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2022-09

The Shah and the Great Khan: The
Mongol-Khwarazm War of 1217-1221
Davis, Erik
Davis, E. (2022). The Shah and the Great Khan: the Mongol-Khwarazm war of 1217-1221
(Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.
http://hdl.handle.net/1880/115315
Downloaded from PRISM Repository, University of Calgary

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

The Shah and the Great Khan:
The Mongol-Khwarazm War of 1217-1221
by
Erik Odin Hiram Davis

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY
CALGARY, ALBERTA
SEPTEMBER, 2022
© Erik Odin Hiram Davis 2022

ii

Abstract
The decline of the Seljuk Empire in the twelfth century C.E. and Seljuk Sultan Ahmad Sanjar’s
defeat by the hands of the Qara Khitai and the Khwarazmian state, led to the loss of the Seljuk’s eastern
territories. These eastern territories became split between the Qara Khitai, The Khwarazmain Empire,
and The Ghurid Sultanate. Building upon the work of his late father Khwarazmshah Tekesh,
Khwarazmshah Muhammad was able to defeat both the Ghurids and the Qara Khitai by 1210. At this
same time there was a new rising power to the east: The Mongol Empire, led by Chinggis Khan. In
1217, a Khwarazmian governor executed a Mongol ambassador at Otrar. An act that resulted in war.
The success and westward expansion of the Mongol Empire is well known. But at this time between
1217 and 1221, their victory was not a guaranteed outcome as the Khwarazmian empire had greater
manpower and experience fighting nomadic empires such as the Qara Khitai. In the historiography of
this period, especially in the English language, little to no time or attention is given to analyzing this
conflict that was a pivotal point in Mongol history and the broader history of the region. Historians
generally default to the primary source argument of Hubris as the reason for why Khwarazm fell and
dedicate no more than a few pages to this conflict at best. So, what caused the downfall of the
Khwarazmian empire? In short, the answer was that it fell as a consequence of military failings
(conquest by Mongols), exacerbated by political and bureaucratic (organizational) failures. Militarily,
the strategy of city defense and the division of manpower for that strategy meant that the Mongols
rarely faced a Khwarazmian army in the field. Politically, the Khwarazmian Empire was the by-product
of both internal and external issues. Internally, these issues were the unreliable subordinate lords and
the queen regent Terken Khatun, whose power conflicted with the Khwarazmshah himself. Externally,
Khwarazm was under constant pressure from its hostile neighbors, who often sought ways of
undermining Khwarazm’s stability. Such matters could not be explained by hubris alone.

iii

Acknowledgements
I would like to first thank my thesis advisor Professor David Curtis Wright of the University of
Calgary’s Department of History. Dr. Wright has provided much invaluable wisdom and guidance
during the process of writing, researching, and revising my thesis. His kindness and patience during
this long and complicated process were key to ensuring the successful completion of this work. It was
his Mongol history class which introduced me to the fascinating world of Central Asia and Iran in the
thirteenth century and his support which meant I could get into graduate school at all.
I would Like to also thank the Graduate Program Advisor Lori who has been invaluable in
guiding me through the complex processes surrounding the department’s graduate program. I would
also like to thank Dr. Alexander Hill for his administration of the Russian Language exam. As well as
both Dr. Hill and Dr. John Ferris for their many years of wisdom and guidance both in graduate school
and in undergrad. I would also like to thank the members of my defense committee: Dr. David Wright,
Dr. Peter Toohey, Dr. Courtnay Konshuh, and Dr. Ken MacMillan for their input, time, and meaningful
advice. I wish to extent my gratitude to the many instructors of the History and Greek and Roman
Studies departments for their time, guidance, and advice in the essay writing and research process, that
has led up to this point in my life. The University of Calgary’s services and resources such as the
Student Accessibility Services and the University Library played very important roles in both my
success and the success of many other students.
I would like to thank my Russian language tutor Erna Abramovich for her wisdom, guidance
in teaching me Russian. Oleksiy Shvets for helping me find Z.M. Buniyatov’s Russian language work
on Khwarazm. My Farsi tutor Zakieh Mohmmadi for her wisdom and guidance in teaching me Farsi.
Finally, to my family, whose help made any of this possible.

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Table of Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. iii
Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................1
Chapter One: General Information .........................................................................................................4
Sources .........................................................................................................................................4
Khwarazm .....................................................................................................................................8
The Qara Khitai .........................................................................................................................10
The Abbasid Caliphate ............................................................................................................... 11
The Ghurids ................................................................................................................................12
The Mongols ...............................................................................................................................12
Key Terms and Concepts ............................................................................................................13
On Cavalry Versus Infantry ...................................................................................................... 15
Chapter Two: The Khwarazmian Campaign .........................................................................................26
Otrar ...........................................................................................................................................17
Suqnaq ........................................................................................................................................21
Jand ............................................................................................................................................23
Fanakat .......................................................................................................................................25
Khujand and Temür Malik ..........................................................................................................25
Zarnuq and Nur ..........................................................................................................................29
Bukhara ......................................................................................................................................31
Samarqand ..................................................................................................................................34
After Samarqand .........................................................................................................................38

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Khwarazmshah’s Muhammad’s Retreat .....................................................................................41
Chinggis Khan’s Sons and The Siege of Khiva ..........................................................................43
Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din .....................................................................................................45
Parvan ........................................................................................................................................47
Indus River .................................................................................................................................50
Jallal ad-Din from the Indus to his Death ..................................................................................52
Chapter Three: The Internal and External Politics of the Khwarazmain State .....................................56
Khwarazm’s Internal Conundrum ..............................................................................................57
Mayachuk’s rebellion ..................................................................................................................63
Hindu Khan’s rebellion ...............................................................................................................67
Khwarazm and its relationship with the Qara Khitai ................................................................71
Terken Khatun ............................................................................................................................75
On the role of espionage and intelligence ..................................................................................82
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................88
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................90
Bibliography ...........................................................................................................................................93
Primary Sources .........................................................................................................................93
Secondary Sources .....................................................................................................................93
Articles .......................................................................................................................................95

1

Introduction
In the year 1217, two mighty imperial powers, the Khwarazmians led by Ala ad-Din
Muhammad and the Mongols led by the cunning and wise Chinggis Khan, were on the brink of an allout war, a war in which only one would survive. In the city of Otrar, the Khwarazmians had slain a
Mongol envoy and taken his caravan of goods, all under the pretext that this caravan had arrived for
espionage and not commerce. Such a brazen act against a Mongol envoy and his caravan could not go
unanswered, so the Khan demanded that Otrar's governor be brought to him for justice; elsewise there
would be war. The Khwarazmians were not to be taken lightly, however, as they had a vast army of
roughly 400,000 men.1 It was a mixture of infantrymen and cavalrymen, based upon the diverse ethnic
and political groups which made up the Khwarazmain state. It was in many ways a mixture of Persian
and Turkic military traditions. The size of the Khwarazmain army was vast in comparison with the
Mongol army, which was estimated to be between 150,00 to 100,000 men strong,2 the majority of
which were cavalry or mounted archers. In a purely numerical sense, the great army of Khwarazm
should have decimated the numerically inferior Mongol army, but in the event it was the mighty
Mongol Empire under Chinggis Khan that eventually prevailed in the war, which endured from 1217 to
1221. Khwarazm was the very first major sedentary state that the Mongols conquered. Mongol victory
was largely due to the greater strategic and tactical mobility that came with a primarily cavalry-based
army and the knowledge of siege warfare that came about as a result of their wars in northern China
and against the Jurchens.
Given the numerical disparity between the Mongol and Khwarazmian states, the Mongol
victory seemed like a great feat. As such, the question that must be asked is this: What caused the

Buniatov, Ziiya Museavich, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, (Москва, СССР: Наука, 1986), 86.
Grousset, Rene, The Empire of the Steppes A History of Central Asia, Trans. Naomi Walford (New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press New Brunswick, 1970), 238.
1
2

2

downfall of the Khwarazmian empire? In short, the answer was that it fell as a consequence of military
failings (conquest by Mongols) as exacerbated by political and bureaucratic (organizational) failures.
From the Mongol perspective, the Khwarazmian conquest was a fantastic success. It brought
them new lands and greater wealth. The Mongols gained access to new siege weapons and developed
siege tactics that would serve them well in their future conquests against sedentary societies. From the
Khwarazmain perspective, however, conquest by the Mongols represented the end result of failings
both military and political in nature. The Khwarazmian strategy of city defense led to less tactical
flexibility for countering the Mongol threat. The unreliability of subordinate lords and the substantial
internal meddling of Terken Khatun posed significant obstacles, both militarily and politically,
especially regarding the functionality and effectiveness of the Khwarazmain state in times of peace and
war. Each political and military failing identified contributed to Khwarazm’s downfall. This conflict
was not a simple clash of empires, and the first chapter will provide a brief discussion intended to
provide a general context concerning the nature of the Khwarazmian and Mongol empires, as well as a
discussion on the primary and secondary sources. It will also seek to outline key concepts, terms, and
geography.
The second chapter will analyze the conflict itself from the Siege of Otrar in 1217 until the
Battle of the Indus River in 1221. It will analyze each battle and its importance for both the
Khwarazmians and the Mongols. For the Khwarazmians, this will pertain in part to the limited success
of their siege defense strategy and the difficulties they experienced in concentrating their forces. For
the Mongols, the Khwarazmian campaign was crucial for the evolution of their siege policy, which
ultimately helped it become a great land empire.
Finally, chapter three will analyze the political and organizational issues pertaining to the
Khwarazmian state, particularly the external and internal politics of the Khwarazmian state from the
time of Khwarazmshah Tekesh in the late 12th century to the time of Khwarazmshah Muhammad in the
early 13th century. There will also be analysis of the role of the Queen Regent Terken Khatun, who had

3

an immense degree of power and influence in running the Khwarazmian state, rivalling the
Khwarazmshah himself. There will also be a discussion on the roles of merchants, envoys, spies, and
intelligence gathering as it pertained to both the Khwarazmians and the Mongols.
All of these factors will demonstrate that the Khwarazmian state was conquered by the Mongols
as a result of its military failings, as exacerbated by political and bureaucratic (organizational) failures.

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Chapter 1: General Information
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief outline of key persons, states, concepts, and
events that will be relevant to understanding and contextualizing the nature of the Khwarazmian state,
the Mongol Empire, the Qara Khitai, the Abbasid Caliphate, and the Ghurids. It will also seek to
provide a brief history of these states and their relevance to the Mongol-Khwarazm conflict. The
Khwarazmian state the Mongols invaded in 1217 did not exist in isolation; it was shaped by its broader
history and interactions with its neighbors. The military and political failings of the Khwarazmain state
can be better understood through a survey of the broad imperial histories of this region and of its key
actors. This chapter will also provide discussion of the primary and secondary sources relevant to this
field.

The Sources
The four primary source authors are Ata Malik Juvaini, Uthman ibn Siraj al-Din Juzjani, Rashid
ad-Din Hamadani, and Shihab al-Din Muhammad al-Nasawi. With the exception of al-Nasawi, all other
authors generally argue that Khwarazmian defeat was a product of their hubris and Mongol superiority.
This is largely because two authors writing at a later time period worked under the Mongol Il khanate,
these being Juvaini and Rashid ad-Din. In the case of Juzjani, he was a subject of the Ghurid Empire
and an adult during the time of Khwarazmain and Mongol conquest. His bias against the
Khwarazmians came from the Ghruids’ destruction. Al-Nasawi is the exception because he was present
in the Khwarazmian court. There can be a fair degree of confidence in the facts presented by the
sources as their descriptions correlate well to the geography of the region. Many of the correlations
between where battles take place and their real world locations is largely due to the detailed
information provided by these sources.
Ata-Malik Juvaini was a Persian noble, governor, and historian for the Il Khanate during the

5

mid to late 13th century. His work “Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha” was a general history of the Mongol empire
and their rule until roughly 1260. His work was known for its flowery prose and inclusion of Islamic
(Arabic) poetry and myths, that were interspersed throughout his work. Generally speaking, the content
of his work is fairly reliable with the exception of literary devices which can lead to some exaggeration.
Regarding the Mongol-Khwarazm war, Juvaini argued that Khwarazmian hubris was the key to their
downfall. This can be explained as a product of both his style of prose and of his biases. As he was a
high-ranking official in the Mongol Il Khanate court, it would be in his political and social interests to
portray the enemies of the Mongols as hubruistic and foolish and for the Mongols themselves as mighty
and wise. While this bias impacted his arguments and how he represented his historical account, the
factual information underpinning the work remained robust.
Rashid ad-Din Hamadani was a Persian noble, governor, and historian for the Il Khanate much
like Juvaini. As his last name suggests, he is from the city of Hamedan which is located in Iran. He
lived under Mongol rule from the mid 13th to early 14th century. His work “Jami’ al-Tawarikh”
(Compendium of Chronicles) was a general history of Asia and the middle east. As it relates to the
history surrounding the Mongol-Khwarazmian conflict, Rashid ad-Din attempts to provide a general
history without the same degree of prose seen in Juvaini’s work. As with most Perisan historians of this
time, his work is a mixture of history in Persian (Farsi) and Arab/Islamic poetry. As he was a subject of
the Il Khanate court, his work does tend to have a pro-Mongol bias. Unlike Juvaini however, he
portrays it as the numerically inferior but more cunning/wiser Mongols under Chinggis Khan against
the numerically superior but hubristic Khwarazmains. This does not seem to impact the accuracy of his
account, however, as many of the facts presented align well with the general histories presented by all
the primary source authors.
Uthman ibn Siraj al-Din Juzjani was a Persian historian and a subject of the Ghurid Empire. His
work “Tabaqat-I Nasiri” (Classes of Nasir) was a general history of the Ghurid and later Mamluk
(Delhi) sultinates. It was dedicated to his patron Sultan Nasir-ud-Din. Juzjani was alive during the time

6

of the war between the Ghurids and the Khwarazmains, and was present for the downfall of the Ghurid
empire which resulted. His historical account was organized by the name of the ruler and the dates
between which they ruled. He would then deliver an account of what happened in the time of that ruler
and at times present his own opinion or judgement of that ruler. As it pertained to Khwarazm, he wrote
with great hostility about them and felt the Mongol invasion was a form of justice. Like Juvaini and
Rashid ad-Din, Juzjani does used the hubris argument when discussing why Khwarazm fell. However,
he does not use the flowery prose of Juvaini or the styles of Rashid ad-Din, he is more matter of fact
and direct in his historical account. While his bias does shape his characterization, it does not impact
the accuracy of his account to any significant extent.
Of the four primary source authors, Shihab al-Din Muhammad al-Nasawi is the most unique.
He was the secretary and biographer for Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din and was present on the
Khwarazmian side for the Mongol invasion. No other source has this perspective and his account
provided very interesting insights into the running of the Khwarazmain state. His work “Sirat Jallal adDin Minkubirni” (The life of Jallal ad-Din Minkubirni) is his chronicle of Jallal ad-Din from before,
during, and after the Mongol invasion of Khwarazm until his death in 1231. Like other authors, his
account does have some bias, while there is some negativity to the Mongols, he also criticizes
leadership within the Khwarazmain state. This may, however, be in service of promoting the legacy of
Jallal ad-Din.
Michal Biran’s secondary study “The Empire of the Qara Khitai in Eurasian History: Between
China and the Islamic World” is an excellent source for outlining the relationship between the
Khwarazmian State and its relationship with the Qara Khitai, especially between pages 60 and 86, even
though the primary focus of the work is on the Qara Khitai, of which Khwarazm was but one of many
components. On the matter of Khwarazm, Michal Biran says that the Khwarazmshah Muhammad was
opportunistic and focused on what benefitted him the most. She also says that the Khwarazmians both
relied upon and undermined the Qara Khitai at many points in their relationship, arguing that due to

7

these issues, the Khwarazmains benefitted more from their relationship than the Qara Khitai. This was
true to some extent, but the Qara Khitai had multiple opportunities to abandon their Khwarazmian
allies and yet chose not to, and this suggests that the alliance had greater benefit in comparison with the
alternatives.
Biran makes extensive use of the Russian scholar Buniatov. Ziiya Museavich Buniatov’s work
“ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231” (Gosudarstvo Khorezmshakhov) (The State of the
Khwarazmshahs 1097-1231), which is one of the best secondary sources analyzing the Khwarazmain
state before, during, and after their war with the Mongols. It is a detailed survey of the Khwarazmain
state with each chapter dedicated to the various parts of Khwarazmian history. He uses several primary
sources, mostly Al-Nasawi, but also Rashid al-Din Hamadani, Juzjani, and to some extent Juvaini. He
does not try to make many arguments in the work, instead focusing on a detailed survey of
Khwarazmain history. Buniatov relied much more heavily on the works of Al-Nasawi, and often
echoed the positive image that Al-Nasawi depicts of Jallal ad-Din.
Rene Grousset’s “Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia” provides a good overview
of the Mongol-Khwarazm war. Like Juvaini, Grousset’s writing was quite hostile towards the
Khwarazmains, and this was largely due to his near exclusive reliance upon Juvaini’s work in his
telling of the broader history of the Mongol conquests. In doing so, he reused Juvaini’s argument of
hubris being the primary rationale for the defeat of the Khwarazmains. (This thesis will, by the way,
show that hubris is an insufficient explanation and that the political and military situation of Khwarazm
was far more complex than simple hubris.) Khwarazmshah Muhammad’s options were more limited
than Grousset’s survey would suggest.
John Andrew Boyle’s relatively faithful translation of Juvaini’s “Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha” (The
History of The World Conqueror) provides a strong introduction and overview of the MongolKhwarazm war, but his translation struggles to make clear the difference between the actual history
being discussed by Juvaini and the times when Juvaini is recounting Islamic myths. One such example

8

was the inclusion of the Islamic Myth of Zarqa of Yamama being placed shortly after the Mongols
captured their first Khwarazmian settlement. This makes it seem initially as if Zarqa were a
Khwarazmian commander when she was not. Boyle does maintain much of Juvaini’s more artistic and
flowery writing and presentation style, and as it is a translation, it also of course maintains Juvaini’s
argument of Khwarazmian hubris as being the key factor in Khwarazm’s downfall.
Wheeler M. Thackston’s three-volume work “Classical Writings of the Medieval Islamic World:
Persian Histories of the Mongol Dynasties” is a three-volume translation and compendium of multiple
primary source authors and is one of the best, if not the best, English-translation sources on the
Mongol-Khwarazm war. Thackston does not attempt to make any arguments as the work is focused on
accurate translation of the source material. The third volume is a translation of Rashid ad-Din’s
compendium of chronicles and provides an excellent and detailed account of the Mongol-Khwarazm
war. As it is a translation work, Thackston himself does not make any significant arguments on the
matter of the Mongol-Khwarazm war.
Some of the most common secondary source tropes or pitfalls tend to be either confusing the
armies of the Khwarazmian subordinate nobility as mercenaries or the cause of the conflict being the
result of some flaw within Khwarazmshah Muhammad’s character. Usually this takes the form of the
hubris theme seen in some of the primary sources. However, it also includes phrases such as “a petty
tyrant briefly sitting atop an artificially united bandit kingdom,” as stated by George Lane.3 The
secondary source tradition tends to use both in some form.

Khwarazm
Khwarazm was a small kingdom located around the city of Khiva, connected to the southern
side of the Aral Sea. Its size ebbed and flowed with the rise and fall of its regional neighbors.

3

Lane, George. Ghenghis Khan and Mongol Rule. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004.

9

Sometimes these neighbors were the Persians, the Parthians, the Seljuuks, and the Abbasid Caliphate.
By the mid to late 12th century Khwarazm was surrounded by the Qara Khitai to the north and east, the
Ghurids to the south, and the Abbasid Caliphate to the west.4 It was during this time and under the rule
of Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Tekesh that the Khwarazmian state began to expand its power and
territorial control.5
Using his alliance with the Qara Khitai, Tekesh was able to leverage his position to largely
undermine Abbasid Calif Al-Nasir's attempts to weaken and destroy Khwarazm. Tekesh was also able
to stem Ghurid ambitions in the region to some extent.6 Tekesh's reign would last until 1200 C.E.,
when his son Qutb al-Din Muhammad succeeded the throne. Tekesh's alliance with the Qara Khitai and
his political maneuvering provided his successor with a strong footing for expansion.7 It was during
the reign of Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad that the Khwarazmian state became the
Khwarazmain empire. From 1200 to 1217, Muhammad would conquer all of Iran, Afghanistan, and a
significant portion of Central Asia.8 He managed to defeat the mighty Ghurid empire to his south and
then the Qara Khitai to his north and east as they themselves were being conquered by the Mongol
Empire. His conquests brought Khwarazm to its zenith, but his war with the Mongols between 12171221 and their cunning leader Chinggis Khan also brought the Khwarazmian Empire to its destruction.9
On this deathbed in 1221 Khwarazmshah Muhammad, would give his title to his son Jallal ad-Din
Menkuberni, who would continue to resist the Mongol conquest with limited to no success until his
death in 1231.10

4

Boyle, John Andrew, ed. The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 5. The Saljuq and Mongol Periods. Vol. 5. (London,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 185.
5
Boyle, The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 5, 188,189.
6
Boyle, The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 5, 192.
7
Boyle, The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 5, 192.
8
Boyle, The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 5, 192-202.
9
Boyle, The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 5, 192-202.
10

Najeebabadi, Akbar Shah. The History of Islam. Edited by Safi-ur-Rahman Mubarakpuri. Vol. 3 (Riyadh, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 2000), 299-302. ,Juvaini, Ala Ad-din Ata-Malik, The History of the World Conqueror, Trans.
John Andrew Boyle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 396-411.

