Studien zur Zeitgeschichte
des Nahen Ostens und
Nordafrikas
herausgegeben von

Camilla Dawletschin-Linder, Helmut Mejcher
(Historisches Seminar, Universität Hamburg)
und

Marianne Schmidt-Dumont
(Deutsches Übersee-Institut, Hamburg)

Band 10

Lrr

Irmgard Schrand

Jews in Egypt
Communists and Citizens

LIT

D ieses Buch widme ich
meinem Vater,
der mich fü r das alltägliche Unrecht
der NS-Herrschaft sensibilisiert hat,
und meinem Sohn,
der ohne Heimat in der Welt zju Hause sein wird.

Mein Dank gilt der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, die meine Promotion gefördert
hat, und der Johanna und Fritz Buch-Gedächtnisstiftung für ihren Druck­
kostenzuschuss.

Bibliographie information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche
Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the
Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de.
ISBN 3-8258-7516-4
Zugl.: Hamburg, Univ., Diss., 2003

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V

“In the local paper ‘Ahora!,’ I read an article, ’Ayacucho lives in terror,’ and from it I learned
that a pistaco was a tall white foreigner who slept by day, drank a lot of milk and carried a long
white knife under his coat He used the knife to cut up Indians. He chopped off heads, and
limbs, and kept their trunks for the human grease with which he oiled his machines. Europe’s
industrial revolution had been lubricated with the lard made from helpless Indians. So had been
the Vietnam and Korean wars. The space shuttle Challenger, I learned, had blown up because
it had lacked this ‘aceite humano.’ ... I had a long conversation with a grim man wearing a
Coca-Cola baseball cap. Pistacos, he told me, had recently hacked the limbs off 30,000 Indians.
I said I was a little sceptical. Had he any evidence? Oh, no, but he’d seen it in the press. Most
pistacos were government mercenaries employed by President Garcfa to pay off his $ 13 billion
debt The blood he sold to the blood banks, the oil to the Western industry. The man thought
Garcia’s pistacos were Argentinian. But he is wrong, a taxi-driver told me later. They were
not Argentinian. They were Swiss. No insisted another, later the same day. They came from
Cangallo, two hours away.”1

'Nicholas Shakespeare. In punuit of Guzmân. in: G nnta 23, Home, Spring 1988, Cambridge. 179 f.

Contents
1 Introduction

1

2

Nation and Nationalism

7

3

Minorities
3.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................
3.1.1 The Influence of the British ....................................................................
3.1.2 Xenophobia and M inorities.......................................................................
3.2 Minorities: C o p ts ..................................................................................................
3.3 Minorities: Jew s.....................................................................................................
3.3.1 Jewish History in E g y p t..........................................................................
3.3.2 Didar Fauzi Rossano for E x am p le..........................................................
3.3.3 The Foundation of the State of Israel.......................................................
3.3.4 E conom y..................................................................................................
3.3.5 Culture, Language, and P o litic s ..............................................................
3.3.6 Egypt, Palestine, and the Egyptian J e w s .................................................
3.3.7 Zionists and Communists..........................................................................
3.4 Foreigners..............................................................................................................

15
15
18
25
27
36
38
43
44
47
52
58
62
63

4

Jewish Communists I
4.1 The Communist M ovem ent...................................................................................
4.1.1 Joseph R osenthal......................................................................................
4.2 Workers and Intellectuals......................................................................................

71
71
74
81

5

Jewish Communists D
93
5.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 93
5.2 A Jewish M ilitan t.................................................................................................. 99
5.3 C u rie l........................................................................................................................103
5.3.1 Curiel’s Self A ssessm ent............................................................................. 106
5.3.2 Curiel and I s la m ......................................................................................... 110
5.3.3 Egyptianization and P roletarization...........................................................114
5.3.4 Iskra.............................................................................................................. 114
5.3.5 P roletarization............................................................................................ 119
5.3.6 The S p l it ..................................................................................................... 121
5.3.7 The War of 1948 ...................................................................................... 126
5.3.8 Curiel and Palestine ................................................................................... 133

6 Jewish Communists HI
137
6.1 Marcel C e re si............................................................................................................ 137

vii

viii

CONTENTS

7

Jewish Communists IV
147
7.1 DarwTsh, Sa'd, D ouek...............................................................................................147

8

Reactions to Curiel
155
8.1 The Right A nsw er..................................................................................................... 155
8.2 The “Imagined” C o n flic t.........................................................................................156
8.3 Communist Foundlings............................................................................................158
8.4 The Lack of A uthenticity.........................................................................................164
8.5 The Grass and the Weed .........................................................................................167

9

Ideology and Economy
171
9.1 InjT A flStQ n.............................................................................................................. 171
9.2 Muhammad Sid A hm ad............................................................................................174
9.3 Amina R ashid........................................................................................................... 181

10 Culture
183
10.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................. 183
10.2 T heE ffendiya........................................................................................................... 184
10.3 Popular G a s s e s ........................................................................................................ 185
10.4 The New G a s s ........................................................................................................ 186
10.5 Costumes and H a b its ............................................................................................... 188
10.6 Education, Authenticity, and Socialist Realism ....................................................... 189
11 Middle Class Communism
197
11.1 National Art and Human C u ltu re ............................................................................ 200
11.2 S tudents.................................................................................................................... 204
11.3 W o m e n .................................................................................................................... 209
11.4 Students, Workers and A risto c ra ts......................................................................... 211
11.5 The Real People and the S c u m ............................................................................... 215
11.6 J e w s .......................................................................................................................... 220
12 Workers
227
12.1 Workers and Intellectuals.........................................................................................227
12.2 The Educated W orker...............................................................................................229
12.2.1 Workers’ Education......................................................................................232
12.3 Foreign Labor and Factory O w ners......................................................................... 233
12.4 Elites among W orkers...............................................................................................236
12.5 Workers and Muslim B ro th e rs ............................................................................... 237
12.6 Workers and Com m unists.........................................................................................239
12.7 Workers, foreigners, and Jews ............................................................................... 245
12.8 The Village and the Factory..................................................................................... 253
13 Kamshish

257

14 Conclusion

265

CONTENTS

ix

A Inventory of Sources
271
A.1 Personal Interview s..................................................................................................271
A.2 List of Documents.....................................................................................................272
A.2.1 Documents from the Centre of Arab and African Studies in Cairo . . . 272
A.2.2 Personal Archives of YOsuf DarwTsh, Taha Sa'd 'Uthmân and Fauzi
H abbashI.................................................
275
A.2.3 Government Archives ................................................................................ 276
A.2.4 Stichting beheer IIS G ................................................................................... 277
A.3 Newspapers and M agazines..................................................................................... 278
A.4 Books and Articles in A ra b ic .................................................................................. 279
A.5 Books and Articles in Other L a n g u a g es................................................................ 285

Note on Transliteration
The text follows the International Journal o f Middle Eastern Studies’ transliteration standard
for words in literary Arabic. All words found in an unabridged dictionary are treated as English
words (e.g. madrasa, ulema, shaykh). Contemporary names and places are spelt as they are
found in standard publications. “Qaf” is rendered “q” and “jim ” is rendered “j ”; Mtah marbuta"
appears as “a.” Except at the beginning of an English sentence or footnote, only proper names
are capitalized. Diphtongs are transliterated as “au” or “ay” where appropriate. The “1” in the
definite article “al” is always retained.
Transliteration of colloquial text, e.g. literature as well as interviews, follows A Dictionary
o f Egyptian Arabic (Badawi and Hinds 1986) though with the modification that consonants that
conform to literary pronuncadon are rendered according to LIMES guidelines; long vowels in
colloquial texts are marked with a macron as in LIMES.
Names are fully transliterated. Names of Egyptians (authors, politicians, communist ac­
tivists etc.) have been rendered as they are pronounced in Egypt Names regularly cited in
English are written according to common usage (e.g. Abdel Nasir, Naguib Mahfouz, Taha
Husain etc.).

Chapter 1
Introduction
The Jewish synagogue in Adli Street in downtown Cairo doesn’t even have a shammas, let
alone a rabbi, left A very old Jewish lady takes care of the building and of the few visitors that
occasionally dare to pass the heavily armed Egyptian soldiers and enter the Jewish prayer house.
The building is beautiful, the architecture fits harmoniuosly into the Egyptian environment and
the adornments are meant to remind the onlooker that Moses had been an Egyptian prince before
he became the savior of the Jewish people in the Egyptian lands, and was called on to bring his
people home. Nowadays, at the beginning of the 21st century, there are almost no Jews left in
Egypt. But there is a visible trend to recover the heritage of the Jews of the Arab lands. In the
internet community websites are posted, and in literature a generation of Jewish writers who
experienced Arab societies only as children, or knew it through stories, integrate recent Jewish
history in the Arab lands into their world of imagination. Egypt was the first Arab country to
sign a peace accord with Israel. Before the second Palestinian intifada began, Israeli tourists
had been a common phenomenon in Egypt Like the Greeks and the Italians, they found the
country completely changed. The old quarters they had lived in, the houses they had inhabited,
they found crowded and deteriorated. The European world of Cairo and Alexandria bad gone.
The glorious 19th century European architecture in the posh downtown quarters had vanished
under the tarnish of pollution, the lack of urban planning, the cheap advertising, the general
disinterest in the preservation of beautiful architecture, and the rush of the rural crowds. Thus it
followed the road of decline other cultures in Egypt had fallen prey to: the Pharaos, the Copts,
the Fatimids, the Mameluks, and the Ottomans.
For the Egyptian public, the peace accord with Israel was waste paper. It ended three
decades of military confrontation but did not lead to real peace between the two countries. This
was mainly due to the plight of the Palestinian people whose fate remains uncertain. Egyptian
intellectuals have adopted the cause of Palestinian liberation and independence, and reject any
normalization of relations with Israel. Even a dialogue on an intellectual and artistic level is
rejected. The most outspoken among those writers, journalists, lawyers and scientists are left
leaning secularists, many of them with a communist past.
In Israel, the foundation of the state of Israel was celebrated as a victory against the British
mandate in Palestine. Jewish resistance fighters first gained victory over a mighty European
power, and then asserted the right of a Jewish nation to its historical homeland against all its
Arab neighbors. For Egyptian intellectuals on the other hand, Israel is the continuity of im­
perialist occupation of Arab lands, the outcome of a colonialist scheme of pretending retreat
while, at the same time, securing the future interests of the West with the implantation of an
alien entity in the heart of the Arab lands • the state of Israel. The Jewish state is perceived as
an assault on Arah/Islamic culture. Just as west of the Jordan Palestinian landmarks and history

1

2

CHAPTER l. INTRODUCTION

were actually wiped out, and the names of Palestinian villages were substituted by new Hebrew
names, Egyptian intellectuals fear that Arab culture and identity in general are threatened by
the state of Israel and Zionist ideology.
Even before their massive exodus in 1948, and again in the aftermath of 1936, Jews in Egypt
have not constituted a numerically significant group. Unlike the Jews of Baghdad they did not
develop an Arabic dialect of their own, distinct from Muslim Arabic. Egypt was, roughly
sketched, the home of three groups of Jews: the Karaite Jews, who were probably the descen­
dants of Jews resident in Egypt since the time of the Pharaohs, and Jews who had come to
Egypt as a result of oppression against them elsewhere in the world: the Sephardic Jews who
escaped the brutal regime of los reyes catholicos after the reconquista, and, a few centuries
later, the Jews who fled the turmoil in Eastern Europe and in the Ottoman Empire. 19th cen­
tury Egypt had welcomed migrants from around the Mediterranean basin, mostly Greeks and
Italians. The ambitious modernization schemes of the Egyptian rulers needed skilled labour.
Economic opportunities looked promising and attracted merchants and businessmen. British
occupation furthered the fortune of the migrants. The struggle for liberation and the protracted
heated debate about the nature of the nascent Egyptian nation stale, though, diminished it soon.
What had been an asset up till then turned into a liability: foreign nationality and non-Muslim
culture. This development hit Jews particularly hard.
Other than Greeks or Italians, Jews had no particular country to return to even though they
referred to France as home in cultural terms. Most of them did not want to leave, but turning
themselves into Egyptian nationals was not merely a matter of naturalization but a question that
involved, above all, a cultural dimension.
To claim its place in modern society, a minority has to be represented politically and to
partake in the debate on social, economic, political and cultural problems of a country, hi Egypt,
Jews had traditionally abstained from politics, they had contented themselves with the role
the millets had played in the old Ottoman Empire. For minorities, organized political activity
had not been deemed advisable. With the upsurge of new political concepts and theories, this
view was challenged. In a democratic republican national state all citizens are called upon
to act politically. In the 1930s, the offspring of 19th century Jewish migrants participated in
Egyptian politics and identified with the national Egyptian cause, in an effort to forge a tie with
the Egyptian masses, and as a sign that they regarded Egypt their home. They became active
at a time when the modem Egyptian nation-state, modelled after European political patterns
under the watchful eye of British colonialism, came into being, and Egyptian nationalism grew
confident of itself in the struggle against colonialism, though still sharing its political and (most
of its) cultural values. Young Jews engaged in a movement that promised to go beyond the
limits of nationalism, to remove social injustice and finally realize the ideals of the French
revolution: liberté, égalité, fraternité first passing through a period of benevolent proletarian
dictatorship. Communism was the political ideology that attracted the brightest minds among
the young generation.
Research has already been done on Jews in Egypt, as well as on communist history. Eu­
ropean and US-American works have traced the rise and the decline of the Jewish community
and its leading families in Egypt An effort has been made to describe the dwindling fortune
of Egyptian Jews as the conflict in Palestine grew more and more urgent during the 1940s and
the ensuing war in 1948, and as, in 1936, Egypt finally became the object of direct aggression
by Israel. The diaspora of Egyptian Jewry has been portrayed. In the following chapters, the
outlines of these works and the works of Egyptian authors who have dedicated themselves to
the economic aspect of Jewish life in Egypt will be referred to and critically reflected. Also,
the research on communist history in Egypt, done by Egyptian and Western historians, will be

3
evaluated and quoted. What can already be said in this introduction is that all that research
has one aspect in common: it regards Jews as an element alien to Egyptian society because
the majority of Jews are defined as foreign in language and in culture. Therefore their political
engagement is regarded as either negligible, not permissible, or even damaging. There seems to
be a multitude of reasons that bears witness against thw e Jewish activists: they engaged them*
selves among Communists while communism never grew into a mass movement in Egypt; they
were a minority within their own community; their social status and cultural outlook seemed to
make ties with the Egyptian masses improbable.
Western (leftist) liberals and Egyptian Communists and nationalists alike meet on common
ground when they claim that in a colonized society any group identified with the colonizer
cannot hope to be in the forefront of struggle for liberation. The main attitude towards those
Jewish Egyptian Communists is best reflected in Albert Memmi’s comment on Jews in Ttinis:
“It is a historical injustice, but whenever there was a majority who shared the same
religion, persons of a different faith were out of place during the search for national
identity • even if the cultural roots and the traditions were almost the same.” 1
The mantra of postcolonial studies is to see history from die viewpoint of the repressed, to
reconquer their history and their lives. In the works
Jewish history in Egypt and the
history of the communist movement in Egypt emphasis has been laid either on the Egyptian
• majority • point of view, on the perspective of a people involved in a struggle for liberation
that had no place for outsiders or “collaborators,” or on the perspective of Jews driven not only
from Europe but also from the Arab lands. This book emphasizes a different perspective: the
perspective of migrants, and their political ambitions. The involvement of young Jews in the
Egyptian Communist movement, their leading role in the foundation of that movement in the
late 1930s, is read as an endeavor to participate in Egyptian politics. The discussion concerning
the possibilities and the limits of such a participation includes the reflection on the role of
minorities in a colonial situation, and the struggle for national identity in a colonized society.
The search for national identity in the Arab World has not yet come to an end. The cultural
crisis and the identity crisis are issues that periodically reoccur in the Arab/Islamic world and
even more so, in Egypt, a country that has been an intellectual center for many centuries. Unlike
intellectuals in the Maghreb states, Egyptian intellectuals did not turn to a European language to
express their thoughts, but the Egyptian intellectuals’ struggle for authority and for the peoples*
minds is the same. The biggest political mass movement in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood,
was initiated by a traditional alim, Hassan al-Banna. The other man who could move masses,
Gamal Abdel Nasir, emerged as a popular leader only after be had already laid his hands on the
keys of power.
In Egypt, the fact that the communist movement was founded by Jewish Communists has
become an embarrassment Discussion about that particular political movement is not centered
on its political ideas and its efforts (and failure) to create a mass basis but on the Jewish leader­
ship of communist groups. Former Communists have turned into prolific writers during the last
two decades. Since it is not dangerous anymore to admit to being a former Communist activist,
round table discussions and oral history projects have come into being. The discussion about
Jewish Communists has always also been a discussion about identity and authenticity. Two
factors have influenced that debate: the upsurge of the new Islamic movement in Egypt during
the 1970s (and its endeavor to represent itself as the only authentic Egyptian mass movement),
and the Palestinian cause.
'KroU 1997,49.

4

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

This study concentrates on the discourse concerning the role Egyptian Jews played in the
Egyptian Communist movement It confronts the view Jewish Egyptian Communists hold of
themselves with the view of their Egyptian Muslim or Coptic comrades. The discourse about
Jews in the Egyptian Communist movement reflects the attitude of a representative group of
people in Egyptian society towards minorities in general, and Jews in particular, within the
framework of the Egyptian nation-state; it revolves around the issue of Egyptian identity, and
therefore encompasses the development of society as a whole, and the change of historical
perspective.
The research starts with a discussion of the development of the Egyptian nation-state and
the place Islam as a culture and a religion occupies within the framework of that debate. That
question inextricably leads to a second preliminary debate: the debate about the role of minori­
ties in the Egyptian nation state, their relation to the British occupiers and foreign capital, and
their rights and duties towards their Egyptian Muslim compatriots, and, in a wider framework,
the Arab national cause. That cause found its embodiment in the Palestinian question. In that
discussion Jews are sometimes perceived as a local minority and at other times as foreigners
and migrants.
In the main part of the research the self-perception of Jewish Communist figures and their
contribution to the “Egyptianization” of the Egyptian Communist movement (and the discourse
about it), and the definition of Egyptian communism is tackled. The comparative presentation
of three different attitudes among Jewish Communist leaders shows not only different trends in
communism but also, and primarily, different approaches to the possibilities and demands o f
integration into Egyptian society.
The chapter “Reactions to Curiel” deals with a wider debate in the Egyptian public that
reflects the attitudes and (mis)perceptions of historiographers and journalists concerning com­
munist politics in general and the engagement of Jews in particular.
One of the arguments raised against Jewish political participation has been that Jews be­
longed to a foreign culture, due to their education and their values. The chapter about the
“Upper Classes” shows that prominent Egyptian public figures came from the same cultural
background but, in contrast to the Jews, were tolerated as leading figures.
Opposition against the “aristocracy,” as against the Jewish leaders, was particularly strong
among Communists of middle class origin. The middle classes hoped for social and political
advancement. Their ambitions were reflected in the cultural productions of the 1930s and 1940s
that showed how the corrupt elite and its francophone culture were bypassed by middle class
newcomers, well-educated and rooted among the people.
Workers, though, were not completely convinced of the virtues of that new class, and full
of mistrust against students and intellectuals who spent too much time talking and too little
time fighting. Yet again, workers themselves had also formed an elite that found its way into
communist ranks and competed with other cadres for influence.
This study does not represent the history of the Egyptian communist movement in the years
between 1937 and 1964, in as much as it is a critical account of the discourse reigning the histo­
riography and the discussion about that movement In the main chapters, it focuses, therefore,
on the question of how the role of Egyptian Jews was and is being perceived by leading Jewish
communist personalities themselves, and their mainly Muslim • though also occasionally Copt •
Egyptian comrades. The material used in this context was gathered from interviews, pamphlets,
newspapers, magazines, autobiographies, and studies concerning the movement In the past
quarter of a century, there have been many voices claiming to reveal the ultimate truth about the
Communists* history, and affirming its Egyptian character. The outstanding feature in most of
the Egyptian contributions has been an attempt to represent the movement as embedded in the

5
current of die Egyptian (national) struggle for liberation from Anglo-American colonialist and
imperialist schemes, and to present it as a political trend that grew unencumbered by foreign
ideas and personalities, in spite of the powerful presence of Jewish immigrants and Egyptian
Jews in its ranks.
The Egyptian communist movement was a clandestine movement, split into groups hostile
towards each other, for most of its existence. Therefore there is no party archive where written
material is preserved. Most of the pamphlets and magazines are gone. The material that was
confiscated by the Ministry of the Interior is still kept under lock and key. Communist maga­
zines and papers, even though they are indicated in the official catalogue of the main archive in
Cairo, Dar ai-Kutub, are still kept in the ‘poison cabinet,’ and one needs special authorization
(i.e. special contacts) to see them. Private archives were of great help, and so was the fact that
the Egyptian historian R ifat Al-SaTd had transferred many of his papers to the International
Institute of Social History (IISG) in Amsterdam and the Centre for Arab and African Studies
in Cairo. Still, interviews were the most valuable source for insights into the perception of the
communist movement of the 1940s and 1950s by its contemporaries. The interviews were auto­
biographical on the one hand, and topical on the other. They were conducted following a main
connecting thread, but in most cases direct questions concerning communist history and partieulary the cooperation with the Jewish leadership and comrades in communist groups, were not
necessary because the respondents were eager to tackle that subject Apart from basic socio­
economic data regarding family, geographical origins, and class, I asked my interview partners
about the neighborhoods they grew up in, about the schools they went to, and the subjects they
learnt about their personal experience with foreigners in general, and with Jewish comrades
in the Egyptian communist movement in particular. I was cautious to allow my respondents to
express the logic of their lives and their political experience as they understood i t Apart from
facts and events, feelings and values dominated a large space in the interviews, as they do in
this study as a whole, because much of what is constructed as evidence for the unsuitability of x
or y in a political or social position or even as a compatriot can be traced back to a set of vague
feelings and solid bias.
My interview partners were numerous and ready to meet me for hours on several occasions.
Because the research went beyond the history of the Communist movement and was aimed
at exploring the attitude of the Egyptian Muslim and Copt Communists towards their Jewish
comrades it was helpful to re-interview my respondents after I had analyzed the content of their
interview. Once more I experienced the incredible hospitality of Egyptian women and men who
were ready to meet me as many times and as long as I wanted. I tired them out with questions
about a past that now seems almost unreal, with its hopes for a better future brought about
by socialism and with the help of international solidarity, and with the ties between comrades
from countries all over the world. Now those former ties have become worthless in the political
field, and have been replaced by interaction with friends and with travel (occasional visits to
the European capitals). In the evaluation of those interviews and the use of those field data, in
conjunction with other evidence to produce historical synthesis and interpretation the diversity
of social and cultural experiences, the implications of gender, class, ethnicity, and religion had
to be taken into consideration. In addition to and in comparison with my own interviews I have
also used material gathered in Egyptian oral history projects.
The problem dealt with in this study exceeds the boundaries of a discussion about a certain
political movement and the rivalry between its members which might occasionally also lead to
the use of ethnic or confessional properties as a means of ousting leading figures or a disturb­
ing fragment of that movement Any political movement is subjected to social and political
leverages, interpreted as reflecting public opinion, or a certain Zeitgeist or simple populism.

CHAPTER /. INTRODUCTION

6

Egyptian Communists hoped to lead the masses in politics, and to educate them. In a country
like Egypt, where die majority of the population was totally uneducated and not used to polit­
ical concepts, this seemed to be a necessity. The interpretation of the “real people’s will” was
in many cases a euphemism, and not much more than petty wrangling for power and influence
• especially since repression and the lack of mass appeal made a field contest impossible.
Rather than only reviewing the problem of the contribution of Jews to the origin and growth
of the communist movement in Egypt per se, I see the discussion of their role as a debate re­
flecting the difficulty and obsession of Egyptian intellectuals with the position of minorities in
Egyptian society. Tackling that question has always included a dimension of dealing with for­
eign powers, or the threat of foreign intervention in Egyptian interior policy, a problem triggered
by the history of foreign occupation and colonialism (justified by the protection of minorities
on the one hand, and by the competition of world cultures on the other hand).
Could a Jew become the leader of a Muslim proletariat? The problem was further com­
plicated by the foundation of the state of Israel, which by definition was a homeland for Jews
only, thus combining the idea of ethnicity and religion, and creating the ultimate national stale.
Even though part of Israel’s population is Arab (Muslims and Christians) - living in Israel and
carrying Israeli passports • Israel is the only modem democratic national state that allows im­
migration only for a specific group of people.
Arab authors put emphasis on the point that orthodox interpretation of the Talmud leads to a
stark differentiation between Jews and non-Jews, valuing non-Jewish life less than Jewish life.
Islam and the Muslims are constantly presented as the tolerant side:
“The Islam and the Muslims (individuals and state) acknowledge Judaism and
Christianity as two divine religions, which means that Islam does not negate ’the
other* completely as Judaism and Papism do - with the exception of the Arab hea­
thens who were eliminated. The Muslim military expeditions and the conquests of
much of the areas that were part of the Roman Eastern and Western Empire, like
the Levante, Egypt and Northern Africa and Andalusia, the Balkans during the Ot­
toman period, those conquests and the spread of Islam by pure proselytization and
commerce and Sufi orders in Asia and Africa, all that made the ‘we’ of the Arab and
Muslims in the memory of the West that ’other’ that competed with it for its past,
and accordingly the contestant that it conjures up, consciously or subconsciously,
whenever it thinks about a project for its future.”2
That celebrated tolerance, though, fell short of acknowledging citizens’ rights for Jews after
1948 (including the right to become politically active). The discussion, as it unfolds in this
study, shows the extent to which social and cultural prejudices against Jews helped to justify
the exclusion of Jewish comrades from the communist movement in Egypt, and made their
participation in that movement look like a historical “accident” in the aftermath. This debate is
all the more revealing because it also presents an insight in the self-perception of the Egyptian
Communists and the classes present in the movement, and their idea of national identity. Even
more so, it is a contribution to the discourse about authenticity that has been going on for much
of the last century, and shows the shallowness and fiction of the concept of “one nation.”

2al-Jabtf 1988.36.

Chapter 2
Nation and Nationalism
“My grandmother insisted that al-sitt Damyana was a Muslim. Robbers had fol­
lowed her to the outskirts of town. She had run away, and the priest, who squat­
ted in the graveyard, had rescued her. Seeing the robbers approaching, she had
screamed in anguish: ‘Gum yan a... ahe yana’ (i.e. They came here, they are here),
and then commended her soul to the Lord. The priest imagined that her name was
Damyana and that she was a Christian. Therefore he buried her in the Christian
graveyard. She was so generous. At night she illuminated the paths in the grave­
yard to shelter the frightened mourners from robbers. They built a church for her
and the maulid of sitt Damyana was a roaring party. The doors of the Coptic graves
would be opened for the visitors,most of them Muslims, and they brought all the
necessities for the maulid: the swings, the fireworks, the puppets, the tirmis seeds,
and the snake charm ers. . . ”'
Most Egyptians perceive modem Egypt as a tolerant nation. Though its majority is Muslim,
it has formed a secular state that guarantees all its citizens the same rights and the same free­
doms. The famous slogan of the 1919 revolution: “religion is for God, and the homeland for
all,“ is frequently quoted to demonstrate the integrative force of that movement. Quotations, as
the one heading the chapter, serve to emphasize the claim that Egyptian culture is shared by all
the inhabitants of the Nile valley: Muslims, Copts and (Egyptian) Jews, of whom only a few
hundred are left
That culture is connected to the villages, to popular Islam and vernacular language, to a
supposed “low culture” that researchers of nationalism in the Islamic world and Egyptian na­
tionalism in the first half of the 20th century thought would disappear or at least lose importance
for the sake of a stronger identification with scripturalist Islam.
From a linguistic point of view it might be argued that Egyptians still understand the village
from where they come as their homeland, and that the identification of the little homeland
with the big one has not yet taken place at a broader level of society. Al-balad, which means
“the country” in Egyptian dialect, is not Egypt as a country, but it denominates the town or
the village, a place in the countryside from where the family originates, a place to return to for
weddings and more often for funerals, a place to make nostalgic reference to. It is the stronghold
of “Egyptianness.” Misr, on the other hand, which means Egypt in classical Arabic, is the
capital, Cairo, in dialect. Misr is different from al-balad: though it is the capital of the Egyptian
nation, it is at the same time umm al-dunya, the mother of the world, and as such not suitable
to become the center of nationalist feelings. In this sense, Jews could not become real Egyptian
1Al-Sald 1999,26-27.

7

8

CHAPTER 2. NATION AND NATIONALISM

nationals. Egyptian Jews were not from the village. They did not have that connection to the
rural hinterland. They belonged to an urban culture. Their homes were the big cities, mainly
Cairo and Alexandria. Like their Muslim and Coptic compatriots, they fostered family ties. But
a society that is organized along family ties cannot easily integrate migrants or local minorities.
Barriers between different cultures and confessions continued to exist also after the revolution
of 1919. The disparity between Egyptians and foreign communities grew, and “Egyptianness”
was ever more strongly identified with Islamic culture, though Islamic culture as high culture
was not predominant in all the mass media, and even less so classical Arabic, as its linguistic
expression. As we will see in the narratives of former Communists, Jews were not accepted as
representatives of an Egyptian political movement, for cultural as well as ethnic reasons: they
were perceived as belonging to a European cultural heritage (though many had originally come
from oriental countries), they could not prove Egyptian ancestry, and there was no connection
to the Egyptian village, the alleged seat of “Egyptianness.” On the contrary, Jews in Egypt were
a symbol for the antithesis of nationalism: cosmopolitanism. Belonging to Europe culturally
found its salient expression in communication. Jews were said to be educated in and to speak
mainly in French. Thus they were considered alien to the culture and the situation in Egypt2
The discourse about the Egyptian communist movement is connected to the discourse about
the development of the Egyptian nationalist cause. The first Egyptian Communist Party was
founded in 1922, in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution against British occupation in 1919.
The second movement began in the 1930s, the years of the youth movements in the Arab world,
and continued until the late 1930s, passing from the stage of Egyptian national liberation to
Arab national liberation. Communists, like all political forces of that time, were moved by the
struggle for national liberation. The evaluation of the role of Jews in that movement has been
influenced by the discourse about Egyptian anticolonialist struggle, the growth of an Egyptian
independent nation state and Egyptian nationalism. The “us-they” dichotomy plays a big part
Jews are perceived as different from “the” Egyptians. The distinguishing features are a mixture
of cultural, ethnic, religious, and social traits. Looming behind that difference of Jews is the
assumed homogeneity of Egyptian society, the existence of an Egyptian nation to the exclusion
of others. Therefore, a look at the discussion about the Egyptian nation and nationalism is
a necessary preliminary step to understand the communist discourse, and even more so, the
discourse about the role of Jews in the movement The short outlook, however, on nation and
nationalism will be focused on the discussion about the development of Egyptian nationalism in
the 1930s and a reflection about a Muslim nation vs. a nation of Muslims, i.e. an Islamic nation
vs. a secular nation. The second communist movement which is at the center of this study,
started in the 1930s; all the main protagonists had been influenced by the discussions of those
years, and all the elements that would from then on constitute the pillars of the debate about
Egyptian authenticity, the relation to modernity, the place of Islamic tradition and the role of
minorities had already been present since the beginning of the century. What further enhanced
the debate and acted as a catalyst for a development towards a stronger identification with the
Arab and the Muslim world in Egypt was the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, which
also reflected on the communist movement, and will be a theme present in all the following
chapters.
There is no commonly acknowledged theory about nations and nationalisms. Since World
JTo «peak a foreign language seemed U>Herder living an artificial life. Fichte even trgued that foreign words in
• language could contaminate political morality. French nationalists, like the writer Charles Maunas (1868**1932),
believed that Jews or Semites in general could not understand or handle the Fiench language as well as the French.
Language, race, culture, and sometimes even religion came to constitute different aspects of the nation. Kedourie
1993,38*66.

9
War II, the West has produced a legacy of critical views concerning the development of nations,
while, by contrast, in the newly decolonized Arab countries the assertion of national character
and destiny, and as a precondition the assertion of the existence of a nation, has been crucial.3
For the argument of this dissertation I will follow Hobsbawm’s and Anderson’s argument that
all nations are invented.
Hobsbawm has described patriotism as the root of nationalism, having in mind the French
revolution, which is considered the hour of birth of the citoyen. Such a patriotism was not
tantamount to a belief in an already existing nation (like the German romantics’ patriotic fervor),
but was expressed in the struggle for a nation whose member one would become by participating
in that struggle. Ethnicity, history or language, even the particular patois of the family, were
obsolete for the definition of the nation.4 Henri Curiel, the founder of the communist Egyptian
Movement for National Liberation (EMNL) and the most controversial figure among the Jewish
Communists, would have considered himself covered by this definition, because he believed that
be had become an Egyptian by his struggle for the national liberation of Egypt
For a colonized society, however, the struggle for the genesis of a new nation was differ­
e n t In the discourse about Jews it becomes clear that even though Jews are blamed because a
considerable part preferred foreign to Egyptian citizenship, in general those politically active
Jews who carried Egyptian citizenship w oe still perceived as foreigners. Egyptian patriotism
in the interpretation of the effendiyya and the elite was not predominantly the wish to renew the
country in a revolution or by reforms (as in the French revolution), but the urge to liberate the
country from occupation. Freedom was not understood as an individual right, but as freedom
from foreign oppression. Workers’ and peasants’ demands had to succumb to this imperative.
In this regard, history, language and ethnicity became im portant The nation was not under­
stood as a community of citizens who cared about the welfare of their country because they had
gained certain rights, but as a community of people growing together by fighting for their right
to form an independent nation.
European authors trace the foundation of nations in the postcolonial order back to the feeling
of unity, bom out of a cultural and linguistic identity, evoked by the domination of western
colonial powers and the process of industrialization and modernization. In Egyptian and Arab
literature in general, nationalism is defined as the awakening of nations to a consciousness
of their own selves. The existence of “real” nations is assumed beyond doubt In the case
of Arab Islamic countries, the term “awakening” even evokes the association of the “Islamic
awakening,” the sahwa islimiyya, which in turn brings up the question of the role of Islam in
the process of nation-building in the Arab world in general and in Egypt in particular.
Ernest Gellner believes that nationalism arises from a process of social change and modern­
ization. Workers and intellectuals are both alienated from their traditional culture; what brings
about a new feeling of cultural homogeneity is their growing class identity. Though in Euro­
pean societies this process was accompanied by secularization, in Islamic societies the opposite
process takes place.
“The generalised new high culture is prevailing not in the name of its folk roots,
but in the name of its links to a faith which is taken with utmost seriousness, indeed
literally with lethal seriousness. The roots which matter are in the transcendent and
JEven if we assume the existence of “real nations” Smith doubts the validity of his model for other than WestEuropean communities. All other nations had to (re)invent the characteristics o f a modem nation. “Eastern Europe
and the Third World have all been trying to imitate a rather singular model whose ethnic homogeneity, like its
parliamentary institutions, simply cannot be transplanted. They have been pursuing a western mirage.” Smith
1986 230.
4Hobsbawm 1996,103-106.

10

CHAPTER 2. NATION AND NATIONALISM
not in the soil. The Uncreated Word of God, not peasant wisdom, vindicates the
new culture. ... It is not clear why the victory of standardised high culture in mo­
bile anonymous societies, which live increasingly by semantic not physical work,
should take the form of nationalism in Europe and of fundamentalism in Islam.
...Islam is unique among world religions, in being, so far, clearly incompatible
with the widely held secularisation thesis, which maintains that the social and psy­
chic hold of religion diminishes with industrialisation.”5

According to Gellner, Islam is the only religion that can keep its strength also in the era of
secularism, because high Islam adapts especially well to industrial social structure. The new
colonial nation at the end of European imperialism had been only the sum of all Muslims in
an arbitrarily defined territory who did not know collective identity. Islam could give them a
political identity that under die conditions of industrialization transformed itself into national
identity. Thus a Muslim nation and not a nation of Muslims was formed. Still, the reason
Gellner offers for the rejection of secularization by Muslims is rather simplistic: they adhere to
tradition after industrialization, because of their pride. Muslims correct their own system and
do not accept an alien one. A secularized Muslim seems to Gellner an anomaly.6
Considering this perception of Islamic societies, a political participation of minorities seems
out of the question, an anomaly tantamount to the secularized Muslim. Thus in the Egyptian
communist movement two anomalies met: young Egyptian Muslims who • in their majority
- considered themselves aloof from religious tradition and belief, i.e. secularized, and Copts
and Jews (with and without Egyptian passports) who wanted to liberate their compatriots not
only from colonization, but from the evils of social injustice and capitalist woes in general.
In the light of Gellner's findings, such a movement appears utterly un-Egyptian, and has been
described as such by its critics. But in the light of Gellner’s concept of Muslim nations, even
the 1919 experience in Egypt with its famous slogan of “religion for God, and the homeland for
all” is out of place, because it was the expression of a secularist state modelled after European
nation states.
Gellner is not the only voice in the discussion about nationalism. He argued that, because
Islam embodies low culture as well as high culture, i.e. script culture, it can renew itself from
within. Benedict Anderson, one of the main representatives of the “invented nations” trend,7*
argues the opposite. Print capitalism plays a major role in the creation of modem nations,
because it always leads to a loss of meaning of religion-bound culture. Printed language creates
uniform fields for exchange and communication and the projection of the image of the presentbased community into a prereligious past Readers and their invisible ties form the basis of what
is to grow into an imagined national community.
Egypt has an impressive prereligious past, which can and has served as a basis for the
imagined national community after the revolution of 1919. Gershoni and Jankowski, who base
their research on Egyptian nationalism on Anderson’s theory,* stress that Egyptians developed a
separate identity from other Arab or Muslim states in the first three decades of the last century.
Linking identity to a Pharaonic past, Egyptians became different from other Muslims. That first
brand of nationalism was territorially bounded; a border marked the end of the nation state and
the beginning of the world around it; it was western-influenced, state and nation were identical.
A tie developed between Egyptian intellectuals and a broader community of Arab literates,
’Gellner 1997,83-84.
‘Gellner 1994.
’Anderson 1998.
'Gershoni and Jankowski 1995.

11
while at the same time the gap between Egyptian intellectuals and Egyptian illiterates widened
Though the two authors base their argument on Anderson's findings and stress the role
o f print capitalism, they arrive at a conclusion for the 1930s that is opposite to Anderson’s
supposition and brings them close to Gellner. In the Egypt of the 1930s, the enlarged book
market led to the spread of Islamic orientation and not to secularism, according to Gershoni
and Jankowski. Egyptian nationalism turned away from the W est Religious groups had the
chance to articulate their concerns and reach a wide circulation. Influential intellectuals, like
Muhammad Husain Haikal and Husain, catered to the demands of a changed consumer taste,
and produced a religious literature that altered the flow of nationalism and helped to create an
Arab-Islamic Supra-Egyptian nationalism. The published books did not return to a prereligious
past, as Anderson demanded, but to the beginnings of Islam and its ideal society. Gershoni and
Jankowski believe that the orientation of Egyptian nationalism changed during the 1930s, due
to the economic and political crisis experienced by Egypt and the world as a whole. They count
the continued British domination, the disappointment at the outcome of the revolution of 1919,
the crisis of democracy in Europe, and an intensified Arab cooperation among the reasons for
the religious outlook of the 1930s.
Islamic and Arab symbols, myths, and values were better suited as a basis of Egyptian
identity, because they supported Egyptian self-confidence. Beyond such psychological reasons
they also served to foster ties with Arab and Muslim neighbors. The Islamic caliphate, the
influence of the news about the Wailing Wall Riots in 1929, the Arab revolt (1936-1939) and the
formation of the Arab League (1943) helped to formulate a Supra-Egyptian nationalism, which
remained secular in concept and upheld Egyptian primacy in the Arab world, while integrating
aspects of Islamic identity.9 The secularist Pharaonic nationalism of the 1920s had been carried
by the Egyptian elite, while the new one of the 1930s was fashioned after the middle class or
lower class, who were less westernized.10
Gershoni and Jankowski obviously assume that the nationalism of the 1930s was closer to
the Egyptian self, the Arab Islamic community - though they, too, call it an imagined community
- than a nationalism engaging pre-Islamic symbolism and embracing secularism. Language and
religion are said to have been subjectively more important for the new effendiyya,11 language,
because Egyptians were still excluded from many lucrative occupations because of foreign lan­
guage demands, religion, because it worked as an element to identify ethnicity.
T h e prominent economic position of foreigners who were neither Arab nor Mus­
lim, and the extensive use of foreign languages by this population, as well as by
much of the westernized elite, may also have worked to strengthen the linguis­
tic as well as the religious self-awareness of the growing urban and literate native
Egyptian population, who were both economically and culturally disadvantaged in
comparison to the Europeanized haute bourgeoisie.”12*
This argument is certainly right It frequently comes up in the discussion about Jews in the
communist movement. Minorities in Egypt not only Jews, but also Copts or Syrian Christians,
were better educated than Muslim Egyptians, even if they were from a similar social back­
ground. Education and the ensuing occupational prospects brought them closer to the Egyptian
*Ibid.. 141-142.
l0The new effendiyya, consisting of a broad social stratum of urban, literate, modem occupational groups was
the key group carrying this brand of nationalism.
"Gershoni and Jankowski 1995, xii-xiii.
"Ibid., 217.

12

CHAPTER 2. NATION AND NATIONALISM

haute bourgeoisie and the colonizer. The “psychological importance of language as a refer*
ent for identity” is a very important factor in the context of Egyptian nationalism - this is also
[»oved in this study.13 The new effendiyya opted for an “ethnic solution” to strengthen their
position in society, which was rather precarious due to the educational overproduction and a
competition for good professional jobs with foreigners.
Their “radicalization” led to a “cultural radicalism which identified western civilization as
the primary enemy, which rebelled against the existing cultural order which was identified with
the West, and which sought self-assertion and dignity within an Arab-Islamic context”14*
The “ethnic solution” the effendiyya sought is reflected in the discussions about the role of
foreign minorities in Egyptian society that will be tackled in the following chapters regarding
minorities and in particular the communist movement Still, the Egyptian public was not as
unanimous in its thinking as Gershoni’s and Jankowski’s approach might suggest In their
approach Gershoni and Jankowski, like Gellner, echo the perception of Muslim thinkers about
the Islamic world as the literal “other.”
Language can bring about imagined communities, by producing and bringing into effect
special solidarities. In the case of Egypt demanding the sole use of Arabic in public and eco­
nomic relations was aimed at marginalizing the elite and the national minorities, and enhancing
the chances of the middle classes. Basically, however, language cannot be an instrument for
exclusion, since anybody can learn any language.13 The problem is how far people can learn a
linguistic duality in order to be able to participate politically. And more important in the case
of Egypt, how easily can the two levels of speech, the vernacular and the intellectual modern
classical Arabic, be learnt and used in their proper contexts? Because behind the claim that Jews
in the communist movement were easily detected by their insufficient language skills, and not
fit for leadership, because of their linguistic shortcomings, looms the difficult relation of classi­
cal and vernacular Arabic in Egyptian public life, which in turn reflects the uneasy relation of
tradition and modernity. Since the 19th century reformers in Egypt, who in the beginning were
mostly Muslim reformers, had set themselves the task to realize a reform (in opposition to the
established religious elite) that was buttressed by non-Muslim and non-Arab knowledge.'6
The conflict between modernism and traditionalism, in Arabic often termed al-turftth wa
al-wäfid (meaning that modernism is alien to an Arab-Islamic society, because it comes from
outside the framework of Arab-Islamic thought), played a big part in the shift of interest of
intellectuals like Haikal or Husain. Perhaps Egyptian intellectuals turned to Islamic themes
in the 1930s to gain ground from the conservatives. Such a tactic was not new. Sheehi has
argued that al-Afghani stuck to traditional writing as a "political manoeuvre, especially after
Arabic had been tampered with by Syrian Arab Christians.”17* The debates among Egyptian
intellectuals were not mainly debates about nationalism, as Gershoni and Jankowski interpret
them. They were debates about tradition and modernity, Islam and secularism that have gone on
until the present day. Those debates were part of a power struggle with religion being one of the
political clubs swung against the opponent. In his book about Haikal, Charles Smith underlines
that Haikal continued to see Islam as an “obstacle to progress,” but the presentation was one
that “outwardly defended Islam and attacked western culture.”11 Haikal had social and political
,3Ibid.. 216.
,4Ibid„ 217.
,JAndereon 1998,115-116.
“ Smith 1997,607-622; Smith 1983.
l7See for the discussion about Arabs and modernity: Hisham Sharabi 1988 and Stephen Sheehi 1992; see about
post colonial deconstruction of nationalist historiography : Paithe Chalerjee 1986; Gyan Pmkah 1990,383-408;
Gyatri Spivak 1987.
'*Smith 1983,109.

13
motives to use Islam, it was not his basic attitude concerning western culture and progress that
had changed. He wanted to profit from the battle about Christian missionary activities in Egypt
and the role of Al-Azhar in state affairs.19
Haikal and Husain were criticized by other intellectuals as giving in to populism and, in
fact, profit Ihha Husain referred to the ‘‘religious concerns of the masses ‘whatever the stage
o f development’ ” as opposed to a few intellectuals’ interest in science and philosophy.
“Both he [Haikal] and Ttha Husain now considered the power of Islam in Egypt
as too strong to permit popular acceptance of western views, but recognition of the
right of the minority to express themselves remained precarious.”20
Haikal was alarmed at the rise of the working classes since the Wafd had reached out for
labor support in 1935,21*and he was worried about the growth of such militant Islamic groups
as the Muslim Brothers and Young Egypt, calling for greater social and economic equality. The
failure of politicians like Haikal was not mainly that they were adherents of a western model of
politics but that they were advocates of the western liberal model which did not argue in favor
of the masses but rather despised them. Haikal, not only being an intellectual and a politician,
but also a wealthy landowner, wished to maintain a separation between masses and elite as
before. He believed in his function as an intellectual in order to guide the uneducated masses,
and he derived his ideal of social organizaton from his remembrance of social conditions in the
countryside. Yet return to the rural ideal was impossible, as was any hope of superimposing
its structure on the country as a whole. Instead he found in Islam the guarantee of intellectual
liberty, individual wealth, and private property. In his imagination, enlightened faith in God
was combined with the acceptance of fate. Haikal appreciated the aspects of modernization including parliamentary institutions -, because they were symbols of progress, not because they
could influence social change.23
Egyptian Marxists criticized the discourse of authenticity in the 1940s and 1930s. It is due
to the Marxists’ endeavor that the bigger port of the nationalist movement became engaged in
the course of radical national liberation. The grip of conservative liberalism on them lessened,
and the discourse of authenticity lost influence. Against the discourse of authenticity they set
the discourse of modernity, emphasizing “the ideas of consciousness, false consciousness, and
ideology.”23 In communist politics, ideology was not linked to tradition but to class interest,
while liberals believed that tradition could be overcome by rational discourse and economic
development The belief in science, in ratio and in enlightenment helps man to finally liberate
himself, and not to give himself up to the forces of fate which ultimately strengthen the power
of colonialism and repression.24
l*From the 1920* already the atmoaphere was charged with ulema struggling for privileges lost in the post fifty
yean and Azhar graduates dreading unemployment. In the 1930s there was a battle between “the enlightened
ulema“ (an expression used by Muhammad ShahOt) and the then Shaikh of Al-Azhar, al-Zaw&hirt, who complied
to SidqTs demands to condemn public rallies held in favor of the Wafd in 1927, naming F üU as the ruler who
should be obeyed. For Shaltflt both. Çidql and al-ZawlhiiT were “enemies o f Islam and constitutional government“
Ibid., 111-112. But the Liberals and he himself were the defenders of true Islam.
“ Smith 1983,118.
21For details see: 'A bbis 1967,63-67 and Bcinin and Lockman 1988,210-217.
“ Smith 1983,121-133.
“ Meijer 1993,116-117.
24AbO Saif YOsuf reacted to *AbMs MahmOd AI-’Aqqld who had turned from a nationalist and supporter of the
Wafd to a conservative. He was a freethinker - writing about evolution, Darwin, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer - a
poet and an atheist who hid his convictions behind a philosophy that equated the inspiration of the prophet with
that o f the poet. Al-’Aqqld cultivated a hostility against socialism. He believed himself to be a genius who was
different from the mass of the people and fit to be their leader. For details see: Semah 1974.

14

CHAPTER 2. NATION AND NATIONALISM

Egyptian Marxists seemed to represent a new generation that believed in the ultimate success
of social engineering, the regime of truth, and man as the master of history. Yet the Egyptian
M arxists’ narrative about the 1940s and 1950s and their activities betray that they were not fat
from that discourse about authenticity and tradition, and, in fact, even more vulnerable, because
they represented an ideology that had been imported from abroad.

Chapter 3
M inorities
3.1

Introduction

Islam is often hailed as a religion that compares favorably to Christianity during the middle
ages. The Muslim conquerors did not force the subjugated people to convert to Islam. On
the contrary, Christians and Jews could occupy important administrative positions in the vast
Islamic Empire. The different millets, the different religious communities in the Empire, could
adhere to their own system of legislation governing personal status. They were allowed to follow
their own customs and religious rites.1 Still, a look into Abd al-Rahman al-Gabarti’s chronicle
about the French occupation of Egypt in the late 18th century shows that the relations between
Muslims, Copts, Syrian Christians, Greeks and Francs were far from relaxed and that foreign
occupation put a further strain on them.2 Christians gained from French occupation. Gabarti
complained that they opened restaurants and cafes, served alcoholic beverages, wore their heads
high, and repressed the population with unjust tax demands. They insulted Muslims, beat them,
and robbed them. They revealed their hatred towards Muslims, and publicly wished for the
extermination of Muslims.3
The interference of foreign powers into the affairs of the Islamic Empire changed the re­
lations between Muslims and non-Muslims profoundly. Classically, those relations had been
governed by the dhimml status, a regulation that had been transferred from ancient tribal Arab
customs into Muslim jurisprudence. A non-Muslim inhabitant of Muslim lands who belonged
to one of the revealed religions, either Christianity or Judaism, was entitled to protection from
the Muslim ruler in exchange for loyalty and the payment of a special head tax called jizya.
“In a way, the Muslim majority tend to view dhimmXs as traditional Muslim men
view their women: inferior, segregated, weak, having specific limited functions in
society, obliged to manifest modesty and humility in behavior, not equal before the
law - yet protected by the stronger group, and in a curious way bearing its honour."4
Through the interference of European powers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, minori­
ties had gained certain privileges and come under the protection of foreign powers. In the course
of the 19th century, reforms were introduced that disturbed the hierarchy among the minorities
'In Germany Albrecht Noth, just to name one voice, has been one o f the defenders of Islamic tolerance partic­
ularly in the fin t centuries of Islam. See: Noth 1991,327-338. His view has been contested by Harald Motzki and
his study about minorities in Egpyt and their situation during and after the French expedition. Motzki 1979.
2al-Oabarti 1989.

3Ibid., 322.
4Zeidaa, 1999,33-67.

15

16

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

themselves and with regard to the Muslim majority in the Ottoman Empire. Muslims were
not content that Muslim and non-Muslim subjects had been put on an equal footing, except
the “Frenchified” gently who hoped for a mixed neighborhood and civilization.9 Their hopes
matched the British colonizers’ conviction that colonialism was in the service of the colonized,
and that Jews and Christians were a guarantee for a “tone of Europeanism” that was supposed
to keep the Turkish provinces “from sinking.”6
Historically, millet members had become prominent in trade and finance, because of foreign
protection. In the 18th and 19th century, property had not been safe in the Middle Eastern
region, being subject to heavy taxation, arbitrary confiscation, sukhra regulations (i.e. means of
transport could forcefully be diverted from commercial use to government service). Christians
and Jews got around such problems by acquiring the protection of a foreign power. Originally
it had been interpreters for foreign consulates - recruited from the minorities • who had enjoyed
their protection. But when the diplomatic missions started to use their own interpreters, they
turned to different occupations. Minorities played a leading role in the economy of most ports
of the Middle E ast In Tbrkey proper, as well as in the European and Asian parts of the Ottoman
Empire, they were prevailing in the world of finance and foreign trade, though Greeks and
Armenians were ranking before Jews.
In 19th century Egypt the influx of foreigners grew and further imbalanced the relation
between the Muslim majority and the Christian and Jewish minorities. This was not a phe­
nomenon that had originally accompanied British occupation, but had started during the times
of the Khedive Muhammad Ali and his successors. Foreign schools, private ownership of land,
the introduction of cotton, public indebtedness, foreign ownership of land go back to times
prior to the occupation and were part of a plan to ensure economic growth and social progress
in Egypt.
Education became an important factor for social advance. Egyptians - above all Muslim
Egyptians - made less use of the opportunities of foreign schools than the minorities. And,
because the latter had more and better schools, they were better equipped for the services needed
with the advent of foreign investments and companies. In Egypt, Greeks had opened their first
school already in 1843. Jewish schools, as well, date from the 1840s, as do Syrian and Armenian
schools. In 1907 literacy among Jews was 44%, among Copts 10%, and among Muslims only
a deplorable 4%.7
But a few decades later, when the modem nation states came into being, all of the minorities
in the Middle East lost their power. Being indigenous or not made no difference. The two
leading millets in Turkey, the Greeks and the Armenians, were “even more indigenous than the
Turks,” as were the Copts in Egypt; still, all of them lost social and economic standing once
modem nation states came into being.**
The modem Egyptian nation state was considerably less tolerant with regard to Egyptian
non-nationals than the Ottoman Empire had been with regard to non-Muslims, though to a cer­
tain extent the two categories overlapped. The modem Egyptian nation state was not an Islamic
state per definition, but a secular state. Still, it became far more difficult for a non-Muslim to
belong to the nation. After the protection of the European nations had been a brilliant way of
’Stillman 1979, 361. The spiritual leaden of the various communities were little satisfied because their ap­
pointments were included in the finnan, and communities were equal. Thus the Greeks complained that they were
not considered superior to the Jews anymore. Previously, the ranking had been : Muslims, Greeks, Armenians and
only then Jews.
‘Ibid., 356.
7Issawi 1981,199-230.
*Ibid., 203.

3. J. INTRODUCTION

17

escaping Muslim courts and supervision, local minorities and the grandchildren of European
immigrants found themselves forced in the 1930s either to apply for Egyptian citizenship or to
secure a future for their children somewhere else.
In many parts of the world, the end of colonialism has led to conflicts among ethnic groups
in formerly colonized countries. In Egypt those conflicts seldom took the form of open violence.
The conflict between Muslims and Copts was older than the end of the British occupation and
due to the straggle concerning the nature of the modem Egyptian state. The conflict with Jews
is connected to colonialism and the creation of the modem Egyptian nation, and also to the
foundation of the state of Israel.
A multitude of explanations has been offered for the genesis of ethnic conflicts in general.
They have been explained as a revived form of earlier conflicts, rooted in tradition and history.
Modernity has been made a culprit, as well as the competition between traditional elites and the
urban middle classes. In Egypt it was obvious that social change demanded a higher degree of
assimilation from minorities. Competition surrounding jobs, land possession and the control of
the market aggravated the conflict
Ethnic groups and social strata are not always congruent but conflict between Muslims and
minorities happened throughout all the strata. Local minorities in Egypt - Italians, Greeks, Jews
and Levantines, though not the Copts • fit the definition of the “middlemen minorities” who
do not create a lower class, but a class in between which mediates between consumers and
producers. The Egyptian middle classes did not exist and Jews and other minorities could take
their place. On a social level, the necessity and the wish for integration in the host society were
very low. But relations inside the groups were of immense importance. Family relations were
also the basis for the economic structure. Egyptians feared to be exploited by those minorities.
Local merchants felt a disadvantage in competition. But unlike other migrating minorities,
Jews were not nursing a dream about a return to their homeland but rather looked to France as
a cultural homeland.
In general, sociopsychological aspects are very important in the discourse about minorities
in Egypt. Colonialism tended to categorize people according to their ability to assimilate to
European culture. The Egyptian elite favored European culture, as did the minorities who ad­
vanced with the advent of the foreign power. Egyptian society became divided into backward
and advanced groups. The majority of the country, especially the fallahin, were regarded as
poor, lazy, ignorant, dependent, and feudalist, while the urban elite, the minorities, and the
advancing Egyptian middle classes tried to prove that they were aggressive, industrious, suc­
cessful, intelligent, and progressive. Such comparisons were not only drawn on a collective
but also on an individual level. In the Egyptian case it becomes very obvious that a negative
self-concept causes fear of the superiority of the other, and the feeling that the existence of the
own group is threatened, even if it is a majority.9
According to Gudrun Krämer, Copts, Greeks, Jews and Levantines - she lists them all si­
multaneously - could be members of the Egyptian nation with equal rights until the 1930s.
The precondition was that they shared the political and economic demands of the nationalists,
adapted to the local customs, and learnt the Arabic language.10 The task to integrate was theirs.
But the probability that a pluralistic society that allowed for more than one identity • a Muslim
Egyptian one-w ould grow was low. By the end of the 1930s, most Greeks, Jews and Levantines
had left.
A comparative look at the situation of Copts, Jews and foreign minorities in Egypt can
’See for i debate about fucfa concepts: Horowitz 1983.
"»Kramer 1982,259.

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

18

serve to better understand the discourse in the communist movement The Egyptian discourse
claims that the Jews who were active in the communist movement belonged to a foreign minor­
ity, as did the majority o f Jews resident in Egypt Jews are perceived as foreign in language,
culture, and citizenship. The discourse about Copts, by contrast, stresses that they are equal
Egyptian nationals. A definition of Copts as a minority is frowned upon. Minorities turn to the
international community for protection. For Copts defining themselves as a minority would,
in Egyptian discourse, mean foreclosing on being part of the nation (because that definition in
itself means that the community demands special rights -justified or unjustified -, and identifies
more with the community’s aims than with national aspirations). Egyptian politicians of all col­
ors fear that in the long run such an attitude could even lead to a separatist movement, as is the
case in Southern Sudan, and they are quick to point out foreign interests behind that policy."
Historically, it was the shadow of British occupation, using the protection of foreign minorities
as a pretext, that hung over the debate. In modem times, it is Israeli and US American foreign
policy that threatens Egyptian national sovereignty.12
Israel was the realization of what a minority • and not even a local minority • could achieve
in the Middle East under foreign protection. The vision of Aharon Amir, an Israeli poet and
publisher, expressed in the aftermath of the Israeli military victory in 1967, highlights the worst
fears of Arab and Egyptian nationalists. He called upon Israel to cope with the intellectual and
moral challenges of the new borders set by the victory. And trying to soothe readers who might
be worried about an Arab majority (until 1990) in a “united” country, he claimed that majorities
were not the decisive factor. Israel was chosen to become the predominant power in the Near
E ast It would exploit its present military superiority and become the protector of all political,
ethnic, and religious minorities in the region, from the Maronites in Lebanon to the Kurds in
Iraq, and the Copts in E gypt13

3.1.1

The Influence of the British

In Egyptian literature, the British occupation is interpreted as a turning point in the relations be­
tween different ethnic and religious communities in Egypt Loyalty towards Egypt is measured
in terms of hostility towards the British. Minorities in general were socially and economically
better off than the (Muslim) test of society, from the late 19th century onwards. Their children
were better educated, they had access to foreign learning, and their relation with the colonizers
"In spring 2001 the US Commission on International Religious Freedom faced closed doom in Egypt Promi­
nent Copts resented the visit and interpreted it as foreign intervention in internal affairs. Pope Shenuda was quoted
as saying that the visit complicated an already sensitive issue. In Egyptian newspapers Copts were portrayed
as being targeted by a US American campaign to project them as victims of government and Muslim majority
persecution. The whole issue gained priority after the Wolf /Specter bill, which proposed to document religious
persecution around the globe and to make it a basis of government policy to speak out against such infringement
of international legislation and treaties, was passed by the US congress in 1998. The fact finding commission's
chairman, Elliott Abnuns, is known in Cairo for pro-Israeli views. Al-Ahram Weekly, 22-28 M ardi, 2001.
"T he US American example seems to emphasize the secularist option. Eisenstadt, reflecting on Jews in the
U SA concludes that since collective identity was not based on primordial historical elements, but political ideol­
ogy, something Eisenstadt calls a “civil religion“ based on the separation between state and church und directed
towards the future, Jews could easily integrate. In Europe, by contrast, national identities and national states that
set symbolic as well as legal boundaries for a political community had developed. In the United States, Jews could
consider themselves Americans and Jews without a contradiction between the two identities. The American ethics
of achievement by education, professional mobility and economic progress was universal and stressed personal
achievement and success. Such an attitude could be shared by all the immigrants. Eiaenstadt 1992,657.
"E ton 1995.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

19

was - to say the least • doubtful.14* Minorities were not underprivileged, as they had been in
the Islamic Empire, but, on the contrary, in an advanced position. They were communities with
a high economic and social status, striving for an end of discrimination. It was the Muslim
majority that was put in a minority position by the foreign occupation of the country.
Copts are said to have suffered and been discriminated against under the British, to the
advantage of Syrian Christians.13 Yet all the minorities in Egypt were deeply involved in the
change of tradition that occurred starting horn the 19th century and the opening of Egypt to
Europe, because of their economic behavior. For them a breach with Islamic tradition meant the
chance for more equality. Changes in clothing are the most visible sign of a change in tradition,
women and their behavior are the most sensitive indicator of i t The British occupation had
caused resentment mainly among the lower middle class and the petit bourgeoisie. They tried to
stick to what they felt was local tradition. But the upper middle class and the upper class wanted
to show that they could be modem as well. Being modem included the knowledge of foreign
languages and culture, a different behavior concerning gender relations, and, as an outward sign,
the adoption of the European way of dressing.16 Department stores that were opened by nonMuslims in Cairo and Alexandria changed the traditional way of dressing. Until then women
had bought from daUOlas, Coptic, Jewish or Armenian women at home. With the new mode of
consumption, fashion changed more quickly. Tradition vanished. A dress could not be handed
down from mother to daughter. Still, elements that have the highest symbolic meaning, like the
veil, took the longest time to change. The attitude to the veil might be connected to minority
behavior
“Elite women adopted European fashion, but clung to the veil for various reasons,
including a desire to show their social status and wealth, express cultural-political
loyalty to Eastera-Egyptian traditions and demonstrate religious affiliation, espe­
cially after non-Muslims stopped veiling.” 17
That Huda Shaarawi took off her veil in public in 1923 signalled the end of an era. The
veil and seclusion vanished. Non-Muslims had a part in that development, because they were
trend-setters. It seems that exactly during that period the veil became more closely associated
with Islam, because Muslim identity needed a confirmation. But gradually the differences in
appearance between the Muslim upper and middle classes and non-Muslims vanished.18*
l4Shahrough Akhavi for example gives Copts much importance in the first half of the 20th century and then
lumps them together with the British and considers them a non-indigenous force with ties to non-Egyptian cultural
values because they are linked to the West by religious ties. Jews, it seems to him, were excluded from the political
elite, but no other ethnic minorities. Akhavi 1973,76-80.
lsAl-BishrT 1982, al-Fiql 1988.
i6As it was Lebanese journalists who brought the Egyptian press to life (see: Jacques Berque 1967,pp. 208, who
refers to P. de Tanazi, tirlkh al-sahSfa al-'anbiyya, 1913), thus Syrian women, most of them Christians, published
the first journals for women in Egypt By 1919 more than 30 different women’s magazines had gone through
Egyptian hands. The debate about the veil, the symbol of women belonging to the urban elite, had a prominent
place in those magazines.
,TBaron 1989,370-386.
11Also, the introduction of public transport the streetcar, changed the way o f life. The streetcar in Egypt was
built and operated by a Belgian company, the Société Générale des Chemins de Fer Economiques, owned by
Baron Edouard Empain. The streetcar is a typical example for the janus-faced effect of modernization: on the
one hand Egyptian workers and conductors suffered from the arbitrariness of foreign inspectors, their bad working
conditions and their subordinate status in general and the streetcar became one of the foci of aggression during the
1919 révolution. Most Egyptians could not afford to ride on the tram until the revolution because the tickets were
too expensive. On the other hand from the perspective of female mobility • concerning affluent women - it was
progress. For details on the tram and tram workers see, Beinin and Loclunan 1988,37-66 and 91-93.

20

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

The national Egyptian bourgeoisie, created during the time of occupation, was closely con*
nected to the foreign communities and local minorities. Ilbert even goes as far as commenting
that
“A national bourgeoisie was created within the meetings of the Municipal Council,
and many of those who were to guide independent Egypt came from Alexandria.”19
While European influence on Egyptian thought and development goes back to the times of
the French occupation and the rule of Muhammad Ali, the pressure to follow western standards
grew even stronger after the occupation. To gain independence Egyptian politicians had to prove
in negotiations that they could govern Egypt following a western pattem. They had to play by
democratic rules, deliver on protection for minorities, and connected with the latter demand and
more important, protect foreign economic interests.
Egyptian politicians had to fight on an inner domestic front as well, a front that came up with
demands opposing those prerequisites. A poor Muslim majority made social and economic
reforms a pressing demand; the emergence of Islamic groups, the King’s scheming, and AlAzhar fighting for a say in national politics led to the increase of an Islamic overtone in the
political propaganda of the 1930s. With the beginning of the 1930s, fundamental solidarity
became one of citizenship, with the Egyptian middle classes demanding recognition.
The cosmopolitanism of the big Egyptian cities, and with it “the classless cosmopolitan
society that was in close touch with the Egyptian elite,” went downhill.20 If Joel Beinin is
right, a change also occurred in classical Arab-Islamic heritage. He believes that that very
cosmopolitan spirit was not the privilege of Jews and Europeans in Egypt, but was rooted in the
classical Arab-Islamic cultural heritage. He understands Egypt, and even more so Cairo, as an
intellectual center of the Arab world in the last third of the 19th century.
“The cosmopolitan ambience and Egypt’s deep self-confidence in its historical
identity rendered it particularly tolerant of the Jewish presence. Egyptian and Jew­
ish cosmopolitanism complemented and nourished each other, until the conditions
that supported them were radically altered by the struggle against the British occu­
pation, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the Arab-Zionist conflict”21
The British in Egypt are said to have disliked the country. They were enthusiastic about India
or Burma, but not about Egypt. The lack of enthusiasm is reflected in the lack of imaginative
interpretation.
“British Egypt never had a Kipling. Perhaps, after all, it did not deserve one.”22
From a British point of view, the occupation of Egypt had a fourfold aim: to end chaos, to
improve an inefficient and debt-ridden administration, to forestall foreign intervention, and to
secure communication with India.23
From an Egyptian point of view, the submission of the country to the geostrategic interests
of the British Empire, French-British competition, and the fact that the European powers had
'»IUbert, Hassoun and Yannakakis (eds.) 1997,33.
“ Silvers 1999, 172-181. Christians and Levantine! were cloaely allied with the Egyptian driving forces of
development The Egyptian National Party, which had been founded by Muy(afa KSmil in 1907, and had counted
famous men like Muhammad Farid and Luth al-Sayyid among its members, raised the slogan “Maîtres chez nous,
généreux envers nos Mûtes, régénération de l’Egypte.” Ilbcrt 1996.
21Beinin 1998,7.
“ Berque 1967.191.
“ Carter 1986,71.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

21

done everything to pile up Egyptian public debt, were viewed less favorably.24*The British, and
in their shadow other foreigners, had come to exploit Egypt and the Egyptians, to transform it
into a cotton plantation providing for British factories. British occupation had turned Egypt into
a provider of raw materials forced to import the expensive products made of its own wealth. The
Suez Canal built with Egyptian man power and Egyptian money but owned and administered
by foreign shareholders, and guarded by British soldiers, became a symbol of the struggle for
independence and sovereignty.
The turmoil that ensued after the 'UrâbT revolution and the assault on foreigners provided the
pretext for direct British intervention and Lord Cromer’s rule.22 Egypt never became a British
colony. For a short time during World War I it was declared a British “protectorate.” Still, the
British in Egypt never assumed the position of the “raj,” a position they had in India. H ll 1914
the British representative was the British consul general (Kitchener then). Only when Egypt
was proclaimed a protectorate did this position change to High Commissioner, and Kitchener
was followed by Sir Henry McMahon, who had been employed in India before. In India the
British system was composed of a tight civil service with an unbroken chain of command, from
the district officer in a remote province to the central seat of authority in Delhi. The British
found themselves in a somewhat more difficult situation in Cairo. The High Commissioner had
to deal with the Khedive as the legal ruler and the ministers, assisted by British advisers who
were in direct control of the local officials who, in turn, were assisted by British inspectors.26
Still, from an Egyptian point of view, until Egypt was granted independence and the Egyp­
tian constitution was passed, Egyptian ministers were little more than decoration, and decisions
were taken by their so-called advisers who retreated reluctantly to the shadows. The British
colonial policy was different from that of the French, who deliberately obliterated Arab-Islamic
culture in the Maghreb region and destroyed traditional hierarchies. The British exercised an
indirect rule, whose most notable feature it was that it sought to manufacture charismatic rulers
out of almost anyone English but left indigenous power structures intact, or even enhanced them.
Cromer insisted that it was not what the subjects to British rule asserted to be their interests, but
what the British conceived to be in their interest that was important.27
As in India, the British were dismissing claims that the Egyptians could govern their coun­
try by themselves in the first decade of the century. For India, Hubei describes the selective
perception of Anglo-Indians that faded out the educated middle class and was solely concerned
with peasants or princes.
“The rising middle class in India, mostly composed of Indians educated in English,
was dismissed as an unimportant minority which could be overlooked, because it
was not the ‘real India.’ ..., the peasants are represented as possessing authentic
Indianness. ... . the ’real' Indian is one who is free of the taint of the modem
world. According to this definition, an English-speaking Indian can only appear to
be lacking something.”2*
24See for example: 'Awad 1988. There are al*o different interpretations of British-Egyptian relations from
western author*. Not all of them consider the British as the saviors of Egyptian peasantry. In fact, the impact
of colonization on Egyptian economy and society is judged as disastrous and destructive, even if the roots of the
damages British agricultural and economic policy brought about, reach back to the days o f Muhammad Ali. See
for example: Schulze 1981 and 1992.
"B lunt 1907.
"Kedourie 1970,92.
"Bivona 1998,23-39.
"Hubei 1996,49-78.

22

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

The British in India, as in Egypt, promoted western education and then "scorned” those who
tried to put it to use. The problem for the British was the fact that educated "natives” posed a
challenge to British rule. They did not accept the claim that the British were ruling in their
best interest but tried everything to wrest power from them. Therefore, the British preferred to
believe that they were not authentic or "real.” That way they could continue to believe in the
beneficence of their Empire.*29 The British exercised what Slavoj Zizek has called "negative
tolerance,” which meant that they respected other cultures on the surface, but, in reality, were
afraid of the competition of their assimilated subjects.30
The same dichotomy between "authentic and westernized” was later adopted by nationalist
movements, which continued on the same path of incompatibility of western and eastern modes
of thought and ways of life the colonizers bad trodden.
The British deliberately tried to use foreign minorities to curtail Egyptian autonomy, lu st
one example is provided by the confidential document Brunyate, the judicial advisor, had
worked out on the eve of the end of World War L Brunyate proposed the creation of a sen­
ate, where the foreign communities of Egypt would be "substantially represented, and which
would have large power over legislation.”31
Egyptians were afraid that the British wanted to fasten their hold on Egypt by naturalizing
foreigners resident in Egypt, and transforming them from foreign communities into "Egyptian
minorities,” or communities resident in Egypt That fear was increased by the British attempt to
interpret the Egyptian national community as a conglomerate of splinter groups, either accord­
ing to religious affiliations, i.e. Muslims, Christians32, and Copts, or to habitat, i.e. hcdouins,
and urbanites.33*This was very much in accordance with the view Cromer had originally held
that Egyptians were nothing but a motley crowd.
The British claimed that they were acting in Egypt out of some kind of moral obligation.
They felt contempt for the Egyptian monarchy; still, they did not want to change the inherited
system. Egyptian shortcomings would be healed by the high moral standards of British officials.
The British announced that a future constitution should be one that safeguarded individual lib­
erty and the interests of the mass of the people, who had to be protected from misgovernment,
manipulated elections, corruption and oppression.14 Still, from die beginning of the 20th cen­
tury British prestige sank continuously.33
The fallah was particularly close to the British heart Even Cromer had felt compelled to act
for the sake of the blue gallabiyyas, and by encouraging their agents to learn Arabic, the British
tried to be closer to the "authentic” Egyptian than to the westernized pashas. The British had
no interest in an essential change in the Egyptian social system. Following a policy of "ventre
plein,” they satisfied the needs of large landowners and peasants but ignored the middle class.
Landlords were won over by irrigation schemes, high cotton prices and ample credit facilities,
^Singh 1988,94.
“ The French, by contrast, produced a system of forced assimilation. They tolerated neither Arabic schooli nor
local administration. Prochaska 1990.
,l Kedourie 1970,93.
“ There were Catholic and Protestant minorities in Egypt For 1947 Al-Bishrf quotes the number of 80,180
Catholics and 90,967 Protestants, the number of Catholics had quadrupled, the number of Protestants tripled since
the beginning of the century. Al-Bishrf 1982,37.
“ ibid., 118.
“ More about the events of 1919 from an Egyptian point of view and about political assassinations in: Mariens
w athilq wa tlrikh Misr al-mu’äsir, Shuhidi’ thaurat 1919, Cairo 1984. The book provides concise information
about all the clashes that occurred between British troupe and natives and a list of all the dead. See also: 'A ll 1978.
“ Schulze and Wieland (Berque with regard to foreigners in general) consider the events of Dinshawai as the
watershed that introduced the gradual recession of loyalty in a colonial society towards its colonizer. Schulze 1992,
Wieland 1980. Kedourie lays more emphasis on the effect of WW I. Kedourie 1970.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

23

but also by social intercourse and affability. The British did not touch traditional institutions,
like the village schools, Al-Azhar, the Shari's courts. Their rule was more one of conservation
and preservation than of undermining traditional authority.36
The Egyptian revolution was carried by the middle classes, the effendiyya.37* The British
believed that the nationalists were representing the Egyptian intelligentsia but were not acting
on behalf of the majority of the Egyptian people, the fallahin.M
A look at the grievances of Egyptians concerning the shortcomings in the educational system
nourishes doubts that the British ever envisaged the creation of a corps of educated Egyptians, fit
to govern the country according to British standards. The opposite seems to be true. The British
tried to prevent the development of an educated Egyptian middle class by all means because
they could do better without it. One of the British officials who was particularly disliked in
Egypt is Douglas Dunlop. He appeared in Egypt in 1888 and became responsible for education.
The Ministry of Public Instruction ranked low in the assessment of the budget. Dunlop is
said to have pursued a policy of “déculturation,” though chiefly at the expense of the French
language.39 Cromer himself felt only mistrust of intellectuals and scholars and reduced the
budget of education to about 1%: ”... for he believed that if the Egyptians wanted education
they should be made to pay for it, or do without it and rely on British talent.”40
This attitude did not change during the time of British rule. Because of the influence that
culture and language might give the French over the British, westernized pashas were liked as
little as the Levantine elite, particularly that of Syria and Lebanon. The British restricted educa­
tion to producing government clerks, and deliberately prevented the evolution of an indigenous
intelligentsia. They thought it enough for the majority of Egyptians to be able to read and write.
Only a small percentage of Egyptians should be entitled to secondary education, while higher
education was obsolete since the British provided that class of technicians. And even if Milner
thought the English advisers - about 1,600 British officials - a class of corrupted and idle people,
and envisaged independent rule for Egypt, still he recommended education to be confined to the
training of clerks, rather than favoring an increase in the number of students receiving degrees
in general culture.41
Until Egypt gained independence, an austere budget for the ministry of education, compli­
cated exams, a confusing number of different systems for teachers* training, and the creation
of differences among Egyptians, because of a duality of social, financial, occupational, educa­
tional, and confessional terms were the consequence of British interference in Egyptian admin­
istration. More than 10 different exams, for example, could lead to a teaching career in Arabic
or natural sciences.42 Foreign missions were abolished.43
^Issaw i 1947.
37Sec for the effendiyya: Dceb 1979,44; Genhoni A Jankowski 1993,7-11; see for the contradictions between
peasants, effendiyya and rural nobility in the struggle against colonialism: Schulze 1981 and 1992.
MSchulze is also critical of the effendiyya aa a new class of professionals who wanted to step into the British
footsteps and to take over, while the peasants were desperately fighting against the advance of colonial society into
the village. Schulze 1981.
»Berque 1972.230.
<0Nsrim 1984, 201. As a comparison to Cromer*s budget: In 20th century the budget rose steadily until in
1930-31 the total budget amounted to LE 44,913,999. In the same year LE 4,894,614, were spent on education,
that is 10,90«.
4lKedourie 1970,118-122.
42See also: Jaha Husain’s criticism of the educational quagmire resulting from administrative difficulties, in­
herited by a Turkish style authoritarianism, opportunism, a superficiality induced by the demands o f exams and
diplomas, the jungle of ministerial decisions taken by the successive ministries o f education, and the different
institutions supervising education. Berque 1972,638-639.
43NasIm 1984,23.

24

CHAPTERS. MINORITIES

The formation of the Egyptian effendiyya was, therefore, only the result of the Egyptian
ministers’ endeavor to encourage the formation of an Egyptian intelligentsia.44 But a consis­
tent educational program or policy was lacking. The Wafd relied heavily on student forces and
tended to give in to students' and parents' demands, in order to win votes.43 The issues sur­
rounding education changed quickly. In the 1920s, education as a general right, Arabic44 as th e
language of education, and the education of girls, especially in college, were on the agenda.
In the 1930s, the struggle between traditional and modem teaching became obvious as the par­
ties became interested in schools and teaching; religious teaching, as well as foreign schools
and missions, came into focus. It took till the 1940s until university teaching flourished, and
it became commonplace to regard education as the basis for development In the 1920s, Egypt
was still a feudal state where such questions were very difficult and the state would not defend
education as a popular right
Better general education was a result of the liberal experiment and the nationalist movement
Secondary education was a step toward a career. Government service was still more prestigious
than professions. The prestige of secondary and university education rose steadily, until in the
1930s even the majority of the Azhar shaikhs from good families preferred to send their children
to a university, rather than to recommend a career in Al-Azhar itself. Mainly students from less
prestigious backgrounds enrolled in Al-Azhar, and often faced unemployment47 Many of their
colleagues in the secular education departments shared their fate. Until the mid-1930s, many
lucrative posts in companies and public service were still occupied by foreigners and minorities,
while educated Egyptians were suffering from unemployment
Knowing foreign languages was an asset for a professional career. Governmental schools
promoted the use of English, though the British did not try to substitute Arabic. Those, who
lacked the means for private education and did not have private access to foreign culture, were
inevitably brought into contact with English, used as a second language by the younger gen­
eration of the Muslim petit bourgeois class, which Berque describes as the product of the civil
service. That class also included many Copts. The Irrigation Department, the Finance Commit­
tee, and the police used English. English did not serve ideological interests, nor was it taught
for intellectual inspiration, but merely for practical purposes. French was the language of the
diplomats and the court, the cultural elite.
Egypt was not only suffering from the British occupation, but subject to the capitulations as
well, until in 1937 the Montreux Convention was signed, phasing them out over a period of 12
years.
“The Egyptian government was not entirely free to make laws or to implement
them until the capitulations had ended, and a whole generation of Egyptians bred
“ YOnis 1999,44. The intelligentsia are all the educated people who because of their education are in a po­
sition to assimilate written culture and to do intellectual work rather than manual work, like employees and free
professionals, media workers, writers and poets. For YQnis the definition is very wide, he even talks about military
intelligentsia as opposed to civilian intelligentsia, secular intelligentsia etc.
^Naslm 1984, 169-171. The duration of elementary education and secondary education «ras changed several
times. All this was accompanied by changes in the curricula and a big upheaval. In the 1920s school exams in
secondary schools could only be passed with a success rate of 60% and if only one subject was Mied the whole
year had to be repeated. In 1927 a new regulation became valid that allowed students pass with a success rale of
only 40%. Did that mean a decline in the quality of education? The author does not dare to give a direct answer.
The promoters of this regulation atgued that exams had been too difficult.
*Since 1916 the society tried to get rid of English as the main language for education. The ministry of education
decreed in 1921 that Arabic was the language in which history and geography were to be taught in the teachers**
college. al-Ahram 8.2.1921.
4TEccel 1984.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

25

cm nationalist ideals of independence and national dignity had to accept the fact that
they were second-class citizens in their own country.”4*
Foreign communities are said to have been equally dissatisfied with the treaty, but for en­
tirely different reasons.
“For nearly a century, these communities had dominated the economic and com­
mercial life of the country without abiding by its laws, and without paying its taxes;
now they were faced with a situation by which they were to lose their preferential
position and to be forced to abide by the rules and regulations of the land.”49

3.1.2 Xenophobia and Minorities
Under British occupation, foreigners resident in Egypt, and religious minorities, enjoyed special
protection, though the influx of foreigners into Egypt had started long before 1882, and the
system of capitulations went back even further.
The British reading of the clashes following the TJribT revolution in 1882 and the Dinshawai
incident in 1906 had a clear xenophobic overtone. For the foreign press, xenophobia was a
frequent phenomenon in Egypt, as were intercommunal tensions. British occupation had further
aggravated social tensions that had already existed before:
“As Hekekyan had witnessed a certain kind of social transformation as to the re­
lationship between the Muslims and non-Muslims in Egypt, he noticed that the
Muslim feeling against Christians had lost its wonted bitterness. Another feeling
replaced it, more intense in its action; that of jealousy and fear and hatred of Euro­
peans and of those sects which are supposed to sympathise with Europeans.”90
Dbert supposes that the xenophobic element was overestimated. He takes the 'Uräbl revolu­
tion of 1882 to be the explosion of newly migrated fallahin who had no political concept (just
as Schulze argues for 1919), and a national uprising mixed with a xenophobic elem ent For­
eigners, in his opinion, failed to distinguish the contours of the national movement. But even
though Ilbeit considers violent clashes between different communities in Alexandria until the
late 1920s at least to be isolated, he invests them with two meanings: the gap between Muslims
and Christians continued to exist, as did a vacuum in the nucleus of the classes populaires that
was not filled by a political organization.91
Commenting on the Dinshawai incident in 1906 - the birth of the fallah as the martyr of
the Egyptian nationalist struggle • (an incident that left one British soldier dead, and led to the
punishment of the involved peasants by flogging and hanging them in their own village) Berque
a Lutfi 1977,169.
"Lutfi 1977.188.
n Mustafa 1968,73. Hekekyan (Joaeph Hekekyan Bey), an Armenian of Roman Catholic creed, was born in
Istanbul. His father worked as a translator in die service of Muhammad 'all, and when the lin t mission was
sent to Paris in 1817 Hekekyan's father asked for his son to be permitted to join the mission. After studying in
England, learning English, French and German, Hekekyan had to specialize in textile engineering and after twelve
yean returned to Egypt to teach and to work as an engineer. He is described as a man with deep insight into the
condition of Egypt and a cosmopolitan figure, an enlightened man who condemned tyranny and felt compelled to
seek the protection of the English from the despotism of'A bbis in the early 1830s though his fean turned out to
be unjustified.

