

According to Phyllis Chesler, Qaraḍāwī’s thought combines features of all the types of old
and new anti-semitism. The “old” anti-semitism mainly belongs to the conservative, neo-Nazi
Right that continues to regard the Jewish race as an inferior race that has no right to exist and
believes that the Jews are Christ-killers.106 Qaraḍāwī’s Islamic point of view expresses these
ideas in his reference to Jews as killers of the Prophet Muhammad and of some of the early
caliphs, the Al-Salaf al-Rāshidūn (literally, “the first who were upright,” the title given to the
first four caliphs of Islam, after Muhammad). In addition to killing the Prophets, the Jews are
accused of observing ancient Talmudic customs, such as infanticide and using blood of Gentiles
for ritual purposes. They did so in Europe and, more recently, in Duma, where they killed the
toddler, Ali Dawabshe. Thus, Qaraḍāwī regards the traits of the corrupt Jew as unchangeable.
An additional feature, taken from Nazism, is the position of “World Jewry” and its danger to
the world, as expressed in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
The “new” anti-semitism finds expression in anti-Zionism and is represented in Europe by
the antisemitic Left that has become associated with the Islamic view that has adopted the
Palestinian narrative. The “religion of Palestinism” presents the Jews as a foreign element, the
last of the colonialists and capitalists. Israel appears as an American puppet that persists in
depriving and discriminating against the peoples of the Third World. Western countries and
their Jewish emissaries are guilty of spreading disease, poverty, suffering and economic failure
among Third World countries, first and foremost, Palestine. Hence, suicide terrorists are called
“freedom fighters.”107
All the features noted above are present in Qaraḍāwī’s thought, that includes completely
denying that the Jews, as a people, have any right to self-determination; negating any
historical connection between the Jews and the Land of Israel; presenting the Holocaust as a
European event in which God punished the Jews, but, at the same time, minimizing the extent
of the Holocaust. Zionism appears as a form of racism and discrimination. Israel’s policy
toward the Palestinians is judged according to a double standard and Israel is denied any right
to self-defense. Qaraḍāwī justifies any means of harming the occupying enemy, namely, the
citizens of Israel, even those who are not involved in fighting. The combination of all of the
features described above places Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī as one of today’s most vicious
Muslim antisemitic scholars.

Notes
1 Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Socialism of Fools: The Left, the Jews and Israel,” Encounter, December, 1969, p. 24; Phyllis
Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism (Jerusalem and Springfield, NJ: Gefen Books, 2015), p. 3.
2 Antony Lerman, “Fictive Anti-Zionism: Third World, Arab and Muslim Variations,” in: Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), Anti-

Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World, pp. 121–122.
3 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 62–66.
4 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 3, p. 235.
5 Rivka Yadlin, “Anti-Jewish Imagery in the Contemporary Arab-Muslim World,” in: Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), Demonizing
the Other: Antisemitism, Racism and Xenophobia (Studies in Antisemitism) (Singapore: Harwood Academic Publishers,
1999), pp. 318–319; Raphael Israeli, “Anti-Jewish Attitudes in the Arabic Media,” in: Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), Anti-Zionism
and Antisemitism, p. 102.
6 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, p. 64.
7 Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism, pp. 20–25.
8 Mordecai Kafri, “Open and Concealed Antisemitism,” Mifne: Bamah le-‛Inyanei Chevrah, 42 (January 2004) (Hebrew),
www.kibbutz.org.il/mifne/articles/040111.antishemiut.htm.
9 Irwin Cotler, as cited in: Alan Dershowitz, The Case for Israel (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), pp. 210–211.
10 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 144.
11 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 66–67; Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Al-ḥalqa (13): Qiyām Dawlat al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnῑ Akhṭar
Aḥdāth al-Qarn”.
12 Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism, pp. 20–21.
13 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, p. 66.
14 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 135.
15 Ibid., p. 177.
16 Ḥammād, Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, p. 206.
17 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 148.
18 Ibid., p. 42.
19 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 134.
20 Ibid., p. 174.
21

Nadav

Shragai,

“The

Fabricated

Palestinian

History,”

Yisrael

Hayom,

7

February

2014,

www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=15323; Shaul Bartal, “When and How Were the Palestinian People
Invented?,” Imago: Journal of Culture and Content, Part One, 13 June 2012, www.e-mago.co.il/magazine-228.html; Bartal,
“Shlomo Sand: The Arabs’ Darling,” pp. 1–3.
22 Lebel, The Mufti of Jerusalem: Haj-Amin Al-Husseini and National Socialism, pp. 237–245.
23 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 135.
24 Ibid., vol. 5, 132, and vol. 3, p. 146.

25 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: Istiftāʿ al-Inqilāb Bāṭil,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 21 January 2014, www.Qaraḍāwī.net/news/7113-2014-01-2004-42-21.html, viewed on 9 March 2014.
26 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 14.
27 Ibid., p. 183.
28 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 96.
29 Ibid., p. 11.
30 Ibid., p. 9.
31 Wistrich, “The Devil, the Jews and Hatred of the ‘Other’,” p. 6.
32 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 98.
33 Ibid., p. 100.
34 Y. Harkabi, The Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning (London: Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., 1979), p. 88. “Article 22:
Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism… … It is racist and fanatic in its
nature…

…

and

fascist

in

its

methods.”

See

also:

The

Hamas

Covenant,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp. “Article 20: The society confronts a vicious enemy which acts in a
way similar to Nazism making no differentiation between men and women, between children and old people… … in their
Nazi treatment, the Jews made no exception for women or children. Their policy of striking fear in the heart is meant for
all… … Deportation from the home-land is a kind of murder.” “Article 31:… … The Zionist Nazi activities against our
people will not last for long.” “Article 32:… … There is no way out except by concentrating all powers and energies to face
this Nazi, vicious Tatar invasion.”
35 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 87.
36 Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 205–216.
37 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, pp. 182–182.
38 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 100.
39 Ibid.
40 Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism, pp. 33–34.
41

“ʾUlamāʿ

Yugharridūn:

Ḥarq

al-Raḍīʾ

al-Filasṭīnī,

Taḥrīḍ

ʾAlā

al-Ibāda,”

Al-Khaleej,

31

July

2015,

http://alkhaleejonline.net/#!/articles/1438354553174470900, viewed on 30 May 2017.
42 Y. Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (Jerusalem: Keter, 1972), pp. 37–40. “Whereas the Arab-Israel conflict is concerned,
there may be no absolute distinction between politicide and genocide,” p. 37.
43 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Fῑ Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt al-Muslima: Ḥayāt al-Muslimῑn wasaṭ al-Mujtama῾āt al-ʾUkhrā.
44 Ibid., pp. 65–71.
45

“Al-Qaraḍāwī:

Al-Islām

yarā

al-bashariyya

ʾusra

wāḥīda,”

Qaraḍāwī

Website,

26

January

2014,

www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/component/content/article/304-2014-01-26-18-24-13/2014-01-26-18-59-19/4762, viewed on 3
September 2014.
46 Qurʿān, vol. 7, pp. 163–166.
47

“Al-Qaraḍāwī:

Al-Islām

yarā

al-bashariyya

ʾusra

wāḥīda,”

Qaraḍāwī

Website,

26

January

2014,

www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/component/content/article/304-2014-01-26-18-24-13/2014-01-26-18-59-19/4762, viewed on 3
September 2014.
48 Ibid.
49 “Al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī yaruddu ʾalā tawzīʾ ṣuwarihi maʾa Ḥākhāmāt Yahūd,” YouTube and the Facebook page of
Akhbār Tūnis, 4 May 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQfcbqc_hWQ, viewed on 30 May 2017.
50 In 2008, Qaraḍāwī met with Rabbis Aharon Cohen and Shlomo Feldman of New York, representatives of the anti-Zionist,
Ultra-Orthodox group, Neturei Karta, in Qatar. They offered to help Qaraḍāwī discredit the arguments of Zionist rabbis
who support Israel by presenting what they referred to as the true answers and principles of the Torah. See: “Yahūd ḍidda
al-Ṣahyūniyya,”

Islamweb.net,

29

May

2008,

http://articles.islamweb.net/media/index.php?

page=article&lang=A&id=144021.
51 Facebook page of Akhbār Tūnis (News of Tunisia), www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=339326979466765, viewed on 30
August 2017.
52 “The Jew that Sheikh Qaraḍāwī Couldn’t Stand to be Near,” Elder of Ziyon Web-site, 30 April 2013,
http://elderofziyon.blogspot.co.il/2013/04/the-jew-that-sheikh-Qaraḍāwī-couldnt.html?
utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed:+blogspot?PDbq+
(Elder+of+Ziyon)&utm_content=FaceBook, viewed on 3 September 2014.
53 “Leading Sunni Scholar al-Qaraḍāwī Refuses to Participate in Inter-Faith Dialogue with Jews,” YouTube Site,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsUCWRVYZFY, viewed on 3 September 2014.
54 Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism, pp. 47–51.
55 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, pp. 29, 190.
56 See, for example: Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʾāṣira, vol. 3, p. 484.
57 “Yawm al-Ghaḍab al-Filasṭīnī,” Qaraḍāwī Website, published on 31 July 2001 and republished on 26 January 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/component/content/article/236-2014-01-26-18-22-18/2014-01-26-18-32-38/1012, viewed on 3
September 2014.
58 “Makānat al-Quds fī al-Islām,” Qaraḍāwī Website, 7 July 2001 and republished on 26 January 2014,
www.Qaraḍāwī.net/new/component/content/article/237-2014-01-26-18-22-18/2014-01-26-18-35-25-1228, viewed on 3
September 2014.
59 Al-Qaraḍāwῑ, Fῑ Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt al-Muslima, pp. 99–100.
60 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 93–94; Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 178.

61 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 144.
62 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā min ajl Filasṭīn (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 2003).
63 Ḥammād, Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, pp. 197–201.
64 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, 116.
65 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 72–74; Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 126.
66 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, p. 68.
67 Ibid., p. 72.
68 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 118.
69 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Shaikh al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 173.
70 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 80–86.
71 Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel, pp. 82–83, 181–186.
72 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 121.
73 Ibid., pp. 124–125.
74 Ibid.
75 Bartal, Jihad in Palestine, pp. 171–172, 181; Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism, pp. 5–7; Al-Suwaidān, Al-Yahūd, alMawsūʾa al-Muṣawwara, pp. 408–449, presents the claim that Jewish control of the world in the fields of economics,
culture, communications and policy. There is no reliable source in scholarly works on American history for the statements
attributed to Benjamin Franklin.
76 Ben-Itto, The Lie That Wouldn’t Die: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, pp. 350–377.
77 Ḥammād, Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, p. 208.
78 Ibid., p. 207.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 208.
81 Ibid., p. 209; Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 157.
82 Ibid., vol. 5, 175; Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 56.
83 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 24.
84 Al-Saʾd, Khuṭab al-Qaraḍāwī, vol. 5, p. 175; Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, p. 24.
85 Roger Garaudy, The Founding Myths of Modern Israel (Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 2000).
86 “Interview with Holocaust Denier, Roger Garaudy,” MEMRI Website, 11 February 2000, www.memri.or.il/cgiwebaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&dbid=articles&act=show3&dataid=167, viewed on 28 August 2014.