10

The Qara Khitai
The Qara Khitai was an empire of steppe peoples located between the Mongols to the east, the
Khwarazmians to the west, and the Jin Dynasty to the south. They controlled vast swathes of Central
Asia. As it related to Khwarazm, the Qara Khitai was at various times an ally to or the dominant power
in their relationship with the Khwarazmain state. In the time of Khwarazmshah Tekesh, the Qara Khitai
was led by Gürkhan Zhilugu. Their relationship in the late 12th century began as an adversarial one.
The Qara Khitai had initially supported Tekesh's brother for the position of Khwarazmshah, but
Zhilugu changed his position in favor of Tekesh because he was more successful and popular among
his people for the position of Khwarazmshah. Their alliance brought both the Khwarazmians and the
Qara Khitai great wealth, expansion, and opportunity.11
This alliance had such great value to the Qara Khitai that they continued to support
Khwarazmshah Tekesh even as his lands were under great threat from the Ghurids and the
machinations of the Abbysad Calif Al-Nasir in 1198 (and earlier).12
The death of Tekesh in 1200 did not bring an end to the alliance between the Khwarazmians and
the Qara Khitai. In fact, under the leadership of Ala ad-Din Muhammad, the territory and wealth of
both continued to expand. Together they managed to defeat the Ghurids, break their empire, and take
their lost holdings. For Khwarazmshah Muhammad, this meant he was safe from the threat of his
southern neighbor. For the Qara Khitai, it meant more revenue and a powerful ally who could help
secure its southern and western borders.13
Alliances, like empires, eventually fall apart. So too was the case with the alliance between the
Qara Khitai and the Khwarazmians. Between 1206 and 1211, the Qara Khitai faced an issue on both its

Biran, Michal, The Empire of the Qara Khitai in Eurasian History Between China and the Islamic World (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 60-63.
12
Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 65.
13
Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 64-86.
11

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east and west. From the west, many Central Asian city-states rebelled with the help of the
Khwarazmains, who would eventually conquer these same rebellious cities for their own imperial
ambitions. To the east, the newly unified Mongol Empire led by the mighty Chinggis Khan smashed
the armies of the Qara Khitai and forced them into submission. These combined pressures from the east
and the west spelled the end of the Qara Khitai and their position as the dominant regional power, a
position they had enjoyed for most of the 12th century.14 The Qara Khitai were important in shaping the
military and political evolution of the Khwarazmain state with respect to its survival and eventual
expansion.

The Abbasid Caliphate
The Abbasid Caliphate was a Sunni Islamic imperial state and the third Caliphate, following the
first under the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the second under the Umayyad Caliphate. The
Abbasid caliphate was centered around Iraq, with the ancient city of Baghdad as its capital in the late
12th and mid 13th centuries.15
It was from his seat in Baghdad that Calif Al-Nasir sought to exert his power, wealth, and
influence. This power had been limited in this time first as a result of the Seljuuks and then later the
Khwarazmians.16
In the context of the Mongol-Khwarazm war, it should be noted that Al-Nasir's impact was
more indirect in some ways and a byproduct of his intrigues into Khwarazmian affairs over a roughly
thirty-five- to forty-year time period, when he incited internal rebellions in Khwarazm and supported
the Ghurids in their war against the Khwarazmshahs Tekesh and Muhammad.

Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 64-86.
Najeebabadi, Akbar Shah. The History of Islam, 279-287., Jackson, Peter. The Mongols and the Islamic World. From
Conquest to Conversion. (London, UK: Yale University Press, 2017), 54-57.
16
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 57-70.
14
15

12

The Ghurids
The Ghurid Empire was the successor to the Ghaznavids that encompassed large swathes of
northern India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and parts of southern Iran. During the late 12th and early 13th
centuries, they were led by Sultan Giyas al-Din al-Guri, and after his death in the early 1200s he was
succeeded by his brother Shikhab al-Guri.17
The Ghurids were long-time allies of the Abbasid Calif Al-Nasir and long-time enemies of the
Khwarazmians. In Khwarazmian history, accounts of the machinations of Al-Nasir usually include the
involvement of the Ghurids, which often would come in the form of the Ghurids invading
Khwarazmian territory or engaging in activities meant to weaken Khwarazmian strength. Although the
Ghurids were able to inflict serious losses on the Khwarazmians and weaken them to some extent, they
would never succeed completely at this. The Khwarazmian alliance with the Qara Khitai, favorable
terrain, the tenaciousness of the Khwarazmian defenders, and a fair amount of good fortune meant that
the Ghurids were never able to defeat the Khwarazmians outright.18

The Mongols
Chinggis Khan’s was an empire of nomadic peoples originating in the Central Asian steppe
region. For most of the 12th century, these nomadic tribes engaged in trade with merchants and their
sedentary neighbors. These Mongol tribes would compete with each other, growing and changing in
strength through conquest, marriage, or assimilation. Larger tribes would absorb smaller ones or
destroy competing factions through raids or other forms of warfare. When not fighting each other for
dominance, Mongol warriors would raid their sedentary neighbors for valuable things such as gold,
furs, silk, metal tools, and animals.19

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 59-63,64-66. , Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, 147-151.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 59-63,64-66. , Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, 147-151.
19
Broadbridge, Anne F. Women and the Making of the Mongol Empire. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1-6.
17
18

13

This system would change dramatically in the 13th century and afterwards with the rise of the
mighty Temüjin, who in 1206 as Chinggis Khan unified all of the tribes of Mongolia. From 1206 to
1217, the Mongol Empire would conquer much of northern China, integrate the Uighurs, and defeat the
powerful Qara Khitai to their west.20
In 1217, the assassination of a Mongol merchant-envoy would spark a great war between the
Mongols and the Khwarazmians. By 1221, the Khwarazmians had been effectively defeated and their
domains absorbed into the now vast and mighty Mongol Empire. By the end of the 13th century
Chinggis Khan and his sons and grandsons had managed to create the largest land empire in human
history. It spanned some 24 million square kilometers, from Korea to the Mediterranean Sea.21

Key terms and concepts
A few regionally specific terms and concepts should be understood in the content of this work.
In alphabetical order, these terms are Atabeg, Central Asia, Khan, Khurasan, Shah, and Sultan. An
Atabeg was the title given to a ruler of Turkic nobility. It was given to the rulers of small states or
governorates and was a subordinate position to more powerful rulers such as emperors or kings or the
equivalent. Central Asia is a geographical region that to its west encompasses the north and eastern
parts of the Caspian Sea, stretching down to Afghanistan to its south, and reaching into Mongolia on its
eastern border. Khan is the title of a truly powerful king or emperor traditionally used among Turkic
and Mongolic peoples. Khurasan was the name of the historical regions that encompassed the Persianspeaking parts of Central Asia. These include northeastern Iran, northern Afghanistan, southeastern
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and all of Tajikistan. Shah is the Persian (Farsi) word for king or
emperor. Khwarazmshah, for example, denoted an individual who was the emperor of Khwarazm.

20

Broadbridge, Women and the Making of the Mongol Empire, 1-6.
Turchin, Peter, Jonathan M. Adams, and Thomas D. Hall, “East-West Orientation of Historical Empires and Modern
States.” Journal of World-Systems Research 12 (2006): 219-29, https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2006.369.
21

14

Sultan is an Islamic term denoting a king or ruler of an Islamic state. It is a term used in many English
translations of Persian works relating to the rulers of Khwarazm, the Ghurids, and several other states.

On calvary versus infantry
It is worth mentioning that the armies of Khwarazm and those of the Great Khan used a
combination of infantry and cavalry, with the former having more infantry than cavalry and the latter
vice versa. Both infantry and cavalry had their own distinct advantages and disadvantages. Cavalry
tended to require a high skillset that required a very long time to develop and perfect. For the Mongols,
horse riding and horse archery were skills learned and developed from childhood. For the
Khwarazmains, cavalry took a long time to train and tended to be expensive to maintain, meaning that
only the more economically well-off could afford to train, equip, and maintain cavalry forces. Broadly
speaking, the specialized nature of cavalry meant that they were far more expensive when compared to
infantry; after all, resources were needed to feed horse and rider, whereas in the infantry, only the men
needed to be fed. In war, cavalry provided greater maneuverability and tactical flexibility when
compared to infantry, especially out in open field and on flat terrain. Cavalry were also faster to deploy
in comparison with infantrymen. Infantry tended to require less time and money to arm and train. On
uneven terrain, infantry tended to be superior to cavalry. Infantry were also more effective against the
walls of fortifications, and they were also better at storming fortifications. On a grand strategic scale,
infantry served a more diverse role. They defended and held territory, manned border outposts,
provided security to settlements, and were the bulk of most armies. Cavalry allowed faster response
times to apply force in problem areas. A good field commander could make use of the strengths and
weakness of both cavalry and Infantry.
Khwarazmshah Tekesh prepared the groundwork both politically and militarily for the
expansion of the Khwarazmian state. Then Khwarazmshah Muhammad was able to use these
foundations to expand the military and political power of the state to its greatest extent. The Qara

15

Khitai’s alliance with the Khwarazmains proved to be a double-edged sword, bringing them wealth and
eventual ruin. They were ultimately squeezed between the expanding Mongol and Khwarazmain states.
The Abbasid threat under Calif Al-Nasir presented itself both internally and externally for the
Khwarazmian state. The Ghurids proved to be a great external military and political threat to the
existence of the Khwarazmian state under both Khwarazmshahs Tekesh and Muhammad. Ultimately,
the Mongols under the Great Khan would take advantage of Khwarazmain military and political
failings to achieve outright victory. The complex interactions between the Khwarazmians, their Qara
Khitai allies, and their Mongol, Abbasid, and Ghurid enemies helped to shape not only the fate of the
Khwarazmian state, but that of the entire region. These complexities would greatly influence the
outcome of the great Mongol-Khwarazm war.

16

Chapter 2: The Khwarazmian Campaign
This chapter will look at the military conflict between the Khwarazmians and the Mongols, and
primarily at the sieges and the impacts they had on both parties, beginning with the siege of Otrar
located in what is today southern Kazakhstan and ending at the Battle of the Indus River in the north of
modern-day Pakistan. This chapter will also demonstrate how the Mongols were able to take advantage
of the Khwarazmain military failings on strategic and tactical levels.
The Mongols ended up conquering the Khwarazmian state and defeating anyone in a position to
resist their conquest. As the introduction section of this work has suggested, this conquest was neither a
foregone conclusion nor the product of hubris. Understanding what happened militarily is key to
explaining the most significant factor in the downfall of the Khwarazmian state. Strategically, the
Mongols’ siege policy and centralized command structure ensured that they could quickly and
effectively respond to any problem areas that arose during the Khwarazmian campaign, especially in
areas of high resistance. On the other hand, the Khwarazmain strategy of city defense and more
decentralized command meant that they were unable to make use of their superior numbers. The
Mongols also had superior field tactics for taking settlements and cutting off enemy escape routes.
Their siege policy also meant that they could use captured resources against the Khwarazmains in both
men and material. Tactically, the Khwarazmian failure to defend settlements led to unrecoverable
losses. With limited exceptions at the very end of the conflict, the Khwarazmians also failed to raise an
army for engaging the Mongols in the field when they may have better utilized their superior numbers.
The Khwarazmian strategy was one of city defense, that is to say the usage of fortified cities to
wait out a besieging enemy. The goal of this strategy was to force the enemy to break off the siege as a
result of food shortages, development of disease, inclement weather, or a combination of these factors.
As this chapter will demonstrate, this was not a strategy adopted entirely by choice. Certain factors

17

fundamental to the political and social structure of the Khwarazmain state played a role in this decision.
This chapter will also look at how this strategy ultimately failed and the impact that each battle had on
the Khwarazmian state.
Naturally, there were two parties in this conflict. The Mongol Empire under the command of the
Great Khan and his sons also played a significant role in the downfall of the Khwarazmian state. This
chapter also seeks to analyze how the Mongols besieged and captured cities as well as the rapid
evolution of their siege policy towards settlements.
Finally, there will be some analysis of two major field battles between the Mongols and the
Khwarazmians under Jallal ad-din Menkuberni. These battles were the Khwarazmian victory at Parwan
and the Mongol victory at the Battle of the Indus River. These battles served to demonstrate how a
Khwarazmian army performed in field conditions.

Siege of Otrar
Located in the north-eastern region of the Khwarazmian Empire in what is today southern
Kazakhstan, the city of Otrar was the first settlement to fall in the Mongol-Khwarazmain conflict. It
was governed by an individual known as Inalchuq or Ghayir Khan, and the commander of the
Khwarazmian forces was the city's chamberlain Qaracha.
Events at Otrar
In preparation for the battle, Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad sent out ten thousand
horsemen. The fortifications and ramparts were repaired and reinforced. Siege engines were also
constructed for the defense of Otrar.22 The siege of Otrar was the first battle the Mongols fought

22

Dughlat, Mirza Haydar, and Rashiduddin Fazullah, Classical Writings of the Medieval Islamic World: Persian Histories
of the Mongol Dynasties, trans. Wheeler Thackston (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 3:170 [488])

18

against the Khwarizmian empire. Juvaini described the fortified city of Otrar in the following terms:
“The citadel, the outworks (fasil), and the town had been well strengthened, and a great quantity of
instruments of war collected together.”23 With this statement, historian Juvaini was emphasizing the
high degree of preparation made for the defense of Otrar. The siege of Otrar began with the arrival of
the Mongol forces led by Chinggis Khan himself. Once at the town, his sons Chaghadai and Ögedei
were placed in command of the besieging forces. The Mongol siege of Otrar lasted for approximately
five months. At this five-month mark, most of the town's defenders capitulated, thus allowing the
Mongols to capture most but not all of the city.
With the exclusion of Inalchuq and his men, the leadership of the town attempted to flee under
cover of night, but they were swiftly caught and executed by the Mongols. Inalchuq and twenty of his
men continued to resist Mongol forces from within the citadel located in the center of the town. Here
they engaged in a fierce and desperate resistance. When the arrows ran out, they began using the bricks
that made up the citadel, fighting in close quarters in tight hallways and spaces that favored the
defender. This desperate struggle continued for a month until every last man including Inalchuq himself
was killed.24 The artisans and able-bodied men who had survived the siege of Otrar were subsequently
pressed into Mongol service for use against other Khwarazmian cities, either directly as soldiers to
bolster Mongol forces or as siege-craft engineers to improve Mongol siege capabilities.25 Historian
Timothy May in his work The Mongol Empire and Rene Grousset in his work Conqueror of the World
state that Inalchuq (Ghayir Khan) was killed by having molten silver poured into his mouth and ears.26
While rather gruesome and dramatic, both cite Juvaini’s account as the source for this using John
Andrew Boyle’s and Thackston’s translations as sources. However, neither work mentions anything

23

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:170 [488]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:170,171 [489-490]
25
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:170,171 [489-490]
26
Grousset, Rene. Conqueror of The World. New York: The Orion Press, 1966.3:60-62., May, Timothy. The Mongol
Empire. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2018. 212-218.
24

19

about molten silver. Both translations say he was killed, but not how he was killed.
The significance of Otrar for the Khwarazmians
This siege was significant in a number of ways. It was the first battle in the MongolKhwarazmian war and was also demonstrative of how the Khwarazmians intended to defend their
imperial holdings: by focusing on forcing the Mongols to engage in protracted sieges. It should be
noted that the fortifications of the Khwarazmain empire were different from those found in Central and
Western Europe during this same time. These structures were made of wooden beams, sandstone
bricks, and a form of mortar. An excellent example of such defensive structures can be found in the city
of Bukhara, located in modern-day Uzbekistan. (Bukhara is the fifth-largest city in Uzbekistan.)
This strategy of protracted sieges also represented a fundamental issue within the Khwarazmain
imperial system militarily. Like other Persian empires before it, the Khwarazmians were the lead party
in an alliance of many different tribes and groups with competing interests who were brought into the
Khwarazmain fold by treaty, marriage, or conquest. While the Khwarazmians boasted a force of
400,000 men, this was not a unified force, as historically these soldiers would have loyalty to their
respective tribes or warlords.27
There does exist historical precedent in the recent history of the Khwarazmian state, both before
and after their relationship with the Qara Khitai, which demonstrated this issue. Under the leadership of
Khwarazmshah Tekish, the Sultan of Baghdad Al-Nasir convinced the Khwarazmian warlord Maiachuk
to rebel against Tekish. Maiachuk and his men pillaged several towns and temporarily controlled
Persian Iraq. Tekish was successful in putting down Maiachuk's rebellion, killing both Maiachuk and
the Vizier who supported Maiachuk.28 Thus, while on paper the Khwarazmian military may have been
very powerful and impressive, the reality was that deploying this force as a single cohesive unit

27
28

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:170,171.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 58-59.

20

probably proved to be far too difficult if not outright impossible.
The strategy of reinforcing cities and towns was meant to exhaust the Mongols and allow the
Khwarazmian empire to survive. This was to work in a few ways: first, the defenders would in theory
have a force multiplication advantage as any attacker would have to breach the defenses of the
settlement. This would provide the defenders with ample opportunities to inflict higher casualties upon
the attacking force. Second, this strategy was related to the nature of siege warfare, and specifically to
the fundamental nature of siege encampments. Generally, siege encampments were not well organized
or sanitary. Many sieges failed because of disease, infection, viruses, and bacteria. In some cases, the
losses that a besieging army incurred due to these medical issues outnumbered those who died as a
result of fighting. Thus, between defense and disease, the Khwarazmians hoped Mongol casualties
would be high enough to force them to leave. Otrar represented the first of such tests for this strategy.
While it had failed at Otrar, there were many other cities and settlements that Chinggis Khan and his
army needed to conquer.
The significance of Otrar for the Mongols
For the Mongols, the capture of Otrar had significant symbolic and military significance. The
capture of the city and the killing of its Governor Inalchuq meant that the murder of the Mongol
ambassadors had been avenged. It also sent the message that the killing of Mongol envoys was a
serious crime and would not go unanswered. Militarily, the capture of Khwarazmian men allowed
Mongol forces to both bolster their own forces and acquire new siege technologies. Such technologies
would make the capture of future settlements much easier. The presence of Khwarazmian men in the
army meant that Mongols would absorb fewer casualties in the fighting as these Khwarazmians were
forced to fight their own countrymen. It was a process which would repeat itself many more times
throughout the course of the war itself and was militarily beneficial to the Mongols and detrimental for
the Khwarazmains. Preventing part of the Khwarazmian garrison from escaping demonstrated the level

21

of control that the Mongol besiegers had over the areas surrounding the city. In siege warfare,
preventing one’s enemy from escaping the besieged settlement was important for several reasons. It
meant tight control over communications and prevented reinforcements from coming; if the besieged
could escape out, then smugglers could bring supplies into the city. Thus, by preventing escape, the
Mongols also prevented Otrar from getting new supplies and prolonging the siege.
The siege of Otrar also represented the early development of their siege policy. If a settlement
resists, then once the city is taken, the surviving artisans and craftsmen were to be captured and
employed by the Mongols and the women and children of that captured settlement would be sold into
slavery or become slaves for Mongol warriors and their families. The garrison tasked with defending
the settlement and resisting the Mongols would face two possible outcomes: either all those in the
garrison would \be executed, or they would be enslaved and pressed into Mongol service, where they
would serve as cannon fodder for the Mongol army as it attacked other Khwarazmain targets. For
soldiers, execution was more common. However, both possibilities were present for all able-bodied
men in a given settlement. The governing leadership and family of a resisting settlement would be
killed. Sometimes the leadership and family of a settlement that did not resist was also killed. This was
done in some instances as a means of ensuring that such capitulation was not made on false pretenses.
The Siege of Suqnaq
After the successful conquest of Otrar and the retribution against Inalchuq (Ghayir Khan),
Chinggis Khan assigned his son Prince Jochi to move in the direction of Jand. Along the way, he came
across the town of Suqnaq. He sent his loyal merchant diplomat Hasan Haji to deliver a message to the
people of the town. This message was for the inhabitants and their leaders to surrender so that they and
their belongings might be left in peace. However, Hasan was assassinated before his message could be
fully delivered. Much like Chinggis Khan after the incident at Otrar with his merchant envoys, Jochi
was obligated to avenge the death of his ambassador. Thus, Mongol forces surrounded the city and

22

besieged it by rotating attacking forces in and out to allow for constant pressure on the defenders, while
also preventing his own forces from becoming exhausted.29 After an undetermined amount of time, the
settlement of Suqnaq fell, the town's inhabitants were killed, the town was looted and burned to the
ground.
Significance of Suqnaq
The events at Suqnaq demonstrated Mongol siege policy in action: if the leaders and inhabitants
of a settlement chose to resist the Mongol army, then they would face severe consequences. As the
Mongol conquest continued, the news spread regarding the stark choices offered by the Mongols:
surrendered and be spared or resist and face total annihilation. It proved to be quite effective for the
Mongols as it enabled them to secure a number of settlements without the need for direct confrontation.
The towns of Barchinlighkent and Ozgand in the Fergana basin (modern-day eastern Uzbekistan,
between Kyrgyzstan to the north, east and south, and Tajikistan to its southwest) both chose to
surrender after the capture of Suqnaq. The city of Ashnas, however, chose to resist the Mongols, and as
a result the city was swiftly destroyed.30 Juvaini was somewhat light on the details as they pertained to
exactly what these rotating shifts looked like. He simply stated that there was a rotation shift of attacks
for day and night. Generally, night-fighting in this time period tended to be risky as it was more
difficult to discern friend from foe. This was true in a siege situation as well, since soldiers would be
scaling the walls with siege ladders (and possibly siege towers depending on length of siege), and once
on top of the walls they would have to fight the defenders in hand-to-hand combat to secure control
over that section of wall, which is where the risks of harming friendlies could occur.