5'Dbert 1996.

26

CHAPTERS. MINORITIES

quotes contemporaries, noting that “for Europeans living in Egypt, good times were over” and
“a revival of fanaticism” was to be observed in “the lower classes.”32
The beginning of the century is compared unfavorably with the days of Ism s'll Pasha, when
every khawaga, every little shopkeeper in a village, had been respected and protected from
attack by the threat of khedivian outrage that would follow any assault Betque does not fail
to add, however, that with the beginning of the century, the rate of violent incidents in general
rose, and that the villager would mostly raise his fist against his fellow villager.
Judgements in the foreign press were not so differentiated and benevolent One of the local
English newspapers. The Egyptian Gazette, even described the fallahin involved in the Din*
shawai incident as “African savages,”33 which went well with the firm ignorance of the de­
mands of the national movement in Egypt on the part of the colonial powers until the revolution
of 1919. The Egyptian side denied any inferiority complex or xenophobia, but stressed the
overboarding emotions in the struggle for the watan.34
The outbreak of rebellion on the Egyptian side, and the attack and looting, appeared es­
pecially shocking in Alexandria because Europeans tended to perceive that city as a very cos­
mopolitan place. It is alive in the poems of Kafavi, whom his biographer suspected of never
having entered an Egyptian home, and the Alexandria Quartett by Durell, which betrays a rather
conventional Victorian fantasy of a confusingly manifold sexual offer. Though the number of
Europeans never exceeded a fourth of the population, the European perception ignored the
Egyptian population of the city.33
After World War II, polarization in Egyptian society grew. The development of the conflict
in Palestine, and its presentation as an Islamic cause, led to growing tension in the streets. On
November 2, 1945, the anniversary of the Balfour declaration, Hasan al-Banna, the leader of
the Muslim Brothers, led a demonstration of 10 - 20,000 people to Abdin square, where he
and others delivered speeches demanding the liberation of Palestine. During the demonstration
and afterwards, the mob broke into the Jewish quarter, attacked Jewish shops, and desecrated
synagogues. The riots spread to Alexandria and to the European community there and lasted
two days. Six were dead, among them five Jews; 670 injured, 500 of them in Alexandria. With
the exception of Young Egypt (Misr al-FatOh), all the political circles in Egypt condemned the
riots.36
Two days before the Egyptian army officially entered Palestine, on 31st May 1948, the gov­
ernment declared martial law throughout the country. Egyptians and foreigners needed special
permission before leaving the country. The property of alleged Communists and Zionists, who
were arrested or interned in connection with the war in Palestine, was seized. A few weeks
later, first some houses in the Jewish part of the city were blown up.
“On 16th July, a single Israeli plane appeared in the Cairo skies and dropped bombs,
which exploded in a poor quarter of the town. On the 17th, an air alert set off antiforeign rioting. Circurel and Oreco were targeted, Benzion, Gattegno, the Delta*5
n Berque 1972,237.
"Ib id ., 238.
“ Al-Bishrf 1982,630.
5SWhen he arrived in Alexandria in 1844 Thackeray was disappointed that the city was less oriental than he
had imagined and full of sophisticated European restaurants serving icecream and French newspapers. Flaubert
made a stopover in Alexandria on his way to Jerusalem in 1850 and found it almost European because of the
many Europeans. Kafavis deemed it a mystic land, full of ancient and modem Greeks. In 1918, Ronald S tem
(1881-1955), the first British military governor in Jerusalem, was reminded of Bond Street in London, when he
went through Rue Cherif Pasha, because of the elegantly clad people and the luxurious care.
“ Mayer 1983,298.

3.2 MINORITIES: COPTS

27

leading Company, the Marconi Telegraph Station, and the building of the Société
Orientate de Publicité. The coat in property damage was high, and many people
were killed. At the time, no arrests or accusations were made.”37
The whole atmosphere in Egypt had changed during the late 1940s. Anwar *Abd al-Malik
holds the green shirts of Young Egypt (Misr al-FatOh), the members of an Islamic youth or*
ganization (Shabâb Muhammad) and the Muslim Brothers responsible for the rioting on 26th
January 1932, and for the change of climate. He claims that the Muslim Brothers had not partic­
ipated in the fight in the Canal Zone. They had engaged in propaganda against the occupation,
but they searched for their enemy in Egyptian society itself. They created an “Angstpsychose,”
and tried to work on an anti-Jewish sentiment, which had been totally alien to Egyptian society
until then. More than that, they attacked not only the material symbols of a western lifestyle,
like bars and entertainment centers in Alexandria and Cairo, but also Egyptians violating the
Islamic code of ethics. They shot lovers in dark alleys, preached religious fanaticism and hatred.
Finally, the black Friday of 1932 with arson and looting in the European quarters of Cairo,
seemed to confirm what the British had always believed about anarchy arid xenophobia reigning
Egypt once they had left Around noon the whole modern city was in flames. By then many
demonstrators had become mere spectators by now. They were passive onlookers “...because
that prestigious capital was not theirs. What was burning were the shops of the rich. And why
n o t...”51

3.2 Minorities: Copts
Berque, like modem Egyptian nationalists, praises the attitude of those “wise Copts and other
Middle Eastern Christians who sought rather to be friends of Islam, recognizing it as the chief
safeguard for men’s identity in that part of die world, the champion par excellence in the long
conflict between East and West, which ought to end in a common victory.”5® But the rival
congresses of Copts and Muslims in 1911 were a sign of the resentment felt on both sides.
As Naguib Mahfouz makes Riyad Qaldas, a Coptic figure in his trilogy, dryly remark in the
1940s: Islam was a religion. Religion was nothing more than a myth, and the problem was that
Copts were interacting with Muslims, not with Islam.60 In the discourse about Copts in Egypt
these are - roughly speaking - two opposing camps: one that considers Copts a repressed minor­
ity in Egypt, with interests clearly distinguished from that of the Muslim majority, and another
that emphasizes the role of Copts as members of a united Egyptian nation, who • for patriotic
considerations - should not try to solve their problems with foreign support, but subordinate
community interests to the common good. Representatives of the latter position tend to stress
the tolerant nature of Islam, its history of peaceful cohabitation with adherents of different reli­
gious creeds in the Middle East, and the predominance of the Islamic civilization that is shared
by all the inhabitants of the Nile Valley.
The discussion about Copts in Egypt and their complaints has not changed since the begin­
ning of the century. Non-Egyptian authors form the majority of the first trend. David Zeidan
argues that Copts are a religious, as well as an ethnic, community, a nation even, while at the
same time they perceive themselves as an important component of the Egyptian nation and share*56
"Kedourie 1970,63-64.

56AM al-Maldt 1971.
"Boique 1972,261.
"M ahfouz 1992.139.

28

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

a common history and culture with Muslim Egyptians and Arabs in general. But the Copts are
“committed to preserving their identity against the assimilative majority.“61
The social and political climate in Egypt does not allow Copts to assert an identity different
from the Muslim majority. Anti-Coptic conspiracy theories and stereotypes dating back to the
Middle Ages are thriving, and Copts are accused of conspiring with foreign «ternies, and o f
secretly planning to take over Egypt and forcibly convert the Muslims.62 A perception of the
world as divided into two camps - Muslims and unbelievers - justifies viewing the Copts a s
part of the monolithic crusading West, whose aim it is to corrupt, divide, and destroy Islam.63
Zeidan even detects a xenophobia developing against the minority that unquestioningly accepts
all baseless accusations of collaboration and intrigue.64
From the point of view of enlightened Egyptian intellectuals, Coptic history is negligible.
Which is tantamount to denying Copts an identity of their own, and extinguishes any marks
they may have left in Egyptian history:
“Coptic history in Egypt is very short. In fact, it doesn’t exceed three centuries. In
reality, Egyptian history consists of Pharaonic and Islamic history. Copts assimi­
lated to Islamic society, as Makram TJbaid did, when he said: T m a Muslim with
regard to culture and a Copt with regard to religion.* ”6S
Makram TJbaid almost managed to become undistinguishable as a Copt: he gave up his
Christian name, and used Islamic discourse and references in speech.66 For that very reason he
was attacked by Muslims as well as by Copts, because the first considered him a thief and the
second a traitor.67 For Egyptian secularists and for Egyptian Islamists alike, Copts as a different
entity within the framework of the Egyptian nation do not exist, since the acknowledgement o f
their difference could lead to a demand for the protection of specific minority rights in the area
of culture, politics and education. Secularists present a holistic concept of Egyptian culture
comprising Pharaonic, Coptic and Islamic elements, and - as a concession to the dominant
Islamic reading of historical and cultural references • stress the tolerance of Islam. Islamists
put emphasis on the peaceful character of the Islamic conquests and on the tolerant character
of Islam, which allows other creeds to be practised, though they believe that Islamic culture
permeates the every-day private and public life of all Egyptians (due to the fact that Islam is
comprehended not only as a religion, but as a way of life).
Time and again, Copts have tried to voice their complaints and demands to assert their
identity. Their status in Egypt had changed prior to British occupation. Researchers agree that
in 19th century Egypt Copts became fairly visible in the upper echelons of society. In 1855 the
jizya tax, which historically marked the difference between Muslims and dhimmTs, was lifted in
Egypt, and shortly afterwards Copts had to do military service, like their Muslim compatriots.
From the establishment of appointed and elected representative bodies in Egypt in 1866, Copts
served on them and reached high offices. In the 1890s, shortly after the British occupation of 6
6'Zeidan 1999,56.
«N oth 1982.536-537.
«Lewis 1994,99-100.
«Zeidan 1999. Copts are comprehended as a cultural entity different from the Muslims. Cultural identity
is reduced to an understanding of culture as rituals and habits surrounding religious belief and seen as a static
expression of human life.
«Interview with Garni) al-Banna, Cairo 27th November 1999.
“ al-Fiql 1988.
«Zizek 1997.145-170.

3.2. MINORITIES: COPTS

29

Egypt, Copts began to register complaints about Muslim oppression.6* The assassination of
Butnis GhfiB, the first and only Copt to reach the office of prime minister in 1908, only two
years after his appointment, was the beginning of a major conflict.
“GhilT had been the Copts’ great man; Muslims felt no regrets, to say the least,
at his disappearance. In the schools, Muslim children revealed what their parents
were thinking, to the great alarm of those in authority.”69*
Publicly, his assassin, the nationalist Ydsuf al-Wardinl, was celebrated as a Christian who
had rid the Muslims of an intolerably arrogant Christian, and became a national hero, as the
British reported. The British complained that in conversations with Europeans, nationalists
would point out the political reasons for the murder, while at home they stressed the religious
aspects and stirred up Muslim sentiments.10
TSriq Al-Bishif, an Egyptian judge turned historian, and known for his research on political
history in Egypt and Coptic-Muslim relations, represents a majority position among Egyptian
intellectuals when he puts the blame for unequality between Muslims and Copts on the British.
It was they who started reasoning that certain public positions touched religious matters, and
that since Egypt was a Muslim country, the people would not be ready for Copts in high public
positions.71* Many Muslims, however, agreed with the British, because they were convinced
that a minority would always try to advance its own sons, while the religious majority was less
prone to emotions like extremism and bias, and therefore better suited for public offices.73
Nowhere in Egypt do Copts form a majority or a homogenuous settlement pattern. They
are found in all the social strata, though their proportion in free professions is higher than the
Muslims’, and accordingly they are not as united in pushing for certain economic programs as
certain culturally and economically discriminated groups elsewhere. Among clerics and laymen
there was a conflict about the right to represent Copts, and at least some groups in the Coptic
community welcomed foreign support. The British were concerned about the safety of the
Middle East minorities in the aftermath of the Armenian massacres. They offered protection,
but their stand towards the Copts was less than benevolent. For them the Copts ranged among
the indigenous.
“The Copts became from tip to toe in their customs and language and their soul like Mus­
lims.”73
Still, it served British policy to consider Muslims and Copts as two distinct communities,
because the protection of minorities was one of the most valuable arguments for foreign in­
tervention in the Ottoman Empire. A very important argument Cromer and the missionaries
working in Egypt used in favor of the occupation was that it had saved the Copts from a mas­
sacre. To stay in Egypt, Cromer stressed alleged threats against Copts, while suppressing the
news that there were Copts who resented British occupation. He sent troops to Upper Egypt to
protect Copts from the Mahdi, and, conveniently, to extend British influence. Still, according to
“ Notables and the preae demanded equality in civil service appointment and promotion, a holiday on Sunday
for Christian employées and for school children and the appointment of more Copts to Egypt’s représentative
institutions. Carter 1986,10.
wBcrque 1972, 260. GhilTs murder was linked to his role in the Dinshawai trial, his readiness to extend the
Suez Canal concession, his signature of the Sudan condominium agreement and the revival of press censorship.
’"Carter 1986,13.
71A l-B ishifl982,78-79.
’’Ibid., 87.
’’Cromer 1908,203.

30

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

British reasoning it was necessary to strengthen the ties with the Muslim population, since they
represented the absolute majority of the population.7475
Copts felt the strong competition of the Syrian Christians, who were assisted by the British
administration in Cairo, especially if they were graduates from the Protestant college in Beirut,
and they were affected by the proselytizing efforts of American and British missionaries.73 In
December 1921, the British presented the Curzon draft treaty to Sultan Fuad, which detailed
civil rights for minorities in Egypt. They were modelled on those in the treaty of Sèvres, and
guaranteed free public and private exercise of religion, equality before the law and with concern
to civil and political rights, which included the admission to public employments, functions and
honors, or the exercise of professions and industries. Minorities were guaranteed the equal right
to establish, manage and control, at their own expense, charitable, religious and social institu­
tions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language*
and to exercise their religion freely therein.76
When Britain - under certain conditions - unilaterally granted independence to Egypt in
1922, it reserved for itself the right to protect minorities and foreigners in Egypt, and to inter­
vene on their behalf in domestic Egyptian affairs.
Coptic authors emphasize how much Copts suffered under British occupation. A Coptic
researcher even reaches the conclusion that the British were looking upon the Copts in Egypt
“in the same way the Europeans were looking upon the Jews in their own countries,Mto illustrate
the discrimination Copts suffered at the hands of the British.77
Copts felt that the British were really not much interested in supporting them. The British,
in turn, found the Copts had more than a fair share in Egyptian life already, and suspected them
of wanting to obtain privileges through the British.78 The policy of the Foreign Office, however,
was not always followed by the Anglican Church and the British press, who took up the Copts*
demand for an equal share in government posts at the beginning of the century.79 Like Jews
74Cromer's successor Gorst found the Copts too weak to lean on and preferred to cooperate with Muslims.
Gorst’s papers, autobiographical note, 121.
75Interview with Thurayft Shakir, 20th October and 18th November 1999.
76Carter 1986,85. Note 82.
^B ahr 1977,227.
^al-Fkjf 1988,41.
79In 19th century the Egyptianization of administrative positions and the changes in economy and landownenhip
had opened the way for Copts to accumulate wealth. According to Egyptian sources Copts occupied 4535% o f
public posts and received 40% of the salaries in governmental service compared to 44% of the Muslims* share by
the beginning of the century. They are said to have been overrepresented among the big landowners, and towards
the end of 19th century owned one fifth of land and buildings, apart from their property in banks. In other sources
the percentage of Copts in the population is estimated as not exceeding 6% while they paid 16% of the taxes on
land. Still another source believes that Copts were holding some 25% of Egypt’s total wealth in the last decades
of the 19th century. Influential Coptic administrators had been permitted to become landowners like their Muslim
counterparts since the days of Muhammad ALi. Sometimes they would own a whole village. When Muhammad
A li's economic system collapsed, Muslim as well as Coptic speculators appeared, dealing in merchandise as well
as in finances. Egyptianization took place under Muhammad Ali and later under IsnUftl, but in the framework of
Ottoman society. For that reason the promotion of Copts retarded compared to Muslim Arabs. Nonetheless more
and more Turks were substituted by Egyptians; Arabic language was substituted for Turkish (since 1869 the new
laws and the government files were in Arabic, and the first newspaper in Arabic was published); in 1855 the head
tax (jizya) was abolished and from 1857 Copts were also enlisted in the army. al-FiqT 1988, 34; Al-Bishrf 1970;
Issawi 1947, 34; Al-Bishrf 1982, 39. In the interview with 'Ariyftn NasTf, the son of a Coptic landowner from
al-Gharbiyya province,1Ariyfin, who worked as a lawyer, talked about the relations between Coptic landlords and
Muslim tenants as well: “Seven generations back my grandfather owned a village that was called after his name,
village AbO MQsfl. Generation after generation, property became dispersed as a result of inheritance. My family
lived on letting land. Between 30 and 40 feddan. My father was not a big landowner. He did not work the land,
he just lived on land tenance. My mother was more progressive, she even supported the (Communist) party and

3.2. MINORITIES: COPTS

31

in Egypt, Copts were not the typical economically disadvantaged minority. Compared to the
Muslim majority, they were better educated, and in the first half of the century well-represented
in the civil service.*0
In the Wafd, Copts were well-represented, though at the beginning of the 1920s the commu­
nity was worried that the high visibility of Copts in the party might hurt it. Wafdist propaganda
went quite far to stress unity. It even went as fin as declaring that “the Egyptians were a unique
and homogeneous race, sharing physical and mental characteristics.’**1
The memory of the 1919 revolution as a milestone in forging national unity between Copts,
Muslims and Jews gained special importance since the discussion about the constitution from
1923 damaged relations again. In their negotiations with the Europeans in general and the
British in particular, it was important for the Wafd to appear conscious of the minority question
since that had been the direct reason for British intervention in Egypt
“The Wafdists with their Coptic members and their written endorsements from
Egyptian Jews, made it clear to those they met that they had the support of Egypt’s
minorities.“*2
The British, however, believed that the Copts supported the nationalist movement only out
of fear.*3 Coptic politicians had a particularly strong interest in the future secularist character
of the Egyptian state, because secularism would be the only safeguard of equal rights for all
the inhabitants of Egypt in every respect. In the face of the common enemy, they did not press
for minority rights but spoke out against them. During the discussion about the constitution,
which was finally passed in 1923, and particularly the definition of Egypt as an Islamic state
in it, breaches became visible in the relation between the two communities. It was not that
Copts were deliberately discriminated against or hurt But there were government decisions
became a member, visiting the families of prisoners etc. Our tenants were usually Muslims, and my family and
the tenants liked each other very much. The village is called AbO Mflsl, but sometimes it’s called ’Izbat al-NasSrf
as well. The tenants are from one family, and even though there is a social difference and they are Muslims, there
is still a lot of sympathy. ( . . . ) Whenever she would go to Ifcnta, or spend the summer in Alexandria or in Ra*s
al-Bar or go to Cairo my mother would dress in a normal way, i.e. without a veil. But in the village it was not
a question of Islam or higfib, but it was a matter of tradition. There was something the women wore like a piece
of gauze or muslin, the shfish, or the tarha (usually a black rectangular piece of cloth to cover a woman's head) to
cover the head as a social tradition not related to Islam, but in Ifcnta or Alex or in Cairo my mother wouldn’t put
any of that” Personal interview, Cairo 26th December 1999.
" ’Some of the Coptic demands in the conference of Assiut backfired. There was a motion to investigate the
excessive number of Copts in the civil service and a complaint that Copts enjoyed too large a share of government
educational facilities and too much influence in government. Copts were very active in the Wafd because they
posiericd many skills required for propaganda and negotiations. Makram 'Ubaid, for example, was included
because Wafdists recognized the need for English speakers. And since TJbaid was not only Oxford-educated, but
also a formidable orator he was invited to join the inner circle of the Wafd in 1920. Carter 1986,61.
•'Ibid.,64.
“ Ibid., 63.
^Kedourie’s description of Zaghlul as apolitical figure and the politics of the Wafd is quite unflattering. Accord­
ing to his reading of historical documents and British Foreign Office files, the Wafd was a terrorist organization
blackmailing the press, landowners and simple faUahin into support and the victory of the Wafd and Zaghlul’s
coming to office as a prime minister was more the outcome of British weakness and loss of the will to rule, in addi­
tion to political miscalculations, than it was owned to the Wafd's real political strength in the Egyptian public. He
strongly contests the Wafd as the representative even of the Egyptian intellectual elite. See: Kedourie 1970. The
British also tended to believe most of what was said about the Copts in the Wafd, even that Makram ‘UbakJ was
ruling the party and bypassing Al-Nahhis or that be was his tool. The residency took an interest in discrediting the
Wafd in the eyes of the Foreign Office and »tressed that the support of the Coptic minority for Wafdist politicians
could be more a liability than an asset This was used especially in the case of Al-Nahhas. Carter 1986,260.

32

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

that explicitly damaged Coptic interests, without the government providing for special clauses
to prevent harm.*4
The Wafd was the only party that defended Coptic political participation and promoted a
Coptic role. This led to attacks on the Wafd as a Coptic clique, and when Makram TJbaid
became secretary general, Al-Nahhas was pictured as his puppet. Egypt was said to have been
delivered into the hands of a gang of Copts.*3 The Wafd itself was also not above using religion
as a weapon against its foes, and when in 1925 'A ll *Abd al-Râziq’s86 book was published with the author known to be leaning towards liberal thoughts -, the Wafd accused die Liberals
of atheism. Religious propaganda, in general, hindered the development of a secular state.
In the years shortly after the revolution of 1919, the slandering of Coptic candidates and
religious propaganda had little effect because of the popularity of the Wafd, and the many
Coptic candidates it put on its lists. There were even shaikhs campaigning together with Copts
to support them. For a very short time the dichotomy between Muslim/ non-Muslim seemed
overcome. But in the long run that propaganda worked, because it made patties reluctant to
nominate candidates who were vulnerable to it, and it made Copts reluctant to be candidates,
because of the risk for their property, person and community.
The discussion concerning the necessity to protect minorities in Egypt went on throughout
the 1930s and 1940s. lim e and again, it was the missionaries who pressed the British to raise
the issue in further negotiations, because not mentioning it would have been tantamount to
claiming that the Egyptian government protected freedom of religion, which, in their opinion,
it did not. Because the Foreign Office did not want to take up the issue again, it suggested that
Egypt make a promise to the League of Nations. In 1936, the missionaries began lobbying for
that promise. Leading Wafd politicians, like Al-Nahhas and 'Ubaid, were against it. The first,
because he considered such a statement to be admitting foreign interference in Egyptian affairs,
and the latter, because he feared that Copts would be accused of seeking foreign protection. For
'Ubaid and other prominent Coptic politicians, like W isif Ghâlï, this had been a consistent line
since the revolution of 1919. It had already been obvious in their attitude towards an eventual
Anglo-Egyptian treaty as a result of the negotiations in 1930. They had constantly rejected any
mentioning of minority protection.
In the late 1930s, particularly in 1938, religiously colored election propaganda was a wide­
spread phenomenon. Shaikh Al-Azhar, al-Maräghl, singled out Makram TJbaid as an enemy
“ In 1911 Shaikh ‘All YDsuf had already argued that Copts were not better qualified than Muslims and had no
right to claim good positions. He contested their share in Egyptian renaissance (nahda), the decisive step towards
modernity in Egypt, because they had not been sent to Europe till the times of IsmlH Pasha. Muslims, Armenians
and Circassians had been to Europe, they were prominent in the modem schools of engineering, medicine and
teaching, while the Copts did not figure there at all till the 1880s and till the beginning of the new century only
in very small numbers. The character of the education for future generations and the share Copts were to have in
it remained the most contested issue for the following decades and mirrored the difficulty of transforming Egypt
into a secularist state that guaranteed equality for the different communities, their religion, culture and language.
Modem education and the introduction of proper vocational training could even lead to the loss of privilege. One
example was the introduction of a special state-supervised education for tax collectors and land registrators. The
sarlfa, i.e. tax collection and land registration, were traditionally Coptic domains, professions handed down from
father to son. In 1929 the ministry of education in the A hrir (Liberal Constitutionalists' ) government introduced
a vocational training with a secondary school exam as a precondition for entering. The Copts protested, arguing
that Muslims were encouraged to take up that profession and that the children of the fayiraf who had leamt the
professions from their fathers already were excluded from access to the training because they did not have the
proper schooling. They protested in vain, and subsequently Copts lost their monopoly on those jobs and were
forced out of the profession. Al-Bishtf 1982,256.
“ Carter 1986,258.
“ al-IsUm wa usOI al-hukm.

3.2. MINORITIES: COPTS

33

of Islam, and hailed FarQq as the new caliph. He defended Islam, and attacked the Christian
missionaries. In the broadcast sermon on the occasion of the bayram feast in February 1938, he
denounced the Copts as “foxes,” and declared that for Muslims to befriend them was to oppose
God’s law.
In the same year Azhar students went through the streets of Shubra in a demonstration
shouting: “lb Palestine with the Copts,” and Copts complained about harassments.87
Al-Azhar was actively involved in politics. Azhar students traveled all over the country to
propagate against the Wafd, and convinced voters that a vote for the Wafd was a vote against
Islam. Shaikh al-Maraghl warned in an interview “that non-Muslims should be happy to see
a strengthened Islam, because it was only the fear of Judgement Day that kept Muslims from
slaughtering non-Muslims.”88
Anti-missionary tracts were in circulation, and Copts were denounced in public speeches.88
In the 1930s, both Copts and Jews in Egypt were affected by the upsurge of a kind of nation­
alism that had an Islamic overtone. Copts, as well as Jews, were negatively affected by the
foundation of the state of Israel, which was accompanied on the Egyptian side by a mobiliza­
tion of sympathy for the Palestinians, on the basis of a shared religious and cultural heritage
that excluded non-Muslims. Secularist politics, which appealed more to Copts and Jews who
did not identify with Islamic contents, had a more difficult stand.
The national cause, and the Palestinian cause, could have served to unite the nation, but this
was not the case. There was no unity concerning the treatment of the national cause, and the
Palestinian cause was handled from an Islamic point of view.90 Copts could not participate in
two of the most attractive and vociferous political movements of the period. In 1937 they left
Young Egypt • a small party with a strong appeal to young men - because the party announced
the slogan "Egypt for Islam,” “Misr lil-Isläm.”91
The Muslim Brothers excluded any Coptic membership by definition. In fact, the orga­
nization contributed a lot to the deteriorating relations between Copts and Muslims. Slogans
like “Watch out for the piaster not to fall into non-Muslim hands under any circumstances” or
“Don’t eat and don’t dress except with Islamic products” alienated Copts. Other slogans drew
a parallel between Jews in Palestine and Copts in Egypt: “Today is the day of the Zionists, and
tomorrow will be the Christians’ day.”92 The Muslim Brothers claimed that Copts had acquired
more power than they had the right to have. In a demonstration in Shubra, one speaker called
on businesses to fire all their Coptic employees. The Shabäb Muhammad announced that they
would boycott objects and services provided by Copts. Salama Musa engaged in an open fight
with the Muslim Brothers, and published a series of articles attacking them in 1946. But the
Coptic Church was not interested in an open conflict with a tough political enemy. The Patriarch
even threatened to withdraw financial support for Musa’s newspaper, M isr, and he was forced*
87At AbO Tig a lawniil had been brought against a Copt for having, allegedly, thrown a Koran on the ground
and having said improper things about the rector of Al-Azhar. Kedourie 1970,200. Quite interesting as a m inor
of that time is the repotted conversation between Husain Haikal and Klmil al-BindaiT, the assistant chief of the
royal cabinet, in 1939. Haikal discussed the Islamic form of government with him, and argued that the principles
of the Egyptian constitution were different from those of an Islamic government, since one of those principles «vas
the guarantee of freedom of belief. The constitution allowed a Christian to change his religion to Islam or some
other creed, and a Muslim to change his to Christianity or any other creed -«rhilst the Islamic form of government
requited the apostate from Islam to be punished «rith death. Ibid., 203.
**La Bourse Egyptienne, 19.3.1938.
"C arter 1986,268.
*°Al-Dis0qT 1988,30*42.
♦'Ibid., 39.
"Ibid., 40.

34

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

to resign • temporarily - as an editor.93
For the Palace, the Copts were republicans by nature. Especially when Farflq followed his
father on the throne, contradictions began to show. First in 1937, concerning the issue of the
coronation • which he insisted to be a religious one • and by swearing an oath not only in
parliament but also in the mosque. The question was whether royal power emanated from the
people or from Islam. Shaikh MarfighI, the regent’s adviser, claimed that the ceremony would
reemphasize the fact that Egypt was an Islamic state, and stop a Coptic takeover which could
produce a Christian aristocracy (sic!).94*
The minority parties (the Liberals and the Saadists), the Palace, and Young Egypt93 all joined
forces in the 1938 election to slander the Wafd and the Copts. Farflq’s endeavor to be declared
caliph could not be of concern to the Copts. Butin 1943 Cairo radio, broadcasting to the Middle
East, still reported that the crowds cheered FarOq during the celebrations for the new Muslim
year as the “Commander of the Faithful” and the “Caliph.”96
Religion was considered an essential element of Egyptian life and education.97 But when in
1933 school became compulsory for children from the age of seven, it was only Islamic religion
that was introduced as part of the curriculum, and thus religious difference was stressed. Copts
complained that the new public schools followed a clearly Islamic trend, and that at least half
of the education consisted of Koran, prayer, and Islamic history, and only a small part of Arabic
language, writing, and mathematics. Even the texts children had to learn by heart in their
Arabic lessons had a religious content.98 Because of the strongly religious character of Arabic,
Copts were not allowed to teach Arabic anymore, and they were not promoted to the position o f
school directors.99 The conflict surrounding religious teaching, and the introduction of religious
texts into text books, made secularists call few the total elimination of religious teaching, as a
guarantee for ruling out a new fitna at least in the coming generations. But there were few
voices as clear as the poet Ahmad Zakl Abfl ShSdTs. Fighting the traditional trend of the 1930s,
he answered demands that Copts should attend religious lessons, and be compelled to learn the
Koran by heart, because it was the best example of Arabic literature.
”... the conservatives failed to note that our Christian brothers mostly do not believe
in the good style of Koran and its wondrous nature (battghat al-qur’in al-sharif
“ Carter 1986,275.
“ ibid., 262. The palace thereafter did not try to improve relations between the two communities. Even in the
royal family itself it came to a serious incident when in 1990 the King’ s sister, Fathiyya, married Riyi0 G hill, a
Coptic diplom at The Coptic Patriarch even apologized to the King for the groom’s behavior and guards were put
on churches the first Sunday after the incident
“ The Wafd founded first an organization to bring the students in line, ribitat al-shubbin al-wafdiyya, league
of the Wafdist youth, under the leadership o f a lawyer, Zuhair ÇabtT. Later it developed into a paramilitary fascist
organization: ai-QumsIn al-Zarqi’. Al-Qumsin al-Khadri’, or Misr al-Fatih, had been founded in 1933 by Ahmad
Husain representing the “extreme right.” Husain turned socialist in 1940. The program of Misr al-Fatih was
designed to attract youths. They demanded the end of foreign economic domination and the curtailing of foreign
privilege. Lutfi 1977,191.
“ Ahmad Husain claimed in the party newspaper that 90% of the Wafd’s followers were Copts backing Makram
'U baid In the liberal press a quota was foreseen for Coptic representation: the thirty Copts the Wafd had norm*
nated out of 230 candidates for the Chamber seats were too many, three would have been enough. Salama Musa
responded in M ifr to such attacks and again there was a comparison with India: he attacked the liberal press
because it wrote about the Copts as if they were the untouchables of India. Carter 1986,265.
“ Al-Bishrf 1982.258.
“ Ibid.. 260.
“ ’Afin» Al-DisOql notes that Coptic teachers in government schools could not be promoted to the rank o f a
director so that their own students became their superiors. This was the case in all public employment according
to Al-DisOql. Al-DisOql 1988,37.

3.2 MINORITIES: COPTS

35

wa i'jizuhu), and it is self-evident that if they believed in it they would not have
remained with Christianity, but the conservatives are unable to understand.”100
Was discrimination because of religion really only a political and administrative problem
without any social dimension in Egypt, as llr iq Al-BishiT claims, or was it more? Family
life did not change after 1919, nor did the importance of kinship relations. Relations between
Copts and Muslims did not develop into family ties. And the importance of Islam as a social
and cultural force did not diminish. On the contrary, Islam was discussed as the religion of
the state, and over and over again the argument that as long as society had not changed Copts
should be protected by the state • or by some foreign force like the British • reappeared. The
Wafd’s problem was that, with the principle of minority quotation refuted, it had to realize the
national ideal and to remove confessional differences. But the Wafd stayed in power only for
short periods and could not enforce a single line of development, even if it had envisioned such
aline.
*Afim al-DisOql does not share either BishiTs assessment of blaming the differences be­
tween Copts and Muslims mainly on the British, or his positive view of Islamic groups, which
BishiT tends to see as the expression of a popular movement, activated by nationalist sentiment
Though al-DisQqT sees the British as an obstacle to the development of Egyptian society, and
their policy to protect minorities as a pretext to remain in the country, he concedes that Copts
had reason to complain, because their share in power was often opposed with dirty means.101
Very few authors relate to public sentiment or bias against Copts. Ahmad Sfidiq Sa'd •
whom we are going to encounter once more as a famous figure in the second Egyptian com­
munist movement - is the only author in a collection of articles to turn his attention to the
populace. Probably his scientific training as a sociologist made him do so. Çfidiq Sa'd quotes
public proverbs that show a widespread bias against non-Muslims in Egyptian society. From his
point of view, the Wafdist leadership and the Egyptian people were different in their religious
assessments. Only some fractions in the high bourgeoisie and the new industrial workers, plus
some marginalized people, left the totalitarian understanding of Islam behind and adopted sec­
ularism.102 The first years of an independent Egypt were the age of the liberal bourgeoisie, and
the Wafd was basically secularist But there were religious institutions in Egypt and groups
with a deep influence on the public widened the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims. The
problem was the fact that those groups and institutions were only perceived as political enemies,
and not in their demagogic capacity. The Nasirist system, which is often praised as secularist
dealt in S&diq Sa'd’s view • and he is supported by Anwar 'Abd al-Malik and Louis 'Awad
in this view -, a blow to secularism, because it used Islamic propaganda in the fight against
Zionism and against the big landowners, and based itself on religious cornerstones to support
its theoretical edifice, non-atheist socialism.
Among the widespread beliefs in the populace was the belief that non-Muslims would go
to hell, that they were liars, dirty, sly, far from the human ideal. There was a gap between
Muslims and non-Muslims that could sometimes be overcome, but widened at other times to
allow aggression and extremism. It was especially the Copts who were accused of being sly.
Jews were said to be merciless. About poor Jews it was said that they had no religion. There
were proverbs pointing Jews out as liars, and contradicting the thesis that all the difficulties
lwNayyil 1997, SI; AM Shldl 1937,40.
101Al-DiaOql 1988,36. In 1923, while diacuaiioai about the new constitution were in full twing, nunon spread
in the provinces that the Copts were going to be given a certain percentage of government jobs (1: 12), and those
rumours helped to create a volatile atmosphere.
""Sadiq Sa’d 1988,47; Abd al-Malek 1971; Schrand 1994.

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

36

arose from political decisions; a popular proverb would state that not even the (Muslim) kids
from the same street would side with Jews and Christians.103
There were attempts from the Copt side to counter the political and cultural attack, like the
foundation of the Coptic nation at the beginning of the 1930s, al-umma al-qibtiyya, demanding
the preservation of Coptic language and tradition, and the support of the Coptic “being” (alkaySn al-qibG) as a people with a glorious past that had to strive for developm ent104*
Still, Coptic fortune did not grow. A Muslim director was appointed to the Coptic museum
in 1930. The Coptic free schools had material assigned that Copts felt belittled their dignity,
like “The genius of Umar,” ('abqariyyat ’Umar) by 'Abbâs MatunQd Al-'Aqqäd. Conversions
of Copts to Islam were announced in public processions. That Copts in the elections of 1930
harvested the worst result in almost thirty years • only three percent of the seats, i.e. 10 out of
30 candidates, compared to a percentage of 10 in 1924 • may be an indicator of the worsening
political and social climate.
During 1946 there were attacks on Coptic churches in Cairo, and in March 1947 a mob
burned a Coptic church in Zagazig. Copts complained of religious fanaticism directed against
them. In anti-Coptic demonstrations in Cairo, marchers shouted “Christianity is finished in
Egypt,” “One Faith in Egypt-Islam” and “Today the English, tomorrow the Christians.” At the
beginning of the 1930s the Muslim Brothers visited heavily Coptic quarters in Cairo and painted
crosses on the houses.103 In January 1932, a Coptic church, a school and a benevolent society
building were destroyed in Suez, and three Copts murdered by a mob on the assumption that
they were British spies.
“In many ways,” Carter comes to conclude, “Suez was the coup de grace, the blow
that destroyed any remaining confidence in the goals of the nationalist movement,
and in the ability of the Copts and Muslims to coexist in peace. As Misr’s articles
continued to prove, the Copts were not conciliated by the government’s actions.
Without a commitment to equality, the nationalist movement could not retain the
loyalty of a minority no longer certain of its place in a shifting society.” 106

3.3

Minorities: Jews

In 1988 an Egyptian newspaper published an interview with Shahäta Harün, a Jewish lawyer
and known Communist. Harün was presented as the model case of an Egyptian Jew. Still, most
of the interview dealt with Harün*s position towards the state of Israel rather than Egypt
l03SSdiq Sa'd 1988,53-54.
104At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, the most militant attempt to defend Coptic interests
took place. In 1949 a Coptic party was founded, the National Democratic Party, which demanded freedom of
worship, adequate parliamentary representation. The Coptic Nation active between 1952 and 1954, i.e. after
the revolution, wanted to purify Coptic religion, and mixed religion and politics. But probably Carter goes too
far when she calls it the only organization that Copts determined to alleviate the community’s grievances could
join. Though she bases her assessment on an interview with Zahir Riyad, the chairman of the African Studies
Department in the Coptic Higher Research Institute. The Coptic Nation, in fact, demanded an amendment to the
Egyptian constitution mentioning the Copte as a nation. The members of the group secretly collected arms and
tried to distinguish themselves from their environment by wearing special garments, reviving Coptic language etc.
But their criticism focused on the corruption inside the Coptic church not on government politics. In 1954 the
group was dissolved and banned.
1Q9Carter 1986,277. The sources are Misr and the Times.
I06lbid., 279.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

37

“It is noteworthy that in the central committee of the Egyptian Tajammu' Party,
which is against the normalization of the relations with Israel, there is a Jewish
member. ... In his 68 years of life, the lawyer ShahSta HarQn Silver© never forgot
that he was an Egyptian (misriyyatuhu), so that he even consented to the marriage
of his two daughters with Muslim men, though he had been arrested for more than
a decade... because he was a Jew and had a cause, and because he refused to leave
his country and to emigrate to a phantom called the ‘promised land.’ ” 107
Harün’s ultimate proof of being Egyptian was the fact that he consented to intermarriage
with a member of the majority of the country, i.e. a Muslim. Thus his family was finally
integrated into Egyptian society. A further proof of being a real Egyptian was his clear stand
towards the state of Israel and die Palestinian question. HarOn himself, however, admitted also
conflict:
“Jews always had a special position, when a clash occurred. I was arrested twice
because I’m a Jew. First in 1949, then in 1967. And three times because I’m a
leftist, in 1946,1970 and in 1979. In general, Jews were worried during the time of
Abdel Nasir. That situation wasn’t corrected until Sadat came and until the peace
treaty. Then the treatment of Jews became less uneasy. Even if that improvement
happened when it was too late.”108
The remarks about Harün’s family situation are echoed again by the conclusion one of
Naguib Mahfouz* figures - Riyad Qaldas, the Coptic “freethinker,” • draws in the 1940s, af­
ter Makram 'Ubaid had left the Wafd:
“If I had lived when Egypt was first conquered by the Muslims and had been able
to foretell the future, I would have urged all Copts to convert to Islam.”109
The striving for national unity, for a homogeneity in social and cultural aspects, which com­
bined an ethnic-linguistic element with a religious-cultural one, excluded Jews and other mi­
norities, not only from the political arena but from Egyptian society in general. Gudrun Krämer
even argues that the Egyptian government consented to the emigration of the Egyptian Jewry
in the late 1940s, because it understood that the majority of the Jewish minority could neither
be integrated nor assimilated in an Egyptian nation that was supposed to be as homogenous as
possible.110
More than Copts, Jews are considered to be the literal “other.” 111 The discourse about Jews
in the communist movement is an almost classical case of finding disturbing characteristics in*1
,0,al-Anba\ 27.2.1988,23.
•“ Ibid.
"»Mahfouz 1992,230.
"°Krilmer 1982,430.
11'The discussions about the Islamic character of the Egyptian nation, the upsurge of Islamic groups, the height­
ened conflict with the British over final troup evacuation and last, but not least the Palestinian cause afflicted Copts
as well as Jews. In publications about sectarian strife in Egypt following the so called “sahwa islBmiyya" (Islamic
Awakening in the 1970s), the Palestinian problem is always present. TBriq Al-Bishri, the main Egyptian author on
Muslim-Coptic relations, on the one hand tries to stress that Copts, by virtue of having proved to be true Egyptian
patriots, deserved a place in the Egyptian umma, while exculpating any discrimination against them as a merely
political mistake. On the other hand he considers Jews active in the communist movement a kind of fifth column
wanting to gain supremacy over an Egyptian political patty. In both cases there is a restraint: Coptic politicians are
politically correct as long as they do not voice the complaints of their particular Coptic constituency, but speak in
the name of the whole nation. Jews are not supposed to become politically active at all since they are foreigners -

CHAPTERS. MINORITIES

38

the other group (their loud laughter, the strange smell of their food, their use of language etc.),
characteristics that serve as indicators for a more radical strangeness. As Zizek says, the others
may look the same, and probably act the same, but there is something that is more than they
are, and it is not human. The element that is so disturbing recurs in fantasies about their sexual
omnipotence, their political omnipotence, and their secret powers.112
With many Jews, differences were obvious and could be overemphasized (the clubs they
frequented, the foreign language they spoke, the way they dressed, the social mixing of men
and women), even if those differences were not due to their Jewish identity, but to their social
standing. The uneasiness that steals up on the majority when a member of the minority changes
cultural and communal allegiance also appears in the reaction towards Muslim converts from
Judaism. They were constantly suspected of secretly having remained Jewish. In that regard,
Egyptian Communists behaved like nationalists who are always looking for a “schibboleth” to
recognize outsiders, and when they fail to find it, they invent one. Just as in the 1980s Islamic
fundamentalists again began to discuss the question of ghiyOr, a dressing code to distinguish
non-Muslims from Muslims.113
Copts present themselves, and are regarded in the Egyptian public, as patriots. Jews are
identified as cosmopolitans, the anathema of nationalists. They are the stereoptype of unpatri­
otic, avaricious, ungrateful, and illoyal elements. Because the “real” Egyptian is connected to
the Egyptian peasantry and the Egyptian soil, the Jew, who was decidedly urban, is his antag­
onist Interestingly, this perception of Jews in Egypt is reflected in the perception of oriental
Jews by Zionist envoys and Israeli officials. Among the many negative judgements about them
was the opinion that they w oe lacking courage, character and ethics,"4 that they were in fret
Orientals, part of the Levantine culture with a rakish attitude towards life, unwilling to till the
so il."5

33.1

Jewish History in Egypt

The number of Jews in Egypt grew considerably due to immigration in the course of the 19th
century. For 1830 Landau estimated their number at 5,000, out of a population of approximately
two million. Fifty or sixty years later, it was around 30,000, though there are no exact numbers
because the first population census in Egypt was conducted only in 1882, and it did not mention
religion. The earliest methodical data for the size of the Jewish community in Egypt stem from
1897. For that year 23,200Jews were counted in Egypt, out of a total population o f9,734,137.116*
In 1907, Jewish population had grown by 53,3% to 38,633. From 1907 to 1917 it grew again
which is not true. Particularly in the case of Henri Curiel, whose family had been settled in Egypt since the middle
of the 19th century, and who became the most controversial of Egyptian Communists, it is not true because he
accepted Egyptian citizenship when be came of age. Therefore from a legal point of view he had every right to
become politically active. Al-Bishrf 1982,597-637.
l,2Zizek 1997,145-170.
ll3Ibid.
' “ Masliya 1989,226.
ll9Matalon 1998, pp. 312.
ll6Befoxe the occupation, for example, travellers noted that lews tried to appear in poor clothes and dwelling,
their women sometimes wearing the Islamic veil. While after the British occupation the upper classes, followed by
the middle classes, started to imitate British and French ways. *\.. indeed it, (the Jewish upper class) contributed
actively to the Westernization of Egypt Side by side with a steadily growing investment in Egypt's business,
industry, and agriculture • as mentioned above • the upper Jewish strata passionately entered the swirl of social life
in Cairo and Alexandria, vying with their neighbors for social elegance, increasingly so in the twentieth century.**
Landau 1968,207; see about economic activities of foreigners in Egypt Tignor 1980.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

39

by 54,2%, more than any other group in Egypt117
Until the first half of the 20th century, numbers remain uncertain. The census of 1947
speaks about 63,550 Jews, but Krämer, like Laskier and others, deals with a number of 75,000
or 80,000 Jews in E gypt1" The Historical Society of Jews from Egypt meanwhile, speaks
about an official number of 80,000 and private estimates of close to 120,000 Jews.11920
According to Krämer, all the Jewish immigrants of the 19th century shared one aspect: they
were poor, young (under thirty), and eager to start a new existence in Egypt “... or better still:
to become rich.”170
Krämer thus agrees with the negative evaluation of Jewish immigrants to Egypt: they did not
contribute to the country’s wealth, but to its exploitation.121 Among 20th century Jews in Egypt
there were few “natives.” Only some could trace their ancestry back to Moses or Maimonides.
15% of the Jews were “autochthonous” Jews, living in small parishes in the Delta, Upper Egypt,
and Harat al-Yahüd in Cairo. They were the social underdogs. The Ashkenasi immigrants (56,000, i.e. 8%) had difficulties to adapt to the Egyptian landscape. They were mostly skilled
workers who could not - even if they were free professionals like doctors - climb up in Jewish
society, because of their lack of French, the language not only minorities in Egypt but also the
Egyptian elite had adopted as their means of communication. The real rulers of the community
were the Sephardic Jews, whose community comprised the “Italian” and the oriental Jews.122
Though many of those “Italian” Jews, however, were not Italian by origin but came from all
around the Mediterranean shores. Many Jews had obtained European nationalities, because
it furthered their position in business and society, but even more of them had not bothered to
acquire any citizenship, because it had not been required in the old Ottoman Empire.
Before 1917,70% of the Jews resident in Egypt had been registered as holding no citizen­
ship. Between 1917 and 1927, their number sank to 45%. One third of the Jews questioned for
a statistic overview in 1927 declared Egyptian citizenship, and the rest held Ttirkish, French,
Italian (only 4,949) and British nationalities.123 That proportion did not noticeably change until
the late 1940s, though Ya’akov Meron, for example, presents a meager 15% of Jews in Egypt as
being granted Egyptian citizenship, which so far is the lowest number in the bargain concerning
Jews and Egyptian citizenship.124*
Rom a western point of view, the Egyptian government put obstacles in the way of nonMuslims trying to obtain Egyptian citizenship.121 Krämer126, Laskier127 and others agree that
'»Landau 1968.198-200.
"'T h e American embassy alto believed in 1947 that there were between 75 - 80,000 Jews in Egypt, 45-50% of
them in Cairo. Al-SaTd 1988,419.
'"hllp.hsje.org.16.4.2001, The Egyptian Community.
l20Ki8mer 1982,30.
121Looking back in history we find that there had always been Jewish immigrants from Spain and Portugal, from
the Mediterranean basin and the Ottoman Empire to Egypt As early as the 16th century there were already three
different communities: an Egyptian Jewish community, the Sephardic community and a North African community.
122Hariri’s family was from Syria. Other famous Jewish families came from Tunisia, Iraq and Aden, like the
Doueks, Serions and Smouhas. Many of the influential families had been present in Egypt since the 18th century,
like the Cattaoui, de Menasce, Mosseri, Rolo and Suarès. The Italian Jews were skilled workers as well as profes­
sionals and bankers. The Mosseris, Pintos and Rossis were among them. Kribner believes that there were about
10,000 of them, living mainly in Alexandria. Kribner 1982,39.
■“ Ibid.. 327.
'“ Meron 1999,92.
'“ Kribner 1982,80
'“ Ibid., 426-430.
'“ Laskier 1995,573-619. Laskier shares Krifmer’s negative view concerning Jewish access to Egyptian citizen­
ship. He estimates that of the 80,000 Jews present in Egypt in 1948 (which was a minority amongst the 19 million
Egyptians) only a quarter had obtained Egyptian passports after the new law concerning naturalization had been

40

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

the political and the social development in Egypt excluded Jews from the Egyptian nation. This
assumption may be right in as much as the national dimension of the Egyptian movement for
independence was not based on the idea of a citizenship that could also include non-Muslim
Europeans who had settled in Egypt, or Jews. For Algeria the same development has been
recorded: modem citizenship was still based on the old idea of an Islamic uiwna.12*
According to Kedouri, nowhere in the Arab world were Jews in favor of the disappearance
of the Ottoman Empire. They were afraid. The old Empire had not been susceptible to the
ideologies and doctrines the new nation states easily fell prey to. Iraqi Jews, who spoke Arabic
and in many regards were more assimilated than Egyptian Jews, sided with the British, and did
not trust the Arab rule following the Anglo French Declaration in 1918.119
“They said that they did not like the prospect of an indigenous government to rule
over them, and gave three reasons in support of their position: the Arabs were
politically irresponsible, they had no administrative experience, and they could be
fanatical and intolerant.“*130
Kedourie and Laskier are among the authors who doubt a Jewish inclination to be integrated
into an Arab nation state. They underline all the negative aspects of the newly emerging Arab
sovereign countries. But Jews were caught between a rock and a hard place, because neither
the British nor the French mandate powers were eager to protect Jews or grant them favorite
treatm ent
Laskier maintains for Morocco th at from 1912 on, French colonial domination had given
Jews a feeling of more political security, and the hope for better social and economic conditions.
The French - like the British in Egypt - did not award any special status to Jews. Educated Jews
did not receive French citizenship or other privileges. Moroccan Jews left the country, because
they were full of mistrust against Muslims, whom they had suspected of needing them for
some time and then wanting to get rid of them as soon as they were able to act independently.
The majority of Muslims was hostile towards Jews, Jews used to think, even if the sultan and
some politicians were honest. When the nationalists came to power in 19S6, Jews were afraid
that they would have to dedicate themselves to national interests. Such an argument is grist
passed in 1929. Another quarter had Greek. French, British, Italian or Austro-Hungarian (till 1917) citizenship.
The rest was stateless.
,2*Harbi 2002,14.
l2,Baiatu 1978,258. “In fact the Jewish community of Iraq was thoroughly Arab, or if you prefer Arabized. Its
language was Arabic, Arabic being even used in its religious services. Its diet was Arab. Its superstitions were
Arab superstitions, and so were its proverbs. Many of the usages were those of the Arabs, even the harem forming
part o f its institutions.’’
130Kedourie 1970,306. With British occupation their vulnerability increased because their social prestige rose
(1914-22 and mandate 1922-32). Many Jews occupied high positions in the admininstration and even received
minsterial posts. This enhanced their visibility. With the end of the mandate and the upsurge of fascism, with
Iraq becoming a center of NS propaganda and the Mufti of Jerusalem fleeing there, the situation of Jews changed.
Between 1934 and 1937 many Jews were murdered. The Jews had fewer opportunities to attend schools and
colleges. In June 1941, there was a pogrome against the 80,000 Jews in Baghdad which became known as Farhud.
But Iraqi Jews did not respond to the call for emigration because their connection to Palestine was very weak.
During 1935-36, on the pretext of making gestures against Zionism, demonstrations were organized in which
Jewish property was attacked, bombs were thrown on Jewish clubs and individual Jews were murdered in the
street In 1941 a coup d'état by officers with connections to the Nazis was staged, but soon afterwards put down.
Baghdad fell to the British. On the following days, in a massacre that was carried out by soldiers and policemen
who had been incited by the fallen regime and by hordes of tribesmen some six hundred Jews were murdered and
many more wounded. Property was damaged. The British did not interfere. Ibid., 307.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

41

to Arab nationalists’ m ills.131 The lack of Jewish national fervor was most obvious in their
negative attitude towards military service. Egyptian Copts were also not particularly in favor
o f conscription. But to be fair, it should be added that not even Muslim conscripts favored the
anticipation of army service, and many tried to escape i t And the more important factor seems
to be that neither for Jews in the Arab world in general, nor for Copts in Egypt in particular, the
army could serve as a social ladder, as was the case for other minorities or social classes.132 For
them, the grim aspect of life in the barracks, in remote areas, and among a mass of uneducated
Muslims, influenced by traditional prejudices, could not be anything else but a deterrent
The debate about Jews in Egypt is tinted with ideology. Emphasizing the unwillingness
of the Egyptian government to accept Jews as Egyptian nationals supports the claim that the
foundation of the state of Israel was a historical necessity, in order to give Jews a homeland.
In Israeli historiography working on the situation of Jews and dhimmls in general, there is
a trend to create a counter image to the Arab Islamic version of peaceful coexistence of all
different religious communities under the reign of Islam. That trend stresses the discrimination
and repression of non-Muslims, and the injustice done to them, culminating in the expulsion
of Jews from Arab lands, and a forced exodus.133 In a “population exchange,” Jews expulsed
from Arab lands left for Israel while Palestinians voluntarily left their house and home and
went to Arab lands • with the only difference that Israel made an effort to integrate those Jews
into Israeli society while Arabs refused to do the same with the Palestinians and created the
Palestinian refugee problem.134
On the Egyptian side, by contrast, the unwillingness of Jews to be integrated into an Egyp­
tian homeland and to accept Egyptian citizenship is stressed. Jews are presented as having sided
with foreign oppressors through the ages, from the Fatimids to the Mameluks, and until modern
times. Jewish Zionists and capitalists slowed down the development of an independent Egyp­
tian nation, on a political level as well as on an economic one.133 In 1926 and 1929, Jewish
capitalism took advantage of the citizenship regulations that distinguished between Egyptian
and Ottoman citizenship. Many of the Jews, and above all the medium and the petit bourgeois
who had been Ottoman subjects, had lost that privilege with the accord of Sèvres in 1920. One
of the authors assumes that most of the Jews in Egypt were of Russian origin and had enjoyed
Ottoman protection. They could not regain Russian citizenship because of the revolutionary
government in Russia. And they could not become Italians either because of the advent of the
fascist regime in Italy. Their hope lay in Egyptian legislation and the possibility of naturaliza­
tion. They sneaked through the loophole of a law that legislators had originally envisaged to
pave the way for the employment of rural migrants and local petit bourgeois. “But, in fact, it
m Laskier 1989, 350. According to Laskier, especially French educated Jews in Morocco were disillusioned
and searched for an alternative to “European style emancipation’’ which led to Moroccans eventually becoming
the single biggest community in Israel. (324). In Morocco poverty was widespread in the cities as well as in the
countryside and in the Jewish quarters.
l32There is a lot of literature concerning the role of the army in Arab societies, particularly its role in the national
revolutionary movements. A comparison between different systems is found in: Büttner 1976. The military service
appears a second time as a reason for Moroccan Jews to mistrust Moroccan nationalism: **(...) they did not wish
to be obliged one day to fight Israel.” Laskier 1990,466.
lu See: Stillman 1991; Cohen 1973; Shamir 1987, about the evolution of the Egyptian citizenship laws and their
application to the Jews in the monarchy period, 33-67. Shulewitz 1999. A different point of view f.e.: Cohen 1986,
125-137. See also: Cohen 1991,55-60. Monciaud 1994,91-105.
ll4This view is strongly represented by Shulewitz 1999,126-141.
llsKlmil presents a statistic for 1938 that shows that the administrative council of die Bank al-Ahli had 60%
Jewish members, though he does not pay attention to the fact that in 1942 that percentage had been reduced to
30%. Kirnil 1999.123.

42

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

served the Jewish presence itself.” 116
RaW 'Abbfis, the Egyptian historian who worked on Jewish Communists, simply assumed
that:
.. The Jews who had come from Europe had kept their citizenship. Many of them
were French. It seems that the French government was facilitating the matter, and
gave it easily to Jews who were of European origin. Do you know who even left the
country? Laila M urid’s brother, Munir M urid.117 He was forced to leave because
he carried French citizenship, and then he returned. But the French and British and
Belgian subjects were kicked out of the country. Many Jews left, and a big part
of the Jewish bourgeoisie left, and they went to France and other exiles. There
were only workers left Many Jews worked as employees in the department stores
of Chicurel, Chemla, and so on. They used to live in al-Dfihir and in al-Sakfiklnl.
Those were the living quarters of Jewish workers and employees. I remember d ut
in 1953 or 1954 the Egyptian government made a law that gave foreigners who had
been resident in Egypt for a certain number of years the right to apply for Egyptian
citizenship. There were very, very few who asked for the citizenship.”11*
Until the 1930s and the end of the capitulations, Egyptian citizenship was not a precondition
either for work or for residence in Egypt Foreign investment and economic activities unfolded,
unihibited by legal restrictions.
That a Jew did not carry Egyptian citizenship did not mean that he did not feel at home in
Egypt. Thus Tignor comments on the Egyptian statistic that indicates that in 1947 50,831 of
65,639 Jews in Egypt were holding Egyptian passports:116
“These figures must contain many errors, since in 1956 most Egyptian Jews found
themselves without Egyptian citizenship and had to be treated as stateless persons.
The censuses apparendy merely indicated what the individuals themselves reported
as their citizenship [my emphasis l.S.]. It would also appear that in some house­
holds children were counted, and in others they were not. The totals do not add up
to the total Jewish population living in Egypt.”*137*140
This is an important argument because it invalidates both former lines of argumentation. It
means that about 80% of Jews registered for the statistic considered themselves Egyptian before
•“ Therefore the number of Egyptian Jews increased from 14,417 in 1917 to 21,934 in 1927. Still the majority
of the 63,330 Jews in the statistic of 1927 remained foreign subjects and the big companies remained with their
foreign citizenship even if they belonged to Jews who were bom in Egypt Ibid.
137Joel Beinin mentions Layla Murad as well. He describes her career as a singer and an artist and dwells on
her conversion to Islam, which was publicly announced in 1946, one year after she had married her colleague
Anwar Wagdi. In 1932 Layla M urid was accused by the Egyptian press of supporting the Israeli government and
having travelled to Israel. “Religious conversions by performing artists like Layla Murad and Daud Husni were
not unusual, but neither did they erase the Jewish identity of the converts.“ Beinin wonders that those conversions
- “Despite apparently having been motivated by convenience rather than conviction ( . . . ) “ • were not repotted in
a reproachful manner. But he does not further investigate the reason why Jews remained Jews in public perception
despite their conversion. Beinin 1998,83-83.
•“ Interview with Ra’Qf 'Abbfis, 17th November 1999.
' “ The statistic indicated for 1947 30,831 Egyptian, 3,260 Italian, 2,192 British, 991 Turkish, 3,368 French,
2,287 Greek, 318 Syrian. 188 Lebanese, 211 Palestinian, 232 other Arab, and 1,761 Jews with other nationalities.
General statistic for 1947 in: HusnT 1993,224.
l40Tignor 1984: Egypt, Ministry of Finance, Statistical Department, Population Census of Egypt, 1907,1917,
1927,1937, and 1947.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

43

the first Arab Israeli war in 1948. Even if we assume that the real number of Jews in Egypt was
close to 80,000, more than 60% of Jews in Egypt thought Egypt their homeland, whether they
held an Egyptian passport or not What did Jews think about themselves, apart from their formal
status?
Of the Egyptian communist Jews who occupied leading positions in the different groups in
the 40s - with the exception of one (Marcel IsrSH) -, all had obtained Egyptian citizenship, some
had even converted to Islam. If not fluent in Arabic, they were at least able to make themselves
heard and understood, and they regarded Egypt their home. It was the country their families
had lived in for three generations at least
Jacques Hassoun speaks about a contradiction inside the Jewish community. Jews who had
arrived at the beginning of the century from Europe or the extremities of the Ottoman Empire,
conscious of the value of naturalization, had hastened to take up Egyptian citizenship. Egyp­
tian Jews who had reached a certain social status constructed, by contrast, imaginative family
histories in which Europe and the adjective ‘European’ stood for some sort of heraldic point of
origin, or created genealogies beginning in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Gibraltar, or Aden (al­
lowing them to claim the glorious protection of France or Britain), rather than seeing themselves
as Egyptian. Hassoun even believes that the status of “local subject” was created in 1948, to get
around too obvious cases of being Jewish, and meant, in effect, that they were stateless. In Hassoun’s line of argumentation, the Jews who engaged with the Communists could .. reconnect
with the past of their ancestors... and rediscover the history of their own Egyptianity not merely
through looking back but by turning to a -hypothetically- bright future.”141

3.3.2

Didar Fauzi Rossano for Example

Many Jews could not meet the preconditions of naturalization, if sometimes only for the lack
of papers proving their rights.142 Law number 19 from 1929, governing citizenship, stipulated
that Ottoman subjects who had permanently lived in Egypt prior to 5th November 1914 were
entitled to Egyptian citizenship. Any foreigner who had lived in Egypt for ten years could
apply for Egyptian citizenship, provided he had a good reputation, a stable income, and knew
Arabic. In case he violated public security demands, Egyptian citizenship could be revoked. The
child of a foreigner bom in Egypt had, upon reaching majority, the right to apply for Egyptian
citizenship, and had to give up any former citizenship.
For Didar Rossano, as for Henri Curiel and other Communists we are going to meet, gaining
Egyptian citizenship thus was not a problem at all. Rossano even integrated herself further
into Egyptian society by marrying an Egyptian officer and (later) diplomat. Rossano’s mother
stemmed from a Jewish family in Alexandria. Though she did not know Arabic, Rossano’s
maternal grandfather, who carried the French citizenship, was fluent in Arabic. He had come
to Egypt from Algeria, following a wave of anti-Semitism in 1898, changing his name, Melek,
into the more French sounding Meley.143 Rossano’s paternal ancestors had come from Italy,
141Dbert, Hassoun and Yannakakia (eda.) 1997,51-32. For Haaaoun it ia the Egyptian authorities who refused to
accept the Jews. “As from 1943, Egypt became the aok Arab country to refuse the right of citizenship to ita Jewish
population despite this community being one of the most tooted and whose presence in die country stretched back
centuries, if not millenia. Thus the Jewish heard themselves described by the authorities as’ foreign.’ ” It is more
interesting though, who in Hassoun’s opinion would suffer most from this turn of fate: he remembers the Jews who
were attached to Thnta, Kafir al-Zayst, Mahalla al-Kubtu, Thnta or Kafir al-Hatabah, i.e. the Jews who lived in the
Egyptian countryside, side by side with the Egyptian fallah, the real indigenous Egyptian, and the Jews who lived
in the poor quarters around the port of Alexandria.
143Rossano 1997.
l4SIn Algeria Italian and Spanish immigrants received full citizenship. In 1870the Algerian Jews became French

44

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

and already had been settled in Egypt for four generations. Her great grandfather had been
a respected rabbi in the Egyptian Jewish community, carrying the Arabic first name of Sa(d.
Rossano believes that her father was given an Italian first name (Angelo) because he was bora
in 1885, after the setting-up of the mixed courts in .1875 and the occupation of Egypt through
British troups in 1882. Thus, to switch to a foreign nationality was advantageous, and it showed
in the names given to the newborns.144
Having to make a choice between foreign and Egyptian citizenship, Rossano’s father de­
clared that he wished to die in “his country,” and the family applied for Egyptian citizenship.
The end of the privileges for the foreign communities inl936 occurred simultaneously with the
appearance of the conflicts inside the Jewish and the foreign communities and the strict regu­
lations of Egyptian naturalization. The racist laws in Italy (1938) provoked a rapture between
Italians and Jews that affected even families of mixed confessions in Cairo. The Italian com­
munity was divided into fascists and anti-fascists, the Greek into Métaxistes and Communists.
The youths felt the differences in the sport clubs : the Maccabi and the Littorio adherents beat
each other up with chairs at the end of a match. Rossano considers the naturalization regula­
tions part of the Egyptian bourgeoisie’s endeavor to protect what it achieved in the twenties.
A non-Muslim had to prove that his ancestors were bom in Egypt, or in one of the provinces
of the old Empire, and that none had received foreign citizenship since 1848, which was the
case in Rossano’s family. Jews were under the impression that it was much easier for Muslims
to become Egyptian subjects, and that Muslims could receive citizenship automatically even if
they were not bom in E gypt145

333 The Foundation of the State of Israel
The Palestine War added a new dimension to the situation of Jews in Egypt Since the 1930s,
Palestine had been a subject that aroused national sentiment in Egypt and had been used by Is­
lamic and nationalist groups against the Jewish presence in Egypt. In the course of the Palestine
War, martial law was imposed in Egypt allegedly to curb disorder and internal conflict Mass
arrests hit Jews on various levels: Jewish private and communal property was sequestered, acts
of sabotage took place.
“The prevailing feeling among Egyptian Jewry was that the Muslim Brothers bore
the major responsibility for the anti-foreign and anti-Jewish incidents.”146
Between May 1948 and January 1950,20,000 Jews left Egypt for mostly European destina­
tions.147*Israel was not their favorite refuge. In 1950,7,154 Jews left Egypt for Israel. On the
eve of the Suez War, however, only a meager 880 went East. Probably one of the reasons was
that Jews who had gone to Israel complained that they had failed to become integrated.14*
citizens as well. The Algerian Muslims were judged by the statut musulman. They w en declared French subjects,
but not equal citizens. To become a citoyen they had to relinquish from Muslim personal law and to submit to
French law completely, while Jews were allowed to cling to Jewish personal law. Muslim religious institutions
were destroyed or misused. Arabic lessons were forbidden and almost all Koran schools shutdown.
144Rossano 1997,38.
I45lbid., 46. Laskier maintains that Jews who tried to receive Egyptian citizenship were turned down. Lastt­
ier 1993. 374. Didar Fauzi Rossano's account confirms that this was not always the case, but depended on the
approach.
,4*Laskier 1995,576; 586.
l47<Abdu and Qisimiyya claim that between August and November 1949 20,000 Jews left Egypt of whom 7,268
went to Israel. 'Abdu and Qisimiyya 1971,181.
'«Laskier 1995,578. See also: Matalon 1998.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

45

The Suez War brought about a turn in Jewish fate in Egypt Under emergency law, at least
900 Jews were rounded up as “suspects,” threatening public order and security. What made the
situation menacing, and probably really contributed to a major change in the perception of the
Egyptian Jewry by Egyptian society as a whole, was that not only the security forces but also
the normal population were involved in this operation:
“Furthermore, there was absolutely reliable information to the effect that almost
all Jewish families in Cairo and Alexandria had been held in confinement at their
homes for considerable lengths of time, often without funds, food or other supplies,
under the surveillance of building concierges invested with police authority to con­
trol Jewish tenants under confinement, and supplied with firearms to render this
control more effective.”149
Jews, in retrospect, were not only allies of European colonialists, but even worse: they had
followed in their masters’ footsteps, and turned from a tolerated minority into a menace to the
liberated states in the Arab world.
The Egyptian government reacted with new legislation. In 1956 the citizenship law of 1950
was amend«! by a decree that prevented Zionists, or any person sentenced for crimes of “dis­
loyalty to the country or for treason,” from obtaining Egyptian citizenship.130
Laskier interprets the modification in citizenship and citizenship laws as a measure to keep
Jews and other minorities from becoming Egyptian citizens. For him, the law regulating citi­
zenship from 1958, which was passed following the foundation of the United Arab Republic,
seems to stress that intention because it accorded “... Arab citizenship ‘to aliens who have ren­
dered eminent service to the state, to Arab nationalism, or to the Arab fatherland’, as well as to
certain people ‘whose religion is Islam.’ ” *ISI
Compared to the summer of 1948, cases of physical mistreatment and/or serious violence
against Jews in Cairo or Alexandria were rare in 1956. In spring 1957, property was returned to
individual Jews who were neither British nor French subjects. The American embassy in Cairo,
therefore, assured Senator Smith, concerning the treatment of Jews in Egypt:
“In November 1956 reports were received about mistreatment of Jews in Egypt.
... Now the embassy has the impression that many of the tactics previously em­
ployed by the Egyptian government with regard to Jews have been abandoned as
a result of the expression of world opinion. Arrests and detentions of Jews have
largely been stopped and many who had been detained were released. Persons who
had specific time limits to leave Egypt received extensions and were not forcefully
deported. Certain persons who had lost their jobs were reinstated. ...th e re is still
an atmosphere of hostility towards persons of Jewish faith in Egypt and Syria in
some regions.”152
'^L askier 1995,579.
ll0Laskier believes that this Egyptian law was unique. It was not. In Iraq a similiar law existed. Masliyah 1989,
216-237.
151Laslder 1993, 386. But in fact the law of 1929 also provided Egyptian citizenship for those who rendered
special services to Egypt Article number six paragraph four gave Muslims who were born in Egypt to foreign
fathers, originating from a country whose majority were Muslims or Arabophone, the right to become Egyptian. In
the aforementioned law disloyalty to the country or treason was a reason to lose citizenship again, and in the 1930s
there were several cases when Egyptian Communists were deprived o f their citizenship because of their political
convictions. Al-Sa'Id 1987,327.
'"M ay 2 1958,774.00/4-1658.CS/J

46

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

An important reason for Jews to leave Egypt, then, was economic hardship. Laskier states
that the fact that employment laws changed, and the percentage of Egyptians who had to be
employed in companies grew over the years, was not the only reason that Jewish employees
lost their jobs, because .. Egyptian citizenship was really of little help for Jewish workers, for
the change over of personnel meant the substitution of ‘real’ Egyptians [Muslims) for Jews.” 153
The American embassy in Egypt reported the shrinking of foreign populations in Alexan­
dria. 3,000 out of 18,000 Italians had left, of the 33,000 Greeks, 2,000 had boarded ships
sailing to other shores. .. Several thousand Jews of various nationalities have more or less
been driven out” The great majority of the Greek emigres from Alexandria had been workers,
skilled mechanics, waiters, and housemaids. The Egyptianization laws had had a direct impact
on the poorer Greeks and Italians, because they limited their employment opportunities and
weakened the favorable position they had previously held relative to Muslim Egyptians in many
enterprises. The reports ended saying that;
.. Since Suez, particularly, there has been a growing number of reports of discrim­
ination against Christians (Coptics) or Jewish citizens, as well as those of Italian
and Greek extraction.”154
Since February 1936, Egyptian citizens had to obtain permission from the Ministry of the
Interior, in order to work for foreign companies. The declared purpose was to enable the state
to exercise sovereignty over all citizens.155 Thus the government pursued a twofold policy:
to restrict the number of foreign workers and employees, and to control foreign companies and
Egyptians working for such. In 1938, article 8 of the decree of the Secretary of the Interior stated
that Jews who possessed ordinary or special residence, as well as Jews deprived of Egyptian
citizenship, would be included in the list of persons to whom access to national territory was
denied, in case they departed from the country for good. Finally in 1939, a work card was
introduced that indicated the religion after the name. Enterprises were advised unofficially that
is was not wise to hire Jews, and the employment service did not recommend Jews for vacant
posts.156 International developments (the Cold War), regional conflict (the escalation of the
conflict with Israel), and the wish of the Egyptian regime to co-opt the support of the Egyptian
masses led to the destruction of the remnants of multicultural co-existence reaching back to the
Ottoman Empire.
“At the present time the regime seems to derive its greatest strength from the work­
ing class. The lower middle class also appears to be in favor of i t The westernized
type of Egyptian is vaguely opposed to the regime, but he is also disillusioned with
England and France.”157
Thus the ahl al-thiqa (good old buddies sticking together) policy of the governing military
regime included not only primarily technocrats but also primarily Muslims, since trust was set
in the family first and the shilla (clique) second. Copts did not abound in military ranks, and
Jews were completely absent. That policy afflicted all the minorities in Egypt:
•»Laskier 1995.587.
154Foreign service dispatch 774.00/12-2157, XR 874.00, December 21.1937. About Alexandria and the sire o f
foreign communities.
I55NR:MAE-CX 33-56, DA IN 202301,18 Feb 36.
l54Laskier 1993.
,,7ft>ieign service dispatch 774.00/12-7857 December 28.1937.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

47

“There were no high ranking Christian officers, and there were none in the Revo­
lutionary Council, not even one. And because they were applying the ahl al-thiqa
politics... to a high degree, it was really bad. There was that organization called
munazzamat al-tahrtr (the Liberation Organization), the one Abdel Nasir began
with before he founded the Socialist Union (al-ittihad al-ishtirOkl). That organi­
zation really had a stake in that development I remember the general atmosphere
in the place I was working in as an engineer, in the Egyptian Railroad Company.
You did not know a Christian from a Muslim. When munazzamat al-tahrtr came
into being, they started to make this aspect felt I remember an incident: one of the
engineers who were sharing the office with me, he did not know whether I was a
Christian or not He did not know it until munazzamat al-tahrtr was formed. I was
asked a direct question: ‘Are you a Christian or a Muslim?’ And the engineer was
astonished. He told me ‘Hell, I always think of you as a Muslim!’ Dealing with
each other was • there was almost no difference. And when I was asked a direct
question, he was astonished. That was an engineer in the same office with me.” 19*

3.3.4

Economy

A crucial question in the debate about Jews has been their economic situation. Foreign minori­
ties in Egypt were, in general, perceived as a bunch of adventurers who had come to plunder the
riches of the country. That it was often the wish to leave a poor background or unfavorable po­
litical circumstances, that drove immigrants to come to Egypt and pushed them into innovative
professions and sectors, is ignored, as well as the fate of immigrants who failed.
Jewish families (the Qattawi, Mosseri, Menasce, Suares, Rolo, Haribf), Sephardic families,
who had all been resident in Egypt since the beginning of the 19th century, or even before
played an important role in the founding and adminstration of important Egyptian banks, like the
Credit Foncier and the National Bank. The Kom Ombo Company, a leading land development
company, had many Jewish directors. Mandelbaum and Horowitz, more recent immigrants
from Europe, helped to establish sugar refining and cigarette industries. Cicurel and Chemla
belonged to the principal department stores and were Jewish owned. In public perception those
families became representative of the Jewish community in Egypt
“But the majority of Jews were of modest means • petty traders and employees and a small number extremely poor.“199
This emphasis contradicts the economically-based explanation model of conflicts between
ethnic groups. Landau believes that Jews’ particular occupations, especially their role as mid­
dle-class entrepreneurs, were overstated, and a doubtful factor in lacking assimilation. From
his point of view, Jews were not assimilated into the majority because of their community
institutions, their specific ethnic and religious background.140
Still, in many studies the economic aspect has gained the upperhand, though in Egyptian
literature the ethnic element has also played a major role. Issawi describes the relation between
the Egyptian majority and the minorities as governed by economic interests. Of the “semiEgyptianized” communities, he saw the Jews in control of finance, while the Syrians provided
officials, men of letters, traders, and village usurers, and the Armenians skilled artisans. The
‘“ Fenouil interview with Fauzf HabbashI, Cairo, 20th October and 18th November 1999.
,NIm w i 1981,204.
'“ Lendeu 1992,216-221.

48

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

background of the nationalist movement was that economic difference.161 Until the 1950s, two
different civilizations with different standards of living existed in Egypt side by side.
“A rural laborer earns under LE 4 per month. A bank clerk starts his career at nearly
LE 25 per month. The difference between the two salaries reflects the divergence
in the standards of living of East and West”162
It was not really a difference between East and West because the affluent classes in Egypt
had sided with the British. Even the urban middle class, who felt economically and politically
cornered by the British, is described by Issawi as the “most Europeanized” section of society.
But the social gap in Egypt was huge.
Jews in Egypt were perceived as money lenders, businessmen, money-changers, and pawn­
brokers. At the beginning of the 19th century, many of them were still poor (as Lane noted)
and lived on public charity. They were mainly active in retail trading, especially fruits (dates),
tobacco, cotton, and silk. With the increasing importance of tourism, Jews became active in
local antique commerce, importing and exporting tourist commodities. There were also many
Jewish artisans, chair makers, silk dyers, tailors, cigarette rollers, etc. An increasing number
of younger Jews found jobs as clerks, book-keepers, agents in local and foreign commercial
enterprises, in foreign consulates, and in the Egyptian government163
During IsmlTTs rule, Jews invested in a number of state encouraged industrial enterprises,
and Landau notes, that though Jews abstained from political participation in the national move­
ment in the 1880s, they contributed to the national movement financially, and a number of
Jewish bankers was in touch with it.16*
Under British rule, Jewish professional intelligentsia (among whom there was a steadily
growing number of lawyers, physicians, agronomists, etc.) became more active in public mat­
ters, socially and economically. Jews became active in bank business. Kriimer believes that the
Jewish community in Egypt developed socially into the form of an onion in the first half of the
20th century: a thin upper layer, a broad upper middle class, a very wide lower middle class,
and a small lower class.
She relates economic success to ethnic origin. Most of the 25% of the Jewish population
who lived on charity and begging were autochthone or oriental Jews. The prosperous upper
class were sephardic Jews, the rest mixed. Yet in all layers, Egyptian citizenship and foreign
citizenship were represented. Only in the lower middle class and the lower class there were also
stateless Jews, i.e. among those who were closest to their Egyptian Muslim compatriots.163
From an Egyptian point of view, Jews posed a threat to the Egyptian economy. In her
study about Jewish history in Egypt, Husnl permanently describes Jewish economic activities
as “dangerous.” Jewish ownership of stationary shops, printing presses and publishing houses
turns into a scheme to gain influence on the press, in order to further Jewish aims. To become
part of the Egyptian industrial union (al-ittihfid al-sinfil) was only a trick to gain the upperhand*142
Issawi 1954.43.
142Issawi 1954. 62. In 1951 of 1,496 names identifiable with any degree of certainty in the list of company
directors in L’Annuaire des Sociétés Anonymes “...3 1 per cent were Egyptian Moslems, 4 per cent Copts, 18
Jews. II Syrians or Lebanese, 8 Greek or Armenian, and 30 per cent Euopeans.” Ibid., 63.
'“ Landau 1968.202. Landau here mentions Augustus Cohen who was lin t the secretary of Colonel Stanton, the
British consul-general in Egypt, and then, in 1866, remained in charge o f the British consulate in Cairo and Moise
Franco, who was in charge of the Ftench consulate in Cairo in 1870.
IMIbid„ 203.
’“ Kilm er 1982,113-115. Those middle classes consisted of shop assistants, employees and clerics (about 15%).
craftsmen (15%). merchants and sellers (30%). liberal professions (5%) and very prosperous bankets, landowners,
entrepreneurs and leading employees (5 to 10%).

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

49

on Egyptian industry. The obvious bias becomes clearer when Husnl describes YQsuf QattawT,
with Tal'at Hart) in tow, meeting bankers in Frankfurt, a city that in her imagination was mostly
inhabited by Jews, with the main branch of the Rothschild family even residing there.166 H usnfs
“we” does not include the Egyptian upper class. Personalities connected to banks and business
in Egypt, 'AdlT Yakan and Ahmad ZfwSr, but also Tal'at Harb were positively disposed towards
Jews.167
Indeed, the antagonism between Egyptian national endeavors to promote Egyptian economy
and industry and the influence of foreigners had been overcome by the end of the 1920s. Even
the M isr empire was ready to bow to economic needs.
“In 1929, the bank established the Misr Cotton Export Company. Recognizing the
intricacies of the cotton exporting business, the bank appointed the German busi­
nessman, Hugo Lindemann, as the export firm’s managing director. For the first
time, a foreigner had been placed at the head of a M isr company. Lindemann had
vast experience in exporting cotton from Egypt At the time he was appointed,
Tal'at Harb asserted that the bank’s nationalist tradition remained intact. Lindemann, he claimed, had spent most of his life in Egypt and though a foreigner, he
was described as being infused with Egyptian nationalist sentim ent”168
By 1948,39% of the total capital invested in joint stock companies in the country had gone
into Egyptian hands. Most of those companies were run by persons residing in Egypt. That is
already a very important difference, because before, as Tignor points o u t a lot of metropolitan
capital had been invested in Egypt and decisions had been dictated from abroad. The en­
trepreneurs residing in Egypt had an interest in the development of the country. In the 1940s,
many of the directors were native-bom Egyptians, though an even larger number were foreign­
ers with a permantent domicile in Egypt. Frictions arose, because ”... by separating themselves
from the main stream of Egyptian life and embracing European ways, the leading foreign busi­
nessmen aroused deep-seated resentment in all segments of the Egyptian society, and even in
the lower strata of their own communities.”169
The disparity of lifestyle thus brought about friction on three levels: between the Egyptian
upper classes and the majority of Egyptian Muslims, between the upper and the middle classes
of the foreign and local minorities and their lower classes, and between the majority of Egyptian
Muslims and those minorities.170*10
,ä Hum I 1993ÜÜ

“ ’Ibid., 65.
M*Hgnor 1984,134. One o f the leading Egyptian entrepreneurs, Amin Yahya, founded the Union Alexandrine
in the 1930’s, an interest group to foster and to link foreign and Egyptian interests in the city and to monitor city
government Ibid., 136.
••»Ibid., 193.
110At the Misr plant in Mahalla al-Kubra the main source of discontent among workers was their ill-treatment
at the hands of the management Managers treated the work forte - cheap peasant labor • badly, using harsh
and autocratic techniques to turn peasants into a proletariat with all the accompanying problems o f absenteeism
and high labor turnover. The company, which had eamt a lot during WW II, built 13 luxurious homes for the
general manager and the division foreman, costing 16,000 LE each. The housing estate, originally constructed for
workers, had been taken over by the state during the war. Workers lived under deplorable conditions, four or five
families in one mud house. And the workers themselves rejected expanded social or recreational facilities, which
they suspected to be intended for the management and not used by the employees, and pressed instead for wage
increases. Therefore the much-mentioned disparities in lifestyle and economic possibilities were obviously more
of a rural-urban, uneducated-educated, haves-and have-nots problem than one o f foreign versus indigenous only.