87 “Yusuf al-Qaradawi Praises Hitler and the Holocaust,” YouTube Site, 19 November 2009, www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VcB_DZ4YQYQ, viewed on 19 May 2014.
88 Interview on Al-Ahrām al-ʾArabī (Egypt) on 3 February 2001, cited in: “Arab-Muslim Debate Regarding the Legitimacy of
Suicide

Attacks,”

MEMRI

Website,

4

May

2001,

www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?

lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=352;Iṣāmal-‛AbdZuhd, “Al-Jihād fī fikr al-Imām alQaraḍāwī,” in: Tālib Ḥammād, Ismā‛ῑl Haniyya, et al. (eds.), Juhūd al-Duktūr Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, p. 153.
89 “Bayān tawḍīḥī ḥawla raʿy al-ʾAllāma al-Qaraḍāwī fi-l-ʾamaliyyāt al-istishhādiyya,” Al-Qaraḍāwi Website, 27 July
2015, http://Qaraḍāwī.net/new/takareer/8086-2015-07-27-13-42-39. “Sheikh al-Qaradawi: There Is No Need for Suicide
Attacks since They Have Missiles,” MEMRI Website, 29 July 2015, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?
lang=he&ID=875141_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=3931.
90 “Al-Qaraḍāwī: nudīnu bi-quwwa kull ʾamal yurīqu dimāʿ al-abriyāʿ,” Official Web-site of the International Union of
Muslim Scholars (Al-Ittiḥād al-ʾAlāmī li-ʾUlāmāʿ al-Muslimīn), 10 January 2015, http://iumsonline.org/portal/ar-EG; “AlIttiḥād yukhaddhiru min al-‛awāqib al-wakhīma li-istimrār al-ʿisāʿa ʾilā al-Rasūl al-Karīm,” Official Website of the
International Union of Muslim Scholars, 15 January 2015.
91 Robert Wistrich, “Antisemitism and Jewish Destiny,” Jerusalem Post, 20 May 2015. www.jpost.com/Opinion/AntiSemitism-and-Jewish-destiny-403703
92 Michael Lasker, The Jews of the Maghreb in the Shadow of Vichy and the Swastika (Tel Aviv: Diaspora Research Center,
The Tel Aviv University, 1992), p. 92 (Hebrew); Norman A. Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2003), p. 104.
93 Esther Webman, The Challenge of Assessing Arab/Islamīc Anti-Semitism (London: Middle Eastern Studies, 2010), p. 681.
94 Al-Qaraḍāwī , Ibn al-Qarya, vol. 1, pp. 5–263.
95 Ibid., pp. 260–261.
96 Nettler, Past Trials and Present Tribulations, pp. 49, 76–78.
97 Qurʿān, vol. 22, p. 78.
98 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Quds: Qaḍiyyat kull Muslim, pp. 35–36.
99

Robert

Wistrich,

“The

Persistent

Survival

of

Antisemitism,”

Mida

Website,

27

April

2014,

http://mida.org.il/2014/04/27/the-persistent-survival-of-anti-semitism.
100 Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice, pp. 16, 23.
101 Gudrun Krämer, “Drawing Boundaries: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on Apostasy,” p. 213; Helfont, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī: Islam and
Modernity, pp. 141–146.
102 Barry Shaw, “Anti-Semitism in the Guise of DE Legitimization and Anti-Zionism,” Jerusalem Post, May 19, 2015.
103 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti- Semitism (New York: Seabury Press,

1974), p. 227.
104 Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, pp. 196–197.
105 Ibid., pp. 100–101; Ziad Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: The Muslim Brotherhood and
Islamic Jihad (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 25–26.
106 Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism, pp. 52–53.
107 Ibid., pp. 53–54; Wistrich, “Anti-Semitism and Jewish Destiny”; Robert Wistrich, “The Persistent Survival of AntiSemitism,” Mida Website, 27 April 2014, http://mida.org.il/2014/04/27/the-persistent-survival-of-anti-semitism.

Epilogue

The first Arabic translation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was published in Cairo in
1927, one year after the birth of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī. This book was adopted, circulated and
popularized by European and American antisemites, who exported it to the Middle East.1
During the 1920s, 1930s and the 1940s when the young Qaraḍāwī’s personality was formed,
there was a sharp increase in antisemitic publications that penetrated and were fed into
Islamic literature. The election of a Nazi government in Germany and the spread of Nazism
during the 1930s stimulated the growth of antisemitic literature in Arab countries. Hasan alBanna was profoundly influenced by Hitler and the Nazis, and, along with The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion, Arabic translations of Mein Kampf were presented (for the first time) at the
conference of the Muslim Brotherhood held in October 1938.2
The past was prelude to the future. Al-Qaraḍāwī spiritual mentors, from Hasan al-Banna
and Sayyid Quṭb to Hajj Amin al-Huseini, were strongly influenced by the type of antisemitism that regards “World Jewry” as dangerous to the world in general and to Islam in
particular. The defeats of the Arabs in their wars against Israel in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973
gave further impetus to the idea that the small State of Israel received unlimited Western
support. International Zionism and European imperialism were blamed for the defeat of the
Arab armies by the fragile State of Israel.3 Qaraḍāwī’s trips to the West Bank and Gaza in the
1950s and the 1960s contributed to his determination that Islam must find the way to destroy
the nascent State of Israel. As a faithful disciple of his spiritual mentors in the Muslim
Brotherhood, Qaraḍāwī believed that only Islam in its capacity as a unifying factor for the
Islamic Ummah could impose and implement the proper solution for solving the problem of
Palestine. His position became even more focused after the defeat of the Arab forces in 1967,
as is evident in his book that explicitly deals with learning the lessons of the defeat. It was
published in 1968, when he was only 42 years old.4
At present, Qaraḍāwī is a charismatic religious figure with authority in matters of Islamic
law. His views on Israel and on the Jews shape those of many Muslims throughout the world.
He is the quintessential representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, despite his rejection of
several requests to serve as its head and Supreme Guide, after the death of Ḥasan al-Huḍaibī.5
Many Westerners regard Qaraḍāwī as holding moderate opinions. On occasion, he has
expressed himself positively about democracy and a people’s freedom to choose. His legal
decisions show that he advocates the integration of Muslim minorities in Western countries
and is in favor of technological progress and the importance of its acquisition in the Arab

world. Qaraḍāwī ostensibly preaches tolerance and peace, for example, during the events that
took place in the course of the Arab Spring. He even has published a fatwa forbidding the use
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction because they kill innocent
men, women and children. Even his more controversial positions are influential and are
recognized by 1.7 billion Muslims and the 57 countries (including the Palestinian Authority)
that are members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Hence, the importance of
a study devoted to describing and analyzing his antisemitic attitudes.
One cannot avoid his unequivocally anti-Jewish attitude toward Israel and the Jewish
people.6 There is a difference between legitimate criticism of Israel’s policy and anti-semitism
and Jew-hatred. Legitimate criticism does not deny the right of Israel to exist as a state but
expects Israel to change its policy toward the Palestinians. Not all anti-Zionism or antiIsraelism should be regarded as anti-semitism.7 However, as we have demonstrated,
Qaraḍāwī’s approach is not anti-Zionism but is simply antisemitism. He does not recognize
Israel’s right to exist at all – without any relation to its size or to the territories, which are
allegedly on Palestinian land. On 1 November 1991, the IUMS issued a fatwa forbidding
participation in peace negotiations with Israel. According to Qaraḍāwī, recognition of Israel’s
right to exist means acceptance of an injustice carried out by an enemy that has killed and
continues to kill Muslims. Therefore, it is important to continue the Jihad against this enemy as
follows:
Accepting any deal with the Zionists and their supporters is forbidden and is regarded as a type of perversion. One must
boycott those who support this and remain faithful until the complete restoration of the rights of Muslims in Palestine.8

Despite his firm stance against recognition of Israel, Qaraḍāwī suspects that a situation may
arise when Arab countries will reconcile themselves to accept the existence of Israel because
of American pressure. Therefore, he has made an effort to reduce American influence in the
Middle East and the Gulf states.9
The same is true regarding his attitude toward the integration of the Muslim minority in the
Jewish state. Qaraḍāwī does not see any problem in Muslim participation in the politics of
Spain, France and other Western countries. However, his attitude differs as far as Israel is
concerned. According to Qaraḍāwī, it is forbidden by Islamic law for Muslims to take part in
elections in Israel, to vote in elections or to be elected to the Knesset. The northern branch of
the Islamic Movement in Israel has adopted his positions.10 Sheikh Rāʿed Ṣalāḥ Maḥājna
regards Qaraḍāwī as his spiritual mentor. Hence, he and other activists in the Islamic
Movement consistently preach non-participation in Israeli politics. In fact, non-participation in
elections to the Knesset is a calling card of Sheikh Salah. This ideological reason for not voting
in elections has become a position that is popular among many Arabs.11
There are major contradictions in Qaraḍāwī’s thought about harming innocent civilians.
While he has come out against attacks, such as those carried out by Al-Qaeda, because the

victims are innocent civilians, he permits suicide bombings by Hamas against Jews. He lends
his support to movements such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad because they fulfill his vision.
According to Qaraḍāwī, as far as Israel is concerned, there is no difference between innocent
civilians and those directly involved in the conflict. All Jews who live in Israel – men, women
and children – are deserving of death because all of Israel is a “military society.” His
justification of suicide bombings, according to Islamic law, is based upon an original
interpretation of the Qurʿānic verse: “God has bought the souls and possessions of the faithful
and in exchange they will win Paradise. They will fight for God and will kill and be killed.”12
They will blow themselves up together with the enemy. The duality appears at the end of the
verse, namely that they first will kill and then will kill others as they die.13 His later statement
(in 2015) that, at present, missiles are enough and therefore, the permission to carry out suicide
bombings has been cancelled, is not sufficient. Launching missiles indiscriminately against
both soldiers and a civilian population also may be considered a war crime.14 Qaraḍāwī’s
writing is characterized by double standards toward Israel: Whereas Palestinian “freedom
fighters” are allowed to kill Israeli civilians indiscriminately, in contrast, when Israel kills or
injures Hamas terrorists who are embedded among the civilian population in Gaza and serve
as human shields, Israel must be regarded as a nation of war criminals.
Qaraḍāwī claims that he has nothing against Jews and that all of his articles and activities
are against Zionists. A close examination of his writings and pronouncements on various
subjects associated with Israel reveals an entirely different picture. There is no real distinction
between Zionists and Jews and he uses the same terms interchangeably. In the book cited
above, The Enemies of the Islamic Solution, Qaraḍāwī points out in the title that Zionists are
the enemies of Muslims. However, statements in the book show that he actually means Jews.
Qaraḍāwī begins by discussing the hatred of Jews toward Islam and Muhammad from the
time of Medina and Khaibar. Jews were involved in killing the Prophet Muhammad, Umar Ibn
al-Khattab and Uthman Ibn Affan. Furthermore, the Jews played a role in the great schism
between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Zionism is a new phase in the continuous struggle of the
Jews against Islam. Thus, the conflict between the Jews and the Muslims is a historicexistential conflict between Judaism and Islam.15
Furthermore, Qaraḍāwī states that the Jews are the slayers of the prophets, beginning with
Jesus. He notes that despite the fact that when the Jews tried to kill Jesus, Allāh caused him to
ascend to heaven, they remain guilty of a terrible crime.16 The Jews killed the prophets,
including the Prophet of Islam and their hatred of Islam has continued without abating from
that time to today. His argument that the Jews are the cause of criminality, namely that they
are “those who spread corruption on Earth,” has influenced Hamas. The organization adopted
this idea in the Hamas Charter. It is a manifestation of classical European anti-semitism, which
also argues that the Jews are the slayers of the prophets, but claims that the Jews are
warmongers, plutocrats and controllers of finances and the media as well. They act as a unit