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:171, [491-491], Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror,
86-89.
30
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:171, [490-492], Juwayni, Ala'u D-din Ata Malik, and Mirza Muhammad,
The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, (London, UK: E.J.W. Gibb memorial, Luzac and Co., 1912), 1:64-97.
29

23

For the Khwarazmians, it further exemplified the strategic failure of the settlement defense and
exhaustion strategy. But this may have been the only realistic option available due to the semi-federated
nature of the empire. Such strategies worked well for Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad during
the earlier part of his reign, when he struggled to contain rebellious lords and the many intrigues of the
Abbasid Calif Al-Nasir of Baghdad. Such problems would define his first decade of rule from 1200 to
1210, and the intrigues of Calif Al-Nasir would persist beyond this first decade.31
The Siege of Jand
The siege of Jand was somewhat unique with respect to its conquest. The city was commanded
and governed by Qutlugh Khan. After learning of the events at Ashnas, Qutlugh chose to abandon the
city and its people. This left the city both defenseless and leaderless. The Mongols sent an envoy by the
name of Chin Temür to the city. He was tasked with speaking to the people of Jand and negotiating
their submission to the Khan. The people of Jand were very unreceptive and hostile to Temür’s offer.
He was able to narrowly avoid the same fate that had befallen Hasan Hajji at Suqnaq. He left the city
and informed the Mongols of Jand's situation: that it was without leadership and harbored a significant
degree of hostility towards the Mongols. On the 4th of Safar (April 12th, 1219), Chin Temür returned to
Jand with an army and laid siege to the city. Though leaderless, the people of Jand chose to resist the
Mongol army. However, the people of Jand lacked both military experience and the necessary
leadership needed to meaningfully resist. The Mongol army sent to besiege Jand surrounded the city
and deployed siege ladders to scale the walls in all directions. The walls were swiftly taken, the gates to
the city were opened, and all of the citizens were forced outside of the city walls. In an astonishing
departure from Mongol siege policy, the citizens of Jand were spared, with the exception of those who
had been most hostile and threatening towards Chin Temür. The city was ultimately ransacked for nine

31

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 57-70.

24

days, and control of the city was given to Ali Khwaja.32
The significance of Jand
Jand was significant in two ways. First, it was a significant departure from Mongol siege policy
where those who resisted Mongol conquest would be killed or forced into slavery. Second, it was the
first time a Khwarazmian commander, who had been appointed by Khwarazmshah Muhammad, had
abandoned his post before the arrival of the Mongol army.
For the Mongols, Jand was an excellent example of the flexibility with which their siege policy
was implemented. Since the main goal of capturing settlements was to take the resources present in that
place, it would be counter-productive to kill the inhabitants who produced those resources. Juvaini
recounted that the Mongols did not take any casualties while taking the city,33 and this likely
contributed to the flexibility pertaining to Jand.
For the Khwarazmians and Khwarazmshah Muhammad himself, this demonstrated a significant
issue with respect to those who were chosen to command and lead cities and territories of the
Khwarazmain state. Either Qutlugh's appointment was a political one (ie: his appointment was
necessary for the Khwarazmians to maintain control over Jand, or it was a Terken Khatun appointee),
or it was a misjudgment of Qutligh's ability to defend Jand. If it were the former, it demonstrated a
serious issue over Sultan Muhammad's ability to command and control his territory; whereas if it were
latter, then questions over the competence or abilities of other commanders under the Khwarazmian
banner would arise. Most likely it was both factors, given that the Khwarazmshah had spent many
years dealing with unreliable and sometimes rebellious shahs who had sought to challenge him
militarily. Those tasked with defending walled settlements were required to be able to manage rations,
troop location, and troop exhaustion, the objective being to outlast a besieging force so that either

32
33

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:171, [491-492]
Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 86-90.

25

disease or attrition forced an enemy to break off the siege. Such individuals would have needed to be
semi-competent at these three tasks, while also being sufficiently loyal to reduce the chances of
rebellion.
Fanakat
During the siege of Otrar, Chinggis Khan sent five thousand men led by Alaq Noyan, Siktür,
and Taghai in the direction of Fanakat, which was only one of many Khwarazmian fortresses. At
Fanakat, these three engaged the Khwarazmians, who were led by Elätgü Malik. Three days of intense
fighting ensued, and on the fourth day the Khwarazmians sought amnesty and surrendered to the
Mongols. As per Mongol siege policy, the civilians were separated for either slavery or impressment
into Mongol service. The Khwarazmain soldiers and their commanders who had fought against the
Mongols were executed by sword and arrow.34
Khujand (Kojend) and the resistance of Temür Malik
The city of Khujand is in modern-day Tajikistan. During Soviet times it was known as
Leninabad (Lenin town). The Khujand spelling is based upon the anglicized Russian Худжанд, In Farsi
(Persian) it is written as "‫ »خجند‬or anglicized (Khojand). The Mongols also captured the city of
Khujand. However, a significant number of citizens and Khwarazmian soldiers led by Temür Malik
escaped the city and took refuge at a reinforced fortress located on an island where the Syr Darya river
splits.35 This fortress was possibly on the island that is north of modern-day Spitamen (Спитамен) in
northern Tajikistan (west of Khujand). This was a highly defendable location. This meant it would be
easier for the defenders to frustrate Mongol attempts to besiege and capture the fort. This position was
unreachable by both arrows and rock-launching mechanical artillery. Juvaini’s description of this island
fortification is quite detailed, to the extent that it is possible to locate it with a fair degree of accuracy

34
35

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:172 [493]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:172 [493,494]

26

when comparing the written word to a map of the region.36 It is through this comparison that the Island
north of Spitamen was identified as a strong candidate for the fortress’s location.
To take this fortress, the Mongols sent reinforcements from other captured settlements
comprising of fifty thousand levies and fifteen thousand Mongol warriors, meaning that a total of
twenty thousand Mongol warriors were dedicated to this task.37 These levies were tasked with
transporting large rocks, with the objective of creating a land bridge and enabling the Mongol army to
cross onto the island with their men and siege equipment to swiftly take over the island fort.
However, Temür Malik was not idle. He had twelve ships constructed that were specifically
designed to thwart incendiary munitions such as flaming arrows. According to Rashid al-Din, this was
achieved by having these ships “roofed over and sealed with felt polished with clay and vinegar, and
provided with small ports.”38 These vessels were regularly deployed to disrupt the rock-bridge
construction and harass Mongol forces. This resistance continued until it was determined that the
defense of the fortress had become untenable. At this point, Temür organized an additional seventy
boats to enable the Khwarazmian escape. The warships were again deployed, this time to shield the
seventy boats and enable a successful escape.39
Upon discovering the fleeing Khwarazmians, the Mongol army gave chase. These boats sailed
in the direction of Fanakat. In a very Hollywood-esqe scene, Juvaini described a Mongol attempt to
stop the fleeing ships with a great chain that was drawn across the river. However, Temür Malik
allegedly broke this chain with his sword in a single blow.40 Mongol forces continued their harassment
of the fleeing Khwarzmians on both banks of the Syr Darya river.
Jochi, the son of Chinggis Khan and a commander of the Mongol army, acted to intercept

36

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:172 [493,494]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:172 [493,494]
38
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:172 [493,494]
39
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:172 [493,494]
40
Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 91-95.
37

27

Temür Malik when he had been made aware of this event. He prepared an ambush for Temür Malik,
consisting of a bridge made of boats, with Mongol warriors stationed on both sides of the river and
mobile siege weapons placed both on this bridge and on either side of the river.
Somehow, the Khwarazmians learned of this ambush and landed their fleet on the beach of a
large body of water close to Jand. Once they landed, the Khwarazmians began to flee on foot. It was
here that Temür Malik engaged in delaying actions with Mongol forces to enable the civilian elements
to escape. This delaying action lasted for several days, resulting in most of his men being killed and the
civilian elements being captured. Malik himself escaped with two arrows remaining and continued his
resistance against Mongol forces, later to make contact with Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad.41
Eventually, Temür would escape Khwarazm for a number of years until he returned to Khujand and
saw his son, who had become a loyal subject of the Qa'an (the prince/ governor) and who had also
earned himself the support of this Qa’an. News of Temür’s return spread, and he was captured for
interrogation. The prince, unhappy with his responses, killed Temür with an arrow.42
The significance of these sieges and the actions of Temür Malik
Details on the sieges of Fanakat and Khujand are relatively limited. They follow a similar
pattern to other Khwarazmian cities where there was resistance followed by surrender: the soldiers and
their commanders were executed by the Mongols and the civilian population was enslaved or pressed
into military service for the Mongols. What makes this particular part of the Mongol-Khwarazmian war
significant and interesting were the events surrounding Temür Malik and his resistance to Mongol
conquest.
There were a number of unique elements to Temür's resistance, firstly the use of the island
fortification. This particular region is dependent upon the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers and is in a

41
42

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:172 [494]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:172 [495,496]

28

mostly arid and mountainous region with a few lakes and reservoirs. Most settlement and farming
activity are thus closely connected to the river and lake systems. It was the only time that any such style
(naval-like combat) and location of a fortification (island) is mentioned by Juvaini and Hamadani with
respect to the Mongol's Khwarazmian campaign. Related to this river-based defense was the use of
specially built ships designed to screen, harass, delay, and frustrate Mongol attempts to take the fort. It
was significant enough that out of the roughly 94,000 Mongol warriors who had initially entered
Khwarazmian territory, 20,000 were dedicated specifically to deal with Temür's resistance. It also led to
the direct involvement of Chinggis Khan's son Jochi, indicating that this issue was significant enough
to merit diversion of Mongol men and resources and require his direct involvement.
The amount of detail and space dedicated to the story of Temür is of significant note as well.
Compared with the sieges of Fanakat and Khujand, far more information was dedicated to his
resistance. The details are rich and seemingly Hollywood-esque. The most obvious detail that seemed
questionable was the cutting of the anti-ship chain placed across the river being broken with the single
blow of a sword. If the chain were strong enough to halt the movement of several vessels, it was surely
strong enough to resist destruction by a single sword blow. This may have also been a literary device
used by Juvaini, as he was known to use flowery language in his historical account. Juvaini's account
also does not detail where the seventy additional ships in his account come from. He simply stated that
the first twelve were constructed at the fort itself and that the seventy other vessels (small boats and
rafts) were delivered in the night.
The relationship of these events to the military defeat of the Khwarazmian state
With respect to the military defeat of the Khwarazmian state, the sieges of Fanakat, Khujand,
and the resistance of Temür Malik only served to delay (and not defeat) Mongol forces. The Mongol
strategy of forcing captured levies to serve as cannon fodder and front-line troops meant that with each
settlement and fortification taken, their army grew larger and the manpower available to the

29

Khwarazmian state grew exponentially smaller. The Mongol strategy in essence led to a snowballing
effect that became increasingly difficult for the Khwarazmian state to counter. The Khwarazmian city
defense strategy, which appears to have been born of its semi-federated nature in combination with
difficulties in raising a concentrated force to counter the Mongol army, was in the process of collapsing
with the fall of each settlement and the destruction of soldiers and their commanders at each settlement
taken. The loss of professional and experienced soldiers and commanders was one that the
Khwarazmian state could not easily absorb.
The significance of these events for the Mongols
The resistance of Temür Malik represented a significant strength in the flexibility and speed of
Mongol strategy and field tactics. They were able to swiftly organize a response to the challenge posed
by the island fortification. The rapid deployment of levy's from as far away as Otrar to deliver rocks for
the creation of a land bridge. The movement of an additional 15,000 Mongol warriors, constituted
overwhelming numbers with which to limit the impact of Temür's resistance. The constant harassment
of Temür's forces as he sailed down the river to escape, the deployment of chains to halt the boats, and
a bridge blockade of boats cobbled together for an ambush were all for dealing with his resistance. The
mobile and rapid deployment of forces to problem areas allowed the Mongols to respond effectively to
Temür's crafty resistance.

Capture of Zarnuq and Nur
Chinggis Khan gave the responsibility of besieging Otrar to his sons Ogodai and Chaghatai.
Mongol forces led directly by Chinggis Khan himself and his son Tolui moved to conqueror the cities
of Zarnuq and Nur, eventually reaching the gates of the ancient city of Bukhara.43

43

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:173 [496-497]

30

Zarnuq
The arrival of the Mongol army came as a great surprise to the people of Zarnuq, and many fled
into the fortress. An emissary by the name of Danishmand was sent by Chinggis Khan to inform the
people of Zarnuq of the Khan's arrival and present them with two options: surrender and submission to
Mongol rule to ensure the safety of their lives and property, or resistance that would result in him
“turning the plain into an Oxus of blood.” The leaders of Zarnuq met with the Khan and presented gifts.
The men were brought outside of the city, and some were assigned to serve as levies under the Mongol
banners.44
Nur
The city of Nur can be found in northern Iran on the southern bank of the Caspian Sea.
However, the city called Nur in the time of Juvaini is known today as Norata in south-central
Uzbekistan. With the assistance of a Turcoman guide, the Khan's army moved in the direction of Nur.
Much like Zarnuq, an emissary of the Khan was sent by the name of Dayir Bahadur. He informed the
people of Nur of the Khan's arrival and presented a deal similar to that of Danishmand. Like Zarnuq,
they too presented food and gifts to the Khan in submission to him.
The significance of Zarnuq and Nur (Norata)
These places are significant as they present examples of Mongol siege policy in which the
inhabitants chose not to resist the Mongol army. As we see in these examples, settlements that chose to
submit tended to remain intact, and their able-bodied men were not always pressed into Mongol
service.
It also demonstrated what happened when the population of a city chose not to kill the Mongol
emissary and instead to heed their offer. In Suqnaq, the people had both refused the Mongol envoy and

44

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:173 [497]

31

even attempted to kill him, and this led to the Mongols besieging the city, killing its leaders and those
who sought to kill the emissary, ransacking the city, and forcing able-bodied men into serving as levies.
The ability to make examples of those who submitted and those who resisted Mongol conquest
proved to be useful to the Mongol army as it encouraged settlements to submit. Submission was far
faster and much more cost-effective for both conquered and conqueror, and it allowed the Mongols to
save time and the blood of its forces, while also gaining manpower and economic resources. Such
resources would be thus denied to the Khwarazmains.
For the Khwarazmian Empire it represented another weakness in its defensive strategy. It was
dependent on every settlement resisting the Mongol army to maximize attrition and opportunities for
disease to breakout. However, if settlements surrendered as they had done here, then the Mongols not
only did not incur attrition, but they also gained additional resources, thus allowing them to continue in
their war efforts.
The siege of Bukhara
Following the submissions of Nur and Zurnuq, Chinggis Khan's army arrived at the gates of
Bukhara, and by Muharram 617 (March 1220) the city was encircled by the Mongol army. The
Khwarazmian army dedicated to the city's defense numbered twenty thousand strong. Led by Kök
Khan and a few other amirs, they attempted to escape the city by night but were caught while crossing
a river by the Mongols and were killed. The city gates were opened ,and both Chinggis Khan and Tolui
Khan stopped at its Grand Mosque.45
The city of Bukhara was looted, and the spoils were placed inside the Mosque (Masjed), and the
singers and dancers of the city were brought there as well. Sayyids (alleged descendants of the prophet
Muhammad himself and held a societal rank similar to that of a European lord), learned men, sheikhs

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:174 [498] , Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 97109.
45

32

(tribal chiefs or members of the royal family), and beasts of burden (oxen, horses, and donkeys); were
humbled by being made to follow the commands of the singers and dancers.46
After the Mosque party, Chinggis Khan left the city and ordered the common people outside to
hear a speech. In this famous speech, he proclaimed: “O people, know that you are great sinners, and
your leaders are at the head of the pack in sin. You may ask me why I say this. I say it because I am the
scourge of God. If great sins had not been committed by you, the great God would not have sent you
one like me as torment.”47
Following this famous speech, he summoned wealthy Bukharin's with orders to have all of their
wealth stripped away. Once this had been completed, the city was raised to the ground, with only
buildings of brick and the central mosque surviving. Finally, Chinggis Khan ordered the people of
Bukhara to take the citadel, which was the singular point of armed resistance against the Mongols in
the city48.
On both sides, catapults, bows, and stones were hurled at each other as the people of Bukhara
were forced to say siege to the city's citadel. In response, the defenders threw containers of flammable
oil (like a crudely processed petroleum oil (Нафт, Naft) at the besiegers. After an unspecified amount
of time, the defenders became exhausted, the moat around the citadel was filled with the dead and
mortally injured, and the citadel was taken. The lords who had hidden in the citadel were executed and
the Qanqlis (royal guard) taller than a whip were also executed. Over thirty thousand men were
executed, and the women and children were taken as slaves. The walls of the city were leveled and the
young men among the surviving besiegers were pressed into Levy service to the town of Dabusiyya.49

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:174 [499] , Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 97109.
47
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:174 [499] , Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 97109.
48
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:174 [499] , Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 97109.
49
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:174 [500] , Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 97109.
46

33

Significance of Bukhara
Of the many battles fought and cities taken during the Mongol-Khwarazm war, the events at
Bukhara were both strange and unique.
For Mongol siege policy, it represented a new precedent: Even if the main part of the city and
its populace surrendered, if the citadel and the city's rulers continued to resist; the city as a whole
would still be treated as if it had resisted. That is to say, the city was to be looted, able-bodied men
were to be pressed into Mongol service as levies, the leaders and army that resisted were to be
executed, and finally, the women and children of the settlement were sold into slavery.
This seemed like a strange departure from the standard policy as demonstrated before, where
willful capitulation led to the preservation of property and the civilian population not being sold into
slavery. Thus, it would appear that incomplete submission was insufficient to secure the Khan's mercy.
The siege of Bukhara was also the first time that Chinggis Khan openly declared himself the
vengeance of God.
The strategic significance of this speech was that it augmented Mongol siege policy through the
use of fear in the context of religious expression. By this point in the conflict, the Mongols had taken a
number of cities either by capitulation or force, and word of what happened had spread within the
Khwarazmian empire. By calling himself and his Mongol army the vengeance of God, the Great Khan
managed to generate additional fear, which in theory meant less resistance and more capitulation from
Khwarazmian settlements. Technologically, Bukhara is interesting as it was the first time that
petroleum-based weapons had been mentioned and deployed.
For the Khwarazmians, the fall of Bukhara represented a major setback militarily and
economically. Bukhara was a major trading and religious center, and according to Juvaini, upon the
Mongol arrival to the city there were 50,000 soldiers who had been tasked with defending the city,

34

while 20,000 of them had been killed trying to escape alongside their amirs and 30,000 of them had
retreated into the citadel without a fight. It still represented a significant loss of manpower for the
Khwarazmian state. At the beginning of the conflict, the size of the Khwarazmian army was
approximately 375,000 to 400,000 men.50 The loss of 50,000 men was equal to between twelve and
thirteen percent of Khwarazm's total military manpower. Soldiers also had to be paid and fed. The
taking of Bukhara meant the Khwarazmian state was deprived of a key source of income needed to
fund and maintain its military efforts against the Mongols.
Samarkand (Samarqand)
Following the events at Bukhara, Chinggis Khan moved his army towards Samarkand. The
army defending Samarkand was immense, totaling 110,000 men, among them 60,000 Turkish warriors
and sixty “Demon-shaped elephants.” Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad had concentrated a
considerable amount of manpower in this place.51
By the time of his arrival, the sons and commanders who had been sent to secure the
surrounding settlements had rejoined their forces with the addition of their captured levies. This
recombined and reinforced army totally encircled the city of Samarkand. With the defenders having no
means of escaping the city itself, Chinggis Khan himself set out to survey the defenses of the city to
find the best way of taking it.52
During this period of survey, Mongol intelligence reported that the Khwarazmshah himself was
not in Samarkand. In response, Chinggis Khan sent a force of 30,000 men led by Jäbä Bahadur and
Subätäi Bahadur in pursuit of Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad. With each passing day, Mongol
reinforcements arrived at Samarkand. On the fourth day, Mongol and Khwarazmian forces clashed in

50
51
52

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 86.
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:174 [501], Juwayni and Muhammad, The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, 1:71-114.
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:174 [501], Juwayni and Muhammad, The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, 1:71-114.