50

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

In 1951, 18% of company directors still were Jews, in 1960 only 5%. Bom over 1,000
persons whose property was sequestrated in 1961, only 4% bore Jewish names.171 In Egyptian
literature it is emphasized that protest against Jewish capital was widespread. Especially the
Kom Ombo land development company is targeted. According to Anas Mustafa, its employees
were mainly Jews and foreigners, earning a manifold of what an Egyptian worker could take
home.172 Another author, Saida Husnl, bases her claims against the Kom Ombo company
and its inspector, the omnipotent Salomon Mizrahi, on accusations brought forward by Young
Egypt The party accused the company of preventing government employees from living in
Kom Ombo. Workers who belonged to the organization had been threatened with dismissal and
forced to leave the village in 1939. Those who tried to read the (party) newspaper, or possessed
one, were also forced to leave. The mayors and supervisors had orders to prosecute all the
suspects.173 Husnl does not bother with the extremely nationalist politics of the party and its
sympathies for fascism, nor does she reflect on the fact whether Mizrahi’s behavior was to be
judged critically in the context of capitalist exploitation, or the disdain that Egyptian landlords,
British colonialists, and the elite of the local minorities shared for the masses - to be precise,
any masses, not just the Egyptians. She presents it as a typical example of Jewish behavior with
regard to the classical ‘wretched of the earth’ (Frantz Fanon), the original inhabitants of the
country.
Anas Mustafa quotes from a complaint against the Delta Estate and Investment Company,
dated from 1949. The management is described as Zionist, hostile to Egypt and its interests,
employing Egyptians only as servants. Profits were secretly sent to Tel Aviv, with Jewish envoys
living in Ma'Sdl - a fashionable district at the outskirts of Cairo • traveling to Palestine regu­
larly. Equally, workers suspected the Buhaira Stock Company to be a den of “foreign Zionist
exploiters,” conspiring against national interests.17475Mustafa, and also Husnl, dug up complaints
about uneven employment chances.173 A bank clerk reported that • to circumvent Egyptian la­
bor legislation • Jewish employees were transferred to a special room in the bank and listed
under a single name, while Egyptian fairish (the “dogsbodies”) but not educated Egyptians
were nominally employed to take their place (1947). Five years later, in 1952, the Portland D m
Cement Company was found guilty of a similar strategy:
“... amongst all the qualified and excellent Egyptians the Portland D in Cement
Company did not find anybody to supervise and administrate the labor office. They
gave the directorship to a Jewish man, who is partial to Jews, apart from the fact
that he is stateless, and belongs to the dangerous Jews of Central Europe.”176
Though the Egyptian authors insinuate that plenty of complaints were forwarded, both o f
them produce no more than three each to support their claims against Jewish capitalists. What
is quoted amounts to little more than obvious libel. Jews are portrayed as foreigners, loyal
to their community and therefore hostile to Egyptians. Egyptians, in all cases, meant Muslim
Egyptians, because Egyptian Copts, as we know from the previous chapter, were suspected
in the same way. Jews were not only lacking patriotism but were thought to be outrightly
treacherous, serving the interests of a different country (or at least subversive). Communism
was not mentioned explicitly in the case of the Portland Dira manager, but there was a tacit
ITIIuaw i 1981,203.
,7IKSmil 1999.169.
,7,HusnI 1993,70.
,T4klm il 1999,169.
I75HumI 1993,63. The lource is Dâr al-W athalq al-qaumiyyi / qism maslahal al-iharikfiL
l76Ibid., 69.

3J . MINORITIES: JEWS

51

undemanding between those forwarding the complaint and the administration concerned with
i t In the discourse about communist Jews, all the aforementioned stereotypes will reappear
again.
Jewish factory and company owners became the foreign exploiter par excellence. Jewish
factory owners denied Egyptian workers compensations,177 preferred to employ Egyptian illit­
erates, and tried to escape the percentage of Egyptian workers and employees prescribed by
the new legislation governing employment in companies. Workers were arbitrarily dismissed.
Qualified Egyptians were not registered with their qualifications, in order to lower their wages,
while non-Egyptians with the same qualification received their full salary.
Jews were operating in families, not unusual for Egyptian business activities, but in the case
of Jews it smells of exclusiveness and monopoly. Husnl stresses that Jews did not invest in land
because they favored liquid assets, which implies that they wanted to remain mobile.17* She
uses a statistic to show d u t 44,56% of Jews were unemployed in 1937, that is almost half of the
57,833 included in the statistic. This number seems to contradict the image of the prosperous
middle class Jews in Egypt. There is also no explanation for the dwindling of this number to
only 5,35% ten years lata1, with the number of Jews included remaining almost stable. 20%
of Jewish occupations in both statistics were not clear, while another 20% was reserved for
commercial occupations. Husnl, however, concentrates on Jews active in the service sector,179
whose number increased from 2,21% in 1937 to 37,37% in 1947, because she interprets it as a
clear sign that Jews were getting ready to leave E gypt180
Jews in Egypt worked hard to become rich, and they occupied the social niche that had been
left vacant by die uneven economic and social development in Egypt.
T hey arrived in the middle of the 19th century, and they wanted to become rich.
The Egyptian middle class was very weak and small, therefore they replaced them.”1*1
Only the poor, the pedlars, the small craftsmen, and the beggars living on sadaqa were close
to the indigenous population. They spoke Arabic as a first language, and they had only primary
education. Husnl, however, makes a Freudian slip when she remarks that those Jews who were
tnosdy of Egyptian origin imitated the Egyptians. Why would they imitate Egyptians if they
were of Egyptian origin themselves? They called their sons by Arabic names, they ate Egyptian
food, dressed in Egyptian dress. But there was something to them that was more than what they
were • the Actor X.1*2*7
177Ibid., 68. Interestingly the tource here is a communist paper, published by Iskra first in April 1947 and later
on by the Democratic Movement for National liberation (DMNL) until May 1948: al-Jamahir, No. 8 ,16th May,
1947, p. 8.
l7*On the other hand, the Egyptian government was dependent upon foreign credits with high interest rates
granted by international (Jewish) banks in London, or ftuis or elsewhere. In the period under study (i.e. 18821948 which coincides with the beginning of British occupation and the foundation of the state of Israel), they
dominated Egyptian economy. This idea is generally adopted in Egypt. The author is supported by an article in
al-Ahtam al-iqtisidr, 23.3.1981, No. 636,21.
,7*Still, we do not know exactly either what khidmlt thakhgiyya are or why their increase should be proof that
lews wanted to leave except if this is meant to be a sort of private broking, arranging ship passages, papers, visas,
hwsinots transfers and the like.
'“ The tource the author quotes is: al-idira al-fm m a U al-ihtl’, p. 294 for 1937 and pp. 400 and 401 for 1947.
»'H usnl 1993.77.
'“ Ibid.,78. According to Saida Husnl, about a third of Egyptian economic enterprises in 1927 was directed by
Jews who were all non-Egyptians. “Jews in their majority were foreigners and only the poor were of us.”

CHAPTERS. MINORITIES

52

33S

Culture, Language, and Politics

Mustafa’s and HusnTs arguments are based on the firm belief that Jews were an alien elem ent
in Egyptian society. Authors like Samir Ra'fat, who reminds his readers that Judaism had its
origins in the Nile Valley, and that the architects of the synagogue in Adli street chose the neopharaonic style for onlookers to recollect “that Moses had been prince of Egypt long before he
became a prophet,” are scarce.1®3
Husnl finds it difficult to understand why Ya'qûb SannQ"s “Abu NaddSra ZarqS’,” a witty,
daring journal, speaking out against the Khedive IsmSTl and his entourage, should be considered
representative of the Jewish community because it expressed public Egyptian opinion and was
a national (qauml) paper. Saida Husnl is a historian but ideological considerations get in her
way as she remarks:
“Jews, as is known about them everywhere in the world, are very far from the
national spirit of any nation they live amongst, because they do not think about
anything but the Jewish umma and qaum yya.”,M
In its last decades, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire had tried to make religion and ethnicity
a private issue. Yet the cultural implications of Ottomanism had remained vague and ambigu­
ous. Had the aim been the creation of a Turkish-speaking homogenous citizenry? Schools
would have had a major role in that scheme, but “few non-Muslim schools taught Turkish ef­
fectively, and few instilled great loyalty in the Ottoman state.”1®5
Even though Egypt followed its own way, problems were the same. The cultural implica­
tions of “Egyptianism” were not clear. Secular education was not realized, the various educa­
tional systems of different communities were competing with one another, and liberal politicians
were tom between traditional Muslim forces on the one hand and foreign powers on the other.
The British occupation was a turning point for the status of Jews in modem Egypt Be­
fore the occupation, travelers had noted that Jews tried to appear poor in clothes and dwelling,
their women sometimes wearing the Islamic veil, while after British occupation first the upper
classes, then the middle classes started to imitate British and French ways.
" ... ; indeed, it [the Jewish upper class I.S.] contributed actively to the Westerniza­
tion of Egypt. Side by side with steadily growing investment in Egypt’s business,
industry, and agriculture - as mentioned above - the upper Jewish strata passionately
entered the swirl of social life in Cairo and Alexandria, vying with their neighbors
for social elegance, increasingly so in the twentieth century.”1*6
Culturally, the Jews of the Ottoman Empire had turned to France. The Alliance Israélite
Universelle played an important role in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Founded in Paris
in 1860 by French Jews, it set about spreading western education among the Jews in the East
■“ The architects were Eduard Matasek and Maurice Youssef Cattaui. Cairo Tunes, September 2,1999. Samir
Ra'fat also reminds his readers that the list o f the men who helped to erect that Jewish monument in 1899 was a
record of names “historically linked with the country’s first privatization in 1898-1906.“ But apart from engaging
in economic enterprises such as department stores, banks, transport companies, urban and suburban development,
those Jewish entrepreneurs also contributed to culture: interestingly, both the Islamic museum in Bab al-Khalq and
the Museum of Modem Art benefittcd from private Jewish collections, (hsje. Gates of heaven. 16.4.2001)
'“ Husnl 1993.144.
' “ Rodrigue 1992,180-183.
' “ Ibid.. 206-208.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

53

Beginning as private establishments with few students, they gained in popularity, and also en­
couraged female education. Secondary schools, vocational training, youth clubs, libraries, and
so on developed also. An Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) report, dating from 1912, il­
lustrates the AIU tendency to foster integration into native societies. The report stressed that
because of their different culture [my emphasis I.S.] the Jews did not play any role in Egypt
where they lived like foreigners; they could neither work as barristers (barreau) nor as judges
(magistrat). They had neglected Arabic culture and language, some, because of their exotic
origin, and others because of their disgust for everything indigenous. The author of the report,
S. Somekh, who had been the director of the Alliance school in Cairo, which existed only until
1923, concluded that Jews would need national preparation to enable them to be incorporated
in the indigenous mass.187
In the 1920s, AIU delegates stressed “the vital importance of continued Jewish presence in
the diaspora, and the need for international Jewish organizations to assist Jewry in becoming
better integrated in the ‘sol natal’.”188 The AIU itself, however, came under Zionist attack
because it taught children a curriculum based on French national culture instead of Jewish
culture.189
Language had been, and remained, an issue since the days of Muhammad Ali and the ap­
pearance of the first Arabic newspaper, with education - especially higher education - in foreign
hands, and big enterprises under foreign owner- and directorship.190 Among the minorities there
was a real Babel of languages. French was the language that united the Turko-Egyptian elite
and the local minorities. Jewish community schools in Egypt, as well as elsewhere, held their
lessons in French until the 1930s. Only then did those schools which were frequented by the
lower middle class adopt the Egyptian curriculum and Arabic as the main language. In 1943
even the community council started to write its reports in Arabic and French. The badly edu­
cated Jews of the lower classes and the lower middle class spoke Arabic as their native tongue •
which does not exclude the fact that Jews belonging to other social classes were able to commu­
nicate in Arabic as well. Oriental immigrants spoke their own Judeo-Arab dialect. The sephardi
immigrants spoke Ladino but French, Italian and Arabic as well.
Rich Jews in Egypt would send their children to foreign schools.191. In 1919-1920, there
l(TChouraqui 1965; Kedourie 1974,73-80.
IHLaskier 1990,465-505; Laskier 1989,321-362. About the situation of lews in Morocco and Jewish emigration
from Morocco; here; 338
1(9After the war the AIU altered its orientation. 1946-47 Hebrew was introduced as a language in the AIU
schools, and new Hebrew teachers and teachers for Jewish studies were trained and employed who prepared the
students for aliyah. Hassoun gives an overview of schools for Jews in Alexandria. Jews had their own schools,
community schools and private schools. The Israelite Community of Alexandria school prepared the students
for the Arabic baccalaureat, the private schools and lycées like the schools of the Mansce Foundation provided
education in French up to the elementary certificate. The lycée of the Jewish Union for education, founded in
1925 by the Bnai Brith masonic order, was intended to educate students “hitherto educated by Christian brothers.”
But Jewish schoolchildren were also present in the French, Egyptian and British schools. Ilbett, Hassoun and
Yannakakis(eds.) 1997,49.
lwThe effort to strengthen Arabic at the cost of Turkish became visible during the reign of Muhammad Ali.
Articles were written in Arabic first and only then translated into Turkish and Arabic, though it was not yet the
official language of the country, occurred in prominent place. But the real breakthrough of Arabic press and Arabic
language started with the reign of IsmftH Pasha. ‘Awad 1969.
191Silvers 1999,172-181. Could it be that his family is connected to the couple whose letter is quoted in Ilbeit,
Hassoun and Yannakakis (eds.), Alexandria 1997. The letter is by a “TripolitanLan to il Duce, June 1937,” a call
for help since he is threatened by the revocation of his Italian citizenship. It says;
“Excellency,
I have the honour to submit to you the following;

CHAPTERS. MINORITIES

54

were more than 90% Jews on the honors list of students who had passed their baccalaureat or
had been admitted to continued education in Paris, at the Lycée Français in Alexandria.192
The gap between Jews and Muslims in Egypt, therefore, grew with regard to education in
general, and to the contents taught. In 1947 about 20% of Jews in Cairo and Alexandria w en
illiterate, the rest knew at least how to read and write.193 Therefore, the educational situation
of Jews in Egypt was much better than that of their Muslim compatriots. Until the 1920s,
education had not even been acknowledged as a general right in Egypt, as mentioned in the
previous chapter. A national curriculum did not exist, and when it came into existence, it
was directed more towards the education of a good Muslim than towards the education of a
good Egyptian citizen, regardless of religion. Private education in foreign schools remained a
widespread phenomenon in Egypt until the 1950s. For decades to come, public schools were
the home of the Egyptian boys from the middle classes, Muslims and Copts, though Copts
were more often than not also educated in private schools. Girls from the middle and the upper
classes • Muslim, Copts and Jews alike • were educated in foreign schools.
Language is at the heart of the discussion about Egyptian Jews being natives or foreigners.
Jacques Hassoun believes that this question became salient only recently. He claims that in the
20th century more than 190 books had been written in Arabic by Jewish authors and published
in Alexandria and Cairo. In 1882 in Alexandria, a handbook had been published in Arabic, to
teach Hebrew to Jewish children. From 1920 on, Hillal Farhi translated and published Arabic
versions of the complete Jewish liturgical texts. Hassoun goes as far as defining Arabophones
as misriyln, Egyptians, and Francophones as khawagât, gringos, thus involuntarily joining the
choir of voices who strip French speaking Jews of their “Egyptianness.”
Hassoun lets Rabbi Moshe Hazan plead for the profound interrelation between Jews and
Arabs:
“There is no other language on earth as pure as Arabic. It is prodigious in its
rhetoric; it abounds with expressions like precious gems. If the thoughts of the
rhetorician, as endless as the ocean waves, sweep up to the heavens and then plunge
into the depths, the words rise with them and fall in the same manner. For Arabic,
this rich and pure language, rides the waves of the rhetoricians thoughts. We will
say it: if only our long past ancestors of the East had been able to teach Arabic to
the Jews! Today we must continue to study and speak it, as what good is there in
introducing other languages into the countries of the East? The sacred language
(Hebrew), Arabic and Turkish are the essentials, any others being mere comple­
mentary or even superfluous. However ... this generation can not avoid foreign
1) Firstly, I beg your pardon for writing in Flench because my wife - Marguerita Silvers • and I, we
speak Italian, but write in French because no ooe encouragea me to learn Italian here.
2) I am a Tripolitanian, citizen of Benghazi, but alas, bom in Cairo.
3) I am registered at the Royal Consulate of Italy.
Help! Help! Help!
DearDuce!
Greatest protector of Muslims and Islam!
By force majeure, they want to take away my Italian citizenship (issued in Tripoli) together with
the original Italian citizenship of my Italian wife, Marguerita Silvers (whose mother is a citizen of
Trieste and father a citizen of Milan).
Help! Help! Help!" Ibid., p. 83.
'"ü b e n . Hassoun and Yannakakis (eds.) 1997,49.
,wUusnl 1993,213.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

55

languages . . .but, dear merchant, you cannot deny the difference that exists be­
tween the Arabic language and those of the sons of Japhet These latter, such as
French, English or Italian, are infested with abominations and bitterness which you
will not find today in Arabic.”194
Hassoun concludes that “Europeanization” had received the “green light,” with a minority
o f Jews drawing the majority, whom he sees still settled in “Hosh al-Gaan” (which literally
means the backyard of the hungry) and in “Wakalat al-Lamoun” towards Europe. Modernity
was “identified with occidentalism.”193
French was the lingua franca of all trade and commerce in the Levant. In Egypt it was the
language of the upper classes as well, who distinguished themselves from the Arabic-speaking
plebeians, and, after the British occupation, from the colonialists. In Alexandria French became
part of everyday life. The salesgirls in the big department stores in Alexandria, Sednaoui,
Chalon, Hannaux were Jewish, Italian, Armenian, Greek, Maltese.
“They all spoke French, the hub of their polyglott world. They were the very im­
age of their juniors, those students of the Christian schools whose studies scarcely
reached the certificat d’etudes... .They were part of Alexandria’s European prole­
tariat of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. To them must be accorded the
merit for having perpetuated the lingua franca - French - over generations. We
looked down on them from the giddy heights of our French lycée, our secular col­
lege. French was everywhere: store fronts, street names, advertisements. But I also
heard Greek spoken by the Egyptians of Ibrahimieh, Italian by the Armenian grocer
at Cleopatra and even the Franco-Arabic of the Shamis (Syrians) and the Copts.” 196
In politics Arabic had become a sine qua no since the revolution of 1919. Amina Rashid,
who grew up in a French speaking household, observed that the men, when they retreated to
discuss politics, talked in Arabic. Jews who engaged in Egyptian politics in leading positions
did not always possess the rhetoric skills, Arabic balUgha, based on the Koran, bestowed on
Muslim activists.197 Their Arabic language skills were more solidly based on the Arabic ver­
nacular. But tackling the language question as a matter of discourse brings us back to Makram
,**Ilbert, Hauoun and Yannakakis (eds.) 1997,42-43. Cited after Rabbi Moshe Hazan, Sheenth ha-Nahalah,
published by Ottolenghi in Alexandria in 1862.
l,5Ibid., 45.
'*Ilbert, Hassoun and Yannakakis 1997, 110. His uncle's Egyptian workers would speak to the rich cotton
merchants in Graeco-Arabic patois while the office staff spoke Arabo-Francais. There was a forbidden out of
bound territory for him that stretched from the Rue de France to the harbour. The “European” Alexandria was
his world. It was, however, Europeans and Egyptians that gathered in the evening in those restaurants and cafes.
Even before the war there was a rift in the cosmopolitan community. The Italians were interned, their property
sequestrated. Fascists, antifascists, shopkeepers, waiters, businessmen, masons found themselves in the same
internment camps. Maltese and Cypriotes were called to the British army. Greeks joined their army stationed in
the Middle East. Armenians thought about going to Soviet Armenia, and actually departed on two big ships after
the war. Palestine was discussed among Jewish students. “In the avalanche of languages, French faded without
us noticing. The hub of polyglottism cracked.” Ibid., 112. With the British Empire invading the town in all its
different shapes English became the language of the War years. “The waiter, the shoeshine boy, the arabieh driver,
the cinema cashier, the tram inspector, the landlady of the 'PENSION', the taxidriver, the shopkeeper, the barroy
boy; all began to speak the special English of Alexandria at war. At school we were more attentive in English
lemons. We were almost envious of the students at Victoria College in their British style uniforms. Hadn’t they
picked the right ticket for the future?” Ibid., 113. (See also about the English: Edwar el-Kharrat, City of Saffron,
Quartet, Loodon, 1989.)
m NagitJ for example, a textile worker and a communist activist, told me that he knew classical Arabic from the
Koran, which helped him develop rhetorical skill. Personal interview with N agltf *Abd al-MagTd, 13th December
1999.

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

56

‘Ubaid, and (be question who was entitled and able to use a discourse based on Arabic as a
sacred language. Women, who were predominantly taught in foreign schools, were excluded,
as were Copts and Jews, whether they were able to speak classical Arabic or not But concern­
ing Communists, classical Arabic was also not the tight way to address the desired public • the
Egyptian working class.19*
Knowledge of foreign languages was the precondition for social advancement It had been
the first reason for unemployment among Egyptians in economic positions. Inside the com­
munist groups, translators and people who had been in close contact with foreign culture were
needed. The impulse for change did not come from inside Egypt or did not have time to come
from inside, because Israel personified imperialism, threatening national Egyptian / Arabic /
Islamic culture. In retrospect, the threat had always been there, embodied in the Jews in the
communist movement, and in the dissemination of communist ideas (since those ideas were not
part of Egypt tradition but imported from abroad).
That the simple line of division between poor uneducated Arabophone Jews and educated
khawagât like francophone Jews did not always work is shown by the following incident:
“In December 1944, in the constituency of Sayida Zainab, a strange scene of lin­
guistic spell-binding took place. During the IshtirOkTcandidate's electoral meeting
(where a fake poll secured him seventeen votes), 'a Jewish Trotskyist, a cripple, rose
to speak eloquently in reply to an Azhari who, from the rostrum, had denounced
the presence of alien elements - Westernized minorities, foreigners and so forth • in
Egyptian society. The two men confronted one another in an Arabic of rare purity.
It became obvious, as their controversy continued, that they were communing (all
arguments forgotten) in the beauty of a language whose difficulties they mastered
so well. The audience, too, lapsed into euphoric enjoyment.’ ” IW
Jews had dreamt about becoming “White-Jewish-Europeans” because that was synonymous
with becoming civilized. Given the fact that Shaikh MarfighT, the rector of Al-Azhar, himself
considered Egyptian society to be uncivilized, and Islamic religion the only bulwark that could
dam in the riff-raff, this attitude is not surprising.200 Races and colors played an important role
under British rule and sometimes intermingled with class and status.
White as a color and white skin color have a high value in Egyptian society and are noticed.
Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot described Saad Zaghlul, for example, as
**__tall and ascetic looking, with small but piercing eyes above a distinctive, bushy
white mustache, he had an elegance of bearing that was innate and impressive__ A
man of the people, he had scrambled to the top through sheer will power. ...A dli
Yakan was totally the opposite. He was born an aristocrat but looked more like
a fallah than ZaghlQl did because he was dark skinned and had negroid features
which some attributed to a Sudanese ancestry. . . n20>
Jews were not only striving to belong to the white, i.e., European camp, but in the Egypt of
1948 were also identified as such. In “La Bourse Egyptienne” from 22nd July 1948, there was
a small but revealing notice:
'“ See also the chapter about worker*.

,wBeniue 1997,650.
“ Concerning al-Maraghl, aee: Kedourie 1970.
“ 'Lutfi 1977,53.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

57

“It would seem that most people in Egypt are unaware of the fact that among Egyp­
tian Moslems there are some who have white skin. Every time I board a tram I
see people pointing at me and saying ‘Jew, Jew’. I have been beaten more than
once because of this. For that reason I humbly beg that my picture (enclosed) be
published with an explanation that I am not Jewish, and that my name is Adham
Mustafa Galeb.”202
Among Jewish Communists there is a tendency to stress that there was a Jewish proletariat
that shared the harsh conditions of everyday Egypt with their Muslim compatriots.203 In 1939,
unemployed Jews protested in front of the community chancellery and other offices, mostly
youths, with little education.20* Not only Jews, but also poor Europeans who lived in the work­
ing class district of the so-called “Arab Alexandria” • Greeks, Maltese, and local subjects shared
the lot of the Arabs.203 But in itself poverty was not a guarantee for solidarity crossing confes­
sional and ethnic lines. Quite to the contrary, the leaders of the Jewish community in Iraq, for
example, were afraid that the Jewish lower classes, once they believed that Zionism would end
their needs and did not have to hold back anymore, would show the contempt they felt for the
Arabs.206
Apart from the Communists there were also other voices calling for a Jewish engagement
in Egypt. In 1935, René Qattawi, together with Rabbi Nahum, encouraged the formation of the
Association of Egyptian Jewish Youth, whose aim it was to promote the Arabization and Egyptianization of the community. In November 1937, the association published a manifesto entitled
“Egypt is our homeland, Arabic is our language.” They called on Jews to take part in the Egyp­
tian national renaissance. Other personalities who advocated Egyptian patriotism embodied
in the knowledge of Egyptian Jewish tradition, Hebrew as well as Arabic proficiency, loyality
towards Egypt while defending the Egyptian Jews against tyranny and repression, and encour­
aging the formation of an educated Egyptian Jewry, founded the Arabic al-Shams magazine.207
Concerning British policies, prominent Jewish representatives adopted a stand similar to that of
the Copts: they emphasized that there were neither majorities nor minorities in Egypt, and that
all were citizens of one country. Therefore, British guarantees were obsolete. Al-Shams and
the association openly sympathized with the Wafd but were faithful to the Egyptian palace.20*
Krämer emphasizes that the majority of the Jewish community in Egypt was not inclined
to be active in politics but was content to follow their own business and to recall the tradition­
ally harmonious coexistence of Jews, Copts, and Muslims, protected by King and government.
Some young Jewish lawyers had engaged in the national movement after 1919, but only Castro
and Cattaoui (the name is sometimes also given as Qattawi) gained political influence.209
"M eron 1999,92.
" L a Tribune Juive, 6th December 1939.
" L a Tribune Juive, 6th December 1939.
" ü b e n , Hassoun and Yannakakis 1997,108. See for a description of a poor Jewish pedlar’s life in Alexandria
Panait Istrati's moving account in: “Familie Perlmutter,” Fjl M. 1988.
"M asliya 1989,216-237.
"B ein in 1998,46.
"K rlm e r 1982,331.
"C attaoui even became a member of parliament and two times minister. He w as-ss was Joseph Ckurel-am ong
the founding members of the Banque M iy and he had the King’s confidence (who made him a member of the senate
from 1927 till 1938) because he was a faithful royalist Krlmer 1982,181. His wife was the first lady-in-waiting
o f Queen Nazli. Though the British embassy reported to London, in 1923, that Cattaoui, who was described as
a “French-educated local Jew” was looked upon as “more than half a foreigner.” (FO 371/10887,7.3.1923, John
Murray from the British residence after Cattoui’s dismissal as a minister.) foreigners were dominating economy,
Egyptians politics. For the 20th century Berque sees a bourgeoisie of business men growing up in Cairo and

58

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

The small group of Egyptian Jews that set out to found a communist movement in Egypt in
the late 1930s and beginning 1940s was, therefore, faced with opposition from their own com­
munity and from Egyptian society. Still, they believed what Jewish Communists everywhere in
the world believed then:
“Minorities,** read a 1946 handbill issued in the name of the “Free Jewish Youth,**
“cannot have peace of mind, nor will their social existence be secure, until the
Iraqi working class attains power this is what drives the vanguard of the conscious
Jewish youth towards the party of the toiling masses.”*210

33.6

Egypt, Palestine, and the Egyptian Jews

The Palestinian cause had troubled Egyptian public opinion since the mid 1930s, though it had
been the main concern of Islamic groups. The end of World War II brought a discussion about
the fate of Jewish refugees and the increasing hostility between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.
Now the question reached a broader stratum of society, because the political climate in Egypt
had changed and political parties, in general, had become more eager to commit themselves to
a wider Arab nationalist engagement.
Even though public opinion in Egypt, as reflected in the press, acknowledged the plight
of Jewish refugees, the concern for the Arab Palestinians occupied a prominent place. The
Egyptian public was troubled by the prospect of more Jewish immigrants to Palestine from
Europe. The bid of Jewish dignitaries in Washington to allow the immigration of 100,000
survivors of Nazi concentration camps to be settled in Palestine, was met with rejection. With
reference to the responsible British authorities, the Egyptian press doubted that those Jews really
wanted to be transferred to Palestine, and quoted British sources who claimed that Jews in the
British-occupied zones in Germany and Austria would prefer to stay there if it was guaranteed
that further persecution would not occur.
"The world will doubtlessly recognize the difference between the integration of
Jews into the people where they already live, and the Jewish nation that takes the
name of Zionism.”211
The leadership of the Egyptian community was at pains to stress that Jewish Egyptians had
been among the first to protest against the events in Palestine, even before the Second World
War. Egypt was “the head and the heart” of the Arab world, and had assumed very rational,
balanced positions since the Balfour declaration. Therefore, Jews in Egypt had been surprised
by the violent turn the protests took on the anniversary of the Balfour declaration in 1945.
The protests of 2nd and 3rd of November had been supposed to be silent protests, and all the
shops should have been closed for several hours. To be a Jew was a religious and a spiritual
question about the relation between man and his creator, while Zionism was a political dogma
that Egyptian Jews did not share. Still, during the demonstration Jewish institutions and Jewish
prayer houses were attacked. Those incidents violated the Jews’ constitutional right to follow
their creed, and to feel that their property was respected and protected.
Al-Ahram emphasized that already eight years before Nahum Effendi, the sephardic chief
rabbi in Egypt, had raised his voice to protest against the abnormal situation that was going to
Alexandria, many of them being of Jewish or Levantine origin: a few of them Muslims, but: Middle Eastern
Christians played by far the most important part, and Copts as well. Berque 1967,243.
2l0Batatu 1978,631.
2ual-Ahram, 3. 11. 1943.

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

59

develop in Palestine. Jews bad found a safe place among Muslims. It was Europeans who butt
Jews.
In a letter to the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nahum Effendi212 complained that nobody could
have imagined the harm that was inflicted upon the Jewish community in Egypt, which under­
stood itself as part of the Egyptian nation. To be part of a nation was not only the right of the
Egyptian Jews but should be the basic solution for Jews everywhere in the world. The Allies had
to find a solution for the settlement of Jewish refugees, other than Palestine which already was
too small for its inhabitants and could not receive millions of refugees. The Palestinian problem
had to be solved in mutual agreement of Jews and Arabs. This was also what Nahum Effendi
would tell an international audience. Nahum Effendi stressed that for generations the Jews had
been living among the Egyptians, and that it was only irresponsible elements who had disturbed
the peace among the people. To complete the harmony, the governor of Cairo himself visited
Nahum Effendi, expressing his regret about the damages that were caused in the incidents of
the 2nd and 3rd of November, and declared that the government would rebuild everything that
had been destroyed in the Jewish synagogues.213
In “letters to the editor,” many newspaper readers commented on the events and on Nahum
Effendi’s opinions. Most of the published letters spoke about Islam’s tolerance and condemned
the assaults as the work of the riff-raff. Michel Josef claimed to speak in the name of the cultured
Jewish youth. He condemned the Zionists and praised Egypt and the political, religious, and
economic rights Jews enjoyed.
“If every human being would claim the land of his forefathers, the Red Indians
would want America, and the blacks Africa, and the Australian aborigines Aus­
tralia, and anarchy would reign the world."
His suggestion for the Jewish refugees was a worldwide distribution, according to available
space and number of inhabitants.
Salima YQsuf Wahba, the secretary of the schools of the Jewish community in 'AbbSsiyya,
wrote that the problem in Palestine had to be solved between Jews and Arabs, without the
interference of the big states. Palestine needed a democratic government, elected by the people,
without any difference between Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Palestine was a spiritual and
cultural home for Jews. But a homeland was one thing, and the religious creed another. Jews
lived among other citizens everywhere in the world, and if there really was a need to create a
Jewish state, it should be at the cost of the superpowers that were proud to support the Jews.214
Nahum Effendi had attacked the “dirty hands” that had violated the sanctum of the Jewish
synagogues. Since Islamic groups had been involved in the demonstrations of November 1945,
Islamic dignitaries were called upon to react. In a radio broadcast the students in schools,
universities, and the religious institutes were called upon to continue their studies, and to protect
2,1Haim Nahum Effendi was the Chief Sephardic Rabbi o f Egypt from 1923 until his death in 1960. Bom
near Izmir in 1872, he received a traditional religious education at a yeahiva in Tiberias. He went to a French
Lycée and then studied Islamic Law in Constantinople. He received his ordination in Paris after attending a
rabbinical school there and simultaneously attended the Sorbonne’s School of Oriental Languages. During the
peace negotiations with the European powers following WW I he served as an advisor to the Turkish delega­
tion. Following the invitation of Moire Cattaoui Pasha, head of the Jewish community in Cairo, he became the
Chief Rabbi of Egypt (Victor D. Sarnia, Foundation for the Advancement of Sephardic Studies and Culture.)
wwwjephardic3tudies.org/baim.html
,,J al-Ahram. 9.11.1945,3.

Jl4al-Ahram. 7.11.1943,3.

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CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

the Jews and their property, because “they belong to us, and they are with us in their hostility
towards Zionism.”213 There were also other voices in the Egyptian press.
The secretary general of Al-Azhar, Shaikh Muhammad 'Abd al-Latlf D ariz, wondered why
the chief rabbi did not mention his opinion, and the opinion of the Jews in general, about the
criminal acts of Zionists in Palestine while deploring Jewish misfortune in Egypt. The head
of the Sufi orders in Egypt*216 assured the Egyptian Jews that all responsible and reasonable
people in Egypt were against such assaults, because in Egypt, and in the Arab world in general,
different religions had always cohabitated in a spirit of tolerance, and Jews had been very safe
in Egypt. Answering a declaration by Rabbi Nahum, he declared that the Egyptian Jews had
not fulfilled their obligation towards Egypt:
“... because the Arab world, and above all Egypt, had expected from you that your
Excellency and the sons of your community • you are the subjects of his Highness
the Egyptian King- stand side by side with your Egyptian compatriots, protesting
against the Balfour declaration, and against the attempt of the Zionists to commit
what does not have a parallel in history: to transport hundreds of thousands of Jews
from Europe, and to impose them with guns and bullets on Arab Palestine, the
calm one, the peaceful one, that has not perpetrated, neither Palestine nor any other
Arab nation, any misdeed against the Jews since the dawn of history. We would
have expected you and all our Egyptian Jewish compatriots to stand with us with
courage and faith in this terrible situation, and to acknowledge the good deeds of
the Arabs, together with the sons of your community in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon,
and we would have wished to hear from you that loud cry on every morning that the
sun rises for us, and the terrible crimes of the Zionists are committed in Palestine.
Those are not riff-raff but organized groups, a general staff of big intellectuals.”217
It was Europe that committed crimes against Jews, and the Egyptian Jews should have urged
the Allies to bring the survivors back home and give them compensation. The Shaikh blamed
Rabbi Nahum because he did not forbid the Zionist flag to fly in synagogues, clubs, and cafes,
and on the occasion of parties and holidays. This behavior provoked a violent answer because
it did not respect Egypt, its laws, and its emotions.
“We were expecting that from you, and we still hope that it might be realized,
... for Egypt and the Egyptians among our Jewish compatriots, for the brotherhood
to remain, and the trust and the mutual respect between all the communities in
Egypt.”218
Jews should try to find a place under Arab protection. That was the continuation of the tra­
ditional relation between the Muslim emperor and the Jewish dhimmï. Egyptian voices argued
that Jews were trying to rely on western friends, who had always betrayed them. They were
an eastern people, relatives of the Arabs, and endowed with an eastern spirit. The inhabitants
of the Near East, the people of the three religions, were the only ones who would be able to
start a new effort to save the world, while Zionist action in Palestine parallelled fascist action in
Germany. Zionists had become racists.219
2,5The Shaikh of ma'had al-llm , al-Ahram, 9.11.1945.
2l6Shaikh Mashaiyakh al-turuq al-sOfiyya.
I,7al-Ahram, 6.11.1945.3.
2l8al-Ahram, 6.11.1945,3.
2l9al-Ahram, 4.11.1945,5. 'Abd al-Mun'am Khallaf in an article titled “Jews of the East we want your voice.”

3.3. MINORITIES: JEWS

61

That Jews in Egypt were an eastern people is an opinion that is completely absent from
die discourse about Jews in the Egyptian communist movement. In that discourse Jews have
become completely identified with their “western friends.“
In 1945, not only the Islamic groups, but also the Women’s Union and university students
had declared their solidarity with the Palestinian demands, such as the abolition of the Balfour
declaration, a stop to Jewish emigration and land sales, Jewish disarmament, the dissolution of
Jewish military organizations, and the release of all Arab chiefs.
In the period shortly before the war in 1948, the government and the opposition press were
full o f articles about Palestine. The Arabs were allegedly fighting 16 million Jews.230 But the
Wafdist press was again also eager to point its finger at Zionists in Egypt. It made scathing
comments about the ignorance and the passivity of the Egyptian government regarding Zionist
activities in Egypt Under the camouflage of sport activities, Zionists advertised emigration to
Palestine. Posters preached Jewish nationalism and Zionism.
"Those who support this club, and supervise its politics in the service of the Zionist
wishes, are all rich Jews, who became rich on the blood of the Egyptians (istinzif
dam al-misriyTn), and because they sided with the English colonialists and struggled
against the national movement and democracy.”*221
Jewish nationalism and Zionism were rejected. But Jews were also portrayed in a way that
would make their future in Egypt a risky project: they were antinational, antidemocratic, proBritish, and • worse than exploiters • parasites. The rich Jews “... whom the Egyptian people
know, dress in Egyptian gallabiyya and preach nationalism, while indeed they are not doing
anything else, but bleeding Egypt white with their companies, and their factories, and their
stores, and their money loads, which they invest in land, and transfer abroad, siding with the
English colonialists in the war against our just national cause. . . ”
Zionists did not respect Egyptian law, and even attacked Egyptian Jews who realized “... that
Egypt has a right to demand from them, and that justice demands from them, loyalty towards
Egypt and its cause, which includes, among other things, the demand not to adhere to Zion­
ism.”222
National newspapers complained that there was a Zionist press in Egypt that fuelled fear
among minorities. That press made foreigners afraid of the Egyptian democratic national move­
ment by presenting it as an extremist and xenophobic movement, though that movement was
only striving for independence and liberation, and did not fight anybody except the enemies of
the homeland. Palestinians also struggled for independence and democracy, while the Zionists’
aim was the colonization of the people for the sake of a handful of rich Jews and refugees.223
There was not only a tendency to play down attacks orchestrated by the Muslim Brothers, or
other Islamist organizations, against Jewish property by alluding to Zionist atrocities in Pales­
tine, but even assaults that took place in Egypt were blamed on Zionists.224 The claim of Zionist
involvement in Egyptian bombings, however, was difficult to uphold. In a speech to university
students at the end of 1948, Prime Minister NuqrfishI complained that there were about 17,000
university students in Cairo alone, and they should not spend their time throwing bombs, but
“ Suit al-umma, 31.7.1946.
221Saut al-umma. 20.4.1947,3. “AukSr al-sahyflniyya ft Misr” (The Zionists’ den in Egypt).
“ According to Saida Husnf Jews dominated the Egyptian press because they had a monopoly on paper, they
owned the important publishing houses and governed the advertising market. Husnl 1993, 143. Among those
newspapers were the Egyptian Gazette and the Egyptian Mail.
“ Saut al-umma, 24.4.1947.
^al-M isrt, 29.7.1948.

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CHAPTERS. MINORITIES

were supposed to work to be the future generation.229 The home-made character o f bomb ex­
plosions became even more evident when an arms cache was found in Cairo that contained 350
bombs and 3 MGs, and the secret apparatus of the Muslim Brothers became known.

3 J .7

Zionists and Communists

Like the British, the Egyptian public of the 1940s had some difficulties to differentiate between
Zionists and Communists.225226*
In 1946 Egyptian newspapers had reported extensively on the first big communist case (ofqadiyya al-shuytfiyya al-kubra).221 None of the 69 accused admitted to propagating commu­
nism, but all agreed upon the fact that Egypt was not ready for communism. Several magazines
and newspapers took the opportunity to slander the movement by pointing out that ‘T h e com­
munist chief in Egypt” was “a Jewish millionaire.”228
Therefore, the Egyptian public was prepared when shortly before the outbreak of the war in
1948, the communist threat in Palestine became an issue for the Egyptian press. The association
between Jews, communism and Zionism was quite simple, even if it led to astonishing results.
Under the headline “The Jews adopt communism and they fight America. In Tel Aviv their
leader confesses their ambitions, their murderous crimes and assaults” the leader of the Stem
gang was quoted concerning connections to Russia, which he considered to be the natural ally
of Palestine. Arab states should not be concerned with Israel, because all Palestine was going
to be liberated from “foreign” domination. First, all of Palestine and the left bank of the Jordan
river were to be liberated, followed by the liberation of all the people in the Middle E ast The
Middle East was going to be a neutral bloc, liberated from foreign imperialism, meaning British
imperialism and “the imperialism of some financial elements who govern the United States.”
The Stem gang, the journalist concluded, had a genuinely communist program that was very
close to the system in the Soviet Union.229
225al-Abram, 14.12. 1948,7.
226Tzur 1999,103-131.
^ S a u t al-umma, 26.7. 1946, 2. Among the accused were: Nu(m in 'AshOr, Raymond Douek, Isfim al-Dfn
HifhT Nfisif, Gamfil al-Dfn GhfiB, Fathl Ahmad al-Maghribf, Ahmad Shukif, AbO Hasan O dallah al-Mufif, Sa'd
Allah Hasan SuUmAn, Mustafa Kfimil Muntb, 'Abd al-Rahmln Al-SharqlwT, Basil! AfinkO, Dr. Sa'd 'A bd alMuHI Khayyfil, Dr. Rahman 'Abd al-Hamld MandQr, Anwar Kfimil, AbQ Bakr NQr al-Dfn, Henri Curiel, 'A bda
Dahab Husain, Ahmad Rushdl ÇAlih, S aid Halim, Muhammad Fathl Al-RamU, $fidiq Sa'd famous as Isaak, TJmar
Rushdl, and Sa'd Zaghlfll Fu*9d. (Fbr details see: Amin 19%, particularly the foreword by SaTd Khayyfil.)
^ S a u t al-umma, 26.7. 1946,2. On page 3 of the same newspaper Dr. MandQr files a complaint against Akhbnr
al-Yaum and demands a compensation of 20 000 LJL because 'AB and Mustafa Amin published an article in
Akhbar al-Yaum on 13th July 1946, No. 88, under the headline T h e Communist chief in Egypt ...a Jewish
millionaire.**
^A l-M isrl, 19.8.1948,1, the main article on the page. Avraham Stern had founded a breakaway Irgun in Israel,
which was also known as the Stem Gang. Initially he had hoped to make contact with Mussolini in order to set up
a Jewish state in Palestine, and later turned to Nazi Germany. Stem was caught and killed by the British in 1942.
His most prominent follower was Yitzhak Shamir. The roots of the Stem Gang lay in the 1930s revisionist Zionist
countermovement led by Zeev Jabotinsky. Stem’s heirs considered Arabs, like Jews, victims of imperialism. They
called their group “Lehi” and imagined that Stalin would help them set up an independent, but pro-Moscow stale.
They were, however, disappointed once more. When the state of Israel had come into being, Lehi denounced
mainstream Zionism as imperialism in another costume. Palestinians remembered the Stem gang for the massacre
of Deir Yassin, which is said to have been the “target of two gangs that wanted to prove themselves,** the Irgun and
the Stem Gang with Begin and Shamir as leaders. See for further information: Deir Yassin remembered. Number
84, 26 September 2001, www.palestinecenter.org; Joseph Heller, The Stem Gang, London, 19%; Lenni Brenner,
The Iron Wall, London, 1984 (195-97, Grundzüge des Vorschlags der Nationalen Militärischen Organisation in
Palfistina (Irgun Zewai Leumi) betreffend der Lösung der jüdischen Frage Europas und der aktiven IfcUnahme der
N.M.O. am Kriege an der Seite Deutschlands (1941)).

3.4. FOREIGNERS

63

News about Jews disappearing from camps in the British occupied zone230 were mixed with
announcements that the communist states in Europe sent their diplomatic missions to Palestine,
and made their Jews sneak from Bulgaria to Palestine. The Wafdist press assumed that Palestine
would be turned into a major center for communism in the Middle East. Those news were mixed
w ith Ben Gurion’s announcement that Jews had not gone to war to accept the same borders after
victory which had been drawn in the UN partition plan. Ten million Jews would emigrate to
Israel. Egyptians felt particularly offended by Gurion, because he compared the Jewish message
to the role of the Greeks for human civilization, while the news reaching Cairo revealed their
uncivilized behavior.231 They did not keep the truce, they betrayed the observers, they smuggled
arm s, and robbed Palestinian towns, even hospitals. Cheap booklets were published about “Our
army in Palestine” and news in Palestine.
The “Bolshevization” of Palestine was of major concern to the whole Arab region. In an
interview, the Lebanese prime minister, Riyld al-Sulh, declared that the Communists worked to
bolsbevize Palestine. The large number of Jewish refugees in all the Arab states would lead to
the spread of communism in the Middle E ast There was intense contact between many Jewish
groups in Tel Aviv and the Soviet Bloc, and the communist centers in Palestine worked to bring
the Middle East under Soviet domination.232
In the years leading up to and after the Second World War, communism had experienced a
revival in Egypt Public opinion in the years between 1945 and 1948 may serve as a background
to the discourse about the communist movement that developed in those years, and that many of
the later activists became involved in during that time. The clashes between different fractions,
the inclusion and exclusion of foreigners, or so-called foreigners, the role of Jews, internation­
alism versus nationalism were all issues that came up in that short period, and the repercussions
have lingered on until present time.
One of the conditions of belonging to the national community in Egypt became very clear
during those years, i.e. the denial of Israel’s right to exist.

3.4 Foreigners
The traditional Egyptian perspective of the relation between Egyptians and foreigners is based
on the assumption that Egyptians displayed particular hospitality to foreign communities, and
that Islam compares favorably to Christianity concerning tolerance. Egyptians of all social
strata are said to have been friendly, treating foreigners with real Arabic generosity, which was
not repaid. The number of foreign residents in Egypt, and even more so, the percentage of Jews
among them, is a matter of discussion. Foreign nationals often considered themselves Egyptian
even though they were carrying a different nationality. The passport matter was certainly only
the outward layer of a far more complicated issue touching on people’s identity. Could some­
body speak French, play tennis, have his wife wear a bikini at the beach, and still feel at home
in Egypt? Were these not all very un-Egyptian activities?
The discussion seems familiar. In western Europe Muslim immigrants are facing similiar
questions. It is a discussion that concerns the question of immigration and integration. How
long does it take for immigrants to be accepted by the indigenous population?
If we consider Copts the indigenous population in Egypt and Muslims the immigrants, we
can deduct that coexistence has remained precarious even after 13 centuries of common expe­
^ t l Misrt, 18.8.1948.7.
“ '«1-Misit. 15.8.1948.
“ •l-M iwt. 29.8.1948; al-Ahram 7.11.1948;al-M isrf, 29.8.1948.

64

CHAPTERS. MINORITIES

rience. The Egyptian assessment of the position of the Greek community in Egypt shows that
not only Jews were judged negatively.
The Egyptian complaint that European influx into Egypt was accompanied by the immigra­
tion of tens of thousands of “the worst European elements” seems quite familiar. Egypt suffered
from that “violent push towards the West” Greeks, Jews, and Italians played an important pw t
in this development233 Already in the Ottoman Empire Greeks had held a predominant posi­
tion. As early as towards the end of the 18th century, Muslims had lost their dominant position
over the inhabitants of the Empire and witnessed a Christian take over. Greeks, Armenians
and Levantines ran commercial operations in the shadow of consular protection.234 The Greeks
who arrived in 19th century Egypt were not affluent merchants, but havenots who were eager to
learn. They would start off doing any job, lean a profession or acquire special skills, and then
turn to business.
Egyptians agree that the Greeks adapted best to Egyptian conditions. Greeks managed to
arrive even in the remotest villages as owners of cafes and bars, m âchants and moneylenders.
They were also the biggest single foreign community in Egypt The Greek population peaked
in 1927, with 76,264 Greeks, 57,000 of them in Cairo and Alexandria alone. In 1947, Greeks
in Egypt still numbered 57,467.235
Ra’Qf 'Abbäs, a renowned Egyptian historian, whom we have met already and will meet
again as a critic of Jewish Communists, has a clear stand concerning foreigners resident in
Egypt
“There were the foreign upper classes Henri Curiel belonged to. But there was also
another kind of foreigners, shop owners, workers, and craftsmen. They had their
own workshops. Those did not have a problem with the Egyptians. The Italian
workers came and worked here, because there were the privileges for foreigners and
they had a better position. There were khawagät craftsmen in quarters like Shubra,
mechanics, carpenters, tailors, and they did not have any problems, because they
had their community, their clubs, where they could live their own social and cultural
life, they did not feel alienated. There was some contact to Egyptians as far as work
was concerned, but no social relations, no marriages or something like that, or very
few. And you can’t blame the Islamic sh a rf’a as the borderline that hindered the
mixing of foreigners and Egyptians. The foreigners themselves did not want to mix
with the Egyptians, because they considered themselves superior to the Egyptians.
The initiative had to be the foreigners’. The choice of integration had to be theirs.
They were the ones who were privileged, even if their social position was less. I
will give you a vivid example: I am from Shubra. Shubra has two main streets,
Shubra street and al-Tiria al-Buläqiyya street Foreigners were to be found in the
vicinity of the main street. They were the tenants of the buildings on the street
The working class tenants lived in al-'Attar street a small alley. They occupied two
blocks only, all the khawagät who were working in the cigarette factories. On the
rest of the street were Egyptians. You would find al-'Attar street paved until the
end of those two blocks, and then the dust would start Down the street there were
workers living as well, but Egyptians, from the countryside. The light of the gas
lamps reached till the end of the paved stretch, and behind it darkness reigned. That
U3'AshmiwT 1997, 29. Until the late 19th century Jews were not perceived as westerners, but as easterners,
together with Armenians, Turks and Levantines, a tradition reaching back to the Ottoman empire.
2,4Ibid., 31.
235Ibid.

3.4. FOREIGNERS

65

shows the difference between foreigners and Egyptians. Even if they were paupers,
there would be a difference. The beggar wandering around with his pianola was
different from the Egyptian beggar.236 In Shubra street, for example, you could
find behind and adjacent to al-Tauffqiyya school the streets with the Italians and
the Greeks. In Shubra street there were four butchers selling pork. One of those
shops is still there, nowadays it belongs to an Egyptian Copt, who inherited it from
the khawaga Murqus. There is a big sign saying ‘All our products are made of
pork.’ Until now, in Shubra. And around Christmas, all the grocers would write
congratulations in French on their shop windows, and there would be Santa Claus
in the shop window, and we would watch that khawaga in the shop window. The
intiative for integration, therefore, should have come from the foreigners.”237
The speaker makes a clear assumption as to what is Egyptian and what is not. Pork and
Christm as are utterly un-Egyptian, though they are stable ingredients of a Copt’s life. Egypt,
in the historian’s view, is a Muslim country where neither pork nor Santa Claus should be
displayed in public.
In 1942/43, Arabic became obligatory for correspondence in companies and for bookkeep­
ing. This was a measure to create more jobs for Egyptians. In 1947, a law was passed, providing
that 73% of the employees, 90% of the workers, and 31% of the capital in stockholding com­
panies had to be Egyptian. To document the Egyptian take-over of state and economy, streets
were made to look more Egyptian: from 1946 onwards, all company signs had to be in Arabic.
Charles Issawi was an eyewitness to the changes which took place in the 1940s. For him,
the term “foreign communities” also covered “unassimilated foreigners of Egyptian citizen­
ship.” According to Issawi, those foreign communities, including Egyptian nationals and nonEgyptian nationals, owned one tenth of the land and a great part of the country’s industrial and
commercial capital. Foreigners were accused of the pursuit of anti-social activities, like drug
trade, with which the government could not interfere, owing to consular protection. Islam, as
Issawi pointed out, did not know racial discrimination among Muslims, therefore Tunisian, Syr­
ian or African Muslims would need only a few years to meld with Egyptian society. But since
intermarriage with the Muslim population was not allowed for non-Muslims, and because the
foreigners would not mix with the Copts for - according to Issawi • racial and cultural consider­
ations -, they could live in the country for 10 generations without any sign of integration. They
kept to themselves, in closed clubs and social circles. The majority of Jews, however, were of
Egyptian origin, Issawi believed. They were not resented, because they did not compete with
Egyptians for government jobs, which most Egyptians still considered the secure outcome of
education. And Jewish usurers confined their activity to the upper classes.23*
Great pressure, he wrote in 1947, was put on the heads of business houses to employ a larger
proportion of Egyptians, meaning Muslims or, to a lesser extent, Copts.
“Naturalized foreigners, bom in Egypt or resident there since their childhood, find
great difficulties in getting their passports renewed, while foreign residents who
leave the country are often unable to return. A bill has been introduced into Parlia­
ment, forbidding foreigners to own land.”239*07
“ »There is a good description in Panait Istrati’s '‘Familie Perlmutter,” Fjl M. 1988 about Jewish pedlars.
07 Personal interview with RaU f'A bbls. Cairo 17th November 1999.
131Issawi 1947,162-166. That was Issawi’s view in 1947, almost an eyewitness.
“ »Ibid.. 162.

66

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES

Issawi concluded that the process of adaptation would not be easy for the victims. In 1947
he obviously did not expect that, instead of adaptation, a complete exodus would be the fate that
awaited the “unassimilated” minorities.
An increasing number of foreigners applied for Egyptian citizenship. In 1947,13,102 new
Egyptian citizens were counted, among them 4,773 of Greek origin.240 Egyptian public opinion
was split in its attitude towards those new compatriots. Two articles from Saut al-umma, one of
the Wafdist newspapers, reflect the atmosphere:241
“The following contribution reached us from the respectable deputy Jalfil Husain:
‘...I t was Mustafa Nahhas Pasha who told the foreigners after Montreux: ‘If you
were foreigners originally you have become one of us by your own will. And some
of you were bom (here), and some of you have their beloved here, and they were
buried in Egyptian soil after they had lived a safe and happy life in Egypt. The
real memories of some of you, which are embodied in literary and spiritual wealth,
connect you so strongly to Egyptian soil that you have become an inseparable part
of i t You exchange Egypt love for love. And the blessed Egyptian earth spreads
friendship, a friendship that is the basis for the continuation of our relations.’ ’ ”
“... and 'UthmSn Muharram Pasha, the deputy prime minister, declared that *... we
have to strive not to shake the trust of the big capital that is invested in our country

Muhammad Mandflr, a well-known Wafdist intellectual and lawyer, commented on the same
page:
“The agreement of Montreux stipulates that foreigners do not receive a special treat­
ment in our homeland, differentiating between them and the Egyptians, if Egptian
law or international law does not prescribe th at And the agreement stresses that the
various legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt are guarded by Egypt, and that
they are not in danger, as long as foreigners enjoy the guarantees of international
agreements. Therefore we do not understand what makes them nowadays demand
agreements about residence rights, and we also do not understand what they want
beyond those guarantees, because they know that the best guarantee they can have
is what they get from the true oriental friendship and the just cooperation of those
with whom they share one homeland. But since parliament consented to the project
o f the regulation of business management that was suggested by 'Atta Bek 'Afifi
and since the foreigners knew that this law demands that 73% of the employees
and 90% of the workers in the companies have to be Egyptians they are revolting
against the law, and the British embassy from behind them. When they felt that the
project needed the consent of the senate, because of the strong interest the Egyptian
public had in it, they unfortunately tried to force the government to stop the law,
and even to pass a new law that would facilitate the naturalization of non-Egyptians.
This was done in order to turn all the employees and the foreign workers who, at
the time, were working in the companies, into Egyptians. Then those companies
^ A sh m iw I 1997, 23. This number should be correct for the foreigners who gained Egyptian citizenship in
the period between 1937 and 1947, though 'AshmlwT does not say so explicitly. There is a disparity with the
number Gudnin Krilmer gives us. She claims that between 1929 and 1949 only 388 foreigners received Egyptian
citizenship. Krilmer 1982,80.
M,$aut al-Umma, 26.4.1947,3.

3.4. FOREIGNERS

67

would not use Egyptians apart from them ... .The Wafd is not against foreigners.
...B u t the Wafd and the newspaper are with Egyptians. ...A n d there are many
countries, like Ttorkey or Iraq, or others in Europe or America, where foreigners
are not allowed to own land, and in spite of that, in Egypt this is allowed for all
the foreigners. No country in the world permits non-citizens to work, except with
a special permission from the labor ministry. An Egyptian cannot work as a physi­
cian or a lawyer in England or in France. And if today Egypt says that there has to
be a system of identity cards, for example, that is not directed against foreigners.”
Foreign capital was welcome, but foreign employees were not. Therefore, the Wafd’s left
wing was against a swift naturalization of foreign citizens.
In 1950, Subhf Wahlda published a book about the foundations of Egyptian history and
economy, and the way from foreign occupation to independence.242 The book was praised as a
thorough research of the history of the “Egyptian question,” combining sociological, economic,
and ideological aspects, and looking into the meaning of certain events and developments more
than into the names of kings and sultans.
Wahlda also looked at the influence of Europeans in E gypt243 For him, there were two kinds
of foreigners in Egypt
The real westerners, most of them businessmen, who had come to stay in Egypt for different
periods of time to invest money. They either left the country once more, or settled down but
stayed connected to their homelands. The others were immigrants who had come to Egypt from
the Mediterranean countries and some parts of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. They
bad kept their foreign passports to enjoy the rights they gave them. That second fraction was
much bigger than the first It was neither Egyptian nor foreign but the fruit of the extraordinary
relationship that had existed between the Ottoman Empire and the Christian states in the Islamic
E ast Those were people who had lived in that empire under the protection of western powers.
They were not subject to any direct authority, neither to a local government nor to any other
government That special situation
“.. .developed in those individuals the traits we are now criticizing in the foreigners
who settled with us. They defy public order, they engage in materialist interests,
and they do not share with the country’s people (ahl al-bilSd) their national ordeal.
That group does not aspire to residence outside Egypt, neither do their governments
take special care of them, though at a certain time they did, as a means of exerting
influence. And in any case, that group is more influenced than the first one by the
nature of the country.”244
Since the number of foreigners in Egypt was relatively small, Wahlda did not believe that
they could do political harm to the country. The Egyptian state had regained control over leg­
islation and finances, and aimed at a wider opening of the economy for Egyptians, though the
minorities in Egypt behaved the same way minorities in any other country did, and preferred to
coordinate their activities among themselves, instead of reaching out to their fellow Egyptians.*
***Wahid* 1990, new revised issue, without dale.
^ H e presented a statistic - then the most recent statistic, and since the book was published in 1950, it is probably
from 1949 • that gives 186,515 as a number including all foreigners in Egypt The Greeks were a majority with
68,559, followed by Italians (48,706), British (31,523) and French (18,821). Turks were 3,201, Syrians 1,931
and other nationalities 14,774. Those other nationalities include Germans, Americans, Spaniards etc. Jews are
not indicated separately, but British, French and Italians are listed according to their origins, and the author finds
among them 5356 Egyptians.

^IbitL , 348.

68

CHAPTER 3. MINORITIES
“Though the majority of those foreigners, as we have seen, consists of settlers who
do not have a certain citizenship, we do not think that we will expel them from
our country one day, or deprive them of the right to work in it, especially since
a considerable part of them are orientals, or immigrants from oriental countries.
The eventual result of such a policy will be that we close Egypt’s door to the real
westerners, and strengthen the position of those settlers - at least in the beginning
• until the real Egyptian elements will have gained the experience they are lacking
now. Our modem economy can doubtlessly do without the western or the western­
ized oriental secretary (kätib) or the accountant, or the translator, without exposing
its essence to great danger, even if the Egyptian who replaces him is less experi­
enced. But it cannot do without the western technicians that it tries to bring in from
abroad.”245

Among the foreigners or westerners mentioned in Wahtda’s publication were the Jews re­
siding in Egypt. Though his book was published after the first Palestinian war in 1948, Wahfda
did not single them o u t This is all the more astonishing since the properties he ascribes to the
second group of immigrants belong to the standard image of Jews in Egyptian literature.
In Egyptian literature, the image of the English had already suffered from the Dinshawai
incident at the beginning of the 20th century. In a novel treating the incident the British were
portrayed as convinced of their nation’s honor and full of cynical disgust for the population o f
the country. English justice did not exist for the peasants.246 Still, the British were not held
collectively responsible, nor were the Egyptians glorified. On the contrary. Two thirds of the
accused peasants appeared in court, because their evil neighbors denounced them, and the worst
of them all was the public prosecutor who wavered between patriotism and his career.
Wieland underlines the moral standing of the author, who deals with the whole incident
in an attempt to describe the human dimension of the tragedy afflicting Egyptians and British
alike, since human dignity had been hurt.247 With the British occupation of Egypt, Egyptian
awareness of the danger Europeans might constitute for them grew, but they still believed in a
common good and a mutual agreement on basic human values. British colonial rule in Egypt
was criticized, and acts of injustice considered singular.
Between the two World Wars a change took place, and more and more authors voiced the
idea that there was no common ground between Europeans and Middle Easterners, and, there­
fore, close personal contact with Europeans was not advisable. The ill-fated “mixed” marriage
between an Egyptian man and a European woman became a frequent subject. In the 1930s
and early 1940s, European moral inferiority developed into a truism. Europeans were not only
materialists and egotists, but also cruel. This negative view of Europeans became even stronger
during the struggle for independence after WW II.
According to Wieland, the Arab image of Europeans is characterized by the so-called eman­
cipation of their women, which receives a negative rating and becomes something like a mania
after World War II, with Egyptian male potency as its mirror image. In the literature that was
^ Ib id ., 348. Wahfda goes on to argue that it is not advisable to invite technicians or experts for a short period
of time only, because the experts would not come and younger people would be detened by the prospect that they
were to be employed for a short period of time only and then their job went to Egyptians. Therefore they would
probably neglect their job or be unwilling to work at all. The scientific colleges in Egypt could not yet produce
the professionals needed in commerce and industry. The few foreign technicians needed would not really compete
with Egyptian nationals.
^ ‘AdhrS’ Dinshaway by Muhammad Jlh ir Haqql (1884-1964). the uncle of Yahya Haqql. published 1906 as a
serial in the magazine al-MinbSr, 1964 as a book in Cairo.
147Wieland 1980,194-200; 648-649.

3.4. FOREIGNERS

69

published after World War II, the stupidity of Europeans and their presumption appeared to
contradict their wish for power and feeling of superiority. Their ignorance was most obvious in
the fact that they did not speak Arabic. In modem Arabic literature and theater, the public was
extraordinarily often reminded of the fact that Europeans either did not know how to pronounce
Arabic correctly, or if they knew how, they could not manage to to do so. That became a source
of endless jokes. Even in serious stories the European hems and heroines appear unable to
master the Arabic language.24*
For Arabs, the Arabic language has (and had) a high value, because of its sacred character,
and because the degree of education was expressed by the degree of mastering the classical
Arabic language in letter and word. The European, who continuously makes mistakes in pro­
nunciation and grammar, appears inferior, his intellectual capacities are diminished.
In the discourse about Egyptian Communists the prejudices against foreigners, or Egyptians
perceived as foreigners, become very obvious and are centered around the ability or lack of
ability to speak Arabic. The lack of language skills adds to the “alien” lifestyle, putting into
question the right to political participation in general, and the right to leadership in particular.

Chapter 4
Jewish Communists I
4.1

The Communist Movement and the First Communist
Party

In the account of the main historian of the Egyptian communist movement, R ifat AI-SaTd,
foreigners had, since the beginning of the 20th century, become politically active in Egypt
and been sympathetic towards Egyptian national aspirations.1 Shortly after the revolution in
Egypt, and due to the international situation after World War I, an atmosphere of revolt was
found everywhere, weakening the British position in Egypt.2 The foreign communities in Egypt
had been able and permitted to voice their opposition to political decisions, and to mobilize
supporters already much earlier. The example of demonstrations by workers from different
nationalities (Italians, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews), as well as people working in the stock
exchange, singing the Marseillaise and attacking the Russian consulate with eggs and onions
on the occasion of the forced deportation of three alleged Russian revolutionaries from Egypt
in 1907, shows that the two big cities in Egypt had become a stage for international political
developments.3 Foreign workers in Egypt, like the Italians, had founded educational institutions
and clubs, which also could be interpreted as a sign that Egypt had become the center of their
lives, that they were putting down roots there, even if they still referred to Italy as their homeland
and maintained strong relations with it. The socialist Italian “Free People’s University" had,
apart from Italians, also Egyptian, Greek, and Armenian members in its administrative council.4
The discourse about the communist movement in the 1920s and the discourse about the sec­
ond wave of communism in the 1940s show several parallels in so far as in both cases an effort
is made to diminish the role of "foreigners,” specifically Jews, in the movement, and to repre­
sent it as an originally Egyptian movement. The Palestinian cause already plays a part, because
of party contacts, a power conflict between Egyptian and Palestinian (Jewish)Communists con­
cerning the predominant position in the Middle East, and the perceived influence of Jews in
international communist bodies.
It was difficult for Communists to gain a lead in the Egyptian labor movement, because
national liberation was high on the labor leaders’ agenda. Even more so, because in the early
'H e mentions Theodor Rosenstein, a man who worked with the National Party (al-Hizb al-Watanl) and its
English paper "The Egyptian Standard.” He answered Cromer’s book about Egypt (Building Modem Egypt) with
a book of his own (The Destruction of Egypt, 1910) and cooperated with William Blunt in the magazine "Egypt”
that was forbidden in Egypt. AI-SaTd 1987,195.
2About the situation that led to the revolution and afterwards, see: Kedourie 1970.
’al-Mu'aiyyad, 21.1.1907.
4Le Phare d’Alexandrie, courtesy o f R ifat AI-SaTd.

71

72

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I

1920s any political activity competing with the Wafd was suspected of being as disruptive to
national aspirations.3*The leadership of the nationalist movement was firmly in Wafdist hands,
a political force so rooted in all layers of Egyptian society and identified with the struggle for
national liberation that Communists could not compete with i t An effort to unite labor unions
under one - socialist - roof resulted only in the organization of a small part of the labor force in
1921.
The first Egyptian Communist Party lasted only a few years. Founded in 1921 as the Egyp­
tian Socialist Party, it received Comintern membership and became the Communist Party of
Egypt towards the beginning of 1923. After a wave of strikes in the first months of 1924, the
Wafd’s great man, Saad Zaghlul, once restored to power, swiftly moved to curb unrest and out­
law the Communist Party. The Wafd was worried about the socialists and cautious not to get
involved, because contacts with Bolshevists or Germans could have harmed its reputation in the
negotiations with the British in 1919.6
In the Egyptian press the Wafd branded Communists as foreigners who did not act on behalf
of the Egyptian workers but rather extracted their money, pretending to improve the workers*
lo t If they had been real reformers, they would have tried to heal their own countries’ woes
first Instead, they had inflicted ruin on their own countries and then run away to others, to
complete their work of destruction.7*Communism as the work of sinister Bolshevist agents was
thus an idea the British, the monarchy, and the most popular party in Egypt could and would
agree on for three decades, and other forces would join to uphold this idea even longer. Most
foreign studies about Communists in Egypt support this view. Laqueur is particularly negative
about Egyptian Communists. Based upon “independent reports,“ he claims that the party never
had more than a few hundred members, of whom 80 to 90% were foreigners. Only during
WW II communist groups had gradually become Egyptianized.* Beinin and Lockman have
put emphasis on the argument that “radical ideas and die call for a united and militant working
class might have appealed to some Egyptian workers,“ but the “communist movement’s abstract
internationalism held little attraction in a semi-colonial situation.” Militant Egyptian unions
kept clear of “radicals.“9 It has been maintained that few of the party members spoke or wrote
Arabic, and even fewer knew how to establish relations with workers, who were assessed as
mere peasants coming for seasonal jobs to the city.10
The Egyptian working class is characterized as small, poor, illiterate, and of peasant origin,
therefore it was difficult for Communists to secure a base among them.
“The fact that many of the communist activists were foreigners did not help either.
5<Isim al-DIn HifnI N lsif contradicts th ii and claims that in the aftermath of the revolution of 1919 there was tn
impetus to found new puties. (Ts&m al-DIn HifnI N lsif, interview 30.9.1968 with R ifat Al-SaTd, 1987,321-326.)
Al-SaTd himself claims that in the beginning 1920s the political climate was not in favor of new parties because
there were already splits in the Wafd, and new parties were accused of harming national unity. Apart from that, the
fear was stirred that the British would take a socialist party in Egypt as a pretext not to leave. Ibid., 219.
t Anls 1963,21. This simplistic interpretation is contradicted by Balatu’s findings wbo claims that the Bolshe­
viks had been ready to support the historical Wafd that went to Europe in 1919, not only ideologically, but also
financially and with arms. What also helped was the explosive situation in 1919 in Egypt itself, and that Enver
Muhammad Husain and the Dirks had allied themselves with the Bolsheviks. Baum stresses that the Egyptians
regarded those as “true and honest Muslims.** Based on British reports be describes the coffee bouse atmosphere as
in favor of the Communists who would support the poor against the rich. He claims that the Egyptian Communist
Fatty wanted to abolish private ownership of land and set up rural soviets. Baum 1978,378-379.
7La Bourse Egyptienne, 4.3.1924.
'Laqueur 1936,31-62.
'B einin and l-ockman 1988, 132. Most o f the 3,000 members of the OGT were, according to Beinin and
Lockman, foreign workers in Alexandria in 1921. Ibd., 139.
'"Laqueur, 1939,29.

4.1. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

73

Even with the best of intentions it was not easy for foreigners who enjoyed a priv­
ileged status to overcome barriers of ethnicity, language, religion, and culture, and
establish close ties with Egyptian workers. The educated Egyptians who joined the
Communist Party were far removed from the indigenous masses and too oriented
toward Europe (particularly toward Moscow) to really analyze and understand their
own society, and develop a program suited to Egyptian realities.”11
Others claim that the party never melded into a cohesive oiganization, that the Alexandrian
branch was “made up predominantly of the more marginal nationalities • Italians, Greeks, Ar­
menians, and Jews” [The reader is left to wonder what the more prominent nationalities - apart
from the Egyptians- might have been. I.S.] that “attracted foreigners, both at the leadership and
rank and file levels, while the Cairo branch was in Egyptian hands.”12 Egyptian intellectuals are
generally described as more moderate, compared to radical foreigners like Rosenthal, and the
Greeks Skouphopoulos and Yannakakis. Greek, Jewish, and other foreign radicals are presented
as activists who wanted to follow the ideal of Bolshevik revolution at any price, and blindly be­
lieved in the new Communist International.13 The Egyptian side emphasizes the indigenous
character of the first Egyptian Communist Party.14

u Beinin and Lockman 1988.153.
l2BoCman 1984.109-122. Salma Botman, however, does not prove any of her claims, and though she cites R ifat
A l-Sald as one of her sources she does not critically review his findings in the light of her own interpretation which
is obviously mainly based oo other sources and estimations among them Mona Hammam 1977. Also: Marius Deeb
1979.
l3Beinin and Lockman 1988,141.
l4Al-Sa<Td 1987, 308-310. Again, like in the second communist movement, the contradictions were mainly
between Egyptian intellectuals and foreigners, a struggle for power in the party. This is very obvious in Salama
Musa's comments about the transference of the party headquarters from Cairo to Alexandria. How the contact
between Egyptian intellectuals and Rosenthal had come about in the first place is unclear. According to Musa, it
was they who approached Rosenthal, according to others, it was the other way round: Rosenthal tried to get in touch
with Egyptians after having been active among Jews and foreigners first In an article in al-Ahram the journalist
claimed that the party had three branches: a Greek one, an Anglo-French one and an Egyptian one. The author
was worried about Rosenthal's - whom he called a socialist extremist - bad influence on the Egyptians. Names
were traded in the press, though in the end the names of the party's central committee remained secret Egyptian
intellectuals were interested in a multitude of leftist ideas, among them were Fabians, Socialists and Marxists. AlSaTd reproduces a letter that seems to prove that foreign Socialists targeted Egyptian intellectuals.(Abdallah Tnln
became the first secretary of the Egyptian-Socialist Party. The program declaration was signed by CA1T al-'A nlnl,
Sal«™ Musa, Muhammad (Abdallah 'Infin and Husnl al-TJrftbl on 29 August 1921, though not by Rosenthal or
any Greek. It included the liberation of eastern women and their education, freedom and self-determination of all
people, resistance against imperialism and determination of workers' rights. After it had become a member of the
Third International in January 1923, the party also called for the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the liberation
and unification of Egypt and Sudan, the cancellation of all state debts and foreign capitulation agreements, an
eight hour workday, and equal pay for Egyptian and foreign workers. Apart from that, the special problems of the
rural population were addressed, the cancellation of the debts of peasants who owned less than ten feddans and the
restriction of landownership to one hundred feddans.

74

4.1.1

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I

Joseph Rosenthal

The figure that arouses opposition in Egypt is Joseph Rosenthal.13 Before founding the Egyptian
Socialist Patty, he had been active in socialist study groups and workers’ organizations.'6 For
the British, Rosenthal was not an agitator, a man not in favor of violent methods. He believed in
educating workers in Communist ideas, to unite them in one big confederation. They suspected
him of being in communication with the Third International and with Bolshevik elements in
Palestine. A good many Jews with communist ideas who might have had connections with
Palestine were reported among the workers who were organized in “his” workers’ syndicate.
Rosenthal’s daughter was said to have visited Palestine and worked with the Mafliya Paolen
Socialim.
The British were as concerned about the development in Palestine as they were about Egypt.
Not only the British mandate administration, but also the Yishuv’s elite and the Arab notables
were agreed upon the undesirability of communist activities in Palestine. The British acted,
because they feared the negative impact of communist propaganda on their empire, especially
India. In the years following the Russian revolution, they suspected Bolsheviks everywhere, ex­
aggerating their numbers relentlessly, aided by anti-Bolshevist forces in the regions adjacent to
Russia who feared the British would leave them alone in their struggle against the Communists.
The British had already been tempted to interpret the 1919 revolution in Egypt as having come
about under Bolshevist influence, and under their watchful eyes any Russian or Polish Jewish
immigrant to the region, especially to Palestine, became a potential revolutionary.
Here Eli Tzur sees an antiSemitic stereotype at work that associated being Jewish with being
dangerous, even more so in the case of East European Jews. For the British, however, it was
difficult to differentiate between the different Zionist groups and the Communists. The Russian
government had committed itself to abstaining from propaganda that could encourage hostile
action against Britain in the British Empire. Yet for the colonial administration, Jews were the
“stereotype of the Comintern emissary which incites the innocent and quiescent natives.“5*17
Above all communism was, the British suspected, detrimental to the Arab acceptance o f
Jewish immigration, which the British strongly favored as a means to develop Palestine. Com­
munism made Arabs fall out with Zionism, as well, and believe that it was tantamount to the
“importation of the least desirable elements of Eastern Europe into the country.” Tsur believes
that Arab disenchantment with Jewish post-WW I immigration was due to a cultural attitude.
They disapproved of the new life-style, the dresses and habits which seemed immoral and lib­
ertine to them.
“The participation of women in labor, cultural activities and politics were viewed
by the Arabs as showing a lack of sexual inhibitions, immoral and therefore com­
munist.” 18
l5The British suspected mainly Greek Socialists of spreading “most daring ideas“ on moral and social conven­
tions. Batatu 1978,375. In Batatu’s account the Egyptian Socialist Party had mainly Egyptian members, though
he refers to AntOn MlrOn as a Syrian (Lebanese). The party did not accomplish much mote than to translate some
essays by Lenin into Arabic and send some cadres to Palestine because the Communists there spoke only Russian
or “pigeon English.“ In his view, Rosenthal worked directly for the Comintern, though he was not sufficiently
supported by it financially. He also claims • from British sources - that it was the radicals around Husnl al-TJrlbf
and Greek and Russian revolutionary enthusiasts who opened branches in Mansunh, Ifcnta, Zaqaziq etc. Ibid.,
379.
'‘ Note 14, p. 200, in: Ismael and el-Sa’id 1990.
l7Tzur 1999,103-131:106.
"Ibid., 109.

4.1. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

75

Because communism was legal in Britain, but repressed in Palestine and Egypt, support for
activists in the occupied territories came sometimes from Britian, and measures against Com*
munists were criticized by the opposition in British Parliam ent Therefore it is not astonishing
that a British note on Rosenthal included the suggestion that even though he was Russian,
British people might sympathize with him. Laqueur even believed that Rosenthal was allowed
to re-enter Egypt when an attempt to deport him after the ban of the Communist Party in 1924
had failed, because of a protest campaign in the British press, mainly the Daily Herald.19
Rosenthal was a man with an established position in Alexandria, working openly, convinced
- as the British knew - that an Egyptian fallah would never become a Communist (as little as a
Russian moujik).20 Rosenthal was also so respectable and influential a personality that Mustafa
Al-Nahhas, Zaghlul’s later heir in the leadership of the Wafd, went to visit him in 1921, to
discuss a declaration Zaghlul intended to announce before the coming election. Rosenthal was
visited in his capacity as the president of the workers’ union.21
In 1924 al-Ahram published Rosenthal’s testimony in the state attorney’s office, with re­
gard to the investigation about the case raised against die Egyptian Communist Party in March
1924. The newspaper called Rosenthal “the living history of a workers’ renaissance (nahdat
al-'ummäl) in that country for 25 years, because he had fostered the cooperation between the
workers through the strength of the syndicates.”22 The judgement sounds very positive, espe­
cially since a few years before, when the Egyptian Socialist Party had been founded al-Ahram
had been very anxious about the detrimental effect foreign Communists might have on locals.23
Rosenthal had come to Egypt 25 years before, and it had always been his concern to im­
prove the situation of workers through education and organization. He had helped founding
syndicates, first the filature workers, then the seamstresses, mine workers, printers - all those
syndicates had been for foreign workers, since the national workers, i.e. the Egyptian work­
ers (al-'ummOl al-watanTyün), had been a minority then compared to foreigners. Their number,
however, grew, and in the course of WW I the foreign workers left Egypt, and Egyptians became
a majority, organized in syndicates that followed parties engaged in the national cause. Rosen­
thal denied that he had been participating in the administration of any of those syndicates, but
he stressed his interests in centers for economic defence and ideological education for workers.
Therefore, he published a call for the foundation of a union that would include all workers. The
aim behind founding a socialist party was to create a political force that could speak with one
voice. Because the syndicate consisted of workers with clashing political inclinations, it was
difficult to follow a common policy. A party could defend workers’ interests in parliament and
fight for labor legislation.
Rosenthal’s name became famous throughout Egypt, because the press had supported his
campaign for fixed shop rents. The very same action brought him in touch with Egyptian
intellectuals interested in socialism: Husnl al-TJrfibl, Dr. ’AU al-'Anânl, Salama Musa and
'Abdallah In to . They agreed on the principles of a socialist party, and with the exception of
Rosenthal, all of them signed the party program.
Conflicts between the leading members of the party soon developed, and Salama Musa,
one of the important intellectuals of the 1920s, spoke out against “foreign” influence on an
“Egyptian socialism” that had to be adapted to Egyptian needs first24 It turned out that the
’’Laqueur 1936,313, Note S.
»B aratt 1978,374-73; Al-SaU 1987; Botman 1984; Baihear 1980; Beinin and Lockman 1988.
2lIamael and el-Sa’id 1990,14.
"al-Ahram , 7. 3. 1924.
"S ee further down thi< chapter.
»al-Ahram, 17.8.1921, bm ael and el-Sa’id 1990,16-17.

76

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I

difference in platform was also one concerning the pro and contra of the Comintern membership
and the role of the workers. In an article in al-Ahram, Salama Musa attacked his adversaries
in the party who did not respect the fact that Egypt could not yet ignore the national bond
and replace it by other popular or social bonds.23 The socialist movement in Egypt had to be
purely Egyptian in its definition, and could not borrow anything from Europe. Rosenthal had
made an effort to spread socialist propaganda for more than 20 years, without being able to
integrate Egyptians in that “outlandish group” that had gathered around him. Egyptians had
only accepted socialism when they saw the moderation and the trustworthy intentions of Musa
and his friends. A communist party that was in continuous contact with Moscow would be
dangerous for the independence movement, since loyalty towards Egypt had to be the first goal,
while socialism came only second.
“I believe that socialism will not succeed here until the middle class agrees to it not to say the rich • before the workers do because they are the enlightened class
that can understand the principles.”26
Musa’s criticism of Rosenthal and others seems not so much a rejection of internationalism
as nurtured by hurt pride and ambition. He argued against a communist party, because he was
a Fabian. Even though he stressed Egyptian patriotism and loyalty to Egypt, he was obviously
worried about the role the class he represented was to play in any further development of a
socialist/communist movement in Egypt. Workers were not fit to lead, because they lacked
enlightenment. Politics were a responsibility thrust upon the educated middle class and the
rich, the country’s elite. Salama Musa was a well-known writer and thinker, though he was by
no means a personal representative for the preservation of Egyptian cultural heritage. He was
an innovator, deeply impressed by Europe.27
Much in the spirit of George Bernard Shaw, he could not see the lower classes able to accept
the new principles. Most Egyptian intellectuals shared this attitude, from Muhammad Husain
Haikal to Taha Husain and 'Abbfis Al-'Aqqfid. In the 1920s there were only few Egyptian
intellectuals who thought otherwise. Many Egyptian intellectuals thought workers too ignorant
(Is9m al-DTn HifnI Näsif2*, like Musa, wanted to direct political activities towards intellectuals.
After the revolution in 1919, he was attracted by other political movements than the Wafd,
because he considered Zaghlul as too moderate. This was not unusual. Like a considerable part
of the Egyptian public, HifnT Näsif had been against negotiations with the British. He had been
in favor of political violence because he hoped that political assaults - like the one on the first
Coptic prime minister, Butrus GhälT, - might move the masses into action. He was convinced
that the political backwardness of the masses made them insensitive to political arguments, and
that parties were too weak.
R ifat Al-Sa'Id found some old comrades who had witnessed, and participated in, the first
Egyptian Communist Party. Their testimony contradicts the claim that the party was only joined
“ al-Ahram, 4.8.1922.
“ Al-Sa'Id 1987. 239.
“ What ’Awad tells about him is revealing. Being a Copt himself his famous coreligionist was a source of
inspiration: Musa introduced him fitst to George Bernard Shaw, then H.G.Wells, Cunningham Graham, Sidney
and Beatrice Webb, Gorki, Tolstoi and Dostojewski. For ’Awad he remained the moat credible of Egyptian intel­
lectuals in the 1920s because even when Al-’Aqqfid and Taha Husain had given up their rebellion and their new
ideas, enlightenment and rationality to popularity and reconciliation with society - visible in their turn to Islamic
biographies -, he remained the only honest atheist. ’Awad 1989.
“ 'Islm al-Din HifnI N isif, interview 2.10.1968, in: Al-Sa’Td 1987, 323-26. In the International Institute of
Social History in Amsterdam his papers are archived. HifnI N isif was a famous public figure in Egypt, dubbed the
red pasha, who appeared connected to several leftist groups.