throughout the world. Therefore, Allāh sent Hitler to punish them. At present, they have
adopted Nazi-like methods against their new victims, the Palestinians. Like the Germans in the
1940s, the task of the Muslims is to show the Jews Allāh’s rod as punishment for their crimes.17
According to Qaraḍāwī, the murder of a Palestinian infant in the village of Duma on 31 July
2015 derived from the practice of Talmudic rituals.18 This is classical Jew-hatred, reminiscent
of popular accusations against Jews that were prevalent in Europe throughout history that
eventually led to the Holocaust of European Jewry during World War II.
The presentation of Hamas as a liberation movement is a later development and represents
an additional rubric in Qaraḍāwī’s attitude toward Israel and Zionism. The 1960s and seventies
witnessed the great awakening of Third World countries. European colonialism was blamed
for all of the pathologies of the Third World, which included the Arab countries. In 1975, the
General Assembly of the United Nations labeled Zionism as a form of racism. The resolution
was passed with the support of Arab, Soviet and Third World countries. The passage of this
resolution made it possible to present the destruction of Israel by using a cleaner terminology
that asserts the claim of Palestinian self-definition and adopts the Palestinian narrative in its
entirety.19 The destruction of the State of Israel was compared with the expulsion of the
Crusaders, the repulse of the Crusades and the removal of European, mainly British and
French, colonialism.20 Conscious of European sensibilities, Qaraḍāwī insists on defining Hamas
and other Palestinian factions as fighters for liberation. In his words, “Muslims have the right
to continue the resistance until the liberation of their land.”21 According to Qaraḍāwī,
Israel is the most definitive terrorist state. Israel was established on the base of massive terror from its first day, when the
gangs of the Haganah used those methods. Massacres were committed [by Israel] at Deir Yassin and elsewhere. Those acts
[of slaughter] were committed in order to remove the Palestinians from their homes against their will and thus, build its
state on their ruins. Therefore, what the Palestinians are doing is Jihad, resistance and defense of the land by means of a
struggle for rights of those who were despoiled. If resistance is called terror, then let us be called terrorists.22

How does one remove invaders? Qaraḍāwī and the legal decisions supporting the Islamic
resistance movement, namely Hamas, and the Islamic Movement in Israel, continue in the
venerable tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood. The following serve as role models for
Qaraḍāwī: the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Huseini, who served as the head of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Palestine during the 1930s and forties; Ḥasan al-Bannā, who sent members of
the Brotherhood as fighters in 1948; and Sayyid Quṭb, whose legal decisions in the 1950s,
called for a war of attrition against Israel through the activities of the fidāʿīyyīn (selfsacrificing fighters).23 Qaraḍāwī regards himself as their successor.
Qaraḍāwī asserts that
the Islamic resistance movement embodies the faith of the Palestinian people, its Islamism and Arabism. The cause [of the
Palestinian people] will not die. Its Jihad will continue. They raise their hands for purification [before prayer] with
purified hearts until victory with the help of Allāh.24

Qaraḍāwī considers it a great honor to guide Hamas after the death of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in
March 2004. His legal decisions give a stamp of theological approval to Hamas activists for
suicide bombings, launching rockets from the Gaza Strip and acts of “lone-wolf” terrorism
prevalent in 2014–2015. The latter often were committed by members of Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad movement. Qaraḍāwī serves as the legal authority of Hamas prisoners for a
variety of issues. Furthermore, his prestige and status provide Hamas with political benefits in
Arab lands, particularly in traditionalist countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. His criticism
of the Egyptian government and the Palestinian Authority have enabled Hamas to continue its
activity against Israel with considerable support of a large part of the Muslim populations in
Arab countries and in Europe.
Qaraḍāwī actively supports the struggle for the Islamic identity of Jerusalem. Like the Mufti
Hajj Amin al-Huseini in the 1930s and the 1940s, Qaraḍāwī continues to spread the idea that
the Jews wish to gain control of the Temple Mount. Qaraḍāwī’s support for the Islamic
Movement inside Israel headed by Sheikh Rāʿed Ṣalāḥ and his encouragement of projects
whose purpose is financing activities in Jerusalem, such as Waqf al-Ummah, prove his
involvement in the efforts toward Islamization of the city. In fact, Qaraḍāwī is the driving
force behind anti-Israel organizations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades and the Islamic Movement inside Israel. All these groups share his vision of
eradicating the Zionist entity and follow his fatwas concerning this issue.
Qaraḍāwī is not simply a conventional Muslim preacher who spreads Jew-hatred. Qaraḍāwī
encourages Hamas to continue its activities against Israel and the Jews by transferring monies
to Hamas via the Al-Quds International Institute (Muʿassasat al-Quds al-Duwliyya), Waqf alUmmah and the the Charity Coalition (Iʿtilāf al-Khair). Hence, it is no wonder that in a report
submitted to the IUMS in August 2014, Ṣalāḥ al-ʾᾹrūrī, a member of the political bureau of
Hamas who resides in Turkey, admitted kidnapping the three teenagers that led to Israel’s
Operation Protective Edge. Likewise, it is not surprising that Qaraḍāwī’s calls for disturbances
in Jerusalem are recognized as a response to Jews ascending the Temple Mount. Similar events
are met with the same response by Hamas and by Sheikh Raed Salah. It is not surprising that
in the wake of Qaraḍāwī’s legal decision, Hamas halted its suicide bombings and “only”
launched missiles against Israel. Qaraḍāwī appears as someone who directs the activities of
Hamas on a strategic level. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are the means for attaining long-term
objectives. They maintain that eventually other forces will join them in bringing about the
liberation of all of Palestine from Zionist occupation. Qaraḍāwī’s long-term plan is to lead
continuous Islamic resistance and Jihad that will lead to the destruction of Israel as a political
entity, namely, politicide. Hence, he negates the very legitimacy of the Jewish national
movement that found its expression in Zionism.
Islam is not only a religion but also a nationality. It defines the members of the Islamic
Ummah as Muslims. According to Qaraḍāwī, Israel is a foreign entity (Kīyān Dakhīl) in the

region that imposed itself by the force through iron and fire. It is like an alien limb in the
Arab/Muslim body and as such it is rejected by the other limbs of the body.”25 Therefore, all
the limbs of the body, namely the entire Islamic Ummah, must support the injured limb.
However, this principle is not valid as far as the Jews and Judaism are concerned. The support
of Israel by world Jewry is regarded as a satanic plot designed to harm Islam. Judaism is a
religion, not a nationality. Therefore, there is no such thing as a Jewish nation, in contrast to
idea of the Islamic nation that Qaraḍāwī shares with other Islamic religious scholars. If there is
no Jewish nation, then Zionism is a racist-colonialist ideology that harms Islam and illegally
dominates Palestinian soil.
Qaraḍāwī’s worldview contains many antisemitic elements. Some are imported from
Europe, such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion; the idea that the Jews killed Jesus, who is
regarded as a prophet of Islam; and the demonic descriptions of the Jews as servants of Satan.
In addition, Jews are accused of ruling the Communist East and the Capitalist West, led by the
United States, and that the Jews control America. All of the above represent Western antisemitism that has become integrated naturally into authentic Islamic anti-Jewish attitudes. The
latter appear in commentaries of the Qurʿān and the traditions of the Ḥadīth that emphasize
Jewish hatred toward the believers of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad whom they
poisoned. These antisemitic motifs are accompanied by blatant anti-Zionism and anticolonialism that was influenced by the struggles against colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s,
when Qaraḍāwī was a young man. This ideology regards the Jews as foreigners, invaders and
occupiers. Jews are foreign, “Europeans” and not “Semites.” They do not belong in the Middle
East at all. Therefore, this type of occupation does not relate only to a part of Palestine but to
the entire country. The purpose of the struggle is the complete cessation of Jewish/Zionist
occupation and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This includes
the right of return to Israel proper and the right of self-definition in all of the land that was
stolen. Qaraḍāwī’s discourse about rights glosses over statements that actually mean the
destruction of Israel by the massive slaughter of its Jewish inhabitants until the fulfillment of
his vision. He presents and proves that the anti-Zionist ideas that developed in the Arab and
Muslim world after the establishment of the State of Israel have morphed into anti-semitism –
a unique Islamic version of well-known Jew-hatred. Qaraḍāwī’s anti-Jewish vision will not
disappear and has become increasingly popular in all the Islamic groups, including ISIS
(Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Shām), and among other Islamic groups in the West. What will be
the next stage of the long battle between Judaism and Islam? Qaraḍāwī has the answers.