35

battle outside the city gates. The battle was costly for both parties, but the results were indecisive.53
On the fifth day, Chinggis Khan himself personally took to the field and forced the defenders to
once again engage Mongol forces in the field outside the city gate. Like the previous day, there were
many losses and no decisive winner. The fighting did, however, have a physiological effect on the
population of Samarkand. This mixture of fear, uncertainty, and desire for self-preservation led to
internal divisions and the development of factions amongst the people of Samarkand. The unity of the
city and its ability to resist the Mongol army had been damaged.54
On the sixth day, the Mongol army began to assault the city again as they had in the previous
days. However, a shaikhu'l-islam (a very high-ranking Islamic scholar and Islamic authority) and a
group of other people came to Chinggis Khan to negotiate protection and amnesty for the 50,000
people who were allied with this Shaikh, in exchange for opening the city gates to the Mongols.55
Mongol forces entered the city and then drove the civilians outside the city apart from the
Shaikh and his compatriots. The city was then looted and its defenses leveled. Those who hid from the
Mongols were killed, and the Khwarazmian elephants were set loose to forage and starve to death.
Only the central fortress and citadel were left to resist capture by the Mongol army, but after a fierce
period of fighting which resulted in the total destruction of the citadel, Mosque, and water canal, the
last points of resistance were captured.56
The people of the citadel were taken to the plains outside the city where the Turks and Tajiks
were separated. The Turks had their heads shaved in a specific way and the rest were killed, 30,000
men and twenty Khwarazmian commanders in total.57 The heads of the Turks were shaved in a specific
way to mark them as defeated and shamed warriors, persons who would serve the Khan and his armies

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:175 [501], Juwayni and Muhammad, The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, 1:71-114.
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:175 [502], Juwayni and Muhammad, The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, 1:71-114.
55
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:175 [502], Juwayni and Muhammad, The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, 1:71-114.
56
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:175 [502], Juwayni and Muhammad, The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, 1:71-114.
57
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:175 [503], Juwayni and Muhammad, The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, 1:71-114.
53
54

36

from then on, and people who had been separated from Khwarazmian soldiers, who had been put to the
sword.
Like other cities captured by the Mongols, the craftsmen were identified and distributed among
the various commanders, as were the women and children who became enslaved. The able-bodied men
who were not craftsmen served as additional levies to the Mongol army as described by both Juvaini
and Rashid al-Din Hamadani.58 According to Rene Grousset’s account, a remaining 50,000 prisoners
were allowed to buy their freedom for a price of 200,000 Dinars.59 This implies that the destruction of
cities may not have been as absolute as Juvaini, Juzjani, and Hamadani would have readers believe.
The significance of Samarkand
For the Khwarazmians, the loss of Samarkand was even greater than that of Bukhara. Over
110,000 men highly trained and skilled in warfare were permanently lost. This loss represented a loss
of between twenty-seven and twenty-nine percent of the Khwarazmian Empire's total estimated
military strength, originally numbering roughly 375,000 to 400,000, according to estimates.60 Between
just Bukhara and Samarkand, the Khwarazmian state had lost roughly forty percent of its overall
fighting capacity. What was more, while the Khwarazmins were losing a significant percentage of their
manpower, the Mongol army had continued to grow in size. The use of levies meant that the Mongol
army could use the captured manpower of the Khwarazmian state against it.
What made Samarkand unique besides the incredible loss in manpower for the Khwarazmian
state was the fact that it was the first time a Khwarazmian army engaged the Mongols in a field outside
of the city. This occurred not once but twice. The truly fascinating thing from Juvaini and Hamadani’s
accounts is that it was not a one-sided affair in favor of the Mongol army. They specifically stated that
both sides incurred serious losses, with defeat only coming as a consequence of treachery. This implied
58
59
60

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:175 [503], Juwayni and Muhammad, The Tarikh-i-Jahan-Gusha, 1:71-114.
Grousset, Rene. Conqueror of The World, 61:226.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 86.

37

that had the Khwarazmians organized their forces and fought the Mongols in the field more often and
before the battle at Samarkand, the course of this conflict could have been dramatically different. This
would not be unreasonable given that before Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad rebelled against
the mighty steppe empire of the Qara Khitai, he had worked with them in conquering the region made
up of modern Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan. The army of Khwarazm and its Shah were familiar
with the field tactics of nomadic steppe peoples. However, such a possibility had long passed by the
time the Mongol army had reached Samarkand.
The policy of city defense, designed to wear out and weaken a besieging force, had failed. It is
unknown whether this policy was one made by choice and considered the best option or if it was the
only available option as a consequence of internal political and bureaucratic challenges.
For the Mongol army and for Chinggis Khan himself, the capture of Samarkand within one
week was an immense accomplishment. In theory, with a defending army of 110,000; it should have
taken many months to several years to take the city, but it fell in a week. Capturing the most welldefended city with the largest contingent of the Khwarazmian army in such a short period of time,
meant that Mongol casualties were relatively light compared with the losses that a prolonged siege
would normally entail. In a prolonged siege, the defenders could wear down the attackers and use
fortifications as a force-multiplying tool. The use of flammable liquids and stones on the enemy from a
protected position would be just one such example. Those besieging a city need a place to relieve
themselves, eat, and encamp between engagements and patrolling duties. Most siege camps of this time
were not as well organized as the Roman castra system of the Republican and early Imperial periods.
Besiegers would often be faced with threats such as disease and contamination of food, water, or both.
These threats could wipe out a camp or weaken it to the point where the defenders could sally forth and
defeat the survivors. By taking the city so quickly, the threat of such an outcome was minimized if not
outright eliminated.

38

It was important for Mongol siege policy as well in that enemy traitors were rewarded with
protection in exchange for their help. Usually, when a city chose to resist the Mongol army, all of its
inhabitants would be subject to the standard punishments of death or servitude. Yet in this instance,
those willing to betray the Khwarazmians were rewarded.
In the broader context of Mongol history under Chinggis Khan, the choice to reward these
traitors seemed to run counter to his own policy. There exists a passage in the Secret History of the
Mongols in which warriors betray their master and present his head to Chinggis Khan as an offering of
their servitude and support, and in response Chinggis Khan had these men executed for laying hands on
their khan. He stated that those who would betray their master would also likely betray him and that
such disloyal persons were unworthy to live61. As such, the act of rewarding treachery seems
contradictory. However, on a pragmatic level, it makes sense.
Given the circumstances of facing a multi-month or year-long siege, the act of rewarding those
who betrayed the Khwarazmshah was seen as a means of setting a precedent. That precedent being the
very real possibility of other settlements that engaged in resistance succumbing to the same issue of
betrayal. It would also serve to undermine the unity of the remaining Khwarazmian states/cities as
issues of trust and the reward for betrayal were so great.
The events after Samarkand
By 1221, Chinggis Khan's Mongol army had conquered well over half of the Khwarazmian
Empire, and Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad was on the run with a force of 30,000 Mongol
warriors led by Jäbä Bahadur and Subätäi Bahadur in hot pursuit.
Chinggis Khan sent Tolui to capture “Khorasan, Merv, Herat, Nishapur, Sarakhs, and those
territories.” The city of Merv was taken without a fight in 1221, and the entire population of the city

61

Onon, Professor Urgunge, and Onon, Urgunge. 2001. The Secret History of the Mongols : The Life and Times of
Chinggis Khan. London: Taylor & Francis Group. Accessed July 10, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central. 11, 184-191

39

was killed with the exception of four hundred artisans.62 Nishapur resisted but fell in 1221 and, like
Merv, saw its entire population slaughtered.63 At Herat the Khwarazmian soldiers resisted Tolui and
the civilian population had opened the city gates to the Mongols, and the Khwarazmian soldiers were
killed and the inhabitants spared.64 Meanwhile, Jochi, Chaghatai, and Ogodai were instructed to
capture the Khwarazmian capital Khwarazm (Khiva). Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad was in
the city of Termez (located on the southernmost tip of Uzbekistan) when Bukhara and Samarqand
fell.65
He evaded assassination by his mother's relatives. As he traveled to Nishapur, he instructed each
place along the way to reinforce their defenses in preparation for a Mongol attack. The pursuing
Mongols reach Balkh, and there aid was given to the Mongols by the leaders, and a special Mongol
representative called a shahna was appointed. The people of Balkh would later resist Mongol rule, and
after a three-day siege the town was burned to the ground. As the Mongols closed in on Nishapur,
Khwarazmshah Muhammad headed towards the fortress of Farzin, while he sent his mother, wife,
concubines, and children to the Qarun fortress.66
Losing an army and being forced to rebuild was something the Khwarazmshah had encountered
before in the first decade of his rule.67 As such, he would not give up so easily. He attempted to rebuild
his army in Persia. He consulted with the Malik of Hazarasf Lur, who had given him advice that had
been intended to open hostilities between the Khwarazmshah and the Atabeg of Fars province.68 This
perfectly exemplified the issues Khwarazmshah Muhammad had regarding the loyalty of his subjects,
who were more interested in how they would use the Khwarazmshah to further their own agendas.

62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Grouseet, The Empire of the Steppes, 240.
Grouseet, The Empire of the Steppes, 241.
Grouseet, The Empire of the Steppes, 241.
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:176 [505]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:176 [506]
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 57-70.
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:176,177 [507]

40

When his Mongol pursuers reached the city of Nishapur they sent emissaries to the city's rulers,
and they told said leaders that they were to surrender to the Mongols, provide them material support,
and not resist because neither walls nor fortifications would be able to save them. If they were to follow
Mongol instructions, they would in exchange be spared both their lives and their property. The
emissaries emphasized that “The surface of the earth has been given to us by God.”69
This declaration was reiterated many times to the many settlements that the Mongol pursuers
came across. They also followed through on these threats to those who had chosen to resist, for
example the village of Tus located north of the Iranian city of Mashhad. They chose to resist, and the
village was totally destroyed. The Mongol pursuers proceeded in a northwesterly direction, towards
Khabushan (what is known today as Quchan). They too resisted and fared the same as Tus.70
Having failed in his efforts to rebuild his army, partly due to internal bickering amongst those
who were supposed to have pledged their fealty to him, the Khwarazmshah was forced to continue his
retreat westwards through northern Iran, eventually escaping to an island in the Caspian Sea.71
During this time, Mongol forces managed to capture the fortresses where Khwarazmshah
Mohammad had sent his wife, mother, children, concubines, and his wealth for their safety. Upon
learning that both fortresses had fallen to the Mongols, he knew for certain that his wife and concubines
had been violated. He also realized that the Mongols would have killed his children. Before
succumbing to his illness, Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad declared that his son Jallal ad-Din
Menkuberni was to be his successor. Shortly after, he died on that island and was buried there.
However, his son Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din would later have his body moved to the fortress of
Ardihin located north of the Iranian city of Hamedan.72

69
70
71
72

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:176,177 [507]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:177 [508]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:177,178 [509]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:178 [510]

41

Khwarazmian resistance did not end with the death of Ala ad-Din. His Son Jallal ad-Din
Menkuberni would famously resist the Mongols and fight them out in the fields with some success.
However, he was ultimately defeated at the Battle of the Indus River, where he was forced to flee and
wandered around to various kingdoms in the Caucasus region until being killed by a Kurdish man
seeking to steal his wares.
Each city between the Mongols and the Khwarazmshah was given the ultimatum that made up
the core of the Mongol siege policy. Some accepted quickly, others initially accepted and then resisted
later, and others chose to resist from the outset. The standard rules associated with those who resisted
applied here. Unlike previous sieges where there was a bit of a divergence from the core of the policy
itself with respect to how resisters were treated, in these instances there was no divergence whatsoever.
Those who resisted were enslaved, forced into levies, or killed off.
The mixed reactions in the various towns that were told to resist were quite telling with
respect to the kind of power and influence the Khwarazmshah really had over his empire. That is to say,
it was quite limited, and it can be explained by the young and semi-federated nature of this empire.
This is especially true of the areas which make up modern-day Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, as
this area had really only been conquered and incorporated into the Khwarazmian empire since
1205/1206. The previous rulers were the Ghurids, who had rebelled against the Ghaznavid Empire in
1186. These same Ghurids had given Ala ad-Din Muhammad a significant amount of trouble, given
that he had to put down a rebellion shortly beforehand.73

73

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 57-70.

42

The significance of Sultan Muhammad's retreat and the capture of more Khwarazmian settlements
Even though the regions that make up modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran were part of the
Khwarazmian Empire and had been so for roughly fifteen to twenty years, his real base of power and
the core of his direct imperial holdings were the territories that constitute the Central Asian states of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. When he attempted to rebuild his
army, Sultan Muhammad consulted a person who was far more interested in dividing the empire by
provoking the ruler of Fars province. This meant that Sultan Muhammad's control over these territories
was largely in name only. Consequently, it would have been extremely difficult if not impossible for
him to raise a new army with which to repel the Mongols and retake all of his lost territory.
For the Khwarazmian state, the inability to raise a new army due to these internal divisions
meant that the war was effectively over and that the Mongol armies would continue to dismantle the
empire piece by piece. Thus, it demonstrated the fundamental issue of how the state itself had been
organized. This semi-decentralized system had allowed these internal divisions to brew and cause the
warlord-nobility to ignore the requests of the Sultan and the threat of the Mongol horde.
For the Mongol Empire, Sultan Muhammad's retreat and inability to raise a new army proved to
be a significant boon. Like a snowball effect, the pursuing Mongol army of 30,000 men had been able
to secure large swaths of Khwarazmian territory and force the surrender of many settlements and
fortresses, to the point that they were able to capture the Khwarazmshah's wife, concubines, mother,
children, and wealth.
Mongol siege policy and experience in besieging Khwarazmian settlements had also made the
Mongol military machine extraordinarily efficient. Settlements that resisted were taken in a matter of
days, as was the case at Balkh. In so doing, the Mongol army was able to weaken the Khwarazmian
state at tremendous speed to the point where it could not resist, and then retake its lost territory. The last
Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din Menkuberni’s resistance and limited successes against Mongol rule would

43

become quite legendary, and many poems would be written about him and his exploits. Still, by the
time of his rise as Khwarazmshah, the state had been militarily broken.
The deeds of Chinggis Khan’s other sons at this time and the Siege of Khiva
After the successful conquest of Samarkand, Chinggis Khan sent his sons Jochi, Chaghatai, and
Ögödei to Khwarazm itself and its capital Khiva. It was located between northern Turkmenistan and
western Uzbekistan. According to Rashid al-Din, the Khan had sent an army “as numerous as the sands
of the desert.”74
The battle began with Mongol scouts arriving in Khwarazm proper, and they acted as bait to
draw out the defending Khwarazmians.75 Approximately 100,000 Khwarazmians were killed and
Mongol forces had entered the city, temporarily capturing a city gate before subsequently leaving prior
to sunset. The next day, the Shah's army and an additional five hundred horsemen retook the lost gate
and prepared to resist the Mongols. Upon the arrival of Chinggis Khan's sons, the city was encircled
and emissaries sent forth bearing the standard message soliciting the Khwarazmians to surrender. Due
to the lack of rocks in the area surrounding the city, the Mongol army chose to cut down Mulberry trees
for use as catapult munitions. Once the levies arrived, they and three thousand Mongols were put to
work building a large trench to divert water away from the city, thus depriving the inhabitants of clean
water and sanitation, with the intent of causing either starvation or disease to befall the defenders.
However, the defenders were able to ambush the Mongols and disrupt the trench-building efforts.76
Infighting among the sons of Chinggis Khan allowed the Khwarazmians to kill a staggering
number of Mongol warriors. These two issues persisted for seven months, and it became so significant
that a messenger was sent stating that the city itself could not be taken. In response, Tolui was sent to
end the infighting and take command of the Mongol forces at Khiva. Under Tolui the city was swiftly
74
75
76

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44

taken, and he burned each quarter of the city that was captured with naptha (petroleum fireweapons).77
Unlike other cities besieged by the Mongols, the fighting at Khiva/ Khwarazm was far more
intense. Resistance from the inhabitants was so fierce that the city had to be taken house by house. This
house-to-house fighting lasted for seven days. Once the entire city had been taken, the survivors were
driven to the plains on the outskirts of the city. The people were segregated, with 100,000 craftsmen
and tradesmen sent to the east, women and children taken prisoner, and the remaining inhabitants
executed. As was standard practice at this point for any city that resisted, the city was looted and
destroyed.78
The significance of Khwarazm/ Khiva's capture
The siege of Khwarazm/Khiva was one of the longest and deadliest sieges in the conflict. It was
one of the few instances of a dedicated Khwarazmian resistance facing a Mongol army that was totally
incohesive. The craftiness of the defenders enabled them to disrupt Mongol attempts to cut off the
water supply, and their skill in causing enough Mongol casualties to jeopardize their efforts in taking
the city. The issue became so serious that Chinggis Khan himself had to send Tolui and some of his
forces to remedy the situation.
Mongol fears of a long-drawn-out siege with house-to-house fighting, which had been
envisioned for Samarkand, were realized at Khiva. While Samarkand fell quickly, the fierce fighting at
Khiva meant it would take seven days of constant fighting to take the city, even after having been
actively besieged for a full seven months.
What was Khiva's strategic significance?
The events at Khiva demonstrated to a fair extent that the policy of city defense undertaken by
Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad was not a totally foolish or shortsighted strategy. In theory, if

77
78

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:179 [514-515]
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45

all settlements had resisted in the way that the capital had, then it may have been possible to wear the
Mongols down militarily, forcing either some sort of negotiated settlement or causing a temporary
retreat. But none of these scenarios materialized. The Khwarazmian forces of the cities that resisted
would fight and cause some casualties among the Mongols, but the inhabitants themselves would not
resist the Mongols to the extent of the house-to-house fighting that had been seen at Khiva. Attempts by
civilians alone to resist the Mongols in places such as Jand, where the Khwarazmian commander and
his forces had abandoned the city, were insufficient.
For the Mongols, the siege of Khawarazm/Khiva demonstrated the consequences of disunity
among their commanders. Where other more powerful cities fell in a matter of days, this city took
months and cost the Mongols far more blood than elsewhere. It also demonstrated that the Mongol
siege policy, heretofore successful, was beginning to wane in its effectiveness. The fierce, dedicated,
and crafty resistance shown by those defending the capital was even greater than the resistance
mounted by Temür Malik at Khojend (Khujand).
For the Khwarazmians, the fall of the capital did not signal the end of the war, and the new
Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din would continue his resistance against the Mongols. He would marry the
daughter of an important Amir and attempt to build a new army with which he intended to fight the
Mongols in the field. There are a few major points of interest with respect to the resistance of Jallal adDin; first was the engagement in open field battles and the use of hit-and-run tactics, a significant
departure in strategy when compared to that of his father, who had preferred attrition through city
defense. Secondly, his resistance fueled rebellions in places that had been taken by the Mongols by
both submission and conquest. Finally, these rebellions showed the waning success of Mongol siege
policy.
Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din
After the fall of Khiva, Chinggis Khan and his Mongol armies rested in 1221. The new

46

Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-din had traveled from the island in the Caspian sea to the city of Ghazni, and
there he was joined by Khan Malik of Merv and the Turcoman chieftain Sayfuddin Ughraq, each
bringing 40,000 men with them. The amirs of Ghor with their armies eventually also reached Ghazni,79
and while the Great Khan and his armies rested, Jallal ad-Din was busy rebuilding the Khwarazmian
army, a process that consisted of drawing lords, warlords, and tribal chiefs to his banner. The soldiers
were far more loyal to their lord than they were to the Khwarazmshah emperor.
The Battle of Parvan (Parwan)
A force of approximately 29,000 Mongol warriors led by Shigi Qutuqu and Qutuqu Noyan was
in hot pursuit of Khan Malik and his army. Upon Khan Malik’s arrival of Ghazni, he warned Jallal adDin of this pursuing force. The Mongols pursued Khan Malik for his feigned submission, abandonment
of Merv, and the movement of his army towards Jallal ad-Din.80 Khan Malik had essentially submitted
on the basis that he would keep his army, and thus his options, open. It allowed him to minimize risk
while he considered whether he should maintain his submission or join the new Khwarazmshah. His
movements to Ghazni suggested that Khan Malik believed his ambitions would be best served with
Jallal ad-Din.
With this Mongol army in pursuit, Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din organized his forces in
preparation for battle, meeting them at Parwan. To his left flank was Khan Malik, and on his right flank
was Sayfuddin Malik. The first day of battle proved inconclusive. Borrowing a trick from Chinggis
Khan's playbook, the Mongols decided to mask their numbers through the construction of straw men.
This was intended to make their army appear far larger than it actually was and thus intimidate the
Khwarazmians.81
On the following day, Jallal ad-Din chose to make use of his superior numbers and ordered an
79
80
81

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attack that encircled the Mongols. The terrain at Parwan was extremely uneven, and there were rocks,
hills, and frequent holes or deep depressions on the ground. This terrain greatly decreased the
effectiveness and mobility of the Mongol forces, especially the mounted troops. This resulted in many
Mongol warriors falling off their horses, which in turn led to the Khwarazmians killing a significant
number of Mongols and forcing them into retreat. With this stunning victory came the spoils of war,
such as a fine Arabian horse that both Khan Malik and Sayfuddin Ugraq desired. The resultant
squabble between the two men over the horse led to Khan Malik striking Sayfuddin. Jallal ad-Din was
unable to mediate this conflict and preserve the unity of his forces. As a consequence, Sayfuddin Ugraq
and his 40,000 men left.82
The significance of the Battle of Parwan for the Khwarazmains
The battle of Parwan was the first major victory against the Mongols, both in a field battle and
in war more generally. It demonstrated that the Khwarazmian forces in the field had the capacity to
defeat or inflict severe casualties upon the Mongols. However, Jallal ad-Din's inability to mediate the
conflict between Khan Malik and Sayfuddin Ughraq resulted in the latter leaving. This greatly
weakened Jallal ad-Din's military strength at a point when growing the size of his forces was critical for
the goal of defeating the Mongols and retaking lost Khwarazmian territory. It also clearly demonstrated
the most fundamental problem in the Khwarazmian Empire’s semi-federated organization: lords and
warlords choosing whether or not to fight under the banner of the Khwarazmshah. This meant that
gathering and concentrating forces for a field battle was far more difficult, as they would have to agree
to bring their army. For Jallal ad-Din, failure to keep these lords happy led to the loss of roughly half
his army.