4.1. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

77

by foreigners and intellectuals, and that workers were not bright enough.
HSfiz Sind29 had been a crucial element in founding a party branch in Mansura. He had
joined the Socialist Party towards the end of 1921, after Zaghlul had been exiled to the Sey­
chelles. He had been encouraged by a brochure about socialism, and had gone to meet the
party members in their headquarters in Alexandria. He was very much impressed by the fact
that the party leaders were really simple people and workers (sic!). Before he went to Alexan­
dria he had been a member in a religious community (jam'iyyat al-istiqim a) whose main aim
was spreading literacy among workers. The party leadership in Alexandria had advised him to
take care to involve all the social strata in the administrative committee of the Mansura branch,
and Häfi? SSnd proudly states that all - from Oxford graduate to worker, but also the religious
establishment - were represented. In Mansura alone there were seven shaikhs involved.
“They were very useful to us. Shaikh al-Mawfifi preached in the party headquarters
and gave speeches which were cheered a lo t”
The Grand Mufti’s condemnation of the Bolsheviks had obviously not influenced the believ­
ers among the communist partisans and sympathizers.30 SSnd believes that there were about 200
party members in Mansura. He does not mention any foreigners. But his contacts in Alexandria
and the people who came to see him in Mansura, were Egyptians. The party activities stopped
with the arrest of the leadership in March 1924.
The party headquarters in Mansura were turned into a workers’ club, with a night school for
workers, to teach them reading and writing. Teachers who were members of the party taught for
free, lessons also included French (not English) • almost twenty years later communist groups
would follow the same path, and French would still be an attractive subject, because workers
wanted to understand their paymasters’ language. An orchestra was set up to play at workers’
weddings, and a rescue service to assist the public in Mansura in case of emergencies. The
Egyptian Communist Party branch in Mansura was, therefore, much more than just a branch
of the party center in the big port city. It was offering community services, and thus trying
to broaden the base for support. The leadership in Mansura was not the classical one for a
European communist party in the 1920s; intellectuals, as well as notables, employees, teachers,
and workers were represented.31 The wide social range of members in the administrative council
of the party in Mansura, and probably of members in general - even though the two interview
partners insist on a majority of workers -, was a strength and a weakness at the same time. The
party catered to the workers, and workers were attracted. Nonetheless, once repression started,
preceded by an anti-communist campaign in the press, support quickly dwindled. The general
public, even inside the party, opted for the Wafd and against the Communists at the crucial
m oment Many party members denied ever having been involved, fearing further harassment
by the police, which prominent members really suffered from for a long time.
For the second generation of Egyptian Communists, Rosenthal was a very maiginal figure
with his circle of Jews, Italians, and Greeks, mere theoreticians.32 Their big man was Husnl
TJrSbl, the envoy the Socialist Party of Egypt had sent to Moscow in 1922 to apply for the
membership in the Comintern. One of the Comintern’s conditions for the acknowledgement
"A carpenter, * 1879. Interview with Sind in Mansura 29.5.1969, in: A l-Sald 1987,311-313.
’'‘Complete text of die Grand Mufti’s (Muhammad Bakheet) fatwa on bolshevism published in Ismael and elSa’id 1990, Appendix B. 163.
3lHifi? Sind mentions Shaflq Bisyfir, an architect, Ahmad Jartblh, an entrepreneur, ‘Abd si-Hamid al-TObajl,
from the a'yin (the notables), and an Oxford graduate, Muhammad Ahmad 'Abd al-Galll, an employee. Shaikh
Ahmad al-M uwift, an Arabic teacher at school. A l-Sald al-Sabrf and H tfi; Sind, workers. A l-Sald 1987,312.
32Report by the Rome Group, personal copy.

78

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS 1

of the new party was the exclusion of Rosenthal, who insisted that every country had its own
road to socialism. The fact that TJrlM, a former cotton merchant, directed the Socialist Patty
in a communist direction contradicts the interpretation of Rosenthal’s and “foreigners” politics
in general as too radical. For the following generation of Communists there was no doubt that
D riH had been far mote of a “radical” than Rosenthal.33
The party’s and the syndicate’s strong organization were attributed to ‘UrSbTs firm hand,
though the party failed to raise workers’ consciousness or produce able cadres. 'UribTs personal
influence had been strong enough to turn the party to communism, while nobody in Egypt had
understood the program the Comintern had imposed. 'UrfibT, however, seems to have also been
an opportunist, wavering between cheering and sneering the national movement.3435TJrfibï, who
became a sympathizer of the German National Socialists in the 1930s, was suspected by other
Communists to have played the role of an agent provocateur in the strikes in 1924, because
he was convinced that the communist movement needed martyrs to grow.33 Therefore he had
insisted on strike • probably to become as popular as Zaghlul, who had been brought to power
by being exiled to Malta. Rosenthal had a negative opinion about the strike. He was sure that
Egypt was not ready for a change, and that the Communist International would not push the
Egyptian Communists to start a revolution that had to fail.36
The criminal court in Alexandria bad no doubts about the nature of the first Egyptian Com*
munist Party.37 Though it derived its political program from the Russian mother party, its
Egyptian character was emphasized. The statement mentions the Syndicate of Workers’ Unions
(Ittihäd niqäbät al-'ummäl) as affiliated to the party. The headquarters were adorned with the
pictures of the heroes of the Russian revolution, the court says. The connection to the Bolshe­
viks must, therefore, have been obvious to any worker entering those headquarters. The court
mentioned that the syndicate had branches in Cairo, Tanta, Port Said, Zagazig, al-Mahalla alKubra, Shibin al-Kum, and other towns. The party’s program, the judges said, was such that it
appealed to any Egyptian (!). The first of the 21 points demanded the liberation of Egypt and
Sudan, and emphasized the relations between the two peoples and their cooperation against any
oppressor, be he national or foreign, and a close cooperation with the most extreme elements
in the national movement The program also included the nationalization of the Suez Canal,
the cancellation of the public debt and the abolition of the capitulations as its main demands.
There were also special labor demands, among them equal pay for foreign and Egyptian labor.
From the court’s point of view, AntOn MSrQn (39 years, a lawyer), al-ShahSt IbrShlm (33
years, an employee in Alexandria), Abram Katz (a mechanic, 26 years old, a Russian Jew), Hil33<U ribI had published quite a number of articles in 1928, ranging from marriage to prison experiences. In
the same year that Hasan al-Banna set out to found the Muslim Brothers, he suggested dial Al-Azhar should be
turned into a faculty of religion, giving Islam the place of just one religion among others because the new age was
a materia] one. Islam in his opinion had all the faults of Christianity. It was intolerant Books had been burnt,
reformers banished, wars waged, but with a new understanding of tolerance the extremism that was correlated with
that ancient institute of religious learning had to come to an end. Amin, no date. The articles were published in
different Egyptian magazines ranging from al-HiUl to al-Muqtataf.
34Beinin and Lockman 1988,142-145.
35Beinin and Lockman regard those strikes as an independent workers’ activity, sparked by wage cuts and lay­
offs and inspired by the Italian example. Communist activists, notably Antffln M M n, were more inclined to nego­
tiate with the government than to aggravate the conflict further. Other authors interpret the strikes and occupations
o f February-March 1924 in a variety o f factories, the railways and the tramway as a result of communist agitation
and a deliberate challenge of the Wafd government. Baahear 1980,63-65; Ramadan 1968,538-542, and Laqueur
1956. R ifat AI-SaTd also attests Communists an important role in the strikes, though he sees them economically
and not politically motivated. AI-SaTd 1987.
“ AI-Ahram, 7.3.1924.
"al-A hrsm , 7.10.1924; also in: AI-SaTd 1987,341-350.

4.1. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

79

lei Sanburg (an electrician, 20 years old, a Polish Jew)38, the aforementioned Husnl al-TJrfibl,
and Safwfin AbO al-Fath were the leaders of the Egyptian Communist Party and the most mil­
itant defenders of communism.39 In the course of the labor unrests of 1924, many leading
members of the Egyptian Communist Party were arrested. Because the Russian government
had given up its right to privileged treatment of Russian citizens, they were tried according to
Egyptian law. It was decided to deport not only convicted foreigners, but also those who could
not be found guilty as charged, but were known Communists.40 The government tried to deport
Rosenthal in spite of his Egyptian passport, but since no other country accepted him, it finally
had to agree to his continued residence in Egypt, on the condition that he would not engage in
further party political activity.41
The court was particularly appalled by the militant strikes in 1924, and the party’s program
directed towards the fallahin (the cancellation of peasants’ debts, the confiscation of cultivable
land exceeding 100 feddan, etc.). It mentions MarQn, Ibrâhîm, Katz, and Sanburg as personally
involved in strike activities. But it was more important to the court that Safwän Abu al-Fath, a
teacher, taught his students communist principles in his lessons, and that (Abd al-Häfiz 'Awad,
taught students at the religious institute in Tanta (al-maTiad al-dlnl al-Ahmad!) that communism
and Islam were in complete harmony. The court quoted Bucharin to prove that only workers
and ignorami were deceived by religion, and that Communists sincerely believed religion to be
harmful. Belief in God and the struggle for revolution, the court argued, were incompatible.
The party and its 1,500 members42 were, according to the court, themselves ignorant enough to
deny that nature had bestowed different shares of wealth and talent upon individuals.
In the court’s opinion, there was no difference between Abram Katz and Hillel Sanburg and
the other defendants. They were all tried as extreme partisans of communism. Nowhere in the
court’s ruling or the indictment do we find the fact emphasized that Katz and Sanburg were
Russian Jews, nor is foreign involvement mentioned. (Whether they were Egyptian nationals
or not is unclear, because in the police report Rosenthal is mentioned as a Russian Jew as well,
39Sanburg and Katz were fugitives. The police knew also other active foreigners, like Albert Freundlich, a Rus­
sian Jew, owner of a bookshop in Alexandria, who was considered a mediator between Egyptians and Europeans
among Communists. Apart from him Samuel Kirsonn (38), Gregory Shoklender (a printer, 19), Moise Wilbushevitch (an electric engineer, 60) and Samuel Zaslavsky (the owner of a library, 40), all of them Russian Jews, were
considered members of the Communist Party in Egypt by the police, some of them having been present in Egypt
for many years. Wilbushevitch allegedly helped Bolshevik Russian workers to find jobs in the Zainat al-Nuzha
company. Zaslavski was the president of the Jewish workers* association in Alexandria. The reliability of the
police’s information, though, might be questionable because Yannakakis, who is also mentioned, is considered an
Italian. A police report from 1924 about the activities of some communist militants, in: Al-SaTd 1987,339.
39They were Sha'bfin HSfiz, 19, from Zagazig, a pharmaceutical assistant, 'Abd al-Hfifiz 'Awad, 27, a teacher
in Ifcnta, Muhammad al-Saghlr, 35, a barber in Shibin al-Kum, MahmQd Ibrfthlm al-Samkari, 30, a plumber, and
(Abd al-Hamld Ahmad T&nh, 33, employee in Mahalla AbO 'AIL They were accused of having formed a gang of
workers and peasants to attack employers and owners and to sow social unrest Indictment in the criminal case no.
393, the national court in Alexandria, Muharram Bek, 1924, published in: Al-SaTd 1987,340.
40Ramadan 1968,545.
41The Rosenthals remained in Egypt and did not stop being engaged politically, thus emphasizing their will to
participate in the political development of the country and asserting their place in i t Rosenthal’s daughter Charlotte
was still active, Mary Rosenthal partook in the second communist movement
^T he International Press Correspondence from 1924, No, 102 gives us the number of party members in Egypt as
700, compared to 800 in China, 600 in Türkey and only 100 in Palestine, International Press Correspondence, no.
102. See also: Al-SaTd 1987,294. Laqueur quotes more numbers from the Jahrbuch für Politik, Wirtschaft, Arbei­
terbewegung, 1923-25, (edited by the Comintern Hamburg) giving a number of 1,500 for the Egyptian Communist
Party in 1921 and 1,000 in 1924. Avigdor, Rosenthal’s son in law, who was sent to Egypt by the Comintern,
reports 2,000 members for 1922 in Revolyutsioni Vostock, vol. 6 (1934). Another Soviet source, I.D. Levin,
Yegipet (1937) mentions 650 members for 1923, among them 80 % Egyptians and the rest foreigners, and in 1924
2,000 members. Laqueur 1956,33.

80

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I

even though he had accepted Egyptian citizenship.)
Still, the British police reports reflect deep concern with the attraction of Bolshevism in
Egypt, which is said to have dominated coffee house talk. The revolutionary situation of 1919
and the upheaval against the colonizers had certainly widened public interest in similiar move­
ments in other countries: the self-assurance gained through a struggle won against the oppressor
encouraged the readiness to break new ground, and to feel solidarity beyond cultural ties.
The late Louis 'Awad’s story about his father is a simple example : Hanna 'Awad was
shocked at the execution of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. Louis 'Awad was astonished
that his father was so emotionally shaken by the injustice that was inflicted upon those tw o
Italian anarchists in the USA. Yet he stresses in his memoirs that that particular event, which h e
followed in the Egyptian press, influenced his own negative attitude towards police and state.43
The Egyptian press was interested in international events, and following the press had be­
come a sort of status symbol and a habit in the villages towards the end of the 19th century.
It enhanced the prestige of village notables to open the paper sent from Cairo.44* Therefore,
a family had not to be particularly politically interested to follow international developments.
Awad’s family was not a political one. They were Wafdists, like a majority of Egyptians. They
belonged to a Coptic - middle class - public in Upper Egypt, not even in the capital, but in the
province, in al-Minya. The narratives of Egyptian workers who had been active in the 1920s
and 1930s establish the same kind of open-mindedness and a feeling of international solidarity.
People everywhere in the world seemed to suffer from injustice and were united by the will to
fight against i t
Police action against Communists does not offer us testimony of the degree of the involve­
ment of foreigners in the Egyptian party’s affairs. Even though foreigners were protected to a
considerable degree by die capitulations, the police cracked down on a Greek group as well,
in the course of the wave of arrests that swept the Egyptian Communists away in 1924. W hat
could be considered real proof for the involvement of Greeks with Egyptian Communists is
the Greek group’s demands, which were clearly connected to Egypt The police confiscated
pamphlets calling for the elimination of the foreign as well as the local bourgeoisie, an end to
British imperialism, and a socialist government49 The Greeks were not deported but tried in
Egypt and sentenced to prison. Upon his release, Yannakakis, who turns up in the writings about
the second movement as well, opened a new shop in Cairo and resumed his political activities.
After the arrests in 1924, the party had obviously received financial assistance from abroad
and was furnished with a private printing press, and a new party publication, the Red Flag (al*atom al-ahmar), was produced; later on also a party newspaper, the Account (al-hisOb), which
was published under the editorship of an Egyptian of Lebanese origin, Raffq Gabbour, who was
a member of the party’s central committee.46*
After 1923, the communist movement in Egypt was infiltrated by police agents. The Cotn43,Awad 1989, footnote 2.66.
«Berque 1972,74-73 with a reference to 'Abbis Al-'Aqqld’s “H ayit qalam."
«Ibid.
«The multitude of active groups in Egypt in the beginning of the 1920s and the many connections between
Egypt, Palestine and the Levante become obvious from the fact that there had been a Lebanese Workers’ Party in
Alexandria in 1922, led by Fu’id al-ShamlB, a Maronite tobacco worker from a poor village in the northeast o f
Beirut, whom Rosenthal had won over to communism. His party was associated to the Egyptian Socialist Petty.
Fu’id al-Sham ill was deported from Egypt and, bock in Lebanon, active in the formation of the first provisional
central committee of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon. The Palestine Communist Party embodied in
Joseph Berger, a Polish Jew, helped him to do to. Another figure, Eire Teper, (Teper alias Max Kogel was the vioe
chairman of the Palestinian party) who also appeared in Alexandria, made an Armenian Spartacus group join the
Syrian Communists. Batatu 1978,381-383.

4.2. WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS

81

intern took a direct interest, and only then party control shifted, according to Al-Sa'Id, from
Egyptian to foreign members. Most of those arrested were said to be Jews from Palestine. Rus­
sian ships were not allowed to enter Egyptian ports anymore, and many Russians were arrested
and deported as suspected Communists. Not all the suspects, however, were in fact Commu­
nists. Some of them were shot on their arrival in Odessa as whites or monarchists.47 The party
was put under the auspices of the Palestinian Communists, and at the sixth congress of die
Comintern in 1928 it was represented by the Communist Party of Palestine as well.

4J2

Workers and Intellectuals in the First Communist Move­
ment

For the first two decades after the Russian revolution, Egyptians detected a profound lack of
understanding for the Middle East in Soviet politics. The world revolution was dealt with as a
rather cosmopolitan affair, exported from one country to another with the help of international­
ists, regardless of cultural and linguistic barriers, because the political and economic truth was
one, exploiters had to be fought everywhere.
The Comintern was perceived as an institution hostile to efforts to establish an independent
Arab brand of communism in the Arab world. Jewish cadres seemed to Egyptian and Arab
Communists conspicuously powerful in the Soviet institutions of the 1920s and 1930s.
There are several oral history testimonies from the first communist movement Workers,
as well as intellectuals, spoke about their experiences and impressions. A major part of those
narratives deals with experiences in the USSR, a component totally absent in the history of the
second communist movement though both discourses are influenced by the developments in
Palestine and a negative attitude towards Zionists, who are - in both cases • accused of scheming
against the movement and making an attempt to dominate it. Particularly the plan to make
Palestine the center for communist agitation in the Middle East was sharply criticized by the
Egyptians.
Difficulties in cooperation between foreign workers and Egyptians were due to different
social situations and the low degree of industrialization in Egypt. But even for Egyptians,
internationalism was not always an abstract concept Egyptian workers who had gone abroad
themselves were very positive about the concept of internationalism.
Few workers were sent to Russia, though the party even advertised in newspapers, and
the public sometimes misunderstood the purpose of studies in the Soviet-Union and thought
it a scholarship offer. 'Abd al-Rahmfin Fadl, a carpenter, really arrived in Moscow, sent by
the Egyptian Communist Party.4* By the time he returned to Egypt he had become a famous
figure, because the Egyptian authorities tried to prevent him from re-entering Egypt It was
only after an Odyssee that he arrived back in Egypt in 1936, but he had to wait even longer to
have his citizenship restored. For him, AntOn Marfln, Husnl al-'Urâbl and Salama Musa were
known figures. But he held only Marfln in really high esteem because he was a leader who
knew his Marxism thoroughly, in contrast to al-'U ribl who did not know that much. Marfln
lived like the poor. This motive of personal austerity is going to appear over and over again.
In Yflsuf DarwTsh’s reflections about his role as a workers’ lawyer and political activist, in
the description of the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation’s (EMNL) first cadre school
where everybody slept on the wooden flow, Henri Curiel included, in InjT AflfitQn’s shame
«Beinin and Loclunan 1988,152.
«Interview with ’Abd al-Rahman Fwjl, 30.9.1968,2.10.1968, in: Al-Sald 1987,321-333.

82

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I

about her expensive dresses • even in the discourse about Jews in Egypt To be Egyptian meant
to be poor for some, though for many others personal austerity could not be a precondition
or a foundation for radical impulse, and radical impulse at a young age did not prevent social
promotion later. MarOn loved the workers. He did not like the intelligentsia, because they, in
turn, despised the poor. MarOn would leave his office and take up the cases of the poor for free.
'Abd al-Rahmän emphasizes, as Häfiz Sind did, the role of the Muslim clergy in the movement.
An Azhar shaikh, Safwän AbO al-Fath, • the same shaikh the court in Alexandria was appalled
to find involved in communist activities and deemed particularly dangerous and abominable would write all the pamphlets, take off his traditional turban fimäma) and dress in a suit
As the cooperation of men of religious learning could give Communists a respectable ap­
pearance and broaden the basis of communication with the masses, so did those scholars signal
that they had arrived at a new age, an age where veils and turbans were of no use any m ore,
where an open mind could even challenge the Islamic basis of government. The British had,
confronted with Muhammad 'AbdQ’s reformed Islam in the late 19th century, considered that
a hat befitted his head better than a turban. The early 1920s, as it should be remembered in
the discussion about Communists as well, were a time of liberal minds and open discussions
in Egypt. Taha Husain reflected on a Mediterranean culture gathering together all the countries
surrounding the Mediterranean basin. Muhammad Husain Haikal wrote about the benefits o f
liberalism. And ‘All 'Abd al-Râziq had shaken the religious establishment with his opinions
about the (lack of) Islamic foundations of government Egypt was in much closer touch with
the Arab world and with Europe than it had ever been since the revolution of 1919, because o f
the influx of Lebanese, Syrians, Palestinians, Greeks, and Italians into Egypt who brought with
them the experiences and the anxiety of other countries and peoples striving for independence
and nation-building.
One of the charges brought against the communist party in Egypt from the beginning was
that it undermined the social order in Egypt which rested on a religious basis. Poor people had
nothing, but the hereafter to help them through their daily misery. Deprived of its consoling
power, they would not be deterred from anarchist rebellion. The government and the religious
institutions in Egypt were called upon in articles and letters in al-Ahram to save Egypt from
the dangers of communism.49 And, of course, there were fatwas condemning socialism as an
offence against Islam. The Egyptian mufti even published a fatwa, following the request of the
Times correspondent in Egypt, that declared Bolshevism a deviation of shaifa. Communists
were denounced as Russian agents. The Communists were lucky, because they had men of
religion among their supporters. An asset that is not only highlighted in the story about the
Communists of the 1920s, but also in that about the characteristics of the EMNL, which had
followers among Azhar students in the 1940s.30 Nonetheless, religion is considered to be one
of the ingredients of Egyptian culture, and it returns as a subject not only concerning the re­
cruitment of party candidates, but also as a matter of rhetoric. In 1921 Shaikh 'Abd al-Latff
Bakhlt, a teacher in the school of law (madrasat al-qudäh), published an article in al-Ahram31
challenging the Communists’ opponents to prove from the Koran and the Hadith that socialism
was against Islam.
According to 'Abd al-Rahmän Fadl, Shaikh Safwän won over many of the Azhar shaikhs.
'Abd al-Rahmän Fadl was one of the rank and file in the communist party. He considers him­
self and BayOmT Al-BasQsT, a welder, as representative of Egyptian workers. Fadl also counts*51
*al-Ahnun. 16.9.1921,23.8.1921.26.8.1921,20.8.1921.

90A* opposed to Ihhrfr al-sha*b (People's Liberation) organization that is said to have been antireligious, though
its founder, Marcello Cereai, vehemently rejected this claim in a personal interview.
51al-Ahram, 10.9.1921.

4.2. WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS

83

Sha'bin Häfiz, a small employee in the railway company, who also arrived in the USSR and
remained active as a Communist in the second movement, among the workers. Safwfin Abfl
al-Fath, Antun Marün, Husnl al-'Uräbl, Shaikh Mahdl, and others represented the intellectuals.
‘Abd al-Rahmfin Fadl was not a traditional skilled worker owning a workshop. He had been
working in a workshop with more than 2000 other workers and active in the syndicate for work­
ers employed in land cultivation (niqfibat 'ummfil istislih al-arSdT). His way had led him from
the syndicate to the General Federation of Workers (Confédération Générale du Travail, CGT /
al-ittihid al-'Smm li al-niqSbfit) in Damanhur and then to the Socialist Party. He came to know
Husnl al-TJribT, and later, he recalls, they were told that the party would be dissolved and a
communist party founded instead. Decisions in the early party were taken by the leadership,
democratic centralism did not exist The rank and file knew little about ideology. Most o f the
quarrels about foreign involvement proletarization, or a more Bolshevik outlook took place
among a few intellectuals, who were also the first to start writing about the conflicts, thus shift­
ing the focus of attention. In interviews it becomes more evident how and why the communist
movement could appeal to Egyptian workers, to the representatives of the “masses.” From 'Abd
al-Rahm&n Fadl’s point of view, the Egyptian Communist Party’s program was not primarily a
program dictated by the Comintern but it was a party program written by Shaikh SafwSn, and
as such guaranteed that SafwSn applied the socialism the prophet had talked about He remem­
bers Rosenthal to be an old socialist who remained with Salama Musa’s faction because Husnl
al-TJrSbl attacked foreigners and especially Jews.
The party seriously and successfully worked for two years, dominating the General Fed­
eration of syndicates in Alexandria, and the factories were in communist hands. Only Saad
Zaghlul ended the Communists’ upswing. 'Abd al-RahmSn Fadl even believes that the party
had between 3,000 or 4,000 members. He stresses that most of the struggle was against impe­
rialism. Some foreigners were working with them. It was useful to use the advantages they had
from the capitulations. He remembers Joiji, a Bulgarian driver, who used to transport brochures
and pamphlets. But his dearest memories of internationalism are reserved for his journey to
the USSR. The party had been dissolved after they had occupied three factories in 1924. They
stayed 13 days, even Stalin was impressed by the Egyptian workers’ backbone. SafwSn, al'U ribl, and MarOn were arrested. The party activity was obstructed.
Therefore, a direct journey to Moscow was impossible. In 1927, 'Abd al-Rahmin Fadl went
to Turkey first He gives us many details about the solidarity he found among the comrades.
“I’m telling you those details to make you know that there was more than a feeling of
intimate friendship between the internationalist comrades, it was a feeling of real affection.”32
The solidarity of the Greek Communists on a ship he crossed the Mediterranean with even
helped him in his endeavor to re-enter Egypt. The realm of internationalism, it seems, started
just beyond the Egyptian borders.
There were several Arab students at the Toilers of the East University, from Syria, Lebanon,
Algeria, and from Palestine Arabs and Jews, but the majority were Jews.*53*In 'Abd al-Rahmän
F a il’s narrative, the conflicts in the Toilers of the East University take only a few paragraphs,
as compared to his personal difficulties in reentering Egypt Yet those conflicts take on an im"A l-S ald 1987,330.
53Apart from *Abd al-Rahman Fadl there were Muhammad DOwMIr, a railway woifcer, Hamdf SaUm, a mailman
and 'Abd al-'AzIz M art, a fitter, and Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aztz (who would him out to be a police agent and
betrayed many of the Comintern cadres sent to Cairo and delivered them to the police). There was also a worker
of Moroccan origin, but sent by the Egyptian Communist Party. As much as the party network had suffered from
the police damp-down in Alexandria, it still lived on in the Confederation of D ade Unions (InittOd al-niqâbùt) in
the countryside.

84

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I

portant meaning in the bigger framework o f the relations between die center of international
communism, Jewish presence, and communism in Palestine and the tightrope Egyptian Com­
munists were walking between an unlimited socialist solidarity and national Egyptian-Arab
identity and interests. 'Abd al-Rahmin Fadl’s tone changes considerably. He starts by saying
that foreign elements wanted to dominate the Arab parties, and Rosenthal suddenly appears in
his narrative. Rosenthal, his daughter, his friends, and his son-in-law, Avigdor alias Constantin
Weiss, sent by the Comintern as a representative, and the Comintern itself are involved in that
effort In the Comintern there was that “Jewish Arab person” responsible for the Middle East,
called AbQ Ziytoi.34
“He did not want any Arab to occupy a leading position in the parties of the Middle
East. Some of the Jews in the Comintern supported him. He was a very clever per­
son who pushed the Zionist goals through. Every time we called for ’Arabisatzia,’
which means Arabization, he attacked us. They criticized us because we raised that
slogan, and I personally was brought to trial in the Comintern. AbO Ziyim said that
Arabs weren’t fit, because they were backward, and he used a stupid person called
Ibrâhîm whom he had brought with him from the Levante. He gave him a letter and
told him to throw it into the postbox, and he threw it in the waste basket. I told them
that he had chosen that person on purpose, and the trial stopped. But afterwards an
upheaval happened in die Comintern, and 70 Zionists were sacked. That confirmed
our fear.”55
In the report of the Rome Group, though, 'Abd al-Rahmin Fadl is said to have described
the problem as having been caused by the Trotzkytes who allegedly dominated the Comintern
and were pro-Zionist. Trotzkytes preferred the Palestinians (interestingly Palestinians, in this
case, could still mean Jews and Arabs) to Egyptians in the Middle East, because they were
pro-Zionist. That this was a bad policy was proved by the purge that hit the Trotskyites in the
Comintern in 1932.56
Trotskyites and Zionists thus are lumped together, and the Stalinist purges are not interpreted
as a bloody power struggle that victimized many of the most devoted communist cadres. On the
contrary, Trotskyites in Egypt have always been eyed suspiciously, suspected of loose ethics and
being close to anarchy. Concerning the USSR, Trotskyites were suspected of being a Jewish
lobby, and therefore, naturally promoting Jewish, i.e. Zionist interests. (For Egypt this did
not hold true because the alleged Trotskyites in Egypt were proud of being “purely” Egyptian,
which meant that neither Jews nor foreigners were involved.)37
'Abd al-RahmSn Fadl’s narrative is supported by Muhammad DQwIdfir, a former stoker and
fireman.3* DOwIdâr joined the outlawed Egyptian Communist Party in 1927 and then went to
Moscow as a student at the Toilers of the East University. He was deprived of his Egyptian
citizenship as well, but came back to Egypt in 1937 and remained politically active. His contact
to the party had come about through Shaikh Safwin AbQ al-Fath in Alexandria, but he had
become a party member in Tanta. Frankly Düwldär admits that his main incentive in becoming
a Communist was that he was longing to see the Soviet Union he had heard about through the
letters of Muhammad 'Abd al-'Azfz, the mole in the party. To mislead the autborites, DflwTdSr*57
^Concerning AbO Ziylm ’s identity and role aee further down this chapter.
"A l-S ald 1987,331.
“ Notes sur l’histoire du P.C.E. (1919-1925), Groupe Rome.
57See chapter about Middle Classes and Communism.
“ A l-Sald 1987, interview 22.1.1970,17.3.1970, and 18.3.1970, pp. 650-661. DOwldir was bom in 1901.

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traveled to Moscow crossing Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. In Moscow he gained the
same impression as ‘Abd al-Rahmin Fadl:
“The main impression was that the Arabic group was a source of interest for ele­
ments of Jewish origin. The Egyptians were a minority (about 12). There were 30
Palestinians and others from Algeria, Marrakesh, Iraq, and Syria, but those were
mostly Jews. The Egyptians were the only Middle Eastern Communists among
whom there were no Jews (sic!). Most of the employees in the department, the
administrators and translators, were Arab Jews as well. We, the Egyptians, had an
opinion about that. We announced that that composition did not suit the natural
circumstances in the Arab countries. The Egyptians were eager to learn Russian
quickly, and we realized that the translators did not know Arabic well, and that they
translated badly. In short, we entered upon a struggle raising the slogan of ‘Arabsatzia,’ which means Arabization. But we were strongly attacked. Even a trial was
organized against us in the university, under the pretext that we were chauvinists
and antisémites. Unfortunately, the other Arabs, in spite of being revolutionaries,
swam with the trend and participated in the attack against the Egyptians, which led
to our isolation and a defeat in the battle for Arabization.”39
The demand for Arabization serves to stress the need to gain acknowledgement as an au­
tonomous culture, worthy to stand among others. The conflict with the Jewish comrades from
the Palestinian Communist Party, in the contemporary context, reads as part of the struggle
against Jewish Zionist predominance in the Middle East, and the attempt to obliterate Arab cul­
ture and identity. Cosmopolitanism in a bourgeois context, reflected as internationalism in a
revolutionary context, is understood as a threat to an Arabic “indigenous” culture that once had
had the reputation of a world civilization.
Düwïdâr remembers that there were about 4,000 students at the Toilers of the East Uni­
versity, from all the Eastern countries: Dirks, Persians, Arabs, Somalis, and others. A Jew of
Russian origin, AbQ ZiySm, whose alias was Haider, was responsible for the Arabic department.
He was vested with absolute powers. The second man was Joseph Berger. Both of them were,
from Düwîdâr’s point of view, strongly biased against Arabs. Berger had helped four of his
Jewish protégés to join the university and to function as tutors in the Arabic department. Those
tutors are described as weak, insignificant elements who created a halo and an air of leader­
ship around themselves which they did not deserve. In DflwTdir’s narrative Egyptians were the
partisans of Arabization whose endeavor was met with fierce resistance from their Jewish adver­
saries. To counter the Arabization demand, many Arabs were brought in from Palestine who, in
their majority, were weak and uneducated. Among the few Palestinian Arabs who found favor
in Dûwïdâr’s eyes were 'Abd al-Ghanl al-Kurml, Naj&tl Sidql and his brother, and Mahmüd
al-Attrash, who is often quoted as an eye witness to the Jewish-Arab conflict among Palestinian
Communists. The Jewish tutors had to evaluate the students, and the weakness of many of the
Palestinian Arabs reduced the reputation of the department in general. Düwïdâr • as well as
'Abd al-Rahm&n Fadl • is convinced that there were Zionist agents among the Jewish cadres at
the university, though he concedes that some of the Jewish comrades would also try to defend
Arab demands and be supportive, only to find themselves repressed like the Arabs.
Workers who were active in the communist movement were usually skilled workers. Egyp­
tian workers who raise their voice in the history of the communist movement are very selfconfident. That self-confidence concerns not only their own individual role, but goes beyond
»Ibid., 652.

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that role to include the Egyptian workers as a collective. Compered to other Arabs, Egyptian
workers considered themselves to be more cultured and educated, thus completing the Egyptian
politicians’ and intellectuals’ image of Egypt as a primus inter pares, the leading nation in the
Arab world. In an inner-Egyptian context, workers would demand not only equal standing with
foreign skilled labor, but a substitution of foreign labor through Egyptian labor and equality
with intellectuals. Skilled workers and activists understood themselves and their movement
as essentially urban, competing with other politically underrepresented and socially repressed
groups (mainly the lower middle class and its academic offspring and small employees) for a
say in the communist movement
In Dûwïdàr’s narrative the Egyptian workers who came to the Toilers of the East University
were raising their voice and making their demands heard. They were outspoken, provoking
discussions and arguments.
“You have to know that the cultural level of the Egyptian worker who had par­
ticipated in the revolution of 1919 and participated in the syndicalist and political
struggle for many years was much higher than the level of the other Arabs.*40
Dûwïdâr had studied two books by ShibU Shumfiyyil41 before be joined the party. Therefore,
he could participate in discussions following lectures, and speak about the evolution, as well
as about the French revolution and its faults, and the class roots of imperialism. His tutors
were surprised that an Arab worker was well-informed about those subjects. In DQwTdir’s
view that was only proof of their own shortcomings because they were not able to engage in a
real discussion and were narrow-minded. What made him even more suspect was his beautiful
Arabic handwriting which he had gained by working as a calligrapher for some time. Dûwïdir’s
tutors can be concluded to have known little about Arab countries and Egypt in particular,
neither about the culture, nor the education, nor the class situation. Dûwïdâr was accused of
being a schemer who had sneaked into the proletariat, because a real Egyptian worker would
not talk and read as he did. To introduce him to the workers* reality he was sent “to production**
for three years. That he had been a member of the Bolshevik Party helped him to return to the
Toilers of the East University in the end.
In his criticism of the Comintern’s view of Arab workers, Dûwïdâr included the Palestinian
party. Based on insider information he deplored the repression of Arabic cadres and the resis­
tance of the Jewish cadres to Arabization. Dûwïdâr had been denounced as an antisémite and an
intellectual petit bourgeois. He had argued in favor of Arabization, to bring about the support
of the Arab masses in the battle against imperialism, and he denied being antisemitic, because
the Egyptians themselves were Semites.
The battle line, so nicely drawn between the Jewish leadership and the Arab cadres - with
the notorious AbQ Ziyfim as the bad boy -, is erased by DQwTdir’s concluding words. As if to
emphasize that the criticism is not directed against Jews in general, Dûwïdâr reiterates what he
mentioned before. He praises a number of politcally aware Palestinian comrades, faithful to
the Arab cause, to the degree of damaging their own career. The Jewish comrade heading the
faction amongst Jews who assisted the Arabization campaign was sacked from his position, and
relegated to the faculty of Oriental studies to teach Arabic.
Dûwïdâr faced enormous problems returning home in 1936. He believes that the sinis­
ter forces which resisted Arabization also resented the return of educated Arabs. His forged*61
“ Al-SaTd 1987,654.
61Susan Laila Ziadeh, A radical in his time: The thought of Shibli Shumlyyil and Arab intellectual discourse
(1882-1917), Diss. University Michigan. Ann Arbour, 1991. UMI. See also: R ifat Al-SaTd 1978.

4.2. WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS

87

passport was discovered, in Alexandria the ships were searched for Communists and he was
prevented from entering Egypt He went to Palestine and took part in the revolution of 1936,
organizing mass meetings, smuggling arms, giving speeches, and gaining fame as “Muhammad
al-Masrf.”
Thus at the end of his narrative, the circle DQwtcttr draws is almost complete. His education
as a Communist ends in Palestine. The fight for Arabization is crowned by his participation in
the revolution of 1936, an upheaval that had far less meaning for leftist secularist intellectuals
in Egypt than the Spanish Civil War, though Islamists were trying to broaden the front of sup­
porters, and established organizations, like Huda Shaarawi’s Egyptian Women’s Association,
were collecting donations. The scheming of his Zionist foes had failed completely. They could
not prevent Dûwïdâr’s return to Egypt, not only as a representative of the Egyptian workers,
but as a symbol for the potential of modem development in the Arab world and the force of
the Arab people struggling for education and the preservation of their own identity and culture.
DûwIdSr even joined the struggle against the most advanced form of imperialism in the Middle
East, Jewish settler colonialism. This argument has to be viewed from the time aspect of the
interview. The encounter between Al-SaTd and DQwTdSr took place in 1970. The shadow of
the disastrous defeat of 1967 still lingered on, while the political system had been profoundly
shaken, and the chances for the Egyptian left to return to the political stage were high. In this
context, the battle for Palestine was of enourmous importance, more than the battle for Egypt.
Egyptians were defending Egypt’s position as the dominant power in the Middle East, and the
defender of Palestinian rights, and the cause of the Arab nation. Düwldâr’s narrative embodies
all those elements, and the role of Zionists as the main competitors for predominance in the
Middle E ast
The relation with international (European) communism, as reflected in those two narratives,
was influenced by the Palestinian cause and the endeavor of Egyptian Communists to defend
the Arab nation and its cultural and linguistic presence in an international organization. Until
1920, Communists in Russia had believed that a revolution in all of Europe was immediately
forthcoming, and that this communist revolution would wash away all the nationalist move­
ments in the E ast Between 1920 and 1928, the Comintern based its politics on the principle of
a struggle of all national classes against imperialism, and the struggle of workers, peasants, pe­
tit bourgeois, and intellectuals against the bourgeoisie (though the Chinese example had proved
already that a bourgeois leadership would even move against revolutionary workers before it
had gained victory over the national enemy). Until the mid-1930s, the Comintern believed in a
class against class tactics, and saw the proletariat as the only class capable of serious struggle
against imperialism. Then a popular front phase followed that lasted well until the end of WW
II (interrupted only by a two years’ stage of class against class factionalism during the time of
the Soviet-German pact, between 1939 and 1941).
The Soviets did not know much about the Arab world. But a good cooperation between
Communists in Arab countries and Moscow was facilitated by the role the Russian or Polish
Communists played in Palestine.62 They did not have difficulties in publishing, or discussions,
or reading books. The Comintern was hoping for a pan-Arabic or pan-lslamic movement that
would bring the British Empire down. Starting from 1929, the national Arab question was
considered an important issue in that context. The aforementioned AbQ Ziyäm was Wolfgang
Auerbach, the chief of the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), who appeared also under the
alias of Daniel, Haidar, Arabicus, or Shaukl.63 But by the end of the 1920s, he had lost his
“ Flore» 1980.217.
“ Ibid., 222.

88

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I

influence in the Comintern. In 1930 he was removed from his post as Secretary General off
the PCP and called backed to the USSR. After that he did not publish anymore. Later be w a s
arrested, and executed in 1941. Joseph Beiger, whose alias was Bob, could publish until 1934,
then he was arrested and spent 21 years in labor camps, and in Siberia. Most of the other Jew ish
leaders of the PCP were killed during Stalin’s puige.
The Arab voice was more difficult to hear. Arab Communists seldom wrote far the m ain
communist organs. Berger’s and Auerbach’s understanding of Palestine was tinted by their u n ­
derstanding of European conditions. (Therefore, they assumed a conflict of interests betw een
feudal effendis and the local bouigeoisie, for example.) They did not comment on ethnic or re li­
gious minorities, but insisted on internationalism, though in 1931 Berger wrote that the m asses’
understanding of communism suffered from the weak communist organizations, Islamic tra ­
dition, and the undemanding nature of the Arabs.64 The lack of Arabization became clear to
the leadership of the Comintern only after the Wailing Wall Riots in 1929. In 1930 and a fte r
much pressure from Moscow, the first central committee with an Arab majority was formed in
the Palestinian Communist Party. Arab cadres maintained that a Zionist conspiracy hampered
communist progress in the Arab world, because weak Arab elements had been sent to M oscow
on purpose, to prove that the Palestinian Arabs were not fit to lead.6*
Flores agrees with Palestinian Arabs that Jews could not be more than midwives, or a s­
sistants, “Hilfskräfte,” in Palestine, just like the Bolsheviki who had been active among th e
different nations in the USSR.66
The Arab party members argued that at first they had been in favor of Arabization, sim ply,
because they were Arabs. Having been to Moscow had helped them to understand that Arabiza­
tion was necessary, because the first stage of struggle in Palestine was national liberation. T he
masses were neither Marxist nor Leninist, they would not trust Jewish names, neither “Haim**
nor “Yitzhak,” but only “Zaid, Khälid and ‘Umar.”67
The same Mahmud al-Attrash who is quoted by Flores as an eyewitness for the impossibility
of Jewish communist activity in Palestine, appears in the history of Egyptian communism and
in context with Egyptian workers’ experience at the Toilers of the East University. Mahmfld
Düwîdâr had mentioned him as one of the good Palestinian comrades in Moscow amongst all th e
failures sent there. Al-Attrash was a real internationalist. His stations of struggle were Palestine.
Russia, Algeria. Finally Rif 'at Al-SaTd tracked him down in the German Democratic Republic.
His testimony is given in a report entitled “The role of the Third Communist International fo r
64Ibid., 240.
"F lares 1980,258.
"Ib id ., 268. Ia Batata’s account Auerbach is a more likable figure. He had complained about the difficult task
set for him and his comrades in the Middle E ast He had been an old Communist, friends with Lenin himself from
his time in Geneva, and he felt that the party suffered from two factors: the Comintern took little interest in the Arab
East and provided little assistance, and the party was composed of a few Jews while progress among Arabs was very
slow. At a secret gathering in March 1927, Auerbach deplored that the Palestinian party was the only communist
front in the Arab East and had to look into matters related to Syria, Egypt and Islamic congresses in Cairo, Mecca
and elsewhere. The International neglected the Arab Communists, unless they sent a special messenger, and they
were not considered a real factor. In 1926 the executive committee of the Communist International reckoned
that the Palestinian Communist Party had “Arabization as a first task," although they turned down with disdain
a suggestion to lessen communist activity amongst the Jews (sic!). Arabs were to be attracted by pamphlets
and a "special newspaper which the French Communists undertook to print in France." (384). The Comintern
functionaries admitted that Arabs did not like to be associated with Jews in Palestine, but hoped that in northern
Syria, with its almost exclusively Arab and Muslim population, a communist center might attract the m atart
Furthermore they were then ready to support all movements against British and French colonialism, including
amirs and tribal shaikhs. Batatu 1978,384-386. Batatu’s information is partly based on eyewitnesses.
"F lores 1980,270.

4.2. WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS

89

the development of national and social awareness in the working class and the Arab people.”6*
Al-Attrash sets out to discuss the main weak points of the communist movement in the Arab
world: a considerable number of Communists in the Arab countries, above all in Lebanon,
Palestine, Egypt, and Syria, belonged to national minorities (al-aqalliyyit al-qaumiyya), mainly
Jews. Most of them came from social democratic parties, and/or arrived at communism through
Zionist organizations like the Bund. In the beginning the Arab comrades trusted them com*
pletely until they discovered that the Jewish Communists did not understand either the re­
quirements of that precise historical stage in the Arab world or the truth of Marxist-Leninist
principles, related to independence and nationalism. The recruitment of all the popular forces,
workers, peasants, intellectuals, petit bourgeois, and even the national bourgeoisie was a ne­
cessity to bring about independence and democracy. But the Jewish cadres dragged their Arab
comrades into an isolationist policy.
Even though the Communist Party in Egypt gained a foothold among workers, it completely
misunderstood the importance of national struggle and the role of the proletariat A major
mistake was the misjudgement of the role of national minorities in Egypt as well as in all the
other Arab countries: the British and the French were biased in favor of minorities, in Egypt and
in Palestine especially. Minorities were given special rights until their bourgeoisie dominated
the economy of the Arab countries. French and British used those minorities to repress the Arab
people, to destroy their revolutionary movements and their efforts to liberate themselves. They
were the extended arm of imperialism. The comrades belonging to those minorities called on
the Arab workers to ignore national differences and to unite with those national minorities in
the name of the international proletariat, instead of uncovering their role as the fifth column of
imperialism.
Al-Attrash tries to generalize and to start a discourse about the role of minorities in the Mid­
dle East in general. Only the Armenians in Syria and Lebanon understood that the “minority”
masses had to turn against “their” bourgeoisie, in order to secure their future and to ally with the
struggle of the toiling masses and the Arab people for independence.49 Lettish radicalism and
subtle opportunism were the reasons for the isolation of the Egyptian Communist Party from
the popular masses and the peasants, which, in turn, helped to crush the party once ZaghlQl had
turned against it, encouraged by the British in 1924. The Communists’ main mistake was that
they favored international solidarity over national liberation, which helped the British to urge
the Wafd to deal the party a deadly blow.
In al-Attrash’s account the mistake was not a mistake of the center of the communist move­
m ent On the contrary, the Third International had put pressure on the Arab Communists to
arabize the leadership and the rank and file of the communist parties everywhere in the Arab
World, from the 1920s on. In the course of Arabization, Arab workers and intellectuals were
drawn to the communist parties. The assumption here is always that “foreigners” deter locals
from joining those parties. The leadership of the communist parties became Arab in Syria,
Lebanon, and Palestine. Though the transition did not pass without conflict, solved in the end
by the expulsion of the opportunist, Zionist, and Trotskyite elements from the party and the
country.
“Those elements considered Arabization a chauvinist plan based on a positive bias
towards the Arab nation. They thought that anything Arab would lead to anti-*
“ Al-SaTd 1989,13-26. From the accompanying letter it is obvious that al-Attrash had sent that report already
ia 1969. Probably a copy of it waa published by the L e b e n » magazine “aHarfq” in (he same year.
**Armenians we also tingled out in the Egyptian discourse. They are considered the only minority that really
adapted to Egyptian life. Petaonal interview with R allf'A bM t, Cairo 17th November 1999.

90

CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I
Semitistn and opposition towards the foreign comrades, and was designed to push
them to the backbenches of the struggle. The Comintern, however, regarded Ara­
bization as a politically scientific plan, studied on the basis of Marxism-Leninism,
a necessary step, because of the nature of the liberation struggle and its demands.
It was the expression of a certain historical stage, decided by the history of strug­
gle for the sake of the socialist revolution. That stage was the stage of national
liberation and independence.”70

Because the Arab countries were colonized by the French and the British, assisted by the
Zionists, the capitalist foreign companies, the national minorities, and the local reactionary
forces, national liberation had to be achieved first In Attrash’s analysis, all those forces are
indiscriminately a stumbling block for independence, and it is worth to emphasize that he speaks
about Zionists first, and only afterwards about national minorities, both of them siding w ith the
colonizers. The difference between those two and the local reactionary forces was that the
latter were part of the national community, and their conflict would be solved on a political,
probably also on a social level, while the conflict with national minorities included - apart
from the economic and social dimension - a cultural (national) dimension that excluded their
participation in the struggle for liberation. Any non-Arab, and in al-Attrash’s further argum ent
the compatibility of Arab and Muslim is very obvious, was an obstacle for the m ovem ent
Attrash’s further remarks are very revealing. Arguing from his Palestinian background, be
generalizes his conclusions, in an effort to make them valid for the whole Arab world.
“It is impossible for the masses at that stage to trust in Haim, Abraham, or Ishaq.
They cannot follow their direct leadership even if they were the best fighters for
national (watanT) independence, because they belong either to the dominating na­
tion (umma) or to the national minorities (al-aqalliyyût al-qaumiyya) on whom the
imperialists bestowed a variety of privileges at the expense of the Arab peoples.
They made them an instrument of injustice and discrimination to fight the hopes
of the toiling masses, and the Arab peoples, and their national movement for inde­
pendence. And precisely at that stage it is impossible for the masses and the Arab
peoples to trust anybody except Zaid and 'AIT and Bakr who are from within their
own ranks, and to march behind them and their leadership, because they are bound
to them by the bound of citizenship, language, customs, tradition, and religion, they
share their misery, and their joy.”71
Al-Attrash made those comments in 1969. In the aforementioned quotation he had used
different names, though the content of his remark was the same. Thus it was then Zaid, KhSlid,
and 'Umar the masses could trust.72 This quotation makes the link between Arab national­
ism and Islam more than clear. Religion has often been mentioned in a general context as a
constitutional reference and an element in everyday life in the Arab world. But al-Attrash pur­
posely chooses names which are intimately linked to the Islamic past, the very beginning o f the
Islamic conquests (futOh). He ignores Christian involvement in the movement for Arab awak­
ening (nahda) and in the Arab liberation movement Culture, the uniting element for the A rab
masses, is Islam: the hope they can once again become a powerful nation is fed by the memory
70AI-Sa1d 1989,19.
71Ibid., 20.
^Flores 1980,270. Flores bases his quotation on Maher al-Charif, Le premier congrès d’ouvrier arabe: emer­
gence du mouvement ouvrier arabe en Palestine, in: René Gallissot (ed.): Mouvement ouvrier. Communisme et
nationalismes dans le monde arabe. Paris: Les editions ouvrières 1978,147-157,255.

4 2 . WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS

91

o f Islamic history, not by the vision of a promising future. In this context, not only Christians,
but also Kurds and other minorities ate excluded.
Al-Attrash refers to his Palestinian experience to illustrate how the worst elements in the
communist movement - foreigners - welcomed Arabization publicly, but fought it secretly. All
the examples he gives are of people (AbO Ziyäm, i.e. Auerbach, Joseph Berger, Avigdor, other
comrades in Lebanon and Syria) who were against the plan, expelled from the party and re­
moved from the Middle E ast Auerbach’s mistake was that in the beginning of the 1920s he
had been heard saying that Zionist immigration to Palestine would mean an immigration of
communist democratic principles to Palestine, a view shared by the British authorities, though
with a less positive attitude. As a strange coincidence, therefore, the mandate authorities, the
Arab communities, Arab Communists, and Zionists were united in one opinion against Jewish
Communists in Palestine.
How to translate the cultural difference between Arab Muslims and Jews in concrete terms?
Was it only a difference in religious creeds and daily dishes or was there something more to it?
Arab Communists, as Arabs in general, harbored a cultural bias against Jews, though many
of them - as will become more evident in the second generation of Egyptian Communists • fa­
vored that new lifestyle Jewish immigrants to Palestine in particular represented. In Palestine,
which was lacking the urban and cosmopolitan atmosphere of Alexandria or even Cairo, that
new lifestyle, the dresses, and habits seemed immoral and libertine. It was a cultural shock.
Communism was associated, therefore, with a lack of sexual inhibition and immorality and
with unseemly freedom for women. The British authorities and the Arab community in Pales­
tine frowned upon May celebrations, for example, when people waving banners and wear­
ing armbands marched through Palestinian streets, loudly intonating revolutionary songs.73 To
Palestinian Arabs, such demonstrations seemed strange because they were not used to such a
manifestation of political power. But in Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brothers (and of course
other political formations) claimed the streets for themselves in the same manner, even using
uniforms.74
Communism attracted many Jews in Palestine. Tzur concludes that “Communism was the
only ideology throughout the Mandate period which was able to entice the youth away from
the Zionist movement”75 Communists, not only in Palestine but also in Egypt, were against the
myth of the new Jew, they opposed speaking Hebrew, and they were against Jewish immigration.
But Communists in Palestine were in a quandary: the Comintern pressed for Arabization with­
out actually taking the Palestinian reality into regard. And even though since 1924 Communists
had turned ever more to the Arab population by publishing leaflets in Arabic and emphasizing
the suffering of the Arab population caused by Jewish colonization, the Wailing Wall Riots in
1929 saw Jewish Communists fighting within the ranks of the Haganah in Jerusalem and Tel
Aviv. The Comintern interpreted those riots as anti-imperialist, Jewish Communists believed
them to be anti-semitic, which in the Comintern’s judgement amounted to “national heresy.”76
Jewish Communists in Palestine withstood the pressure of the nationalist enterprise as long
as possible, but in the course of time they were forced to acknowledge the primacy of national­
ism, of a fictitious national bond separating Jews and Muslims, and translated into the reality of
a state over the primacy of an ideology that acted cross-culturally and was neither embedded in
religion nor tradition, but in the ideal of social justice and equality.
For Egyptian workers the confrontation with Jews in general, and Jewish Communists in
"T zur 1999,121.
74Sec chapter about culture.
"T zur 1999,128.
"IM .,1 2 6 .

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CHAPTER 4. JEWISH COMMUNISTS I

particular, took place in a different framework than for the Palestinians, though both shared the
impression that Jews were an element alien to the Arab environment, allied with the colonial
powers, and trying to get the upperhand even over the forces opposed to imperialism. For
Egyptian workers it was important to emphasize their superiority with regard to other Arab
workers, and their equal standing with intellectuals. They stressed that Jewish cadres could not
be successful in an Arab environment for cultural reasons, and because they were ignorant of
the social and political conditions in the Middle E ast Their ignorance is always proved by their
shortcomings concerning the Arabic language. This leitmotiv is repeated throughout the history
o f Jews among Egyptian Communists. Equally persistent is the synonymous use of Arab and
Muslim, and the suspicion that any Jew might be a Zionist77
Representing the Comintern as being dominated by Zionist schemes is more than mislead­
ing. Hitherto there is no proof that at a certain period of time minorities were overrepresented
in the Comintern. Even in that internationalist body the concept of nationalism changed in very
short intervals. In the early 1920s, multicultural experience was an asset, but it turned into a
liability in the 1930s. Many communist cadres reported, for example, Jewish or Latvian citi­
zenship in the early 1920s, while in the 1930s, Russian would be more common. The conflict
Egyptian workers experienced with Comintern apparatchiks might therefore have been as much
a conflict between North and South as it was a conflict between workers and intellectuals, while
the absence of any Arab voice joining ideological discussions was then - as it is now - certainly
one of the main problems.

77O laf K irchner Das Studium der Biographie von Komintemisten: vorläufige Schlußfolgerungen, vorge­
tragen auf der Konferenz: Die Komintern in Moskau: Schnittpunkt verschiedener Wellen/ Internationale wis­
senschaftliche Konferenz. Moskau 28-29, September 2000. Forschungsprojekt: Biographisches Handbuch zur
Geschichte der Kommunistischen Internationale. Until now the project has studied 249 biographies of Comintern
members, which is only about 20% of the biographies involved in the project. Concerning the characteristics of cit­
izenship, Kirchner points out that statements about citizenship also reflected the development of Soviet nationality
politics, and that in the 1930s many so-called minorities, above all Ukrainians, Belarussians and Jews stated their
nationality as being Russian. From his findings Kirchner deducts that in 73,1% of all cases there are statements
concerning citizenship. In 28% of the cases it was Jewish (Russian 51 %; 2 1% others). An average amount of Jews
got in touch with the Comintern in June 1928 (Russians June 1932, Ukrainians October 1932, Letts in July 1926).
Apart from the great number of people who found their way to the Comintern between 1920 and 1922. i.e. during
the developing phase o f the organization, most arrived between 1930-32, 1935 and 1937/38, i.e. after the great
purges in the apparatus of the Comintern. Jews, Russians and Letts were very active during the first years o f the
Comintern. Concerning Russians and Jews in the middle of the 1920s, it can be observed that the more Russians
arrived to the organization the fewer Jews were involved. Cadres with a multicultural experience, among them also
Russians, got in contact with the Comintern much earlier than others, but in the course of time they were less and
less accepted in the Comintern apparatus.

Chapter 5
Jewish Communists II
5.1

Introduction

In the mid 1930s, the seeds for the second Egyptian communist movement were sown in cul­
tural and political clubs. The fame those clubs gained in a short time proved that the younger
generation of Egyptians felt an urge to learn and to know, and was by no means in a mood to
isolate itself from Europe and turn completely to the Arab and Islamic world. On the contrary.
In Europe and in Asia, die change of power and the struggle of ideas and ideologies were trans­
lated into a clash of arms. The Egyptian public was fascinated by the turmoil and hungry for
information. The clubs and associations that sprang up and catered to an educated public filled
(albeit in Cairo and Alexandria only) an important void. They offered lectures about fascism,
information about the war in Europe and Asia, and research about Egypt. And even though
in the beginning those clubs reached out to the public of the foreign communities mainly, in­
terviews with Egyptian activists show that the opening of those circles to a broader public of
Egyptians, starting with the beginning of WW II, found an echo. Many Egyptian students and
professionals were attracted (and recruited) by those opportunities to leam more about the world
that surrounded them, and about their own country.
In the narratives of Jewish activists from the 1930s, cultural and political activities are re­
called in one breath. Jews, Levantines, Greeks, a few Egyptian Copts, and very few Muslims
had been active in a loose cultural context. They organized expositions and concerts, published
magazines. Apart from several smaller groups, the two biggest legal associations, the Peace
Partisans1 and later the Democratic Union2 were the main gathering place for juvenile intellect
and unrest, and a spirit of antifascist resistance and enlightenment that developed into a num­
ber of different clubs and associations.3 The Peace Partisans offered the opportunity of contact
between members of local minorities and Egyptians, because of its public activities.
“In 1933, at the beginning of the Abyssinian War, the association held a big meeting
to condemn the Italian agression. I attended the meeting, and I remember that
who spoke were 'Aziz AntOn, 'Abd al-Fatt2h Al-Tawfl, and Raymond Castro (Leon
Castro’s son). ...T h at association was successful in bringing about good legal
'Founded in 1934 by Paul Jacquot Deacombet with branche» in Cairo and Alexandria.
2Founded in 1939 in Cairo and Alexandria by Marcel IsriH , Raoul C uriel. Raymond Aghion and Pola Alaili.
3See Ismael and el-Sa’id 1990,37. Among the moat famous were al-Khubz wa aJ-hurriyya (Bread and Free­
dom), al-Fann wa al-humyya (Alta and Freedom), Rabitlt Ja lib it wa K hlrijiyylt al-JIm i'a (League of university
atudeots and graduates), and Jami*at al-buhOth (Groupe Études). All in all, there were about 17 different associa­
tions.

93

94

CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS D
relations between leftist foreigners and Egyptians.**45

Not only were the speakers Egyptians and foreigners but the Peace Partisans’ news was
also published in Arabic, and French as well.3 Most of the discussions in the Peace Partisans*
sessions were about international politics, ranging from Japanese imperialism to conditions in
German concentration camps.6
Descombes, the main figure behind the Peace Partisans, and one of the critics of foreign
involvement in Egyptian communist affairs (though he was the godfather for the Workers* Van*
guard, one of the communist groups that originated in the 1940s) underlined the distance from
Egyptians. Speaking Arabic was shameful for foreigners in the Egypt of the 1920s and begin­
ning 1930s, the time he grew up.7
“Fust I wish to underline that I have felt, since 1940, that our part had definitely
ended. We had planted the seeds, and that was enough for the foreigners. We
thought that we should leave the whole issue to the Egyptians alone, and if they
were in need of some information or help, for example translations or something
like that, we would offer it. But the option that we, the foreigners, would initiate an
'Egyptian Communist Organization* was rejected.**8
The preconditions which he set for a push to change social and economic conditions in
Egypt - connection to Egyptian politics and legal public activity • were not met in the eyes of
his critics.9 Rather, the association was attacked as being stuck in a foreign ghetto and hampered
by a paranoid secrecy.
Descombes is also a witness for the assumption that Jews turned to communism following
group-specific interests. According to Descombes, Jews were afraid of fascism and ready to
cooperate with anybody who was against the Nazis. Jews were, according to Descombes, also
very afraid of the Muslim Brothers and ready to give unconditional support and money to any­
body who appeared to be antifascist.10 Descombes was eager to assert that his group totally
4Edvard Levi, interview with R ifat A l-Sald, Paris November 1968, in: A l-Sald 1987,662-63. Levi, bon
1902, was arrested in 1948. He was deported in 1936, as a French subject
5See chapter about workers.
6Rossano 1997,48.
7Paul Jacquot Descombes in an interview with R ifat A l-Sald, in: A l-Sald 1987,669-676. The son o f a Swiss
company owner and born in Cain», he had gone to a foreign school and studied music in Gennany. He had came
to know Communists in Germany. Coming back for a vacation in 1932 he learnt about the conditions of Egyptian
workers, and upon Hitler’s appointment as German chancellor he decided to stay in Egypt and get in touch with
Egyptian Communists. He felt something had to be done “to liberate the Egyptian people and to mobilize them.”
Ibid, 669.
•ibid., 673.
•Therefore he rejected a Greek proposal to join a demand for Thaelman’s release following his accusation of
being the main culprit in the Reichstagsbrand. This incident had no meaning for Egypt, he judged. Being appalled
by what he considered to be an overdose of secrecy among the only Communists he could find in Egypt, the
Greek group around Yannakakis, Kaliyarikos and Peridis, he decided with four others to found of a new group
that was to break through the walls of the foreign ghetto and get in touch with Egyptians and Egyptian reality.
That reality did not mean Egyptian party politics or a real assessment of power brokering in Egypt, but - in the
sense of socialist realism - it meant the situation o f workers and peasants, bypassing • as British colonialists did
- the indigenous (westernized) elite. Descombes was looking for a legal basis, and the foundation o f the Pence
Partisans’ Union Ittihad ansâr al-salim , affiliated to the Rassemblement Universel pour la Paix, seemed to be an
ideal form of organization.
l0In their account of the trial against the Muslim Brothers in 1934 the Lacoutures give a merciless presentation
of Dr. Khatnis Memeida, the deputy of the supreme guide. Asked in court why his organization did not cooopenie
with the government he answered: “Because we did not want to create uneasiness among foreign nationals.”

5.1. INTRODUCTION

95

declined to accept Jewish support, which implicitly involved Zionist support."
When the war started, the Peace Partisans’ work became obsolete, and a new group, the
Groupe Études, replaced it, aiming at making conditions in Egypt known to Europeans, and
also to the British and Commonwealth soldiers stationed in Egypt
Jews were in a conflict concerning the correct answer to anti-Semitism. Edward Levi, the
President of the League for the Combat of anti-Semitism in Alexandria, wanted to fight fascism,
but not to invite emigration to Palestine like the Zionists did. For Jews the struggle against antiSemitism occupied an important place in their political agenda. That fact has been mistaken as a
sign o f their estrangement from Middle Eastern societies, from an Egyptian point of view. It has
been read as a sign of overidentification with the West and with the Jewish community, because
anti-Semitism was perceived by Egyptians as alien to Middle Eastern societies while Zionism
was a real threat. Eli Mizan, the chief of the Peace Partisans in Cairo (there was another branch
in Alexandria), had also been active in the League for the Combat o f anti-Semitism, which had
been founded in 1933.*
12
The League for the Combat of anti-Semitism worked against the Nazis, organized a boycott
against German goods, films and magazines which sympathized with Germany. It was mainly
Jews who were active, but also a few Armenians and Greeks. The influence on Egyptians was
sm all.13
“We started as Jews fighting anti-Semitism and then we were moved by the Abys­
sinian War, the Spanish Civil War, the popular front slogan, and in the end we were
Communists. We participated in Wafd demonstrations, because Castro was close
to them.” 14
Not all the Jews in Egypt chose the road to communism. The Egyptian suspicions against
Jew s who would only defend their own communal interests found a justification in the attitude
o f men like Marcel Misiko, bom in Alexandria in 1907.'1 He became active in a group of Jewish
and Greek antifascists in 1936, among them Charles Issawi. Misiko describes himself as totally
isolated from Egyptians and not even interested in getting in touch with them. He understood
. .. “Why, they would have been afraid to see the Brotherhood come into power. Foreigners are afraid of us, 1am not
sure why.” ( . . . ) “By this time”, the Lacoutures conclude, “the tongue-tied Khamis had said a good deal, showing
the extent to which he and his companions were aware o f their race hatred.” Lacouture 1958, 254. Descombes
does not comment on the Muslim Brothers or their role, as he does not mention any of the political forces in Egypt
But T lriq Al-Bishifs assessment of the Muslim Brothers as a truly popular force and the Lacoutures assessment
o f the Muslim Brothers' race hatred and their awareness of the uneasiness foreigners felt towards them in Egypt is
a striking difference to the image of the tolerant open-minded Egyptian society.
"L eo n Castro, a lawyer and former Wafdist is often mentioned in this regard.
l2T he L.I.S.C.A. (lajnat muklfahat m u'idih al-slmiyya) is said to have had 1,200 members in 1935. A l-Sald
1987,517.
13A l-Sald 1987,517. A l-Sald bases his claims on a report by Spano, an Italian antifascist about communist
activities in Egypt According to that report the L.I.S.C.A. was directed by Edvard Suriyanu, a Communist. A
certain Moise Mosseri is mentioned among the best comrades, who spoke and wrote Arabic as well as French and
English and Espannto. Edvard Suriyanu is characterized as an intellectual who did not know classical Arabic.
(Walth er Laqeur mentions the Italian comrade Spano also as a political refugee from antifascists who returned to
Italy at the end of the war. Laqueur 1959, Annotations page 321.) The Committee against anti-Semitism in Egypt
had been founded in 1933 by Leon Castro. Mizan had been a pupil in the lycée then and established a branch at
school. Leon Castro, a supporter of the Wafd and editor in chief of a magazine called “Liberté,” who had taken up
the struggle against anti-Semitism in the first half of the 1930s was also engaged in the Peace Partisans. Castro was
a link to the 1920s and the Whfd’s endeavour to win over all the Egyptian society. Liberté tried to gather support
for the Wafd among foreigners.
14A l-Sald 1987,666.
I}lbid.. 688-689.

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CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS H

himself as a democratic Jew active against Nazis. There was no justification for a clash w ith
the British or an engagement in Egypt Properly read, it means that any engagement in E gypt
would have meant a clash with the British. The British, however, - for reasons due to political,
economic and geostrategic power on the one hand, and cultural links on the other hand - were a
more reliable ally in the struggle against fascism and for the sake of the survival of the Jew ish
community than the Egyptians could be.
This attitude led to a conflict with other group members. Misiko first left the group, and in
May 1948 he bade Egypt good-bye. Misiko had been bom in Alexandria in 1907. One of h is
counterparts, Raymond Aghion, bora in Alexandria in 1921, made a different choice. Accord­
ing to him, foreigners knew each other intimately, from schools and clubs, social intercourse.
Therefore, they were quick to agree and to disagree, but they all influenced each other, a n d ,
therefore, they were drawn to the left in the late 1930s.16 French literature was brought to lif e
on the streets of Egypt: Victor Hugo, Flaubert. There was a multitude of reasons for young
Jews to become a leftist: the popular front politics, fascism, a conflict of generations, a rebel­
lion against their bourgeois families. Aghion not only wanted to be a communist activist, b u t
dreamt about a future as a physician in the Egyptian countryside. The first Arab-Israeli w ar
destroyed all his hopes. He and his friends had considered themselves Egyptians even if Egyp­
tians had considered them foreigners. Now they were not only foreigners but Jews, a “potential
fifth column.”17
At school, students like Aghion, but also the aristocratic Egyptians, were influenced b y
progressive teachers at the French lycées in Alexandria and Cairo.18 For Egyptian governmental
schools, this type of education was unimaginable. Politics was learnt in activities disturbing th e
lessons and the schoolday, and it often led to an interruption or even the end of an ordinary
career in public institutions.
Towards the end of the 1930s and the middle of the 1940s, several clubs and groups had
developed that served as fronts for communist organizations, and attracted Egyptian students
as well as professionals and skilled workers, such as the House of Scientific Research (där
al-abhäth al-Hlmiyya), the Committee for the Promotion of Modern Culture (lajnat nashr althaqâfa al-hadttha), and Bread and Freedom (al-khubz wa al-hurriyya), to name but a few.19
By the end of the war, four main communist groups emerged:
The Egyptian Movement for National Liberation (EMNL) (al-haraka al-misriyya li altaharrur al-watanT) under the leadership of Henri Curiel, Iskra under Hillel Schwartz, Peo­
ple’s Liberation (lahrTr al-sha'b) under Marcel IsriH , and what was to become the Workers*
Vanguard (talfat al-'ummät), famous also as the New Dawn (al-fajr al-jadld) named for their
magazine, under YQsuf DarwTsh, Raymond Douek and Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd. The EMNL and
■‘ Ibid., 677-683. (interview conducted in Pari* in April 1973)

"Perrault 1991.206.
'•YOsuf DarwTsh, personal interview, Cairo 14th November 1999 and 20th December 1999. Often mentioned
is Anna Kayenko, later Tubi, o f Russian origin, from a communist family that had lived in Egypt for a long tim e.
But the combined effects of fascism and war had also recently brought politically active leftwing elements, w ho
found their income in foreign schools, to Egypt Dina Forti, an Italian antifascist active with the Peace Partisans in
the late 1930s, recalls that activities were usually restricted to the Italian community normally. Italian antifascists
had the ultimate aim of returning to Italy, joining the antifascist struggle in the ranks of the Italian people. But she
remembers also three Italian teachers (Ugo Nacson, Paolo Patino and Renato Mielli) in the Italian school who w ere
Communists. One of them, Renato Mielli, an Italian Jew, had been forced to leave the university of Padua after th e
Italian government passed its racist legislation. In the Italian school and in the French lycée in Alexandria he and
the other two teachers taught their students about the injustice of the invasion of Abyssinia and the Spanish C ivil
War. School was an important field of antifascist activity. Mielli. unusual for an Italian antifascist in Egypt, had
learnt Arabic as well. Al-Sa*M interview with Dina Forte, Rome 24nd February 1973, in: Al-SaTd 1987,684-687.
,9See Ismael and al-Sa’id 1990,37. Further details see: Chapter about Egyptian middle class.

5.1. INTRODUCTION

97

Iskni had sprung up at about the same time (1942). Henri Curiel, the leading figure in the
EMNL, and Hillel Schwartz, the leading figure in Iskra, had both been active in the Democratic
Union (al-ittihod al-dïmuqrâtf), founded in 1939 in Alexandria and Cairo, which had also been
a field of recruitment for Marcel IsrfiH.
Those communist groups became active in a students’ and workers’ milieu. Their members
were mainly middle class Egyptians, the famous petit bourgeois whose claim to represent the
majority of the Egyptian people • and most of all the working class • was to play a big role in
the conflict concerning Jews in the communist movement. Following the foundation of the state
of Israel, Jews who had been leading or only active in those groups were sidelined within a few
years time, a process which was as much due to a dynamics inherent in the groups themselves
as it was due to external forces. Their effort to integrate themselves into Egyptian society was
blocked. This development came as a surprise for them. What now seems to be a logical con*
sequence of political events inside and outside Egypt was not perceived as such then. Egyptian
Jews have emphasized that Egypt was different from the other Arab countries, notably Syria and
Iraq, where the struggle against Zionism had been put high on the agenda. The Iraqi People’s
Party, for example, which had been founded as a legal shield for the Communists, did not admit
Iraqi Jews. That policy was said not to have been inspired by racial bias, "but by a prudent re­
gard for the objective conditions of the country.”20 By the end of the 1930s, when the Egyptian
Communists were ready to acknowledge Abdel Nasir’s success story and join the bandwagon
of Arab nationalism, they rid themselves of the blemish of Jewish leadership as well, only to
find themselves ending up in the concentration camp of the western desert, side by side with the
Muslim brothers.
In the discussion about Jews in the communist movement, their right to lead has been con­
tested, as has been their share in the development of that movement and the direction it took.
Jews have been held responsible for the difficulties that movement had in striking roots in Egypt,
and for its internationalist outlook at the expense of a purely Arab-Egyptian nationalist outlook,
which found its most salient expression in the communist support for the partition of Palestine.
The four communist groups mentioned above, and several smaller groups that existed in
their shadow, were in a process of constant attraction and rejection. Their aim was to found a
communist party, but the precondition was a union between the groups. How this union was to
be brought about, by one group swallowing all the others, or by a union on negotiated terms,
was a hotly debated issue that is not of interest here. The first big union between the EMNL,
Iskra, and People’s Liberation, which led to the foundation of a new organization called the
Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL) in 1947, already imploded in 1948,
and triggered the spin-off of a multitude of small groups. The experience of that particular
period in Egyptian history, leading up to the formation of the DMNL, its existence and policy,
and the radical politics followed by the splinter groups, was crucial for most of the Communists
involved in that movement
In the 1950s, the most controversial figure, Henri Curiel, acted only as a leader in exile,
his membership in the Central Committee of the remnants of the DMNL dormant most of the
time, because it constituted an obstacle for the expected union with other groups. In Paris
Curiel headed the Rome Group, which understood itself as part of the Egyptian communist
movement in exile. Schwartz had already left Egypt, as had IsrSH. Schwartz dropped out of
politics completely, Israel joined the Italian Communists. Douek, Sa'd, and DarwTsh were still
the leaders of their group, which concentrated on workers, but had difficulties to recruit more
members due to the extreme secrecy surrounding the group. Another Jewish leader, Odette
1978,593.

98

CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U

Hazan, appears in the late 1940s and beginning 1950s, but with a devastating effect on a number
of Communists since she was the head of the most radical and Stalinist group that had split
away from the DMNL, the “Egyptian Communist Organization” (al-munazzama al-misriyya
al-shûyffiyya / better known by its acronym mishmish).
Since this study focuses on the discourse about Jews in the communist movement, the polit­
ical participation of minorities, and the question of Egyptian identity, the Egyptian communist
movement is not explained in all its details, and groups, and history. There are other excellent
works the reader can refer to, and the multitude of groups with overlapping “castings” only
causes confusion and does not add to the understanding of the main problem.21
Differences concentrated on the attitude towards Naserism (politics and economy), front
politics (mainly the cooperation with other political forces), economic theories, and different
models of socialist development Each of the Jewish leaders occupies a special place in the
historiography of the Egyptian Communists:
Henri CUriel is the “bad guy,” the foreign Jew vested with charisma, but guilty of misleading
Egyptian Communists in the Palestinian question, too sympathetic towards Israel and not ready
to content himself with the role of a banker for the Communists instead of being an activist He
usurped the real Egyptian leaders’ position.
Marcel IsriH is his mirror image: The foreigner who knew his proper place. Though be
fulfilled the preconditions for an Egyptian leader - he grew up in Shubra, a popular place as
opposed to the rich Zamalik where Curiel grew up, spoke Arabic like an Egyptian, and had to
work to earn a living -, be never tried to lead a communist organization, and when after 1948
the time had come for the Jews to leave Egypt he left on his own for Italy - his assumed home
country which he had never seen before • and joined the PCI.
YQsuf DarwTsh, Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd and Raymond Douek are presented, and present them­
selves, as purely Egyptian. They did not only speak the language and were Egyptian citizens,
but also were Muslims. All of them had converted to Islam, though this did not prevent their
comrades from excluding them from the leadership of the United Egyptian Communist Party in
1958 because of their Jewish origin.*li
2>Jamlfat Tahrfr al-Sha'b (People’s Liberation Group 1939), Iskra (1942), al-Qata and al-Haraka al-misriyya
li al-taharrur al-wafanl (Egyptian Movement for National Liberation / EMNL 1942) united in 1947 to become:
al-Haraka al-dlmuqrOtiyya li al-taharrur al-watanf (Democratic Movement for National Liberation / DMNL).
Between 1948 and 1949 die DMNL disintegrated into seven smaller entities: The Communist DMNL (Hadis*
at-shuyltiyya),the Progressive Liberation Front (Jabhas al-tahrfr al-taqaddumiyya), the Joined base (al-Qfida
al-mushtaraka), the Voice o f the Opposition (Saut al-mu’Srada), Towards a Bolshevist Organization (Nahwa
munazzama bolshifiyya), Towards a Communist Party (Nahwa hizb shuyitl), the Revolutionary Bloc (al-takattul
al-thaurf). The Egyptian Communist Organization (al-munazzama al-shuyttiyya al-misriyya /mishmish) evolved
from the union between the Joined Base, the Voice of the Opposition and Towards a Bolshevik Organization.
In 1949 the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rdya) (ECP), which was better known as al-rilya (the Flag, after its
mouthpiece), came into being under the leadership of F u ld MursT and IsmlH Sabri 'Abdallah, who had both stud­
ied in Paris. Between 1930 and 1933 new groups emerged. The DMNL remained present on the Egyptian scene
as one of the biggest organizations, now mainly in competition with the Workers’ Vanguard (JattaS al-'ummOl),
under the leadership of the Jewish triumvirate Sa'd, DarwTsh, Douek, the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rilya)
under the leadership of F u ïd MursT and Ism ill Sabri 'Abdallah, who were entirely opposed to leading Jewish
cadres and convinced of their monopoly on Egyptian Communism, and a number of smaller organizations (al-

najm al-ahmar, talfat al-shuytflyln, nawdh al-hizb al-shuyift al-misrf, jabhat al-tahrfr al-uufaddumiyya, nahwa
hizb shuyCftmisri). By the end of 1933, efforts to unite those different groups had been partially successful, but the
big union came about at the end of 1937. First the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rilya) and the Unified Egyptian
Communist Party (al-Muwahhad which included the former DMNL and several smaller groups) united to form the
United Egyptian Communist Party (al-hfuttahid), and finally, under the inclusion of Hizb al-ummâl wa a/-fallahin
al-shuytfTal-misrf (the Egyptian Communist Party of Workers and Peasants / the former Workers' Vanguard which
had also been known as the “New Dawn” group after their mouthpiece) the Communist Party of Egypt was founded
in January 1938 (though it was soon to split again into the DMNL branch and an opposition).

5.2. A JEWISH MILITANT

99

5.2 A Jewish M ilitant
The first approach occurs through the eyes of one of his admirers and fellow militants, Didar
Fauzi Rossano. Curiel had become active in that vacuum between the good old days and to­
morrow, between Jews occupying the posts of ministers and university chairs and advancing to
the arch enemy o f the Arab nation. On the threshold of the 20th century, Jews had succeeded
in stepping out of the shadows of dhimml existence in Egypt Classically, dhimmls were the
source of tribute, they were the “necks and arms” of society, of a defeated and lowly rank.22
Within a few decades, Jews, with the Egyptian rulers’ ambition to join the caravan o f western
modernity, had received a higher social rank than the majority of Muslim Egyptians. And un­
der the cultural hegemony of the colonial power, they did not hesitate to manifest their cultural
and social difference. In Curiel’s generation, that difference had become most obvious, the gap
between the indigenous Muslims and the Jews • immigrants and locals - grew. Though it grew
in the same measure that the gap between Egyptian social classes grew.
Jews in Egypt felt that their position in Egyptian society had remained insecure, even if
some of them could go to the King’s ballroom parties, and many sent their children to the best
schools in Egypt. Security was delivered by the community itself only.
Didar Fauzi Rossano, a middle class Jewish woman and loyal supporter of Curiel, was not
a deep believer. But she learnt Hebrew, and depicts herself as a conscious practioner of Jewish
rituals. Her father did not demand anything, but to practice them once a year. Rossano used
to fast, to eat the unleavened bread during the seven days o f Pessah. Those were practices
without a theological basis. But after her marriage to Osman Fauzi, an Egyptian officer, a
change occurred :
“Je me remis ostensiblement à respecter le yom Kipour, c’ était pour signifier à ma
mère que je ne devenais pas une étrangère. Car, en Egypte, être juive, c’était ap­
partenir à une famille, à une communauté! Et lorsqu’il n’ya pas égalité des chances
dans une nation, au moins est-on soutenu par elle.”23
Belonging to the Jewish community was a source of pride and prestige. It did not harbor
the ghetto mentality of Eastern Europe, and it was different from the Jewish communities in
the Maghreb. Egyptian Jews were even famous in the Middle East, because they did not have
a specific Egyptian dialect that would make them identifiable as Jews, unlike Iraqi Jews for
example. The Jewish families in Egypt, and especially the Jewish bourgeoisie in the big cities,
were open to the outer world, an openness not traced back to French culture sui generis, but
in its non-colonial essence comparable to English culture. The British did not try to integrate
Jews. The French had offered French citizenship to Jews in Algeria, the British in Egypt did
n o t French was the Jewish language, and it was only in the Jewish quarter that Arabic was
spoken.
“Notre identité s'affirm ait par la culture. Ni dominante, ni dominée.”24
“ Ayubi 1995,58.
"R ossano 1997.47.
"T h e identification of Jew* in Egypt neither wirb Egypt nor with the European countries whose languages
they spoke (Italy or Prance) is not that astonishing. In a study on young Pakistanis in Great Britain, the researcher
found that they identified in the first (dace with their religion and their culture and tradition as Muslims, but not with
Pakistan as a country. Though they were born in Great Britain, educated and socialized they tended to distance
themselves from the British and to emphasize the superior nature o f Islam compared to European (occidental
Christian) culture.