Notes

1 Itamar Rabinovich, “Antisemitism in the Muslim and Arab World,” in: Yehuda Bauer (ed.), Present-Day Antisemitism
(Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 1988), pp. 256–257.
2 Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, pp. 91–92; Matthias Küntzel, Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism,
Nazism, and the Roots of 9/11 (New York: Telos Press, 2007), p. 25.
3 Itamar Rabinovich, “Antisemitism in the Muslim and Arab World,” pp. 257–258.
4 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Dars al-Nakba al-Thāniya. As Qaraḍāwī wrote in his introduction, this work was completed in November
1968, and since then has been published in many editions.
5 Ahmad ʾAli, “Al-Qaraḍāwī Mundh Majii ila Qatar lam uayid hukman ẓaliman,” Qaraḍāwi Website, 24 December 2013,
www.Qaraḍāwi.net/news/7064-2013-12-23-11-11-47.html.
6 Krämer, “Drawing Boundaries: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on Apostasy,” p. 214.
7 Shlomo Avineri, “Antisemitism as a Political Tool,” in: Bauer (ed.), Present-Day Antisemitism (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon
International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 1988), pp. 33–34, 40–41.
8 Saleh, History of Palestine: A Methodical Study of the Palestinian Struggle, pp. 48–49.
9 Baroudi, “Sheikh Yūsuf Qaraḍāwī on International Relations: The Discourse of a Leading Islamist Scholar (1926–),” pp.
10–11.
10 In 15 September 2015 it became an illegal organization in Israel.
11 The rate of Arabs who voted in the Knesset elections in 2009 and 2013 is slightly over 50 percent. See: Jacky Houri, “Polls
in the Arab Sector: The Rate of Voting Is around 50 Percent,” Haaretz, 20 January 2013 (Hebrew).
12 Qurʿan, vol. 9, p. 11.
13 Dr. ʾIṣām Al-ʾAbd Zuhd, “Al-Jihād fi fikr al-imām al-Qaraḍāwī,” p. 155.
14 “Bayān tawḍīḥī ḥawla raʿy al-ʾallāma al-Qaraḍāwī fi-l-ʾamaliyyāt al-istishhādiyya,” Al-Qaraḍāwi Website, 27 July 2015,
http://Qaraḍāwi.net/new/takareer/8086-201507-27-13-42-39; “Sheikh al-Qaradawi: The Palestinians Do Not Need Suicide
Attacks as They

Have Missiles,” MEMRI Website, 29

July

2015, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal/pl?

lang=he&ID=875141_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=3931.
15 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmī, pp. 61–19.
16 Patterson, Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins, p. 81; Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession, pp. 809–810.
17 “Yusuf al Qaradawi Praises Hitler and the Holocaust,” YouTube, 19 November 2009, www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VcB_DZ4YQYQ, viewed on 11 May 2017.
18

“ʾUlamāʿ

Yugharridūn:

Ḥarq

al-Raḍīʾ

al-Filasṭīnī,

Taḥrīḍ

ʾAlā

al-Ibāda,”

http://alkhaleejonline.net/#!/articles/1438354553174470900/, viewed on 30 May 2017.
19 Wistrich, “Anti-Zionism as an Expression of Antisemitism in Recent Years,” pp. 79–187.
20 Sivan, Arab Political Myths, pp. 15–52 (Hebrew).

Al-Khaleej,

31

July

2015,

21 Al-Qaraḍāwī, “Waṣf Ḥamās bil-ʿirhāb muṣība wa-taghyīr lil-waʾy.”
22 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, pp. 1078–1080.
23 Sayyid Quṭb, “Ḥarb al-ʾIṣābāt,” Al-Daʾwa, 20 November 1951, cited by: Shaul Bartal, The Fedayeen Emerge: The PalestineIsrael Conflict, 1949–1956 (Bloomington: Author House, 2011), p. 72.
24 See: Official Facebook Page of Imam Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, 13 August 2015.
25 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Fatāwā Muʾāṣira, vol. 3, pp. 479–481.

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Interview
Interview with Khālid Abu ʾArafa, Minister for Jerusalem Affairs in the first Hamas
government in 2006, 1 February 2012.

Newspapers
Al-Ahram al-Arabi (Cairo, Egypt).
Al-Hayat – (London, United Kingdom).
Al-Qassamiyun, Hamas periodical published (Gaza).
Al-Quds (Jerusalem, Israel).
Al-Raya Newspaper (Doha, Qatar).
Al-Sharaʿa.
Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London, United Kingdom).
Al-Watan (Doha, Qatar).
Filastin al-Muslima, Hamas bulletin (London, United Kingdom).
Haaretz (Tel-Aviv, Israel).
The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, Israel).
Maʿariv (Tel-Aviv, Israel).
Sawt al-Haqq wal-Hurriya (Umm al-Fahm, Israel).
Tishrin (Damascus, Syria).
The Washington Post (Washington, USA).

Internet sites

Al-Aqsa Channel (Gaza) – http://aqsatv.ps/
Al-Ikhwanwiki site – www.ikhwanwiki.com/.
Al-Jazeera – www.aljazeera.net/portal.
Al-Qaraḍāwī website – http://qaradawi.net/new/Home/page.
Al-Sharq – http://elsharq.tv.
Anti-Defamation League – www.adl.org/?referrer=www.google.co.il/.
Ben–Yehuda Project – http://benyehuda.org/.
Center for the Legacy of the Intelligence Community (Malam) – www.terrorisminfo.org.il/en/index.aspx.
Filasṭīniyyu 48 Website – www.pls48.net/.
Haaretz – www.haaretz.com/.
International al-Quds Institute Facebook – www.facebook.com/Qii.media?pnref=story.
International Union of Islamic Scholars (IUMS) – http://iumsonline.org.
Islamicsity.com site – www.islamicity.com/mosque/SURAI.HTM.
Islamonline.net – http://islamonline.net/.
Israel Channel Two News – www.mako.co.il/mako-vod-live-tv/VOD-efacf0702f3fd31006.htm.
Israeli General Security Agency (Shaba”k) –
www.shabak.gov.il/english/Pages/homepage.aspx.
Israel Ministry of Defense – www.mod.gov.il/Defence-andSecurity/Fighting_terrorism/Pages/default.aspx.
Katāib Izz al-Din al-Qassam website – www.alqassam.ps/arabic/.
Madinat Al-Quds Website – www.alquds-online.org/index.php.
MEMRI (The Middle East Media Research Institute) Website – www.memri.org/.
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) – www.pcpsr.org/en.
The Palestinian Information Center (Al-Markaz al-Filastini lil-Iʾlām) [Hamas] –
www.palinfo.com/.
Palestinian Media Watch – www.palwatch.org/.
Radio Yerushalayim Website – www.jerusalemnet.co.il/.
Shabakat Filastin Lil-Ḥiwār (Hamas Facebook and Website) – www.facebook.com/paldf,
www.paldf.net/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=27.
Walla! News [Israeli site] – www.walla.co.il/.
Waqf al-Ummah Facebook page – www.facebook.com/video.php?
v=633170103434966&set=vb.622390311179612&type=2&theater.
Yad va-Shem website – www.yadvashem.org/.
Yale Law School, The Avalon Project – http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
Ynet News – www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3083,00.html.

Index

Aaron 76
Abbas, Mahmoud (Abu Mazen) 136–137n141, 148–155, 157, 159, 160, 176n113
Abdu, Muhammad 89, 94
al-ʾAbd Zuhd, ʾIsām 140–146, 172n23
Abraham 12–13, 58–65, 66, 69, 82, 83, 85, 182–183, 196; as Abram 60; as Ḥanīf 59, 60, 64
Abu Khdeir, Muhammad 162
Abū Shaʾr, Taleb Hammad (Ṭālib Ḥammād) 140
Abu Zuhri, Sāmi 149–150
acts of (self-)sacrifice 8, 103–109, 117, 118, 129, 141, 144, 146; see also suicide bombings/attacks
Adam 82, 187, 197
Affān, Uthmān Ibn 57, 80
al-Afghānī, Jamāl al-Dīn 89, 94
Afghanistan 109, 118–120, 162
Africa 81
Al-Aqsa and Al-Quds Radio 165
Al-Aqsa Channel 18
Al-Aqsa Intifada 33
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 53, 208
Al-Aqsa Mosque 11–12, 14, 15, 17, 22, 23n17, 23n38, 26, 27, 33, 36, 38, 45, 52–56, 66, 70n26, 81, 85, 87, 91, 92, 113, 123–128,
138n169, 139, 144–146, 148, 151–158, 162–163, 165, 169, 170, 188, 190; “International Al-Aqsa Institute” 55; Judaization
of 124–125
Al-Arabiya Television Network 118
Al-Azhar University 7, 12, 16, 26, 29, 113, 151–152, 157, 159, 188
ʾAli, Yūsuf 4
Al Jazeera network 1, 12, 37, 45, 47n55, 53, 101, 109, 119, 120, 124, 126, 129, 137n160, 166, 188, 189, 190, 192
Allāh 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42, 47n32, 52, 53, 56–60, 62–64, 65, 66, 67, 75, 78, 80, 81, 83,
86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107–109, 112, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 129, 132n33, 146, 147, 163, 166, 167,
169, 171, 189, 194, 206, 207; see also God
‘Alliance’ 87, 191
Al-Nuqrashī 10
Al-Qaeda 103, 117–119, 194, 205
Amalekites 64

America see United States
Americans 73, 76, 109, 117, 119, 162, 179
anti-Israel bias 157, 180, 189, 194–195
anti-Israelism 205
anti-Jewish 41, 163, 191, 196, 197, 205, 209
anti-semitism 3, 40, 42, 53, 82, 87, 95, 98n78, 141, 154, 162, 165, 179–193, 195–198, 204–206, 209; cultural 180, 190–192;
economic 180, 192–193; ideological 180, 183–186; “new” 180, 186, 189, 195, 197, 198; political 180, 181–183; religious 180,
187–190
anti-Zionism 42, 179, 197–198, 205, 209
anti-Zionist 188, 190, 196, 197, 201n50, 209
Apocalypse 123
apocalyptic Islamic traditions 53
Arab countries/nations 8, 30–32, 34, 36, 89, 93, 102, 110, 113, 143–145, 149, 151, 153, 155, 159–160, 164–165, 167–168,
194–195, 204, 205, 207, 208; pogroms in 195
Arab Higher Committee (Al-Lajna al-ʾArabiyya al-ʾUlyā) 34
Arabian Peninsula 42, 179
Arabism 92, 207
Arab-Israel conflict 200n42
Arab Joint List 139
Arab League 145, 159, 160
Arab nationalism 35
Arab Revolt 34, 37
Arabs 61, 62, 64, 66, 73, 75, 81, 88–89, 92–93, 118, 121, 125–128, 154, 186, 190, 192, 196, 197, 204, 205; as descendants of
Canaanites 61, 64; as descendants of Ishmael 59, 64, 82; as heirs of Abraham 63, 64; as Semites 82
Arab Spring 50n121, 102, 149, 151, 159, 160, 205
Arab Triangle 126
Arab world 2, 35–36, 45, 73, 81, 87, 88, 92–94, 102, 124, 142, 152, 159–160, 164, 171, 181, 209
Arafat, Yasser 103
Argentinians 76
armistice agreements 68, 69, 72n88
al-Arouri, Saleh (Ṣāliḥ al-ʾᾹrūrī) 139, 163, 176n125
al-ʾᾹrūrī, Ṣalāḥ 208
al-Asad, Bashar 102
Asia 82
atheists 42, 180
Axis countries 35
ʾAyyāsh, Yaḥyā 142, 146–147, 186
al-Azīz, Umar ibn Abd 25