82

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:182 [524]

48

For the Mongols
The defeat at Parwan came as a great surprise to the Mongols. Up until this point in the
Khwarazmian campaign, almost all the battles were sieges with the exceptions of Temür Malik's
resistance at Khujand and the defense of Samarqand, the latter of which had both field fighting and
siege warfare. In these events the Mongol army was victorious. The impact of this defeat for the
Mongols was significant enough that Chinggis Khan personally led an army to attack Jallal ad-Din and
put an end to his resistance. The battle of Parwan was the second to last major military engagement of
the Khwarazmian campaign for the Mongols, the Battle of the Indus River being the final major
engagement.
News of Khwarazmian victory at Parwan led some conquered cities to revolt. These revolts
were quickly crushed, and in their wake the inhabitants faced the same consequences as those cities
that had initially resisted the Mongols. The major consequence of these uprisings for the Mongols
related to their siege policy. Up until this point, the policy was to demand that a city surrender, and if
the city accepted, in exchange the inhabitants would remain unmolested. These uprisings caused a
significant shift in how Mongol forces dealt with the capture of cities. In short, cities that surrendered
would be subject to a similar fate to those who resisted. The revolts had demonstrated to the Mongols
that even if a city and its leadership submitted to Mongol rule, there was no guarantee that they would
remain loyal. At the first hint that the Mongol fortunes may turn for the worse, these cities had revolted.
This policy change indicated that even if submitted cities wanted to revolt, they would not be able to as
they lacked the requisite defenses and manpower. Juvaini noted this change in policy and stated, “Since
destiny held them captive, surrender availed them not, neither could they rely on submission and
abasement;” and that “Jallal ad-Din was still casting confusion and disorder into those regions.”83 This
issue of rebellion was so serious for Chinggis Khan that when the people of Balkh submitted to the

83

Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 130-133.

49

Khan, he had them driven out of the city and into the fields, where all men, women, and children were
put to the sword.
The killings at Balkh and the larger rebellions that occurred demonstrated that the Mongol siege
policy was beginning to fail. The policy was effective as it pertained to dealing with cities that resisted
as they would be unable to rebel. However, with respect to submission, the policy was very dependent
on the leadership and the populace's willingness to adhere to their commitments. Submission was to be
a byproduct of either honor or fear. Loyalty, even during the time of Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din
Mohammad, was a fickle thing, and fear fell by the wayside for some at the news of Jallal ad-Din's
victory at Parwan, thinking that he might be able to come with a great army and retake all of
Khwarazm. Thus, Mongol siege policy was abandoned with some aspects of it being sporadically
applied. As a consequence, both cities that did resist and those that did surrender suffered the same fate:
men killed, women and children enslaved, craftsmen forced into service, and able-bodied men being
put to work in the levy. Authors H. Desmond Martin and Ruth Dunell challenge the extent to which
cities that resisted were actually destroyed.84 How can cities be repopulated so quickly to the point that
rebellion is once again possible? It does suggest that the degree of destruction in some cases may have
been exaggerated by the primary sources. Dunell suggests that the survivors of sieges who were not
enslaved or killed were allowed to repopulate cities under the control of a Mongol governor and
garrison.85 This means that men who were not able-bodied and women not wanted as slaves may have
been spared and left to repopulate the city.

84
85

Dunnell, Ruth. Chinggis Khan World Conqueror. New Jersey: Longman (Pearson) Publications, 2010. 4:78-83, Martin
H. Desmond. The Rise of Chingis Khan and His Conquest of North China. New York: Octagon Books, 1971. 32
Dunnell, Ruth, Chinggis Khan World Conqueror, 78-83

50

Battle of the Indus River
In response to the surprising defeat at Parwan, Chinggis Khan himself gathered his army and
moved to confront Jallal ad-Din.86 When news of Chinggis Khan's advance reached Khwarazmshah
Jallal ad-Din, he decided to take his remaining forces in the direction of Ghazni with the intent of
crossing the Indus River.87 Joined by his sons, Chinggis Khan moved in pursuit of the fleeing Jallal adDin, whose crossing of the Indus had been delayed by the slow rate of boat construction. Such boats
were important for transporting men, money, and supplies across the river. Troops at the tail end of
Jallal ad-Din's army engaged Mongol scouts. The survivors of this Mongol scouting party reported
Jallal ad-Din's location to the Khan. Upon learning Jallal ad-Din's location, Chinggis Khan moved at
great speed through the night. In doing so, he managed to catch up to the Khwarazmians, and by
morning Jallal ad-Din’s army had been sandwiched between the Indus River to the south and the army
of Chinggis Khan to the north.88
Before the battle began, Chinggis Khan gave his men explicit orders that the Khwarazmshah
was to be taken alive. The battle itself began with Mongol forces working to envelop the
Khwarazmians, and this included capturing the beachhead between the river and the Khwarazmian
army, an action that would prevent their escape via the Indus River. As this was happening, Mongol
forces attacked the Khwarazmain right flank led by Khan Malik. His forces were wiped out, and he
himself was killed while attempting to flee to Peshawar. The Khwarazmain left flank shared a similar
fate. In the center, Jallal ad-Din and seven hundred men continued to fight until the early afternoon.89
Upon realizing that the battle was lost, Jallal ad-Din crossed the river on horseback, attacking
any Mongols who attempted to intercept him. This dramatic action impressed the Khan greatly, who

86
87
88
89

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pointed out this deed to his sons and commenting that “such a son should come from a father!”90 Two
possible meanings to this statement include: first, that his sons should learn from such an example of
daring, and second, that his sons should raise their children to be as audacious as Jallal ad-Din.
Juvaini’s account of this action is a bit more dramatic than this; he relates that Jallal ad-Din had in fact
forded the Indus River on horseback, and this follows a general pattern for Juvaini’s colorful
exaggeration of certain events. The fundamental piece of information here was that Jallal ad-Din
escaped at a price.
While stories of what happened differ somewhat, the general consensus is that Jallal's treasures
were thrown into the Indus River, all of his men were killed (including his male children), and his wife
and harem were either killed or captured.91
For Khwarazm
The battle of the Indus River was the final major confrontation of the Mongol-Khwarazmian
war, and for all intents and purposes it represented the end of both the Khwarazmian empire and of
Jallal ad-Din's aspirations to rebuild his army and retake lost territory. With his treasure in the river, his
sons dead, and with both his wife and harem either being killed or captured, Jallal ad-Din was without
heirs or the means to pay for an army. The primary strategic objectives for the Khwarazmians were to
build an army and buy time for the building of said army. Both objectives were made more difficult by
the slow boat construction and the loss of Sayfuddin's forces. For the Khwarazmians it was a loss of
both men and more critically time. If he were to have any hope of building an army large enough to
defeat the Mongols and retake Khwarazm, Jallal had to get his army, family, and treasure across the
river before the Mongols arrived. Strategically and tactically, the uneven and mountainous terrain of
what is today northern Pakistan had many benefits useful to Jallal ad-Din. The terrain itself was

90
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favorable to the defender, which meant limited mobility for mounted troops. The battle of Parwan
demonstrated that such terrain was quite favorable to the Khwarazmians. Thus, such action was
theoretically sound. As stated earlier, defeat here signified the end of Jallal ad-Din as a meaningful
threat to the Mongol empire, as without his treasure and money, he was unable to finance a new army.
For the Mongols
The Battle of the Indus River was the last major battle for the Mongols in the war, and Jallal adDin's army was the last standing field army that could challenge Chinggis Khan. This meant that
resistance would be more localized in the form of besieging settlements. The three major objectives of
this battle were to defeat the Khwarazmian army, capture Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din and his family,
and undo the damage caused by the Mongol defeat at Parwan. The first goal was achieved in full as
Jallal ad-Din's army was totally destroyed, and without an army, Jallal ad-Din posed a far less
significant threat to Mongol conquest. The second goal was partially achieved with Jallal ad-Din
escaping capture and his family being either captured or killed. With his wife, harem, and sons being
captured or killed, Jallal ad-Din would no longer have any heirs, and for the Mongols this meant no
more rebels claiming the throne of Khwarazm (Khiva). By forcing Jallal ad-Din to abandon his
treasure, the Mongols also denied him of any ability to raise and arm a new army. Finally, victory here
helped to discourage further rebellion and thus undo the damage caused by defeat at Parwan.
Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din from the Indus until his death:
After the battle of the Indus River, Chinggis Khan sent his sons Sübetei and Jeme in pursuit of
Jallal ad-Din.92 He traveled to the soon-to-be lost Khwarazmain holdings in eastern Iraq (sometimes
referred to as Persian Iraq or Western Iran), all the while being pursued by the Mongols. He attempted
to assert his rule in this region, but this was short-lived. His adventures continued with combat in the

92

Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 142.

53

Georgia-Armenia region before being killed by a Kurdish bandit as he traveled in the mountains of
northern Iraq/Persia in 1231. While his adventures were most lively, he was never able to rebuild his
army and retake that which had been lost to the Mongols.93
The Khwarazmian siege defense strategy failed. Some cities in the Khwarazmian state chose to
surrender. Those that resisted were taken and both were subjected to the Mongol siege policy. The use
of captured Khwarazmian levies by the Mongols meant Mongol strength increased with each city
taken. Conversely, it meant that each city lost was a significant blow to the power of the Khwarazmian
state and its ability to resist. The cities that resisted would fall in anywhere between a few days to a few
months. Some cities fell to intrigue such as Samarkand, which was the best-defended city in the
Khwarazmian state, with over 110,000 men defending it. The speed at which these places fell, along
with the resources provided to the Mongols by the settlements which chose to surrender, meant that the
Mongols were able to circumvent all of the benefits that the Khwarazmian strategy sought to achieve.
The resources of surrendered settlements meant that starvation of the besieging Mongols was unlikely.
The swiftness with which cities were taken meant that disease did not have time to become a factor.
Finally, inclement weather did not seem to factor in at all for either side.
Mongol siege policy also evolved to a great extent over the course of this conflict. The original
siege policy which served the Mongols well for most of the war had changed dramatically by the end of
the war.
However, if a city surrendered, it would be subjected to different conditions. The leadership
would submit to the Khan and provide food and gifts to him. In turn, the leadership and the population
of a settlement would be spared, meaning no slavery for women and children, and no mass executions
of the males of the settlement. In some cases, able-bodied men would be called into levy service for the
Mongols, but this was not always the case.

93

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:188-192 [545-555]

54

This policy of resist-and-be-destroyed or surrender-and-be-spared served the Mongols well and
to the detriment of the Khwarazmian state, but it was heavily reliant upon the surrendered settlements
and their leadership honoring their submission to the Khan. For most of the war, even after the death of
Ala ad-Din Muhammad, these settlements had maintained submission. The rise of Jallal ad-Din led
some settlements to rebel, especially after the Khwarazmian victory at Parwan and the earlier defection
of Khan Malik. The unreliability of the surrendered lords made the Mongol policy shift, and both
resisting settlements and surrendered settlements faced the same fate.
The Battle at Parwan under Jallal ad-Din demonstrated that it was possible for a Khwarazmian
army to defeat the Mongols in the field. The field battle at the Indus River demonstrated that the
fractious nature of the Khwarazmian state was a significant weakness in comparison with the unified
Mongol army. The following chapter will look into the fractious nature of the Khwarazmian state in
greater detail.
The Khwarazmian strategy of city defense was a significant military failure. Strategically, it
allowed the Mongols to isolate smaller pockets of defenders and pick them off using superior local
numbers. It meant the Khwarazmains were defeated in a piecemeal manner. Tactically this meant that
the defenders had less manpower and resources to resist the Mongol sieges for long periods of time at
each besieged settlement. With the exception of the field battles at Parwan and the Indus river, the vast
majority of military engagements were sieges. All of these sieges were subject to the Mongol siege
policy, which evolved as the conflict dragged on. Until the time of Jallal ad-Din’s resistance, Mongol
siege policy provided two distinct outcomes for captured settlements based upon resistance or peaceful
surrender, with the former meaning large scale destruction and looting and the later leading to little to
no looting and some men being pressed into Mongol service as levies. Each siege after Otrar also
featured the Mongols pressing these levies to attack Khwarazmian targets, effectively using
Khwarazmian manpower against itself. Each settlement taken would add to the size of the Mongol levy

55

and led to a snowballing effect where the Mongols became stronger in number with each settlement
taken and the Khwarazmains becoming weaker.
There were of course some notable differences that broke with the pattern of siege defense and
of the Mongol siege policy itself. After the rise of Jallal ad-Din and his resistance against the Mongols,
namely the unreliable lords who had previously surrendered ended up betraying their Mongol masters.
As a result, the Mongol siege policy was forced to change. Now the outcome was the same for captured
settlements regardless of surrender or resistance. The siege of Samarqand was unique not just because
of the size of the defending garrison, but also due to there being field battles and an example of internal
betrayal. The Khwarazmain garrison sallied forth to meet the besieging Mongols and they managed to
inflict many casualties. Like the Battle of Parwan, it provided a glimpse into what a Khwarazmian
army could do in the field against the Mongols. Samarqand was also unique in that the city fell due to
internal betrayal. Other notable differences from the siege pattern was the resistance of Temür Malik.
His resistance was unique in that it was a siege, a naval battle, and a field battle. It was also an example
of how quickly the Mongols could adapt and respond to field conditions against a crafty opponent. The
siege of Khiva was also an outlier in what was a broader pattern of general sieges followed by a
settlement’s surrender. The siege of Khiva was unique in that it lasted longer than the sieges of most
other Khwarazmain settlements, it was also the only major example of the siege defense strategy
functioning with some degree of success in that Mongol casualties were abnormally high in the process
of taking this city. While soldiers had sallied forth to fight the Mongols in the field at Samarqand, at
Khiva the defenders fought a more guerrilla style campaign of raiding and disrupting Mongol defenses
and siege works. This included successfully disrupting Mongol attempts to divert the flow of water
away from the city. Finally, the battles at Parwan and the Indus river were unique in that they were not
sieges at all but strictly field battles.

56

Chapter 3: The Internal and External Politics of the
Khwarazmian State
The military chapter outlined the most significant factor behind the Khwarazmian state's
downfall, but it was not the only major factor in its downfall. This chapter will look at the internal and
external politics of the Khwarazmian state from the later years of Khwarazmshah Tekesh's reign to the
time of Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad. It will also look into the powerful, influential, and
disruptive role of Khwarazmshah Muhammad's mother Terken Khatun. Finally, there will also be some
analysis regarding the role of merchants and espionage in the context of Mongol-Khwarazmain
relations.
Politically, the Khwarazmian state had many vulnerabilities, the most significant of which was
the unreliability of its subordinate nobility. These were people nominally loyal to the Khwarazmshah
and had their own armies, which they were to bring into Khwarazmian service should that be requested.
Instead, they undermined the Khwarazmshah’s ability to prosecute war against not only the Mongols,
but earlier external threats as well. Terken Khatun contributed greatly to the vulnerability of the
Khwarazmain state by actively undermining the authority of Khwarazmshah Muhmmad. She put
people loyal to her in key positions in both the government and the military, and she also exacerbated
the issue of unreliable subordinate nobles by protecting them as well as other bad actors within the
Khwarazmain state apparatus. Khwarazm was also quite susceptible to outside forces seeking to
undermine the stability of the state through the incitement of rebellions. At times these internal revolts
would be used as justifications by the Ghurids for their invasions of Khwarazmain territory, invasions
that nearly destroyed the Khwarazmain state two times. In this way an internal political problem could
and did evolve into an external political problem.
Unlike the Mongols under Chinggis Khan, the Khwarazmian state was not unified with total
and absolute loyalty to the Khwarazmshah. The stability of the state was heavily dependent upon the

57

abilities of the Khwarazmshah to modulate competing interests. Internal and external political pressures
also had significant impacts on the stability of the state and in its ability to mobilize forces against an
invader.
Internal divisions within the Khwarazmian state came in many forms. The ethnic divisions
between Perisan and Turkic peoples were one such form. Far more significant were the unreliable
subordinate lords who engaged in rebellion or subversion. These internal divisions were not new during
the time of the Mongol-Khwarazm war, but they did make the prosecution of this war harder on the
Khwarazmians.
The external politics of the Khwarazmains state also came in a few forms. The outside intrigues
of Calif Al-Nasir led to a few internal rebellions in Khwarazm. Other forms included the Khwarazmian
alliance with the Qara Khitai and their war with the Ghurids. The Khwarazmian state as it existed in
1217 was partly a byproduct of these earlier conflicts.
Terken Khatun was another major political factor in the collapse of the Khwarazmian state. Half
of the Khwarazmian state was loyal to her over Khwarazmshah Muhammad, and this effectively made
her a co-ruler. She protected and appointed key people in both the state bureaucracy and the military;
Inalchuq was one such protected appointee.
Finally, the role of espionage and intelligence for both the Khwarazmains and the Mongols.
With a strong focus on the Mongol use of merchants as both spies and diplomatic envoys. All of this
demonstrated that Inalchuq's suspicion of espionage was not without merit or at least some
consideration.
Khwarazm's Internal conundrum
The internal political situation of the Khwarazmian Empire was unresolved and unstable by
1217 and thus exacerbated military issues as they related to the defense of the imperial state. The

58

internal issues faced by the Khwarazmian state assumed many forms, and it was threatened by many
actors within. The first such issue was the semi-federated structure of the empire itself.
The semi-federated system was one in which sultan/Khwarazmshah Muhammad's group (the
Khivans) were the most powerful. The empire was built upon military conquest, marriage, diplomatic
agreement, or willful submission. As was seen in the military chapter, this meant that loyalties were
fickle.
On paper the rulers of conquered lands and their armies belonged to the Khwarazmian state and
its Khwarazmshah/Emperor. In reality these lords, warlords, and tribal chiefs would only act if they
thought they could benefit or even grow their power (such people will be referred to as subordinate
ruling nobility). These leaders posed a significant internal threat to the Khwarazmian state and
passively weakened it, disintegrated it from within as a result of rebellion, or allowed local rivalries to
waste resources critical to the survival of the state.
The sultan of Merv during the Mongol conquest was one such example; his rivalry with another
sultan took priority over the security of the state. The rivalry between the Malik of Lur and the Atabeg
of Fars also served as another example with respect to the unreliability of the subordinate ruling
nobility.
Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad was on his way to Nishapur when Samarqand fell.
While there he learned that the Mongols had sent princes Jäbä, Sübädäi, and Toquchar with thirty
thousand men in pursuit of him with orders to capture him alive. In response to this information.
Khwarazmshah Muhammad chose three courses of action. First, he told every place he came across
between him and Nishapur to prepare their defenses for a Mongol attack. Second, once reaching
Nishapur he quickly moved on to Persia. Third, he chose to consume alcohol as a way of dealing with
his depression. While the consumption of Alcohol is forbidden (haram) in Islam, this did not prevent
people from consuming it. Once he reached Persia, Kharazmshah Muhammad travelled to Farzin
fortress to meet with his commanders and determine the best course of action. He also sent his wives,