100

CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U

Curiel’s role and his political leanings were not extraordinary in that bourgeois layer of
the Jewish community in Egypt “de culture française (ou mixte lorsqu’on était également [!
I.S.] lettré en Arabe).”23* Curiel was urged to action by the victory of fascism and nazism in
Europe with its repercussions in Egypt, the renewed Egyptian national movement, and the end
of the communal privileges. It was precisely the end of what had always been held against the
immigrants involved in the Egyptian communist movement that made some of them want to
share in Egyptian political life. Until that moment, Didar Rossano had felt perfectly secure in
her own community. “Le Curiélisme" was for her “une disponibilité désintéressée.” All the
groups Curiel created, and she was involved in, did not strive for power. Rossano mentions the
EMNL explicitly and adds “... puisque son objectif immédiat était national.” The Communists’
position concerning the two state solution in Palestine, the dialogue between Israelis, Arabs,
and Palestinians to solve the conflict, was not due to the Jewish identity of Communists, their
European culture, or the fact that they became active in Europe, it was due to communism as a
political ideology.26
For Didar Fauzi Rossano, the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians” did not include chauvisinism. During the first years of the 1950s, the open spirit of the 1940s remained. In 1951, it was
possible for her to engage in political work in popular quarters. Her halting Arabic was not an
obstacle.
“De même que l’accent épouvantable d’Henri n’avait créé aucune méfiance chez
les ouvriers qu’il formait à l’action révolutionnaire. Aujourd’hui ce serait impens­
able.”27
Rossano perceived Egypt as an open country, ready to receive and to accept her even in
the position of a representative of the people. What she perceived as her own shortcoming, the
difficulty with the Arabic language, did not matter, either in a political or in a public context, or
in the contact with the broad populace. She does not mention any other difference, neither in
taste nor in behavior.28
Prior to the late 1930s, there were no frictions between the Muslim and the Jewish com­
munities, because contact was limited. When conflict came, it did so according to strict rules,
well defined-places and hierarchies. Egyptians appeared in a life like Didar Rossano’s or Henri
CUriel’s prior to 1939 as servants, business partners, or members of a political establishment
which struggled for the realization of a nation Jews did not really belong to. But in daily life, in
daily aspirations, in education, work and love affairs they did not appear. The change in political
climate in Egypt during the 1930s, the stronger Islamic definition of Egyptian statehood and so­
ciety made identification with the Egyptian nation state more difficult for non-Muslims. But the
world had started to move at high speed, and the young generation rushed to participate. Politics
was no longer an affair for elderly gentlemen who did not change the basics of society. Because
the whole world was shaken by fascism and war, Egypt became part of that world. It was no
longer a fairy land of pyramids and mummies, close enough to Europe to be affected by cultural
trends but not changed in its substance. For a few years it reverberated with all the political and
cultural shocks that hit Europe, in an intellectual as well as in a very human and material sense.
"Rossano 1997,45-47.
"S he is particularly appalled by Ra*Qf ‘Abbas’ sue rapt to interpret the help for Communist Palestinian prisoners
in Egypt as support for Zionists because he did not understand the use of fictitious names. Her letter of protest was
not published in Egypt Ibid., 113.
"Ib id ., 79.
"H ow far this is also related to the milieu she moved in and the Egyptian Muslim and Coptic counterparts she
met is discussed in the chapter Ideology and economy.

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101

Revolutionaries of different nationalities were stranded there, Greek soldiers, Yugoslavs, Italian
antifascists. They had not come, like the Russian and Polish revolutionary migrants, in the first
two decades of the century to work in Egyptian • foreign owned • factories as skilled workers
o r to do business as tradesmen. Egypt was a basis to fight for the freedom of their homelands.
Egyptians were tom between the fascination for Rommel’s victories in Africa and the illusion
o f liberation from British colonialism at German hands and the Red Army’s triumph at Stal­
ingrad. The young migrants of the third generation had grown up in an atmosphere unshaken
by the turmoils of Egyptian interior policy. They had been longing for the cultural capitals of
western Europe and the flair of being en vogue in every sense, and not always a bit too late,
or a bit on the periphery as it is the case in any colonial city, in any hinterland or province.
They witnessed Egypt’s transformation into a land of revolutionary change. The barbarism that
had raided Europe made them see the injustice and the need for change in Egypt, and consider
Europe as less desirable destination. For the first time, identification with political develop­
ment in Egypt, and with Egyptians as comrades in a common struggle, was possible. Since the
borders across the Mediterranean were closed, they had to turn around to see their Egyptian
contemporaries. From the late 1930s, the political situation for Egyptians changed and left the
well-trodden path of a futile tug-of-war with the colonial power concerning Egyptian indepen­
dence. Egypt was to become a theater, not an auditorium, for international developments. The
world seemed caught in a common fate, socialism and democracy were options that functioned
transnational^. Those options stirred the political scene which had until then been dominated
by corruption-stricken minority parties, the conservative Islamic groups, and the Wafd, which
was already losing its grip on power. Young Egyptians - though independence was high on their
agenda - were nonetheless eager to learn that colonialism was only one expression of an eco­
nomic system that exploited people everywhere. They were looking for new leaders and new
ideals, and were ready to unite with forces outside Egypt - especially a powerful force like the
Red Army that defied snow, hunger, and the formidable German soldiers • as well as with men
and women inside Egypt who were neither Muslims nor spoke perfect Arabic, but had the same
political aims and the dream of a better society.
Even a girl like Didar Rossano, so little interested in politics that she did not read the news­
papers until 1941, finally got attracted by politics. Until World War II, Didar Rossano “felt
nothing else but Jewish,” her fantasies were stimulated by the kibbutz movement, though she
does not remember debates about Zionism. For Rossano and her schoolmates, Zionism was not
a matter of identification. She remembers documentary films about cultivation and communal
life, cinema Metro, which still exists, packed with people. She was a member of a group of
girl guides who used to march into the desert, accompanied by Maccabi scouts, sleeping un­
der an open sky, parading in shorts or in a blue dress with a white necktie embellished with
the star of David. But she stresses that “... nous n’avions comme tradition de la judéité que
l’extraordinaire horra endiablée.”29
It is Rossano’s declared aim to explain what Curiel really did, because she finds his actions
misrepresented at the hands of mediocre competitors. She sees the national liberation as his
primary concern in Egyptian politics. In France he focused on the support of the liberation
movements. And she feels herself - “par choix!” • belonging to the revolutionary movements
that later on received observer status at the UN, the PLO, and the ANC, who both of them chose
armed struggle as the means for liberation.30
Rossano herself and her husband Osman became members of CUriel’s organization. The
" R oumio 1997,46.

»WA. II.

102

CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U

EMNL, as well as the DMNL, are bis organizations in Rossano's eyes, and be is the central
figure, with him it becomes easy to break the law and to put herself outside legality. The main
factors that pushed Didar Fauzi Rossano to action were not different from the impetus guiding
any other Egyptian comrade: the reduction of the peasants to a pack animal, the arrogance of the
English military and administration, and the overall corruption, the inactivity of the nationalist
parties, and the full-mouthed propaganda of the Muslim Brothers which was not followed by
action.
Rossano admired Curiel. She ascribes it to his influence that she discovered a higher quality
of life. A higher quality of life: meaning to fight, to be committed to a (changing) cause.
They were engaged in “une organization de paumés pour paumés.”31 They did not adhere
to the myth of the Third Woridists, but understood the Third World as different societies in
different states of underdevelopment that embodied a certain revolutionary potential, but no
revolutionary essence as such.
The Rome Group32 got involved in the struggle for Palestine, supported the FLN, and after
being arrested in October 1960 with Curiel, Rossano was deported, because she was not a
French citizen. She went to Algeria and stayed there until 1969.
Discourse in Egypt does not integrate the “paumés pour paumés” formula. That Curiel lived
in France illegally for many years, that he insisted upon Egypt as his homecountry is registered
with a shrug. He could not claim for himself to be either ibn al-balad or ibn al-shaT), nor was he
even from ibna’ al-dhawät since there was no Egyptian or Arab lineage connecting him with the
indigenous elite of the country. For Didar Rossano, Egypt was in the first place a memory o f the
European quarter of Cairo surrounding Soliman Pasha Square • Soliman Pasha, the Frenchman,
as Didar reminds her daughters, al-Colonel Saif, as Egyptian history has it, Joseph de Sève, who
was one of the military instructors who followed Muhammad Ali’s call and came to Egypt, and
who was promoted to chief of staff after he converted to Islam. In 1963, his statue was replaced
by one ofT al'at Harb. Rossano moved in the radius of al-(Ataba al-Khadrä’, die stock exchange,
and the Ezbekiah theater. The theater and the opera, the expressions of higher culture, were
frequented by the educated, the people with European background and leanings. Rossano’s
mother laughed about the cartoons depicting Misr effendi33, she used to go and see Naglb alRihinl, the Lebanese comedian, even though she did not know much Arabic. Ronit Matalon
and Shulamit Lapid are two contemporary Israeli authors who conjure up memories of the
Egyptian opera in their figures of elderly Egyptian Jews stranded in Israel. They long for a
glorious Egyptian past while they spend the evening of their lives in godforsaken Israeli towns.
Egyptian cultural life attracted Arabophone Egyptians, as well as the Francophone minorities.
But the most spectacular expression of that life, the opera, was burnt down on the black Friday
of January 1932, symbolic of a stage in the development of the modem Egyptian nation drawing
to a close. The modem opera house that took its place in the late 80s • planned by a Japanese
architect - is built in the Islamic tradition of palaces and gardens.
Didar Rossano knew Bab al-Louk, where the French Lycée was (and still is) located. Heluan,
now a site of heavy industrial activity and the starting point for workers’ unrest following the
defeat in 1967, was for Rossano a spa where her mother used to take her in the winter to cure her
of her cough. Her hobbies were bicycle riding, swimming in the swimming pool of the Mena
31Ibid., 18.
32The group Henri Curiel and other» founded in Pari» m ■ group of Egyptian Communia» in exile. See further
down this chapter.
u MiK effendi was the Egyptian man-in-the-street, a petty bourgeois in a western style jacket with a taibuah
on his head, representing the typical Egyptian government employee. See for lengthy description and details, for
example: Berque 1972,477.

5.3. CURIEL

103

House hotel, or rowing a boat on the Nile.34 Hers was a privileged childhood in Cairo that most
o f the rank and file members of the communist movement could • and did • only dream of,
while the Egyptian upper middle class and upper classes indulged in much the same activities.
Rossano did not see much Egyptian misery in her childhood, except the ever present beggars.
Real everyday life poverty she met only as a grown-up member of the Egptian Women’s Asso­
ciation when she entered the poor quarters to evaluate the needs of its inhabitants. But a slum
was also not the habitat of the majority of Egyptian Communists. As we will see later, most
o f them had not come close to a factory or workers’ living quarters before joining communist
ranks.
Rossano describes herself as ’’carrying Cairo inside her,” and you believe her when you read
how she describes the waters of the Nile and its shores, the plants and the smells, the skills her
mother developed in Egyptain cuisine, and the special sense of Egyptian humor embodied in
the figure of Misr effendi. Probably one of the keys for understanding Rossano is what she says
about her parents.
“Os étaient des khawagat [which in a footnote she says mean those who wear hats
and live an European style of life I.S.] mais pas des étrangers. Rien, vraiment rien
de commun avec cette société alexandrine décrite par Lawrence Durrel.”35
Didar Rossano was, like most of the Communists, acting against conventions. But she
showed her dismissal of conventional behavior even in the personal sphere. Her marriage to
Osman Fauzi had been against the social norms. She continued to work, which caused a scan­
dal. Fauzi’s Muslim family and friends had only reluctantly accepted his marriage to an eman­
cipated Jewish woman. As an officer, Osman Fauzi lost all his chances to be promoted to the
royal guard. On the Jewish side, too, it was a scandal that Didar Rossano had married a pen­
niless Muslim, though his English mother and the Circassian grandfather added to the groom’s
prestige. Rossano rejected the only social and economic advantage her marriage would have
had: a new perspective at work, since the bank she was employed at was desperately looking
for Egyptian nationals knowing English.36

53

Curiel

Jews have been held responsible for many of the diseases afflicting the Egyptian communist
movement in the 1940s and 1930s. The splits in the movement, the endless debates, low security
standards, centralism, the distance from masses and corruption, have all been heaped on the
shoulders of the Jews. But many of the difficulties the Egyptian Communists faced were typical
for small radical groups in an intellectual-petit bourgeois environment Curiel has been accused
of monopolizing a power center, of being unable to accept opposition, or dissent. Sometimes
those shortcomings were ascribed to his bourgeois upbringing, to his Jewish origins, or worse,
even to a Zionist scheme of conspiracy aimed at destroying the communist movement in Egypt.
But even if Curiel (whose secret name was YQnis) was not a Muslim, even if he spoke Arabic
with a foreign accent and came from the ranks of the class enemy, he had the charisma of a
leader.
"R m m im 1997,31.
"Ib id ., 36.
"Ibid., 64.

104

CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U
“The troth is that before that crisis [i.e. in the DMNL in 19481.S.] the cadres’ trust
in the leadership embodied in Ytlnis was absolute. But the crisis exploded, and the
splits continued, and so many ideological, political, and organizational questions
came up which the leadership failed to answer in a transparent way. Thus the trust
in the leadership was shaken, even from the side of the cadres, who refused to build
a fraction or to split off.”37

Communists, the Egyptian Prime Minister Sidql declared in 1946, did not work for the sake
of Egypt, but for foreign countries. They provoked unrest, instigated destructive movements
among students and workers inspired by change elsewhere, and they invited foreign powers to
intervene in Egyptian domestic affairs. Those accusations followed the upheaval at the begin**
ning of the year, when a wave of strikes and demonstrations had shaken the country.3* Sidql,
though, does not mention any foreigners or Jews among the Communists. He speaks about
workers and students, an almost exclusively Egyptian clientele. The Lacoutures, two Bench
historians, agreed with Çidqfs view that the communist movement was associated with foreign
powers, though it played an “essentialist nationalist role.”39 They noted that the movement
was strong and on the increase, though it had been led and inspired by foreigners, composed
mainly of intellectuals, and the links to the masses were superficial. For the Lacoutures the main
problem of the Communists was the Palestinian conflict, because Russia had voted in favor of
partition but Muslim militants had been against i t The extreme left wing of the Communists had
supported the Russian position. The man responsible for that policy seemed to the Lacoutures
to be Henri Curiel. Curiel had been at the center of many differences: he had been in touch with
Marty, the DMNL had translated a book by Tito, Curiel favored popular front tactics -, but the
Lacoutures do not mention a conflict based upon national identity. It was true that the social and
cultural climate in Egypt had changed. Egyptian industrial circles had been eager to neutralize
Jewish competition, which had already become dangerous between 1939 and 1943. They had
probably been in favor of the war in Palestine for that particular reason. But the conflict itself
brought about deeper changes.
“The conflict earned Egypt a new enemy, the Jew, who could be blamed for every
public misfortune___However, the poison of race-hatred had entered a land where,
only twenty years before, eminent Jews held positions as ministers and university
professors. For the first time in the streets of Cairo you could hear the word (Jew)
uttered as a threat or an insult”40
The police turned against leftists, and did not differentiate between Zionists and Commu­
nists. With the defeat in the first war against Israel the state disintegrated, the old society
collapsed.
In 1946 Curiel and four comrades had been arrested in a bar in downtown Cairo (Big Ben),
and accused of communist conspiracy.41 A press campaign against Curiel had been instigated
that used the image of the “Jewish-Communist millionaire,” to smear the communist movement
37Mahm0d HamdT 'Abd al-Gawid, 7.7.1973, interview with R ifat Al-Sald, in: Al-SaTd 1989.224. 'Abd alGawld was a member of the DMNL shin, which Curiel continued to consider a part of the DMNL. The group
bad almost disintegrated in May 1949 when only Kamil and Ibrihlm ’Abd al-Hallm were left because the rest was
imprisoned.
*L e journal d’Egypte, 16.7.1946.
MLacouture 1938,236.
«Ibid., 103.
4'In 1946 a case was filed against Communists that became known as "al-mu'Omara al-shuyU’iyya al-kubnT
(The big communist conspiracy).

5.3. CURIEL

105

Curiel had been arrested several times before. In 1942 he had been released, with the warn­
ing not to engage in further political activity. He was a figure that troubled political police in
Egypt very much. To them he seemed behind all communist groups and efforts, supporting them
ideologically, financially, and practically. The police noted that his father was an Italian citizen,
but that he, Henri Daniel Nasim Curiel - there is an Arab element also in Curiel’s name - had
received Egyptian citizenship on 19th October 1939.42 The majority of persons involved with
him and mentioned by the police were Egyptian nationals, not foreigners. In the police files
the foreigners involved appeared able to speak Arabic. Some of them spoke fluent Egyptian di­
alect, others had some difficulty to formulate their sentences, mixing classical expressions with
dialect, but nonetheless they spoke the language. Curiel’s answers showed a mixture of classi­
cal Arabic and dialect that was typical for (educated) foreigners. Curiel’s Arabic, as repeated in
the protocol, is not void of grammatical mistakes, mixing male subjects with female adjectives,
which is thought to be particularly funny by Arab listeners. But in general his Arabic is more
than comprehensible. Only between the classical questions and the answers there is sometimes
a difference. Curiel uses links like “WrtF” to indicate the genetive, which is supposed to be very
colloquial, or 4W ’ to indicate a relative pronoun, and “do” or “dT as demonstrative pronouns
instead of “hâdhâT and 44hadhihJ,”43 That Bakhur Minahim Munshaf was caught in 1944, in
the context of FathI Al-RamlTs election campaign, writing on the walls in the 'AbdTn police
district in Arabic ("Socialism Will Lead The World” and "Socialism Against Imperialism”) and
in French ("Long Live Communism”) shows that the equation: Jew = foreigner = ignorant o f
Arabic did not work.44
Other revolutionary efforts figured in the Communists', or suspected Communists’, speeches
and discussions. Greece and Spain were a frequent reference.45 Government and police were
42He had not only acquired a permission to publish hurriyyat al-sfoïQb in 1941, but he was also perceived
as being behind cultural associations like Culture and Leisure {al-thaqQfa wa aJ-farâgh\ Bread and Freedom
(ai-khubz wa al-hurriyya), the Socio-cultural Center (al-markaz al-thaqöft al-ijtima'T) and the Democratic Union
(al-ittihâd al-dlmuqrüß - for which one also Raymond Aghion, Esther Setton and Henriette Aibeh, who is specified
as a teacher in the French school in al-Dhahir, and Ezra HarfirT, an engineer in the Mosseri company, were listed
as involved), even if other figures like Marcel Ceresi, Anwar Kfimil and Salim Sidney Salamun, E na Harari and
Tomas Plamuts and others had been arrested in connection with those associations between 1941 and 1943. All
of them were under observation until 1945. But Curiel was also believed to be behind FathI Al-RamlTs election
campaign in Sayyida Zainab in 1944. Kamfil Sha'bfin was deemed to be his most devout disciple, apart from
Husain Kfizim, 'Abdu Dahab, 'Abd al-MagTd AbO Hasba, MahmOd al-(AskarT and IbrfihTm Hfifiz al-'Attfir. The
police also believed that Curiel was also behind a group that called itself al-jabha al-ishtirOkiyya (the Socialist
Front) and included MahmOd FathI Al-RamU, Muhammad FathI Al-RamU, Mustafa Muharram Al-RamlT, RamsTs
YOnfin, Lutfallah SuUmfin, George Hinain, (Abd al-'AzIz Salim Haikal, MQsfi ‘Abd al-Himid (also called MQsi
al-Kizim), Muhammad Nahld AbO Zahra, Anwar Kfimil (Uthmfin, Fu’fid Kfimil 'Uthmfin, Husain Salfih Dahab,
'Abd al-Wahhfib Muhammad, Muhammad FathI al-Kubra, Khigr MahmOd Khidr, Salamun Salim Sidni, Tomas
Plamuts, Izra Harari, 'Abd al-Fattfih Sfidiq al-SharqfiwT, Mustafa Kfimil Munlb, Mukhtfir Thufîq al-'Attfir, Ibrfihlm
Ifeufiq al-'Attar, Kfimil al-Tilmisfinl, Hasan 'Abd al-Rahmfin al-Tilmisfinl, BakhQr Minahim Munshah. All of them
were known to the political police. Mentioning their names only serves to shed light on whom the police thought to
be connected to Curiel. ' Adil Amin, though, does not publish the court files completely, but just gives an overview.
Atrfin 1996,243-280.
43See: Al-Sa'Id 1989, 101-108. Nàdl al-ittihâd al-dOmufrütL Al-markaz al-thaqdft al-ijtimO'L mahdar tahqtq
at-ntyöba. Al-Sa'Id mentions in a footnote that the protocol was part of the file about the big communist case in
1946. al-Qaflyya al-shuyltiyya al-kubra li 'dm 1946, pp. 1026-1031.
44Amin 19%.
^RamsTs YQnfin went to the rostrum during FathI Al-Ramli’s election campaign. He referred to the revolution
in Greece speaking about the Greeks* exploitation by the king, the government and the hunger of the Greek people.
FathI Al-RamB pointed out that there were a hundred families in Egypt only ruling 17 million. Amin 1996,243280, here p. 247. In 1942 the credo of a small Communist group had been reported to the police: *Tbe rich class
exploited the poor class. The parties worked for the interest of their members. A revolution had to take place

CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U

106

ready to believe in the imminent dawn of revolution, because they knew best about the abom­
inable conditions the majority of Egyptians lived in, and they believed in the continuous threat
that the Soviet Union and its system, the story of a successful revolution and a winner in the
war, represented. Communists believed that revolution was possible in the Middle East, police
sources said. They were fighting for a republican system in Egypt.46 And they were counting
on Russian help for the materially repressed country.47
The police had gathered much information on Curiel. He had been under observation for
several years. Because the police was an authoritarian apparatus, it looked for the man who
pulled all the strings in the chaos of small communist groups in Egypt, engaged in fighting each
other. Curiel’s personality fit their idea about such a man. He was the most intellectual figure, a
talented organizer, and a conspirator. He did not hide his political convictions in conversations
with prison inmates, guards, workers, or anybody else he m et He was convincing, and he kept
in personal touch with the rank and file in the organizations he was active in.
Curiel, and the communist Jews in general, were a reason for worry for Egyptian and British
authorities. Some penniless Egyptian Communists were not a problem, but a communist move­
ment with financial resources was to be taken seriously, and even more so, one with international
contacts. Marcel IsrSH's group, the People’s Liberation, had been founded, according to the po­
lice, not only in Cairo, but also in Paris. IsrSTl was known to have good contacts to Palestine,
and Palestine was a source of unrest for the British. The Palace was particularly uneasy about
Curiel, and he • having been deported • suspected the Serail behind his expulsion.4* The Palace
had been with the Axis powers. Kings had been toppled from power everywhere, and Com­
munists were - especially after the USSR had survived the war victoriously - conceived as a
veritable threat

5.3.1

Curiel’s Self Assessment

Curiel did not perceive himself as a foreigner in Egypt because he had deliberately chosen to
belong there. He was well aware that he looked different that his Arabic was far from perfect
He could not hide in the Egyptian masses, because he would always be detected as a stranger.
Nonetheless, his choice had been to make Egypt his homecountry by renouncing his Italian
citizenship, even before becoming a Communist and much to the distress of his father. The
Curiels, like the Rossanos, had been resident in Egypt for three generations already when they
went into politics. This was even admitted by Curiel’s critics.
in Egypt, as it had happened in Spain, and the association would take care o f arranging for such a revolution to
happen by furnishing each member with a pistol to overthrow the system and transfer the government into workers’
hands, and he taught them the greeting of the association that consists of a fist and a bowed arm.” The report is
about Bread and Freedom (al-khubz wa al-hurrfyya) and Anwar K im il's effort to recruit students from the weaving
school (madmsat ai-nasfj) in 'Abbfisiyya. Ibid.
4tThe other authors were Ahmad RushdT Silah and S aid Khayil, MusUfa K irail Munlb and Salih ’Urtbf.
47,Abd al-Latlf Dahab, a Sudanese was mentioned.
44According to Perrault, as early as 1942, legal steps were taken to strip Curiel of his Egyptian citizenship.
After his arrest in 1942, the Egyptian authorities had kept his passport He had gone to court to receive it back
which in turn would have also meant a further acknowledgement of his Egyptian citizenship. The first court
declared the matter outside its jurisdiction, but the court of appeals confirmed Curiel's rights and even a demand
for compensation. In 1950 a representative of the Egyptian state went into revision once again, the court of
appeals’ decision was annulled, as was Curiel’s Egyptian citizenship. It was reasoned that Curiel had not expressly
denounced his Italian citizenship. Without any official decision for his expulsion and while his lawyers were
appealing against the judgement, he was forced on board a ship leaving for Italy. For details about the juridicial
confusion, see: Perrault 1991,222-23.

5.3. CURJEL

107

Q u id 's father, Daniel, an affluent banker with a villa in Zamalik, one of the rich neigh­
borhoods in Cairo located on an island in the Nile, had been fluent in Arabic. He considered
Egypt his home, and Arabic was his native tongue, unlike Curiel who spoke French as a first
language. In his interviews and biographical sketch, Curiel abstains from buttressing his claim
for Egyptian citizenship with the history of his ancestors. He was bom in Egypt to a father bom
in Egypt, that had been enough to entitle him to Egyptian citizenship. His father's family had
moved to Egypt from Italy in about 1850, his mother’s family had come from Türkey.49
Most of the front line Jewish Communists' ancestors had come from one of the provinces
of the old Ottoman Empire, from Syria, Türkey, Rumania or Bulgaria, to make a living in
Egypt.30 They were merchants or professionals, people die thriving economy needed to assist
development, engineers, doctors, or lawyers.31
Curiel emphasized that he was deeply influenced by the Egyptian national movement in
the mid 1930s, and that political developments in Egypt were his incentive to choose Egyptian
citizenship.
“When I reached the age of 21, we were in 1935. Egypt was boiling over with
national demonstrations, hostile to colonialism. I became enthusiastic about Egypt
and the Egyptians. I decided to choose the Egyptian nationality. I was bom in
Egypt to a father bom in Egypt and it was my right to choose my citizenship at
the age of 21. That was neither an easy nor an accepted thing to do in the foreign
community, because it meant that I would lose my right to enjoy foreign privileges.
My father was very opposed to it, but I insisted."32
The mid 1930s in Egypt were known as the years of the young: in 1935 students took
to the streets, threatening editors who made derogatory comments about the Wafd, breaking
windows, and fighting the police. Students demanded more action than the parties, the Wafd
included, were ready to embark on because their aim was to share in the power deal but not to
bring about an open confrontation.33
"The undivided frenzy that inspired these young people, as once it had inspired
ZaghlQl’s village supporters, implied an equally undivided need, in which unsat­
isfied sexual desires, the search for new forms of expression, the questioning of
society, mingled with political complaint, but went beyond it. This was a turbulent,
hopeful generation, in quest of its own identity. As a young Maghribi nationalist
called it at the time: shabab ghafl ‘youth lacking a sign’. If they were tom between
violence and eloquence, both representing the lure of something unknown, it was
because they had not yet found their own form of expression, which had to be the
decolonization of the world.”54*
^ A b b ls (ed.) 1988.
*See the chapter about Jews where Haroun is hailed as a teal Egyptian Jew. Both Haroun's grandfathers came
from Syria, one from Damascus, the other from Aleppo, both had been impoverished small merchants. Perrault
1991,32.
5'See for details about Curiel's life: Perrault 1991. Translated from French “Un homme à par.“, Paris, 1984.
The book has as well been translated into Arabic, Rajul min tiifz farfd.
“ interview with Henri Curiel in Paris 25th January 1970, in: Al-SsTd 1987, pp. 731-741, here p. 731.
55The hopes o f the youths were also supported by the youthful monarch, who inherited the throne in 1936, and
by the new stars in music and film, such as Muhammad ‘Abd al-W ahhlb and Farfd al-Attrash.
“ Berque 1972,459.

108

CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS B

Curici had to leave Egypt for France in 1937, in order to receive medical treatment in Fuis.
He never thought about getting in touch with the communist party in France. He went back to
Egypt, because he wanted to become active in Egyptian politics, not in France.
The decolonization of the world became CUriel’s obsession. He accepted Egyptian citizen­
ship at the age of 21, two years before the capitulations were abolished. Yet, to become an
Egyptian would mean for him something different than only accepting citizenship. He wanted
to participate in Egyptian politics, to have a share in the political future of the country and the
shape society would take. Curiel was well aware of the path Egyptian politics was taking. If
for Egyptian youths supporting the Wafd still meant to support the endeavors of an Egpytian
liberation movement, for Curiel neither becoming a Wafdist nor a Liberal Constitutionalist was
an option. It is self-evident that none of the two groups attracting other Egyptian youths - the
Muslim Brothers and Young Egypt - could be attractive to him. Young Egypt smacked too much
of fascism while the Muslim Brothers were not open to non-Muslims. Both groups were deeply
involved in the Palestine question. In 1939-1940, Young Egypt initiated an anti-Jewish cam­
paign calling for the boycott of Jewish businesses in Egypt. Curiel does not explain his aversion
to the two classical secularist parties in Egypt. But neither the Liberal Constitutionalists moving
ever more to the right and adopting an Islamic discourse, nor the Wafd that had lost its revolu­
tionary fervor and was struggling to embark on an Arab nationalist course, appealed to many
of the new generation of educated Egyptians from different social backgrounds. The late 1930s
were a phase when religious propaganda was used to defame political enemies. With the Pales­
tinian conflict gaining momentum, Jews moved into the center of aggression, being labeled
the enemies of Islam. Though it was mainly Muslim organizations (the Young Muslim Men
Association and the Muslim Brothers) which drew up manifestos against partition and alleged
British atrocities in Palestine, the Wafd took a chance and used demonstrations in Alexandria
and Cairo to wage a new anti-British campaign. Wafdist newspapers reprinted allegations con­
cerning Jewish intentions to occupy the al-Aqsa Mosque. The new international development
influenced further British policy. The German-Italian Axis necessitated a new strategic position
in the area, and the coming war in Europe overshadowed all the British decisions. Scandals and
intrigues shook the government and the monarchy.
In 1938 and 1939 the economy was sliding, financial debts growing, strikes and unemploy­
ment increasing. All the 1930s had been overshadowed by an economic crisis, but it became
more severe after trade with Europe was suspended. In Egypt, tensions between the pro-German
camp and the pro-British one grew. The appointment of a British minister of state in Cairo and
the continuing flow of allied troups into Egypt increased the fear that Egypt was intended to be
a new protectorate. British intelligence repotted in the spring of 1941 that the average Egyptian
was sure that the British would lose the war, and that Turkey would allow the German troups
to pass through, who would then encircle Britain’s position in Egypt The Allies’ defeat in the
western desert led to an upsurge in anti-British propaganda. Jews were held responsible for
the shortage of food and the high prices of essential products. The British reported that antiSemitism had become a permanent factor in Egypt. The loss of face the Egyptian Monarchy
suffered in 1942 further fuelled the Egyptian nationalist movement and weakened the Wafd. In
February 1942, the British surrounded the Palace with armored units, and forced the King to
appoint Nahhas as Sim ’s successor to the prime minister’s office. Nahhas had to pay for his
grip on power with the repression of anti-British activities. Rommel’s advance only came to a
halt in al-Alamain in July 1942. The Wafd got more and more involved in party infighting, as
Makram 'Ubaid left the party.
In Egypt, Curiel was sure, Jews could not become anything else than Communists, if they
wanted to engage politically. They were drawn more to the internationalist communist move-

5.3. CURJEL

109

m ent than the Egyptians were because of their broader cultural outlook. Jews were enraged by
fascism. In contrast to young Egyptian Muslims and for some time also Copts, Jewish youths
could not flirt with fascism, because it was a movement designed to destroy all the achievements
o f liberal democracy, the promises of equality of all citizens under a national secular banner, it
singled Jews out as scapegoats.
Curiel took the right to become politically active for granted, a right that would be gradually
denied to Jews in Egypt. Curiel and many other Egyptian activists did not stop fighting once
they had left Egypt, and they remained connected to Egypt, and more generally to the Middle
East, in their political interests and engagement Communism at least allowed an orientation
beyond narrow nationalism, and exceeding Egyptian borders.
‘There is no obscurity that would deserve all those ‘complexes’ which some of the
Egyptian Communists got about this subject. And contrary to what some of the
comrades who go to extremes in their nationalism think, their [i.e. Jews’ I.S.] role
was not negative at all. If it were why did the evil-minded Egyptian reaction make
such an effort to expel them from Egypt, and was counselled to do so by its imperi­
alist friends! Was it aiming at supporting the Egyptian communist movement? Did
the communist movement in Egypt all of a sudden gain strength after they had been
expelled.”55
Neither fascism nor imperialism were the sides Curiel and similarly minded young people
wanted to belong to. The British, who were ready to support any antifascist activity, were
snubbed. The British effort to secure a stable pro-British anti-Axis powers’ government in Cairo
even gave Curiel the possibility to establish his first intimate contact with Egyptian politics.
The logical reaction of the foreign community in Egypt to British tanks surrounding 'Abdln
in February 1942, and forcing the King to appoint die Wafdist Nahhas to the post of prime
minister, was that of relief. But Curiel, who had not left Cairo for Palestine, as many other
Jews had (packed on a British train heading for Haifa), grasped that the loss of face would
fuel nationalist fervor. Curiel had tried to direct public attention to the error Egyptians made
in imagining that the German army was a force of liberation. Together with George Pointée, a
Swiss bom teacher and Communist, Muhammad NSsir al-Dïn, and Dr. Fu’âd AhwSnT, he had
written and distributed 4,000 pamphlets in Arabic, warning the population of the implications
o f a German victory. (NSsir al-DTn was a teacher in the police college, and Dr. Fu’Sd AhwSnl
a teacher in a secondary school.) But only Curiel’s arrest, preceding the batde of al-Alamain,
made him really understand the political situation. Most of the other internees in the Zaitun
interment camp were fascists. Being a Communist and a Jew, he was not liked much in the
beginning. HusriT TJrSbï, the former Communist now turned fascist, first attacked him, but then
began to to counsel him. The camp was Curiel’s school, his baptism of fire concerning the
meaning of “Egyptianness.” He understood which social class could lead the change in Egypt,
and under which bannen
T gained a lot, because I got in direct and harsh touch with many politicians who
were basically the sons of the petit bourgeoisie. Briefly said, I was Egyptianized
in the camp. ... I felt strongly that the petit bourgeoisie was deeply moved by the
national movement, and that it [the national movement I.S.] could be benefited
from.”56
M‘Abbis 1988,88.
’‘ interview with Henri Curiel in Paris in November 1968, in: AI-Sa*Id 1987,72S-730. here 728.

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CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U

After that experience he left the dubs and cliques that had a “foreign’* character and set
out to form the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation (EMNL). Curiel, like all other
Communists in Egypt, is part of the discourse about foreigners and Egyptians and the effort
to Egyptianize communism and Communists. For him, like for other Jewish Communists, the
discourse about foreigners in the movement was part of a power struggle. In his own narrative
Curiel got in touch with Egyptian intellectuals, and they became very active together, contacting
workers, aircraft mechanics, Sudanese and Nubians. Old Communists • though they were afraid
-joined: Shaikh Safwfln, 'Abdal-RahmSn Fadl, Yannakakis, Dr. Hassouna, Dr. al-QSdf.
Curiel had felt compelled to found his own communist group, because other groups • notably
the ones close to Marcel Isrifil - were composed of narrow-minded people, small employees on
the periphery of society. The advantage of a bourgeois upbringing, Curiel concluded, was that it
helped to broaden the horizon. Other self-appointed communist leaders were merely provoking,
and agitating, screaming atheists, calling for anarchy.37
The Peace League, headed by Jacquot Descombes38, had not been to Curiel’s liking. He
wanted to work politically with Egyptians, and the foreign majority in the Peace League seemed
to be full of mistrust against any new Egyptian member.
Curiel wanted to go to the heart of the matter. He did not want to deal with Egyptianized
foreigners or Egyptian intellectuals in the first place. That was the strategy Descombes and
Hillel Schwartz, the Iskra leader, followed. In an interview with R ifat Al-SaTd Curiel insisted
that he had wanted to work with Egyptians, Sudanese, and Nubians.

532 Curiel and Islam
Curiel supported his claim for leadership in the communist movement by emphasizing that
his group, the EMNL, had recruited students from Al-Azhar. The EMNL had access to the
stronghold of Islamic science and teaching, the backbone of traditional Egyptian society. The
rules of dialectic materialism were formulated in rhymes by an Azhari like Ibn Malik’s Alfiyya.
Marxism was a means to improve the living conditions of people. Communists had to prove
that they deserved the people’s trust. This included an acceptance of religious belief. Curiel
himself had lost his faith as a young boy, and since be had experienced Christian faith in an allChristian school39, he was convinced of dogmata being very relative. But to fight the majority of
^N otes sur l'histoire du P.C.E. (1919-1923), Groupe Rome. Curiel in an interview with Al-Sald in: Al-Sald
1987,732.
54See for the Peace League: Botman 1988; A l-Sald 1988. Al-Sald has an interview with Descombes who
strongly denies to have been directing any Egyptian communist organization and undertinea in the interview his
foreign upbringing, the disdain of foreigners for Egyptians, and the impossibility o f foreigners leading an Egyptian
communist party. He encouraged YOsuf Darwlsh, SSdiq Sa'd and Raymond Douek to form a communist group
that was to Ire the nucleus of a Communist party in Egypt. See also: AM Saif YOsuf2000, concerning Descombes’
role, and YOsuf Darwlsh in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1999. The Peace Partisans* Union had been organized
in 1934 and was affiliated to the Rassemblement Universel pour la Paix. “It attracted middle-class intellectuals.
Egyptians, and foreigners and included some Wafdists and women from the Union of Egyptian Women.” Ismael
and el-Sa’id 1990,33. Descombes is often blamed because he is seen as too cautious. Ceresi accused the Peace
Partisans, who had organized first in Alexandria and were followed by a similiar group in Cairo, of being deterred
by the example of the old communist party. According to Ceresi, the Peace Partisans were exclusively active among
foreigners who lived in a community completely isolated from Egyptian society, and they were mainly Greeks,
affiliated to the Greek Communist Party and Jews o f different nationalities. They thought that the failure o f the
first communist party was due to Egyptian history, and concluded that Egypt was not yet in the proper historical
stage for the foundation of a communist party. Therefore the group kept to itself, was extremely frightened of
infiltration and opened its doors only to a very limited number of foreigners even. Taqrtr Marcel lira'll (CeresfJt
(!) BidOyat al-haraka al-'ummOllyyaftMisr. in: A l-Sald 1987, pp. 698-714, here pp. 704-703.
’’The Jesuite school in Fargala.

5 3 . CURIEL

111

Egyptian’s philosophical or religious understanding would only lead to a dissipation of forces.
In Egypt, Al-Azhar did not have to be fought It could not be compared to the Orthodox church
in Russia that had supported the Russian Tsar.®0 Egyptian Communists were not out to emulate
the example of Spanish anarchists and bum mosques instead of churches. Working among
Azhar students meant working with very poor traditional students, which was certainly what
confirmed Curiel in his neutral or even positive attitude towards religious institutions in Egypt
Traditionally, Al-Azhar was seen as a source of resistance against the government though that
resistance had always been directed against a foreign occupational force, especially against the
troups of Napoleon Bonaparte. In this context 'Umar Makram (the head of the descendants of
the prophet / naqtb al-ashräf) has been considered the true leader of the Egyptians (al-za'Tm
al-m isrf al-awwal). He advised the Egyptians to accept Muhammad Ali as Egypt’s new ruler,
and thus laid the foundations for a new stage in Egyptian history that would eventually lead to
Egyptian self-rule.*61
Curiel probably felt attracted by Al-Azhar and judged it by the students he came to know,
who were - like Mubarak 'Abdu Fadl - from the poor stratum of Egyptian society. He found
pleasure in emphasizing that he could not meld with Egyptian society, that he was an outsider.
His looks and his language betrayed him. Still, he could sit with Azhar students, and they would
be overwhelmed by his personality and his ideas, yet confused by his Arabic. They would take
refuge in considering him a kind of a French scholar. In the EMNL Curiel would take care to
be personally responsible for the Azhar section, though for objective reasons he actually was
the least suitable for that job. Was it to prove that his message would help him to carry the day?
That even or particularly the most traditional and conservative element in Egyptian society was
open to him, a Jew, a francophile intellectual, because of his political ideas? The police files
concerning the case against Egyptian Communists in 1946 even named some Shaikhs among
the persons supected of a communist conspiracy.62
Yet even though Curiel drew close to Azhar students, he did not believe in assimilation.
Muhammad HusnT 'UrSbT had tried to convince him to convert to Islam when they had met in
the internment camp in 1942.
’T he temptation was great because during that time I wished to ‘Egyptianize,’ and it
seemed to me that to embrace Islam could be one of the means to assert my ‘Egyptianness.* But what saved me from that lapse was actually the German advancement
and the fear that it would look as if I had converted to protect myself. There were
many Jews who had the same wish, and many of them turned to Islam.”63*
Curiel is the only Communist who talks about turning to Islam as a means of integrating
himself more into Egyptian society. Though it is understood that other Jews converted to Islam
for that reason, such a motive is never discussed. As YOsuf DarwTsh’s experience in the late
“ ‘Abbas 1988,102.

61See Farid al-Haddld about ‘Umar Makram in 1997. Farag FOda in qabla al-suqflt gives us also a very positive
assessment of ‘Umar Maknun’s role, though reading Gabarti’s account about Bonaparte in Egypt we may feel
doubtful about the beneficial role of Al-Azhar shaikhs in dealing with the French. Gabarti himself is critical about
ulema who acted irresponsible and incited the people to rio t In his narration ‘Umar Makram is not in Cairo, but on
the run most of the time. In Gabarti’s account it is evident also that once the French had retreated from Cairo, and
Mamluks and Ottomans returned, a massacre occurred that victimized Christians and Jews alike. Abd ar-Rahman
al-Gabarti 1989, 284-289. In his early days, before he became an Egyptian renegade, Nasr Himid AM Zayyid
attacked the Al-Azhar shaikhs because in his opinion they were no better than the militant Islamic groups and also
out to gain power. Nasr Himid AM Zayyid in: Q adiyl flkriyya, al-Isllm al-siyisT 1989,45-78.
“ Amin 1996, pp. 242-268.
“ ‘AbMs 1988,106.

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CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS H

1950s showed, becoming a Muslim would not divert attention from a Jewish origin. Curiel
decided that what really counted was what somebody did for the sake of the improvement of
social or political conditions.
“I could not become Egyptian except through struggle for the sake of my country
and its people. And I still believe that I went the right way.”64
Curiel could not become Egyptian by adapting to Egyptian culture, though some of his
friends tried. Though he wished them success, he did not believe in that way. And the develop­
ment of Egyptian culture during the 1940s and 1950s seemed to prove him right because it was
European standard dance, musical influence, and film that advanced.
“There was quite a number of Jews who had the same wish [to assert their ‘Egyptianness’ I.S.], and many of them (sic!) turned to Islam, and they dived into the
study of Arabic language, and ate Egyptian meals, and tried seriously to acquire a
taste for Egyptian songs, dance, and films. I hope they were successful, but I solved
the question in a different way. The point in question here is what somebody does,
and not what he is. To improve my Arabic language, for example, would have been
useful for only myself. But to make an effort to study Marxism was more useful
for my comrades and my country. I could not become Egyptian except through the
struggle for the sake of my country and its people, and I still believe that I went the
right way.”65
One of the men recruited to work at Al-Azhar was MubSrak 'Abdu Fadl.66 'Abdu Fadl was
a Nubian who enrolled at Al-Azhar in 1942 because his eyes were weak, and an Azhar career
was the only viable solution for him. The family had come from a Nubian village in 1939. The
father worked as afarräsh at the building of the tax authority. Nubians were servants in Egyptian
society. Their life was characterized by extreme poverty on the one side, and an exclusion from
the main stream on the other side. Nubians were black. In Egyptian society, black is a color
that is associated with social underdogs. Nubians are known to be good-hearted and honest,
embodying the naive qualities of village life. Mubarak 'Abdu Fadl was much against the British
soldiers and their illicit behavior he witnessed in Tmfid al-Dfn Street, a street hill of bars and
vaudevilles theaters, where the family lived. He started to study history to find out how the end
of British occupation could be brought about. In 1945 he joined the EMNL under the influence
of another student at Al-Azhar. Because he invited other students not to join a demonstration
the heads of Al-Azhar had prepared to greet King FarOq on the occasion of his birthday, he was
relegated and stamped a Communist. Mubarak 'Abdu Fadl was active at Al-Azhar with students
at the Al-Azhar secondary school level and in the three faculties of law, language, and religion.
He remained an EMNL cadre all his political life. From his point of view, the EMNL was a
popular and activist force.67
Curiel’s interest in Al-Azhar did not diminish. He encouraged MubSrak 'Abdu Fadl to write
a report about Azhar students to the International Students’ Union, because they did not know
44Ibid.
“ Ibid., 106.
“ MubSrak ’Abdu Fadl. in: Al-Sa<td 1989,123-210.
67It was the only communist group that recruited Sudanese and Nubians. To organize Nubians would have been
impossible had it not been for a special section because they lived a life so separate from the Egyptians. Urey had
their own cafes and meeting places, they did not mix with Egyptians. They were the poorest stratum of society and
would only trust each other.

5.3. CURIEL

113

about those students. M ubirak, however, refrained from complying with his wish, because by
1948 he felt out of touch with the situation at Al-Azhar’s educational institutions. Curiel used to
attend the meetings of the Al-Azhar section, as he laid emphasis on personal contact with all the
sections in his organization, and with individuals. He was a good pedagogue. M ubirak 'Abdu
Fadl remembers that he wrote a statement for the elections in 1950. His little experience in
political writing made him use the purely rhetoric expressions he had been taught to employ at
Al-Azhar (‘ibârât balfighiyya IchSliyya). Curiel worked with him to revise the paper three times.
M ubirak 'Abdu Fadl fails to mention Curiel’s weak Arabic. He presents a totally different
picture. From the point of view of knowing the Arabic language, 'Abdu Fadl had an advantage
over Curiel and reason to be critical. He had studied at Al-Azhar for six years and before
that had learnt to recite the Koran by heart for two years. Still, be portrays Curiel as a leader
who knew how to educate young cadres and to teach them how to write a good political text.
Probably being marginalized in Egyptian society brought him closer to Curiel and increased his
tolerance.6*
Curiel has several narratives about his contact with the literary “man from the street,” and in
this context the religious link appears again. There is the story about the simple peasant whom
he met in prison and who asked him about the reason for his arrest. Curiel told him what being
a Communist meant for the country. The man gathered all the ordinary prisoners around him to
tell them that Curiel was the expected Mahdi (al-mahdfy al-muntazar). Curiel does not fail to
stress that he talked to him in Arabic with a foreign accent, which he mentions with regard to the
Azhar students as well, still, the populace accepted him as a man who could fulfill their hopes
for a redeemer, and received and addressed him within the framework of traditional Islamic
belief. In his biography, Gilles Perrault mentions the same story, but this time the person Curiel
meets is not a simple fallah, but a famous robber called Ibn Bamba, accused of several murders
though there were no witnesses to his crimes.66*69
A political approach using religion, though, was refused by Curiel. The EMNL took a
positive stand towards religion, but an Islamic interpretation of Marxism was rejected. For
Curiel, scientific socialism was a necessary political ingredient.70
The national liberation movement, not popular Islam, was for Curiel the dynamo of change
in Egypt After the end of WW II, the old leadership of the Wafd had failed to create a new
impetus. Democracy and national liberation were the slogans that could unite the Egyptian
masses, and therefore the new organization that sprang up from the merger between Curiel’s
EMNL and Schwartz’ Iskra in 1947 was called the Democratic Movement for National Libera­
tion (DMNL).

66At Al-Azhar Mubirak had been ranked among the Sudaneie and treated as a foreign student, even though he
was an Egyptian Nubian. In 1950 he was threatened with deportation to Sudan. He insisted upon being Egyptian
and was able to prove it Nubians were concentrated in special quarters in Cairo, they met at special places, their
links among each other were much stronger than their links with the Egyptians. The Al-Azhar section of the
DMNL had been closed because after 1950 it had lost all its members. The Nubian section became obsolete as
well because the old cadres like ZakI M urid, M ubirak 'Abdu Fadl and Muhammad NOr al-Dtn SuKm&n Y isir
were active for the DMNL oo a nationwide scale and the foreigners’ department had lost its political significance
according to M ubirak ’Abdu Fadl, since foreigners had been forced to leave Egypt or left of their own free will
after the war in 1948.
"Perrault 1991,182.
10Al-Said 1987,738. 'Abd al-Fattih al-SharqiwT favored such an approach and left the organization in 1945.

CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U

114

533

Egyptianization and Proletarization

The EMNL had been organized in sections, due to the demands of society and politics, accord­
ing to Curie!. Some were national sections: Armenians, Nubians, Sudanese, and some social
sections, like the women's, students’, youths’, and workers’ sections. Curiel argued that the
EMNL was an organization of beginners. It was not yet a communist party. The women’s ques­
tion could not be discussed in a normal mixed cell, but had to be tackled among women first
Once a real elite of women was created, discussion could proceed on a different level. Another
reason was security. Nubians knew and trusted each other, as, for example, students did. Politi­
cal work and recruitment was facilitated. Among workers there was a difference between those
who had recently come from the countryside, as was the case in Kafr al-Dawwar, for example,
where they were still connected to their villages, and had to be organized according to origin
and not to job. But in Shubra workers were more progressive, therefore they could be organized
in factory cells. Azharis could not be mixed with modem students.
Curiel’s statement bears testimony to the difficult task of applying communism in a society
still in the first stage of industrialization. At first the introduction of modernity into that society
had been the project of ambitious rulers of the Muhammad Ali dynasty, then it had been forced
upon the country by colonialism. In that process social differences had sharpened, and new
cultural differences sprang up. The EMNL wanted to set the lead in bringing about change, but
it had to start from the present and take all the differences into consideration. What had been
true in Iraq was true for Egypt as well:
"The relatively small number of industrial workers were, in their bulk, illiterate,
inexperienced, limited in their outlook, of recent peasant or artisan origin, and,
therefore, still devoid of the qualities - the organizational habits - that only pro­
longed exposure to the discipline of the factory engenders; in brief, they were not
as yet ready for command.”71
This problem became crucial when the union with the other communist group came about
Curiel and most of the EMNL members had a critical attitude towards the organization they
were to merge with, Iskra.

5.3.4

Iskra

The discussion about Iskra and CUriel’s attitude towards that competitive group is important in
so far as Curiel’s judgements about that group can be related to what would become common
knowledge about the Communists active in the 1940s and 1950s. Many of the former student
cadres who remained active Communists had been former Iskra members, and their negative
attitude towards Curiel remained unchanged over the years.
Curiel and the Iskra leader, Hillel Schwartz, had been active together in the Democratic
Union. The leftist scene in Cairo and Alexandria - as everywhere in the world • was not particu­
larly large, so people knew each other. Fishing in the same waters did not increase sympathies.
Iskra had come into being by coincidence. A Greek Communist who pretended to be a
Comintern envoy urged Eli Mizan and others to found a communist organization. Mizan, Hil­
lel Schwartz, and Max Adiret followed his advice and founded Iskra. According to Mizan,
Schwartz voted against Curiel’s membership, because he had been arrested before.72
71Batata 1978.508.
^E lie Mizan, interview with R ifat Al-SaTd, P uis Nov. 1968, in: A l-Satd 1987.666-669. Mizan*« nationality
is not mentioned. He was arrested in 1948 and expelled in 1949.

5.3. CURIEL

IIS

Curie! had consented to the merger with Iskra to increase the financial means of the orga­
nization and to overcome the difficulties of a split communist movement, though he had many
objections against Iskra. The French and the Italian Communist Parties had urged the union be­
tween the two biggest communist groups, presenting the split as the reason for all the problems
and the merger as a solution.73
Curiel’s first apprehension against the IskrawTyln was that they were not moralist enough.
A Communist had to be a moralist, but Iskra members wanted to get rid of bourgeois fetters.
“All those questions (i.e. Egyptianization, ethics, attitude towards the British,
Egyptian nationalism) would decide the popularity of the organization, and the re­
spect of the masses for it, and their adherence to it”7475
Albert Arid had been a member of Iskra since 1945, when he was only 15 years old. At the
age of 18 he joined the DMNL.73 At first he had been engaged with other students. They read
only French books, the pamphlets of the French Communist Party, and it was only in 1946, at a
party in the lycée that they declared solidarity with Egypt and the Egyptian national movement
and left their "snail-shell.’’ Arid started to read Egyptian newspapers, to live in an Egyptian
atmosphere by visiting Fu’Sd university. He witnessed Latlfa Al-Zayyfit and Gam il ShalabI,
both Iskra members, giving speeches in a packed hall. Arid, whose father was Egyptian, was
still studying in the foreign section of the lycée that led to the French baccalaureat. He stressed
that his group recruited a number of students from the Arabic section for Iskra, among them
Muhammad Sid Ahmad, who became one of the most vociferous critics of Jewish engagement
in Egyptian communism, Ilhim Saif al-Nasr, Muhammad al-Shawârbî, Tauffq Haddfid, Fu’Sd
HaddSd, and Halim TflsOn.76 R ifat A l-Sald did not fail to ask him about the famous Iskra
parties that will be mentioned several times here, because parties, immoral behavior, and Eu­
ropean education seem to be inextricably linked. In Egyptian (male) imagination, parties are
an un-Egyptian event, because men and women are mixed, alcohol is served, men and women
dance together, and illicit behavior in general is implicated.
Arid explained that they had arranged parties because people of their age and milieu used
to go to parties. But the Iskra parties were different, because some time was spent on serious
political discussion. Actually, parties served as a recruiting ground for girls, as did visits to the
movies.
To former Iskra members, Curiel seemed rather backward and reserved. Curiel tried to
style the Democratic Movement for National Liberation that had originated from the merger
n halian and French Communists did not understand Egyptian reality from Curiel'* point of view. The Italian«
could not believe that the Egyptian national movement had pressed for the annulment of the agreement of 1936.
They taw the Wafd as the main enemy. The French could not see the Free Officers’ movement as a positive phe­
nomenon. They interpreted everything as the result of US-American and British colonialism vying for influence,
and their students did likewise. This is meant as a side-swipe against Ceresi and his Italian connections as well as
against al-ifya, the Egyptian Communist Party under Fu’Sd MursT and Isms’ll SabiT 'Abdallah.
74A l-Sald 1987,734; interviews with Curiel in h ris November 1968 and 25 January 1970 in Paris, 725-741.
'AbbSs 1988; Curiel 1999. Muhammad Sid Ahmad claimed that Curiel was against Egyptian men marrying Jewish
women (sicl). Curiel was vesy strict and asked for the end of such relations. Markaz al-buhoth al-’arabiyya 2000,
264.
75His father had been boro in Turkey to a Sephardic family. Before WW I the father left for Egypt. His maternal
grandfather had come from Russia to Egypt, the grandmother from Rumania at the end of the 19th century. Arid's
mother had been bora in Egypt A ril's father had become an Egyptian citizen in 1924, had wont the larboush, and
had Egyptian colleagues as well as friends. Botman 1984,502-506.
74A l-Sald 1989,230-236, here 231. In the interview with Salma Botman only five yean later Arid pointed out
that their group included Jews, Greeks, French, some other Christians, but no Muslims. Botman 1984,506.

116

CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS n

between Iskra, the EMNL, and People’s Liberation according to Egyptian social conditions.
He demanded that women were to be organized in a special section. Curiel was apprehensive
of the sex scandals surrounding Iskra, and therefore thought it a must that women became
secluded in a special department in the DMNL. Aimée Setton, who was the representative of
the women’s section in the Central Committee, had endeavored to work on a program for the
empowerment of women, together with InjI Aflätfin, who became a prominent Communist
Debating the women’s lot in Egypt they had discussed the Koran as a text that only became
repressive towards women in its interpretation, but not in its original version. Women - as
much as foreigners • were in a precarious position in the movement Though throughout the
1920s and 1930s women had increasingly worked in charities, were more mobile due to street
cars and automobiles, and better educated, it was still difficult for them to become politically
active. It was easier for girls and women from upper class Egyptian families, and from the
Jewish upper and middle class families, because they were freer in their movements. But for all
the communist groups, women were a source of uneasiness, because tradition focused on the
position of women in society.
All the Egyptian communist organizations experimented with the kind of women’s organi­
zation that would be permissible in Egyptian society. In a male dominated partriarchie society
women’s liberation was not a primary aim. The fear of damaging the Communists’ reputation
and causing public outrage or being suspected of moral laxity, and thus losing support among
the traditionally bound populace, was what drove the different groups to different measures. The
Workers’ Vanguard (talfat al-'ummfil) had also arranged for a special section just for women.
Khalid Hamza became responsible for two cells.
’Truly speaking, we managed to do a few things, we could discuss and come up
with directives from the women’s cells. We asked the comrades, the workers, how
they treated their women. ... You know that the Egyptian workers, historically,
are of peasant origin. .. .The woman in the countryside is deemed to be inferior.
... Were the Egyptian workers, after they had become Communists, treating their
ladies in this same way? This was among the achievements of our cells. We also
prepared a report on the women’s movement, but after five or six months we re­
alized that we were mistaken, and that our arrangement caused isolation for the
women’s movement, and we dissolved the cells, and they were mixed again. For a
long time, for about two years, the supervisor who was responsible for me in the
organization was a lady, and she taught me so many social things because I come
from a very narrow-minded milieu. She taught me to respect a woman, and to lode
upon her with a different progressive view. She was from a different environment
She was cultured and had enjoyed an English education, and she had a very high
level of culture. She was the wife of Hasan SidqT. Her name is Thurayi Adham.
She died. She was among the people who influenced me a lot”77
Curiel was not only apprehensive of Iskra’s women’s politics, but also of their recruitment
style. He asserted that there could be no more “red clubs” (like the Maccabee Club, the Aubetge
al-Shabib Club in Alexandria, the Friends of Culture and the Pen’s Clubs / asdiqä’ al-thaqäfa
and nâdî al-qalam), and that the typical Iskra recruitment through cliques and families had to
stop. Iskra’s news and the party rules were both in French. Iskra had a “huge number” of young
people from foreign communities, and the activities within those communities were manifold:
^Personal interview with Khilid Hamza, Cairo 21st November 1999.

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they got in touch with Jews fighting against Zionism, Armenians fighting the Dashnag78, the
Greeks fighting the royalists, and Italians fighting the fascists.
According to Arid, there were no aristocrats in Iskra. Most of the Iskra members were petit
bourgeois or middle class.79 But the foreign features were visible. Arid admits a cultural and
social gap between the Egyptian and the foreign middle class and petit bourgeoisie. The very
rich members in Iskra came from Egyptian families, though, like Muhammad Sid Ahmad and
Ilhfim Saif al-Nasr.80
Arid argues that Iskra could not reach workers, because it relied upon family ties and per­
sonal relations. The brochures were pure theory. It did not have any mass appeal because people
did not know about i t The name was secret, pamphlets were not signed. Other members were
surprised at the merger with the EMNL because they had not even known that other communist
groups existed, and they had not been asked for consent Arid supports Curiel’s criticism in
many aspects. No constructive way was found to address conflicts. The different traditions,
and/or die “wrong” social background, and the inability to adapt to the situation in Egypt were
permanently highlighted as the reason for those conflicts. The repercussions of the continuous
power struggle on the new organization, the DMNL, were disastrous. Arid traces the eruption of
discontent and bickering to the suffocating atmosphere of the period, following the clampdown
on the national movement in 1946. Another reason can certainly be found in the disparity be­
tween strict party discipline, the sacrifices many comrades made, and the real political effect of
communist politics. This aspect will be tackled in one of the next chapters that deals with rep­
resentatives of the Egyptian middle class, the class striving to advertise itself as the heir to the
corrupt Egyptian elite and the foreign minorities, and as the real representative of the “people.”
Curiel perceived Iskra as a group that had evolved from the affluent Jewish bourgeoisie.
Egyptianization had been refuted by Iskra before as a sign of extremist nationalism. Still, even
the Iskra leader had changed his name. From the public prosecutor’s interrogation of Hillel
Schwartz, the Iskra leader and the “foreigner'’ par excellence in the Egyptian communist move­
ment’s history, we leant for the first time that he gave his name as being “Halil Adham, bom in
Cairo.” Schwartz answered the prosecutor’s questions, articulated and taken down in classical
Arabic, in popular dialect Asked about his name he answered:
“My old name was Halil Schwartz. I changed it to the name of HaGl Adham, and
there is a court ruling concerning this fact dating from about 1935.”*'
Schwartz, as he has been known to his contemporaries in spite of his changed name, was 27
in 1930. His change of name occurred in 1935, at the age of 12. He advised the court to ask his
71See for the Dashnag: www.realchange.nareg.com.au/ch3.htin. On that page you can find a chapter from an
unpubliahed PhD thesis by Atmen Gakarian, not only explaining the nature o f the Dashnag, but also the difficulties
Armenian! who “returned” to the Soviet Republic o f Armenia from the Middle East were confronted with. The text
h vety interesting in our context because it challenges • from an Armenian point of view • the idea that emigrants
can re-migrate to the country their ancestors have come from. The Armenians who had stayed behind were against
the newcomers for fear that they might want to introduce western ideas.
^A l-S ald 1989,233.
" in an overview prepared by Curiel of 300 EMNL members 30% (230) «sere said to be workers, 16% (80)
students, 18% (90) defined as young people, no intellectuals, no foreigners, 3% (23) army personel, 3% (23) from
Al-Azharand 6% (30) Sudanese. In comparison, Curiel listed for Iskra a total number o f900 members, of whom
16% (140) were workers, 22% (200) students, 22% (200) intellectuals and 40% (360) foreigners. The DMNL
thus turned out to be an organization where workers had lost their influence and the proportion of foreigners had
become equally big (28%, i.e. 390) to (26%, i.e. 360), while students and intellectuals together held a majority of
34% (480 / 20% students and 14% intellectuals).'Abbls 1988,163.
11Al-SaTd 1989,329. Mahdar tahqlq al-niyOba, 16th March 1930. The questioning was copied from the case
file against Schwartz, pages 1030-1038. Schwartz left Egypt after two years in prison in 1932.

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CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS B

father for the papers proving his statem ent Schwartz had been a student at the French lycée in
Cairo. What might have caused his father to apply for a different name for his son, making him
look less foreign and more Egyptian?*2
Louis ‘Awad interpreted the choice of old Pharaonic names for Muslim and Coptic children
alike as a sign for increasing integration from both sides in the stage following the 1919 revo­
lution. He detected a sense of identity that was not primarily directed towards Islam. ’Awad’s
argument is valid also in the case of Egyptian Jews. The names minorities give to their children
also express the degree of adaptation or identification. As mentioned before, Marcel IsrSH be­
came Marcel Ceresi once he had left Egypt for Italy. Mimi Cartel, a DMNL member, married
to the poet KamSl 'Abd al-Hallm, called herself Magda ‘Abd al-Hallm.
For Curiel, the name of the group already spoke against i t “Iskra” was not connected to
Egyptian reality, but was reminiscent of the Russian experiment Iskra was dedicated to theory.
The Iskra members had no concept of struggle and connection with the masses. Foreigners and
Egyptian intellectuals had the upper hand. Once the two groups had merged, Iskra members
intimidated EMNL members, because they were better educated. Basically, the EMNL had
been a proletarian movement Proletarization, ta'm ll, the second step that was supposed to
follow Egyptianization, had stopped with the merger with Iskra. Curiel was looking for cadres
with special individual qualities to form his organization. He complained that Iskra had had
no proletarian leaders endowed with natural authority, altruism, and experience in workers’
struggle prior to his engagement with the Communists, but the EMNL had managed to recruit
such elements.83
To reduce the influence of Iskra in the new organization, the DMNL, it had been necessary
to isolate foreigners, because they were not Egyptianized. When the merger with Iskra came,
Curiel demanded that all the foreigners should be gathered in one section. Curiel and Schwartz
remained in the Central Committee, however.
“The foreigners were gathered or stored away in one section, and the leadership
was in its majority Egyptian.”84
According to Curiel, Marcel Isrä’il became responsible for the foreign section in the DMNL,
which consisted of Greeks, Armenians and Italians. But even though he raged against foreigners
at times, in his autobiographic papers he describes the active Jews among the Italians as loyal
comrades who were humble, self-sacrificing, and generous. There were about a thousand, who
were subsequently scattered in many countries. Curiel emphasizes that those Jews remained
politically active even after migration, that they were successful professionally, and that most
of their children became educated, an attempt to fence off claims that they were only exploiters,
of a comprador mentality, goldhunters who could only prosper in a poor exploited country •
Kln Pem ult’s eyes, Schwanz could never have been a Halil Adham. His parents were from Rumania, but
French educated and stranded in Egypt in 1914 when the war began. His father, a physician who disliked Rumania,
volunteered for the British army and stayed in Egypt He was successful in his profession and the family was well
off. They disliked the indigenous population, though the father pretended to be a leftist if not a Communist WW D
left Schwartz junior no other possibility, but to stay in EgypL The dwindling family fortune forced him to look for
a job. According to Perrault Schwartz knew little Arabic, neither colloquial nor literary. Perrault 1991, 135-158.
A few pages later, Perrault lets Aimée Setton declare that all the discussions in the DMNL central committee were
in Arabic. Curiel, Schwartz and herself were the only non-Egyptian members she says. (195) Curiel further on
is said to have adapted the “Communist Manifest” to Egyptian Arabic together with Raymond Stamboul! because
EMLN members were reluctant to accept its Syrian Arabic. (184) This seems to contradict the allegation that
Jewish Communists in genera) could not speak Arabic.
“ Curiel found Muhammad Shaga, a textile worker in Shubra al-Khaima a perfect example for such a leader.
MAl-SaTd 1989,95.

5.3. CURIEL

119

the ever-present picture of Egypt as the milk cow for foreign investors and speculators who had
come with empty bands.
In the DMNL the number of members had increased, but so had the social differences among
members. Iskra had attracted the sons of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, of the big families like the
Nabawfs and the Shalaqinls*5. Curiel welcomed them for practical reasons: protecting the or*
ganizations’s magazine, "The Masses” (al-jamOhlr), was easier with well-known names and
relations reaching inside the Egyptian establishment Curiel had gathered information on Egyp­
tian parties and institutions and the persons involved, to gain an overview about how powerplay
functioned in Egypt (much as a political scientist would do), and to assess who was approach­
able. This kind of evaluation and fact-gathering is typical for marginal leftist grass roots groups,
and most of the Egyptian intellectuals involved felt they were making a scientific effort to grasp
Egyptian reality in numbers and facts.16
As long as a political group has no share in power brokering, the process of decision making
remains highly intransparent, all the more so in a country like Egypt, where political process
was (and is) informal and takes place within a small elite circle. For a marginal political group
there are two factors that can help it to gain insight and influence. One is to gain the support
and the protection of influential figures, as was the case for Young Egypt and 'Aziz al-Misri.*7
The other option was that a small group managed to grow into a mass movement, as had been
the case with the Muslim Brothers, and thus gained access to personalities and institutions
remote and closed before. Therefore, to gain members for the communist movement who had
relations with the Egyptian political elite by birth right and could facilitate political action was
an advantage. Curiel’s appreciation of those members, and his concession that the movement
needed such people - though he was eager to come close to the "real Egyptians” - could even
be used as an argument against voices exaggerating the influence foreign minorities had over
Egyptian politics and economy.
Still, the disadvantages of the merger with Iskra were soon to outweigh the advantages. In
19SS, in an account of the events following the merger between Iskra and the EMNL for inner
party use, Curiel considered Iskra elements the reason for the failure of unity in the DMNL, and
the fractioning.**
There had been far too many foreigners and students compared to workers in the new organi­
zation. To overcome that problem, foreigners as well as students had been gathered in separate
sections. The best cadres had joined the workers' section.

S J i Proletarization
From Curiel's point of view, Egyptianization was finished when the EMNL and Iskra merged.
The next step was proletarization. Four Egyptians, two of them intellectuals and two workers,*17
“ MafcmOd al-NabiwT. ’An al-Shalaqinl.
“ See Anwar 'Abd al-Malik in his answers to the public prosecutor in 1946 concerning his activities in D ir
al-Abhnh. Amin 1996,222. Curiel described himself to the public prosecutor as a member of the Association for
Economy, Statistics, and Legislation as well as of the Royal Association for International Law and the Farmers*
Union in Egypt Amin 1996,258.
17In the M l of 1947 General ’Aziz al-Mifrf was elected honorary chairman of Mifr al-FatOh. 'A dz al-M ifrt
had become the inspector of the Egyptian army in 1936, replacing a British officer. In the same year Egyptian
intelligence services became national.
MA report Curiel prepared for his comrades in the DMNL at the end of 1955. “al-MartMl al-ra'lsiyya Ual-sinf
däkhii al-haraka al-dltnuqrMyya Ual-taharrur al-wakxnlft'Om ai-wahda Mäytt 1947-Yünytt 1949." (The general
stages of the straggle in the Democratic Movement for National Liberation in the year of the union May 1947/
June 1948.) 'AbMs 1988,157-184.

CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U

120

were chosen to lead the workers’ section.*9 Both workers were from the EMNL, the two intel­
lectuals from Iskra. Soon a war between Iskra intellectuals and Curiel started. Iskra intellectuals
pressed for an Egyptianization that would oust Curiel from leadership • i.e. an extremist, na­
tionalist reading of that policy, in Curiel’s view. Curiel, in turn, targeted Iskra intellectuals and
declared: “... the struggle against the bad influence of the intellectual Iskra members.”90
Those intellectuals had to be stopped, because they would turn workers into intellectuals in
the “bad sense of the word.” The workers’ section was the future party’s elite. But for Egyptian
intellectuals, Curiel complained, proletarization was unimportant It was enough to be Egyptian
to be qualified for leadership.
“The strange thing was that who most opposed my idea, were the students, i.e.
the petit bourgeois elements, because they were annoyed by ‘proletarization’ poli­
tics, and imagined that the interest for workers would mean that their value dimin­
ished.”91
Egyptianization took place with the quick promotion of Egyptians to the leadership. They
gained experience by doing, but proletarization could not take place that way. Workers could
not be promoted overlooking their intellectual shortcomings. What was true in Iraq was true
in Egypt as well: the intelligentsia was adverse to discipline, disinclined to act in subordinate
roles, and despised authority. Fahd, the Iraqi communist leader, was doubtful of the fitness of
intellectuals, and specifically of petty bouigeois intellectuals, for party leadership because they
“cloaked petty passions with ambitious communist phrases, and were constitutionally unable to
involve themselves in the struggles and miseries of the workers and peasants.” 92 The problem,
though, was that the industrial workers were still only a few, and a majority of them were unable
to lead due to the lack of experience, education, their peasant or artisan origin.
The argument for “Egyptianization” had been that the difference between foreigners and
Egyptians was too big, but then Egyptian intellectuals claimed that the difference between a
worker and an intellectual was much less. The encounter between the proletarians and the
intellectuals was already a process of proletarization.93
Accusations about the bourgeoisie spoiling workers (which will be heard again in later chap­
ters) were voiced by Curiel first:
“The Iskra methods made their appearance again in the sections ‘Iskrans’ were
dominant in. They destroyed the plus they had added to the organization. What
reigned was partisanship and family action, and cliquishness. The secret red cliques
were newly formed and contacts made from behind the back of the organization.
Money became the main reason for work in the workers’ sections. So that the
joined transport section (tram, bus and so on) which was completely dominated by
Iskrans, asked for relatively huge sums of money to prepare for the election of the
tramway workers.”94
The connection with Iskra had made money a very important factor, Curiel complained.
Iskra cadres were paid more than EMNL cadres, which caused problems in the DMNL. Under
**Shuhdl ‘Atiyya, 'Abd al-Ma’M d Al-GibaiH (sometimes ‘Abd al-Rafcmln NSyir is mentioned instead of him),
Muhammad Shaga end Sayyid Rifs'!.

“ •Abbés 1988,16S.
91Ibid., 99.
92Batatu 1978,493; quotation 308.
“ 'Abbés (ed.) 1988.
"Ibid., 176.

5.3. CURIEL

121

a new central committee which was elected following a DMNL conference in September 1947,
it was decided to reduce the “salary” again. Following that decision, “Iskra’s workers’ section,
which had been steadfast only because of money,” decreased.95

5 3 .6

The Split

In the party conference of September 1947, ShuhdT ‘Atiyya, a Cambridge graduate and the
first Egyptian Iskra member, triggered off the first division in the DMNL.96 The conference
had been convened to discuss the composition of the DMNL leadership. Curiel was critical of
the performance of the new organization. A purely coordinating committee for the different
sections was not enough at the top of the organization. There was no real leadership. 21
responsible figures attended, among them the seven members of the central committee. The
main problem, from Curiel’s point of view, was that the gap between the two organizations had
not been overcome, and that Iskra tried to demolish the EMNL’s influence. ShuhdT ’Atiyya
asked for the exclusion of Curiel and Schwartz “... because of their foreign origin, since both of
them are Jews, educated in a foreign culture (muthaqqafOn thaqâfa ajnabiyya), even though both
of them enjoyed Egyptian citizenship. To hide the real meaning of his suggestion to oust YQnis
[i.e. Curiel, I.S.], the founder of the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation and its main
leader, SulTmSn [i.e. ShuhdT 'Atiyya, I.S.], spoke about the ‘Egyptianization* of the leadership,
repeating the slogan that the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation had used to expose
Iskra’s real nature; but Egyptianization was not the problem then, because nobody could raise
doubts about the nature of the Egyptian movement and its leadership. The conference rejected
SuHmSn’s proposal after a violent discussion. The result of the vote was: twenty votes against
one vote, namely SutTmSn’s own vote. He behaved like that because of his failure as the person
politically responsible for the official magazine of the movement, and because of the criticism
that was directed against its editors.”97
The conference ended with the election of a central committee that had only four members,
Hillel Schwartz and Curiel among them. Curiel and ShuhdT 'Atiyya, but not Schwartz, became
members of the politburo.
ShuhdT 'Atiyya had a good reputation among Iskra members, but also among members of
other organizations, because he was the editor-in-chief o f “The Masses,” which had been Iskra’s
magazine in the beginning. There were complaints that the magazine had lost its mass appeal
after ShuhdT had been removed from the board of editors, and 'Abdu Dahab, who was seen as
Curiel’s man, had taken his place:
ThurayS ShSkir “Al-jamâhTr was a public organ, and in spite of that we distributed
it, because the government would try to lay its hands on it as soon as it was out. And
when it came from the print, we used to go and take it in a bundle and distribute it
"ib id ., 170. Professionals in the EMNL had been poorly paid. Four or six L.E. had hardly been enough to
feed a single persoo, let alone a family. Normally friends and relatives would help. With the union with Iskra
the movement’s budget had jumped. Under the administration of ‘Adil ('Abd al-Ma'Md Al-GibaiH), professionals
were paid between 16 and 18 L.E. a month. Curiel was critical of that development After the conference the
“salary” was reduced to 8 to 12 L.E. monthly.
"ShuhdT ‘Atiyya ‘Abdallah al-Shlfil, one of the martyrs of the communist movement and the author of a wellknown book about the national movement in Egypt See: R ifat al-Sa’id. al-JaiTma, Cairo 1984. In 1974 the court
of southern Cairo, first instanceffourth chamber (mahkamat janOb al-Q ihira al-ibtidllyya/ al-di’ira al-rlbi’a) ruled
that a crime had been perpetrated against ShuhdT 'Atiyya, and that he had died following (intended) torture. The
case had been brought to court by Rauya ShuhdT Fetridis, Shuhdl ‘Atiyya’s wife and Hanln ShuhdT, his daughter.
The lawyer, who represented them, was Ahmad al-Khawiga.
" ‘A bbis 1988,168-169.

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CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS B
among each other, you take ten and you take ten, and I was naming around till late
at night distributing the magazine, and I was so afraid.”
question: “Did the magazine reach the workers?”
Fauzl HabbashI: “Yes, they printed it in thousands. And from the self-evident ex­
amples concerning al-jamûhlr magazine Thurayi reminded me now of something.
That in those days when Shuhdl ‘Atiyya was the editor-in-chief of the magMiwe,
he was a professor at the university and something very big, a real theoretician
for the leftist movement in Egypt And we were taken by surprise when Henri
Curiel replaced him by a person who was not a theoretician at all in my opinion. A
complete failure. A Sudanese guy named 'Abdu Dahab. A committed man but a
light w eight and not to be compared with Shuhdl ’Atiyya at all. And when Henri
removed Shuhdl ’Atiyya from the post of editor-in-chief of al-jamâhTr and made
’Abdu Dahab editor-in-chief the magazine did not sell anymore.”
Thurayi Shikir. “After having had a real voice and a say and publishing w aken*
news from here and there and analyzing political positions. You’d really love to
read it. And when he changed [the é d ita I.S.] it did not sell anymore. That’s one
of the big mistakes.”
Fauzl HabbashI: “I would say that Henri was naive to a dangerous degree, I claim
that he was afraid of its influence, afraid that he would lose the leadership.”
Thurayi Shakir “People started to love Shuhdl, he had a strong influence. He was
very tall and convincing.”
Fauzl HabbashI: “Of course Shuhdl was one o f the promising leaders, who would
have pushed somebody like Henri Curiel aside. Shuhdl was clearly opposed to
Curiel, and opposed to the communist movement entering Egypt by way of some­
body like Henri.”
question: “What was his social background?”
answ er “He was an able university scholar. He studied f a free, and was sent to
Oxford with a grant. He came back and had a respectable social position. He had
a petit bourgeois background. I mean I visited him at home. His home was in
Funun al-Khallg Street, a normal apartment, I mean not from a high class family,
and I don’t say from a low class family. Because he was excellent they sent him to
Oxford with a grant, and because he was brilliant they were afraid of his influence
among the university students, and they transferred him to a job in the ministry of
education to curb his influence on students.”9*

’Atiyya was a man Egyptian students and intellectuals identified with. In June 1948, the
police had arrested Shuhdl ’Atiyya because the public prosecuta had received information that
’Atiyya, who was then 36 years old, and an inspecta in the ministry of education, was an
active Communist. The police knew that two communist groups had merged, and that Shuhdl
’Atiyya was a member in the central committee of the newly emerged group, the DMNL. In the
police report it was further stated that ’Atiyya and others had been expelled from the DMNL,
because they had wanted workers to have the right to obtain leadership, and because he and
others had observed that its leadership was limited to intellectuals, to Egyptian and foreign
Jews. The police had found a paper Shuhdl ’Atiyya had published, titled “A Wrong Decision”91
91Personal interview with Fauzl HabbashI Mid Thurayi S h ttir, Cairo 20rh October aad IM i November 1999.