Badr, Battle of 91, 113
Baghdad 35, 58, 153, 154
Balfour, Arthur 1
Balfour Declaration 8, 26, 29, 59, 79, 81, 84, 141, 181
Balkans, the 35–36
al-Banna, Ḥasan 7–11, 13, 14, 21, 25–34, 40, 45, 99, 105, 109, 122, 133n56, 135–136n126, 151, 170, 171, 196, 204, 207;
assassination of 25, 34, 44; and way of Wasaṭiyya 8
Banū Hāshim 192
Banū Naḍīr tribe 45, 58, 80
Banū Qainuqāʾ tribe 45, 58, 80
Banū Quraish 192
Banū Quraiẓa tribe 45, 57, 58, 80, 106
Barak, Ehud 86
Baroudi, Sami 3
al-Batānūni, Abd al-Wahhāb 9–10
Bathsheba 67
Baṭṭūta, Ibn 12
Bāz, Ibn 2
Begin, Menachem 75, 78, 95n8, 186; memoirs of 75; Nobel Peace Prize 75, 95n8
Beirut 3, 54–55, 58
Belgium 165
Ben Gurion, David 59, 78–79
Berlin 35–36, 165; Radio Berlin 45
Bible 59–60, 62, 64, 67, 74, 77, 81, 84, 185; Hebrew 71n49, 74, 83, 84, 94
Bilhah 59
bin Laden, Osama 118–120
Bkeirāt, Nājeḥ 130
blood libels 58; Antioch 58; Beirut 58; Damascus 58; Hama 58
B’nei Brith 87, 191
Bolsheviks 84
Britain 30, 75, 79, 81, 84, 118, 181; British Foreign Office 101
British Mandate 4, 30, 34, 45; see also Palestine
Buber, Martin 78
Bush, George 84
Bush, George W. 186
Caesarea 58

caliph 111, 119, 179, 180
Caliphate 81, 92, 94
Camp David peace agreement 87
Canaan 64
Canaanite Arabs 182–183
Canaanites 61, 64–66
Canada 167
capitalism 191, 196
Carter, Jimmy 84, 185
Catholic Church 85
Catholics 86
Caucuses, the 35
Cave of the Patriarchs (Machpelah) 55, 65, 75, 125, 128, 144, 148, 185
Ceylon 35
Charity Coalition (Iʿtilāf al-Khair) 6n26, 35, 49n88, 100, 110, 129, 130n6, 144, 208
Charlie Hebdo 194
Charter or Constitution of Medina see Pact of the Ummah
Chechnya 109
Children of Ishmael 59
Children of Israel 52–53, 56–57, 59, 61–62, 64–67, 69, 71n32, 74–76, 78–79, 82, 83, 87, 141, 182–184, 189–190, 196, 198
China 35
Chosen People: Christians as 184; Jews as 59, 62, 75, 77–78, 84–85, 183–184; Muslims as 18, 184
Christian countries 31, 58, 80, 167
Christianity 3, 19, 37, 52, 60, 65, 72n58, 182, 184, 190; judaization of 84; pacifism of 3; Protestant 85
Christians 57, 60, 83, 85, 108, 109, 112, 125, 162, 180, 185, 186, 187–188, 189, 193, 198; “good” vs. “negative” 188; see also
Chosen People; People of the Book
Church of the Holy Sepulcher 15
Clinton, Bill 84
Cold War 121
colonialism 8, 27, 79, 81, 88, 103, 121, 125, 141, 179, 183, 190, 207, 209; anti- 209; British 36–37, 88, 207; cultural 121;
European 122, 207; French 88, 207; Italian 88; Zionism as 88
Communism 42, 79, 82, 84, 85, 191, 196
Communists 180
Criminal Case 04\2637, the State of Israel vs. Raʿed Salāḥ Maḥājnah, et al. 6n26
Crusaders 54, 68, 81, 95, 97n71, 156, 180, 207
Crusades 42, 51, 54, 67, 85, 207
Daḥlān, Muhammad 158

Dār al-Islām (House of Islam) 12, 51, 61, 103, 119, 171, 195
Darwīsh, ʾAbdallah Nimer 113, 123, 126
David 59, 66–67, 71n49
Dawabshe, ʾAli 170, 186; murder of 170, 186, 198
Dayan, Moshe 15, 79
Day of Atonement 52
deicide 179
Deif, Muhammad 176n114
Deir Yassin massacre 75, 185–186, 207
democracy 89, 101, 131n16, 187, 204
Depression 39
Descartes, René 75
Deuteronomy (book of) 61
al-Dīn, Nūr 86, 97n71
al-Dīn, Ṣalāḥ see Saladin
Doha 55, 139, 152, 160, 188–190
Doha Agreement 160, 176n113
Dome of the Rock 15
Duma 170, 186, 198, 207
Egypt 4, 7, 9, 11, 19, 20–21, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39–41, 43, 45, 47n42, 47n55, 58, 110, 113, 128; Cairo 10, 11, 16, 23n26, 29, 30, 75, 76,
81, 87, 93, 101, 102, 138n164, 148–151, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 166, 168, 171, 183, 195, 196, 204; government 166, 208;
Mufti of 113, 151, 155–157, 171; Mushāʾ 39; peace treaty/agreement with Israel 75, 87, 95n8, 156, 159–160; Philadelphi
Route (tunnels) 149–150; Ṣaft al-Turab 7; steel wall on Gaza border 148–151; “Young Egypt” (Miṣr al-Fatāt) 195; see also
Rafah Border Crossing
Elijah (prophet) 77
England 27, 119; London 118, 119, 165
Euphrates River 45, 88
Europe 2, 44, 58, 67, 87, 100, 119, 129–130, 165, 166, 171, 191, 195, 197, 198, 207–209; Eastern 67, 84
European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 2, 35
Eve 187
Exodus (book of) 75
Falash Mura (Ethiopian) 76
Faraj, Muḥammad Abd al-Salām 86, 97n68
Farouk I, King 31–32, 39, 47n42
Fatah 120, 125, 139, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 158, 160, 170
Fatah movement 101

Fayyad, Salam (Salām Fayyāḍ) 150, 160
Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt 2
Firestone, Reuven 189
First Intifada 102–103, 162, 179
First Temple 193
Fitna 44, 57, 80, 183
France 119, 205
Franklin, Benjamin 191–192, 201n75
Freemasons 82, 84, 87–88, 191
Freud, Sigmund 181, 184
Gandhi, Mahatma 78
Garaudy, Roger 193
Gaza 2, 18–19, 22, 26, 32, 54, 100, 102, 103, 108, 110, 116, 121, 126–128, 130, 140, 149–150, 158–163; Strip 140, 148, 150, 158,
160, 161, 163–170, 204, 206; blockade of 166; Islamic University of 140, 143, 148; see also Gaza Strip; Gaza wars
Gaza Strip 4, 18–19, 100–101, 104, 110, 126, 136–137n141, 170, 208
Gaza wars 160, 161, 163, 164, 171; first 143
“General Central Committee for Aid to Palestine” (Al-Lajna al-Markaziyya al-ʾᾹmma li-Musāʾadat Filasṭīn) 29
Genesis (book of) 60
Geneva Initiative 185
genocide 129, 142, 180–181, 200n42
Gentiles 77, 198
Germany 112, 181, 196, 204; Nazi 35, 142, 206; Nazism in 204; see also Berlin
Ghannouchi, Rached 176n125
al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥamīd 25
al-Ghazali, Muhammad 42, 170
al-Ghāzi, Nāsiḥ Ibn ʾAbd al-Raḥmān 147
Ghazzāwī, Khalīl 6n26, 49n88, 129
God 43, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 75–78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 85, 91, 100, 118, 141, 143, 144, 147, 153, 154, 164–165,
169, 183–184, 185, 187, 189, 192, 193, 197, 199; of humanity 84; of Israel 84; the One 67, 76, 184
Golden Calf, story of 75–76, 80, 90
Goldstone Report 155
Goldziher, Ignaz 81, 83
Gordon, A.D. 78
Gospel 60
Granada 58
Great Al-Umari Mosque 18, 19, 170
Greater Syria 11

Gulf States 100, 205
Gumʾa, ʾAli 155, 156, 157, 171
Haaretz 126, 157
al-Habbash, Mahmoud (Maḥmūd al-Habbāsh) 151–154
Ḥadīth 7, 11, 20, 33, 52–54, 106, 124, 151, 153, 174n81, 187–188, 193, 209
Haganah 95n8, 111, 207
Hagar 58–59, 62
Haifa 13, 35
Ḥajj 47n32, 115
Hamas 2, 3, 4, 6n26, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 18–20, 23n17, 33–34, 39, 49n88, 53, 55, 56, 70n9, 71n33, 81, 88, 96n53, 97n58, 99–104,
106–111, 113–116, 118, 120–125, 127–129, 130n6, 131n12, 134n90, 135n98, 136–137n141, 139–151, 155–164, 166–171,
176n125, 186, 198, 206–208; Daʾwa activism of 99–100, 129, 144; General Cultural Committee of 145; Political Bureau 7;
as terrorist organization 165–166; see also Hamas Charter; Hamas Covenant; Hamas government
Hamas Charter 185, 206
Hamas Covenant 82, 87, 96n48, 97n58, 99, 135–136n126, 143, 200n34
Hamas government 2, 7, 22, 70n9, 100, 110, 140, 149, 159–160, 166, 170
al-Ḥamīd, (Ottoman Sultan) Abd 81, 92
Hamoud, Yasin (Yāsīn Ḥammūd) 125–126, 137n160
Haniyeh (Haniyya), Ismail 7, 18, 22, 100, 110, 127, 130, 136–137n141, 139, 140, 159, 160, 170
Hapoel Hamizrachi movement 78
Ḥawwā, Saʾīd 109, 145
Hebron 12–15, 17, 55, 65, 75, 125, 128, 144, 148, 164, 166, 185
Hejaz 56
Herzl, Theodor 81, 84, 92
Hezbollah 88, 101–102
Hijaz, the 35, 45
Hitler, Adolf 35–37, 39–40, 42, 129, 193–194, 204, 206; Mein Kampf 40, 204
Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī (Party of the Islamic Liberation) 13–14, 16
Hollywood 192
Holocaust 16, 24n45, 90, 112, 180, 184–185, 193, 195, 199, 207; reparations for 90, 112; see also Holocaust denial
Holocaust denial 180, 184, 193–194
Holy Land 53, 57, 76, 80, 85
Holy Trinity 83
Horns of Hettin, Battle of 97n71
House of Faith (Dār al-Ῑmān) 154
al-Huḍaibī, Ḥasan 11, 40, 43, 44, 204
hunger strikes 114–115, 134n90