59

children, and mother Terken Khatun to the fortress of Qarun.94
At the fortress of Farzin, Khwarazmshah Muhammad summoned the Malik of Hazarasf Lur,
who was named Malik Nusratudin Hazarasf. He advised Khwarazmshah Muhammad to “decamp
immediately. There is an impregnable and highly fortifiable mountain between Lur and Fars called Tani-Balu.” He suggested that this location was strong and that “in one night we can gather a hundred
thousand foot soldiers.” The Kharazmshah deduced that the real purpose behind Malik Nazarsf's
proposal was to “show open enmity to Atabeg Sa'd of Fars,” and he chose accordingly to reject the
Malik's advice.95
This was a prime example of the unreliability of the subordinate ruling nobility in Khwarazm
because as the state was falling to the armies of Chinggis Khan, Malik Nazarasf was more interested in
proposing an idea that would benefit him and undermine his competing lord Atabeg Sa'd. Although
both were subjects under the Khwarazmian banner, and although a great external threat was
approaching, their quarrels took priority over the security of the state and its holdings, which were its
people, cities, territory, economic, and manpower resources, all of which were under the possession of
the state. In this instance the holdings in question were those of the Khwarazmian state. The claim that
one hundred thousand men could be raised in a single night was far too fantastical, even for the
Khwarazmshah, and thus his rejection made sense. Malik Nazarasf's intention was to use the
Khwarazmshah as a pawn against the Atabeg of Fars. Nazarasf wanted Khwarazmshah Muhammad to
remain in his territory and used his fantastical offer as a means to this end.
For Khwarazmshah Muhammad, these internal quarrels served only to delay his retreat and
waste time, time that was sorely needed for organizing and rebuilding his army. Time, Khwarazmshah
Muhammad could ill afford to spend on the enmity between two of his subjects. The promise of one
hundred thousand men in a single day demonstrated two possible issues that the Khwarazmshah could

94
95

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:176-177 [506-508]
Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:176-177 [506-508]

60

not afford to face while trying to fend off rapid Mongol conquest. First, Malik Nazarsf either did not
take the Mongol conquest seriously or else had little to no experience in the logistics of raising and
arming large military forces; and second, if Malik Nazarsf did not understand how long it would take to
raise an army, then how reliable could he be as a field commander? This question of reliability was not
one that Khwarazmshah Muhammad could afford to take lightly, because he needed commanders who
were reliable and effective in the field.
Another example of this issue relating to the unreliability of lords occurred during the time of
Jallal ad-Din and the conflict that had arisen between Khan Malik and Sayfuddin Ughraq over a horse.
As he was dying due to illness and fatigue, Khwarazmshah Muhammad passed his title and role to his
son Jallal ad-Din. The new Khwarazmshah, Jallal ad-Din, found himself in a most dire situation
militarily and politically in 1221. The Mongol armies of Chinggis Khan had conquered the
Khwarazmian capital of Khiva and much of the surrounding territories, but still left unconquered were
the regions in what is today southern Afghanistan and western Iran. His primary objective was to defeat
the Mongols and reconquer lost Khwarazmian territory, and to do this he headed towards Parvan, a
region north of Kabul. There he gathered as many lords/warlords/tribal chiefs and their armies as he
could. Two major Khwarazmian lords who brought between them about seventy thousand men were
Khan Malik of Merv and Sayfuddin Ughraq. Khan Malik had initially traveled to Chinggis Khan in
order to give his submission in person. He was instructed to return to Merv and allow Mongol forces
safe passage, and in exchange the Mongol armies would not disturb his land or his people. This
agreement was upheld by the first two Mongol armies that passed through Khan Malik's territory, but
the third army led by Toquchar did disturb the land and its people by raiding it and engaging the
mountain folk in battle.96 The actions of Toquchar and his army against Khan Malik forced him to
reevaluate his position: would he be better off as a subordinate to the Great Khan? were Toquchar's

96

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:181 [522]

61

actions isolated, or would they happen again? could his position and power really be secured under the
auspices of the Mongol Empire? He could choose to resist the Mongols by going over to the new
Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din, and if Jallal ad-Din succeeded, he could secure more power and wealth
for himself. The cost of submission seemed to be an unreliable guarantee with respect to his ability to
maintain power in Merv. The price of resistance if he failed was the loss of Merv and most likely his
life. Khan Malik ultimately chose to take his chances with Jallal ad-Din, as the rewards of Jallal's
victory seemed to outweigh the rewards of remaining submissive to the Great Khan.
The death of Khwarazmshah Muhammad and the rise of Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din did not
go unnoticed by Chinggis Khan and his Mongol armies. The order was given to take him alive, as had
also been the case with his father Khwarazmshah Muhammad. When Khan Malik chose to join Jallal
ad-Din he had to act with great haste in order to avoid being intercepted by Mongol scouts, but it turned
out that his movements were indeed discovered by Mongol scouts, and a force led by Shigi Qutuqu
gave chase. What happened next was the Battle of Parvan, where Mongol forces met with defeat at the
hands of Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din. For the Mongols Parvan was a great upset, one that forced
Chinggis Khan himself to lead an army to crush Jallal ad-Din. For the Khwarazmians, the battle
provided great rewards, but the spoils of that battle were both blessings and curses. While the spoils
were good for Khwarazmian morale and coffers, the arguments over the spoils of war made it a curse.
One such spoil, an Arabian horse, led to a heated confrontation between Khan Malik and Sayfuddin
Ughraq, each wanting the horse and refusing to accommodate the other. Jallal ad-Din failed to mediate
this conflict because of his distrust of those would judge the matter, and also because there was no
winning move for him in this situation. That is, regardless of who he sided with, the other would leave.
Because Khan Malik had struck Sayfuddin, it would be extremely difficult to mediate this matter to the
satisfaction of both parties. His failure to mediate led to Sayfuddin Ughraq leaving with roughly half of
Jallal ad-Din's army. Thus, at the Battle of the Indus River, Jallal ad-Din's greatly diminished army was

62

destroyed and Khan Malik was killed.97 Juvaini and Al-Nasawi do not really explain who these judges
are and what their arbitration procedures were like; it is only stated that Jallal ad-Din was distrustful of
these judges.
Khan Malik was a prime example of this issue of an unreliable lord for both the Khwarazmians
and the Mongols. He had a negligible degree of loyalty to both empires, and indeed his only real
objective was to maintain his own power and wealth. He would side with anyone who could guarantee
these things for him. He sided with Khwarazmshah Muhammad before the Mongol-Khwarazm war
because he could best guarantee his power in doing so. But then when the Mongols appeared to be
winning the war, he chose to submit to the Mongols. Then when the Mongols appeared to be unable to
guarantee his power or appeared to be a threat to his power, he chose to follow Jallal ad-Din. While on
paper the Khwarazmian army had far more men than the armies of the Great Khan, lords like Khan
Malik meant that in reality the number of men available to the Khwarazmshah was far more limited.
This included the total number of both infantry and cavalry, the latter being more expensive to train and
equip. When Khan Malik finally chose to deploy his army to assist Jallal ad-Din, it was only because
he thought the rewards outweighed the risks. His pride and willingness to quarrel over a horse
demonstrated that he believed his wealth and position were more important than the need to co-operate
with other lords and raise an army large and capable of resisting the Mongols successfully. Khan Malik
went out of his way to submit to the Great Khan while Khwarazm was being conquered, as he valued
his people, land, and power more than his loyalty to the Khwarazmian state and his Khwarazmshah.
Naturally, Sayfuddin Ughraq was also guilty of being an unreliable lord. Just as with Khan
Malik, Sayfuddin’s pride and obsession over a horse and the ensuing argument compelled him to leave
Jallal ad-Din's army, thus dooming it at the Battle of the Indus River. He valued his pride more than his
loyalty and relationship with Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din and the Khwarazmian empire as a whole. He

97 Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:181 [522]

63

had essentially chosen a horse over the Khwarazmian state.

The impact of Khan Malik’s unreliability
Khan Malik's unreliability meant fewer troops at the disposal of Khwarazmshah Muhammad –
fewer troops who were critical in rebuilding the Khwarazmian army and would have been needed in the
retaking of lost territory. For the Mongols, this unreliability meant re-evaluating their siege policy and
ultimately abandoning it, and this in turn meant that towns that had submitted afterwards would be
treated similarly to those that had resisted. This meant regardless of whether a city fell by resistance or
submission, t the nobility and soldiers who were tasked with defending a settlement or fort would be
executed all the same. It also meant that the conquered place would be looted and its walls torn down.
For the inhabitants, women and children would be enslaved and skilled craftsmen and able-bodied men
would be pressed into service for their work levies.. For Khwarazmshah Jallal ad-Din, Khan Malik's
actions cost him his army and any hope of retaking Khwarazm.
The quarrel between Sayfuddin Ughraq and Khan Malik during the time of Jallal ad-Din
represented a much later example of the unreliable subordinate ruling nobility that had proven to be
quite troublesome for the Khwarazmains. Such unreliability was an issue impacting both
Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad and his father Ala ad-Din Tekish.

Mayachuk’s rebellion
In 1197 C.E. (594), during the final years of the Khwarzmshah Tekish's reign, this problem of
unreliable lords led to the rebellion of Shams ad-Din Mayachuk (Shams ad-Din is a personal name
from Arabic meaning “sun of the faith”). Mayachuk was a governor for the Khwarazmian-controlled
territory of Persia and Iraq (a region roughly between modern borders of western Iran and eastern Iraq).
This rebellion was to a large degree sponsored and instigated by the neighboring Abbasid Calif of
Baghdad Al-Nasir. It should also be noted that Mayachuk's rebellion was ultimately his choice, a choice

64

that impacted the internal stability of the Khwarazmian state and was indicative the of this issue of
unreliable lords.
The Abbasid Calif Al-Nasir in Baghdad felt threatened by Khwarazmshah Tekesh. In order to
stave off the Khwarazmian threat, Calif Al-Nasir began to court friendship with Shams ad-Din
Mayachuk. He sent kind messages to Mayachuk designed to stroke his ego and get into his ear. AlNasir said that while the Sultan-Khwarazmshah Tekish was the ruler, the real ruler was “the Pahlavan
of the universe, the second Rostam, the victorious conqueror, the guardian of the borders of the state
(kyr-isfahsalar), and the governor (na-ib) of the Emir of believers is only Shams ad-Din Mayachuk!”98
Note that Rostam was the name of a Persian Hero from Ferdowsi's Shahnameh (Book of Kings),
The Shahnameh (the Book of Kings, but more literally The Letter of Kings). In Farsi the full name is
“‫ ”شاهنامه‬and it is the national epic of Iran and of the Persian people. It is one of if not the longest epic
poems. It tells of Persian history during a mythical age, an age of heroes, until the founding of the
Sassanid empire.
With his words of praise and temptation, Calif Al-Nasir convinced Mayachuk to rebel against
Khwarazmshah Tekish. He moved his forces to Hamadan and managed to persuade the city's
inhabitants to surrender to him, but on the eighth of June 1197 C.E. (June 20th 594) an envoy of
Khwarazmshah Tekesh arrived at the city and read out a decree: “The Holy lord, the victorious
conqueror, the great Hadjib, Malik Emir of the East and West Shams ad-Din, Ulug-habjib, the warrior
(gazi) kyr-isfahsalar Mayachuk, the assistant of the Emir of the believers – he is our slave, and his
justice is known to us. We have decided that he, being our viceroy (on " ib) in all of Iraq, would
execute all our orders. He is the refuge of the ra " isov [district council], qadi and other officials.”99
(Note here that a Qadi is an Islamic scholar and judge in courts of Islamic law.)

98
99

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 57-61.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 58-61.

65

The Khwarazmshah was ignorant at this time of Mayachuk's betrayal, as he was in region of
Khwarazm. Thus, with such a decree from Tekesh and his ignorance of the rebellion, Mayachuk felt
that he was free to act without consequence, so he began committing large-scale theft in the country.
His troops were rampaging all over Persian-Iraq, from Hamadan to Abhar and Zanjan. Every hen and
rooster that dared to make sound was killed, working oxen were taken from farmers, and the people of
Persian-Iraq were abused greatly.100 Mayachuk was out of control in his raiding of Persian-Iraq, and
blood flowed like water. He thought about taking the title of Sultan, since the territory was now in his
hands. His army raided and taxed the madrassas (schools), mosques (masjeds) and other places.
Upon learning of the deeds of Mayachuk and his army, Tekesh realized that he had to kill
Mayachuk. With this Khwarazmshah Tekesh gathered his army in Persian-Iraq, and in fear of
retribution, Mayachuk ran to the fortress of Ardakhan. Abandoning his army, Mayachuk fled the
fortress and was caught by Tekesh. Mayachuk was killed and the head of the vizier who had patronized
Mayachuk was cut off.

101

Internal impact of Mayachuk’s rebellion
Mayachuk's rebellion demonstrated a significant problem in the structure of the Khwarazmian
state: he had an army both large enough to rebel and wreak havoc on a significant number of towns and
villages highlighted this problem as it related to the subordinate ruling nobility having enough power to
proclaim independence. It also demonstrated how susceptible these Khwarazmian rulers were to
outside influences and pressures.
The significant autonomy granted to subordinate ruling nobility by the Khwarazmshah also
meant that responses to rebellions such as the one by Mayachuk were slow. This meant that the damage
a rebel such as Mayachuk could do politically, militarily, and economically was quite significant.

100
101

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 58-61.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 58-61.

66

Politically, Khwarazmshah Tekesh was made to look weak for allowing the rebellion to last as long as
it did. It also sent the message that Tekesh was less able to protect them. Militarily, both armies were
part of the Khwarazmian empire, and this meant two Khwarazmian armies were fighting each other;
therefore the overall military strength of the empire was reduced as a result. Economically, the loss of
livestock, oxen for fields, and the raiding of cities and villages meant a net loss of resources in this
region and a loss of tax revenue.

External consequences
Mayachuk's rebellion was not only an internal affair; it was also to a large degree a product of
Calif Al-Nasir's machinations. The impact of this rebellion for the Khwarazmian state was thus far
greater than it would have been if it were a purely internal affair.
Once Mayachuk's rebellion was put down, Calif Al-Nasir, fearing Khwarazmian retribution,
attempted to ally himself with the Ghurid Sultan Giyas al-Din al-Guri. Al-Nasir sought to incite Giyas
al-Din into attacking the Khwazmians. Giyas al-Din sent a letter to Tekesh stating that if he attacked
Al-Nasir, the Ghurids would invade Khwarazm.102 This was done as a pretext for his invasion.
Realizing that his position was in jeopardy, Khwarazmshah Tekesh turned to neighboring Qara
Khitai for help. Tekesh then turned to besiege Herat. By April 1198 C.E. the Qara Khitai had managed
to inflict many defeats in Khorasan, but they were eventually forced out by Giyas al-Din and his
army.103 This resulted in a period of negotiated peace, one that largely held until the rebellion of Hindu
Khan.
Khwarazmshah Tekesh's alliance with the Qara Khitai was the result of his marriage to TerkenKhatun, daughter of the Kipchak Khan Jankishi. Originating from the Bayat tribe, Terken Khatun

102

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 59-63.

103

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 59-63. , Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 60-67.

67

brought with her many Turkic tribes to Khwarazm.104

What this says about the Khwarazmian state
All of this demonstrated that the Khwarazmian state and its structure were highly susceptible to
outside influences. Since the warlord nobility had the military means to rebel, a pervasive outside
influence could be used to destabilize and weaken the state. Mayachuk's rebellion did just that, and the
cunning of Al-Nasir meant that he was able to avoid the consequences for his machinations. The Qara
Khitai managed to alleviate some of these militarily pressures. Internal instability was used as a pretext
for external invasion.
Like his father Tekish, Khwarazmshah Muhammad struggled with the rebellious, unreliable,
and self-serving subordinate ruling nobility. Early in his reign, Khwarazmshah Muhammad had to
secure his rule from those who wanted either to reject his rule or take his land.
One of the early examples of this phenomenon were the deeds of Hindu Khan and Taj ad-Din
Alishah. Hindu Khan was the nephew of the Khwarazmshah and son of Nasir al-Din Malik Shah.
Malik Shah was the former governor of Nishapur, who ruled during the reign of Khwarazmshah
Tekish. He was deposed by Khwarazmshah Muhammad for his “arbitrariness” (za svoevolie / за
своеволие). In this instance what began as an internal rebellion quickly turned into a large-scale war
between the Khwarazmians and the Ghurids. Thus, an internal problem bore external consequences.

Hindu Khan’s rebellion
Following the deposition of Nasir al-Din Malik Shah, Hindu Khan and Taj ad-Din Alishah went
to Merv in order to gather troops. Learning of Hindu Khan's conspiracy to rebel, Khwarazmshah
Muhammad sent an army commanded by Emir Chakir al-Turki against them. Hindu Khan fled the city

104

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 59-63.

68

as soon as Chakir approached Merv, and his mother and children were captured in Merv and sent to
Gurganj. Hindu Khan, however, went over to the Ghurids and their leader Sultan Giyas ad-Din al-Guri,
who was the oldest and most powerful rival of the Khwarazmshahs.105
Internally, Hindu Khan's rebellion was swiftly crushed, but it quickly facilitated the Ghurids’
invasion of Khwarazmian territory. As with Mayachuk, internal rebellion turned into external conflict,
and this was the result of Hindu Khan's unreliability as a Khawarazmain subject, the difference this
time being that Khwarazmshah Muhammad and his Qara Khitai allies had ultimately managed to
achieve a different result.
Much like with Mayachuk's rebellion, the Ghurids used Hindu Khan's rebellion as a pretext for
invasion. Sultan Giyas al-Din sent the ruler of Talakan, Muhammad Jan-bek, to capture Merv from
Emir Chakir al-Turki. Once at Merv, Chakir was presented with an ultimatum: either restore the
Khutbah (public Islamic prayer) and mint coins with the name of Sultan Giyas al-Din or else leave
Merv altogether. Chakir surrendered.106
Next, Nishapur was surrounded by the Ghurids, who were bidding fair to take the city. While
the Ghurids had been besieging Nishapur, Khwarazmshah Muhammad finally secured his power and
raised an army with which to counter the Ghurid invasion. The death of Tekesh had led to instability in
the Khwarazmian court, and thus Ala ad-Din Muhammad had to ensure the stability of his internal
affairs.107
Giyas ad-Din was old and sick at this time and was waiting for his brother Shikhab ad-Din in
India to bring forth his army to assist in the Ghurid-Khwarazm war. In August of 1201 C.E.
Khwarazmian forces laid siege to Herat, and Giyas ad-Din sent an army under the command of his
nephew Ali-Gazi to oppose the Khwarazmian siege of Herat. Between the approaching army of

105

Juzjani, Uthman ibn Siraj al Din, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, Ed, W Nassau Lees (New Jersey, United States: Gorgias Press,
2010), 147-151.
106
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 64-66. , Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, 147-151.
107
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 64-67. , Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, 147-151.

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Shikhab ad-Din al Guri and the arrival of Ghurid Emir Muhammad Jan-bek, the Khwarazmians were
forced to call off the siege after forty days. The Khwarazmshah's army clashed with the army of
Shikhab al-Din on the banks of the river Merverud, with both sides taking heavy losses.108
In 1202 Khwarazmshah laid siege to Sarakhs and was tricked into losing his supplies by the
starving defenders. After taking Nishapur following a two-month long siege, Khwarazmshah
Muhammad set his sights on the fortified city of Sarakhs. (It should be noted that the Persian word for
town and city are one and the same word: Shahr “‫”شهر‬.) This Ghurid stronghold was the home of Emir
Zangi and his family. After forty days of besiegement by the Khwarazmians and faced with widespread
famine, Emir Zangi informed the Khwarazmshah that he would surrender the city. Zangi and his forces
left the city, raided the Khwarazmain provisions, and then ran back into the fortress. Since his
provisions were stolen, Khwarazmshah Muhammad was forced to call off the siege. Sarakhs, however,
was to fall to the Khwarazmians a short time later.
The fighting continued and the Ghurids were moving towards Khwarazm itself, but the onset of
winter halted the advance of the Ghurid army led by Shikhab al-Guri. At Tus the Ghurids raided and
confiscated food and animal feed from the inhabitants.109
In January 1203, the death of Ghurid Sultan Giyas ad-Din al-Guri derailed Shikhab's plan for a
springtime invasion of Khwarazm. News of the Sultan's death and the infighting amongst the Ghurids
compelled Khwarazmshah Muhammad to engage in a new offensive. Near the city of Merv, the Ghurid
defenders commanded by Emir Jar-bek were defeated and the Khwarazmians took Merv following a
fifteen-day siege that culminated with the severed head of Emir Jar-bek being sent back to
Khwarazm.110
These successes against the Ghurids would continue into 1204, when the Khwarazmians took

108
109
110

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 65. , Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, 147-151.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 66-67. , Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, 147-151.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 67- 70. , Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, 147-151.