5 3 . CURIEL

123

(qarOr khäti1). 'Atiyya had become the leader of a new group called “The New Trend” (harakat
al-tayyir al-jadld) or “The Revolutionary Bloc” (al-takattul al-thaurf). ‘Atiyya was considered
a dangerous Communist, and had been transferred to Assiut before and banned from working
for four months.
Al-JamOhlr had been a weekly magazine. The Ministry of the Interior had given the lawyer
MahmOd al-Nabawf 'Abd al-Laflf permission to publish a cultural, social and political magazine
in Arabic, called “The Moon” (al-badr), appearing weekly. Some Communists had got in
touch with him, and offered to finance the magazine and take over the editorship. The name
was changed to al-Jamählr and the first edition published on 7th April 1947. The magazine
incited workers to rebelliousness and was the mouthpiece of the DMNL. The DMNL was,
according to the police’s assessment, the strongest communist organization in that period of
tim e and prepared for the foundation of a communist party. Curiel was seen as the investor
behind the magazine. In December the magazine was finally forbidden, after several numbers
o f the magazine had been confiscated, and the magazine suffered great losses.
The pamphlets, proving the line ‘Atiyya’s splinter group pursued, did not indicate any crit­
icism concerning Palestine, or the Jewish leadership, or the role of foreigners. The DMNL
remained detached from the masses. The main aims had to be to defeat colonialism, to lay a
basis for socialism, and to form a communist party, not “to run after” populist movements and
local activities. The leadership of the DMNL were not professional revolutionaries, nor were
the technical apparatus and other party organs led by practised cadres who were able to with­
stand police harassment. Cadres and members were recruited from within the circle of friends
and relatives, and the organization had filled with spies and mediocre elements. Party members
had to be directed on a daily basis, and had to receive sound training, not a superficial course.
Hiding places had to be arranged. Did the leadership know what a real cadre was, or were they
referring only to the leadership itself when they used that term? How could they give an order
to party members to try their luck, and then tell them that they were not ready to bail them out?
What was the use of an organization that had been active for years if it did not have the ability to
protect its members from repression? Egyptian Communists had not succeeded in connecting
their organization to the workers’ movement, even though the communist groups had existed
for eight years. No revolutionary organization existed that could form a communist mass party.
The repercussions of repression were strongly felt in the pamphlets. Cadres had to be pro­
vided with money and books to allow them to live underground for a period of time, that was
more than a few weeks or a month. A real Bolshevik organization, an iron group, had to be cre­
ated. And even though the Egyptian fallahin had been detached horn the national movement,
Communists had to try to broaden the socialist awareness of workers first, and then to send pro­
letarian cadres to the countryside to organize the fallahin, according to a geostrategic plan that
included the industrial sites and exploited the fact that they were close to the villages. The third
pamphlet called for “The Egyptianization of Marxist Leninist Theory" (tamslr al-nazariyya
at-markisiyya al-lininiyya). To meet that promising demand, the pamphlet mentioned only the
translation of the main Marxist texts into Arabic, and the preparation of courses on socialism for
workers. One of those courses explained the workers’ struggle with a reference also to Egyptian
examples, like the destruction of machines in the course of the 'UrâbT revolution. Revolution
was to be made more understandable by the translation of stories about the heroic deeds and the
sacrifices of heroic workers, and fighters, and great Communists all over the world. Finally, the
pamphlet demanded the production of revolutionary literature and poetry which would help to
sharpen resolution and kindle zeal.99
99Amin 1998,9-22. A general remarie concerning Egyptian Marxism could be useful here. Even though ShuhdT

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None of the issues really tearing the movement apart were mentioned. And even more im­
portant, the demands of 'T he Revolutionary Bloc” did not go beyond what Curiel himself had
argued. Shuhtff ‘Atiyya’s understanding of Egyptianization was not connected to any Egyptian
grassroots experience. The pamphlets were discussing an Egyptianization in form not necessar­
ily content.
Shuhdï 'Atiyya’s Revolutionary Bloc had originated in the students9 section. The students
organized a putsch and ousted their leaders.100 A part of the foreigners* section joined them.
The Revolutionary Bloc members were mainly from Iskra. Arié believes that the main reason
for the discontent was boredom. There had been a low tide in university activities after the
government had clamped down on the national movement in 1946. But Curiel’s reaction to
the putsch was not very diplomatic either. Shuhdï 'Atiyya, Anwar cAbd al-Malik, and Husain
Kfizim were expelled, politics not discussed.101
More splits occurred, but the majority of the DMNL leadership stayed with Curiel, and
some Iskra cadres even changed sides.102 Accusations exchanged over immoral behavior, west­
ernization, lack of authenticity (though that term, usually translated into Arabic as asOla, still
had to be invented and acquired frequent use only with the rise of the Islamic movement in the
1970s), and the conflict about who could represent and lead the Egyptian people and its toiling
masses accompanied the communist movement in the 1940s, and dominated the discussion in
the last decades far more than the question how the mass of the Egyptian poor, the fallahin
and the urban squatters, could be mobilized and addressed. This is partly due to the fact that
Islamic groups had moved in already, and by providing basic institutions (health care centers,
schools, tuition, welfare, and charity work) had tied a laige segment of the population to their
ideology. Leftist groups, in general, offered nothing but ideology, there was nothing to gain, no
tangible amelioration of a living situation, but on the contrary, continuous police terror and a
confrontation with society and its traditional values.
Iskra, as well as the EMNL, had hoped that one oiganization could swallow the ocher or
dominate it. For Curiel, the Iskra leaders were the sons of pashas and Toreigners.” Foreigners
A tiyya demanded an "Egyptianization" of Marxism, his understanding of what that might be did not go beyond
the translation of texts. Heroes that could serve as examples for struggle were not local figures, but important
personalities in the international communist movement Looking into Egyptian historiography it is striking that
history “from below," history seen with the eyes of the people at the bottom of society, is a project that is totally
absent from the scene. It would have been the natural consequence of engaged Marxist thought and scientific
endeavour to undertake the re-discovery of popular resistance movements in Egypt, not the movements directed
against foreign occupation only, but those directed against exploitation in a general sense. The history of bandits,
for example, like in Hobsbawm’s Bandits (1969), research about living conditions of peasants and the urban poor
and their mode to survive, comparative studies about living conditions in Upper and Lower Egypt, the real history
of the Arab invasion of Egypt and the relation between religions in Egypt and so on. Critical research has a difficult
stand in Egypt Publications are easily suspected of disturbing social peace. The critical perspective is the domain
of Arab nationalists. Thus it is not surprising th at for example, Curiel's man from the people who identifies him
as the "Mahdi," is in R ifat Al-SaTd’s interview a simple fallah and in Gilles Renault's book a famous robber whether the difference might be due to R ifat Al-SaTd’s interpretation or Curiel’s own recollection of events is
unimportant in this respect but certainly the "expropriation" of property does not count among the respectable
traits of an Egyptian Communist.
l00Robert Setton and GamJU Gh&IT.
IOiSa'd Zahrfin, Husain al-Ghamrf, Michel ‘Abd al-Sayyid, Da*0d ‘Aziz, Muhammad Sid Ahmad, Dhim Saif
al-Nasr, Tauftq Haddad, Niqula Ward, some foreigners and only a single worker were among the members of the
Revolutionary Bloc. Arid, in: Al-SaTd 1989,296-300, here 297.
,02The main clash occurred between Curiel and ‘Abd al-MaT>0d Al-Gibaill, who had been responsible for public
relations. He criticized Curiel for his politics. The line of the democratic national forces was very general and
included passages from Stalin's speeches, he said. In fact everybody worshipped texts, also the forces who opposed
Curiel.

5.3. CURÆL

125

was a label he gave to “elements with different foreign nationalities who live totally detached
from Egyptian life, and to rich bourgeois Jews Vho did not know Arabic because of their foreign
culture • who do not share in the struggle of the movement, except on a very narrow scale,
and who saw their dominating influence in Iskra reaching zero in the DMNL.” Those were
the people who would rage against centralism. The Revolutionary Bloc was nothing but the
elite of reformist elements who felt sidelined because the revolutionary trend was gaining more
strength. Therefore they would adopt slogans like “Dictatorial centralism!“ or “Terror in the
Central Committee,” or “ 100% work among industrial workers.” 103
But, for Curiel, both the national movement and the popular movement were equally im­
portant The DMNL called for national unity (wahda wataniyya), as the Wafd had done. A
concept virtually any party in Egypt would pay lipservice to but which was, in practice, often
violated, especially in the late 1930s when Curiel had decided that Egypt would be the stage
where his political ambitions should unfold. For him as a Jew, national unity had an even wider
meaning than the ordinarily perceived unity between Copts and Muslims and different social
classes. Curiel took part in a discourse on nationally defined politics. This was partly due
to the precarious historical situation in Egypt, and the fight against colonial occupation. For­
eign dominance in Egypt had to be ended, and Curiel did not engage in a purely anticapitalist
rhetoric, because he wanted to address any class in Egyptian society under the precondition
that it was ready to fight imperialism. To mobilize on this basis - pro-Egyptian, anti-British,
and anti-imperialist • an identification with Egypt and Egyptian interests implied a dissocia­
tion from what was perceived to be foreign influence and politics. Another motive to engage
in an anti-foreigner discourse was the competition with other francophone Jewish communist
leaders and the “indigenous” Egyptian Communists, who would push, under the disguise of
Egyptianizadon, for an extension of personal power and influence. Curiel’s engagement for the
communist movement was meant to serve as an entry ticket to Egyptian society, because he
identified himself with the mass of the Egyptian people. Curiel saw himself in a revolutionary,
optimistic, uprooting trend against an opportunist, pessimist, and reformist one.
“I, for example, was formed on Egyptian ground in spite of being a foreigner, but
there are Egyptians who were formed, politically and ideologically, outside Egypt.
And that was also a source of difference between the two trends. The reaction knew
that truth. Therefore it concentrated its attacks on us and not on the others. When
I was expelled from Egypt, the chancellor at the cassation court confessed to my
lawyer that the serait had pressed for my deportation. Had our role been passive the
reaction would not have wanted to deport me.” 104
Curiel considered the petit bourgeoisie the tool of reaction in most countries, because it
wanted to go back to the old times before the advent of capitalism, when it had been better off.
Small traders, employees, artisans, and so on were the main supporters of the Muslim Broth­
erhood, for example. But after the October revolution, Stalingrad, and with the change in the
balance of powers, the role of a petit bourgeois in a country like Egypt had changed. Stalin­
grad had changed his attitude towards socialism. The USSR had been considered a fortress
o f atheism and a waylayers’ cave, it had been portrayed as a den of iniquity, spreading loose
ethics all over the world. After the end of WW II, it had become obvious in Egypt that the
upper classes themselves were prone to immoral behavior (inhilal), and their propaganda con­
cerning the immoral Soviet Union did not work anymore. The Soviet Union had become a
'“ ‘Abba* 1988.172.
104Ibid.. 96.

CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS n

126

respectable country, and Communists agitating for the communist model could be respectable
people, attracting Egyptians from different strata of society.105 Curiel’s project was ambitious.
The organization he was out to form would be a real competitor to the Wafd because not only
were the workers a revolutionary force in his understanding, but the whole of Egypt, all the
revolutionary forces in Egypt, were to be addressed.
“We wanted to be a democratic mass organization for each group. Egypt needed
mass organizations, a students’ union, a workers’ union, a women’s union.”106
The DMNL has a special place in the communist movement, because it was connected to
the Free Officers’ movement This connection has brought admiration for the success o f the
movement in the deposition of the king and the old elites on the one hand, and disgust for the
political repression on the other hand. In Curiel’s narrative it was he and Osman Fauzi (Didar
Fauzi Rossano’s husband, who had been critical of the Palestinian adventure all along) who
agreed after the end of the Palestinian war in 1948 that a national officers* organization (tanpm
watanT li al-dubdt) had to be established inside the army. Curiel presents himself as one o f the
spiritual fathers of this project and still defends this policy, though mistakes were made when it
came folly into practice.107

5 3 .7

The War of 1948

Curiel was arrested, like many other Communists, in the weeks preceding the first Arab-Israeli
war in 1948. The communist press had been wanting against that war, and declared it in the
interest of the Arab reaction. Apart from the Communists, leading Zionists had been arrested
as well. But the DMNL, the biggest communist organization so far, was already in tatters by its
own doing.
In his papers, Curiel had not mentioned the Palestinian conflict as a source of dissent in the
DMNL. And Didar Fauzi Rossano, as mentioned before, stressed that the pro-partition position
the organization assumed had been due to communist convictions. In the discourse about the
communist movement, though, the conflict concerning Palestine was pushed to the fore, and
added a dimension to the notion of “foreigner” that Curiel had missed.
Sa'd ZahrSn, one of the members of the Revolutionary Bloc, claimed that the contradictions
between the views of foreigners and Egyptians in the DMNL leadership had been unreconcilable. Foreigners had not been able to understand “the strong national feelings involved in the
Palestinian issue.” The authorities would use the Jewish leadership as a pretext to act against the
communist movement, and present its politics as Zionist.10* In his latest English work, R ifat
Al-Sa'Td presents the Palestinian cause as a strong reason for dissent in the DMNL leadership:
“The young leaders... were on the periphery of the ideological organizations. Their
ideological age was not more than one or two years. They all came from the same
social background and were bound by common daily problems and common polit­
ical issues both in the university and the mode of production. Those young people
105Ibid., 93. This is part o f a chapter called “Dhlkrayät al-milad" (au al-müää al-thänl) (Memories of birth or
the second birth) 1934-1943.
l06AI-SaTd 1989,90-100; 91.
l0,Curiel. in: AI-SaTd 1989,90-100.
,0*Ismael and el-Sa’id 1990,62, footnote 62. based on an interview with Sa'd Zahrin.

5.3. CURSEL

127

were motivated by the lofty moral, human, and cultural ideals of Islam and so­
cialism without falling into the dark pitfalls of ideological fanaticism, or narrow
partisanship... ."1W
The young Egyptian revolutionaries wanted action while, as Al-SaTd’s source, Sa'd ZahrSn,
explained, the old guard, represented by Curiel and other foreigners, hesitated to a c t They
were content with critical analysis and theories about class struggle while ruling the organiza­
tion in an authoritarian style. Al-SaTd supports ZahrSn’s view. The government be believes,
had successfully identified the communist movement with Zionism, and the public suspected
Communists. This feeling was strengthened by the DMNL’s acceptance of the partition plan.110
Al-SaTd builds up a conflict between the DMNL leadership around Curiel and his opponents
that is based on a chain of various elements: the old guard against the newcomers / theoreticians
against activists / authoritarian centralism against democratic centralism /rich against poor /
atheism or Judaism against Islam / ideological fanaticism against lofty human ideals. All those
arguments will appear again in the chapter about reactions to Curiel.
The “old guard” could have meant “old” only in the context of political experience and
activity because Curiel and 'Atiyya were about the same age. Schwartz, bom in 1923, though,
was considerably younger and probably closer to the students’ section because of his age. Also,
the common social background of that new guard existed only in Zahr&n’s imagination, as
further chapters will prove. The ideological fanaticism was certainly also on the side of the
self-appointed revolutionaries who demanded proletarization at all costs. The most revealing of
the arguments is probably the recourse to Islam as a basis for humanism.
Imprisoned in 1948, Curiel was released in 1930, only to be deported to Italy.
“I was deported in darkness and without a passport I became a displaced person
on the deck of a ship, and without a homeland (watan). However, I am Egyptian,
and I will remain an Egyptian, proud of being Egyptian.”111
The question of who could be a member of the Egyptian communist movement and the
party that was to originate from that movement and more specifically, who could be in the
leadership, did not cease to worry the Egyptian Communists after Curiel had been expelled.
Because even though he was prevented from returning to Egypt he continued to take an interest
in the development of the movement and, by way of correspondence and envoys, took part
in DMNL discussions and decision making. To what extent he was influential is difficult to
assess, though his major role becomes very clear from the fact that until 1938 the question of
whether he could become a member of an Egyptian communist party’s central committee or
not was open. Since 1931 there had been a plan for work, according to Curiel, approved by the
Egyptian comrades. He and his comrades in French exile, who called themselves “The Rome
Group” (majmJfat Roma), did not want to lead.
“We cannot accept, in any case, the accusation that is directed against us that we
are trying to lead the party from abroad. Such an accusation can only be raised
by people who do not feel any responsiblity. You know better than anybody else
that even if we were wishing for the leadership, which is not true at all, we do not0
l0*IbicL, 56-57.
"Ibid.. 68.
" ‘Curiel’» farewell was published ia al-Bashfr, a public DMNL magazine. al-Bsihlr, 3rd September 1930. AlS ald comments the letter : “. .. , but he left and did not return. Though for a long time Raditu members remained
corresponding with him tad accepted from his writings some of their directions.” Al-Safd 1983,37.

128

CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS II
have any means to really assume the leadership. You know better than anybody else
that the Politburo, and die Central Committee, and all the leading institutions of the
party meet and make their decisions, without the party group abroad expressing its
opinion concerning the questions that are discussed.”112

The role of Curiel and the Rome Group, in the time between Curiel’s expulsion from Egypt
- under the pretext that he, though he had assumed Egyptian citizenship, had not given up his
Italian citizenship • and the dissolution of the group, was never openly discussed. Except for
Egyptians who themselves spent some time in exile abroad - like YOsuf Al-GindT and Sharif
H atita -, contacts with the group are not mentioned, nor is their connection to the reestablished
DMNL and subsequently emerging joint communist organizations. However, groups other than
the DMNL emphasize Curiel’s continuous influence on the former group, and in interviews he is
occasionally mentioned as a central committee member until 19SS. Didar Fauzi Rossano reports
the continuous efforts of the comrades in Paris to help organize support for Egypt in France and
to support the organization in Egypt with material and technical items. Whether any financial
support was involved is not mentioned, since the whole issue of receiving support from abroad
became increasingly sensitive during the Nasir era. But the fact that another leader, Odette
Hazan from the extremist Egyptian Communist Organization (mishmish), considered becoming
an Egyptian communist leader in exile in 1952'13 is a sign that during the 1950s this plan was
not thought impossible.
According to Muhammad STd Ahmad, the Rome Group had been decisive in DMNL deci­
sions until late 1957. He mentions that the Iraqi Communists, with whom the Egyptians wanted
a closer cooperation, were against Curiel, because they found him to be too inclined towards
Abdel N asir."4
A letter from Curiel in 1954 reveals how closely developments in Egypt were followed in
France. Curiel talks about the line the DMNL takes, and about the difficulty to become a real
revolutionary force. The leadership of the DMNL was young and inexperienced, they were not
proletarians, but still petit bourgeois and intellectuals. Not being proletarian in its majority,
the DMNL was heading towards leftist extremism, which was one of the typical pitfalls which
young communist organizations fell prey to. The first paragraphs were rather general. Curiel
even softened the notion “young” by adding a “probably” which leaves space to imagine that
he did not know who was in the lead in 1954. The DMNL, which had gained force again be­
tween 1950 and 1952 because of its support and work for the Stockholm appeal, had suffered
a loss of prestige and credibility, after die Free Officers’ regime became more and more un­
popular among Communists, and proved to be thoroughly anti-communist and hostile towards
the workers' movement. The DMNL’s fortune sank and (after Bandung and the Suez Canal
crisis) rose with the officers’ politics. In 1953, the DMNL again suffered from a split off and
a conflict in leadership, and it lost out in the merger with other communist groups. Curiel’s official - influence seemed curbed, and only grew again in 1955.'15 Though he did not know the
l,2*Abbâs 1988,217. A letter from Curiel to the politburo dated from January 12,1958.
1IJSee Muhammad STd Ahmad in the chapter “Ideology and economy.“
1l4Four DMNL members had to leave the central committee of the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rttya) because
of an Iraqi demand: Kamil 'Abd al-HalTm, Shuhdl ‘Atiyya, Ahmad al-R ifll and MuMrak ‘Abdu Fa0l.
" ’M ubirak 'Abdu Fadl (DMNL), HamdT 'Abd al-Gawid (DMNL, the Revolutionary Tlrend/ al fayyùral-lhaurt),
FakhrT Lablb (The Communist Vanguard / talfat al-shuytttyth), Ahmad Khidr (al-najm al-ahmar / the Red Star),
Ibrâhîm 'Urfa (Towards a Communist Party / nahwa al-hizb al-shuyO'T). Fakhrt MakkI (the secretary of the Pales­
tinian League for National Liberation as an observer) formed a committee to prepare a merger. The Egyptian
Communist Party (al-rûya) and the Workers' Vanguard {tattat al-'ummd!) did not join the committee. In the two
documents drawn up by that committee, the DMNL’s supportive position towards the army was criticized and

5.3. CURIEL

129

newcomers al the rank and file and the members of the other groups, he certainly did know the
leading cadres of his own organization, and some of them were also very close to him. Curie!
criticized his comrades, because they treated Egypt like an isolated case.
“D’abord vous considérez la situation égyptienne comme se développant en vase
clos, comme n’étant pas fortement rattachée ä la situation internationale i laquelle
vous ne faites même pas allusion. Or, dans la situation actuelle ne pas tenir compte
avant tout de la situation internationale c’est risquer les pires aventures. Il semble au
lecteur de votre lettre que la libération de l'Egypte et le changement de la structure
sociale est une affaire purement interne, un simple conflit entre la nation égyptienne
et l’impérialisme anglais, et même un conflit entre le peuple égyptien et les troupes
d’occupation. 11faut au plus tôt mettre fin à cette tendance qui a sa source dans votre
solement du inonde extérieur. U faut mettre au premier plan l’analyse de situation
internationale et par voie de conséquence il faut mettre au 1er plan vos taches de
liaison avec le mouvement mondial anti-impérialiste, démocratique et pacifique qui
est la force décisive dans la lutte de la nation égyptienne pour sa libération.”
Curiel goes on to criticise his comrades for their vague ideas about Egyptian workers and
their “incapacité de concentrer une partie importante de leurs forces dans le travail com. et
démocratique au sein de la classe ouvrière et du mouvement syndical.” In his answer to the
comrades’ letter he blames them, furthermore, for their neglect of legal and democratic work.
Even in a period of repression, such activity was important, and the DMNL differed from the
Egyptian Communist Party (al-räya) in acknowledging its value.
“Un des mérites historiques du MDLN, c’est d’avoir à peu près seul mené l’action
démocratique dans tous les domaines.”
Curiel describes the DMNL continuously as “our'’ movement, though he alternately de­
scribes activities and aims as “our” or “your.” Though he leaves no doubt about his interests and
his ambition to discuss and influence politics in Egypt, he recognizes the difficulty of judging
and counseling from abroad, and presses for “l’un de vous” to come to France to discuss matters
in person, and not only by way of letter. Curiel is worried about “une unité ‘sentimental.’ ” that
might have attracted DMNL cadres and lured them into union with other organizations. He is
worried that they might have neglected ideological struggle as a precondition for a successful
union.116
1954 had been a difficult year in Egypt In March, Abdel Nasir had proved victorious in
the showdown with Nagib and his push for more democracy that had been supported by the
Communists. In the same year, “Operation Susannah" (also dubbed the Lavon affair) had been
the Free Officers' putsch was described as backed by the United States. The second paper concerned organiza­
tional questions and included a number of liberal aspects. In the central committee that was formed later the
smaller organizations were represented by three members while the DMNL sent II. Among those eleven were
ZakI Murid, Muhammad Shatta, Mublrak ‘Abdu Fadl, YQsuf Al-Gindi, Shuhdl ‘Atiyya, Ibrihlm ‘Abd al-Halhn,
F u ld Habbashl and Curiel himself. Curiel’s membership, though, was to remain dormant until his “question”
was resolved. Kamil 'Abd al-Hallm was not included because of outside pressure. In 1935 the “muwahkUT
the Communist organization that had originated from the merger changed its attitude towards Abdel Nasir, and
the DMNL again gained more influence. FakhrT Lablb (jalfai al-shuyftlyln), Ahmad Khidr (al-najm al-ahmar),
MahmQd Amin al-'Älim and Bahlg NasAr (nahwa al-hizb al-shuyitt) became DMNL members and Curiel gained
full central committee membership again, as well as Kamil 'Abd al-Hallm. Interview with M ublrak ‘Abdu Fadl,
22nd of January 1982, in: AI-SaTd 1989,365-370.
" ‘Document, a letter from Henri Curiel to the DMNL leadership from 20th February 1934,12 pages in French.

130

CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U

uncovered and a trial set up in which Egyptian Jews were accused of sabotaging Egyptian
security, in cooperation with the Israeli secret service. The Israeli government rejected the
charges and presented the detainees as victims of a show trial against Zionists. The Egyptian
government, in turn, underlined that the whole case was not against Jews, but against Mossad
agents. In an anti-communist campaign that was unleashed in the Egyptian press in autumn
1934, Communists were again accused of Zionism, as had already been the case in the 1940s.
The communist movement was allegedly led by the Zionist Henri Curiel, who resided in Paris.
For the press, communism and Zionism were synonymous with atheism and promiscuity. From
the point of view of Egyptian journalists and politicians, money and sex were the key motives
for the young Egyptian Jews who were accused of conspiring against national security in E gypt
But in a parallel developm ent those two elements were also used to interpret Jewish influence
in the communist movement in E gypt117
This campaign, however, obviously could not hurt the relation between the Rome Group
and the DMNL. In 1933, the Rome Group sent a letter to Egypt asking for the exact conditions
of the merger between the eleven organizations that had joined the United Egyptian Communist
Party (al-hizb ai-shuyitl al-m isri al-muwahhad), to make sure that the group would join that
party on a basis of correct ideological and political ideas.
“...in order [for us LS.] to be armed politically and ideologically for continuous
struggle, according to the line that the Central Committee of the United Communist
Party of Egypt laid down. Our group promises to stay steadfast in its fight under
the banner of the United Egyptian Communist Party for the sake of Egyptian in­
dependence, the victory of liberties, international peace, the improvement of living
conditions for our people, and the establishment of socialism in our country.”
The letter is signed by the United Egyptian Communist Party’s Group in Rome (majm&at
al-hizb al-shuytfT al-m isrt al-muwahhad bi ROmd).11*
In a letter dated from 1937 it became evident that the group would leave the party in the
near future. It was a letter of defense. Curiel defined the Rome Group as a group of comrades
who had struggled in the Egyptian communist movement and were living abroad now, either
voluntarily or by “force majeure.” Some of them were ready to return to Egypt, others n o t
But even those who did not intend to return went on struggling in the Rome Group, for in the
Rome Group they found a field for their real revolutionary activity, an activity that was directed
towards Egypt. The group consisted of comrades who could not return to Egypt since those who
could had done so already, even if it had been under dangerous circumstances. The group was
criticized, he chided, because it consisted of foreign comrades and Jews. Though in reality their
membership should have been a source of pride for the Egyptian party. Those who had had the
opportunity to return, in order to share in the direct struggle in Egypt, had done so. The foreign
comrades and the Jews had proved loyal towards the communist movement in Egypt, contrary to
the assumptions of their adversaries.119 The group had helped the party in Egypt directly, it had
participated in the political life of the party by way of correspondence and political studies. It
had helped to provide the party with propaganda material, translating books, preparing lectures,
studies, and documents. It had helped financially by paying party fees, recruiting people, and
donations. And it had helped to strengthen Egyptian presence on an international level, in
IITSee for deuils on Operation Susannah: Beinin 1998.
"^Translated from Arabic, published in: 'A bU s 1998.
"*In Arabic, al-khaft al-'Omm U-a'mOl ai-mqjmifa al-qadZtna U al-hizb al-zhuyfft al-mifrf bi al-ihârÿ (The
general line for the work o f the old Egyptian Communist Patty (al-rOya)'» group abroad) (1937), ‘Abbis 1998,
214.

5.3. CURIEL

131

conferences and meetings. The group had informed its Egyptian comrades about the date and
the program of conferences, it bad helped to prepare an Egyptian contribution and to present
Egyptian demands, it had financed Egyptian envoys, and sometimes represented Egypt when
none of the Egyptians could come. Last but not least, it had promoted the Egyptian workers’
cause, and the Egyptian national movement, and the democratic movement, defending them
against the imperialist attacks, and forging contacts with the international workers’ movement
and other communist parties.
From CUriel’s argument in his letter in 1934, and the politics he had followed from the
1940s, it had always been obvious that he supported an internationalist attitude for the Egyptian
Communists. Being stranded in Paris, he and his group became a window for the isolated
Egyptian Communists that allowed them to present their case on an international level, a vital
issue at a time when direct contact between the embassies of communist countries in Egypt and
Egyptians in general was extremely difficult120 On the other hand, this attitude allowed Curiel
to go on playing a role in a movement that came increasingly under the grip of Arab-Egyptian
nationalist politics. In a letter to Naomi Canal in May 1957, Curiel was still optimistic: the
Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya) was the only party - compared to its Arab counterparts •
that accepted Jews in its leadership. Therefore they did not have to fear the policy of uniting
with other groups believing in the party’s flexibility.121
But only a few months later, in January 1958, the Rome Group sent a bitter letter to the
Politbüro of the newly formed United Egyptian Communist Party. Should people who had
fought with the Egyptian communist movement for half of their lives stay affiliated or join
foreign parties? Before WW n any Communist, whatever his country of origin might have
been, would become active in his resident country, and under the flag of the local communist
party. Now parties had their own rules and customs. It depended on the origins of Communists
if they could join. In France, people from former French colonies could join, but US-Americans
could not But the more important question was: did a homeland need support from a group
abroad or not? Franco’s Spain was such a case. The Egyptian communist group abroad had
been formed to support struggle in Egypt. The group was more useful doing that than joining
the parties in their resident countries. Even the French Communist Party had supported that
activity, and permitted some of its members to leave its ranks and join what had been first the
DMNL abroad and then became part of the United Egyptian Communist Party. Since 1951 there
had been a plan for work, approved by the Egyptian comrades. The Rome Group had neither
intended to lead the party nor was it in any position to do so. Since 1954 it had not issued
any more independent publications, just translations, though it had struggled for a just peace
between Israel and the Arab states. They had always considered themselves party members and
subjected to party discipline, although they had had many objections, first against Curiel being
sidelined, then concerning the hostility towards Abdel Nasir between 1953-54.122 Their opinion
had not been asked for in the decision to expel the group. To accept that humiliating step was
tantamount to “submission to racism.’’123
The politburo of the United Egyptian Communist Party was not open to further arguments.
In March 1958 it declared that the Rome Group was isolated from Egyptian reality, an aigu,J0See for example material from the GDR embassy in Cairo, viewed by the author.
>2"A bbls 1998,241.
l22Curiel had advised Communists to be with Abdel Nasir because their influence would help to constrain him.
Them was, however, a clear difference between intellectuals whom Abdel Nasir appreciated, and lower cadres that
were persecuted by his apparatus. The regime had many negative sides. Curiel listed the rejection of democracy
and workers' and peasants’ demands, the omnipotence of the secret service, the inclination towards religious
extremism (sic!), the racism against minorities and the anti-Semitism. ’A bbis 1988,230.
' “ Ibid., 216-219. The letter is also photocopied in its Arabic original. 220-21.

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CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS B

ment that had been put forward as a pretext in the communist movement since its beginnings to
exclude elements termed bourgeois or foreign or westernized, and undesirable in general. An­
other argument was that the group was not under the control of the party organs. New horizons
would open up for the group’s members who were now able to join communist parties in their
resident countries. Egyptian Communists wished for “saines relations avec les partis frères." a
wish implying that the Rome Group had hampered such relations. The fifth reason that had (not
unanimously but only with a majority) been accepted was that the group had a foreign char­
acter.124125In the French text of the decision it only said “La formation du G roupe..." leaving
an empty space after formation, which, in the Arabic publication of Curiel’s papers, edited by
Ra’Gf 'Abbäs, was filled with the term ajnabl (foreign). The Rome Group was ordered to dis­
solve on 14th March 1958. Party members were forbidden to keep in touch with the comrades
abroad politically or within the framework of the organization. Contact was only allowed under
the supervision of the person responsible for foreign relations. Personal relations, though, were
permitted. In case any of the group’s comrades would return to Egypt and wish to join the party,
the politburo would have to consider his case.
In April 1958, the Rome Group accepted the decision taken in Cairo. It adhered to party
discipline until the bitter end, though the group complained that the order to dissolve had come
.. sans tenir compte le moins du monde des sentiments des camarades du Groupe,
membres inébranlablement fidèles au mouvement communiste égyptien auquel la
plupart d’entre eux appartiennent depuis plus de dix ans et auquel ils ont consacré
durant cette période le meilleur d’eux-memes et qu’on a traité avec un manque total
d’égards, comme des adversaires plus que comme des camarades.”121
The Rome Group insisted on continuing to pay their party dues and keeping in contact It
would also contiue to send books on the theory of Marxism-Leninism. The group would choose
a different name in order not to be mistaken for a representative of the Egyptian party. Comrades
who hoped to be able to return to Egypt would continue their struggle for their homeland, and
continue to follow activities related to Egypt even abroad.
The resolution ends with the declaration that the comrades in France would make an effort
to serve the Egyptian working class’ cause, the Egyptian independence, and the struggle for
peace.
”... - à continuer, comme ils l’ont toujours fait, à rester fidèles au P.C.E., que ce soit
en liberté ou en prison, en Egypte ou à l’étranger, dans le Parti ou hors du Parti.”
Curiel and other comrades abroad thus faced the same policy Darwîsh and others had to
face in Egypt. Jews, whether converted to Islam or not, whether Egyptian citizens or not, were
not welcome any more in the communist ranks of the late 1950s. A tendency perceptible from
the outset of the movement had gained momentum and finally overthrown not only the old
leadership but also old internationalist principles and revised them in favor of an attitude that
suited the Arab nationalist climate dominating the public sphere and the perceived antagonism
between the Arabs and the West. Cosmopolitanism reaked of the old world, the King and his
entourage, colonialist domination, and repression. Freedom would come about at the hands of
“real” Egyptians, Arab Egyptians, which included also the acceptance of Islam as a cultural
framework, and retrospectively excluded anybody not at home within that framework. Even
124Résolution du Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Egyptien. Seconde semaine de Mare 1958. Maritas
al-taihOth al-'arabiyya.
125Document titled Texte des resolutions, dated from 1958, Maifcaz al-bubOth al-'arabiyya.

5.3. CURIEL

133

though the very same cultural framework was only vaguely defined and was mixed with social
and economic aspects, as will be seen in the chapter about Egyptian middle class Communists.

5.3.8

Curiel and Palestine

In the discourse about Egyptian Communists in the 1940s and 1930s, voices speaking out in
favor of Curiel are few. History is judged in the light of recent events, even the possibility o f
a Jewish Muslim cooperation in a communist movement seems to be very remote. The ArabIsraeli conflict, apart from the already mentioned favored self-interpretation as Muslim and
different, is the main cause. Curiel provided his critics with a target in that respect.
Contrary to efforts to present Curiel as a promoter of the Israeli state, YOsuf Al-Gindf,
a former DMNL activist and publisher, is very positive regarding Curiel’s role in Egyptian
communism and the Middle East peace process.126 In Egypt the EMNL had asked the Jewish
community (al-tä’ifa al-yahüdiyyà) - which according to Al-Gindi had 100,000 members - to
practise solidarity with the Egyptian national movement as the Jews had done in 1919. The
EMNL was certain that the future of the Jewish community could only be secured if it became
an integral component of the national Egyptian movement like other m inorities.127*This position
was met by much opposition from organisations like the Muslim Brothers who did not believe in
a national state but an Islamic one, and nationalists for whom there was no difference between
Jews and Zionists. Even the Egyptian governments who were dependent on the English and
subject to the serait paid only lipservice to national unity. As Curiel had argued in 1948, AlGindf argues half a century later the solidarity with the Arabs in Palestine was used as a means
to make the Egyptian masses forget that before the liberation of Palestine could occur Egypt had
to be liberated. Jews in Egypt were oriental Jews, not Zionists. They did not want to emigrate
but they sympathized with the plight of the Nazi victims, even if this meant inflicting injustice
upon the Palestinians.
The partition of Palestine was, in the DMNL’s view, the result of the Arab governments’
position. In 1947, the DMNL published a pamphlet that accused the Arab governments of
speaking only about Jews and not about occupation. Only an atmosphere of trust and mutual
acceptance between Arab and Jewish workers could have saved the Palestinian state as a unity,
but Arabs and Zionists were eager to let arms speak. To reunite the two states, imperialism as
a source of division had to be defeated. Arab governments were threatening Jews in all of the
Arab East. They evoked the ghost of an internecine, religiously motivated war whose essence
was chauvinist. For the DMNL, national struggle in Egypt was also entitled to the adjective
muqaddas (holy).12*
Curiel never changed that position. As a consequence, he made an effort to bring about
a dialogue between Israelis and Egyptians, at least on the level of the communist parties and
groups. The DMNL as an organization followed this line for a sh o t time even after Curiel’s
expulsion from Egypt. Among the documents of the Rome Group there is a report by Curiel on
the occasion o fa letter from the DMNL to the Israeli Communist Party in 1933. Curiel described
the Arab-Israeli relations as an obstacle for liberation and democracy in the Arab world. The
Israeli army played the role of the policeman against liberation movements in the Arab World.
But the Arab governments also were against a democratic Palestine. They caused the refugee
problem. The Arabs supported Jordan, which was fiercely opposed to Palestinian independence.
126Al-Gindi (ed.) 1999. Personal interview with YOsuf Al-GindT, Cairo 20th January 2000.
127Al-Gindi (ed.) 1999,11.
'“ The pamphlet was reprinted as an article in al-JamOiOr, the DMNL organ, on 21st December 1947. Ibid.,
17-20.

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CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS D

The Egyptians had annexed Gaza under the pretext of trading it for the Suez area. The boycott
of Israeli goods was driven by the fear of the compétition of Israeli products. The Arab rulers
were afraid of any contact with a legal communist party that had Arab cadres and leadership,
and an Arab press as well as parliamentary representation. Palestinian refugees received unjust
treatment from Arab governments, they were dealt with like enemies. The real enemies of
any progressive force, however, were chauvinism and reaction. The DMNL had withstood the
chauvinist wave and defended national interests, the interests of the Eyptian people, and of
Arab and Jewish people in Palestine. The DMNL believed in the Israeli Communist Party. It
was understood as the leader of the Arab and Jewish democratic forces. A democratic Arab
force could have stopped aggressive Israeli politics; Arab chauvinism, by contrast, could only
enhance it. The DMNL had to fight for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and for
friendly relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel. It had to be against Zionists but for the
Jewish right to a state in Israel.
For Arab nationalists this position amounted to high treason. In some respects it sounded
quite close to the Israeli position, especially the argument concerning Palestinian refugees.
Curiel was a politician who had uncomfortable opinions resisting the black and white pattern
of Arab-Israeli relationship in the following decades. That the DMNL maintained contact with
Curiel, and that he even remained an influential figure until Israel had compromised itself in the
debacle of the Suez Canal aggression, is astonishing but also reveals one of the different roads
history could have taken. Relations and dialogue between Jews and Muslims were possible.
The representation of a country with a Muslim majority by a Jew was not as impossible as for­
mer Communists and their critics would have liked it to be. As Didar Fauzi Rossano remarks
about the Egyptian Women’s Union (Union des Femmes d’Egypte/ UFE)
“... lorsqu'ils sont du bon coté, les privilégiés de naissance ont une ouverture et
un fonds de culture qui ne s’écaille pas comme une couche de vernis. J’insiste
sur l’ouverture parce qu’elle fut spéciale et que votre génération ne l’a pas connue.
Ainsi la direction de l’UFE (de la bourgeoisie aisée) collaborait avec des commu­
nistes et des Islamistes, et ne s’opposait pas à ma présence. Elle ne s’opposa meme
pas à ce que je fisse partie des délégations de femmes égyptiennes aux congrès in­
ternationaux (soutenus par Moscou), alors que la première guerre Arabo-israélienne
se terminait. J’étais certes femme d’un officier de l’année égyptienne, mais j ’étais
aussi liée, par ma soeur, à la grosse bourgeoisie juive d'argent.”129
Rossano recalls a women’s congress in Paris where the French delegate proposed the par­
ticipation of Israeli Communists in a regional meeting. The Syrian Communist Party delegate
recoiled from such an idea, not as a matter of principle, but because:
.. nos peuples ne comprendraient pas et nous nous isolerions, s’étendant alors sur
les sacrifices des siens (méfiez-vous mes filles des grandiloquences; elles cachent
l’incapacité à maitriser une situation). C’est alors que je pris conscience (Simone
ayant loué notre travail d’explication) de ma chance d’avoir évolué dans ce milieu
d’ouverture, étranger au nationalisme chauvin (qui mordrait hélas plus tard l’espace
sans susciter la résistance de nos camarades).”130
lwRossano 1997,81.
130Ibid., 81. Rossano’s account about the preparation of the “Congrès international de l'enfance“ which took
place in Vienna in 1932, gives us a good idea of the connection between Curiel and other exiles, Egyptian women
activists (Cdsa NabrlwT, ’Aida NasraJIah, Hawi’ Idris, InjT AAltfln and Didar Fauzi Rossano) and Egyptian Com-

5.3. CURIEL

135

Curiel was well aware of the change of positions that took place among Egyptian Commu­
nists. In 1957 he criticized his comrades because Egyptian Communists had joined the boycott
policy of the other Arab Communists in meetings including the Israeli Communist Party. They
were afraid to be isolated from the masses and waiting for the right moment to come, but in fact
it was bourgeois nationalism that was seducing them. The Rome Group, by contrast, remained
in touch with the Israeli Communists. In a letter from the same year, Curiel warned of the
deepening of imperialist influence in the Arab countries through the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
Rome Group was shocked by Egyptian communist policy in 1957, which considered peace with
Israel tantamount to joining the Baghdad Pact The move was considered a real performance of
"nationalist communism,” even Abdel Nasir’s politics, they judged, was better. Curiel blamed
Syrian and Lebanese progressives for their belief that the war of attrition and the economic boy­
cott would finish off Israel while peace would save i t In his eyes this was a reactionary position.
The fundamental difference lay in his belief that Israel had the right to exist as a result of the
UN decision. Israel was a result of colonialism, as were many states in the region. The conflict
was only useful for the imperialists. War harmed all the parties involved. Curiel complained
that in the Arab World as well as in Israel a call for peace was considered high treason and
lack of patriotism. Israel could claim to the outside world that it was the only party looking for
peace, which made an impression on the Europeans who believed in peaceful solutions after
the experience of two World Wars. The Arabs failed in the propaganda war because they were
chauvinists, enamoured of fascist slogans. They did not appear prepared for peace, and were
thus unable to win over public opinion. The international dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict
was completely neglected on the Arab side. Curiel insisted that a big part of the Israeli society
wanted peace, but there was no Arab partner in sight, which in turn strengthened right wing
Israeli politicians who wanted to expand. A change in Israeli society would come about with a
change in Egypt’s position. Curiel felt positive about the Israelis. They were linked to Europe
and to the USA because of the Arab economic boycott, but change was possible. And finally:
Where had passivity led? To a shirking-off of responsibility, national tragedy, human tragedy,
ideological confusion, strange thoughts far from Marxism / Leninism, and last but not least, the
exclusion of all Jewish comrades from the party.
Curiel and the Rome Group cooperated actively with Israelis, even forming an EgyptianIsraeli Committee, including Israelis and Egyptian democrats living in Paris.
“We are conscious of the fact,” Curiel’s introduction to the first brochure, published
by the Egyptian-Israeli peace committee, ran, “that we are representing a trend that
is still very weak in the public opinion of both our countries. In reality we are
the only case of Egyptians and Israelis cooperating and discussing problems that
separate our countries.”131
This means that even after the crisis with the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rHya) Curiel
and his group did not only continue to work in the same direction they had before but also
continued to understand themselves as Egyptians representing • even if it was a feeble trend
• a (non-existent) democratic public opinion in Egypt After 1957 and the afore mentioned
brochure, there is a gap in Al-GindTs representations of Curiel’s Middle Eastern involvement
a gap that was due to the round-up of Egyptian Communists.
munists and their effort to win the support of public figures, in this case Khilid Muhammad KhSlid, Rashid alBanfiwI (an economy professor at the Pu’ad al-Awwal university who gained influence under Abdel Nasir), and
'Aisha 'Abd al-Rahman from al-Ahnun newspaper.
111Al-Oindt (ed.) 1999,101. Al-Gindl does not give a dale for the publication of the brochure, but it must have
been after 1957.

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CHAPTER 5. JEWISH COMMUNISTS n

Curiel concentrated on the liberation struggle in Algeria, though he never gave up on his
imprisoned comrades in Egypt. From 1965 onwards, Curiel worked within the framework of the
Solidarity League (ràbiiat al-tadûmun) that offered assistance to national liberation movements
in the three continents and to antifascists. Curiel remained convinced that peoples’ interests
could not be contradictory. To work for the freedom of Algeria was not counterproductive to the
interests of the French people, as any activity connected to the Arab-Israeli conflict had to be in
favor of both peoples. The Palestinian national rights had to be acknowledged, a rapprochement
between Arab and Israeli progressive forces achieved, and as a third point “... the equal rights
of the Arab minority in Israel and the Jewish minorities in the Arab world” acknowledged.132
Curiel also remained in contact with Egyptian comrades after 1967. He stressed the right of
national groups to exist Palestinians could not meld into the population of other Arab countries.
To fight for Palestinian rights would help create a suitable climate for Arabs to acknowledge
Israel and the legitimate rights of Israeli Jews. Imperialist forces and expansionist circles in
Israel were strong, but had it not been for the Arabs’ insistence on going to war with Israel
many Jews abroad would have stopped supporting the Israeli government, whose positions they
would not have shared under normal circumstances. It was only the fear of a new holocaust
that made them react The Israeli public was drunk with victory and believed in assurances
that the Arabs’ restrain was based on deterrence. Only a Palestinian state could bring an end to
terrorism, not the Israeli option of relentless revenge for terrorist acts. The progressive forces
in the Arab world and the Israeli peace movement could share one camp instead of being part
of an irrational Arab-Israeli confrontation.133
The 1973 war brought about a change in Egyptian politics. Now the government itself
started to think about peace negotiations with Israel, much to the dismay of a young genera­
tion of Egyptian leftists, active at universities, and a new generation of Islamists, contesting
the leftists’ influence on the Egyptian public. But Al-Gindi is eager to connect Curiel to recent
developments on the Israeli-Palestinian scene. In a speech at a celebration commemorating
the 20th anniversary of Curiel’s assassination, the PLO representative, SabrT Gris, reflected on
Curiel’s role in bringing about an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. In 1976 Gris had been the deputy
director of the PLO research center in Beirut Together with 'Isàm al-SartawT he had been sent
to Paris to initiate a round of secret dialogues with Israeli politicians.134 The atmosphere had
changed since the October War of 1973. A peaceful solution seemed to be at least a faint pos­
sibility. In 1974 the PLO had announced its willingness to establish Palestinian sovereignty
on any piece of land the Israelis would retreat from. It became obvious that the Palestinians
were ready to accept the partition of Palestine and the two-state-solution. Curiel and his friends
helped the Palestinians to get in touch with Israeli doves while leaving the two sides to nego­
tiate alone, and reducing their role even to less than the role of mediators. Though in the end
those first meetings (even though they continued for months) became futile when the reins of
government passed to the Likud under the leadership of Begin.
■“ Ibid.. 104.
■“ Ibid., 116.
,34Ibid„ 155-158. Kalimat SabrTGris, mumathil munazzamat al-tahrirflihiifiU bi dhikr nutrûr 'ishrin 'âman 'aJà
ightiyäl Henri Curiel (The speech of Sabri Gris, the PLO’s representative, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary
of the assassination of Henri Curiel.)

Chapter 6
Jewish Communists

n

6.1 Marcel Ceresi
Curiel did not pay much attention to his family origins in his autobiographic notes. For him it
was enough that he had been entitled to Egyptian citizenship and proven his identity through
his political engagement. Marcel Isriftl Ceresi’s case is different
He was bom in Egypt like Curiel, a third generation Jewish immigrant. Marcel Ceresi is
introduced in the communist oral history project as of Italian origin.1 According to a firman
issued by the Sublime Porte, his grandfather ElTyähQ IsriTO Ceresi had been appointed the head
of the Jewish community in Egypt in the first half of the 19th century. During the reign of
kina'll Pasha2 he had been a member of the Khedive’s advisory council (majlis istishärf), and
then turned into one of the big landowners in the region of Mit Ghamr in the Nile delta. Ceresi’s
grandfather serves as an example for the rise of the Jewish minority during the 19th century and
the accumulation of private landownership and wealth by men close to the reigning family and
in public office. For Ceresi it is more important, however, to quote him as an example of the
national spirit new migrants could develop, since he had helped Ahmad 'UrSbT in his 1881 revolt
against British colonialism.2
Ceresi describes his father as a typical case of an Egyptianized Jew (yahüdî mutamassir),
with a majority of Egyptian friends, wearing a tarboosh, speaking Arabic, listening to Arabic
music, and being named in Arabic: Murqus. Also, the second generation of Ceresis was linked
to the Egyptian nationalist movement. Ceresi strengthens this link by mentioning YQsuf AlGindT, the “emperor” of Zifta, among his father’s friends. By the end of World War I, their
'M arcel Isrtll Ceresi in: AI-SaTd 1989, A report sent to R ifat A l-Sald by Ceresi in 1973. His statement about
the Egyptian Communist dates from 1933 and was prepared for the Italian Communist Party. Ceresi occupies
more than 30 pages in A l-Sald’s volume (27-89). in the oral history project of the old Communists and the Center
for Arab Studies (Shihfldlt wa n i^ a, vol. one) he occupies more than 30 pages. In two personal encounters and
interviews (1 Ith March and 4th April 1997), I experienced him as an elaborate orator with an astonishingly good
memory. Though most of the old Communists are extraordinarily intelligent men and women who remain very
active and vivid inspite of their advanced age. Ceresi’s strong Egyptian memoirs are all the more outstanding
he left Egypt half a century ago and continued his life in a different environment. From his engagement,
however, the relations he kept up and his continuous interest in Egyptian communism, it is very obvious that
his role in Italian communist politics never matched his Egyptian experience. Changes in his narrative seem
rather deliberate. Judging from the mere timetable it is questionable whether his grandfather really arrived in the
beginning of the 19th century or rather in the second half of it
MsmiH Pasha ((1830-1893), Egyptian Khedive 1863/67-1879.
1Ceresi. in: Markaz al-buhûth al-'arabiyya 1998,16. 'UribTs revolt started with a rebellion of Egyptian officers
«gain«« the injustice of unequal pay and promotion regarding Egyptian and Circassian/TUrkish officers. It then
escalated into a protest against European financial control and British intervention.

137

138

CHAPTER 6. JEWISH COMMUNISTS IB

family fortune had dwindled. Ceresi’s father became an employee in a cotton ginning company.
Ceresi speaks of his mother as of Iranian origin, though the maternal grandmother spoke fluent
Arabic and dressed in traditional Egyptian clothing (milOya and habära, i.e. the traditional wrap
of Egyptian women and a silken veil). Ceresi’s upbringing was not different from his Egyptian
companions’. He was bom in a popular quarter, inhabited by middle class and lower middle
class Jews in Cairo in 1913, but spent his first years in the Egyptian delta, in the village of MR
Ghamr, peasant children being his first playmates.
Ceresi’s biography almost perfectly suits an authentic Egyptian Communist The family
was an integral part of Egyptian society and of the Egyptian nation. The connection to the
'UräbT movement the friendship with one of the Wafdist chieftains, the childhood in the Egyp­
tian countryside, the Arabic language at home, and the dwindling family income make Ceresi
an ideal candidate for a Jew accepted by Egyptian Communists. Ceresi, however, did not es­
cape French education either.45At school the first alienation took place because children were
prevented from speaking to each other in Arabic.
Ceresi describes himself as a young adult very interested in politics. He participated in
Wafd demonstrations against the King and Prime Minister Sidql in 1930 and 1933, and was
beaten up like other demonstrators. In 1946 - already at the more advanced age of 33 - he
participated in the demonstration of 21st February in IsmS'iliyya Square confronting British
tanks. Ceresi presents himself as an Egyptian nationalist, steeled by gunfire and truncheons. He
had been impressed by the suffering of Egyptian children in cotton mills and the Greek workers’
arrogance, and was determined to bring about a change.
This endeavor introduces a second dimension in Ceresi’s biography. He was not only rooted
in Egyptian society but also connected to other communist parties in the Middle E ast The
leadership of the Lebanese and the Syrian Communist Parties insisted on the duty of foreign
Marxists to turn Egyptian workers and intellectuals into Marxists. KhSlid BakdSsh, the later
secretary general of the Syrian Communist Party, enjoys high esteem among Egyptian Com­
munists. A staunch supporter of a pro-Soviet line, he took the helm from Fu’Sd al-Sham ill, a
Lebanese trained in Cairo, upon his return from the KUTV (The Communist University of the
Toilers of the East) in Moscow in 1936. His star rose to unprecedented heights when he was
elected member of parliament in 1934, which added immensely to his prestige among other
Arab Communists.9 In another narrative Ceresi also met a Comintern envoy, who urged him
to recruit Egyptians for the communist movement, after he had told him about the Peace Par­
tisans and the Greek groups connected to Marxism. In 1936, at a time when Curiel had just
decided to apply for Egyptian citizenship and become Egyptian by struggling for a better future
for his country, Ceresi had already been told (and convinced) that foreigners could not become
the leaders of a communist movement, but had to restrict their role to the education of Marxist
cadres.6*
4In his memoirs R ifat A l-Sild describes himself as a small child, attending the “Rauda al-taufiqiyya” primary
school in Mansura and watching the Jesuits and their students (rim the school window walking along the adjacent
path. He was impressed by their black suits that gave them an awe-inspiring air, and their gentle smiles. “When
the bell rang we would follow bigger students clad in their black uniforms, the sign of their Jesuit school, and
we would dream to grow up and dress the same uniform.” R ifat Al-SaTd himself, though, was then to attend the
American school, run by American Protestants, which had Muslim, as well a t Christian, and many Jewish students.
He speaks with affection about the teachers and their endeavor to promote love and affection between the children
of different creeds. A l-Sald 1999,29-30.
5See for his standing among Iraqi Communists Bstatu 1978,721. He ia quoted as having occupied a place of
honor in the struggle and hearts of the masses of the people, not only in Syria, but in Iraq and all the Arab countries.
6A small detail in Ceresi’s narrative ia quite enlightening since be adds that the meeting with Shawi and
Medowiyan took place in the house o f one of the French comrades in Lebanon. Medowiyan himself was Ar-

6.1. MARCEL CERESI

139

Ceresi’s Lebanese contacts are used by other authors and groups as well. Abu Saif YOsuf,
the historiographer of the Workers’ Vanguard (ta lfa t al-'ummâl), employs them to strengthen
the (early) antizionist attitude of Egyptian (Jewish) Communists.
“In summer 1933, Marcel traveled to Lebanon for a health cure. He met distin­
guished Lebanese Communists there. And the most important issue he returned
with from Lebanon was his fierce aversion against Zionism. He was aware of Zion­
ists who pretended to be leftists. They could be found at any of the Jewish clubs
in Cairo. And Marcel also returned with an idea about the urgency to found a
communist party in Egypt.”*7*
AbQ Saif YOsuf thus shifts the focus that Ceresi himself had put on the foundation of a
communist party to antizionist conviction and activity.
Back in Egypt, Ceresi started to write about Egypt for the Lebanese leftist press, and pub­
lished antifascist articles defending the Republican cause in Spain for French newspapers in
Egypt Like YOsuf DarwTsh, Ceresi had volunteered for the International Brigades in the Span­
ish Civil War, but the Spanish consul had turned both of them down. Ceresi’s declared line,
not to try to lead a communist group in Egypt, was congruent with Descombes’ line. Even the
reasons he gives for the break with the Peace Partisans is quite similiar to the arguments De­
scombes used to describe his own determination to found a new association and not to continue
with the remnants of the old communist party in Egypt. For Ceresi, Descombes was only a
lukewarm Marxist and reluctant to “Egyptianize” the group. He ascribed the failure of the first
communist party to Egyptian history, and concluded that Egypt had not yet reached the proper
historical stage for the foundation of a communist party. Therefore, the Peace Partisans had
kept to themselves, extremely frightened of infiltration, and had allowed only a few foreigners
to join them. In 1938 Ceresi founded, together with George Pointée, Raoul Curiel, Fu’Sd alAhwinT, Muhammad NSsir al-DTn, and others, the Democratic Union that was anounced with a
big party.1 Ceresi’s first bad impression, and probably a sense of competition with and mistrust
of Henri Curiel, originated from that time. Ceresi claimed that Curiel had turned the Democratic
Union into an aristocratic club while, approximately at the same time, Ceresi went to work in a
factory as a storeroom manager, and was soon dismissed because he tried to start a syndicate.
The central committee of the Democratic Union, Ceresi claims, was “Egyptian in its ma­
jority,” though Ceresi himself mentions a number of internationalists who were involved. The
aim was to attract Egyptians by democratic anti-fascist struggle and to teach the most progres­
sive members Marxism.9 Ceresi wavers between presenting himself in the role of the classical
Italian godfather and presenting himself at a distance. He is at pains to stress that he knew
his place as a foreigner and was always ready to step back to the second rank. But he cannot
menian. One o f C eresi'i ocher conversation partners was Faraj A llah al-Hilw. Comm unists inevitably moved in an
envifomern that was confessionally and ethnically mixed.

7Y0suf 2000,50.
'George Pointée, Raoul Curiel, Fu’Sd tl-A hw inl, Muhammad N ifir al-DTn and others. Çidiq Sa'd considered
the men who split Trotslcyites, a loathsome species of people in the eyes of any real Communist. Ahmad $8dkj
Sa'd in: AI-SaTd 1989,235.
'Sandro Rocca, an Italian antifascist, was one of the members of the Democratic Union, according to Ceresi,
and the Italian consulate even intervened to stop the first assembly and the party because of its antifascist character.
This prevented Rocca from giving a political speech, and he just recited an Italian poem. Raoul Curiel was the man
financing the Democratic Union according to Ceresi, but still Ceresi does not fail to repeat that it was “Egyptian in
its majority." Maricaz al-bubOth al-'arabiyya 1998,24.

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CHAPTER 6. JEWISH COMMUNISTS ID

resist emphasizing that he was behind a number of communist groups and clubs and the effort
to democratize the DMNL.10
Ceresi is relentless in his attitude concerning the foreign community in Egypt Foreigners
lived in a colony of their own. The foreign leftists of the 1930s who engaged in antifascist
politics did not know about the rest of the population, or about political, economic or social
problems in E gypt most of them did not want to know either.11
Ceresi is eager to distance himself from any other Jew in the communist movement and
makes himself a witness for the negligible influence of Jews on the communist movement
He lists all the communist groups that were founded by non-Jews. There are three labels:
Jewish, non-Jewish, and Egyptian. His rating implies that the “non-Jewish Egyptian group"
label receives the highest score.
In the interviews for the oral history project of the Institute for Arab and African Studies,
Ceresi tries to support Egyptian claims that communism was an (almost) authentically Egyp­
tian affair. The Peace Partisans were founded in 1934 by three people: Jacquot Descombes,
the Swiss, Piridis, the Greek, and Karamanian, the Armenian, and Ceresi adds: "They are not
Jews."123 Ceresi was in touch with members of the Egyptian Communist Party of 1922 "who
were all Egyptians.” He also knew the group around Salama Musa "who were all Egyptians."
The University Graduates’ Union he was in contact with was - you guessed it - an "Egyptian
group.” In a strenuous effort to find more exclusively Egyptian groups close to the Commu­
nists, Ceresi conjures up the Wafdist and Young Egypt Youth who wanted socialism and were
of course “all Egyptians.” A group in Studio Misr that was influenced by Soviet cinema was
"all Egyptian,” as well. To further counteract the association of communism and Jews in Egypt,
Ceresi mentions Italian antifascists and Communists who were all “not Jews.” Even the teachers
in the French lycée who played a big part in convincing their students of the virtues of commu­
nism were all “not Jews.” The two outstanding qualities of Ceresi’s communist contacts thus
are “Egyptian” and “non-Jewish,” while the option of “Egyptian Jew” did not occur to him .12
10According to Raymond Aghion he had left the Union of Peace Partisans together with Marcel la ri' II, Raul
Curiel and a Greek woman, who was a journalist. They decided to become a Mandat group and to recruit Egyp­
tians. Studies were organized in Arabic. In 1940 a conference was convened and about 20 or 23 members par­
ticipated, among them Tahsln Al-Masri, As'ad Halim, Muhammad Haikal and 'Abd al-'AzIz Haikal, Khidr and
Salah U râbî, Husain Kizim and FathI AI-RamII. The executive committee was elected and apart from the three
Egyptian members, Ceresi became a member. People's Liberation (Tahrtr al-sha'b) formed Bread and Freedom
(ial-khubz wa al-hurriyya) under the responsibility of Anwar Kimil and Culture and Leisure (ihaqäfa wa farOgh)
under the responsibility of Isrfl’ H’s wife, Jeanette. In October 1941 many of the cadres were arrested by police,
Marcel Isrfl’fl was deported to Palestine. In 1944 Isri’ll reorganized Tahrtr al-sha'b. See: Al-SaTd 1987; 1989;
Markaz al-buhüth al-'arabiyya 1998.
11Taqrtr Marcel IsrH’lt (Ceresi), (1) Bidâyût al-haraka al-ummdliyyaft Misr, in: Al-SaTd 1987,698-714, here
704-703. Ceresi wrote this report in 1933 after he had been banned from Egypt to introduce himself to the Italian
Communist Party. Originally the report had been written in French. Ceresi was ready to denounce Jews and
foreigners in the movement - above all Curiel - and emphasized the fact that he knew his place in history: first he
shunned the limelight and helped only to form a communist movement. He never went to the top and in 1953 he left
Egypt and became part of the communist movement in Italy which was his natural place. This description stands
in stark contrast to his effort to prove that he struggled to join the communist movement in Egypt and remained
active. He stressed that he was prevented from entering Egypt after be had escaped to Palestine from Rommel's
attacks on al-Alamain and that he entered Egypt illegally to continue his struggle. He could have left Egypt on his
Italian passport in 1948, but he preferred to go on fighting underground, like hundreds of comrades, for almost a
year. Markaz al-buhQth al-'arabiyya 1998,34-35.
*2Ibid., 22.
l3Marcel Ceresi in interviews with Ramsls Lablb, K hilid Hamza, Shuktf 'Adhar, and Fauzf HabbashI dated
between 1995 and 1997, as well as a letter to R ifat Ai-SaTd from 1985 concerning his presentation of the conflict
in the DMNL, in: Markaz al-buhüth al-'arabiyya 1998, 13-39; Second part of a report Ceresi wrote after having
been expelled from Egypt in 1953. The report was sent to R ifat Al-SaTd in 1973 and published in: Al-SaTd 1989,

6.1. MARCEL CERESI

141

lb gel in touch with Egyptians and cooperate politically, Cercsi joined “Art and Freedom”
(al-farm wa al-hurriyya), a group led by George Henein and Anwar Kamil. Henein was a
francophone Egyptian poet who was close to the French surrealists. Both had been active in the
Democratic Union, but had not been happy with the atmosphere and decided to found their own
group.*14 Originally Ceresi joined to get in touch with the rank and file and recruit people. Even
if he pretended not to be aspiring to leadership he was convinced that he knew the path to a
genuine Egyptian communist movement. Though “Art and Freedom” (which will be discussed
in a later chapter) was a purely Egyptian affair, Ceresi was not content with Henein’s line:
“It was only natural that I clashed with the chief of the association because I was
always calling for the Egyptianization of the movement, while he was striving for
the westernization of Egyptians. And one day he told me (that revolutionary leader)
that the liberation of the Egyptian people was going to take place with the stupid
workers and fallahin being kicked in their asses.”is
Ceresi was appalled by Henein’s opinions. He concluded that “Art and Freedom” had just
imported a surrealist trend from France without any link to Egypt or the Egyptians.
Ceresi added two expressions to the discourse about communism in Egypt. Henein is, for
him, a mutafamag, a man who behaved like the Francs - the Francs as opposed to the Muslims
in the time of the crusades. In Egyptian local dialect afrangT means the same as ajnabT, foreign.
Tamstr and taghrtb are set in opposition to each other, Egyptianization versus westernization.
Ceresi has a long list of matters of dispute among Communists between 1935 and 1952.
They fought about the basics of communist activity like the structure of the party, the formation
o f Marxist Egyptian cadres, and the primacy of underground activity. They could not agree
as to whether they wanted to agitate only workers, or the toiling masses in general with an
emphasis on workers. Should Communists concentrate on national struggle and disregard its
class content, or stress the link between national and class struggle? Was the forthcoming
Egyptian revolution a socialist one or a popular nationalist revolution of a new kind? Was
cooperation with the Muslim Brothers an option, or popular front politics in general, or was
the future communist party a party that would lead a popular front? What about the relation
between socialism and religion: would Egyptian communism propagate scientific socialism
(without criticizing religion) or a socialism on a religious basis? How would a communist party
develop out of the multitude of communist groups? Would one group just outgrow and swallow
up all the other groups or was it preferable that a unity was reached between the revolutionary
organizations or their majority based on a program and shared politics? What about the Free
Officers Movement? Were Communists to support them or to join the opposition camp in 1952?
A part of these considerations were a reflection on the tensions between the Popular Van­
guard and the other organizations, particularly the cooperation with the Wafd, the expansion
of one revolutionary group at the expense of others, the extreme secrecy of work and agitation
restricted to workers. Others reflect discussions in the DMNL and opposition to Curiel’s policy,
mainly the popular front policy, the concentration on national struggle and absolute centralism.
Socialism on a religious basis did not rank high in the discussions but was only a position repre­
sented by the tiny Nile Valley’s People’s Party (hizb sha'b wOdtal-Ntf), which considered itself
pro-communist but anti-M arxist In 1947/48 it became opposed to the DMNL and later joined
the Popular Vanguard.
27-89; Personal interview with Marcel Ceresi in Cairo, 15th March and 4th April 1997.
l4See for further details about Anwar Klmil in the chapter on Egyptian Communists and the middle classes.
■’Ceresi, in: Al-Safd 1989.83.

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CHAPTER 6. JEWISH COMMUNISTS U I

In his exclusive focus on non-Jewish Egyptians, Ceresi finds only two reasons why E gyp­
tians would become active in the communist movement: the heroic attitude of Dimitroff in
the Reichstag trial, and the support for the Spanish people against Franco, against the German
Nazis, and the Italian fascists. Marxist and socialist ideas found acceptance with a growing
number of Egyptian intellectuals, but the reasons Ceresi gives are utterly “un-Egyptian.” C eresi,
however, also tried to find French support for his efforts in Egypt. In 1939 he went to Paris to
contact the international peace movement.16
The People’s Liberation (tahrtr al-sha'b) was founded in 1939 as the first communist orga­
nization in Egypt with the declared aim of making a new start with a group known for being
absolutely Egyptian, with its leadership consisting only of Egyptians with the exception o f a
single Italian, Ceresi. It had two front groups. Bread and Freedom (al-khubz wa al hurriyya),
to work among workers, and Culture and Leisure (al-thaqQfa wa al-farägh), aimed at foreign
intellectuals. Ceresi does not explain why an Egyptian communist group would found a front
organization to work among foreign intellectuals. Was is to raise funds? Or to get translations
done? Or because there were not enough Egyptian intellectuals? Or to gain influence with an
otherwise despised fraction of the populace?
Even though Ceresi repeated over and over again that he was a foreigner and did not want to
lead, he became responsible for the secret organization in the People’s Liberation, especially the
cadre school. Apart from those activities he gave lectures in the “Leisure and Art” association
about art, music, literature.17 Ceresi does not go into detail about the activities of People’s Lib­
eration. He mentions only a number of known Egyptian intellectuals as members (As'ad Halim,
Tahsin al-Masri, FathT Al-Ramh, Anwar Kfimil, Salih AbO Saif,) adding three workers.1* The
group did not exist for long. In October 1941,10 members of his organization were arrested,
nine were set free after being brought before the judge.
“But considering the alliance between the English and the Soviet Union, all were
released after two months.” 19
Only Ceresi was held in a detention camp for Italian fascists for 11 months. AbO Bakr Saif
al-Nasr, his comrade and the son of the minister of war, helped to get him released. Ceresi’s
relations with the true Egyptians were thus not restricted to workers, but reached the top level
of the Egyptian political elite and of a government that cooperated with the British.
In another version, French intervention gained him his liberty.20 In a third version, the
Italian antifascists protested against his internment and he was released and expelled to Pales­
tine, riding on the same train with many other Jews and antifascists who had decided to flee
Egypt when news had reached them that Rommel had approached al-Alamain. Ceresi lived in
the internment camp for antifascist refugees in Bethlehem, and was charged by the Palestinian
Communist Party with teaching Arab workers and intellectuals Marxism. He moved between
'*Markaz al-buhdth al-'arabiyya 1998,25.
’’Among the prominent members was Salih AbO Saif who was not arrested with other People’s Liberation
(Tahrtr al-sha'b) activists in 1941 because he worked in Studio Miyr.
"M arkaz al-buhfith al-'arabiyya 1998,26. Among the visitors were Louis 'Awad and 'Abd al-Ladf
Ceresi does not mention what kind of culture he taught, but he could not possibly teach Arabic classical music.
Knowing the identity of one of his customers, Louis 'Awad, we know that they listened to European classical
music, European literature and poetry. Ceresi discussed Egyptian language with 'Awad, which could not mean
anything else but a discussion of colloquial as national language, which 'Awad favored. That Ceresi found himself
competent enough to teach the origin of civilization while he refrained from partaking in political struggle seems
odd.
’’ Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1998,27.
»Perrault 199L 159-160.

6.1. MARCEL CERESI

143

the Palestinian Arab villages and towns, and proudly recollects that leaders of the movement
in Israel and Jordan had learnt their basics from him. Ceresi maintains that he did not engage
in the discussions surrounding the split between Arabs and Jews in the Palestinian Communist
Party.21 He understood himself as belonging to the Egyptian communist movement, not as a
Jew engaged in the discussion about the Jewish homeland and its implications for Communists
in Palestine. The Palestinian Communists offered him an opportunity to stay, but he refused.
He did not want to become a professional politician in Palestine. All the other Italians had gone,
but he was still stranded in Palestine.22
Ceresi does not elaborate on his Palestinian experience in his interview with Communist
comrades in 1999, as he had done many years before in his answer to R ifat Al-Sa'Td; probably
because it had become even more of a stigma to be Jewish and go to Palestine. Remarkably,
Ceresi does not tackle the Palestinian question at all throughout his interview, and he does not
refer to the war. It took Ceresi five attempts to return to Egypt from Palestine.23
All other communist organizations, except the organization he had helped to bring into life,
had foreign leaders. Nonetheless, the process of Egyptianization in the communist movement
had been completed in 1943 since most of the cadres were Egyptian, and newspapers and books
were in Arabic and connected to the Egyptian situation.
Yet the theme “Egyptians and foreigners” remains the prominent issue for Ceresi in the
years afterwards. Foreigners and Egyptians were separately organized in the DMNL, which
had originated in 1947 from a merger between Iskra and People’s Liberation first (the United
Vanguard / al-fatfa al-muttahida) and the EMNL second.
“Most of the foreigners did not even know the Arabic language, and their field of
activity was completely different from that of the Egyptians.”24*
Unfortunately he does not give us any clues as to whom exactly he was alluding to. There
were Communists like Dina Forti whose engagement was clearly limited to the Italian com­
munity23, but there were also activists like Niqula Garis, a member of the Greek section in the
DMNL, who had joined the organization relatively late, in 1948.
There were many Greeks in the group, he remembers about 20, the brothers Yannakakis, Fifi
Kana and Mary Papadopulos among them. Greeks had accompanied the communist movement
in Egypt since its beginnings. Curiel and the EMNL had been eager to help Greek soldiers who
rebelled against the British and refused to be dispatched to Italy. Communist news reached the
Greeks in English, and they translated it into Greek. Speaking about the splits in the DMNL
occurring in 1948 and after, be says:
“In those days, with the deterioration of the situation and the people who had split
off, turning from pretending to be revolutionaries in the foreigners’ section to escap­
ing from the struggle altogether, a slogan came up saying that we were foreigners
and we did not have a role to play in Egypt. To remain in the organization had no
21According to Alexander Flores, the conciliatory attitude towards Jewish / Zionist as well as Arab nationalism
from the part of the international communist movement and the Palestinian Communist Party led, in its conse­
quence, to the ethnic split of the patty in 1943, when a binational solution for the conflict became nonviable.
Flores 1980.
“ Ceresi, in: A l-Sald 1989,66.
“ Maritaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1998, 18 (13-38). Among the people who were in his group were die famous
poet 'Abd al-Rahmin Al-Sharqtwl, the worker Fikrf Al-KhQH, the writer and poet Nu'mSn ‘AshOr, Asms Baffin
and As*ad Baffin, Raul Makarius and Ibrthlm Sa'd al-DIn, the sociologist
“ Ibid., 39.
“ See further up this chapter.

144

CHAPTER 6. JEWISH COMMUNISTS ÜI
justification. The majority of the group almost went that way, but I and the brothers
Yannakakis decided to stay in the arena. And we had the slogan: you fight where
you live.”

Five of the originally twenty Greeks decided to fight on. Garis became a member of the
Egyptian Communist Oiganization (mishmish), worked in Shubra al-Khaima, and with workers
in the Ideal company. He was responsible for a workers’ cell of seven. R ifat Al-SaTd does not
ask him how he got along with the workers in his cell. Obviously he knew Arabic, otherwise
it would have been impossible to communicate. Judging from comments of Egyptian mem­
bers, Garis must have been an exception in the oiganization because the majority of Egyptian
members were unable to recruit new members among workers, because of their social back­
ground, not for ethnic reasons. Garis was arrested in February 1952 and put in prison yet not
expelled. He spent several years in prison, not communicating with other Communists for fear
of compromising his organization, only to discover in the end that it did not exist anymore. In
al-Qanätir prison he finally joined another communist group.26
Ceresi is not bothered by the contribution comrades like Niqula Garis made to the Egyptian
communist movement. For him it is more important to stress that the DMNL was shaped
by foreign influences. Schwartz and Curiel were fighting each other about financial issues,
and criticism was not welcomed. Ceresi was not a member of the central committee but had
voluntarily backed down. The DMNL was the most influential communist oiganization. It
had the best revolutionary cadres and members who were loyal to the communist cause. But
Ceresi was disturbed by the leadership and its political line, and by the majority of students and
petit bourgeois.27*Curiel’s idea of an alliance of the national democratic forces and the debate
about whether the communist party was the avantgarde of the working class or of all the toilers
including the petit bourgeois were inacceptable to Ceresi.
He had been the second man in the public relations’ section. His frontman was 'Ädil ‘Abd alMa'bud Al-Gibaill who was against Curiel’s political line and defended Marxist thought, which
led to the formation of the Revolutionary Bloc (al-takattul al-thauri). A series of split-offs
began, the most well-known group being the Egyptian Communist Organization (mishmish)1*,
which comprised, according to Ceresi, most of the foreigners and intellectuals at the end of
1948 • also the aforementioned Niqula Gris. Foreigners were udemagogues,” spending time
studying books and imposing their presence on the Egyptians.29*
The fraction Ceresi had joined - the Revolutionary Proletariat (al-'ummäliyya al-thauriyya)
- and 'Abd al-Ma'bQd Al-GibaitT personally were much criticized among Communists for the
same reasons Ceresi lists to reject foreigners in the communist ranks: in their majority they
were students, some of the leading figures left Egypt soon after they had started the split-offs
in the DMNL, and went to pursue their professional careers at foreign elite universities like
»N iqula Garis, interview with R ifat A l-Sald, Athens 10th March 1976, in: AI-SaTd 1989,319-321.
27Ceresi aigues here about the alleged plan of the Workers’ Vanguard to become the left wing of the Wafd.
In 1947 ShuhdT 'Atiyya had published an article in al-Jamühtr, the DMNL paper that Iskra had brought into the
union, pleading for a new party, i.e. a communist party, to fulfill the needs of the masses. According to Ceresi,
the Workers’ Vanguard answered in a Wafdist newspaper saying that the Egyptian people did not need a new party
since the Wafd existed and was enough to liberate the people. See Ceresi, in: A l-Sald 1989,41.
»The Egyptian Communist Organization (al-Munazzama al-shuyO'iyya al-misriyya / Mishmish) originated
from the Voice of the Opposition (Saut al-mu'ärada) and Towards a Bolshevik Oiganization (Nahwa mtmaaama
bülshifiyya) and followed a radical “workers only” policy in theory. The leaders were Odette and Sidney Salomon,
both Arabic speaking Jewish Egyptian nationals. In the chapter about Egyptian middle class Communists a lot will
be said about the group and its impact. Like many others Muhammad SM Ahmad was deeply influenced in his
assessment of the communist movement by his experience with that group.
»C eresi, in: AI-SaTd 1989,45.

6. J. MARCEL CERESI

145

Oxford and Cambridge. In Sharif Hatäta’s memoirs, Al-GibaitI turns out to be a particularly
cold and bureaucratic figure, fit to suit the technocratic regime of Abdel Nasir that courted the
communist intellectuals and banned communist workers.
Against Curiel being “half of a Zionist” (Ceresi) counts Ceresi’s effort to form the Antizionist League. The declaration said that it was best for the Egyptian Jews to connect themselves
to the Egyptian people. Until now Ceresi has been proud of this declaration. Even this ef­
fort, however, has to be sanctioned by a non-Jewish Egyptian voice, and Ceresi explains that
'Abd al-Ma’bûd Al-Gibaifi was in favor of the declaration. They wanted to convince the Jewish
working masses of the danger Zionists constituted, and they wanted to explain the difference
between Jews and Zionists to Egyptians. Ceresi wrote the pamphlet “for the sake of Jews in
Egypt.”30 Izia H ariri, not Ceresi, became the Secretary General of the League because he was
an Egyptian Jew. The League was dissolved when a bomb exploded in Cinema Metro, and the
members of the Antizionist League were accused of that atrocity. The police arrested 30 or 40
of them, but finally the Prime Minister, al-Nuqrashi, dissolved the league because he considered
it a provocation to the Jews.
The Antizionist League, Curiel wrote in 1955, had been Iskra’s brainchild. It had been
established in spite of the opposition of the EMNL. The Antizionist League had been a big
mistake in that dangerous phase of Egyptian politics and the development of the Palestinian
question. The existence of the League had led to provoking incidents with Jewish youths,
even outright clashes in quarters with mainly petit bourgeois Jewish residents, like al-Dhahir.
Schwartz, who had been responsible for it, had finally dissolved it quiedy.
‘To acknowledge that is was a mistake to form that League would have been tanta­
mount to acknowledging that Iskra as such was a failure.”31
In the aftermath, however, the Antizionist League is often used to prove that Egyptian com­
munist Jews were against Zionism. Curiel’s critical attitude towards the League becomes food
for the rumor that he was a Zionist in communist disguise. None of the communist Jews in­
terviewed or quoted in books about the history of the communist movement in Egypt miss the
opportunity to emphasize their active opposition to Zionism. Few mention anti-Semitism as a
problem. Curiel, though, was the only one to actively engage in an Arab Israeli dialogue.
Ceresi spent the best time of his life as an Egyptian activist, between 1948 and 1949, when
he had gone into hiding from police raids. He changed housing 27 times and lived in popular
quarters. The close link to the Egyptian people had finally been forced upon him • and them.
With warmth he mentions Shuhdl ‘Atiyya with whom he spent many hours during that time,
even serving him as a liaison officer since ’Atiyya did not leave the house. This connection is
particularly important since ’Atiyya is one of the martyrs of the communist movement, killed in
the Nasirist detention camps, and has been judged as the man most suitable for the lead in the
communist movement because of his abilities, his popularity, and his political insight.32
In his interview with comrades from the communist movement for their oral history project,
Ceresi is pointedly presented as Curiel’s adversary:33
“Marcel believes that Henri Curiel played the part of a saboteur in the Egyptian
communist movement, as a result of his wish to dominate the movement in spite
“ Personal interview with Marcello Ceresi, Cairo 15th March and 4th April 1997. See also: Beinin 1990,63.
11‘Abbas 1988,169.

32He is particularly known for his book on Egyptian nationalism: Shuhdl ‘Atiyya al-Shafi'T, Tatawwur al-haraka
al-wa|aniyya al-misriyya, 1882-1956. Cairo 1957. In 1945 he had already written on the same subject with ‘Abd
al-Ma’bfld Al-GibaiH: Ahdflfunl al-wa|aniyya.
“ Ceresi, in: Markaz al-buhflth al-‘arabiyya 1998.

146

CHAPTERS. JEWISH COMMUNISTS ID
of his befog a foreigner and a Jew. He inflicted damage on the movement because
his part brought about fragmentation and ftactionalization in the communist move­
m ent Marcel says that Henri Curiel was 'half1 a Zionist who tried to bring about an
agreement between Communists and Zionists. When be formed the Rome Group in
Baris, its role was not limited to the Egyptian communist movement, but ‘interna­
tional.’ It had contact with communist organizations in Africa. He said that when
be left Egypt for Italy in 1953 he did not have more than a few Lira, and Henri
Curiel sent a letter inviting him to come to Baris because he should have a position
in the leadership, and he promised him a good life there, but he refused the invita­
tion because in his opinion he should become a member in the communist party o f
his country after his role in the Egyptian communist movement was finished.”34

Italy was Ceresi’s country. Egyptian Communists are certain that he was only a guest in
Egypt, even if be fulfilled die preconditions: he spoke Arabic, he was Egyptianized, he did
not even want to be a leading figure in the communist movement But his true place, in their
imagination, was in Italy. They cherish him because he understood that neither foreigners nor
Jews could play a role in a political movement in Egypt He confirms the doubts about Curiel
they always had: “half” of a Zionist on unspecified charges. The agreement be wanted to bring
about between Zionists and Communists is not defined, neither is it defined who those Zionists
and Communists were. It is a language understood only in the climate of the negation o f normal
relations between Egypt and Israel and a total rejection of a dialogue on a political, cultural, or
even human level. Stalinist politics may also have played a part in Ceresi’s early arguments.
Cosmopolitans were not welcomed in the communist ranks of the new super power, and the
1950s, the time when Ceresi wrote his first report about Egypt for the Italian Communist Party
(PCI) and joined it, was ripe with a new round of trials against (alleged) Jewish dissidents.33 A
contact with Curiel was compromising, just as any contact with any Israeli or Jew nowadays is
compromising. Curiel gave Ceresi - who was poor, just a few lira in his pockets • not only the
promise of a leading position, but also of a good life. Thus he seemed to do what Jews always
did: buy people with money.145

14Ib id . 19-20.
15In 1952, for example. 15 prominent Soviet Jem , leaden of the Jewuh Anti F aicût C oareinee, were brought
to trial in the Soviet Union. 13 were executed. Jewish hiuory and religion were taboo in the Soviet Union.
Rubenttein and Naumov (eds.) 2001.

Chapter 7

Jewish Communists IV
7.1

Yusuf Darwïsh, Ahmad Sâdiq Sa'd, and Raymond Douek

The history of the communist movement in Egypt starts for Descombes, the founder of the
Egyptian Peace Partisans, only after he had laid down his work. His role was to hammer Marx­
ism into Egyptian heads, and then to hand the leadership over to real Egyptians. Curiel had be­
haved like the French and was supported by them. French Communists had believed that they
could initiate a communist movement in Algeria. Curiel had believed he could head a com­
munist movement in Egypt Descombes saw his main disciples, three Jews, YQsuf Darwlsh,
Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd and Raymond Douek, better suited for that task.
In his recently published first book, only dedicated to the Workers’ Vanguard (ta lfa t al'ummät), Abfl Saif YQsuf, one of the prominent members, makes an effort to present the lead­
ership of the 1940s and 1950s as rooted in Egyptian soil.
“From what we said about the individuals of the Egyptian group of three it becomes
obvious that we do not offer a complete biography for each of them, but we were
primarily concerned to show the distinguishing characteristics in their life as Egyp­
tians, in their upbringing and their cultural and political formation, and the link to
their political performance.” 1
AbQ Saif YQsuf repeats his message about the Egyptian character of the new group, as
opposed to the multicultural character of the Peace Partisans, several times.2 He stresses that
Jacquot Descombes was determined in his rejection of any foreign part in a communist party
in Egypt. Most of the foreigners active in that circle also attempted to get in touch with the
communist parties in their home countries, once WW II had begun. AbQ Saif YQsuf, though,
fails to discuss who it was that had the power to define who was a foreigner in Egypt For his
group, Descombes and the Peace Partisans played a positive role in Egypt and the three men
who were entrusted by Descombes to further lead a communist party in Egypt were Egyptians.
For Ceresi, Darwïsh, Sa’d and Douek were not different from Curiel or himself. For Egyptian
Communists outside AbQ Saif YQsufs circle, the three of them were also suspicious elements.
Ahmad Sfidiq Sa'd, bom in 1919 in Shubra, Cairo, is presented by AbQ Saif YQsuf as of
a petit bourgeois foreign family whose roots go back to a Turkish Jewish family that came to
Egypt towards the end of the 19th century.3 He received a French education at the lycée in
1YQsuf2000,32.
’ibid., 49; 51; 52; 58.
’Ibid.