Husein, Muhammad Ahmad 154, 156, 157
al-Ḥuseini, Hajj Muḥammad Amīn 8, 27, 28, 29, 34–39, 45, 57, 65, 142, 191, 196, 204, 207, 208; and Hitler 35
Ibn Abu Talib, Caliph Ali 180
ibn Affan, (Caliph) Uthman 179, 206
Ibn Bāz, ʾAbd al-ʾAziz (Ibn Baz) 112, 129
“immunity of the Prophets, the” 67
imperialism 79, 204
India 35
Indonesia 35
International Congress for Palestine 29
International Jerusalem Institute (Muʿasasat al-Quds al-Dawliyya) 3, 54–56, 110, 125, 129, 137n160, 145, 163, 173n32, 208;
Fifth Conference of 145
International Union of Muslim Scholars (Ittiḥād ʾUlamāʿ al-Muslimīn) (IUMS) 2, 20, 38, 45, 54–55, 102, 118, 125, 128, 130,
139–140, 148, 149, 152, 158, 162, 163, 164–165, 166, 168, 169, 171, 176n125, 205, 208; Fourth Conference 176n125; General
Conference 162, 163, 168, 169, 170
Intifada 102–103, 143, 164–165, 170; see also Al-Aqsa Intifada; First Intifada; Second Intifada; third intifada
Iraq 29, 30, 35, 45, 109, 118–120, 162–163, 183; northern 97n71
Irgun 75, 95n8
Isaac 58–59, 62–65, 69, 82, 181, 196; Aqedah (the binding of) 62, 72n58
Isḥāq, Muḥammad Ibn 58
Ishmael 13, 58–65, 69, 82, 142, 181, 183, 196
ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Shām) 162, 166, 209
Islam 10, 22, 26–29, 31–32, 36, 37, 40–46, 51–52, 57, 58, 60, 65, 67, 69, 72n58, 74, 77, 79, 81–88, 90–95, 98n106, 99, 101–102,
104, 106, 109, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 122, 126, 128, 138n164, 140–143, 147, 150, 151, 162, 167, 168, 171, 177–178n149,
180, 182, 183, 184, 187–189, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198; women in 140, 193, 204, 206, 208–209; see also Shiite Islam;
Sunni Islam
Islamic banking 2
Islamic caliphate 14, 38, 82, 195
Islamic countries 13, 35–36, 58, 80, 83, 96–97n53, 119, 141, 164, 167
Islamic Jihād 53, 118, 120, 129, 130, 206, 208
Islamic Jihād–Bait al-Maqdis 14
Islamic Jihad in Egypt 97n68
Islamic Jihad in Palestine (Al-Jihād al-Islamī fī Filasṭīn) 122
Islamic Jihad Movement 18, 102, 186, 208
Islamic law 108, 116, 120, 123, 139, 140, 143, 147, 149, 156, 161–162, 164–165, 167, 167, 170, 174n81, 194, 204, 205, 206
Islamic Liberation Party (Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī) 13–14, 16, 54, 110, 122, 192
Islamic Modernism 89, 94

Islamic Movement 3, 6n26, 16, 53, 100, 102, 122–124, 126–130, 140, 144, 148, 157, 170, 205; see also Islamic Movement
in(side) Israel
Islamic Movement in(side) Israel 16, 53, 55, 100, 103, 113, 122–123, 126, 128–130, 139, 145, 156, 162, 169, 171, 176n125, 205,
207, 208; Northern Branch 6n26, 16, 55, 113, 123, 139, 169, 205
Islamic party, Al-Nahḍa (Revival) 176n125
Islamic Resistance Movement 103, 207
Islamic revival 2, 81, 102–103, 126, 130
Islamic revolution 18, 43, 148
Islamic solidarity 166–167
Islamic solution 79
Islamic world 28, 32, 80–82, 86, 164, 181
Islamic World Congress for Jerusalem 35
Islamism 207
Islamization: of Jerusalem 208; of prophets 52, 63
Israel, Kingdom of 84
Israel, State of 2–4, 7, 9, 13, 17–21, 30, 32–33, 38–39, 41–42, 44–45, 51, 53–56, 66–69, 73, 79, 81–82, 84–95, 95n8, 99–103,
105–106, 108–109, 112–113, 116, 119, 121–123, 125–126, 128–130, 135n98, 141–142, 144–152, 154–171, 172n23, 176n113,
179–181, 183, 185–186, 188–190, 192–197, 199, 201n50, 204–209; Arab citizens of 113, 126, 130, 138n169, 145, 157,
210n11; democracy in 89; General Security Services (the Shabak) 100; government 164, 185, 186; legitimacy of 113, 123,
155, 158, 180–183, 195, 197–198, 205, 208; Minister of Defense 110; military service in 107; missile attacks on 33, 104–105,
141, 164, 167, 171, 194, 206, 208; as Mujtamaʾ ʾAskarī (“military society”) 33, 75, 79, 104, 118, 120, 144, 194, 206; nuclear
weapons of 88, 91, 105, 109, 141, 192; peace treaty/agreement with Egypt 75, 87, 95n8, 156, 159–160; Security Forces 124,
126; suicide attacks on 105–109; as terrorist state 111, 119, 134n73, 165, 183, 185, 207; as Zionist entity 208; see also Israel
Defense Forces (IDF); Knesset; racism
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 4, 158, 166, 171, 184, 190
Israeli–Palestinian conflict 3, 56, 58, 69, 169
Israelis 57, 65, 69, 73, 75, 86, 103–104, 106–109, 116, 119, 136–137n141, 142, 146, 154, 182, 185, 189, 194, 198, 206; as terrorists
34, 55, 195
Israelites 66
Israel Occupation 55, 113, 125
Israel-Palestine conflict see Israeli– Palestinian conflict
Istanbul 101, 140, 162, 176n125
Italy: Fascist 35
ʾIzz a-Dīn al-Qassām Brigade 12, 37, 71n31, 96n48, 100, 136n133, 139, 146, 147, 149–150, 158, 160, 161; Al-Qasāmiyyūn
magazine 37
Jacob 59, 62, 65, 82, 181, 196
Jaffa 37

Jāhiliyya 40, 43–44
Jebusite Arabs 182
Jebusites 64
Jenin 15, 17
Jerusalem 3, 4, 11, 13, 15, 20, 28, 33, 35, 38, 45, 51–55, 66, 67, 70n9, 71n31, 73, 75, 85, 86, 87, 96n53, 97n71, 100, 103, 110, 120,
124–129, 134n84, 164–165, 170, 171, 208; British occupation of 153, 154, 156; as capital of Israel 89; Crusader occupation
of 152, 153, 154, 156; East 3, 6n26, 15, 49n88, 124, 140, 144–145, 148, 150–157, 161–163, 168–169; Gilo neighborhood of
71n31; Islamization of 208; Israeli occupation of 154; Jordanian 4; Judaization of 3, 66, 123–125, 145, 148, 150, 152, 153,
156, 158, 162, 163, 168, 188; Mufti of 34–39, 45, 55, 58, 65, 154, 157; Old City of 4, 125; Sheikh Jarrāḥ neighborhood 55;
Shoʾafat neighborhood 164; West 15, 157; see also Al-Aqsa Mosque; Temple Mount; Western Wall
Jerusalem Conference 152
Jerusalem Fund (Ṣundūq al-Quds) 28, 38
Jesus (Christ) 19, 83, 85, 179–180, 190–191, 206, 209
Jew-hatred 58, 88, 146, 205, 207–209
Jewish Feast of Tabernacles (Sukkoth) 149; demonstrations in Jerusalem during 144, 148
Jewish people 3, 59–60, 76, 84, 129, 171, 190, 205
Jewish-Muslim relations 77, 79–81
Jews 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 22, 27, 28, 30–31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40–42, 44–46, 51–61, 62–63, 65, 67–68, 69, 74, 76, 78–88, 92, 95,
95n4, 96–97n53, 97n58, 98n106, 99, 105–106, 108, 109, 112, 117, 123–126, 128, 129, 138n164, 140–145, 152, 161–163, 165,
167–168, 170–171, 177–178n149, 179–199, 200n34, 204, 206–209; Ashkenazi 89; as “children of death” 116; as chosen race
77–78; as Christ-killers 85, 179–180, 191, 198, 206, 209; as descendants of Isaac 59, 62–63, 64, 69, 181, 196; of the Diaspora
79; Ethiopian 89; “good” vs. “negative” 188; hardheartedness of 74–75; as heirs of Abraham 64, 66; of Khaibar 45, 69; of
Medina 52, 56–58, 60, 63, 65, 69, 77, 80, 179; as mixture 142; as people of Israel 76, 78, 84, 183–185; pogroms against 29,
35–36, 48n65, 58, 195; religious 89; Russian 89; secular 89, 90; Sephardic 89; as slayers of prophets 77, 86; stubbornness of
75–76; see also Children of Israel; Chosen People; racism; People of the Book; world Jewry
Jihad 2, 3, 8–10, 12, 14, 18, 19, 22, 23n38, 27, 28, 31–33, 39, 43–44, 46, 55, 56, 67–69, 86, 99–101, 103, 105, 107–109, 110–112,
114, 118–120, 122, 140–141, 143–145, 147, 156, 157, 161–163, 165, 172n23, 173n32, 178n155, 181, 188, 193, 196, 205, 207;
and children’s participation 109; defensive 161, 197; in offensive war 116; progressive 162; in war of no choice 116; and
women’s participation 107–109
jizya 44, 83, 187
John Paul II, Pope 85
Jordan 11–12, 23n38, 30, 76, 87, 156, 157, 161; Amman 12, 15, 16, 26; Hashemite Kingdom of 4
Jordan River 4, 79
Joshua 66, 75
Judaism 3, 19, 32, 41, 42, 52, 57, 58, 59, 60, 65, 69, 72n58, 74, 76, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 91, 94, 95n4, 106, 142, 167, 171, 179, 182,
183–184, 189, 190, 194, 195, 196, 197, 206, 209; Messianic 85
Judaization: of Al-Aqsa Mosque 124–125; of Arab mind 86–87; of Catholics 86; of Christianity 84, 85, 191; of Jerusalem
123–125, 145, 148, 150, 152, 153, 156, 158, 162, 163, 168, 188; of Palestine 145; of Protestants 86; of world 84–86