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Herat. These successes were made possible in part by Shikhab al-Guri's need to quell rebellions in
Lahore and establish his rule over the Ghurids. Once he had settled his affairs, he marched against the
Khwarazmians. Using a combination of scorched-earth tactics to deny the Ghurids supplies and the
opening of a dam to flood the plains and slow the Ghurid advance, Khwarazmshah Muhammad was
able to buy time for himself and his army. When conditions allowed, the Ghurids marched on
Khwarazm and defeated the Khwarazmshah's army. The city of Gurganj was under threat as a result,
and the Khwarazmians called upon their Qara Khitai allies for assistance. Gur-Khan and his forces
intercepted the invading Ghurids and defeated them. The intervention of the Qara Khitai completely
reversed the course of the war and forced Shikhab ad-Din to surrender territory and treasure and to
agree to a truce with the Khwarazmians. When the conflict came to an end in 1205, the Ghurid state
was in disarray and many of its jurisdictions were declaring independence. It ultimately disintegrated
with the death of Shikhab ad-Din al-Guri.111

The internal and external consequences of Hindu Khan’s rebellion
Hindu Khan's rebellion sparked a large-scale, four- to five-year conflict with the Ghurids, and
this war greatly weakened the strength of the Khwarazmians state. It was also a major catalyst for
Khwarazmshah Muhammad's alliance with the Qara Khitai via marriage to one of their princesses.
What had begun as a purely internal affair that created a small degree of instability had exploded into a
larger-scale external affair, an affair that almost cost the Khwarazmian state its very existence.
Although the Khwarazmians were victorious, they were to an extent a junior partner as a result
of their weakened state. Khwarazmshah Muhammad had the difficult task of securing and maintaining
his control over the newly acquired territories. As the Ghurid example showed, the subordinate nobility
who were supposed to be loyal and subject to their ruler had a strong penchant for rebellion at the first

111

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 67- 70. , Juzjani, Tabaqat-I Nasiri, 147-151.

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sign of weakness. For example, the death of Giyas ad-Din al-Guri forced Shikhab al-Din to return to
Ghurid territory to assert his control over the lords who sought independence from the Ghurid state.
These same lords rebelled when Shikhab was defeated in Khwarazm, and they thought him dead. Then
when Shikhab really did die, the Ghurid state disintegrated. Many of these same unreliable Ghurid
lords would, along with the territories which they controlled, eventually became subjects of the
Khwarazmian imperial state as a result of the Khwarazmian conquest. Not even the Khwarazmian state
was immune from this issue. Khwarazmshah Tekesh’s death in 1200 forced Ala ad-Din Muhammad to
sort his affairs and assert his rule as Khwarazmshah. Thus, while the size and power of the
Khwarazmian state had indeed grown significantly, it also incorporated more unreliable subordinate
ruling members of the nobility who could undermine the security and stability of the Khwarazmian
state.

Beyond the unreliable subordinate ruling nobility; Khwarazm and its relations with the Qara Khitai
While unreliable lords certainly contributed to the downfall of the Khwarazmian empire and
certainly caused both internal and external issues, its relationship with the Qara Khitai also had an
impact. As already described, the Ghurid-Khwarazm war severely weakened the Khwarazmian state. It
changed the nature of Khwarazm's relationship and alliance to the Qara Khitai significantly. Whereas
Khwarazm was originally a strong and respected ally, after the war it became much closer to being a
vassal state of the Qara Khitai.
The relationship between the Qara Khitai and the Khwarazmian state changed dramatically
between the time of Tekish and the time of the Khwarazmshah Muhammad. During the time of Tekesh,
the Qara Khitai sought initially to support the brother of Tekesh for the throne of Khwarazm. However,
Tekesh was more cunning and used “the old Khwarazmian method of opening the Oxus dykes.”112 The

112

Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 61.

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combination of his cunning and marriage to Terken Khatun enabled him to secure his power and
alliance with the Qara Khitai over his brother.113
The effectiveness of this alliance in the time of Tekish proved to be a mixed bag. Faced with a
Ghurid invasion, Tekesh requested support from the Qara Khitai. Initially they were successful in
repelling the Ghurids, but the force sent was ultimately defeated. As a consequence of the Qara Khitai's
involvement, the Khwarazmian state under Tekesh survived with limited territorial loss.114
The Qara Khitai would again be involved in a war between the Khwarazmians and the Ghurids
during the reign of Tekesh's son Khwarazmshah Muhammad. The details of this conflict and its
outcome have already been covered in the context of Hindu Khan's rebellion, but there is much more to
be said about the drastic shift in the regional balance of power that resulted from it.
With the Ghurids effectively defeated and no longer in a position to threaten the Khwarazmians,
the regional balance of power shifted heavily in favor of the Qara Khitai and Khwarazmshah
Muhammad. This was an extremely unwelcome surprise for the Abbasid Calif Al-Nasir, who had been
desperate to either outright destroy or at least weaken his greatest enemy, the Khwarazmians. In
desperation, Al-Nasir attempted to lobby the Qara Khitai into fighting the Khwarazmians. For the Qara
Khitai, Khwarazmshah Muhammad was the key to their victory over the Ghurids and had been very
diligent in his payment of tribute to them. Thus, at that time they saw no reason to do as Al-Nasir had
asked. The Abbasid Calif also tried to get the now-struggling Ghurid ruler Shikhab to ally with the
Qara Khitai against the Khwarazmains, but this also ended in failure.115
While the Ghurid war had weakened the Khwarazmshah, his alliance with the Qara Khitai
meant that his northern and eastern borders were secure for a time. This enabled him to spend most of
1206 and 1207 working on stabilizing his control over the former Ghurid territory he had managed to

113
114
115

Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 61., Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 72-78.
Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 65,66., Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 72-78.
Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 69., Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 72-78.

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conquer. Adding these territories to his empire allowed Khwarazmshah Muhammad to offset the
manpower losses he had incurred as a result of the war. This new territory meant that the
Khwarazmians and the Qara Khitai were the most powerful groups in the region at the time. Al-Nasir
had been meddling against and undermining the Khwarazmains during the reigns of both Tekesh and
Ala ad-Din Muhammad, and now that the Khwarazmians were in a position of strength, he rightfully
feared Khwarazmian retribution. But at this time Khwarazmshah Muhammad was still expected to pay
his annual tribute to the Qara Khitai.116 In short, the Khwarazmians were stronger but not strong
enough to act fully against the Qara Khitai should they wish to.
In 1208 the nobility of Bukhara in Transoxiana, who were under the rule of the Qara Khitai,
requested that Khwarazmshah Muhammad intervene in their affairs. His involvement led to a war with
the Qara Khitai in which Muhammad allied with the sultan of Samarqand and took Bukhara for
himself. The brief war effectively ended in a stalemate, and by late 1209 and early 1210, the
Khwarazmians were once again paying tribute to them.117
The Mongol invasion of the Qara Khitai and Uighur rebellion in late 1209 ultimately enabled
the Khwarazmians to invade Khitain Transoxiana. Between late 1210 and 1212, the Khwarazmians
took the cities of Otrar, Ozgand, and Smarqand.118 Thus, sandwiched between the invading Mongols
and Khwarazmians, the Qara Khitai fell. This was ultimately to Khwarazmshah Muhammad’s
benefit.119
During the time of Tekesh and Muhammad, this alliance with the Qara Khitai meant the
survival of Khwarazm, with each ruler being spared defeat. For Muhammad, this alliance not only
helped him to maintain his power, but also to expand it exponentially. His southern enemy, the Ghurids,
had been destroyed and their lands in many cases became his lands. When the Qara Khitai was

116
117
118
119

Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 69-71.
Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 72-74., Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 72-78.
Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 78.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 72-78.

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weakened, Khwarazmshah Muhammad was also able to take Transoxiana.
As far as the external politics of the Khwarazmian state were concerned, this alliance enabled
the Khwarazmshah to eliminate his enemy to the south and greatly threatened his enemy to the west; by
1213 the Khwarazmian Empire was on the surface the most dominant power in the region. It also
meant that the Abbasid Calif Al-Nasir was in a much weaker position to undermine the Khwarazmian
Empire, as he no longer had allies strong enough to invade or destroy Khwarazm. The one power that
could have done something chose not to and was ultimately destroyed by the Mongol Empire.

The internal effects of the Khwarazm-Qara Khitai alliance
Although Khwarazmshah Muhammad succeed in expanding his empire and separating himself
from the Qara Khitai, he still had to stabilize his situation internally and solidify his control over the
newly conquered lands. This process included replacing unreliable governors with people who he was
trusting to be reliable. The Mongol-Khwarazm war began in late 1217 or early 1218, and this meant
that Khwarazmshah Muhammad had at best five years to achieve this. Given the tumultuous nature of
his early reign, five years was insufficient to achieve this fully.
It should be noted that in the year 1212/1213 the prince of Samarqand unsuccessfully rebelled
against the Khwarazmians,120 and in this way the issue of unreliable subordinates had cropped up
again. Finding reliable subordinates in the Khwarazmian Empire was not a simple task, and any
subordinate who believed they could rebel against the state successfully did so. When Khwarazmshah
Muhammad was out in the field and believed to be missing for three days in the Khwarazm-Qara
Khitai war, his brother abandoned the siege of Herat in order to usurp the throne.121 Given that his own
brother would undermine him, finding loyal and dependable subordinates was not a simple thing. The
event itself was very similar with the situation faced by the Ghurids when they were defeated, in that

120
121

Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 69-73. , Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 77-78.
Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 69-73. , Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 74.

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any whiff of Shikhab's (or in this instance Khwarazmshah Muhammad) being either dead or missing
would lead to usurpation and instability. This is why five years of time in cementing Khwarazmian rule
was insufficient in these newly conquered lands. Finding reliable people was extraordinarily difficult.
There is of course a degree of irony that must be noted with respect to unreliable allies,
especially and specifically as it related to Khwarazmshah Muhammad's loyalty to the Qara Khitai.
Since he was paying tribute to them, in a way he was both their ally and vassal. Ala ad-din Muhammad
was loyal to the Qara Khitai when he was weak and disloyal when he was strong. In this way,
Khwarazmshah Muhammad was just as guilty of being unreliable as the rebellious subordinates he
commanded.

Terken Khatun
No meaningful discussion of the Khwarazmian political situation in the context of its downfall
is possible without discussing the Queen regent – the mother of Khwarazmshah Muhammad and the
wife of Khwarazmshah Tekesh. Terken Khatun and her relatives proved to be a significant internal
issue for the Khwarazmains. She was in many ways a co-ruler who commanded the empire's Turkic
peoples, while Ala ad-Din Muhammad largely commanded the empire's non-Turkic, largely Persian
populations. Half of the empire listened to her, while the other half listened to Khwarazmshah
Muhammad.
The matter of Terken Khatun presented two questions of stability and control as they pertained
to the internal politics of the empire: What role did ethnic tensions or ethnic competition play in both
its internal politics and in the context of the Mongol-Khwarazm war; and what impact her feud with
Khwarazmshah Muhammad's son Jallal ad-Din had internally and in the Khwarazmian war. It should
be noted that there was a trend among historians of this time and before to attach blame to powerful
women, for some negative aspects of male rulers. Some of these negative aspects may include: Hubris,
betrayal, the killing of allegedly good or wise advisors, penchants for narcissism and/or debauchery,

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acts considered senseless and/or destructive, as well as acts of extreme duplicity. A very famous
example of this phenomenon would be the role of Agrippina during the time of Roman Emperor Nero.
The historian Tacitus in his work The Annals depicted her as trying to be co-ruler, sharing power with
her son Nero and trying to control him to some extent.122 Tacitus says that Agrippina was very
aggressive in trying to solidify her power including engineering the deaths of people she thought could
threaten her position early on including possible adult successors to the throne who were not her son
Nero123. Nero himself would engage in such destructive acts when he poisoned Britannicus, the
fourteen-year-old son of the previous emperor124. It should be noted that similar to Juvaini and other
authors, Tacitus was writing well after the given events and was biased in his reporting. For Tacitus this
bias was very anti-Nero and anti-Agrippina. The accounts of Terken Khatun by primary sources appear
to be following this pattern of Terken Khatun being partly to blame for the alleged hubris of
Khwarazmshah Muhammad. However, that would ignore a key piece of information regarding women
in Turkic societies in this place and at this time. It was not inconceivable for there to be a female tribal
ruler within Turkic societies. Khwarazm being a mix of Persian and Turkic traditions, the idea that
Terken Khatun could be in a powerful enough position to influence and maintain the loyalty of her
Turkic subjects was well within the boundaries of possibility. Such influence could and did impact the
internal and external affairs of the state to differing degrees.
The Khwarazmian state contained multiple ethnicities, and the main competing two were the
Turkic people, for whom Terken Khatun was patroness, and Khwarazmshah Muhammad, who ended
up being a patron for all other groups, who were mainly Persians.125
These tensions played out in the form of competition for governorships and powerful roles in

122

123
124
125

Tacitus, Gaius Cornelius. The Annals. Translated by J.C. Yardley. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. XIII (1-5)
270-272
Tacitus, Gaius Cornelius. The Annals. XIII (1-26) 270-283
Tacitus, Gaius Cornelius. The Annals. XIII (14-19) 276-279
Daryaee, Touraj, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Pg 247

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the state apparatus, with Terken Khatun installing her Turkic supporters at all levels of the
Khwarazmian government. For Khwarazmshah Muhammad, this meant that it was almost impossible
to dismiss or fire Turkic officials, governors, and bureaucrats, even if they were demonstrably bad at
their jobs or were engaging in corrupt acts such as looting the treasury.
One significant example of this phenomenon was the vizier Nizam al-Mulk Nasir ad-Din
Muhammad ibn Salih, whose appointment was the doing of Terken Khatun. Nizam al-Mulk quickly
turned out to be a “talentless person and a bribe taker,”126 a person who was both corrupt himself and
an enabler of corruption. “Khorezmshah, fearing his mother and her tribesmen who held key positions
in the administrative apparatus, tolerated him for seven whole years, but in the end he dismissed this
vizier from business.”127 He was both arrogant and extravagant, meaning that he used the state's wealth
on himself for a seven entire years. Because he had Terken Khatun's support, Nizam al-Mulk had a free
hand to continue indulging in spectacular corruption.
Khwarazmshah Muhammad worked to put an end to the trouble caused by Nizam al-Mulk.
Normally such men would have been executed for committing such misdeeds, but under Terken
Khatun's patronage he was a protected individual, which meant that he could not be executed. Thus, the
next most severe punishment for Nizam al-Mulk was dismissal and being sent to Terken Khatun in the
city of Gurganj.
Terken Katun's response to the deeds of Nizam al-Mulk and his punishment was extraordinary.
As Nizam approached Gurganj, Terken Khatun ordered all of the city’s residents to convene in the city
center and greet him as an honored visitor. She placed him into her service and even provided Al-Mulk
with even greater prestige: he was entrusted with the management of her possessions. Previously he
was accompanied by four spearmen upon leaving the city, but now he was accompanied by eight.128

126
127
128

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 95.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 95.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 95.

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Khwarazmshah Muhammad, the conqueror of the Ghurids and the Qara Khitai, the scourge of
Calif Al-Nasir, was unable to punish this most vexing and vile of servants. Such was the power and
stranglehold over the Khwarazmian state that Terken Khatun had. She was a significant threat to the
internal unity and function of the Khwarazmian state and had the ability to constrain or outright
undermine Khwarazmshah Muhammad's ability to run the state if he decided upon a course of action
with which she disagreed. Nizam al-Mulk, therefore, represented one example of how Terken Khatun
could undermine the state. She protected someone who was engaging in corruption, enabling more
corruption, and taking critical economic resources from the Khwarazmian state. But because he had her
protection, he was not punished but rewarded. Such people could undermine the state without
consequence as long as they had her protection.

The external consequences of Terken Khatun’s power
Nizam al-Mulk was not the only corrupt and inept person in a position of power and under the
protection of Terken Khatun; the infamous Inalchuq of Otrar was another such person. His reckless
murder of Mongol merchant envoys sparked the Mongol-Khwarazm war and ultimately led to the
downfall of the Khwarazmian empire. Inalchuq was a Turkic relative of Terken Khatun, and as was her
tradition, she positioned him as governor of Otrar.129 As has been described above, Terken Khatun had
also placed her Turkic allies into key military, political, and bureaucratic positions. In concert with her
policy of protecting and rewarding bad actors, these appointments meant ample opportunity for trouble
and dysfunction within the state.
Inalchuq’s murder of Mongol merchant envoys created both an internal and external problem
for the Khwarazmains and Khwarazmshah Muhammad himself. Inalchuq was a protected person
because of Terken Khatun, and this placed Khwarazmshah Muhammad in an impossible position.

129

Paul Ratchnevsky Genghis Khan pg 122

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Chinggis Khan had requested that Inalchuq be brought before him for punishment. Since he was a
protected person, Khwarazmshah Muhammad could not do this easily, and Terken Khatun could and
very well may have frustrated or blocked any attempt to give up Inalchuq. Internally, giving up
Inalchuq would be seen as a sign of great weakness, and as has been noted before, perceived weakness
meant rebellions. As a consequence, Khwarazmshah Muhammad would face either the wrath of Terken
Khatun and her allies, should he acquiesce to the Great Khan's demands, or else face the wrath of the
Great Khan in an all-out war.
In this way Terken Khatun represented a significant obstacle to the maintenance and success of
the Khwarazmian state. The Mongols were led by Chinggis Khan, who directed all the affairs of his
great empire. Khwarazm was ruled by Khwarazmshah Muhammad and constrained by Terken Khatun's
use of Turkic dependents. In the context of the Mongol-Khwarazm war, this meant the outbreak to the
war itself, the ability of Khwarazmshah Muhammad to prosecute that war, and the events of the battles
therein were all by-products of Terken Khatun's political power. As stated by Bunyatov, “Orders and
decrees of the Khwarazmshah were often canceled by the all-powerful Terken-khatun and became
invalid. She could resolve any issues at her discretion and issued decrees on her own behalf.”130 In this
way she could contradict Khwarazmshah Muhammad and hinder his ability to organize an army for
field battles. During the war itself there were several instances of Turkic forces attempting to flee
sieges instead of fighting. One such example was Otrar, where the leading people and their Turkic
troops (excluding Inalchuq) unsuccessfully attempted to escape from the city at night.
The protection of corrupt subordinates by a person who had both power and influence may be
seen as the repetition of a propaganda tool by Al-Nasawi. Propaganda which strongly attributed these
protected corrupt subordinates with undermining or actively participating in the downfall of the
Khwarazmian state. This connection between the person of influence (Terken Khatun) with these

130

Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 128.

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protected persons (ie: Inalchuq) by Al-Nasawi, has its origins in his primary source: Jallal ad-Din. This
association may indeed be propagandistic to some extent and therefore somewhat exaggerated.
However, when attempting to determine why Khwarazmshah Muhammad was unable or unwilling to
act against Inalchuq, Al-Nasawi’s suggestion of Terken Khatun’s protection remains the strongest and
best supported argument. This is especially so when the alternative answer proposed by Juvaini,
Juzjani, and to some extent Rashid al-Din Hamadani, was this idea of hubris on the part of
Khwarazmshah Muhammad. Even these three authors agree that Terken Khatun had a significant
degree of power and influence within the Khwarazmain state. Which only further supports Al-Nasawi’s
suggestion. This issue of protected persons becomes especially notable when ethnic and tribal loyalties
in Khwarazm at the time are taken into account as well.

At Samarqand
When news of Samarqand's downfall and the pursuing Mongols reached Khwarazmshah
Muhammad, he chose in response to continue his retreat. “With him he had a group of his mother's
relatives, Uranis. They wanted to kill him but one of them informed the Sultan, who changed his
sleeping place... At dawn the felt of the tent looked like a sieve because it had been pierced by so many
arrows.”131
As if it were not bad enough that the war was being lost to the Mongols, now Khwarazmshah
Muhammad had to fear more active attempts to take his life. Khwarazmshahs always had to worry
about assassination, as do most kings and people in power. The issue here was that combined with the
issue of disloyal lords, there were also unreliable factions from within the royal family itself. The
resource drain of Terken Khatun's fights with Jallal ad-Din was a significant enough issue on its own,
but now her Turkic faction had managed to divide the remaining forces of Khwarazm even more.

131

Dughlat and Thackston, Classical Writings, 3:176-177 [506-507].

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It was extremely difficult if not impossible for Khwarazmshah Muhammad or any leader to
dedicate all of their focus and energy into defeating an invader when there were enemies within their
own courts -- enemies who would work to frustrate the Khwarazmian war effort or attempt to
assassinate the Khwarazmshah himself. The actions of these internal enemies denied the leader the
focus and energy he needed to fight an external invader.