147

CHAPTER 7. JEWISH COMMUNISTS IV

148

Alexandria. He studied Arabic with a teacher who had graduated from Al-Azhar, to be able
to enroll in the faculty of engineering at the Fu’Sd al-Awwal University in Cairo. In 1942 he
graduated. By the end of his studies, he knew Arabic because of his political work with the
Marxist intellectuals and his journalist activities.
“SSdiq Sa'd said that his cultural and inner Egyptianization, (tamslruhu al-thaqäflu
wa al-nafsTu), were primarily due to his participation in the national movement,
and to his study of the books of 'Abd al-RahmSn al-Rifâ'ï about the history of
the Egyptian national movement. But - as he added - his Egyptianization became
deeper with every discovery of Egypt’s social, cultural and political characteristics
in the light of Marxism.”45
Neither Sa'd, nor Darwlsh, nor Douek had been educated at Egyptian governmental schools.
For all of them, as for Curiel, real friction with Egyptian society started when they were young
adults.
Douek was bom in 1918, in the Sakaklnl quarter in Cairo, to a lower middle class family
that was quite destitute. His father came from a Syrian Jewish family in Aleppo, while his
mother was Egyptian from Härat al-YahOd in Cairo. AbO Saif YQsuf describes his father as a
man who loved books about Arab tradition and literature. Raymond Ibrâhîm Douek went to
French schools, then to an English school. He could not finish his education because o f the
family’s poor economic situation, and from 1934 onwards he worked as an employee for the
Egyptian radio. He was initiated into Marxist ideas by Greek Communists.3
Neither Curiel nor Ceresi mentioned direct confrontations with other political forces. SSdiq
Sad remembered a clash with Young Egypt at college in 1938, on the occasion of the Loodon
conference on Palestine. They were shouting slogans against Jews, and Sidiq Sa’d gave a
speech • “with my Arabic and my foreign accent"6 • explaining the difference between Jews
and Zionists, and then shouted a slogan against Zionism.
Ahmad Sidiq Sa’d had also published a book about imperialist schemes in Palestine, and the
common struggle of Jews and Arabs against Zionism and imperialism.7 The Workers’ Vanguard
had been against the partition of Palestine. The Soviet Union’s pro-partition position had been
due to its interests as a state, and Soviet Communists could not be attacked for their position.
Still, after the war, the Workers’ Vanguard changed its position and opted in favor of partition
because that opened the way for a Palestinian state.
In the 1970s, in his interview with R ifat Al-SaTd, Ahmad SSdiq Sa’d did not emphasize his
family background or justify his claim to be the representative of an Egyptian communist trend.
The pains AbQ Saif YQsuf takes a quarter of a century later to present him as an indigenous
Egyptian by choice and of his own making are matched by YQsuf DarwTsh’s self-portrayal in
the oral history project of Egyptian Communists that came into being as the combined effort of
old Communists and the Center for Arab Studies.*
YQsuf Darwlsh is a Karaite Jew of middle class origin. The family’s origin is documented
until 1848, with a contract about landsale to a member of the Darwlsh family. In 1946 YQsuf
Darwlsh and his relatives presented that very same contract to the Egyptian authorities to prove
their Egyptian origin and receive a certificate confirming their Egyptian citizenship. Darwlsh
mentions his relatives’ names to buttress his claim to “Egyptianness”: he had two paternal
4Ibid., 51.

5Ibid.
‘ Ahmad $ldiq Sa’d, interview with R ifat Al-SaTd, 6th April 1975, in: Al-SaTd 1989,253-269.
7Filaapn baina m akhilib al-isti'm lr. (Palestine in the claws of imperialism)
■YOsuf DarwTah in : Maifcaz al-buMth al-'arabiyya 1999.211-273.

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149

uncles called Ibrihlm and Thfibit, Ibrfihlm’s sons were called T hibit and YOsuf. He recalls his
relative. M urid Farah, who worked for the Khedive 'Abbfis Hilml as a lawyer.*9 He had been a
writer, researcher, and poet, who wrote on the history of resistance fighters (fida’tyOn) as well.
This adds national color to the family history. Among his relatives was also Da’Od Husnl, a
famous musician. All of them men whose names • as YOsuf DarwTsh’s name, too • would not
give their owners away, but could also be perceived as Muslim names.
In a lengthy description of the 1919 events, which he witnessed as a nine-year-old, DarwTsh
describes the bloody clashes, the individual assaults on English soldiers, and the slogans. This
approach is paralleled by the narratives of other Egyptian middle class Communists, who almost
all mention the 1919 revolution as an important date in their family’s history and for their
political awareness. DarwTsh further emphasizes his claim to “Egyptianness,” and his right to
political engagement, by a list of adolescent friends - all of them non-Jews - who were successful
and famous in Egypt because of their merits in the diplomatic, scientific or artistic field. He adds
a list o f Arabic literature and magazines, and stresses his allegiance to the Wafd like most of the
Egyptian youths, and his mourning of the death of Saad Zaghlul.
Even when he went to France in 1930, he stayed connected to Egypt, founding the Asso­
ciation of Arab Students in Toulouse in 1931, which was joined by most of the Arab students
there. Still, he also got involved in antifascist activities in France. He speaks about going to the
Italian club in Cairo, the opera, the AUC. In 1932 he had a close encounter with Italian fascists
and felt the power of the capitulations. Italian fascists beat him up because he refused to stand
when their hymn was played. He reported the incident to the police, and the case ended up
in the Italian consulate. As a lawyer in mixed courts, he witnessed the bias of foreign judges
towards their own nationals.
DarwTsh introduces a new term in the discussion about the Peace Partisans. They were a
group of “semi-foreigners,” foreigners and Egyptians. This definition has been accepted by
foreign researchers.10
When he returned to Egypt, DarwTsh worked with the Peace Partisans, who were very ac­
tive against Zionism. They issued many pamphlets supporting the Palestinian cause, against
partition and Jewish immigration. DarwTsh and Douek met with Ahmad al-Husainl and MOsa
’ 'A bbis Hilml who became the Egyptian Khedive after the death of Tauftq in 1892 had been educated in Aus­
tria and knew German, French and English, but no Arabic. The British were not satisfied with his performance
because they found him too westernized and civilized, the prince in turn was dissatisfied with their penetration
of the Egyptian administration and the country in general. In Berque’s description about the tug-of-war between
Cromer and ‘Abbis II, the most striking element is the argument o f being “Egyptian" or not exchanged between
the two parties. Thus HilmTs private secretary, Roullier Bey, whom Cromer disliked, was called a “true Egyptian“
by the Viceroy, while he considered Mustafa Fahml, the Prime Minister, as “too British, not sufficiently Egyptian“.
Cromer in turn praised the Prime Minister “whose prime virtue was being a M uslim... he was an admirer of Eng­
land, and convinced of Egyptian incapacity.“ Cromer excluded any Christian as a possible candidate for the Prime
Minister’s office. But faced with demonstrations in Mansurs and Zagazig, he was forced to admit a public opinion
in Egypt which he termed “Muslim opinion“ and amidst signs of growing “fanaticism” not only the Cairo garrison
was reinforced, but also a Protectorate implicitly declared, with all ministries supplied with British “advisors,”
who in fact governed the country. Anti-British feeling was rife and a Young Egypt movement bom. Berque 1972,
163-169.
MBotman 1984. “Mutamaasirfln ate also sometimes called semi-foreigners. I have adopted this term and use
it interchangeably with the term cosmopolitan Egyptians.” Ibid., note 38 p. 161; Botman defines mutamassirOn
as “foreigners" in quotation marks, or Egyptian minorities, also called mutamaasirfln. She wavers between call­
ing mutamaasirfln people of “foreign” origin and outright foreigners and underlines their influence on Egyptian
ecooomy “after the country became part of the global economy by the second o f the 19th century.” Ibid. 53-54;
“MutamassirOn were those of foreign ancestry and culture and often Egyptian bom.” Ibid., 96 note 47. DarwTsh
names the lawyers Constantin Vergopul and Lisso Hazan, Theodossi Pienides, Paul Jacquot, Raymond Douek,
‘Abd al-Raziq al-SanhOrf, *Abd al-Wahhib aJ-'AshmiwI, Fiona Na'mat Rishid and Prince 'A bbis Halim.

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CHAPTER 7. JEWISH COMMUNISTS IV

al-KMlidT when they came to Cairo." Also, AbO Saif YOsuf takes pains to describe Douek,
Sa'd, and DarwTsh as above all involved in activities connected to Egyptian independence, by
cooperation with Wafdist students and solidarity with the Palestinian people.
“The Peace Partisans rejected a Jewish national home in Palestine, or anywhere else
on Arab soil, completely.”1112
In the discourse about Egyptian Communists it has become very important to demonstrate
early awareness of the Palestinian question, because the Arab world has become increasingly
self-centered, and Islamic Arab questions have become, also in retrospect, more important than
transnational political movements and developments, as will become clearer also in the follow­
ing chapter. The years between 1936 and 1939 were the years of the Palestinian revolt. The
Palestinian Arab leadership was sent into exile, and the revolt was defeated by the combined ef­
fort of the British military and Zionist militia. That revolt has become a major event in political
Arab awareness nowadays, perhaps also because resistance against Israeli politics has almost
entirely shifted to the Islamic camp in recent years.
The memory of other communist militants who were active in the Peace Partisans’ ranks,
like Didar Fauzi Rossano, for example, revolves around other issues, namely primarily around
Nazism and the Japanese atrocities in China.
Douek, Sa'd, and Darwlsh became organized in a Marxist clique of about 25 or 30 persons,
which worked from behind the “Groupe Études” (jamrfat al-buhûth) and replaced the Peace
Partisans after 1939. All of them had been foreigners or “foreignized” with the exception of
DarwTsh, Douek, and Sa'd, according to Sa'd himself. The term “muta’ajnabT is only used by
Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd. It is the counterpart to “mutamassir" (Egyptianized). A “muta’ajnabt" is
a westernized, or an europeanized, Egyptian. Those denominations serve to create a distance
and emphasize Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd’s claim upon “real Egyptian stock.” He and his comrades
wanted to develop a communism which suited Egyptian national characteristics.13 Communists
had to assume a national role in Egypt. The pure (naqt) nationalist (wafanl) was a Communist,
the pure Communist a nationalist. The ideology of internationalist communism that had domi­
nated Egyptian communist thought until then, and negated nationalism (qaumiyya) or preached
cosmopolitanism, had to be defeated.
The Marxist group that originated within the framework of the Peace Partisans was the
continuation of the first communist party in Egypt, and existed during the 1930s and 1940s as
a secret group. The group members were Greek, Italian, Cypriote, Armenian, and Egyptian.14
Some of them would join the Workers’ Vanguard. In Darwlsh’s memory, WW II acted as a
11AbO Saif YOsuf also dwells on this aspect YOsuf 2000,49-50.
"Ibid.
"Ahmad Sidiq Sa'd interview with R ifat Al-Sald, 6.4.1975, in: A l-Sald 1989.253-269.
"YOsuf DarwTsh remembers Paul Jacquot Descombes, Ramood Douek, Victor Douek, Constantin Vergopoulo,
later also $idiq Sa'd and himself, as the original members of the Marxist group inside A nfir al-Salim, which
engaged in theoretical studies while the Greeks were their link to the populace. Paul Jacquot was an electric
engineer who was expelled in 1946 and since then lived in France. The brothers Pierrides were Greek, one an
accoutant in a cotton factory, the other the owner of a sweets shop. Zenon and Jerry Caramenion were Armenian.
Zenon worked in the Matussian Press and left for Armenia in 1948, then to France. Adele Misan was Descombes’
wife. She came from a francophile eastern family and engaged in studies about agriculture in Egypt Yannis
Criticos was a professor of philosophy, who fought with the free Greek army and stayed in Greece. Alan Wiuleton
was an English teacher in government schools and a British Communist who left Egypt in 1946. His wife. Celine
Hasin, was an Egyptian who became very active in the British Communist Party and helped Egyptian and Arab
Communists. RenatoFarfara was an Italian, a Butagaz manager, who became active among wotkers, learnt Arabic
and stayed with the Workers’ Vanguard until 1951 when he returned to Italy. He printed for the movement had an
archive in his villa in Maadi, helped workers who had been dismissed to find a new job. Strath Zerbini was a Greek

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watershed. All the nationalities had to work alone. The drive for the foundation of a communist
party grew. DarwTsh lets Bakdfish turn up again, this time to meet Descombes.
In 1941 Jacquot Descombes, not one of the “Egyptian” members of the Marxist group,
met Khfilid Bakdfish, the leader of the Syrian Communist Party. Bakdfish urged Descombes to
create a communist party even if there were only 10 comrades, good Marxists, who had a clear
perception of the sociopolitical and economic situation in Egypt
YOsuf DarwTsh prepared himself for working with syndicalists. He gained the workers’
tru st though workers would not confide easily in people, for fear of being exploited. His work
acquainted him with leading Egyptian syndicalists. They were the first group to read Marx­
ist texts and study syndicalism. Some of them had been connected to the Muslim Brothers
before. They engaged in strike committees and strike funds. Mudarrik is the great leader in
Darwlsh’s memoirs, a very broad-minded and well-informed man, “a true example of an ed­
ucated worker.”13 When SidqT outlawed communist propaganda and organizations in 1946,
closing down all the progressive magazines and newspapers, Sfidiq Sacd, Raymond Douek, and
YOsuf DarwTsh decided to establish a communist organization, which had only 24 members in
the beginning, apart from candidates and sympathizers. Roughly half of them were intellecuals,
and the other half workers and syndicalists.16
In the interview with Al-SaTd, Sfidiq Sa(d maintained that they were completely set against
foreigners. Non-Egyptians could not join their Marxist group. People of other nationalities
could only sympathize with the group, without the right to vote.
Darwlsh’s version is a bit different. Once the organization which was first called The Pop­
ular Vanguard for Liberation (al-talfa al-sha'biyya lil-taharrur / tisht), and soon changed its
name into The Workers’ Vanguard (taifat al-'ummäl), to express a class position)17 had come
into being, 50 comrades joined. In the beginning they had to discuss the semi-foreigners (asnäf
al-ajünib), who had been fighting side by side with them before. Their services could not be
denied. Many of them had been struggling for revolution since 1935.'* There were about 20
o f them (i.e. about a quarter of the group that only had 75 members!). It was decided not to
exclude them, but to organize them separately. Al-mumarr, the corridor, was bom as a special
and belonged to the family who owned the Cotton and Oil company in Kafir Al-Zayyat, an engineer who lived on
hie (alary and donated the rest of his income to the communist movement. He was expelled from Egypt in 1941
and went to France. Ann« Kayenko, later Hibi, his wife, was of Russian origin, came from a communist family
that had lived in Egypt for a long time. Dina Forte and Soknte Milli were members as well. There was Constantin
Yergopulo who was a lawyer in the mixed courts, his father a rich cotton merchant. After WW II he left for
Switzerland. Alice Gatnbanzi was a Yugoslavian from Alexandria who left Egypt in 1954. Yanni Hagiyandiriya
left Egypt in 1949 for France. Darwlsh describes him as a very active Greek. Jacquot Tubi was an Englishman
from Alexandria. His father owned a bank. He worked with the Workers’ Vanguard and left only after I9S2 for
Ranee. Theodos and Alexandra Piemdes, the Cypriote poet and his wife, were very active, as was D on Stoliar.
YOsuf Darwlsh, personal interview, Cairo 14th November and 20th December 1999.
"YOsuf Darwlsh, in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1999,236.
"D arw bh remembers: MahtnQd al-'Askarf, T*hs Sa'd TJthmin. MafemOd Hamza, ‘Abd al-Maqyfld Aba Zaid,
‘Abd al-'Alim Tmira, Muhammad FOda, Muhammad Tayak, Fu’id ’Abd al-Min’am ShalfOt, Muhammad 'Abd alG hafflrand Muhammad MadbOO from the workers’ side; YOsuf Darwlsh, §Sdiq Sa'd, Raymood Douek, AbO Saif
YOsuf, HilmI Yasin, Ahmad Rushdl Çftlah, Iqbil Hasan, Dina Mahwl, Ishiq Mushak, Adlb Dimitri, 'Abd al-'AzIz
FahmJ and Sayyid 'Abdallah from the intellectuals.
ITOther people called them Popular democracy (al-dDfwqnOtiyya al-sha'biyya) because they had adopted Mao’s
theory about die new democracy. And they were called New Dawn (al-fajr al-jadld) as well. The party organ was
the Goal (al-hadqf), the public one Popular Struggle (kiflh al-sha'b). al-Hadaf was only distributed to the cells,
about 30 issues. In 1948 the Workers’ Vanguard had only 100 members, but in 1937 they were between 1,000 and
1.200. Afctnad $idiq Sa'd in the interview with R ifat Al-SaTd, in: Al-SaTd 1989,233-269.
"Darwlsh mentions Zenon Caramaaiou, Jerry Caramanion, Adèle Mizan, Henriette Mizan, Renato Farfara.
Alice Gambarazi and Margot Sheppard.

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CHAPTER 7. JEWISH COMMUNISTS IV

section for those. It was their right to fight as Communists in Egypt as long as they were present
in Egypt, but they had to leant Arabic and to become familiar with Egypt to be included in
cells and receive the right to vote in party affairs. In case they were unable to leant Arabic they
would have to leave Egypt and join the communist movement in European countries. Among
their tasks was the publication of articles related to international development and the commu­
nist struggle in French. Darwlsh does not fail to mention that those foreigners were as loyal to
the Egyptian as to the Palestinian cause.
“They insisted on the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland, their soil,
and their right to self-determination, thus rejecting the mere existence of Israel in
the heart of the Middle East” 19
The group’s behavior towards “foreigners” reflects the attitude of the 1940s: either complete
assilimilation or departure. The Workers’ Vanguard was the group whose Jewish leaders went
to the very limits of assimiliation, only to find themselves back on square one in 1957. In the
eyes of the majority of Egyptians they remained Jews, and as such their own arguments against
foreigners and semi-foreigners, foreignized and westernized Communists turned against them,
and their origin was used as an argument to exclude them from party leadership. They became
not active in an expressively Islamic framework where Islam functions as the main element of
identity politics and political ideology opposed to western cultural hegemony. In the case of
Mahgub ’Umar, a former Communist turned Muslim and Islamist, it is still remembered that
he was a Copt, but his political history - the active participation in anti-Zionist struggle under
PLO leadership and his involvement in the Islamic movement - leaves no doubt that he believes
in the superiority of Islam as the cultural and political model. In contrast, communism as such
was suspect because it was an imported ideology, based on a secular concept of society, and
non-Muslims joined it because of that quality. Therefore they could not be advocates o f an
Islamic brand of communism, but converted to Islam as a concession to social convention and
the status quo of social and political development in Egypt that had to be overcome, not in the
direction of further involvement with Islam but by pushing secularism.
The years after 1952 cover only a few pages in DarwTsh’s narrative. The heated controversy
concentrates on the 1940s. The relation with the Nasir regime is difficult. After first consid­
ering him a fascist, the opinion about the officers’ role in society changed with the Bandung
conference and the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. With the political rapprochement of Nasir and
the Eastern Bloc, Communists grew more confident of him and hoped for more influence.30 Abu
Saif YOsuf was elected secretary general of the Workers’ Vanguard, which changed its name
to the Egyptian Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (hizb al-'ummäl wa al-fallohln al-misrf). SSdiq
Sa'd, Raymond Douek, and YOsuf Darwlsh were elected members of the central committee of
their organization. At the date of the last merger of communist groups in 1958, the organiza­
tion allegedly had about 2000 members. Loyalty had not diminished, but the renewed effort
to unite Communists rekindled the old conflicts. This time Egyptianization and proletarization
were not the slogans, but nonetheless Jews were excluded. Hilml YasTn and AbQ Saif YOsuf
had negotiated the terms of union with other communist groups. The leadership of the Egyp­
tian Communist Party (al-räya) insisted on excluding Jews from the leadership in the United
Communist Party:*20
'’ YOsuf Darwlsh, in: Maikaz al-buhüth al-'arebiyya 1999,242.
20Darwlsh tells us about an incident with Mustafa Amin, the owner of Akhbar al-Yawm newspaper, who was
an arch enemy of Communists. He tried to gather information about Darwlsh. Generally he gathered names and
addresses of Communists because he disliked their good relations with Abdel Nasir.

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153

‘They were talking about three people in concrete terms: Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd, Ray­
mond Douek, and me. SSdiq Sa'd and Douek had converted to Islam a short time
before the union. I had converted in 1947. But Sa’d ZahrSn described who was
meant, namely ’those who were of Jewish origin.’ I believe that was extremely
chauvinistic, and that suggestion and its acceptance was a real blow for the three
of us. After so many sacrifices and a long struggle, they dealt with us as if we
were second or third rate Communists. And our own party, the Workers’ Vanguard,
accepted that condition and let them get away with that racist fault. It was only
workers who opposed the condition. I did not oppose, Douek neither, nor did Sa'd,
because we imagined that is was necessary not to prevent the union. HilmI YasTn
was very shaken when he came and informed me about that condition. I did not
observe or contradict cd-rOya's suggestion. And really HilmI YSsIn and Aba Saif
YQsuf accepted that condition. The DMNL was not a driving force in that discus­
sion because they did not have a problem in dealing with Jews or foreigners.”21
DarwTsh was especially taken aback upon discovering that an Italian comrade, sent by the
PCI to press for a united communist force in Egypt, was in favor of that precondition. The Italian
Communist considered it neither an essential nor a principal matter. Almost half a century later,
DarwTsh was still shaken by the lack of loyalty of his own party, and that streak of racism
and discrimination among Communists. What hurt him more than the attitude of the Egyptian
Communist Party (ai-rtlya) members, known, like Sa'd ZahrSn, for their anti-Jewish position after all that group had for some time excluded Jews from membership -, was the disloyalty of
his own group.22
Former leaders and members of the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya) boasted of its “allEgyptian” (i.e. non-Jewish) leadership and were unequivocal in describing their group’s attitude
towards Jews. In interviews the complete exclusion of Jews from the group was explained as
due to loose ethics while in other interviews with different interview partners, this measure
was described as temporary and due to “internal contradictions over the state of Israel” and the
notorious foreign pronunciation of Arabic.23
Those reservations were mainly directed against former Iskra members but gradually ex­
tended to Jews in general, and in the end hit those Jews who had done their utmost to meld
into Egyptian Muslim majority society. Converting to Islam would not change Jews in the eyes
of their comrades. DarwTsh, Sa'd, and Douek had been sidelined in the bid for the leadership
of the communist party that emerged from the merger in 1958. The United Communist Party
of Egypt did not allow Jews in leading positions, though it might be argued as well that part
of the debate revolving around such questions was a mere disguise for power struggles and
personal or fractional hegemonial desires. Nonetheless, the exclusion of Jews from leading po­
sitions as a precondition for the union between different communist groups did not meet much
resistance because it was congruent with a general political and social climate. Petty infight­
ing, however, soon led to a conflict about whether AbQ Saif YQsuf of the Workers’ Vanguard
{faitat al-'ummäl), who had negotiated the terms of the union, would be suitable for the post of
secretary general of the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya), given the fact that he was a Copt.
What YQsuf DarwTsh denounces as a “racist” attitude occurred once more after the wave of
arrests that hit Communists in 1959. DarwTsh was a public figure. AbQ Saif YQsuf, the secretary
general of the United Egyptian Communist Party, had issued a party order that all those who had
21YQsuf Darwtsh, in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1999,2S8.
12Personal interview with YQsuf Darwtsh, Cairo 14th November and 20th December 1999.
a Botman 1988,111-112. Botman based on an interview with Da’Od 'Aziz. Beinin 1990,105.

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CHAPTER 7. JEWISH COMMUNISTS IV

played a public role would defend themselves politically and announce their party membership.
Yet 'Abd al-'AzIm Anis, a former rSya member and a member of DarwTsh’s party cell, tried to
dissuade him from doing so because “tie was of Jewish origin.” His party cell consented to ‘Abd
al-'AzIm’s suggestion. But DarwTsh did not defer to their directions, and proudly admitted his
membership in the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya) in court
In his narrative political exclusion happens gradually, first an exclusion from party leader­
ship, followed by an exclusion from party membership. Curiel was not only excluded from
leadership and membership in the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya), but even deprived of
Egyptian citizenship.
The discourse among Communists has a reflection in the behavior of their torturers in the
AbO Za'bal concentration camp. Involuntarily perhaps • perhaps also intentionally -, DarwTsh
lets a short passage about the death of Farid HaddSd follow the description of his own disap­
pointment in his comrades. HaddSd was beaten to death by the guards, whom DarwTsh over­
heard ordering him to say: “Ana khawaga” (I am a khawaga),. . . . but his only answer was “I
am Egyptian.”24

^YOsuf DarwTsh, in: Maikaz al-buMth al-‘arabiyya 1999,262.

Chapter 8
Reactions to Curiel
Curiel is a target for criticism for three reasons:
1. He embodies the stereotype of an Egyptian Jew.
2. He had an international radius of activity.
3. There is a collection of his personal papers and writings about the Arab-Israeli peace
process and a biography by Gilles Perrault.

8.1 The Right Answer
In a reaction to the last book published in Cairo about Curiel’s view of the peace process in the
Middle East, all the old resentments against Curiel resurfaced. The author of a review article
about the book. Dr. Fahml 'Abd al-Saläm, is disgusted by the fact that Curiel considers “the
popular national feeling” that was behind the incidents in 1943 chauvinistic, and charges him
with a bias towards Jews. The author cannot believe that none of the other DMNL members put
Curiel back on the right track. Curiel, he writes, used to amuse himself in the night clubs of Kit
Kat (a famous red light district in the rural district of Imbaba, just across from the fashionable
Zamalik where the Curiels lived), longing for the day to leave Egypt Curiel - “al-yahüdt, alajnabt, al-aristüqrtttt, al-milyünïr” (“the Jew, the foreigner, the aristocrat the millionaire”) •
could not even pronounce Arabic correctly:

“Imiltu eeh ya rabbi, ... isma ’ya khabibi... imsiku wakhidflus... imsiku wakhid saghlala.”
Any Egyptian reader is at once reminded of the old films featuring Turkish dames in come­
dies. It is a parody of Curiel, and at the same time a means to display Arab superiority over
foreigners. After “picking the prime of girls,” the author remarks, Curiel became full of love for
the Egyptian poor. But what the author is really after is not communist politics but Curiel’s at­
titude towards the Palestinian question. He is upset that the DMNL’s public organ, aUJamählr,
declared the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 a crime and a manoeuvre to divert the masses from the
struggle against imperialism and to engage them in a racist religious war. The molotow cock­
tails at his home, the office of al-Jam&hlr-magazinc, and the al-Midan library were a proper
answer from “the Egyptian masses.”
Since 'Abd al-Saläm cannot ignore that the DMNL was not a one-man show he alleges
that the best fighters left the DMNL because of that the organization’s position concerning
Palestine, and were accused of lacking internationalism. Chauvinism, Fahml 'Abd al-Saläm
concludes, meant to be against Israel. But in 1957 Egyptian Communists finally had understood
155

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CHAPTER 8. REACTIONS TO CURIEL

that .. a Jew can only act in favor of a Jew (al-yahQdl lil-yahadt), even if he pretends to be a
revolutionary.” 1
And a few pages later .. Though it was the Jewish masses who had deprived the Arab
masses from security since they had founded their state, priority is always given to the Jewish
people, their security and rights, but the Arabs* rights are second rate for Curiel.”2
Curiel had considered Zionists a minority in Israel. Most of the Jews, he argued, had com e
because they had nowhere else to go. Zionists had managed to occupy major positions, and to
drag the whole country into their direction because the majority felt threatened by their Arab
neighbors. For the Egyptian author Curiel's position is unbearable. His attempt to engender
sympathy for the Israeli position or a deeper understanding of Israeli anxieties is tantamount to
treason. Curiel stated that after their victory in the war of 1967, the Israelis would not retreat
to the status quo ante, and that they understood the war as a defensive action. He admonished
“his” Egyptians to understand that Israelis believed to be threatened by extinction, that they had
sacrificed a lot which they would not give away without compensation. In the author’s view, this
position unmasks Curiel and shows him to be a complete traitor to the Arab cause, who even
arranged “shameful meetings” (liqä'ät al-'är) between Israelis and Palestinians. He received
the right answer a bullet in his head.
This was the most extreme reaction to Curiel so far. It was published in the respectable
government-owned literary monthly al-Hilal. Al-Hiläl has a reputation for the presentation o f a
whole school of secular thought in the 1920s and 1930s (Al-'Aqqäd, Taha Husain etc.) and the
creation of a bridge between the East and the West, and had been - already in the late 1980s the arena for a debate about Curiel and Egyptian communism before.

8.2 The “Imagined” Conflict
Mustafa Tiba, a former DMNL cadre and renegade, had participated in that debate, and later
published a book of his own on the history of the Egyptian communist movement3
Tiba agrees that the big communist groups were led by foreigners throughout the 1940s.
He names Curiel, Schwartz and Jacquot Descombes. But since the beginning of the 1930s, the
Egyptian Communist Party (al-râya), the Workers’ Vanguard, and the DMNL had been led by
people who were, though they were Egyptians, equally strangers to Egyptian reality (ashbah bi
al-ghurabä’ *an al-wâq? al-misrt).4 Their ideas were bare of any Arabic Egyptian sources. Tiba
complains that those intellectuals were not “real” Egyptian intellectuals. He demands thought to
be enshrined in the framework of national culture, tradition, and circumstances. An intellectual
had to think through the “filter” of national history, heritage, the kind of masses he had to deal
with, and the way how to deal with them. It seems obvious that all this typifies not really an
Arabic but clearly an Islamic filter.
(<Abd al-Sallm 2001,121-133. here p. 128.
2Ibid., 131.
3JIba 1990. Tiba criticises R ifat AI-SaTd as being biased towards the DMNL. He also blames him for having
used an interview Tiba gave to Selma Botman and marking it as his. This criticism, however, obviously does not
concern all the conversation between AI-SaTd and Tiba, (in: AI-SaTd 1989,342-347), but only two pages, and he
does not find any faults in the interview. Tiba 1990,108. Apart from "pba’s book, which was published in 1990,
Jlb a had participated in a discussion on the pages of al-Hilâl magazine between Jlriq Al-Bishri, Muhammad SM
Ahmad and himself as a reaction to the publication of Curiel’s papers (Auriq Henri Curiel) edited by Ra’Of'AbbSs.
That discussion took place between April and November 1988. flb a ’s article was published in November 1988
under the title: Haula aurttq Henri Curiel: matlab taqwfm maudtttli al-iârikh. (About Henri Curiel’s papers: An
objective judgement of history is necessary.)

4Jlba 1990,97.

8.2. THE “IMAGINED" CONFLICT

157

Tiba claims an “organic” relation between Egyptian patriotism and Arab nationalism that the
Communists in the 1940s were not aware of. They did not realize the danger of the foundation of
the state of Israel.3 Under Q u id 's leadership, the DMNL had published an analysis of a Jewish
nation (qaumiyya isrû'ltiyya), that was, in accordance with Stalin’s rales, united by language,
territory, and culture, and therefore had the right to found a state. To defend that right meant to
defend that state and its existence. Thus the war of 1948 turned into a liberation war against the
reactionary Arab regimes.
“How can we describe such a historical mistake concerning the understanding of
the Palestinian cause, especially after the imperialist aims hidden behind the im­
plantation of Israel in that area were discovered?”®
But in spite of that mea culpa attitude which most of the former communist cadres share,
and which reflects more than anything else their lack of historical perspective and the urge to
be integrated into the political mainstream, Tiba concedes that the overall atmosphere in Egypt
played into the hands of the Zionists. The demonstration in November 1945 commemorating
the Balfour declaration was neither against Zionism nor in solidarity with the Palestinian cause,
but an assault on Jewish property and living quarters in Cairo, with Young Egypt (Misral-FatOh)
supporting the Muslim Brothers. The demonstration did more harm than good. It frightened
Jews in Egypt, and made them more susceptible to Zionist ideas and emigration schemes. The
policy of the Arab governments, some Arab political groups, and reactionary parties was what
brought 60% of the Israeli population to Israel. It was logical that Jews turned to communism.
In all the poor and colonized countries of the Third World communism was spread with the help
o f foreigners, and Egypt was no exception to the rale.7
Internationalism, (umamiyya), had been an important concept in the 1940s, and the attitude
o f the Soviet Union had been decisive. Tiba contests the claim that Egyptian Communists had
been completely aware of Zionist danger and its effect on Egyptian and national Arab security in
general, and accordingly, the juncture between Egyptian nationalism and the Arab nation. This
thought had been absent, and Communists became only belatedly conscious of its meaning. To
Tiba, what was written against Zionism in the leftist and communist press in the 1940s, was
only the reflection of internationalist solidarity with a people suffering from repression, it was
not die outgrowth of a position pointedly demanding solidarity with the Palestinians as a people
particularly close to the Egyptians, or as a people Egyptians would identify with as Arabs and
Muslims.
Tiba refutes die narrative of a straggle between foreigners and Egyptians concerning the
Palestinian cause in the 1940s declaring it to be “imagined” and not supported by real events.
Most of the political papers of the Egyptian Communist Party (al-riya under the leadership of
Fu’Sd MursT and IsmiTl Sabri ’Abdallah) and all the reports against other organizations orig­
inated with the accusation that they were opportunists or even traitors, not with regard to the
Palestinian cause but with regard to conceived deviations flnom the correct path to communism.8
’Ibid., 91.
‘ Ibid., 103.
tTRm it particularly critical of TSriq A l-Bishtfs changed attitude towards Communists. In his famous book
about political movements in Egypt between 1945-1932, he had still counted the Communists among the decent
political forces striving for national liberation, and been critical o f the Muslims Brothers, who, in fact, were
described as being in line with Çidqfs politics and his ally in lighting back the Wafd, the Communists and the
progressive forces. See also B ishtfs position further down this chapter.
*The conflict with the DMNL reached a peak with its “blessing” of the Free Officers' movement that the
Egyptian Communist Party (ai-rOya) considered a fascist imperialist movement, which had to be resisted. The

CHAPTER 8. REACTIONS TO CURJEL

158

Tiba confesses that he does not believe in conspiracy schemes or religious reasons for the
Curiel “phenomenon.” There was no struggle between foreigners and Egyptians, on the con­
trary, Curiel had been in favor of Egyptianization, and the DMNL had had a majority o f Egyp­
tians in its central committee. The main problem had been the al-namä al-dhûtT theory that
embraced a tactics to form a communist party by eventually winning over all die members of
adversary communist groups.*9

83

Communist Foundlings

Ra*üf (A bbis10 had brought Curiel back on the agenda with his publication of CurieFs papers
in 1988. In a lengthy introduction (about 60 pages) to the Arabic translation of CuriePs au­
tobiographic notes, his assessment of the EMNL and the DMNL, documents concerning the
Rome Group spanning the years from 1951 till 1958, and two letters from Curiel to Noemie
Canel from 1957, 'Abbfis, a prominent Egyptian historian and university professor, took the
opportunity to publish his opinion of Curiel.11 The introduction, if thoroughly read, makes any
objective approach to CuriePs papers impossible.
Contrary to what would be expected of a well-known Egyptian historian, 'Abbâs, an ex­
pert on modem Egypt, starting from Muhammad Ali’s nation building project to US-American
schemes against Abdel Nasir and the Egyptian workers’ movement, is very subjective in his
description of Curiel and his role.12
'Abbâs starts from the assumption that colonialism made Egyptians strangers in their own
country. That feeling provided the impetus for the revolution of 1919, as well as for the need
for a renaissance. 19th century Egypt was a country attractive for the rich, for investors, for
foreigners who came to exploit the Egyptian peasants.
“Egypt was an El Dorado where to realize quick wealth through the exploitation
of Egyptian peasants who needed credit to finance the cotton plantations. Those
Egyptian Communist Patty had been at its best when it had been fighting the supposed fascists, and its followers
had been convinced of the genius of its leaders who exposed the government as fascist But with the change of
government politics and its description as socialist the fortune of communist leaders vanished. Tiba 1990,94-96.
9Ibid., 118.
,0<Abbas is from a different generation and a different social environment He was born at a time when Egypt
was still occupied, but the most important years in the cultural formation of a young adult he spent under the
regime of Abdel Nasir. MI was bom in 1939. My father dreamt to make me an Azhari ‘Him and at three and a half
he enrolled me in the kuttflb. I stayed there until I was seven, but I could not learn Quran by heart because 1 did not
understand what I was supposed to recite. But when they enrolled me in elementary school I passed the exam at
once and they put me in the second grade, though even there a recommendation from a bey was necessary.** Ra*uf
'Abbâs, persona] interview, Cairo 17th November 1999.
11After CurieFs assassination in 1978, that material was kept by Joseph Hazan. Joyce Blau handed a part o f it
to Joel Beinin, a US-American Middle East historian, who in turn gave it to Ra*0f 'A bbis, probably not foreseeing
the adverse reaction it would trigger in Egypt, though Beinin as well as Botman remained remarkably cool towards
Curiel's role in the communist movement in Egypt and largely ignored it falling into tune with the prevailing mood
among Egyptian Communists. The archive of the Rome Group is now kept in the IISG in Amsterdam. Marianne
Wigboldus and Jaap Haag have prepared an inventory of the papers of the Egyptian Communists in Exile (Rome
Group) including the papers of Henri Curiel (1914-1978) 1945-1979 (-1984), Stichting beheer IISG, Amsterdam
1997. The collection actually comprises much more than what is known in Egypt The correspondence between
Cairo and Paris was large, covering the class analysis of the Free Officers, as well as agricultural reform and
political work among peasants, the situation of political prisoners, the Sudanese question, the analysis of Egyptian
politics throughout the 1950s, and problems of the communist groups related to the role of professionals, the
question of unity among Communists etc.
I2‘Abbâs 1967.

8.3. COMMUNIST FOUNDLINGS

159

foreign adventurers came to engage in usury and cotton trade at the same time.
And we do not think that there could have been a better time for Nasim Curiel •
Henri’s grandfather • to migrate to Egypt, therefore we believe it must have been in
the 1850s”'3
This is also said to distinguish his position from Perrault’s: that Curiel’s family had arrived
in Egypt in the course of the French campaign, more than half a century earlier.14*
“They stayed in Egypt as foreigners, separated from the Egyptian society. Curiel
spoke broken Arabic. Who knew him and saw him says that he spoke Arabic, but
with a foreign accent Legally he’s regarded to be Egyptianized.”13
‘Abbäs does not ponder this point any further. Curiel was a naturalized Egyptian. Therefore
be had every right to become politically active, and in his papers he explained his political
activity and his identity. Only Marcel Ceresi, who kept announcing that the leadership of the
communist movement belonged to Egyptians, finds favor in ’Abbäs’ eyes.
**Tlie one who understood best was Marcel IsrfiTl. He was close to workers and to
Azharites. I met him last year in Italy, and he speaks the vernacular like somebody
who was raised in Shubra. [In fact, he was raised in Shubra. I.S.] The ’Bread and
Freedom’ group and Anwar Kämil were with him. He spoke to everybody in his
own way. The foreign Marxist cadres actually failed. Being a Jew did not prevent
Marcel from getting in touch with Egyptian workers, there was no racism. There
was a leadership that wanted to establish a political movement in a society with an
Arab-Islamic culture, with people who were speaking a totally different language
and had a different way of thinking, and there were people who thought that it
would not work out that way, that the movement could not gain roots.” 16
The reason for the alienation of Curiel and others was not the racism in Egyptian society
but that Curiel lived in a world where the British and allied support against the fascists was
all that counted. The image of the Egyptian “milk cow” exploited by foreigners (colonialists
and foreign minorities, Jews included) is employed several times to illustrate the unreconcilable positions. The political movement in Egypt in general • 'Abbäs does not specify further •
was against the foreign bourgeoisie. Thus Curiel’s confession that a young Jew could not have
become either a Wafdist or a Constitutionalist but only a Communist, is turned against him. It
is insinuated that no political movement would have accepted those foreigners. ’Abbäs rejects
Curiel’s claim that by engaging in communism Jewish Communists had won the “national di­
mension” (al-bu’d al-watanl), and that they, by virtue of adopting communism in Egypt, had
become Egyptian Communists.
“As if the place of communist activity provided them with an identity, instead of
being the honest expression of the Egyptian working class, which requires that
communist activity is the expression ofthat class’ avantgarde, whose then desperate
situation those foreign Jewish Communists did not know.”17
"'A b U s 1988,19.
“ Renault 1991,25. Perrault quotes Raoul Curiel, Curiel’» brother, who aasumea that his ancestor must bave
come with Napoleon Bonaparte. The Curiel» seem to have come from Spain to Italy and then to E gypt
^Interview with RaU f'A bbis, Cairo 17th November 1999.
“ Ibid.
,7'Abb*s 1988,28.

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'Abbas blames Curiel and the other Jewish bourgeois (not the involved Egyptians) to have
sympathized with the workers’ lot without knowing anything about Egyptian reality, about syn­
dicates and the workers’ movement because they did not know Arabic. The DMNL was not a
workers’ party. There even was no equality for workers in that party. It could not grow into
an Egyptian communist party because of its composition. For the sake of historical objectivity,
however, 'Abbâs should have added that none of the Egyptian communist groups ever had a
majority of workers in its ranks, or the possiblity to grow into a workers’ party. Curiel’s way to
get in touch with ordinary people draws a special (town from 'Abbâs. Disparagingly, he notes
that Curiel recruited one of his best Sudanese cadres, 'Abdu Dahab, through the servants at his
father’s house.
“His contact to the Sudanese started with whom? It started with the recruitment of
the servants at home, with the sufragiyya. That is very strange, he was a Marxist
and took a racist position. He made a single organization for the Sudanese and
Nubians. Even inside the DMNL they had their own department, the Sudanese
department, that is a racist differentiation.” 1*
Contrary to 'Abbâs in his assessment of CUriel’s role for the Sudanese Communists Muham­
mad NQif el-Amln, a Sudanese, arrives at the conclusion that:
“Curiel, of all Egyptian and foreign Communists, was able from the beginning to
perceive, and then to make full use of, the political potential of the Nubians and the
Sudanese in Egypt.”19
'Abbâs dismisses Egyptian Communists in general as the sons and daughters of the rich
bourgeoisie who wanted to entertain themselves a bit, attracted by a certain Marxist jargon, the
perspective to escape a daily routine, and the possibility of an entrance ticket to the foreign
communities. Though he has to admit that the activities of communist groupings and their
publications influenced the political public until the 1960s.
Usually an introduction takes the texts following it into account 'Abbâs does n o t He
claims that Curiel chose the name for the new organization emerging from the merger between
'•interview with RaW 'A bbis, Cairo 17th November 1999.
’’"finally the Sudan had always been by and large the Achilles* heel of the bourgeois Egyptian political parties;
and this inbuilt weakness was largely responsible for those parties' schizophrenic attitude towards its people. In
their hearts those parties were agreed that Egypt should own the Sudan; and yet such strong beliefs could not be
laid bare before the Sudanese without incurring his wrath and forever losing his good faith • something which the
Egyptian bourgeoisie feared could swell the ranks of pro-British elements in the Sudan for whom co-operation with
Egypt was anathema. Therefore, Egyptian political parties, as well as their corresponding governments, were all
agreed on one thing with regard to the Sudanese in Egypt: he should always be treated gently and kindly even if that
meant treating him better than his Egyptian counterpart. This preferential treatment was nowhere clearer, or mote
significant, than in the low profile which the security authorities had been directed to adapt towards the Sudanese,
including students, in Egypt. And since the Communists were the arch-enemy in the eyes of those authorities, the
fact that the former would stand to gain considerably if and when they managed to secure the allegiance of the
Sudanese, was certainly beyond doubt. Thus the Umdurman Group inside Curiel’s organizations often came to
shoulder the responsibilities of the whole of Curiel’s movement over and above its specific role of looking after
the interests of the movement amongst the Sudanese in Egypt and in the Sudan in general. It quite successfully
and efficiently managed to discharge the functions of indoctrinization, organization and general dissemination of
Communist ideas at least so far as the Sudanese in Egypt were concerned.” el-AmTn 1996,22-40; 22-23. (The
author’s idea is interesting though his informations about Curiel are not particularly co rrect. In fact what is said
in his notes about Curiel is wrong in detail. The author’s assessment is that Curiel is “generally considered the
father of Egyptian Communism in its later 1940s phase in the same manner as was Joseph Rosenthal - another Jew
- considered its father in is earlier phase in the 1920’s.” Ibid. 36, note 3.)

8.3. COMMUNIST FOUNDLINGS

161

the EMNL and Iskra to be the Democratic Movement for National Liberation, because the name
was meant to indicate that “all nations” were represented in that new organization.20 Though,
in fact, Curiel himself explained the initials differently, and it is very difficult to believe that he
wanted to stress the multinational character of the group while he was at pains to discuss the
need of Egyptianization and proletarization with Iskra members. For Curiel it was important to
include a broader spectrum of society in his movement. Therefore the term “democratic” was
chosen instead of “workers’ movement,” as had been suggested by a leading Iskra member.21
'AbbSs’ bias against Curiel is rather obvious. Curiel was a foreigner and remained a for­
eigner, and in his political initiative had to have been prompted by some hidden aim. ‘Abbäs
is after a conspiracy theory that appears already in the first third of his introduction to Curiel’s
papers. He wonders why it was a Jewish bourgeois and not someone from other parts of the
bourgeoisie who founded the communist movement, and why it happened in the parameters of

WWI1.
“Questions that need an answer, especially if we find out a little later that those
Jewish Marxist elites of the Egyptian communist movement are the reason for the
clique set ups and the splits, the immersion in theoretical discussions, and the in­
volvement in artificial ideological conflicts without any interest for the political
struggle, all of which almost suggests a prepared scenario.”22
'Abbäs sees Curiel involved with Zionists because he met with Jewish volunteers for the
British army. Like many other details of Curiel’s life this one is also taken from Gilles Perrault’s Curiel biography. 'Abbäs is not concerned with Curiel’s impression that it was mainly
progressive Jews who distributed German and Italian books among the POWs they had to guard,
later also a political bulletin that the EMNL published and translated into German and Italian.23
His sole concern is that possibly the military experience those soldiers would gain would later
be used against Arabs in combat.
For 'Abbäs the DMNL’s support for the partition of Palestine completely contradicts its
understanding of national liberation, and its aim to support Arab unity. “How could,” he asks,
“Arab unity be realized when a Zionist being existed in the heart of the Arab World?”24
Based on Perrault again, 'Abbäs stresses that Curiel had good contacts with Zionists in the
internment camp in 1948, who were later released and deported to Israel. He does not mention
that Curiel even initiated discussions between Zionists, Communists, and the Muslim Brothers,
with the aim of helping the internees understand that their opponent was not a monster, but a
human being capable of dialogue. Probably in an intellectual culture that bans communication
“ T h e ’foreign department' was organized according to communities. There was a Greek section, an Armenian
and a third Italian that included many Jews. That way the foreigners were kept in seclusion and had nobody else,
but YOnis and Shandi [Henri Curiel and Hillel Schwartz I.S.] to represent them in the central committee. Because
all the nations (qaumlyät) were represented in the new organization it was agreed upon Henri Curiel's suggestion
to call it *al-haraka al-dîmuqrétiyya li al-uharrur al-watanf.* ” Abbäs 1988,40. It is noteworthy that 'Abbäs insists
upon considering Curiel a representative of foreigners in the DMNL while Curiel, on the contrary, was loathing
the great influx of foreigners that came with the merger with Iskra. He was at pains to distance himself from the
foreigners’ section, though on the other hand, he knew that he would not be considered an authentic Egyptian and
that among those foreigners were many faithful comrades.
2l,A bbls 1988,167. 'Abd al-MalrOd AI-GibaiIT. who was to initiate the first split from the DMNL (the DMNLrcvohitkmary workers / al-'ummaliyya al-thauriyya).
“ ‘Abbäs 1988,23.
“ Perrault 1991,143.
Abbäs 1988,43.

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CHAPTER 8. REACTIONS TO CURIEL

with “the enemy’' for fear o f compromising itself, even communication between prison inmates
of different political inclinations seems an act o f treason.23*
Curiel refused to leave the internment camp when the Zionists were released by the end of
1948 in compliance with the truce terms. He still believed that be could play a role in Egypt,
and was afraid that be would lose credibility, a credibility which in 'Abbfis interpretation he
never had. 'Abbfis accuses Curiel of having been an intermediary for Zionists in Egyptian
prisons. It is enough for him to mention that Curiel defended the role of Jews in the Egyptian
communist movement and called their critics “antisémites,” just as - 'Abbfis adds in brackets
• Zionists usually do. Curiel, in short, is lacking the national dimension. Belonging to the
national community thus means, in 'Abbfis’ interpretation, to acknowledge that a Jew is a Jew,
and that to demand the exclusion of Jews from the leadership of the communist movement is
not a chauvinist move, but simply in compliance with the most salient traits of the Egyptian
people. A Jew has to prove that he is not a Zionist, and it is best proved by an unambigioasly
hostile position towards Israel, and a low political profile in Egypt
'Abbfis emphasizes that the DMNL was slandered as Zionist, fascist, and imperialist by
other communist groups united in the oppositional camp. Curiel’s EMNL had considered the
Egyptian patriotic (wafanl) opposition against the immigration of Jews to Palestine a kind of
“anti-Semitism,” (quotation marks in the original) and considered resistance against Zionists
tantamount to “trekking the imperialist path.” The Jewish Antizionist League, organized by
Iskra members, had to fail because it was faced with the resistance from Curiel and other Jewish
members.26 This polarization is intentional. A look into the papers 'Abbfis himself edited shows
that Curiel was hostile to Zionism and its narrow-minded Jewish nationalism. Though Curiel
did not demand a categoric end of Jewish immigration to Palestine, he dearly saw the damage
the Zionist project did to Jewish communities elsewhere, above all in the Arab world, and
preferred a democratic solution to a national one. Still, it was also true that for Curiel there
was no doubt that since Zionism had created a Jewish minority in Palestine, that minority was
endowed with the right to build a nation, even if his basic conviction was that Jews should
participate in building a homeland with other people, and not focus on Palestine. Jews had
to share in the straggle for democracy with other people. Displaced persons in camps had to
be assisted to return to their home countries, or the UN had to help them go to any other safe
place. Palestine was not a solution for Jews. This implies that Curiel did not support Jewish
immigration to Palestine.27
Other Jewish Communists, 'Abbfis remarks, had emigrated to Israel, and understood that the
establishment of the state of Israel had blocked the way for the possibility to continue working
in Egypt Not so Curiel. He worked for Arab-Israeli peace. He wanted to make Arab-Israeli
coexistence possible without ever criticizing the aggressive Israeli expansionist politics. How
could a Jew of foreign origin who supported the foundation of Israel continue to assume a
leading role in the Egyptian communist movement in a country where the national cause had
reached its climax and the countdown for the armed straggle against the British was running,
a country that officially was in a state of war with Israel? The answer is quite simple. Curiel
considered himself an Egyptian. He supported the straggle against the British, even armed
straggle. 'Abbfis identifies Curiel, foreigners and Jews in general with the British colonialists,
^T his attitude waa by no mean* «range to Communuts. Members o f the Workers’ Vanguard would not talk
to DMNL members, as in later years the very extremist Egyptian Communist Organization members were forbidden to talk to anybody belonging to a different Communist fiction even if this meant to be cut altogether from
communication. See chapter on Communism and Middle Class.
**AbMs 1988,42.
27See chapter on Palestine in Egyptian politics.

S 3 . COMMUNIST FOUNDLINGS

163

while Curiel himself • and many others - did n o t For ‘Abbäs it is clear that the DMNL could
not realize front politics and urge national liberation onward because a quarter of its members
were rich and foreigners. Curiel did not even speak Arabic and had little experience with the
Egyptian situation. And the contradiction between the demand for national liberation from
foreign presence (sic! not domination, literally al-wujäd al-ajnabl) and the acceptance of that
presence in Palestine was insurmountable.2*
‘Abbäs sees the communist Jews as a byproduct of foreign occupation who had to leave
with the colonialists. But Curiel, and the men and women who shared in his struggle, saw
themselves at home in Egypt, and assumed a right to share in the political life of that country.
Curiel could not see any contradiction in his support for the national rights of Jews in Palestine
and his engagement for the national cause in Egypt. In both cases British colonialism was the
main enemy.
Curiel, 'Abbäs believes, got in touch with secret services when he had finished his part in
Egypt, took up residence in Paris, and stepped on the international stage. The European commu­
nist parties were hostile towards him, and 'Abbäs wonders whether the Italian Communists had
information that justified their hostile positif» towards Curiel and his group. The “prepared”
scenario 'Abbäs mentions includes money. One of 'Abbäs’ main concerns with regard to the
DMNL is the question how it was financed, and how its cadres and the publications were paid.
Curiel, he criticizes, does not give details. 'Abbäs combines his questions and assumptions with
the hint that probably Curiel’s father, that “usurer who sucked the Egyptian peasants’ blood,”
was financing the DMNL, and hid behind the Egyptian “reactionary forces” who accused the
DMNL of receiving financing from abroad.29
'Abbäs also finds the sums of money the Rome Group spent, highly dubious. He cannot
believe Yusuf Hazan’s explanation to Gilles Perrault that fifty of the generous ('Abbäs puts
this term in brackets, either doubting generosity among political activists, or generosity among
Jews) Egyptian Jews sacrificed 50% of their income. Human inclinations had no weight in
political considerations, especially when big sums were involved. 'Abbäs fails to mention those
sums, and he is obviously completely ignorant of the personal willingness to sacrifice for the
common cause communist activists showed in many cases. 'Abbäs even suspects that Curiel did
not insist on the connection to his Egyptian comrades for sentimental reasons or a genuine desire
to keep in touch with them. He believes that Curiel wanted to use the communist movement in
Egypt to initiate an Israeli-Egyptian dialogue. Finally, 'Abbäs concludes, in 1958:
”... the Egyptian Communist Party liberated itself from the adoption of those Jew­
ish communist foundlings whom the international communist movement had ousted
before because it had doubted them. But they insisted on their connection to the
Egyptian communist movement.”30
'Abbäs’ introduction drew criticism in Egypt as well. R ifat Al-SaTd considered it full of
mistakes and prejudices.31 He was especially annoyed at the remark that the Egyptian Move­
ment for National Liberation (EMNL) considered the resistance to Zionism tantamount to fol­
lowing the imperialist track (darb min durüb al-imbiriâliyya).32 Al-SaTd emphasizes that all the
publications and the activities of the group hint at their rejection of Zionism. The alleged role of
» ‘A bbii 1988.63.
»Ibid., 34.

»Ibid., 67.
’'Commentary by R ifat A l-Sald on R a lf ‘Abbés’ introduction to CUriel's papers, in: al-AhiO, 2nd March
1988.

» ‘Abba» 1988,42.

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CHAPTER 8. REACTIONS TO CURJEL

a liaison officer between Israelis imprisoned in Egypt for reasons “touching national security”
and spying is equally refuted.33
R ifat considers that accusation pure invention and slander. ‘Abbäs even goes as for as
translating “Palestinian prisoners,” the term in Curiel’s original letter, as “Israeli prisoners”34,
while, according to Sa’id, Curiel was really talking about an actual Palestinian prisoner, in this
case Fakhn MakkI, who had been the secretary of the “League for the National Liberation o f
the Gaza Strip” ('usbOt al-taharrur al-w atanlft q iu f Ghana). The Rome Group organized his
contact and the contact of other prisoners with their families. Sa’id also wonders about ‘AbbSs
comment that Jewish Communists did not stay in Israel because they were Francophiles,35 and
he hints at the point that all the Jews who immigrated to Israel had a different culture.

8.4 The Lack of Authenticity
More influential than Ra’Qf ‘AbbSs’ voice, who commented on Jewish Communists only in a
book read by a small community of readers, may have been TIriq A l-Bishtfs comment A lBishri, a former leftist turned enlightened Muslim, had his share in the debate on the pages o f
al-Hiläl magazine, following the publication of Curiel’s papers in Arabic. But he also added
his reflections on the Egyptian Communists to his book about Copts and Muslims in Egyptian
society and their place in the national Egyptian community. In the chapter about Communists
he does not mention either Copts or Muslims, but he sets Communists in contrast to the Muslim
Brothers. The Communists were the only political force in Egypt that neither found a place in
the political national community nor in the political religious community (neither in al-jam ifa
al-siydsiyya al-wataniyya nor in al-jamifa al-siyùsiyya al-dlniyya) in the 1940s. It was totally
isolated, and did not contribute to either of the two communities. This isolation, BishrT reasons,
was due to the leadership.
In an earlier book about the political movement in Egypt between 1945*1952, B ishifs ac­
count of the Communists’ activities in Egypt had been rather benevolent36 The communist
movement was embedded in the framework of nationalist political activity, and in the 1940s, as
in the 1950s, rather successful. Bishif was in favor of a national Arab movement in that book,
Islam did not feature much. The Muslim Brothers were one group among many, and he looked
at them with suspicion. He mentioned “foreign Jews" active in the communist movement as
a source of mistrust and conflict. Foreigners inflicted damage on the movement because o f
their mere presence not because of any affiliations to foreign powers. He considered the strag­
gle concerning Egyptianization and non-Egyptians in the leadership one of the causes for the
DMNL’s rapid split, and repeated Laqueur’s version of a conflict between Iskra and the EMNL
about the partition of Palestine and the disbanding of the Antizonist League because of a lack
of response.37
BishrT had the same sources he would quote again in his book about Copts.3* He had talked
to Fu’Sd MursT and IsmSTl SabrT ‘Abdallah, the leaders of the Egyptian Communist Party (al-*14
»Ibid.,69.
14Ibid., 244, footnote 2.
»Ibid., 47.
»A l-Bishit 1972,275-475.
»Laqueur 1956,44-42. Laqueur is not very precise regarding details and he does not quote sources. He believes
that most of the petty discussions were held in French. Ibid. p. 314, note 1, which is contradicted by eveqrbody
involved in the movement Laqueur bas some difficulties in tendering names and organizations correctly, and is
dearly not in favor of Communists.
»Al-BishtT 1982.

8.4. THE LACK OF AUTHENTICITY

165

räya), who had told him that they had already in France, in 1948 - before returning to Egypt
and getting in touch with the communist movement or being acquainted with its publications
- insisted on the Egypdanization of the movement, and demanded the retreat of all foreign­
ers and all Jews from the leadership of the movement, and ensured the support of the French
Communists for their demand.39
BishrT had few other interview partners. Most of his information was derived from newspa­
per clippings. The essential reason for his changed view of the communist movement and his
emphasis on the foreign character of the movement - foreign in the sense of lacking authenticity
(asOla) - was due to his own changed outlook and not to any new findings. (Bishif actually uses
this term.)
BishrT rejects the idea of an international class solidarity superceding the solidarity of a
national community. History, culture, tradition, the level of development, geopolitics, and en­
vironment leave an indelible mark on a national community and the political actors within i t
Communists in Jugoslavia and China had understood th a t and provided their movement with
asdla, but in Egypt the Communists had completely failed to do so. This failure was due to the
involvement and the leadership of foreign Jews in the communist movement not only in E gypt
but in the Levantine as well, which is of particular importance to BishrT because those were
countries directly connected to Palestine. The Comintern damaged the movement in Egypt with
a scheme to bring the Arab communist parties under Zionist domination, a scheme whose proof
was to be found in the Comintern messengers who arrived in Cairo and were in their major­
ity Jews. In the socialist associations and clubs there were too many active foreign elements,
not only Jews but also English, and the British welcomed those activities because they were
anti-fascist
Antifascism was not an originally Egyptian movement The foreign leftists were part o f the
European antifascist movement. They were interested in the Spanish Civil War, but they did
not care about the revolution in Palestine in 1936. Zionists could appear in antifascist disguise
and put on a democratic appearance. But in Egypt there was no fascism to fight against. The
Muslim Brothers and Young Egypt (Misral-Fatdh) had to be understood in an Egyptian context,
the occupation forces and the King were oppressors but still forces the foreigners and the Jews
profited from, and the alliance with Germany was based on political calculation. The fight
against European fascism did not justify an engagement in Egyptian politics. The Jews who
became active in the communist groups did not have a right to be come active in Egyptian
politics.40
Dialectic materialism was nothing but anti-religious propaganda. For BishrT, “Jew” and
“foreigner” are synonyms. All foreigners present in Egypt in the first half of the last century
were alien to the Egyptian environment. There was a social wall between them and the Egyp­
tians because of language and customs. The capitulations made them stay outside the reach of
Egyptian jurisdiction, and the fact that they were subject to foreign legislation forged a strong
bound between the foreigner and his homeland. Foreigners were arrogant towards the sub­
dued Egyptians, and they could neither integrate into the social nor the political milieu because
culture, society and laws were so different. Foreigners did not assume official positions or
representative functions in spite of British occupation and its endeavors. Neither Muslims nor
Copts would intermarry with the foreigners.41
“Egyptian civilization is so developed historically and has so much asäla that Egyp»Al-BUhrf 1972,444.
«Al-Biihrf 1982,598-633.
4lAI-BUhrf 1982,610.

CHAPTER 8. REACTIONS TO CURIEL

166

tians do not need foreigners to fight for the liberation of the oppressed among them.
Egyptian memory preserved Muhammad Ali’s renaissance, and the ‘UrSbl revolu­
tion, and other things. That theory, which equates between the Egyptian worker and
the foreign worker in his social and political position, does not acknowledge that
there is another wall beyond class isolating the two from each other. It ignores the
national element which is the source of strength for the political movement against
the invaders.”42
Foreigners, in Bishrf s point of view, did not have any right at all to become politically active.
Foreigners and Jews who were active in Egyptian politics were against Young Egypt (M isr alFatäh) because they were against that party’s nationalism, not against anything else. (Louis
'Awad was a strong opponent of Young Egypt as well, precisely because be was a C opt) The
Muslim Brothers’ activities are also not a permissible argument for the political engagement of
foreigners. One might even understand their alliance with the Axis powers. Foreigners did not
have the right to become active against them. Foreigners are the first to be criticized because
they act against the national community, the Muslim Brothers can only be mentioned in second
place. Al-qaumiyya, the nation, is the only permissable container for democracy, social justice,
and class position.
The attitude of foreigners surpassed Egyptian considerations. In their engagement against
the Axis powers their national attachment, their political ties within the framework of their
fatherlands, or their ties with exiled communities or sects played a part41
Foreigners were not needed to introduce Marxism to Egypt not even for the translations.
Translation had been important since the days of Muhammad Ali, people had been moving
between East and W est but probably Egyptians looked too much to the W est “What they
gained did not outweigh what was damaged.”44
The proletarization in the DMNL continued at the expense of Egyptianization. Al-BishrT
guesses that Egyptian intellectuals were not enthusiastic about proletarization, and that they
would have dealt with it in a different way.
’They had a feeling of national unity that connected them to the workers, but sep­
arated them from Curiel. Therefore it is not convincing when he says that the
Egyptian intellectuals voluntarily ceded their leading positions to the workers. It is
obvious that Egyptianization was spoilt by proletarization. And Curiel was respon­
sible for the decision.”43
The slogan “Egyptianization” in itself was abnormal (shazz). It was an aberration that for­
eigners founded a national movement, because the slogan indicated an aim. “Egyptianness”
cannot be the aim because it has to be the outset. Egyptianization is a foreigners’ slogan while
Egyptianness is the Egyptian presence and his self. Bishri even reads the merger between Iskra
and the EMNL in a national context:
“That is a clearly national conflict on both sides, a conflict decided by Curiel who
had the keys to power in his organization, in order to counterbalance the growing
Egyptian strength in his organization with foreign support from Iskra.”46
41Ibid., 610411.
"Ib id ., 614.
"ib id ., 616.
"Ib id ., 618.
"Ib id ., 621.

8.5. THE GRASS AND THE WEED

167

BishiT is thus determined not to take the historical record into consideration, neither in
Curiel’s own version of events nor in that of his contemporaries. He is only out to prove his
own argum ent Therefore he interprets the development of different Marxist groups as the result
of a national struggle between Egyptians and foreigners, especially Jews. Egyptians did not
suffer from an inferiority complex, they were not an easy prey for chauvinism as some fellow
Egyptians had said, but they were just not eager enough to preserve their wafan. Naturally
BishrT gives prominence to the Egyptian Communist Party (al-röya), which appeared in 1949.
For BishrT it is of special importance because it excluded foreigners and Jews from membership
from the beginning. That group .. is like a historical acknowledgement that the events brought
about, concerning (the fact) that there was a national struggle between the Egyptians and the
foreigners in the communist movement, and that many of those Egyptians ... were fighting
another struggle in their organization against the domination of the Jewish foreigners over their
organizations.**47

8.5

The Grass and the Weed

Even former Communists who are sympathetic to Curiel sometimes cannot hide their prejudice
against Jews. Sharif HattUa, a renowned writer and public personality in Egypt, the husband
and comrade in arms of feminist Nawwal al-Saadawi, may serve as an example.4*
Sharif Hatitia could not really pretend to belong to the Egyptian masses. He was from a
landowner’s family. His father had studied at Cambridge and embarked on a diplomatic career
in Egypt while his mother was British. To engage in politics made him feel at home in Egypt
Comrades found him very European, especially in his behavior towards women.49 Even in
a leftist Egyptian context his political ideas are unusually progressive. Hatfita had joined the
DMNL. He was impressed by Curiel whom he considers an extraordinarily charismatic leader
until now.50
Foreigners who settled in Egypt founded the communist groups. H atita chooses the word
istautanu for “settling,” an expression that means both to be tooted somewhere and to usurp a
place, because in the last decades the word has become connected to Israeli-Palestinian history
and settler-colonialism. Schwartz, the Iskra leader, was too narrow-minded for the task he had
set for himself. Descombes was afraid of the risks and acted in a closed circle. Marcel IsrS’il
was easily aroused to anger, while Curiel was a real leader, intelligent, creative, able to continue
revolutionary political activity. He wanted to take a risk, to use his brains, and to be a decisive
force. He was the representative of
“. . .a trend that represented no more than a minority, convinced that there would
be no redemption unless there was a new relation with the people by establishing a
just system that removed all forms of differences based on class, religion, color, or
47Ibid., F iild Murat in an interview with Al-Bishif in January 1979.
aMAm stirim en wurde Sherif Hatäta unterstützt Henri Curiel konnte Ben Bella sogar überreden, sich bei
Nasser für Hatätas Freilassung einzusetzen. Als ihn Joseph Hazan in Algier abholt sagt Sherif: ‘Es ist besser, ihr
zieht euch zurück. Ihr könnt Ägypten nicht verstehen. Ihr seid Ausländer, Fremde.’ Da erinnert sich Hazan
wieder an einen Varfall, der sich lange vor der Verhaftung Sherifs zugetragen hatte. Sherif Hatäta glaubte,
ihm für die Oberweisung einer beträchtlichen Summe danken zu müssen, indem er ihm die ‘volle* ägyptische
Staatsbürgerschaft verlieh. Hazan • er hielt sich für ebenso ägyptisch wie Sherif, der selbst mütterlicherseits britis­
cher Abstammung war • hatte laut Uber diesen Witz gelacht, damals." Perrault 1991,292.
49Personal interview with Muhammad YOsuf Al-Gindl, Cairo 20th January 2000.
“ Personal interview with Sharif Hatata, Cairo 1st November 1999 and 18th January 2000.

168

CHARIER 8. REACTIONS TO CURIEL
gender. And when the Soviet Union appeared as a world power promising a new
life, those enlightened [sic! I.S.] elements moved from the belief in democracy to
the horizons of socialist thought, and thus by the end of the 1930s Jews resident in
Egypt adopted Marxist thought”11

Those foreign elements (foreigners and Jews are used as synonyms here) were crucial in
acquainting Egyptians with socialist ideas. At first glance H atita’s evalution is positive:
Those Jews were “enlightened,” a term which in 1993, the time the book was published in
Egypt had become a term reserved for Muslims, mainly those of former leftist leanings. But
those Communists could not deliver on the promise of redemption. One of the reasons was that
the Jewish leadership had many disadvantages. The language HatSta uses is as metaphorical as
it is venomous:
“Those seeds became poisonous grass, i.e. weeds, that had to be uprooted, if the
new plants were to fit Egyptian soil and to thrive in it. It had to become fruitful
without carrying viruses with it, or mushrooms that prevented its natural growth.”32
Jews, we team from Hatfita, suffered from repression while they toiled as slaves in pharaonic
Egypt They left under the guidance of Moses, started to believe in monotheism, and considered
themselves a “chosen people” in a “promised land.” From the very beginning of their existence,
they were a minority that was “very extremist” Their life was dry, governed by a merciless law.
Money was needed to protect that minority from its enemies since money was an irresistible
power. The chosen people would not mix with others and allow marriages outside the same
religion or ethnic group. Jews would not trust strangers but rely upon each other, consecrate
heritage and tradition. Those attitudes bred special intelligence and abilities in Jews and made
them successful as merchants, politicians, and artists, patient and consistent men. The Jews
who resided in Egypt had not been bom there except for a few who were Karaites. Most of
them were of western or eastern European extraction, bound to European culture and interests,
removed from the Egyptian masses, history, religion, heritage, and interests. They were a closed
community.
Socialism was a means to become connected to the society they lived in, but they could
not get rid of all their “old shackles.” They had to remain connected to their past and their
environment. Because of their “foreigness” they could not remain at the head of the communist
movement for a long time, or participate in leading the Egyptian people, whatever their abilities
on a theoretical and organizational level. Those Jews were tom between reality and ambition,
and therefore they “inoculated” the movement with disadvantages that were inherent in their
Jewish essence:
• They were prone to ideological extremism and relied on Marxist texts, instead of deriving
theory from Egyptian social reality and the heritage of the people’s struggle.
• They were isolated from the people and their spontaneous power, and they lacked national
feeling in many cases.
• They left a legacy of infighting because of their own inner conflicts and their unwilling­
ness to leave the stage when it was time to do so.51
s,H attta 1995,23.
51Ibid., 26.

8.5. THE GRASS AND THE WEED

169

- The organization would have been in need of: tolerance, dialogue, and organizational
compromise, in HatSta’s opinion typically Egyptian (Muslim) qualities, properties of the
majority.
HatSta does not leave Zionism unmentioned. Though he does not believe that Curiel was a
Zionist agent, he suggests the possibility that Zionists helped to destroy communist groups in
Egypt by increasing the “typically Jewish” negative qualities of Egyptian communism because
die left was their enemy.
To illustrate his case, HatSta recalls his own encounter with one of the Zionists active in
Egypt. In the fall of 1962, IbrShTm HarSrT, nicknamed Abi, arrived at the detention camp HatSta
was confined to. The function of HarSrT, in Hatfita’s narrative, is to describe to what extent a
Zionist Jew was alien and hostile to the Egyptian environment, which ill-reflects on Egyptian
Jews in general. HatSta felt uneasy about him, though they did not socialize. In fact, the
Zionist did not share either food or drink or cultural activities with the other prisoners. HatSta
remembers HarSrT as a foreigner, “dressed in khaki shorts that left most of his body naked,”
wearing leather sandals on his feet.
“His white skin turned to red flesh under the glare of the desert sun. His features
reminded me of pig. His nose was wide at the nostrils, the small eyes moved
incessantly as if he was looking for something. They shunned meeting mine, and if
they settled on my face 1 felt a straight cool look as if two nails were piercing me.
There was a slyness in his eyes, full of hate for others. I saw him roaming the camp
with heavy steps, cautious like a w olf. . . . canying a blue backpack.”53
Above all, HarfiiT was a miser, one of the worst attitudes in a prison community, and he man­
aged to escape. HatSta’s description of HarSrT is very similiar to that of the British, especially
concerning the skin color that is not fit for Egyptian sun. Though the military outfit, the khaki
shorts HatSta describes, were as much a legacy of the Zionists (later especially the Palmach
generation) as they were due to military tradition, upheld in most youth movements during that
time, the Muslim Brothers included. HarSrT embodied the enemy, a rich man, an archeologist,
who knew the desert better than the prison guards, an egotist, concerned only with himself.
Curiel’s outfit was not different from that of HarfiiT. HatSta again mentions the short khaki
pants and the leather sandals. At his first meeting with him he stepped down from a car.
“I saw at first glance that he was a foreigner. His tall build, very slim, his shoulders
bent”
For him, Curiel remained the most impressive personality among the leaders of the move­
m ent In Paris HatSta was close to him for more than a year (1950-1952). He had traits that
made him an able political leader and a creative positive personality, certainly not a conspira­
tor, or an agent or a Zionist Curiel was the bom revolutionary. He sensed practical solutions
and duties. That helped him to assess the national reality in the right way, and the causes that
were really important for the people. His expulsion, HatSta concludes, was a big loss. Still, in
HatSta’s opinion, Curiel’s disadvantages were his Jewish origin (asl) and his ethnic belonging
(Trq). He had no chance to escape his heritage. To belong to Egypt to be able to be active
in Egypt an Egyptian family line was indispensable. Therefore, nationhood in Egypt had ex­
clusive, not inclusive, character, not so much in letter and law as in thought and imagination.
"Ib id ., 30.

170

CHAPTER 8. REACTIONS TO CURŒL

To become an independent state was for most people the immediate translation of “it is our
turn now” with “our” excluding those who had seemed in charge before. A fictitious purely
Egyptian origin in a historical pre-19th century past was created and the descendants o f those
migrants who arrived during the 19th century were excluded from the right to work, to suffrage,
to eligibility, to economic activity, and finally to residence.
Even with all that exclusiveness, however, Egyptians had already been affected by the dam*
aging practises that foreign upringing was accompanied by. The Egyptians recruited to com­
munism - from an environment close to those foreigners - were removed from die m asses, full
of theories, praising texts that were not in harmony with national experience and undemocratic,
and thus the soul searching for the real Egyptians had to go on.3454

54Ibid., 34-50.

Chapter 9
Ideology and Economy: The Case of the
Upper Classes and the Endeavor to
Become Egyptian
What was the difference between the Jewish Communists who were excluded from the lead­
ership of the movement and the aristocrats who allegedly had gathered especially in Iskra?
Concerning Curiel and others, it has been maintained that their foreign culture and upbringing,
combined with their “foreign” pronounciation of Arabic, made them unsuitable figures for the
leadership and, in fact, even for the membership in the communist movement. As the example
o f three of the Egyptian upper class cadres will show, they had to struggle as much as their
Jewish comrades to become “Egyptianized.” Muhammad Sid Ahmad, InjT AflStQn, and Amina
Rashid had been educated in foreign schools, and brought up in an environment removed from
the life of ordinary Egyptians.*1 All of them wished for a political role and for social change, all
of them rebelled against their families, and felt a strong sense of responsibility. French culture
had been the main source of knowledge and values. Muhammad Sid Ahmad confessed that he
did not feel Egyptian because he was at home in English and French. For the two women first
political involvement, then their work and finally marriage became a means to join the people.

9.1 Iqjï Aflâtün
InjT AflStQn was a fighter for women’s liberation and an ardent activist for communism for
decades. She was known for her engagement for the Palestinian cause, and more than that,
she was one of the most famous Egyptian painters.2 In her autobiography, she was at pains to
explain what difficulties she overcame to become a real Egyptian. To become a communist was
the most important step.
AflStQn’s family belonged to the upper level of Egyptian society. She grew up in downtown
Cairo and in Zamalik, the island that has hunted Communists’ imagination until now because
it is perceived as the heartland of the posh and the westernized. AflStQn had been educated at
French schools: first at the Sacre Coeur school, which was led by French nuns. It was famous
among the affluent for its output of model wives: obedient and satisfied with what fate offered
to women.3 The majority of students were Christian from rich Coptic families, and a few from
'See also Berque 1972,473 about girls like InjT AflltOn, their life style and their ignorance of Arabic.
2AflltOn 1993.
1Ibid., 17.

171

172

CHAPTER 9. IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMY

ambitious middle class families.
“They were proud of conversing in French. And they competed with each other in
despising everything that was Egyptian, or Arabic, or was in any way connected
to th at The Muslim girls were a minority, very few. They were accepted by the
Christian majority, who tolerated their presence. But the struggle against the other
minority, that of the Jewish girls, was violent. That was one of the first things that
aroused my astonishm ent and then my aversion, at that early age.”4
AflStQn describes in miniature what most Egyptians felt was their state of society. The
majority had turned into a minority, its habits, and even its language, despised and neglected.
The Christian minority had gained the upperhand, and AflStQn experienced the intolerance of
one minority (Christians) against the other (Jews). AflStQn never mentions Jews again in her
book, nor does she refer to the power struggle between Iskra and the EMNL, or any other
organization, though she could have delivered insights because she had become a member o f a
variety of communist groups: Iskra first, then the DMNL until 1952, and finally the Egyptian
Communist Party (al-rOya).
The Sacre Coeur school was an ordeal for InjT AflStQn. The nuns pried into her private life,
and tried to break any flee spirit They were obsessed with suppressing sexuality. Egyptian
society, the society AflStQn came from, seemed to be very liberated compared to them. Finally
AflStQn was transferred to the secularist French lycée, where the students themselves had de­
veloped a system of evaluation to gain the title of “lycéenne,” which was carried with pride
and honor. AflStQn felt free, and intellectually challenged. To her, the lycée appeared a nonaristocratic milieu, very different from that of the Sacre Coeur school. She started to distance
herself from the friends of her childhood. She continued to meet them, however, at the parties
and balls organized by Princess Shuwikar, the first wife of King Fu’Sd. The atmosphere was
not different from the famous Viennese opera balls. The débutantes were presented to society
in order to find a suitable husband, men and women mingled, and danced together following
European Orchester tunes.
“The young men stood out because of their obstinate ignorance. Most of them had
not finished their education. They relied on money and influence, but money and
influence and being a bey do not make culture and learning futile.”5
AflStQn is a child of her age. The corrupt clique surrounding the King was doomed to
decline. The ignorant pasha had become a motif in popular culture, like films. The middle class
hero, learned, cultured, and connected to the masses was waiting for his entrance cue.
Painting helped InjT AflStQn to enter the world of Egyptian intellectuals. She had become
convinced of scientific socialism and national activity to liberate her country. She understood
scientific socialism as including women’s liberation. This conviction made her move voluntarily
“from the camp of the rich to the camp of the poor.”6
France was the source of cultural inspiration not only for the Jewish elite. It had the same
function for the Egyptian aristocracy. But AflStQn refused to travel to France to study fine arts.
“It was not acceptable and rational that I would leave Egypt and go to the khawagût
countries for several years while I was thinking about the long and painful process
"Ibid.. 18.
’ibid., 28.
‘ Ibid.. 33.

9.1. INJIAFLÄTON

173

of Egyptianization for myself with all my heart. For me personally. I, who speak
french and who lost 18 years in a society wrapped up in cellophane paper. Until I
was 17 years old, my language was French, and when I started to be in touch with
people I could not loosen the knot that tied my tongue! Was I in fact chopped off
from the tree?”7
Thus, starting from 1944, Aflitfln tried to “...vehem ently approach this homeland.” She
felt that she did not know much about Egypt, and that language was the most difficult hurdle.
In 1944 AflitQn became an Iskra member.
Language was not the only problem. Since her childhood AflStün had been used to ikhtildt,
the social mixing of boys and girls, who played together, “in a very healthy and natural way and
on a fundament of equality.“8 Traditional Egyptian society did not allow the mingling of the
two sexes except in very narrow limits, but since Iskra was a secret organization, women and
girls were working with men.
“There was the complex of the colleagues themselves and the eyes of Egyptian
society, the mouths of reaction that spread slandering rumors about the Marxist
girls in order to defame them and their struggle in public opinion.”9
What was the solution? A special department for women was created that separated the
two sexes, but not in the organization as a whole, rather on the lower levels only where the
Egyptian comrades were concentrated. To AflfitOn, that structure in her organization seemed
rather “unnatural.” She considered it backward, but it helped to prevent “petty and emotional
problems,” such as the objections married men would raise in case their wife was organized in
a different cell with other men.10*
AflStQn’s first mission was to get in touch with Egyptian girls, students, and intellectual
women, and to draw them into the progressive m ovem ent" She was successful and famous
because she could move in international circles, published books about feminism, and her rep­
utation as an artist grew. But she felt guilty because she had a wardrobe full of beautiful and
expensive dresses at home while most of the students • she was not in touch with workers - she
recruited were not so affluent The Egyptian press used to refer to her as “the communist who
owns forty dresses.”12 In the late 1940s, she was not only called the aristocratic com m unist but
a Zionist as well.13
Her real Egyptianization and Arabization14 took place with the marriage to HamdT 'Abd alGauwSd, a public prosecutor and a M arxist from a middle class family, not ibn al-dhawSt. He
helped her to get rid of her complexes, and assured her that her engagement for the exploited
was a benefit for the revolution. Her parents gave in to the marriage, obviously relieved because
she could have made a worse choice, judging from the political milieu she moved in:
“My mother felt reassured because he was an Egyptian and a Muslim.”13
7Ibid., 34.
■ibid.. 14.
’ Ibid.. 39.
,0Ibid.
"Ibid.. 45.
"Ibid., 98.
"Ibid.. 113.
"Ibid.. 104.
"Ibid., 98.