Judea, Biblical 4
Kaʾba 59, 60, 124, 154, 156, 192
Kashmir 103
Khaibar 72n88, 206; Battle of 80
Khatib, Kamal (Kamāl Khatīb) 113, 130, 136n132, 162, 176n125
al-Khaṭṭāb, Umar ibn 15, 44, 53, 57, 80, 83, 161, 179, 206
Khazars 65, 67, 69, 82, 142, 182
Khdeir, Muhammad Abu 164; murder of 164
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 68
Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah 20
King, Martin Luther 179
King David Hotel: explosion at 75
Klatzkin, Jacob 79
Knesset 84, 113, 122–123, 130, 139, 205, 210n11
Kook, Rabbi 76–77
Kuwait 183
Labor party 68
Landau, Shmuel Haim 78
Land of Al-Shām (Greater Syria) 161
land of Islam 27, 51, 67, 142–143
Land of Israel 59, 61, 65–66, 76–78, 84, 88, 122, 142, 161, 163, 181, 185, 199
Lau, Yisrael Meir 113, 188
Leah 59
Lebanon 11, 17, 28–30, 35, 75–76, 88, 121, 161–163, 183, 185; see also Second Lebanon War
Libya 35, 36, 110; Tripoli 36
Likud party 68, 95n8
Madrid Conference 91
Maghreb, the 36
Mahajneh, Raed Salah (Rāʿed Ṣalāḥ Maḥājna) 3, 6n26, 16, 55, 70n26, 100, 103, 113, 122–130, 136n132, 136n133, 137n160,
148, 139, 144, 145, 148, 150, 156, 157, 162, 170, 174n63, 205, 208; arrest of 128
Malikite school of law 27
Mashal, Khaled 4, 139, 142, 166, 186
Maṣlaḥa 68
al-Masri, Ibn Nujaim 105
Mecca 12, 16, 28, 40, 51–52, 57, 59, 62, 72n88, 80, 110, 113, 115, 124, 154, 155, 156

Medina (al-Medina) 12, 16, 36, 42, 45, 52, 54, 56–58, 60, 77, 80, 110, 124, 206; Jews of 52, 56–58, 60, 63, 65, 69, 77, 80, 179
Mediterranean Sea 4
Meir, Golda 90
Merchant of Venice, The 191
Messiah 59, 76, 85
Middle Ages 180
Middle East 37, 81, 94, 119, 121, 181, 191, 204, 205, 209
Morocco 12, 35, 159; Tangiers 12
Morsi, Muhammad 101, 183
Moses 14, 19, 21, 52, 57, 61, 65–67, 74, 75–77, 79, 80, 82–83, 91
Mosque of Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb 15
Mossad 183
Mt. Sinai 75
Mubarak, Hosni 20, 101, 102, 148–151
Muḍṭarrūn 192–193
Mujāhidūn 27, 29–31, 43, 144, 147
Mursi, Muhammad 151, 159, 166
Mūsa, Khaḍar ʾAdnān 114
Muslim Brotherhood 3, 7, 9–16, 19, 20, 21, 25–33, 35, 39–41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47n55, 53, 54, 64, 87, 89, 95n4, 99, 101, 103, 105,
109, 122, 126, 129–130, 135–136n126, 136n137, 138n164, 140, 145, 148, 159, 162, 165–166, 170–171, 178n155, 192, 195–,
196, 204, 207; Egyptian 40–41, 44, 46, 47n55, 101, 104, 109; Supreme Guide of 10, 11, 16, 25, 29, 40, 43, 102, 204; as
terrorist organization 165–166; Third Congress of 28; see also Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 19, 28, 41, 46, 101, 104, 150–151, 159
Muslim countries/nations 12, 20, 32, 86, 93, 110, 128, 141, 143, 149, 168
Muslims 69, 73, 77, 78, 79, 81, 83–89, 91–93, 100, 104, 105, 109, 110, 113, 115–116, 118–122, 124–126, 128–130, 139–141,
143–147, 151–152, 154, 156, 162–168, 171, 180, 181, 183–184, 187–190, 192–194, 196–197, 204–208; as descendants of
Ishmael 69, 142, 181, 183, 196; desire to die for beliefs 105–106; marrying Christians or Jews 189–190; see also Chosen
People; Muslim countries/nations; Muslim world; Muslims, killing/massacres of; Shiites/Shiite Muslims; Sunnis/Sunni
Muslims
Muslims, killing/massacres of 75, 185; Cave of the Patriarchs massacre 75, 185; in Crusades 85; Deir Yassin 75, 111, 185–186;
Sabra 75, 185; Shatila 75, 185; village of Qana, Lebanon 75, 185
“Muslims of Europe Conference” 101
Muslim world 32, 35–38, 45, 53–54, 81, 86, 94, 122, 144, 167, 169, 180–181, 192, 209
Nablus 15, 17, 108, 157, 164
Nasrallah, Sheikh Hasan (Ḥasan Naṣrullāh), 101
Nasser, Gamal Abdel 40, 44
Nazis 65, 84, 184–185, 193, 196, 204; concept of race 183–184; see also Germany

Nazism 196, 198, 200n34, 204
‘necessity (Ḍarūra),’ principle of 33, 68, 104–105, 113, 117
Nehemiah 77
neo-Nazi Right 198
Netanyahu, Binyamin 68, 86, 89, 166
Neturei Karta 188, 198, 201n50
New Testament 28, 39, 77, 78
Nigeria 35
Nile River 45, 88, 183
Noah 13, 60, 71n54
North Africa 58, 182
oil weapon 144
Old Testament 78, 84
Operation “Annanei Stav” (Autumn Clouds) 158
Operation “Gishmei Kaitz” (Summer Rain) 158
Operation Cast Lead 143, 158, 161
Operation Pillar of Defense (Amoud Anan) 158–160, 161
Operation Protective Edge 19, 20, 54, 106, 135n98, 160–164, 168, 195, 208
Operation Warm Winter 158
“Organization of Arab Youth” (Munaẓẓamat al-Shabāb al-ʾArabī) 29
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 205
Oslo Accords 4, 125, 129, 143
Oslo II Accords 112
‘other,’ the 94, 181, 187
Ottoman Caliphate 81, 92
Ottoman Empire 81
Pact of the Ummah 77, 80
Palestine 2, 3, 7–14, 17–22, 25–33, 35–39, 51, 53–56, 59, 61–63, 67–69, 73, 76, 78–79, 81, 83–84, 86, 88, 92, 95n8, 103–105,
109–112, 117–121, 123, 125–129, 135–136n126, 139–145, 150, 154–155, 157, 161–162, 164–165, 167, 169, 171, 179, 181,
186, 188–192, 195–197, 199, 205, 207–209; British 4, 95n16; British High Commissioner of 39; Civil War in Mandatory
95n8; English conquest of 81; as “the Land of Prophecies and Blessings” (Arḍ al-Nubuwwāt wal-Barakāt) 53; Mandate 35,
81; Mufti of 8, 27–29, 31, 196; parliament of 145; partition of 29; as the Promised Land 81; see also Palestinian problem
Palestine-Israel conflict see Israeli– Palestinian conflict
Palestine national movement 34
Palestinian Authority (PA) 4, 20, 33, 55, 56, 101, 103, 112, 121, 126–127, 131n12, 144, 149–155, 157–158, 160, 169–170, 171,
205, 208; government 152; Mufti of 127, 157

Palestinian cause 2, 7, 9, 17–19, 21–22, 28–29, 32, 35, 39, 90, 110–111, 140–141, 143–144, 151, 159–160, 188, 190
“Palestinian holocaust” 36
Palestinian-Islamic nationalism 171
Palestinian Legislative Council 169
Palestinian National Covenant 184–185
Palestinian problem (Qaḍiyyat Filasṭīn) 28, 32, 36–38, 44, 45, 68, 129, 163, 164, 169, 181, 185, 194, 204
Palestinians 2, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 21, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 54, 63, 64–66, 69, 83, 85, 88, 90, 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110–114,
116, 118–120, 124–125, 127, 141, 143, 145, 148, 149, 152–156, 158, 159, 161, 163–169, 181–184, 186, 188–189, 193–195,
199, 205–207, 209; as descendants of Canaanites 64–66, 72n62; as freedom fighters 195; prisoners in Israel 113–116;
refugees 15–17, 24n45, 90, 112, 116, 164m, 168; reparations for suffering 90, 112
Palestinian Self-rule Authority 4
Palestinian territories 87
Palestinism 195, 198
Pan-Islamic Congress see World Islamic Congress
Paris 165, 193, 194
Party of the Islamic Liberation see Islamic Liberation Party
Pasha, Glubb 31
peace treaty 32, 77, 87, 95n8, 156; Egypt-Israel 75, 87, 95n8, 156, 159–160
Peel Commission 59
Pentagon 120; Mufti of
People of Israel 183, 184, 185
People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb) 27, 57, 60, 79, 83, 91, 187; Christians as 57, 60, 79, 83, 187, 189; Jews as 57, 60, 79, 83, 91,
116, 187, 189
Peres, Shimon 68, 89
Persia 35
pogrom(s) 29, 35–36, 48n65, 58, 195
Poland 59, 69, 181
politicide 186, 200n42, 208
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 53
problem of Palestine see Palestinian problem
Promised Land 14, 81, 195
Prophet Muhammad, the 12, 13, 18, 25, 33, 36, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 51–52, 54, 56–58, 60–61, 63, 68, 72n88, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86,
91, 102, 103, 106, 112, 114, 123, 124, 145, 146, 153, 154, 156, 170, 179, 180, 187, 188, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 206, 209;
Ascension of 146; Night Journey of 28, 51, 146, 153, 190; as “warrior-prophet” 195
protected people (Ahl al-Dhimma) 83, 181
Protestants 39, 84–86, 191
Protocols of the Elders of Zion 37, 82, 84, 88, 91, 94, 97n58, 190–192, 196–198, 204, 209