Quarrels with Jallal ad-Din
Terken Khatun greatly despised Jallal ad-Din, her grandson and heir to the Khwarazmian
throne. The quarrels between the mother of Khwarazmshah Ala ad-din and his son Jalal al-din further
demonstrate the internal political issues facing the Khwarizmians. The Khwarazmshah's mother
“loathed and worked against her own grandson Jalal al-din,”132 and this created an issue where the
limited resources of this young empire were not being used to their fullest potential -- resources that
could have been used to strengthen and establish a unified administrative system were misplaced in
internal political feuds. This contributed to further weakening the Khwarzimians during a critical
period of the establishment of political power.133
A major source of detailed information with respect to the role and influence of Terken Khatun,
comes from the writings of Al-Nasawi. He was Jallal ad-Din’s secretary in the 1220’s and wrote Jallal
ad-Din’s biography. The information he presented is quite detailed and aligns with the histories of other
primary sources of this time and shortly thereafter. However, given Terken Khatun’s quarrels with Jallal
ad-Din and his primary source of information on internal Khwarazmian affairs being the very same
Jallal ad-Din, there did exist an inherent anti-Terken Khatun bias. It is difficult to determine the
complete extent to which this bias impacted the accuracy of Al-Nasawi’s account. Given the level of
detail presented by Al-Nasawi and the pattern of ethnic loyalties established by other primary source

132
133

Grouseet, The Empire of the Steppes, 237.
Buniatov, ГОСУДАРСТВО ХОРЕЗМШАХОВ 1097-1231, 95, 124, 128. , Grouseet, The Empire of the Steppes, 237.

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authors, it would be safe to argue that his account was fairly accurate, or as accurate as his account
could have been given his sources.
Considering how much power Terken Khatun had in the Khwarazmian state and the fact that
she wielded it to constrain Khwarazmshah Muhammad, it is obvious that the amount of resources
available to her for use against Jallal ad-Din would have been considerable, resources that the
Khwarazmian state could ill afford to spend before and during the Mongol-Khwarazmain war. Part of
her hatred for Jallal ad-Din was because his wife was Persian and not Turkic. In this way, she had less
control over him. Terken Khatun and her Turkic dependents were in many ways significant obstacles to
the stability and unity of the Khwarazmian state. Where Chinggis Khan ruled unanimously, Khwarazm
was divided. This led to a clear disparity in the effectiveness and flexibility, both politically and
militarily, between the Mongols and the Khwarazmians, and it had significant internal and external
consequences.

On the role of espionage and intelligence
The Mongols used merchants as envoys and spies. Merchants were very useful as intelligence
tools because they could sell information and also have a legitimate reason for entering towns and
populated places. Some of these merchants acted as official diplomats of the Mongol Empire. Since
traveling merchants were so common, it meant that detecting which one was for primarily commerce
and which were there for espionage would have been very difficult.
At Otrar, Inalchuq accused Mongol merchant-envoys of espionage. To an extent spying was part
of their mission, but at Otrar their role was primarily diplomatic and commercial. According to Juvaini,
Inalchuq used the pretext of espionage to kill them and take their wares for himself.134 This accusation

134

Juvaini and Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror, 79-83

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of espionage was not unfounded; merchants often served as spies for their respective benefactors.135
Since Inalchuq was under Terken Khatun's protection, as was Nizam al-Mulk, both men were of similar
character, and therefore this charge of killing out of greed with a weak pretext was well within the
boundaries of expectation,s as was the difficulty that Khwarazmshah Muhammad had in acting against
him.
The Mongols were effective managers of merchant espionage, and it was through merchants
that the Mongols discovered the divisions within the Khwārazmian Empire and then exploited them to
great effect. During the war with the Khwārazmian Empire, the Mongols exploited this disunity, with
Muslim governors defecting to the Mongol cause and opposing the Sultan.136
As an external threat, merchant spies could and did provide the Mongols with critical
intelligence on terrain, major cities and their layouts, the internal political affairs of states, and much
other critical information that could and did drastically affect the outcomes of wars.
Most historical mentions or discussions of Khwarazmian espionage operations and techniques
tend to be fairly limited. The most significant mention of Khwarazmian espionage pertained to its use
of diplomatic envoys tasked both with establishing diplomatic relations with the Mongols and
gathering as much intelligence as possible regarding the Mongol military and political situation. To
some extent, Inalchuq’s imprisonment and execution of Mongol merchant envoys can be seen as an
example of Khwarazmain counter-intellegence.
Ultimately, it was clear that the Mongols invested a great deal of time and money into
maintaining and developing their network of friendly merchants who provided them with accurate and
vital information in their war against the Khwarazmians and all future foes. It was an investment that

135

Ratchnevsky, Paul, Ghenghis Khan. His Life and Legacy. Trans. Thomas Nivison Haining, (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell,
1992.), 122.
136
Jackson, Peter, The Mongols and the Islamic World. From Conquest to Conversion, (London, UK: Yale University Press,
2017), 86-90.

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meant the Mongols had a significant intelligence advantage compared to the more limited methods of
the Khwarazmian state. It proved to be a significant Mongol success story in their war effort. The
limited methods of the Khwarazmian state in the area of intelligence should not be seen as a pure
failure on their part, but as a source of limitation for them.
A brief history of Mongol-merchant relations
In this region of Central Asia and Mongolia there existed strong relationships between nomadic
peoples and traveling merchants. Merchants could provide nomadic peoples with critical goods that
they could not otherwise access137 -- things that could only be produced in sedentary societies such as
metallic goods, iron weapons, and cookware. In many ways nomadic peoples economically and
politically organized themselves around this relationship with sedentary societies.138 One of the names
used to describe these merchants was the word “ortaq,” a Turkic term meaning “partner.”139 These
ortaq were mostly Muslim and Uighur merchants who engaged in overland or maritime trade between
China and Persia.140 Generally speaking, the nature of merchant trade required good observation skills
and a strong knowledge of the economic and political situations in the places where they did
business.141
In 1203, Chinggis Khan had his first recorded encounter with a merchant. He met a Central
Asian merchant while fleeing a failed assassination attempt with his followers, and this trader brought
with him one thousand sheep and sought to exchange them for the furs of squirrels and sables (a

137

ALLSEN, THOMAS T, “Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners, 1200-1260.” Asia Major 2, no. 2 (1989): 83,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41645437.
138
Allsen, “Mongolian Princes”, 83.
139
Allsen, “Mongolian Princes”, 85.
140
Endicott-west, elizabeth. “Merchant Associations in Yüan China: The ‘Ortoy.’” Asia Major 2, no. 2 (1989): 127,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41645438.
141
May, Timothy, The Mongol Art of War (United Kingdom: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2017), 70.

85

species of marten). This trader was believed to be Hasan Hajji, the very same person who was later be
killed at Suqnaq during the Mongol-Khwarazm war.142
In 1211 a merchant named Ja’far Khwajah was sent by Chinggis Khan to uncover the intentions
of Altan Qan, ruler of the Jurchens. His role as merchant-spy was also important in the downfall of
Peking (Beijing) in the year 1215.143 At this time the city was also known as Zhongdu and also by the
slightly older name Nanjing (Southern Capital) in the Secret History of the Mongols.
Ja'far Khwajah was an interesting example and case study in Mongol-merchant relations. He
acted as both spy and envoy for the Great Khan. Under Jurchen (Jin Dynasty) law, Mongols were
forbidden to enter China. Ja'far Khwajah was one of the many merchants who helped the Mongols
engage in trade with the Jurchens.144 Chinggis Khan prepared his war against the Jurchens by gathering
intelligence from defectors, refugees, merchants, and diplomatic envoys. In the service of the Great
Khan as both merchant and envoy, Ja'far Khwajah was tasked with going into Jurchen territory and
delivering a letter to the Jurchen emperor. This letter demanded that the Jurchens submit and pay
tribute to the Mongols. Ja'far was imprisoned by the Jurchens but managed to escape and warn
Chinggis Khan about Jurchen plans to attack the Mongols. His imprisonment was also used as a
justification for the Jurchen-Mongol war. In 1211 the Mongols defeated the Jurchen army and besieged
Zhongdu, but they were forced to withdraw after a month for lack of siege weapons.145
Here we see the merchant Ja'far acting as both envoy and spy who provided intelligence about a
Jurchen attack and represented the Great Khan to the Jurchen court. Using the imprisonment of a
merchant envoy as a justification for war mirrors the later events at Otrar and in Khwarazm, and the

Allsen, “Mongolian Princes”, 87. , Sh Choĭmaa, Mongolyn Nuut︠︡ s Tobchoo : The Secret History of the Mongols, trans.
Igor De Rachweltz, 2nd ed. (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: Bolor Sudar Publishing House, 2015). 509-521.
143
Allsen, “Mongolian Princes”, 87.
144
Qiu, Yihao. "7. Jaʿfar Khwāja: Sayyid, Merchant, Spy, and Military Commander of Chinggis Khan" In Along the Silk
Roads in Mongol Eurasia: Generals, Merchants, and Intellectuals ed. Michal Biran (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2020), 145. https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1525/9780520970786-011
145
Qiu, “Jaʿfar Khwāja”, 147.
142

86

similarities are indeed striking. One major difference being that Ja'far survived his imprisonment with
the Jurchens whereas the Mongol merchant envoys at Otrar did not survive.
In 1213 during the Jurchen-Mongol war, Ja'far also proved to be a key source of intelligence
behind the Mongol victory at the Juyong Pass. The Juyong Pass was a critical chokepoint and defensive
position for the Jurchen state, and a significant number of Jurchen men and material were dedicated to
its defense. Ja’far knew the terrain in and around Juyong very well, and as a merchant he sometimes
needed to avoid border guards while engaging in smuggling or tax evasion. Ja'far was able to guide the
Mongols around the gate and played a pivotal role in capturing Juyong.146 The Mongols led by Jebe
had managed to take this pass in 1211 as it guarded the approaches to the Jurchen (Jin) capital of
Zhongdu147. In 1211 Jebe used feigned retreat to draw out the defenders into the open field, where the
Mongols destroyed the Jurchen defenders and allowed them to plunder Zhongdu148. The events of 1213
involving Ja’far was during the second taking of Juyong149. In 1214/1215 Ja'far would once again act as
an envoy of the Khan and was critical in securing Jurchen submission to the Mongols.150 Merchants
like Ja'far provided key intelligence that was important for the Mongol state and its war efforts. Using
merchants as both envoys and spies proved quite effective. Ja’far Khwajah is mentioned in the Yuanshi
(The history of Yuan Dynasty), but his name is not mentioned in The Secret History of the Mongols. In
chapter 11 of the Secret History, the topic of the Mongol-Jurchen conflict is discussed and the MongolKhwarazm conflict is briefly mentioned, with a greater focus on Jallal ad-Din as opposed to his father.
In 1215, Khwarazmshah Muhammad sent an embassy to Chinggis Khan tasked with gathering
intelligence and determining Mongol capabilities and intentions.151 Through this delegation Chinggis

146
147

148
149
150
151

Qiu, “Jaʿfar Khwāja”, 148. ,Choĭmaa, “The Secret History of the Mongols”, 509-521.
Wright, David Curtis. “The Mongol Conquest of the Jin Empire, 1211-1234” In The Mongol World, edited by Timothy
May, 106-108. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2018.
Wright, David Curtis. “The Mongol Conquest of the Jin Empire, 1211-1234” 106-108
Wright, David Curtis. “The Mongol Conquest of the Jin Empire, 1211-1234” 106-108
Qiu, “Jaʿfar Khwāja”, 149. , Sh Choĭmaa, Mongolyn Nuut︠︡ s Tobchoo, 509-521.
Allsen, “Mongolian Princes”, 87.

87

Khan said, “I am the ruler of the East and thou the ruler of the West. Between us let there be a firm
treaty of friendship, amity, and peace, and from both sides let merchants ( tujjãr) and caravans come
and go, and let the fineries and wares of my lands be brought to thee and let those of thy lands likewise
be directed [to mine].”152 The Great Khan ordered road guards to provide safe passage to merchants
and made an agreement with Khwarazmshah Muhammad that merchants would also be given
protection in his land as well.153 This agreement was honored until the Otrar incident.
The Mongol tradition of using merchants as tools for trade and espionage continued during the
Yuan dynasty in China, when the Mongols would sponsor and protect merchants as they engaged in
commerce. During the reign of Ögödei (1229-1241) there was a report describing the Mongol practice
of entrusting Muslim merchants with silver, a practice predating the establishment of the Yuan
dynasty.154 In the reign of Qubilai (1269-1294), these merchants went from having minimal regulation
of their activities to having a significant degree of regulation and supervision by the Yuan
government.155 The branch of the Yuan government dedicated to the management of merchants would
eventually became a general bureau of money management. This office was tasked with the spending
of money and the management of merchants specifically engaged in espionage for the state.156
These examples demonstrated the strong connection between Mongols and their merchant
partners. Both groups benefited greatly from each other; the merchants gained funding and protection
while the Mongols received up-to-date and highly detailed intelligence that they could and did use
during their conquests of other states. This symbiotic relationship between Mongol and merchant was
established well before the Mongol-Khwarazm war and would continue to prove fruitful for both
parties in the thirteenth century. The Mongol-merchant relationship in combination with the

152
153
154
155
156

Allsen, “Mongolian Princes”, 88.
Allsen, “Mongolian Princes”, 88.
Endicott-west, “Merchant Associations”, 132.
Endicott-west, “Merchant Associations”,133.
Endicott-west, “Merchant Associations”,134.

88

Khwarazmian practice of using envoys as intelligence gatherers meant that Inalchuq’s suspicion of the
Mongol merchant-envoys was not unreasonable. At Suqnaq, Hasan Hajji died acting as both merchant
and envoy for the Mongol state. Hasan risked and ultimately lost his own life for the sake of this
relationship. This further demonstrated that the Mongols and merchants valued each other highly.
Political Conclusion
Internal divisions within the Khwarazmian state came in many forms. The semi-federated
nature of the Khwarazmin state meant that the unreliable subordinate lords were a major source of
instability. They also posed a major obstacle in the Khwarazmian ability to prosecute wars, as was
seen many times in the Mongol-Khwarazm war. For Khwarzmshah Muhammad, Malik Nazarasf
wished to use Khwarazmian resources in his competition with the atabeg of Fars, as opposed to
fighting the invading Mongols. Under Jallal ad-Din, the conflict between Khan Malik and Sayfuddin
Ughraq ultimately led to disaster at the battle of the Indus in 1221.
Internal revolt was sometimes the byproduct of external influences, and these revolts could have
external consequences. In the time of Khwarazmshah Tekesh this was manifested in the machinations
of the Abbasid Calif Al-Nasir and his inciting of Shams al-din Mayachuk to rebellion. Once this
rebellion was quelled, Al-Nasir convinced the Ghurids (Khwarazm's southern neighbor) to threaten
war, and this led to the Khwarazmians making an alliance with their northern neighbor, the Qara
Khitai. Al-Nasir's machinations ultimately led to a brief conflict between Khwarazm's new alliance and
the Ghurids. In the reign of Khwarazmshah Muhammad, the internal rebellion of Hindu Khan evolved
into a major conflict with the Ghurids, and this in turn ultimately led to the dissolution of the Ghurid
state, to the benefit of the Khwarazmians.
The complex and evolving nature of the Khwarazm-Qara Khitai alliance proved to benefit the
former more than the latter. Unlike with the Ghurids, the machinations of Calif Al-Nasir proved to be
ineffective in splitting this alliance.

89

The issue of Terken Khatun had a profound impact on the Khwarazmian state. She played a key
role in dividing the state in many important areas. She fomented divisions between the Turkic and
Persian peoples of Khwarazm and favored the Turkic peoples. She installed Turkic leaders loyal solely
to her in key state and military positions, and in so doing undermined Khwarazmshah Muhammad's
ability to effectively rule the country on his own. Her protection of Inalchuq led to the MongolKhwarazm war itself, which in turn resulted in the destruction of the Khwarazmian state as a whole.
In matters of espionage, intelligence, and merchants, both the Khwarazmian and Mongol states
used envoys for both diplomacy and espionage. The big difference between them was that the Mongols
used merchants as spies, diplomats, as well as sources of trade and investment. This was an established
practice that had started well before, and continued well after, the Mongol-Khwarazm war.
These factors contributed to the political and bureaucratic and organizational failures of the
Khwarazmain state, ultimately resulting in its downfall during the period of Mongol conquests.

90

Conclusion
Chapter one provided a brief explanation of key persons, states, concepts and events relevant to
understanding and contextualizing the fundamentally complex nature of this region. It also provided a
brief history of this region, with a focus on their relevancy to the Mongol-Khwarazmian conflict.
The second chapter analyzed the military conflict between the Khwarazmians and the Mongols,
starting from the siege of Otrar and ending with the battle of the Indus River. It analyzed each battle as
it pertained to both the Mongols and the Khwarazmians. Some cities in the Khwarazmian state chose to
surrender, and meanwhile, those cities and fortifications that chose to resist ended up being conquered
and subjugated. The use of captured Khwarazmian levies by the Mongols meant that Mongolian
strength increased with each city taken, while conversely for the power of the Khwarazmian state, it
meant that each city lost was a significant blow to its ability to resist.
As the conflict progressed and evolved, so too did the Mongol siege policy. If a settlement's
leadership and inhabitants chose to resist, then once the city was taken the surviving artisans and
craftsmen were captured and employed by the Mongols and the women and children of the captured
settlement would be sold into slavery. Garrisons defending settlements that resisted the Mongols would
either be executed or enslaved and pressed into Mongolian military service. If, on the other hand, a city
surrendered, it would be subjected to different measures. The leadership would submit to the Khan and
provide food and gifts to him, and in turn the leadership and the population of a settlement would be
spared, meaning that no women or children would be sold into slavery and that there would be no mass
executions for the able-bodied males of the settlement. In some cases able-bodied men would even be
levied into military service for the Mongols. After surrender, everything depended on whether the
surrendered leaders honored their submission to the Khan. This held until the time of Jallal ad-Din,
when some Khwarazmian settlements broke their submission and resisted. As a consequence, Mongol
siege policy ended up being the same for both cities that resisted and those that surrendered.

91

The third chapter analyzed the politics of the Khwarazmian state, considering the internal and
external politics of the Khwarazmian state from the later years of Khwarazmshah Tekesh's reign to the
time of Khwarazmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad. It also provided insight into the powerful, influential,
and disruptive role of Khwarazmshah Muhammad's mother Terken Khatun. Finally, there was also
some analysis regarding the role of merchants and espionage in the context of Mongol-Khwarazmain
relations. These internal divisions came in many forms, mainly as issues relating to unreliable
subordinate lords who proved to be significant obstacles to the Khwarazmian state’s ability to
prosecute wars effectively.
Externally, the Khwarazmian state was beset by many challenges, particularly internal revolts
supported or instigated by the Abbasid Calif Al-Nasir, and by the Ghurid empire’s invasions from the
south, usually in support of these internal revolts. Other challenges included maintaining the
Khwarazmian alliance with the Qara Khitai, and this proved critical to the survival and ultimate
expansion of the Khwarazmian state.
The issue of Terken Khatun had a profound impact on the Khwarazmian state. She exacerbated
internal divisions by favoring the Turkic peoples of Khwarazm over their Persian subjects. She
installed Turkic people loyal solely to her in key state and military positions and undermined the
Khwarazmshah Muhammad's ability to effectively rule the country on his own. Her protection of
Inalchuq was one of the most important causes of the Mongol-Khwarazm war.
In matters of espionage, intelligence, and merchants, both the Khwarazmian and Mongolian
states used envoys for both diplomacy and espionage. But what made the Mongols unique was their use
of merchants as spies and diplomats as well as agents of trade and investment. These measures proved
to be effective in the Mongol-Khwarazmian war and in their relations prior to it.

92

For the Great Khan and the Mongol state, victory over Khwarazm proved decisively successful.
It was a validation of their centralized command structure in which all power was exclusively under the
control of the Great Khan himself. It also demonstrated the significant strategic and tactical flexibility
of the Mongol state, an example of which was the case with Temür Malik’s resistance, when Mongol
forces were able to swiftly re-deploy their army and levies to defeat the crafty Khwarazmian defenders.
This conflict also validated and solidified the Mongols’ siege policy and their development of siege
tactics that would prove to be incredibly useful in future conflicts against other sedentary societies.
Still, Khwarazmian failings made the Mongol victory easier. The Khwarazmian strategy of city
defense had failed, and it meant that the Mongols could isolate cities and take the Khwarazmian state
piece by piece. It also limited Khwarazm’s tactical options to those related to the defense of besieged
settlements. The unreliability of Khwarazm’s subordinate nobility made the formation and deployment
of Khwarazmian imperial forces more difficult. Unlike the Mongols, all military and political power
was not concentrated in the hands of Khwarazmshah Muhammad. Power was subject to the whims of
the unreliable subordinate lords and the active subversions of Terken Khatun.
In seeking to understand the downfall of the Khwarazmain state, it is important to note that it
had ultimately more to do with the failings of the Khwarazmain state than it did with the immense
power of the Mongols. Thus, the Khwarazmain state fell by Mongol military conquest, which conquest
in turn was accelerated by Khwarazm’s political, bureaucratic, and organizational failures.

93

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