Qandīl, Hishām 159
al-Qara Dāghī, ʾAli Muḥy al-Din 20, 164–165, 168
Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf al- 176n125; Aʾdāʿ al-Ḥall al-Islāmi (Enemies of the Islamic Solution) 2, 44, 138n164; Al-Quds Qaḍiyyat kull
Muslim (Jerusalem: The Problem of Every Muslim) 2, 38, 76, 145; anti-semitism of 196–199; arrest of 148; and Charity
Coalition 130n6; Dars al-Nakba al-Thāniya (Lessons about the Second Nakba) 2, 161; and finances 6n26; Fiqh al-Jihād
(Laws of Jihad) 2, 8, 111, 116, 121–122, 134n73, 141, 145, 147, 161; on Gaza 161–164; and Hamas 99–122, 140–148,
158–161, 165–166; and Ḥasan al-Banna 25–34, 45, 133n56, 196, 204, 207; as Islamic law expert 108, 113, 128, 139, 143,
171, 204; and Islamic movement 122–126; on Israel 194–195; on Jerusalem 122–126, 151–158; on the Jews 73–78, 87–92;
on Jihad 161–165; Khuṭab al-Sheikh al-Qaraḍāwī (Sermons of Sheikh al-Qaraḍāwī) 2; as legal authority 7, 111–112, 146,
169, 171; life of 7–21, 195, 208; memoirs of 9, 17, 21, 23n26, 25, 34, 43, 196; Min Hady al-Islām; Fatāwā Muʾāṣira (From
the Guidance of Islam: Contemporary Legal Rulings) 2; and Muḥammad Amīn al-Ḥuseini 34–39, 45, 196, 204, 207; on
Palestine 164–165; as poet 7, 34, 39, 140, 190; and Sayyid Quṭb 36, 39–44, 45–46, 131n24, 196, 204, 207; as “the Sheikh of
Death” 8, 32; as “Sheikh of Palestine” 7; as “Sheikh of the Palestinian Cause” 110; as “the Sheikh of Terror” 32; studies of
1–3, 7; and suicide bombings 33, 103–109, 115, 117, 118, 146, 194, 205–206; visits to Palestine 11–19; on Zionism 78–82;
see also Al-Sharīʾa wal-Ḥayāt (Islamic Law and Life)
al-Qassām, Sheikh ʾIzz al-Dīn 29
Qatar 17, 100, 101, 139, 153, 158, 160, 176n113, 201n50, 208; Emir of 160, 176n113; see also Doha
Qibla 162
Qiyās (“analogy”), principle of 154, 174n81
Al-Quds (Jerusalem) International Institute see International Jerusalem Institute
Al-Quds see International Jerusalem Institute
Quraish tribe 16, 57, 68, 77, 80, 91, 106, 112, 114, 192
Qurʿān 4, 7, 11, 16, 18, 20, 26, 27, 28, 34, 40, 42, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62–64, 65–66, 67, 74–75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 89,
90, 91, 94, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105–106, 108, 112, 120, 122, 124, 132n33, 140, 146, 147, 152, 153, 154, 165, 174n81, 177n132,
178n155, 183–184, 187–189, 193, 196, 198, 206, 209
Quṭb, Sayyid 36, 39–44, 45–46, 79, 82, 131n24, 167, 170, 177–178n149, 196, 204, 207; see also Jāhiliyya; Takfīr
Quṭuz, Saif al-Dīn 86
Rachel 59
racism 180, 183–184; Jewish 77–78, 184, 186; against Jews 180; in Judaism 184; Nazi 184; in State of Israel 88, 183; and
Zionism 88, 163, 180, 199, 200n34, 207, 209
Rafah Border Crossing 149, 168
Ramadan 113, 114, 162, 167, 168
Ramallah 17, 100, 149, 157, 160
Rantisi, Abd al-Aziz (ʾAbd al-ʾAziz al-Rantīsī) 19, 108, 121, 166
al-Rashid, Sheikh Muhammad Abd 120
Reagan, Ronald 84

refugee camps 15–17, 164, 168; see also Palestinians
regional nationalism 181
Reiter, Yitzhaq 2
reparations: for Holocaust 90, 112; for Palestinian refugees 90, 112
River Jordan see Jordan River
Russia 35, 69, 76, 82, 109; Czarist 37
Ṣabrī, ʾIkrima 55, 130, 157
Saʾd, Ibn 58
Sadat, Anwar 95n8, 156; assassination of 97n68; Nobel Prize for Peace 95n8
Saladin 25, 51, 54, 68, 86, 97n71, 144
Salafists 2
Salah, Raed see Mahajneh, Raed Salah (Rāʿed Ṣalāḥ Maḥājna)
Samaria, Biblical 4
Samuel (prophet) 83
Sarah 58–59, 65, 182
Saudi Arabia 88, 100, 112, 187, 208; Jedda Conference 187, 188, 189, 198
Schacht, Joseph 81
Second Intifada 99, 102–103, 108
Second Lebanon War 101–102, 158
Second Temple 193
Semitic people/Semites 82, 142, 183, 196–197, 209
September 11, 2001, terror attacks 117–120, 186, 198
Shahāda 103
shahīd 9, 10, 12, 18, 19, 22, 23n17, 23n21, 44, 56, 58, 100, 103–104, 115, 143, 146, 147
al-Shaikh, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abdallāh 129
Shakespeare, William 191
Shalit, Gilad: kidnapping of 158
Shamir, Yitzhak 90
Sharīʾa law 13, 20–21, 35, 37, 68, 102, 107, 111, 117, 118, 147, 170, 194; courts 119, 154, 156
Al-Sharīʾa wal-Ḥayāt (Islamic Law and Life) program 1, 37, 85, 124–126, 129
al-Sharīf, Kamāl 9
Sharon, Ariel 100, 189
Shaul (king) 83
Shiite Islam 68
Shiites/Shiite Muslims 2, 44, 57, 80, 81, 94, 101–102, 180, 206
Shiite-Sunni relations 102
al-Shiqāqi, Fatḥi 142, 186

Shuhadāʿ 27
Shujaʾiyya 168
Sinai 30, 148–149
Al-Sīsī, Abd Al-Fattāḥ Saʾīd Ḥusein (Abd al-Fattah Al-Sisi) 33, 102, 104, 128, 151, 161, 166, 168
Six-Day War 4, 15, 91, 161
“Society of the Dime for the Unfortunate of Palestine” (Jamāʾat al-Qirsh li-Iʾānat Mankūbī Filasṭīn) 29
Solomon 59, 66–67
Solomon’s Stables 157
South America 81
Spain 58, 80, 96n53, 105, 205; expulsion of Jews from 58, 80, 96–97n53; suicide attacks on 105–106
Sudan 29, 30, 183
suicide bombings/attacks 8, 20, 33, 71n31, 103–109, 115, 118, 129, 141, 144, 146, 171, 194, 205–206, 208; by al-Riyashi, Reem
Saleh (Rīm Ṣāliḥ al-Riyāshī) 108, 129; and children’s participation 109; and women’s participation 107–109, 129
suicide terrorists 199
Sunna 82, 91, 147, 152, 153, 154
Sunna-Shiʾa relations 4n5
Sunni Islam 68, 111, 128, 130, 169
Sunnis/Sunni Muslims 44, 57, 80, 94, 102, 130, 180, 206
Supreme Muslim Council (Al-Majlis al-Islāmī al-Aʾlā) 34, 35
Syria 11, 18, 29, 30, 35, 51, 58, 76, 81, 97n71, 102, 109, 110, 128, 162, 163; Damascus 11
al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr 58
Takfīr 40–41, 43–44
Talmud 73, 77, 91, 179, 186, 190, 191
Talmudic ritual 207
al-Tamīmī, As‛ad Bayyūḍ 13–14
Ṭanṭāwī, Sheikh 188
Tatars 154
Tel Aviv 35
Temple Mount 3, 35, 45, 85, 100, 123–125, 128–129, 136n133, 139–140, 145, 148, 152, 156, 157, 162, 170, 189, 208
Temple of Solomon 66, 85, 87, 91
terror 147, 186; assassinations as 142; blessed 129; concept of 102, 141; illegitimate 119–120; legitimate 118, 119–120, 132n33;
war on 121; Zionist 121
terrorism 54, 55–56, 146, 166, 208; definition 166; racial 180, 194; state 134n73; suicide 129; women’s participation in 141; see
also September 11, 2001, terror attacks; suicide bombings/attacks; terror
terrorists 33–34, 54–55, 88, 108, 111, 120, 195, 206–207; suicide 105, 199
third intifada 54, 161, 164
Third World 199, 207

Toledano, Nisim 166; kidnapping of 166
Torah 28, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 91, 106, 179, 183, 184, 185, 189, 195, 201n50
torture 40, 44, 114, 166
Treaty of Ḥudaibīyya 68, 72n88, 112
Treaty of the Ummah see Pact of the Ummah
Tunisia 35–36, 110, 159, 168, 176n125; Tunis 36, 48n65
Turkey 35, 163, 208; see also Istanbul
two-state paradigm/solution 143, 185
Ukraine 76
ʾUlamāʿ 147
Umayyad period 51
Ummah 18, 19, 20, 27, 32–33, 42, 52, 55, 56, 63, 69, 77, 78, 93–94, 109, 112, 121, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 139, 144, 145, 147, 149,
150, 159, 161, 162, 164–169, 171, 180, 181, 190, 195, 204, 208–209
Umm al-Fahm 144–145
Union of Islamic Scholars 161
Union of Islamic Scholars of Palestine 108
United Arab List (Al-Qāʿima al-ʾArabiyya al-Muwaḥḥada) 113, 123
United Nations 106, 135n98, 155, 168, 181, 195, 207; General Assembly 207; Security Council 168
United States 33, 36, 39, 41, 44, 84–86, 88, 91, 100, 101, 105, 109, 118–120, 129, 141, 143, 155, 166, 167, 179, 183, 191–192, 197,
205, 209; armed forces 120; Constitution 191; Constitutional Congress 191; Middle East policy 119, 121; policy toward
Israel 84, 91, 119, 143; Radical Right in 85; suicide attacks on 105–106; Washington, D.C. 33
Vatican 191
al-Walid, Khaled Ibn 144
Waqf al-Ummah lil-Murābiṭīn wal-Murābiṭāt (lit.: the Fund of the Ummah for the Defenders [of the Al-Aqsa mosque]) 139,
140, 208
war on/against terror 118, 121, 186
Wasaṭiyya, school of 1, 20, 140
“Way of Resistance” (Al-Muqāwama) 125
weapons of mass destruction 205; forbidden by Islam 141
Weizmann, Chaim 79
Wenzel-Teuber, Wendelin 1
West, the 1, 27, 32, 41, 82, 86, 93, 94, 102, 121, 183, 185, 187, 196, 198, 209
West Bank 3, 4, 15, 17, 21, 100, 112, 120, 130, 136n137, 136–137n141, 139, 157, 163, 165–167, 183, 204
Western Wall 37, 124, 128
World Islamic Congress 35, 45, 48n66

world Jewry 36, 41, 79, 81–82, 84, 87–88, 171, 181, 191, 198, 204, 209
World Trade Center 186
World War I 79
World War II 30, 35, 65, 207
worthy death 105
Yad va-Shem 48n67
Yaḥya (prophet) 57, 80
Yāsīn, Ahmad 18, 19, 99, 100–101, 103–104, 107, 108, 169, 208
Yāsir, ʾAmmār Ibn 114
Yemen 35, 58, 159, 172n23
Yosef, Ovadia 106
Yugoslavia 35; Zagreb 36
Zabūr (the Book of Psalms) 63
al-Zahhar, Mahmoud 106
al-Zaidānī, ʾAbd al-ʾAziz 172n23
Zakariya (prophet) 80
Zakāt 3, 29, 37, 90, 99–100, 115–116, 144, 187
Zechariah (prophet) 57
Zilpah 59
Zionism 8, 29, 40, 41, 64, 73–74, 76, 78–79, 81–82, 84–86, 88, 94, 125, 179, 181, 183, 184, 189, 191, 194, 196–198, 199, 204, 206,
207, 208, 209; Messianic 59, 85; as new Nazi movement 184; see also racism
Zionist lobby 85
Zionist movement 36, 59, 75, 79–81, 92, 123, 179, 193
Zionist occupation 88, 125, 165, 208–209
Zionists 46, 63, 64, 68, 108, 120, 121, 122, 125, 129, 141, 145, 152, 164, 167, 168, 181, 188, 183, 188, 189–190, 193, 194, 198, 205,
206
Ziyāda, Ḥātim Yūsuf Abu 9, 11, 30
Zoroastrians 108
al-Zuhd, Wāʿil 140, 170