CHAPTER 9. IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMY

174

9.2 Muhammad
Sid Ahmad
•
•
Muhammad Sid Ahmad is never mentioned as an important figure in the communist movement,
as opposed to InjT AflStOn. The scion of a wealthy and influential Egyptian family, a wellknown journalist and author, he became one of the figures involved in the discussion about
Curiel’s papers, as edited by Ra’Of 'A bbis in 1988, and an important participant in the debate
about the normalization of relations with Israel.
For their Egyptian middle class comrades, people like Muhammad Sid Ahmad were as
remote as the Jewish leaders, one of the reasons that may have motivated STd Ahmad to engage
so actively in the debate about Curiel. Ra*Qf 'A bbis did not know STd Ahmad's family. But he
knew Anwar ‘Abd al-Malik, who was an Iskra member as well, and may have aroused the same
feelings in ordinary Egyptian comrades:
‘T he Copts who were in the communist movement were in their majority people
with a foreign culture. For example, somebody like Anwar 'Abd al-Malik, as an
example for the Copts. His mother was Egyptian. I knew her personally, I shared
bread and salt with her. She was an Egyptian Copt, an Upper Egyptian. But he
studied at the Jesuits’ school, and when I was with him at his house, his mother
used to talk to him in French when she addressed him, they spoke Arabic only
with the servants. The social standing makes the religious dimension unimportant
Who shared in the communist movement wanted to confirm that they belonged to
a movement that was into social causes. There were several Egyptians in the com­
munist movement from that class, like Muhammad STd Ahmad and such people,
and there was a gap between them and the popular Egyptian culture. They admired
the principles because they were different from their own milieu.”167*
In the Egyptian public, Muhammad STd Ahmad is introduced as a man who was deeply
impressed by the two most important events in Egyptian public life: the revolution and “the
rape of Palestine” (ightisOb Filasffn).'1 He acted against the interests of his own class and
with the workers, i.e. the masses, who defended the broad visions of humanity, tolerance, and
pluralism because at home, in his aristocratic environment, he had learnt those values.1* Those
values, which were essentially the values of the French revolution, had also been leamt by STd
Ahmad’s Jewish comrades, but, speaking about them, nobody ever mentioned those principles.
In the 1990s, Muhammad STd Ahmad confessed that he refused to be just a single intellec­
tual, but wished to be the mouthpiece of a relevant group of people, not a “general without an
army.” His legitimacy was derived from the Arab street and the Arab intellectuals.19 He had
been influenced in his attitude towards Israel by his experience with the Jewish Communists in
Egypt. He had believed that a dialogue with Israel was possible and more than a tactical peace
could be in sight.20 Therefore, he had belonged to that group of Arab intellectuals who wished
to engage in a dialogue with Israeli artists and intellectuals in 1999, and drew up a plan o f action
"R a’Qf ‘Abbis, personal interview in Cairo, 17th November 1999.
l7Huq0q al-nis, no. 24 UktOblr 1999.
"STd Ahmad did not leave Zamalik, as InjT AflitOn did not leave downtown Cairo. STd Ahmad is a man honored
by ambassadors, intellectuals, politicians and scientists, as a thinker, a writer and a journalist, writing forai-Abram,
al-Hayat, le Monde Diplomatique and al-Ahali as well. Probably Amina Rashid was the one who was most critical
of her family, also in a very personal way. She was most consistent in forging ties with the people, even in her
private life and surroundings. Interview with Muhammad STd Ahmad, Cairo 19th November 1999; interview with
Amina Rashid 31st October and Sth January 2000.
"Ahmad 2000,46-49.
“ Ahmad 1977.

9.2. MUHAMMAD SlD AHMAD

175

to deal with Israel from the outside as well as from die inside. But he had backed down once
he found himself isolated. Muhammad Sid Ahmad did not want to act without a mandate, the
same mandate that the Communists had been lacking in the 1940s.
Muhammad STd Ahmad’s approach to communism had nothing to do with Egypt. He was
impressed by the kind of Bench literature his schoolmate Albert Arié’s sister read, and es­
pecially taken with the poetry of the Bench resistance. (We have met Arid before, who had
recruited STd Ahmad for Iskra. Though Sid Ahmad does not mention this detail.) His native
language was French. Sid Ahmad came to communism through Bench culture and literature.
His Arabic was weak, and he had to make an effort to improve i t
Already at the lycée Muhammad Sid Ahmad became an Iskra member. In his autobiograph­
ical sketch for the oral history project of former Communists, Muhammad STd Ahmad is more
outspoken about Iskra than in former interviews. Iskra recruited by means of haflat. Haflät in
Arabic is an ambiguous term. It is difficult for the listener to believe that any serious business
could have gone on in that context On the contrary, Haflät, with a mixed attendency of boys
and girls, could not mean anything but loose ethics and lack of sincerity. This impression is
verified at once:
“In Iskra there were really easy Jewish girls (banOt yahodiyyät mutasähilät) though
I cannot say that this was intentional [siel I.S.J. The majority of those girls left for
France later, and many joined the PCF. There was a degree of openess. Relations
were easy, even sexually. Iskra encouraged boys and girls to associate [mu'âshara
/ a term that means social intercourse as well as intimacy I.S.]. I do not say per­
missiveness (ibähiyya), but without narrow mindedness (tazammut). Many would
many, or some such thing. The relations were European, and the way of thought
was European as well.”21
According to Muhammad Sid Ahmad, this behavior triggered a negative reaction because it
was not in accordance with the “values of the Egyptian people." InjI Aflitffln did not mention
any of this. The “backward” behavior she noticed is qualified as “the values of the Egyptian
people” by Sid Ahmad. The Iskra leaders were khawagät (in the original), Jews, about 300.
“It could have been a Masonian organization as well, or something like that, be­
cause recruitment did not take place in the loci of struggle, but it was through
cultural activities, or through the parties.”22
As Sid Ahmad well knows, “Masonian” has a very bad ring in Egyptian ears. For him as
an enlightened Egyptian, the cultural dimension of free masonry may be clear, but for most
Egyptians it had and has the flavor of colonialism, and sometimes is mentioned in one breath
with Zionism.23 Iskra was the cosmopolitan or internationalist trend in the communist move­
ment, if judged only by its composition. Again Sid Ahmad uses a word to describe that quality
- 'aulaml - which arouses suspicion in Egypt In the 1990s, 'aulama was coined as a new
expression to describe the process of globalization that • among leftists and Islamists alike •
threatens lesser developed countries like Egypt and forces them into a new dependency, a kind
o f neo-colonialism.
JIMarkaz «J-bubdth al-'arabiyya 2000,264.
a Ibid., 255-292, here 238.
Bln Louis 'Awad'» attempt to discredit Jam il al-Dtn al-Afghlnl, for example, the latter’s membership in a
masonic lodge played an important part. In the 1990s Saudi-Arabian publishing houses had flooded the Egyptian
bookmarket with publications securing the then UN Secretary General Boubua Ghatt o f being a free mason.

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CHAPTER 9. IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMY

The information about Egypt that was exchanged among Iskra members was the kind o f
information khawagût had. It was white men’s knowledge, and Muhammad Sid Ahmad con­
trasts this knowledge with the necessary (though mysterious) thaqOfa misriyya aslta which he
does not define, presupposing that his listeners and readers - the initiated, i.e. the real Egyptians
- know what it is. He abstains from positioning himself at a proximity or distance from that
culture. We leant only that the EMNL was more popular than Iskra, and Curiel, at least, used to
fast in Ramadan in order to share popular sentiment and tradition.
Muhammad Sid Ahmad learnt two lessons from his communist political experience:
1. Nobody could create an identity for himself and belong to a community of his own choice.
2. The result of a collective move was often very different from what any of the participating
individuals had intended.
The main contradiction forced itself upon everything. In the Middle East the Israeli-Arab
conflict constituted the main contradiction, not the conflict between capitalism and socialism.
Communists were instmmentalized, and were not Marxists in the first place, but vulnerable to
matters out of reach and unplanned.24
That mysterious issue “out of reach” was the Arab-Israeli conflict, which disclosed what
Muhammad Sid Ahmad perceived as different political interests pertaining to different cultural
origins.
Muhammad Sid Ahmad speaks about a dissonance between Egyptians and foreigners, at the
bottom of the divisions in the DMNL that occurred in 1947/48. It was a rebellion against the
foreign, and most of all the Jewish, leaders, but nobody said so. Muhammad Sid Ahmad had
joined the rebels against Curiel’s leadership in the DMNL. Though he had not been a leader
then, he took a leading position in defending the split-off, and defined it along nationalist lines
in the interview with R ifat Al-SaTd, who asked him expressis verbis about the opposition to
Curiel.25
The Palestinian cause had been the burning fuse that put an end to the first stage of the
second communist movement. The public campaign of the mid-1940s forged a link between
Zionists and Communists, and some thought that they could get rid of the stigma by ridding
themselves of Jews. Jews were seen as a liability. Some, like Sa‘d Zahrfin or Husain al-Ghamtf,
the proponents of the Revolutionary Bloc (al-takattul al-thaurf), were a bit over the edge in
their chauvinist attitude towards Jews.
Muhammad Sid Ahmad describes himself as having been unaware of the fundamental dif­
ference between the Jewish Communists’ view of Zionism and the basics of a truly Egyptian
identity that demanded a different view. There were two opinions opposed to each other inter­
nationalism directed against Zionism versus Arab nationalism directed against Zionism.
Communists were tom between an internationalism that differentiated between Jews and
Zionists and an Arab nationalism which did not necessarily admit a difference. Some former
nationalists, Sid Ahmad deplores, even arrived at racist, if not fascist, convictions and believed
in no difference at all. So what could progressivity mean after all? Did progressive forces have
to deal differently with Zionism than reactionaries?
He presents himself as a swimmer against the tide, still influenced by the Jewish legacy of
the Egyptian communist movement. He cannot see Israel as an entity, as the Jewish Communists
could not either, because otherwise they would have been forced, in Sid Ahmad’s words, to
24Markaz al-buMth al-'arabiyya 2000.274.
“ Al-SaTd 1989.301-304.

9.2. MUHAMMAD SÎD AHMAD

177

reject their identity as Jews. They tried to differentiate between different trends in Zionism: the
extremist hawks, with whom understanding would be impossible, and the doves, open-minded
Zionists, who were open for development To condemn the Jewish state as a whole would have
meant to condemn Jewish Communists in Egypt Sid Ahmad tries to make it a point that he
is different from other Communists. There were Egyptian Communists who had suffered from
Jewish hegemony in the movement for a long time (hiqba kOmita), and they were opposed to
Jewish leaders in the communist movement For them the nationalists’ position • to reject Israel
as an entity and in detail even if that led to anti-Semitism • came as a relief.
Reading Sid Ahmad’s article in al-HiUU magazine as part of the discussion following the
publication of Curiel’s papers in Arabic, it is difficult to differentiate between his position and
that o f the extremist nationalists.26 His main concern was that Jews wanted to meld their Jewish
identity with the communist movement, even if they were not conscious o f that wish. This idea
is nothing but a variation of B ishtfs concern that an abstract idea like communism could be
distorted through the identification with certain regimes or persons. Sid Ahmad had suggested
this idea before, in a book published in 1984.27
His argument was that since Zaghlul had outlawed the Egyptian Communist Party in 1924,
he had opened the political arena for the right wing parties and the pioneers of national thought,
like 'Abd al-‘Azîz al-M isri, who were against the 1936 accord with the British and in favor o f a
rapprochement with Germany. The place of an “internationalist dimension” in Egyptian politics
that would have helped to understand that Germany was a worse opponent than Britain had been
left void. Jews were aware of the dangers of a German occupation of Egypt because it touched
their identity as a Jewish community, even before it touched the Egyptian identity as a whole.
Therefore, confusion surrounded the reasons for the development of the Egyptian communist
movement in the beginning of the 1940s. Was it founded to shelter the Jewish identity of its
founding fathers, without a further glance at how conscious they were of that aim, or was it
because of the conviction that Egypt needed a political movement that represented the working
class?
He takes up the same idea in his nanative in the oral history project more than a decade
later. The only ideology that could unite Jews and non-Jews confronted with Rommel was
Marxism. For Jews, Marxism was a wider framework than Judaism, a guaranteed attraction for
the Egyptian national movement.
“It was a cause of identity connected to their personalities. The Egyptian people
was used and employed for an aim linked to the Jews.”2*
This idea of a people being used appears again on a personal level. The Jewish cadres wanted
to recruit the Egyptian upper classes. They wished to safeguard their identity and their lives in
a tense atmosphere. Therefore, they recruited Egyptian aristocrats to their ranks. Jews wanted
a public that would not look upon them as Jews but as Communists. The public would consider
them militants, progressists, detached from their Jewish identity. The Egyptian aristocracy
could assist them with money, influence, connections, and social positions.
“Today we know how the Jews had penetrated Egyptian society, apart from the
original Egyptians among them - like Qattawi Pasha - those are Jews, and Egyptian
Jews. But there was, of course, a tender feeling towards Israel. I remember that
* Ahmad 1988,21-27.
17Ahmad 1984,112-114.
a Maffcaz al-buhOth al-'ambiyya 2000,270.

CHAPTER 9. IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMY

178

after §idql Pasha became prime minister in 1946,1 was treated in a special way in
the ranks of Iskra. They were very happy that I had relatives in top government
positions.”29
Muhammad STd Ahmad thus insinuates that there was a real clash of interests between
Egyptians and Jews in the communist movement IsmiTl Sidql Pasha (Prime M inister from
1930-34 and again in 1943, and a Wafd opponent) was one of the most hated politicians in
Egypt Amina Rashid, one of Muhammad STd Ahmad’s relatives, though much younger than he,
who joined the communist movement only in the 1930s, recalled that other children threw stones
at her when it became known that she was Sidql Pasha’s granddaughter. He was responsible for
the repression not only against Communists but against “the vanguard of the intelligentsia” in
1946.30
Apart from this conflict with Egyptian society, Sid Ahmad also reveals a logical mistake. If
Jews really had penetrated Egyptian society and had been in the power center, they would not
have been in need of him who did not wield any personal influence but was just a school boy.
As long as the issue was to protect Jews from the Nazis, it did not contradict the Egyptian
national project, the social liberation of the Egyptian people, and the national liberation of
Egyptians and Arabs. But when the protection of Jewish identity became connected to the state
of Israel, things changed. Because the establishment of that state was in clear contradiction to
the interests of the Egyptian people. Therefore, it was no coincidence that the DMNL imploded
in 1948.
For Sid Ahmad, Palestine was not an issue in the communist movement prior to 1948, which
to him is proof that there was a “Jewish stage” the movement went through. He does not pay
much attention to his own background, international framework, Egyptian politics in general, or
the Soviet Union’s position. The Syrian and Iraqi Communists were closer, he believes, to the
mood of the street. He had listened to Latlfa Al-ZayySt, a prominent Iskra students* leader at the
campus, lecturing about Palestine in 1947. She talked about demonstrations, and it seemed to
him that she did not share the positive position towards partition. He complains that he had not
been aware of nationalism. Instead, he had been directed towards a kind of national liberation
that aimed only at socialism. Anwar 'Abd al-Malik (the same Anwar 'Abd al-Malik mentioned
in the interview with ‘Abbâs) and Shuhdl ‘Atiyya finally emphasized the national dimension,
while Curiel ignored it.
“I remember that Anwar ‘Abd al-Malik got in touch with me and told me: the
leadership is in the hands of Jewish elements, and we have founded a Revolutionary
Bloc to fight that ill situation.”31
Muhammad STd Ahmad reads the crisis of the DMNL in 1948 as the breach of an unwritten
contract between the Jewish leadership and the Egyptian intelligentsia:
”We do not become Zionists and demand of you that you do not behave hostile
towards Israel like the Arab nationalists. Thus we can meet on the common ground
of Egyptian identity.”32
19Ibid,. 273.
“ Benjue 1972,577-582.
3lMarkaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 2000,260.
12Ahmad 1988,25.

9.2. MUHAMMAD SlD AHMAD

179

The arrests that affected Zionists and Communists after the beginning of the war in 1948
compromised the composition of the Egyptian communist movement. It was unclear whether
those Jewish Communists had been arrested because they were considered Communists or be­
cause they were considered Zionists. Sid Ahmad deliberately jumbles the two categories be­
cause to the arrested themselves there was no doubt where they belonged. Doubt is also not
cast on the movement as a whole, but only on the Jews. Their identity is not endangered by the
Nazis as much as it is by the establishment of Israel. In fact the profound difference Sid Ahmad
fails to mention is that it was not Jewish identity that was endangered by the Nazis but Jewish
life, and it was not Jewish identity that was endangered by the foundation of the state of Israel
but rather an identity that transcended i t Could a Jew be anything else but a Jew? Could he be
Egyptian as well? The European experience seemed to prove that it was impossible for a Jew
to belong to Europe. It seemed to prove that Jewish cultural identity had to be transformed into
national identity to protect Jews not only from assimilation but from extinction. Sid Ahmad was
disappointed:
‘They did not necessarily consider this affair something that touched their political
decency.”33
Muhammad Sid Ahmad himself had left the DMNL in 1948 and joined the most radical
of the splinter groups, the Voice of Opposition (saut al-mu'ärada), that was to call itself the
Egyptian Communist Organization (mishmish / al-munazzama al-shuyitiyya al-misriyya) later.
Though he had allegedly left the DMNL because it was in the hands of Jewish leaders, he
joined another group that was again led by Jews: Sidney Salomon and Odette Hazan, both
of them Jewish Egyptian nationals. Mbhmish, Sid Ahmad concludes later, was also a Jewish
attempt to get the upperhand over Egyptian Communists after the DMNL had failed.
Odette Hazan was the uncontested leader. In 1948, Muhammad Sid Ahmad was a young
man, only 20 years old, a student who had sacrificed his professional ambitions and doubtlessly
splendid career for a volatile political project that made him a prisoner in a furnished apartment,
exposed to the whims of a dominating • female - (Jewish) leader whom he stayed connected to
even after she had left for Paris in 1952. For four years (from 1950-52 he was imprisoned) Sid
Ahmad did not communicate with anyone but members of his organization since communica­
tion with other groups was forbidden.
Mishmish, as it was called among Egyptians, aimed at a 100% workers’ presence. Sid
Ahmad describes himself as included in the leadership of that group, together with Odette
Hazan, Sidney Salomon, and FStma ZakI, after Michel KSmil had been arrested, though he
does not elaborate on what kind of duties he had.
His own political role in the communist movement is completely absent from his narrative.
The only account about party activity he gives is the recruitment of his younger brother and
many others surrounding him. Concerning mishmish’s acitivities among workers he does not
refer to his own experience with workers - workers and peasants never occur in his narrative -,
but again to a quite spectacular scene: Jewish girls were forced to leave downtown Cairo and
recruit workers, though some of them did not even know Arabic.
"The mishmish leader did not harbor any teal respect for the organization’s mem­
bers, and she did not care about them. In Odette’s opinion, all this was only a
53Ibid., 24. lb strengthen his argument, Muhammad Std Ahmad does not miss the chance to mention Curiel’s
alleged opposition to the Anti-Zionist League, which Schwartz, according to him, had initiated in 1947, and which
counted 300 members. Curiel’s argument for its cloture had been the isolation from the Jewish community, lb be
part of the national community thus meant to be with the Palestinian cause. The Anti-Zionist League is turned into
a lacmus lest Curie! did not pass.

180

CHAPTER 9. IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMY
’transition stage.’ She would say: ’We want workers, even if we have to sacri­
fice a hundred girls from the Jewish upper class families for the sake of a single
worker!’ ”34*

Although Muhammad Sid Ahmad stresses that Odette was the unchallenged leader o f the
organization and a real Stalinist, he also was a senior member of a group that adhered to an
abusive concept What was behind this concept and its disrespect for humans? Was it the Jewish
leadership? European materialism? The experience of the Maoist version of communism, i.e. a
version developed in an oriental traditional society, as it was spread among students in Egypt in
the 1970s, led to the same kind of abuse and hurt, though the protagonists were all non-Jews.33
After the revolution, Odette Hazan planned to go abroad and play the role of the party
leader from abroad. Only when hurdles were put in the way of her departure did she give up her
Egyptian citizenship. She left Egypt in March 1954 for good. Sid Ahmad helped her to finance
her political activities in Paris and to form a group to defend Egypt After the Suez Canal crisis,
he stopped doing so because a comrade, Sa'd Butrus Al-Jaw il, advised him that it would not be
wise to go on sending money to a Jew in France while Egypt was being attacked.36
To join Abdel Nasir, the connection with the Jews had to be c u t Muhammad Sid Ahmad
speaks about “healthy and frank” relations with the national forces which could only be estab­
lished if Jews were absent and which were necessary to curb Abdel Nasir’s influence. Because
Jews were Anti-Zionists, they were against Arab nationalism as well. Muhammad Sid Ahmad
believes that their negative attitude towards Zionism led to an emotional and cultural imbal­
ance.37
Muhammad Sid Ahmad, though, could not find peace of mind in the communist movement
even after he had abandoned the Jewish leaders. He describes himself as the biggest financier
of al-räya (The Egyptian Communist Party under the leadership of IsmSTI SabtT 'Abdallah and
Fu’ad MursT). Was he really appreciated for personal reasons or just for his wealth? Did be
receive an important position in the party because he was rich, or because of his intellectual and
militant skills?38
Among Communists, party relations took priority over family relations. In 1953 Muhamtnd
Sid Ahmad had wept at Stalin’s death more than at his father’s. Joining the Egyptian Communist
Party finally made him return home in the late 1950s. His mother became a well-known figure
among communist prisoners in the al-Khatga oasis because many times she went to bring them
her gifts. Unwittingly, Sid Ahmad gives another example of the perceived difference between
the Jewish leaders and the Egyptian environment Egyptian mothers are held in high esteem
in the communist movement. Tliis family dimension is absent among communist Jews. They
were active as individuals, and the help that was sent for the prisoners was sent as a collective
help, administered by a group of people not by a family.
In the end, Muhammad Sid Ahmad arrives at the conclusion that not a Zionist conspiracy
but cultural imperialism shown by Jews destroyed the Egyptian communist movement. This
was mostly seen in the class that was supposed to win the class struggle:
“Many who were recruited from the basis were examples of people exposed to cor­
ruption and distortion of identity, if only because they were torn from their workers’
“ Markaz al-buhOth al-'aiabiyya 2000.264.
“ ÇUab 1997.
“ Muhammad Sid Ahmad mentions Fi(ma ZakI, Nabl) al-HiUli, Bolus Banna, Sa’d Al-JawII and al-Mistakiwf
as persons he dealt with in the Egyptian Communist Organization.
)7Maikaz al-buhath al-'arabiyya 2000,284.
“ Ibid., 283.

9.3. AMÎNA RASHÎD

181

environment instead of sowing the seeds in the real and original workers’ milieu.
All the organizations did that to different degrees. They [i.e. the workers I.S.] had
had values before they became Communists, and they lost many of them after they
became Communists.”39
Sid Ahmad had been a Communist himself. Was he protected from that loss of values by
virtue of being an Egyptian bourgeois? Is it not the attitude of the British colonialists towards
the good native that is behind Muhammad Sid Ahmad’s complaints about workers’ innocence
lost? That attitude was not restricted to the Egyptian upper classes but widespread among the
educated, who considered education, the traps of freedom, and lost virtue a burden they did not
want the workers to share. The real people and their good qualities is a fiction ethnographers
and educated classes in third world countries cherish alike.

93

Amina Rashid40

Amina Rashid belonged to a younger generation. She joined the Communists only in 1954,
after the Egyptian revolution, and after the departure of many of the active Jewish comrades.
Sid Ahmad had been her hero. Rashid had attended the French lycée in Helipolis. She was
harassed because of her grandfather, the former prime minister, Sidql Pasha, and the SidqlBevin agreement She felt there was a different Egypt, apart from the Egypt she was living in.
The family lived in a villa in a popular quarter. The seamstress who came to their house was a
Jew.
”And we would live together, and eat together, and we would laugh at Jews. She
would always tell us that they would call after her in the street: ’Inti ashlOna, inti
yahûdiyya’, you’re miserable, you’re a Jew. And we would laugh a lot. Her soul
was very Egyptian, we would laugh a lot. It was only later that differences became
apparent”
Amina dressed well, the men at her home drank whiskey and discussed politics, her mother
went out at nights. Contact was limited to the very wealthy and the extended family. Muhammad
Sid Ahmad’s sister, her husband and all of her friends were active in the communist movement.
In 1954, Amina Rashid joined the Egyptian Communist Party (ial-rOya), and stayed active until
1959. She was astonished to find that the party meetings had to end with the insult of the other
communist organizations. Her comrades told her that she was a romantic like her class, which
made her feel guilty. In the 1950s, the problem of Egyptianization continued to exist. Rashid
wanted to read Marx and Engels, but her party responsibles told her
”*No, you have to form a national Egyptian spirit (lâzim titkauwint rûh wataniyya
masriyya). Don’t read anything but the pamphlets.’ And I read all the pamphlets.
They said that the former generation had been into theory, and they did not un­
derstand anything about the situation of the national movement and class analysis.
And I was even weak in Arabic. My family spoke French at home. I avoided Hegel
and the dialectic, and read the pamphlets. And I worked in translation. Translating
the literature of the European communist parties.”
"Ibid., 270.
40Amina Rashid, personal interview Cairo 31u October 1999 and 5th January 2000.

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CHAPTER 9. IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMY

Amina Rashid never worked with anybody coming from the people (shefbQ. She was active
in a cell that was busy with translation. They were into theory. She was a student, but kept
herself at a distance from student activities to protect herself from getting known. After the
Suez Canal aggression in 19S6, they discussed Israel in a party meeting.
“We rejected Israel and all that, and then there was a party decision that the Jews
in the party should convert to Islam. A part of the cell was against that idea. We
understood ourselves as internationalists. We didn’t have that thing about Jews
becoming Christians or Muslims. And nobody was especially religious. But they
said, no it’s because of the national cause, and we are against Israel, and for the
masses it’s not right that there are Jews amongst us. Though the Jews who had
remained were very few. After 1956 most of them left Egypt. The rich ones went
to Europe, and the poor ones went to Israel. Though nobody was really in a mood
to go there. ’How are we going to take up arms against Egypt?’ they’d say. There
were girls with me in school who were not inclined to do th at But inspite of the
opposition, the decision was taken, and some converted to Islam.”
Amina Rashid left Egypt for France in 1965, and stayed abroad for 13 years. In 1978 she
returned, and tried to engage in politics again. She was a member in the committee for the
defense of national culture, and against the normalization of relations with Israel. But again
she discovered that her political group was engaged in reading theory only, and in discussing a
party program without die group being rooted amongst the people.
“That’s why all those discussions come up, that one is a Copt and that one i s __
There is no real work done. It’s all personal conflicts. Now there’s more democracy,
you can say in public that you’re a Communist, when I was young you couldn’t,
they would have thrown you into prison at once. But now the gap between us and
the people is much wider. Before it was forced upon us.”

Chapter 10
Culture
10.1 Introduction
The communist movement in Egypt, which grew from the shadow of the antifascist struggle in
the 1930s, became active in an era of increased Egyptian self-assertion. The Egyptian majority
had been forced to content itself with the position of a minority under British colonial rule,
which tried to shape the country after its own image. On the first level, a campaign was launched
for the use of Arabic, which had been banned first from the diwans by the Ottoman Empire and
its Ttirkish elite, and then from the counters and conference halls of banks and companies by the
European soldiers and businessmen. This demand, in turn, was connected to the employment
of Egyptian nationals in enterprises and businesses, which had been hampered by the extensive
use of foreign languages in business conducting and book keeping. (Book keeping in English
or French had also prevented full control of companies and banks by the Egyptian ministry of
finances.)
In 1939, the Egyptian magazine Akhlr Stfa launched an urgent appeal to the government:
“We must take advantage of this [i.e. the war I.S.] to rid ourselves of the last
shackles of the Montreux conference with respect to the mixed courts. We must
oblige concessionary companies, henceforward, to allot 60% of their positions to
Egyptians, and to use the Arabic tongue. We must make the teaching [sic! I.S.] of
Arabic widespread.”1
In the same year, the Cairo municipality started to introduce Arabic street signs and Arabic
car plates substituting the Latin script
Curiel, Schwartz, Ceresi, Darwîsh, Douek and Sa'd had by then all already appeared on
the political landscape. They had not come from the workers’ districts of Shubra al-Khaima
or Hilwan, or better still from a traditional quarter charged with Arab Islamic history, like
Sayyida Zainab, where education still did not exceed the traditional kuttab. They had come
from downtown Cairo, which was, though it was more Arabic spoken than Alexandria, still
far removed from the popular quarters. The urban landscape of Cairo reflected social as well
as cultural distinctions, not only with regard to the foreign minorities, but with regard to the
Egyptians themselves:
“The middle bourgeoisie, which was tinged with Europeanism and which formed
a minority in its habits, if not by its origins, preferred to live at Heliopolis, where
1A khlr S»'«, 24th O ctober. 1939.
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CHAPTER 10. CULTURE

184

distance and the baroque geometry of the architecture provided adequate protec­
tion from the ‘natives’. Then there were Zatnalik, Duqqi, Garden City. Expansion
westward was modem in style, reflecting increased wealth and European influence.
The sometime upper-class districts, Bab al-Luq, Munira, Maliya had come down
in the world, like the vestiges of Isma'fl’s reign, without becoming completely dis*
possessed. Clot-Bey Street had a shocking reputation. The Levantines had deserted
Faggala, though the Jesuit college still stood there.”2
During the Nasir era modem districts developed which housed the all - Egyptian middle
classes and technocrats like Muhandisin, again separated from the “natives” in Bulaq al-Dakrur
by railway tracks behind which kerosene lamps shed light on the fish mongers and vegetable
sellers on the main road beside the sewer and mud alleys leading into the crowded district.

10.2 The Effendiya
Most studies dealing with Egyptian history and culture concentrate on the production o f high
culture: books, political and cultural magazines, newspapers and theater, authors who created
outstanding works of art. Based on important writers of that period of time and their drift toward
Islam, Gershoni and Jankowski have pointed out that Egyptian nationalism was in a dilemma in
the 1930s and 1940s because it:
“... had simultaneously to fight the West, to borrow appropriate models for modem
community from the West, and to establish its cultural and psychological distinc­
tiveness from the West.”3
An Egyptian nationalism of “authentically” Egyptian character would therefore adopt Is­
lamic, Arab and Eastern symbols, myths and values as the basis of Egyptian identity. Because
the carrier of that new identity, the effendiyya, were less westernized and of lower social origin
than the elite, they were from the outset closer to Arab and Islamic images, and language and
religion had a stronger meaning for them than for the elite, who had produced the Egyptian
nationalism of the 1920s.
Egyptians who became active in the communist movement in the 1940s, and above all the
student segment that caused the disturbances in the DMNL, were part of that effendiyya. To be
an effendi meant to be visually different from the popular classes, wearing European style cloth­
ing. Education was central to the status of an effendi, who would be employed in government
service as a teacher or a civil servant, or as a clerk in a private enterprise. Even the graduates of
the technical schools, who were employed as foremen and technicians, could be counted among
the effendiyya. An effendi had less prestige than a pasha (from Ottoman background mostly, and
belonging to the indigenous political elite), or the European bourgeoisie. But he was certainly
different, and endowed with more prestige than the mass of the rural peasants (fallahin) and the
workers ('ummdl). Deeb has remarked that the effendiyya could easily go back to the villages
because they were equally at home in the villages and in the towns.4 Still, they were an essen­
tially urban phenomenon. Most of the Egyptian Communists came from effendiyya families.
By becoming Communists they had opted for a political line that was in contradiction to an
2Berque 1972,605.
Hjeraboni and Jankowski 1996,214.
4See for the effendiyya: Deeb 1979,44; Genhoni and Jankowski 1996,7-11; See for the contradictions between
peasants and effendiyya and rural nobility in the struggle against colonialism: Schulze 1992; Schulze 1981.

10.3. POPULAR CLASSES

185

Arab-Islamic heritage. Yet in the straggle for power inside the movement, they fought on the
ground of an authentic Egyptianness. To base the bid for power on language was easy. Nobody
could contest that the majority of the country spoke Arabic, and that the population had to be
agitated in that language. The cultural definition was more difficult

103

Popular Classes

The discussion about Jews in the communist movement shows how “un-Egyptianness” became
identified with a certain religious and/or ethnic element in Egyptian society.
Fu’ad MursT, the leader of the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya), claimed, concerning
the majority of Jews in Iskra:
“It was a symbol of dissolution: sexual dissolution, moral dissolution. This might
be justified as liberation of thought But the Egyptian people did not accept this, or
regard it as anything other than dissolution.”5
Culture includes customs and habits, traditions, religion, dress codes, food, music, all the
daily and artistic expressions of men. Above all, it is about the relation between people in a
society in general, and men and women in particular. Culture is not a static coordinate. It
develops and changes. The integration of certain aspects of an Arab-Islamic heritage into an
imagined Egyptian identity was as true as the desire of the developing middle classes to prove
modem, and to take the place of the western professionals and the corrupt local elite, or at least
to become a partner in power sharing. In this respect, education was as much a weapon as was
moral superiority and authenticity, to defend the right to leadership in society, and the role as
the mouthpiece of the mute masses. But as much as the middle classes would stick to the claim
of representing the “authentic” Egypt, in contrast to foreigners and to the elite, as much would
they want to differ from the popular masses.
Apart from the political articles in al-Ahram or any other publication of that time, the adver­
tisements, the photographs, and the social news spoke a language of their own about the state of
society at that time. The middle class reading public may have been influenced by the upsurge
of Islamic works about the prophet Muhammad’s life and the rightly guided caliphs, as Gershoni and Jankowski maintain, but its imagination was also fuelled by other images in films, on
stage, and in advertisements, which did not primarily present the virtues of Islamic society, but
a mixture of middle class ambitions towards a European style of life and conservative ethics. A
generation gap separated the young Egyptian Communists from the figure of KamSl Shawkat in
Naguib Mahfouz* trilogy, the classical tarboosh wearing effendi and school master, living in his
father’s house, and still at home in the old quarter near Al-Azhar, Gamaliya. They resembled
Ahmad Ibrahim Shawkat Ahmad did not suffer primarily from foreigners. Invited to a tea
party at his English professor’s house, he did not encounter problems with the professor or his
wife, but he was confronted with his (Egyptian) lady of the heart’s refusal even to think about
marriage because of the social gap that separated them. That was the final blow that drove him
into the arms of his real lover an independent Egyptian girl, the editor of a non-profit leftist
magazine, from a poor working class background, educated and decent6 A girl that resembled
most of the middle class women engaged in the communist movement though not InjT AfiStOn
and her class.
’Benin 1990,103.
‘Mahfouz 1992.

CHAPTER 10. CULTURE

186

The intellectual climate of the 1930s was one of disenchantment and frustration. It seemed
that ideas of western liberalism were a sham. Communists were among the various extremist
factions that came to the rise, seeking a way out of the political stagnation that had become
synonymous with moral stagnation. Islamists were on the other edge of extremism, and were
better off in their bid for authenticity. For them, materialism, greed, and tyranny were only
the abstract terms for what lay at the basis of the destructive powers of western civilization for
oriental societies, whose fate was slow annihilation, and profound and complete corruption at
the hands of the British occupation forces. Imperialism had to be fought in the Egyptian soul
first to withdraw physically from Egyptian soil.7*
Back to the roots meant back to the Islamic tradition, the way Hassan al-Banna interpreted
it. Even though Communists were materialists, they were also engaged in a discourse about
the end of colonialism, not only as “the disappearance of colonialism but the disappearance of
colonized man,” who saw himself, his failures and victories in the colonizer’s vision of progress
and modernity.* Communists were demanding an “Egyptian communism,” based on Egyptian
experience and culture. They were fighting for “Egyptianization,” but in concrete terms this
only seems to mean that Egyptians would fill the positions foreigners had occupied before.
Corruption as an issue was omnipresent in newspapers as well as in arts. Communists
and Islamists were united in their rage against the corruption by westernization and bourgeois
behavior. With the discourse about tire communist movement in mind, their positions become
rather indistinguishable:
“Women have lost their Muslim virtues by their immodest participation in the par­
tying and dancing which marks so many of the offical and unofficial functions.
Why? Because ‘European women do it and we want to be like Europe in all re­
spects!’ As a consequence, the nation is tom in its personal and home life between
an Islamic and a western pattem; some have remained Muslim while others have
‘outwestemized the westerners.’ "9
Does this not ring a bell? Westernization of Egyptian society was a concern that united the
leadership of the communist groups with their rivals inside the groups and with their opponents
from different political trends. Apart from Egyptianization and westernization, a repeated attack
against the DMNL argued that it spoilt workers and turned them into bourgeois. The contact
with the bourgeois leadership allegedly corrupted their behavior, it blurred the limits between
the classes, not the cultures. The question of class and culture was therefore inextricably inter­
mingled with the ambitions of the Egyptian middle classes, the new effendiyya, being caught in
the middle.

10.4 The New Class
Much of the cultural production of the 1930s and 1940s suggested that the middle classes could
take over from the old bourgeoisie. In films that social class appeared worn out and hateful: the
villas, the women with their plunging necklines, smoking cigarettes, the French intérieur, the
French in-language. Films suggested that the excesses of the rich could be mitigated through
the development of a sophisticated and responsible middle class which could partake of the
best Europe offers without loosing its authenticity.10 Listening to old Egyptian Communists, all
’Mitchell 1969,230.
( Fanon 1963.266-267.
’Mitchell 1969,223-230.
l0Armbruster 1996,93-% .

10.4. THE NEW CLASS

187

those elements appear to emphasize the lift between foreigners and Egyptians. Anew class was
gaining ground.
That new class consumed not only films but also magazines. Weekly magazines offered
news about Egyptian stars, interspersed with jokes and cartoons in colloquial Arabic and satires.11
The advertisements reveal the mood of that period probably even more than the articles: women
in modern European dress were compared to the classical Egyptian rural-beauties behind trans­
parent veils. The ads for perfumes, soaps, and make-up showed women with European features,
rouge on their lips, bare shoulders, and open hair. In al-Ahram the most beautiful Egyptian legs
in nylon stockings were revealed to right above the knee for a contest12
The women in the photograph, depicting the women from the Wafd bringing flowers to Saad
Zaghlul’s grave in 1948, were all in short-sleeved European dresses, wearing their long hair
open and flowing.13 Pictures of men and women, bodybuilders, tennis players, and swimmers
in shorts and bathing suits were abundant In all respects the Egyptian press landscape was
sim iliar to what the Lebanese press has been until now.14*But that broad section of the Egyptian
middle classes that opted for modernity and against Islamism was walking a tightrope in its
approach to modernity.
“But while western glamor may have featured in the image of modernity popular­
ized by al-Ithnayn, the contents of the magazine often functioned to suggest what
sort of behavior was going too flu. For example, while the beach theme empha­
sized prominently in the summer advertising campaigns of the first issues signaled
the adoption of a new bourgeois habit, the contents of the magazine indicate that
the limits and etiquette of beach behavior were still being negotiated. A cartoon
shows two women on the beach wearing the latest in western bathing fashion. One
of the suits is a bit more revealing than the other - practically a bikini, with top and
bottom connected only by a slender strip of fabric. The first woman, wearing the
marginally more modest suit, says ‘Wow! It’s hot today!’ The woman in the ‘urbikini’ replies, ‘Didn’t I tell you not to wear that heavy bathing suit?* The reader is
allowed to feel traditional indignation (’we don’t dress like those women, how dare
they do that’) while participating in a thoroughly untraditional practice.” 13
Literary accounts show that not only the urban middle classes, but also their rural relatives
from Upper Egypt traveled to Alexandria, renting a cottage or staying in a hotel, and enjoyed
the waves, women and men in proper bathing suits • sometimes homemade.16*
The participation in “thoroughly untraditional practices” was probably the most challenging
and the most deterring element in communist work. The ideology of the communist groups
emphasized equality between the sexes and between religions. The “wretched of the earth”
were to conquer their share of wealth and to turn society botttom up. Going to the beach was
a modest challenge compared to that endeavor, yet one that could also hamper - in a figurative
sense - progress on a higher level.
"Ibid., 76-82.
I2al-Misrf, 29.8.1948. (In the year 2000 the veiled employees in the Egyptian press archive could not believe
that this had been the atmosphere of 1948 Egypt)
"at-Ahram. 7.11.1948.
"al-M isrf, 18.8.1948.

"Annbnister 1996,80.
"al-CharTSt 1996.

CHAPTER 10. CULTURE

188

10.5

Costumes and Habits

Costumes and habits reveal a lot about people and the way they stage themselves. The Mus­
lim Brothers believed themselves to reflect the traditional traits of Egyptian society, starting
from the traditional dress of the members to the discourse, the moral values, and the separate
organization (and secondary rank) of women. The Muslim Brothers’ political outlook was de­
termined by the urban leadership, the rural masses were only the backbone of the organization.
The membership of the Muslim Brothers largely represented “an emergent and self-conscious
Muslim middle class.” 17
However, the impact of time, fashion, and a western dress code showed even in a Muslim
Brothers’ show of force, not in Cairo, but in the rural Mansura.
“Hasan al-Banna visited the town and entered it in a parade that looked like a parade
of invaders. In the very front were the troops of the rovers, in their khaki dress, in
shirts and shorts. They were so many, and all of them were peasants who were
probably dressing in shorts for the first time in their lives. They were trying to
keep in step for the first time as well. From the shorts, the tails of their underwear
would show, which did not go with that uniform. The scene was hilarious, but the
gathering was big and frightening, and after the rovers came the music band with
their drums.” 18
In this sense, MahgQb 'Umar may prove to be right when he concludes in his interview, “alhaddra f t Masr ya'ni badla,” i.e. “civilization in Egypt means a full suit” and it could be added
that the example of the Muslim Brothers showed that demonstrating power meant wearing khaki
shorts and marching in step at a certain period of time.
Even Islamic agitation was influenced by western elements. Kedourie wonders about Shaikh
al-MarfighT, the rector of Al-Azhar, who began his radio broadcast on the occasion of the kurban
bayram in 1938 with a reference to FarOq.
“ ‘The union of two holidays after His Majesty has become the ruler of the country,*
he said, ‘is a sign that FarQq’s birthday is an Islamic holiday, as well as a national
festival for all Egyptians, whatever their different religions and creeds.’. .. ‘The
Holy Azhar, professors and students,’ he continued, ‘present their loyal and sin­
cere congratulations upon the two events to His Majesty King Fartiq. May God
grant him a long and prosperous life for humanity in general and for the Islamic
religion in particular.’ ”19
Kedouri interprets MarSghfs reference to the King’s birthday (while birthdays in contrast
to the day of death, are not usually observed in Islamic countries) as an attempt to enhance
Farflq’s position and popularity. Popularity with whom, we might ask? MarSghT introduces the
typical European style celebration of a king’s birthday in an Islamic cloak, a move seemingly
designed to appeal to the middle classes; or else it could be interpreted as a proof of how far*23
l7As early as 193S, Mitchell notes that of the 112 leaden attending the third general conference
only
23 were classified as shaykhs, most of these being rural in origin. Many yean later, in 1933, a listing o f the
Consultative Assembly showed that of 130 memben, only 12 bore the title ‘Him, and 10 others were either ‘elders’
(a'yûn) or ‘village headmen’ ('umad) and were rurally rooted; the remainder were of the effendlyyar Mitchell
1969,329-330.
"A l-S ald 1999.
'*Kedourie 1970,201.

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189

European features had penetrated Egyptian culture already. Most of the well-known Al-Azhar
shaikhs with good family backgrounds did not foresee a future for their sons within their own
institution, but sent them to a university • a distinctively secularist institution molded after a
western pattern • to receive a modem education.20
Traditional education was out of pace with modernity, and it did nothing to protect a tra­
ditional character from the seductions of modem life. Dissatisfaction and unemployment were
widespread among Azhar students who belonged to the impoverished section of society. There­
fore, Communists could gain access to Azhar students. In Bairam al-Tünsi’s m aqim it there is
a scene of an encounter between two Azhar shaikhs with Egyptian beauties on the Alexandrian
beach.21 Trying to take a look at foreign women they discover that the bathing beauties are not
foreigners but native Egyptians though they indulge in “European” activities like gymnastics
and sunbathing. These students seem to be out of touch with the new world, though wishing to
touch it in a very literal sense.
“In such a world the student either conforms to the expectation of the new Euro­
peanized bourgeoisie, or remains destitute. From this perspective the heroic refor­
mulation of society planned by “official” intellectuals such as Taha Husain or Louis
’Awad appears only as unobtainable material goods and licentious behavior . . . . or
a bevy of scandalously immodest girls on the beach.”2223

10.6 Education, Authenticity, and Socialist Realism
The realm of pure science, high ethics, and intellectual flow had shifted away from the Azharis
to the adherents of modem science. Communists were critical of “official” intellectuals like
Taha Husain, and considered him only “a bourgeois writer.” Husain, though, described himself
as a man brought up and educated among the people, feeling like the people, and close to the
people in his aims. Communists could not agree with Husain's opinion that values and culture
did not emanate from the people, and that people, on the contrary, had to be brought closer
to humanity and civilization by education. Literature, art, philosophy, and science contained
true values that had to be preserved. The people - the masses - were ignorant, stupid, and dull,
endowed with a bad taste.23
^E ccel 1984. He argues chat in the 1930s it was not the sons of the affluent who graduated from Al-Azhar,
but rather the lower classes. He quotes a shaikh claiming that there was a class basis for barring AzharTyTn from
D ir al-tU1flm and Madrasat al-Qudfih, which led to government employment And one of his interview partners,
who did a survey among Azhar professors, found that they themselves would not send their sons to study at Azhar.
but preferred government schools. The educated class did not have any formal religious education any more,
while the religious elite, in comparison, was more poorly educated, largely of village origin, and from die lower
classes. Ibid., 292. Until 1960 Al-Azhar was a university that catered only to the religious professions. The
problem of unemployment among Azharites lingered on during the 1940s and the 1950s raising fears of the “army
of unemployed Azharite graduates being a source of unrest in the country.** In the 1950s the supervisor of Azhar
affairs came to note that Al-Azhar did not yet produce religious scholars who were in a position to offer such works
of experience and production as the progress of Muslims called for. He deplored that foreign students in Egypt
were found, upon coming home, either hardly knowing anything about religion while having aquired experience if
they had studied in the civilian (secular) universities of the UAR or having acquired religious and Quranic science,
but having gained no practical knowledge. Ibid., 313.
2lMaq&ma called “Camp Caesar**. al-ThnsI 1974,20.
“ Armbruster 1996.57-58. Booth 1990.
23In AbO Saif YQsuFs enormous Vktihû'iq wa mawâqif min târfkh al-yasdr at-misrt, 1941-1957, Cairo 2000,
which is classified by the author himself as “mädda U Ulrikh munauamat talTat al-'ummär (material about the
history o f the Workers’ Vanguard) there is a comment by Taha Husain on an article that was published in: New

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Though the communist intellectuals were opposed to Husain’s opinions, especially the ooes
who boasted of being “ibnâ’ al-sha'b” (from the people) had undergone personal and social
change by education. Education was an important public subject, and it was the membrane
through which social penetration took place. Even the rich had to receive an education to
become accepted by society and films brought this message home. In Togo Mizrahi’s film
“Layla bint al-tTf” from 1941, the young peasant girl was not accepted in society because she
did not know how to dress and to behave. Only when she learnt French and dressed elegantly,
the hero fell in love with her.24 She had to be westernized, i.e. civilized in appearance, to be
lovable. Her husband wanted his future wife to adapt to an urban lifestyle, though he did not
allow her any emotional, let alone sexual, liberty out of fear for his male honor (karibna or
sharaf).
Among the generation of Egyptian students and young professionals that became active in
communist groups in the 1940s not only the impoverished aristocrats could identify with the
protagonist in one of the famous films of that period, “White Rose“:
“.. .the main figure, though of aristocratic origin, has to rely on what is the fortune
of the middle class: education. He is endowed with the moral armor of the middle
class against all the laxness and shamelessness of the bourgeoisie: Ibn al-dhawtt is
’overly Europeanized, lazy, effeminate, or otherwise corrupt*n2S
The middle class character is the enlightened modem young man, “ibn al-balad, and aristo­
crat in equal parts,”26 an imaginary figure that can be modem and educated while at the same
time neither corrupted by westernization nor stuck in traditionalism. This character role was
what communist cadres hoped for for themselves. Another film by Kamil Silim from 1939, al‘Azlma, which was dubbed “realistic,” as opposed to the category of the “salon-film” that “White
Rose” was put in, had the same message. A barber’s son, ibn al-balad, reached a university ed­
ucation and joined the ranks of the middle classes, finally even marrying in a love match, albeit
a girl from the same social milieu. The new educated middle class that the ibn al-balad wants
to join is set in the middle between two extremes: the irresponsibility and the absence of work
ethics and educational ambition in the aristocracy, and the vulgarity of the popular quarters’ in­
habitants, whose backwardness he leaves behind and whose virtues he preserves, thus becoming
fully rooted in Egyptian authenticity.
For what the middle class aspired to was nothing less than to resemble the upper class.
No Egyptian middle class girl would dance a belly dance. But they would try to learn the
modem ballroom dances: rumba and foxtrott. Because they could not afford a dancing school
or felt ashamed to go there, they would take lessons at home with sisters and cousins. In that
sense it was not only Jews who tried to be “white" (meaning European and civilized), it was
the middle class Egyptians as well, be they Copts or Muslims, unless they chose Islam as a
political ideology and not only as a religion. This caused a distance from the popular classes,
and explains the difficulties even the self-proclaimed ibn al-balad had in recruiting workers.
The popular classes were not a source of pride for Egyptian society. Folklore was repre­
sented as a picture of where the viewers (modem folk) had come from, not important in its own
right, remarks Armbrusten27 For the 1930s and 1940s, Shafiq observes that the representatives*17
Dawn (at-fajr al-jadtd), No. 12, 1st November 1943, p. 4, by Dr. 'A ll al-RaT about Arab Utenture beta e cu
yesterday and today. Yflsuf 2000, pp. 1038.
“ Shafik 1996,175.
“ Annbnister 1996,97.
“ Ibid., 105.
17Ibid., 107.

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191

of lower social classes appeared only as funny figures in films. The contempt for local cul­
ture, exemplified in the underprivileged classes, was accompanied in many films of that time
by a (apart from some moral reservations) positive representation of a western life style. Moral
reservations were the point where all the political forces could meet, and what became salient in
literature or theater featuring an Egyptian’s encounter with foreigners. Even though the lower
social classes were ill-represented in the Egyptian media, the values they allegedly believed in,
the values of the village society as a stronghold of a puritan, male society bound by a code of
honor, values and belief, were upheld: i.e. everything that supported partriarchic society, above
all the norms that concerned women and family.
Communists were in favor of socialist realism, and against the misrepresentation of the
popular classes in works of a it For them the working class was the new social force o f the late
1930s and the 1940s in Egypt The petit bourgeoisie - apart, of course, from the communist
comrades themselves - was scorned because it believed that its offspring would join the ranks
of the middle class, that education was a means to gain prestige and better jobs. They did not
engage in politics, and wished to rid themselves of their old roots that connected them with the
poor popular classes. But those classes were the embodiment of what was thoroughly Egyptian.
In their book about Egyptian culture, two communist intellectuals stated that for society to
progress, a cultural expression of characters was needed that could not be found in any other
country: in their customs and traditions absolutely Egyptian, in their conversations and dialect,
in their jokes and their seriousness, and above all in the social problems that were their driving
force: stolen water, a street imposed on them, an abrogated constitution: problems that were
typical for a particular period in Egypt. They had found such characters in the literature of ‘Abd
al-RahmSn Al-SharqSwTs ibn al-balad, which had made rural life come alive. al-Ard made
them feel the cotton blossoms, smell the soil and the dust, feel the joy of the weddings and the
fear for each buffalo that threatened to drown in the well while the peasants tried to save it in
despair. It gave them:
“... a revolutionary hero for all the periods of our history, representing him in his
truth and in his actual limits without exaggeration or falsification. He is always
present in all the stages of our life, with the avantgarde of the people’s forces.”2*
The two writers celebrated the communal aspect of village life, the common monumental
struggle, in their search for authentic culture. 'Abd al-Rahmän Al-Sharqäwl’s fallah was a real
Egyptian personality, his words were filled with the vigor of the generous Egyptian peasant,
his dialect was filled with a rich heritage of words, jokes, and proverbs, expressing the huge
heritage of struggles.
But even if the leading political and cultural figures of the 1920s and 1930s originally came
from the countryside, nobody wanted to make his way back there. The “noble fallah,” as the
“noble savage,” were prominent in imagination not in reality.29 Far from being romantic, the
Egyptian fallah actually led a miserable life. An Egyptian employee would not accept being
transferred to the countryside because of the bad living conditions. Living in the countryside
“ al-'Ä lim uodA nts 1989,131-140.
^F o r example, in Yahya H aqqfs “Qandll Ummu Hi&him” the physician finds his way back to the roots, and
reconciles learning and tradition. In reality neither did popular medicine find its way into Egyptian clinics nor did
physicians find their way to the people, i.e. into the countryside: in 1935 out o f 3,151 physicians in Egypt 1,958
practised in Cairo and Alexandria alone, which is about 60%, while the majority of the population was living in
the countryside. Naslm 1984. Springborg describes how Sayed Marei’s wife could only be convinced to move
from Heliopolis to the countryside • where her husband had to reside to strengthen his grip on the electorate and
his power base • when a new villa was built for her. Robert Springborg 1982.

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meant to live in the middle of dirt and ignorance, without dean drinking water, proper education
for the children, and the possibility of medical treatm ent The countryside was a synonym for
crime, deprivation, and superstition, a closed society marked by strong partisanship in political
and sometimes also religious regard. The gap between the middle classes and the fallah was as
wide as the gap between the middle classes and the urban popular classes.
By virtue of education, members of the middle classes had managed to escape the ignorance
and poverty of popular class environment in every sense, the narrow alley and the crowded
houses as well as the traditionally backward society. Communists were no exception to that
rule. With most of them coming from a lower middle class background, the impetus to engage
in the making of a new society, and to escape the ties of family and tradition, was very strong.
Still, recounting the experience under different circumstances and a different “Zeitgeist,** the
urge to stress their own link to “the people,” and to create a distance from the foreign and the
western elements, became even stronger.
The dichotomy between the educated classes and the masses continued after Egypt gained
indepence from the British, and replaced the dichotomy between the British master and his
Egyptian servant. It was a minority that led a majority. In Egyptian historiography the masses
are seen as homogeneous, acquiescent, and uneducated in political action. They were • and
remained so - in need of a savior, somebody who knew Egypt and the masses, thus depicting
them not as different constituencies but rather as a whole, with a collective memory. Zaghlul
had been such a figure. He became the mystic leader of the masses, who would follow the elite
because they could understand his language, and this included believing Zaghlul to be a good
Muslim.30
In turn, Zaghlul could persuade the elite to accept his brand of politics, secularist politics,
because it won them the masses. The conviction that the masses understood only one kind of
language - the language of Islam -, and would measure any person according to its rule remained
a dogma among the educated effendiyya, whose icon Zaghlul had been. This conviction can also
be traced in the discourse about the Egyptian communist movement.
Apart from al-Ard (1968) and Sirä1al-abtäl (1962), there are no noteworthy Egyptian films
conveying a socialist message. The paternalistic attitude towards the masses did not change.
Even renowned Egyptian realists like Saläh Abu Saif, who had once been an organized Com­
munist, watched peasants with mocking condescension. Fake socialist ideas did not exceed the
level of moral interpretations. Class struggle appeared to follow the pattern of good and evil.
And most of the time it was not the class enemy but poverty that struck hardest. The protagonist
was personally responsible for his social descent and was subject to fate. Solidarity was not a
means to escape it.31
Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd, a leading member of the Workers’ Vanguard and an important Egyptian
sociologist, argues that solidarity in the sense of class-conscious solidarity, was and remained
30See: Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid concerning Lutfi al-Sayyid about whom she says that Ûtefallahin would not under­
stand what he said because he used terms they did not know, and it was easy for his adversaries to convince the
fallahin that the democracy he was preaching in reality meant atheism. “For example in 1913 during the elections
for the Legislative Assembly Lutfi had run for office on a ‘democratic* platform. The opposition «dm knew that
the fallahin had no idea what democracy was, spread the rumours that democracy meant atheism, whereupon the
fallahin voted for his opponent who did not use any newfangled terms.“ Lutfi 1977,32.
, l Shafik 1996, 188. Even in the most realistic Egyptian films social conditions cannot be changed. Society
is almost as “powerful as fate.“ Shafik believes that ooly the infitOh with its new possibilities for upward social
mobility did away with the former determinism. The new positive heroes gain the iniative, and they defend their
rights even taking refuge to violence. But what they fight is not different from the ghosts of the past: materialism,
egotism and corruption, and what they are guarding is even less different: the family and the traditional social
values. See further Khayati 1990,118. Concerning literature see: Cohen-Mor 2001 and Flhndrich 1983.

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193

a concept confined to a very thin layer of industrial workers in Egypt In general, people had
always believed in the priority of connectedness in Egyptian society, in spite of social difference.
The belief in the Islamic nation reigned as a concept that had, apart from the religious, also
a philosophical and a cultural • cultural in the widest sense • connotation. Exploitation was
interpreted as injustice, a comportment going beyond what was decent. But the mere existence
of the rich merchant, the big landowner, or the factory owner was a matter o f fact, and was closer
to the division of labor that life demanded than to social injustice, even if it might carry deeply
rooted disadvantages that had to be assessed as a whole. Profit was halâl, if the process as
such left a big enough margin for others to live off. That idea included the notion o f difference
from other nations. There were “mote foreigners,” i.e. non-Muslim foreigners, and “lesser
foreigners,” i.e. Arab Muslims, but they all differed from Egyptians.32
Communists had rejected the discussion about authenticity, the relation between modernity
and tradition that the liberals and the Islamists had embarked on. They pursued dialectic ma­
terialism and the culture that emanated from the struggle against colonialism as a process that
affected the individual and the society. But in their accounts o f party history Communists tend
to do exactly what European historians are accused of, they create a dichotomy between Europe
and non-Europe, between developed and undeveloped, cultured and primitive. The popular
masses they talk about are the masses beyond the reach of workers’ organizations. They are
caught in a national history that does not allow a more heterogenous concept of what is modern
and what is social history. Colonialism’s “abominable traces,” al-'Âlim and Anis emphasized,
were still contaminating Egyptian cultural emotions (wajddnund al-thaqäfl) and educational in­
stitutions. All the aspects of life were dominated by an attempt to be liberated from imperialism
in all its forms.
“Our small trifling problems and the big important ones, like unemployment, love,
religiosity, immorality, freedom, marriage, baseness and goodness, disease and
health, all that is the fruit of a general social situation.”33
Ibn al-balad or bint al-balad was the Egyptian city dweller who refers to himself as son or
daughter of the country, as opposed to the foreigner, the khawaga, the white collar worker, the
minvazzaf, and the elite, the dhawOt. Today the term has come to acquire the added connotation
of one who continues along traditional cultural lines. In a sociological study carried out on ibn
al-balad, his salient characteristics were believed to be the following:
“He was gay, jovial of spirit, possessed a keen sense of humor that could make
him turn any situation, painful or pleasant, into a subject o f mirth-levity being the
saving grace of an otherwise dreary life. Humor is a safety valve that keeps people
going in the face of overwhelming odds, a means of exorcising calamity by holding
it up to mockery. The basic ingredient o f conversation was therefore the nukta, or
anecdote, the joke which summarizes the public reaction to any situation, tersely
and wittily.”34
The marginalized traditional figure of ibn al balad is an identity formed by virtue of oppo­
sition to the Europeanized bourgeoisie. Mustafa Tiba, a former adherent of the EMNL, then
the DMNL, and later a member of the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya) talks about appear­
ances and class differences on two occasions: when he mentions his first meeting with Curiel,
that conflict becomes obvious:
»SaVI 1990,114-115.
u al-'Aliin 1989,28.
MLutfi 1977,35.

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CHAPTER 10. CULTURE
“It was the first time that I got into an elevator, because the ‘sons of the lanes’ [i.e.
ibnâ’ al-hâra, another expression for ibn al-balad I.S.] of our times did not have
any contact with buildings having an elevator.”

jib a was a world apart not only from Curiel but also from the affluent Egyptian comrades.
He mentions Curiel’s dress style and outer appearance, the bent back, the glasses, lean, dressed
in his khaki shorts, a white shirt with short sleeves, and sandals at his feet And he goes on to
say:
“If my colleague ShauqT33*had not been sitting beside me and had been the same
height as Yünis,36 I would have been confused and would have thought YQnis
ShauqT or the other way round, because Shauql was in his dress and with his glasses
a copy of the original.”37
Later in the book he recalls how he went to his first meeting, being responsible for the
committee on the municipal level of the party (lajnat madütat al-Qähira in the DMNL). The
meeting was in 7amalik, which in the 1970s in the songs of Ahmad Fu’id Nigm and Shaikh
Im im still appeared as the quarter of the elite, rich people, where the popular classes got lo st
There were Egyptian activists, however, like Muhammad Sid Ahmad or InjT AflfitOn, who were
at home in Zamalik, and grew up in a “huge house that was located in Zamalik with a very
beautiful garden.”38 TIba describes his experience as follows:
“A feeling of alienation entered my self as soon as I had sat foot on Zamalik [which
is an island I.S.] looking for the street where the place we were going to meet
was located. The same feeling grew stronger while I was waiting for the members
[of the committee I.S.] to arrive one after the other, after a servant had received
me and apologized for the absence of the owner of the house who was the last to
appear. When ‘Shauqf - the responsible person for the organization - proposed
the agenda without including what I was used to as being the rules, the feeling of
alienation was substituted by rage. A session would have to start with what was
called ‘security’, which meant agreeing about what every member would say to
the police officer in case of arrest. And the second point was that who came too
late was called to account and punished. When I drew the responsible person’s
attention to that point, he offered a fake excuse, and put the two points on the
agenda that also included welcoming me, the discussion of the internal and external
political situation, the organization’s activities in Cairo; and I added the plan for the
demonstration. Before the session started, I felt that ShuhdT 'Atiyya al-ShfifiT, who
had welcomed me as the representative of the committee, was die one closest to me
of all the people present”39
This encounter has all the elements: TIba represents himself as to ibn al-balad, somebody
for whom the quarter of the rich is already an unusual place to go to, as are the amenities found
»The secret name for Kamil S haliln, who was the person responsible for Jlb a in the EMNL and then a student
in the Fine Arts College.
»C uriel’s secret name.
^ flb a 1990,35.
»A flltdn 1993,12. The house where she was actually bom in Shubra was also a large house surrounded by a
garden, which now has become a secondary school. Ibid. p. 10.
»TIba 1990.40.

10.6. EDUCATION, AUTHENTICITY, AND SOCIALIST REALISM

195

these. “Their” lifestyle does not suit the pasty. The man representing that life style is not a
foreigner but an Egyptian.
The relation between poor and rich, the definition of each person’s place in Egypt, is not
easily changed. In his memoirs, which won the Egyptian book award in 2000, R ifat Al-SaTd
remembers a conversation with the shauwlsh Ahmad DahshOrf, a subaltern officer in the rank of
sergeant, one of the prison guards while he was suffering in solitary confinement The following
dialogue took place:
“Uncle Ahmad, what do you think about the government?”
“The government has always been a bitch.”
“Any government?’
“Any government”
“What about Abdel Nasir?”
“A smart guy.”
“Do you love him?”
(With disapproval) “What do you mean, do I love him? Am I going to marry him?”
“And what’s your opinion about us?”
“Good kids, decent fellows.”
“Why do you beat us then?’
“That’s my job. It’s my daily bread. The government told me to beat you and I have
to beat you.”
“But the government is a bitch?”
“I’m working for the government”
“But frankly speaking. Uncle Ahmad, do we deserve to be beaten?’
(With strong devotion) “O f course.”
“Why, Uncle Alunad, don’t we defend the people?”
“Everybody says so. Words are for free. Son, you are effendis and pashas, like the
other beys, you only say that you are with the poor, but is there a rich man who is
with the poor?”*'
Al-SaTd describes bow depressed he was when be heard those words. Still there is an
important difference between his attitude and Tlba’s: he is for the people, but he is not trying
to be one of the people, while in Tiba’s argument stressing the difference in behavior, costume,
social standing, and living quarters is important to mark a difference and to forge a belonging to
the people, to be ibn al-hdm , or ibn al-balad. In a society so strictly divided along lines of class
as the Egyptian society, the “proper” place is very im portant The British occupation made all
Egyptians second class citizens. In the fight against the colonizer the different social forces had
to be allies. The pashas and the middle classes were at once competing and struggling with the
British. The lower classes, because they did not have any access to the commodities or to the
lifestyle associated with the West, had to be convinced of committing themselves to a common
struggle against the British on the basis of shared traditions and a sense of being Egyptian. The
40Al-SaTd 1999,233-234.

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CHAPTER 10. CULTURE

fallah would not light for other than concrete local interests. According to Afaf Lutfi, to be a
fallah meant to be:
. an individualist who distrusted others and suspected their motives, who was
eager for recognition and believed in his destiny.”41
The government, in the fa lla h ’s mind, was the “other,” whether it was a foreign or a local
government did not make a difference.42 The otherness of the government was reflected in an
opposition not only to the elite but to the white collar workers and the muwazzaßn as well. Was
it because they were westernized, m utafam ap Or was it because they were as remote from the
life of the indigenous population as were the foreigners?
The lifestyle of the Egyptian middle class had changed thoroughly in the 1930s and the
1940s, and considerably approached that of the upper class and that of the Europeans. Com­
munists in Egypt belonged, by virtue of ideology, to the most Europeanized fraction in society,
and were targeted with the accusation of loose ethics and westernization. The struggle against
colonialism had been accompanied by a campaign for authenticity. After the defeat in 1967 and
with the growing influence of oil money, a real process of rethinking took place. The Islamist
movement gained momentum, and modernity and westernization (as identified with it) received
a different evaluation. The unveiling of women had been followed by their conquest of the
beaches, short sleeves and short skirts, and then the veil dropped again. The publication of the
communist debate is significant in this context It started in the 1980s, at a time when the left
was on the retreat, and the Islamists had taken over in public.

41Lutfi 1977, S3. This is what she says about Zaghlul, whom she describes as being a fallah at heart.
4îIbid., 26.

Chapter 11
Middle Class Communism
To engage in the communist movement meant to give up social security and professional careers
for the sake of a political struggle whose outcome was uncertain. Communists were accused
of conspiracy and terrorism by the organs of public security, they were described as indecent
and immoral. For workers, their decision to participate in the communist movement came as
the logical result of their daily exploitation and their struggle for survival. They had gathered
experience from strikes, they knew the feeling of solidarity in the factory halls.
For the aristocratic comrades there was no social urge to join the movement. They were
pushed by a desire not to belong to the victimizers but to take the side of the wretched of the
earth who would be victorious in the end and deal the corrupt royal system its deadly blow. It
was more of a revolt against an antiquated social order, and a liberation that would bring “the
people" to power, with "the people” understood as a pure and innocent entity whose rule would
rejuvenate and empower the country.
The Egyptian middle classes, which dominate the discourse about the Egyptian communist
movement, had other interests. In their majority, those activists were not yet employees or free
professionals. Most started their political activities as students. Some did not continue it once
they had finished their studies. Others remained students for years to be able to pursue their
political career, or had to postpone their exams because of long term imprisonments. Some of
the Free Officers, including Abdel Nasir himself, came from the same background as commu­
nist activists. The sons and daughters of lower middle class families, but also impoverished
landowners like HilmI YasTn or Sa'd Rahmï,1 hoped to advance socially by pursuing a higher
education. They felt hampered by a social structure that allowed social advance only for those
who had, in addition to a higher education, the right social capital.
Many of the middle class communist activists claim a Wafdist family background, several
even a family background with a martyr in the 1919 revolution.2
'HilmI Yaaln was bom in 1919 in Bani Swaif. The family lost their fortune because Yasln’s father became
a drag addict AI-SaTd 1989, 270-275 (interview conducted in 1978). Sa'd Rahml, ibid., 305-509 (interview
conducted in 1983).
2YaaIn’s mother had even been arrested in 1931 because she took part in a demonstration. RahmTs family had a
Wafdist minister. Su'ld Zuhair’s family, for example, was originally from the Delta. But her father had already left
the village to receive higher education in Cairo. Her grandfather had been an Azhar student her father became an
English teacher for the secondary stage of education. Like R ifat AI-SaTd and Muhammad Al-Gindl, Su'ld Zuhair
has a story about her father and the British, about the resistance in her family against occupation, the support for the
Wafd and Sa'd ZaghlQI, which implied personal sacrifices. Her father was exiled to Sudan and lost his job because
he denied Dunlop his respect Because of the grandfather’s efforts, the man was only confined to his home village
where he engaged in gathering support for the Wafd before 1919 and helped the villagers resist the mayor and
the big landowners. Matkaz al-buhQth al'arabiyya 2000,124. S u'ld Zuhair’s elder sister, who became a teacher
first and then a radio announcer, was known in al-Minya as a “Jeanne D'Arc” for her oratory in demonstrations.

197

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In the conflict between different communist groups it becomes obvious that the real prob­
lem of Communists in Egypt was the recruitment of the broad mass of the population. The
middle classes’ offspring claimed to speak the language of the people, and to be better suited
for leadership than the founders of the communist movement, “the” Jews and “the” aristocracy.
Though the development of the communist groups throughout the 1950s showed that changes
in leadership did not generate changes in membership, even if we take the difficult political
situation brought about by the dictatorial regime of the Free Officers and its mass appeal into
regard.*3
Men and women belonging to the lower Egyptian middle class, who joined the communist
groups starting from the late 1930s, molded their lives according to western role models and
cultural influence. Women asserted their right to full citizenship. That meant not only the right
to work but also the right to become politically active, which was easier within the framework
of new revolutionary organizations than within the framework of the traditional parties or or­
ganizations. They were anti-traditional and oriented towards modernity, though at the same
time involved in a contest with European migrants in Egypt for jobs and positions, a contest
that reached the communist movement as a bid for power between the indigenous people and
the newcomers. In this contest the cards of tradition, culture, and proximity to the masses (be­
cause of origin and customs) were played and became part of the communist discourse, as has
become obvious in the previous chapters. The lack of learning had been an argument to keep
Egyptians out of jobs. Education was, therefore, the means for advance, and the ground from
which demands were raised. The issues emphasized in the discourse of the lower middle class
Communists are different from those in the discourse of the upper classes or the Jewish leader­
ship. Apart fom outside pressure, especially women had to face opposition from their families,
and feared for their reputation when they engaged in communist groups. In the discourse about
Communists it becomes very obvious that they are more conservative because they were easily
targeted and hurt by the slander directed against the Communists.
Women were at once heading for a change and pushed to assume responsibilities and change
their role while being restrained by the shackles of a conservative society and competing with
aristocratic women and Jewish women, who were more progressive in their outlook and in
their abilities. Even though the comrades might have been attracted by the “foreign” women,
they still expected “their” women to be decent and respectable. Most of the women had not
joined communist groups on their own but through the mediation of brothers, husbands, or other
relations. Thus there was continuous control. The burden of secret party work weighed heavily
upon them: secret meetings in private apartments with mixed male and female attendance.
The reference of the national movement, we might deduct, waa not Islamic history • why not to compare her to
'Aisha or KhadTja -, but more recent French history. This might have had two reasons: one of them being that
it might have seemed a degradation for the mothers of the faithful to be mentioned in the context of a national
liberation movement, and that there was a certain shyness to do so. The other and certainly stronger reason was
that Egypt had embarked on resuming a place in modern history and that Jeanne D’Arc urging the dauphin to light
the English was a far more attractive personality. Su'ftd herself was also occupied in the media world. T hunyl
Ibrihlm came from a family that was close to political and secret action. Her brothers were engaged with Wafd
activists, and the mother helped 'Islm al-DIn HifnJ N isif. They hid pamphlets as well as arms. Thurayl joined the
Communists when her husband, a doctor, did. Her teacher was Lsila sJ-Shil from a family of activists with her
two sisters Amlra and H at also involved in communist activities. Thurayl IbrtMtn, Markaz al-buhOth aTarabiyya
1999,19-26.
3According to 'Abdallah al-ZaghO the merger in 1957 brought about changes in the leadership, but not in the
ranks, i.e. it did not add any new members. A l-Satd 1989,469. ShahMa al-Nashlr (DMNL), personal interview
in Cairo 2nd December 1999. 'Abd al-SSlih Mabrtlk (DMNL) complained that even workers’ leaders had to step
down from party posts after the merger because people were promoted to leadership without any legitimation from
the basis, but for the sake of belonging to the leadership of one of the groups which united. Al-SaTd 1989,463.

199
the distribution of banned magazines or pamphlets at night, marriages with comrades that the
families did not approve of, frequent arrests and ensuing financial problems. The secret service
was harassing the wives of known Communists and pushing them toward divorce, sometimes
with the promise of a new partnership and a good job. Not only the secret service but also
the group dynamics and rules made life extremely difficult for militants. Small as they were,
those Stalinist groups had their members in the iron grip of cadre organizations. Democratic
centralism was not practised anywhere. Knowledge of competitive forces was withheld from
the rank and file.45
On the contrary, the communist foes were slandered in meetings, and became a formidable
force that threatened to overshadow the real enemy in the horror cabinet At least two of the
groups (the Egyptian Communist Party / al-rOya, and the Egyptian Communist Organization /
mishmish) had established a secret apparatus that controlled the members, evaluated them con*
stantly, monitored contacts with other groups, deviations from the political line, and personal
relationships. Members who were married or engaged to comrades in other groups were urged
to break up. Relations between Muslims and Jews were frowned upon because they were con*
sidered “inopportune” in the social and political Egyptian climate. Family relations and regards
could also constitute another difficulty. The fear of police agents made members suspect each
other, but brothers of one family would not allow one of their siblings to be suspected.3
The whole climate of those groups was poisonous and crushed more than one comrade.
He who retreated for private reasons (to raise a family or pursue a career) lost his high moral
standing, since a real revolutionary was ready to sacrifice petty personal ambitions for the sake
of the ideal.
“To the respected comrade Sa'd 'Abd al-Salfim, I inform you that I retreat for rea­
sons not related to the movement but personal ones that can never be healed. They
affected my nerves and destroyed me forever. My life has turned into a desert whose
air is burning me. There is no shadow for my head or water to still my thirst or a
way, an aim or hope. Therefore I decided to be emotional and I cannot make any
effort any more, but I will pay my membership dues all my life and bid farewell,
Wahid.”6
4T he DMNL, a i Sa'd Butrus rem arks, was following the line of a party that eompriaed intellectuals, the petit
bourgeoisie, workers and peasants. Its critics considered this to be a rightist deviation. But the basis had little

say in the line. They did not know the leaden of the groups and they did not know about other groups and their
politics.
5Not only the Egyptian Communist Organisation, but also the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya) had a
secret apparatus ijihOz rigOba) to keep group members under surveillance. Members of the Egyptian Communist
Organisation were continuously evaluated according to knowledge and effort and to security requirements. Files
existed about members, and they could be called in for questioning. The influence of that constant evaluation was
so strong that trust among members vanished. The effect of that policy continued even after the dissolution of the
group. Ahmad NaMI al-HililT, a well-known lawyer, describes himself in the 1950s as unable to talk to his partner
about politics because they did not know each others ratings. Ahmad Nabfl al-H ilill, in: AI-SaTd 1989,314-318.
The Egyptian Communist Party (al-räya) had a secret apparatus as well, with JamU G huna being at its head.
The party members’ private life was under party control. Even to many a member one had to ask for permission.
According to Ghuna, Fu’fld MurSt became afraid of the apparatus’ power because Ghuna wanted to extend his
authority to the central committee. The conflict with M uni developed because M uni was with Muhammad Nagib
and the Muslim Brothers in the showdown with Abdel Nasir in 1954. Ghuna voted against this option and was
accused of confessional objectives (he was a Copt) and sympathies for Abdel Nasir. As a consequence G huna was
accused of damaging the organization and betraying it to the police. From a letter published in: AI-SaTd 1989,
348*352.
‘From a letter found in the pockets of Salima Sa'd Muhammad, accused in the case against the DMNL in 1951,
see for details: Amin 1998,94. Salima Sa'd (aged 21) is described as a shoemaker, an activist in the workers’

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CHAPTER 11. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

As always in sectarian groups, the rules deterred some, others went to the other extreme and
turned Islamists, but many also stayed involved for most of their life, switching between groups
sometimes, spending many years in prison or in detention camps, but they remained faithful to
their revolutionary ideas, and stuck to the special ambiente of Egyptian Communists.
That ambiente was not only shaped by political ideas concerning a forthcoming revolution
in Egypt It was also shaped by a certain lifestyle. As pointed out above, among Communists
rules of behavior were different from traditional Egyptian society because the political struggle
and the ideas as such imposed changes. Secret work demanded of every member to do his
duty if not always to gain rights. Women had to go out alone, sometimes at night even to
distribute magazines or to pick up messages. Even the wives of conservative workers had to
become active once their husbands had disappeared in prison. Most of the women worked.
They understood themselves as a progressive force, though the middle classes’ were at pains to
distinguish themselves from the aristocracy and the foreigners on the one side and the popular
masses on the other side.

11.1 National A rt and Human Culture
Those difficulties were already revealed in the early leftist groups. Anwar Kimil was active
in the Art and Freedom Group (jamä'at al-fann wo al-hurriyya) founded in 1939. Its declared
aim was to defend art and liberty, and to acquaint young people in Egypt with social, literary,
and artistic movements in the world. The discourse about the group showed the contradictions
between the Egyptian middle classes and the aristocracy, as well as between Egyptians and
foreigners, and the uncertainty about what constituted Egyptian culture. The EMNL leader,
Henri Curiel, considered the group childish, or anarchist at best For the historian R ifat AlSaTd, they were Trotskyites. In their majority, they were young people ready for a clash with
society, revolting against ethics and politics and turning to arts to express this revolt They
celebrated “base art” (al-fann al-munhatf), as opposed to the fascist understanding of “healthy”
a rt The enchantment of “base” forms of art would continue for some time, as opposed to tra­
ditional cultural understanding which followed the Islamic tradition of differentiating between
high scriptural forms of culture and base, i.e. popular culture. A few years later, Louis Awag,
who had little sympathy for Communists, would assault poetic tradition with a plea for “base
poetry.” Surrealism was not a genuine Egyptian product. It had been bom in Europe, connected
to the defeat of human civilization in World War I, and the findings of psychoanalysis concern­
ing the reality behind reality. It was a rebellion against traditions and values. But it expressed a
certain “Zeitgeist” that appealed to intellectuals and artists in Egypt, though it could not appeal,
of course, to the mass of the Egyptian people, as it did not appeal to the masses in Europe.
Backwardness, stagnation, and arbitrariness in a more general sense were enemies found
in Egypt as they were all over the world. Contrary to what communist intellectuals defending
socialist realism would argue 20 year later (see previous chapter), Salama Musa in an introduc­
tion titled “One human culture or numerous national cultures?” to André Gide’s “Defense o f
Culture,” published by Art and Freedom in Arabic, defended the world’s cultural heritage.
Art, Salama Musa argued, was national, but culture as such was a human expression. New
media had helped to create a common taste in art, or at least shared principles. He blamed
nationalisms for their attempt to paint history, psychology, economy, and even religion with
milieu, who was not only responsible for the distribution of pamphlets and magazines among workers, but also
used “to give lectures in public places when be went to sit with his colleagues in the cafes. Those lectures looked
like ordinary conversations.”

I l.l. NATIONAL ART AND HUMAN CULTURE

201

a national color. The state, he complained, had occupied the place mankind had held before.
But mankind was above citizenship. Culture was what advanced man, and it was the common
heritage of all nations. The bode included lectures on culture, against Nazism, of course, and in
favor of the Spanish Republic. And because the forces who understood themselves as progrès*
sive in Egypt during that time, were arguing within that framework for a shared human culture
that embraced Orient and Occident, or as far as they could see, Egypt and France alike, they
perceived European fascism as more of a threat to that culture and to the values of mankind in
general than Zionism. Not the Palestinians in their struggle against the British occupation and
the Zionist settlers, but the Spanish republicans represented the political ideal, and the European
fascists the main enemy, because they embodied racism, militarism, hostility towards science
and cosmopolitan culture.
An American University of Cairo graduate in 1932, Kfimil was interested in writing and in
subversion. Social conflict in society set workers, fallahin, and small employees in opposition
to the big employees, the land and factory owners. The call for “base arts” which united Kfimil
with painters and poets, was an expression of the struggle against the traditions and conven­
tions, not only of bourgeois society but also of the limitation of letters and pictures, in fact o f
imagination itself, imposed on society by Islam. Art and Freedom’s first brochure had Picasso’s
Guernica on the back cover. It carried the signatures of six Egyptian intellectuals and artists: the
tireless Salama Musa, Kamfil al-Tilmisfinl, George Henein, Ramsls Yflnfin, Fu’id Kfimil, and
Anwar Kfimil. It was printed in Arabic and French. For Kfimil, not the content of the message
but who conveyed it, was important:
“The importance of that call was that all the undersigned were Egyptians.”7
With Albert Cosseri’s stories published in the group’s magazine, al-tatawwur, it was the
other way round. Anwar Kfimil introduces Cosseri as the author of the first “real” Egyptian
stories that “expressed popular ambiente and new directions” in Egypt, even though his stories
had to be translated from the French. Cosseri had been bom in 1913 to an Egyptian family,
whose branches extended in the Delta from Damietta to Alexandria, and lived in Egypt until
1945 when he left for Paris, but he never wrote a single word in Arabic. Kfimil, as well as the
Egyptian critic GhfiH Shukri half a century later, were ready to acknowledge Cosseri’s message
as Egyptian, but they considered him a French writer.8
Egyptian writers had gone to Paris or London since the 19th century, and they had con­
siderable influence on their compatriots because of their modernist ideas. Shukri himself had
spent many years abroad, as had his mentor Louis 'Awad, and before him Salama Musa, Riffi'
al-TahtfiwT, Al-'Aqqfid, Tauflq al-Haklm, and Taha Husain. Cosseri argued that he did not em­
igrate, Egypt was inside him. He had felt uprooted since he reached adolescence. To go to
another country was not im portant In Egypt he had not written a single word in Arabic. His
friends used to translate what he wrote. He had no other choice but to write in French. But he
chose to remain Egyptian. He never felt French. Any creation was first and foremost human
creation, addressed to mankind. The linguistic accumulation in the Egyptian language con­
tained the plurality of civilizations. Mahfouz wrote in classical Arabic, Cosseri in French. But
the context in both cases was Egyptian. The spiritual heritage of classical Arabic, the values
and the ideas, were not necessarily Egyptian, GhfilT Shukri contradicted him. The interaction
between Egyptian dialects and classical Arabic had helped to develop a national language that
7A1-Sa*id 1987,691-697.
»Ibid. 692.

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an Egyptian writer had to use. Cosseri was an authentic Egyptian and an authentic writer, but
not an Egyptian writer.9
In Egypt the message of modernity had to be delivered in Arabic, and it had to be deliv­
ered by people Egyptians were ready to acknowledge as fellow-Egyptians. The doubts in the
message had to be overcome by a personality that was beyond doubt, like Saad Zaghlul. Any
person suspected of difference, of otherness, was therefore not suited to deliver a message that
was supposed to attract the masses, because the masses would allegedly only confide in a person
they could identitfy with. Whom the masses identified with was decided by the self-appointed
speakers of the masses, who also defined the cultural context
Anwar Kim il, an Egyptian surrealist attempted to be connected to the masses more strongly
and formed a new club. Bread and Freedom (al-khubz wa al-hurriyya). Though Kim il main­
tains that no foreigner was involved, it is known from Marcel IsriH ’s description that he was
behind the club, which was also confirmed by other members. IsiiH ’s (constrained) low profile
is reflected in Kim il’s insistence upon independence from any foreign figures.
“Our movement had to be a popular Egyptian one, and a foreigner loyal to the cause
could offer his help and services from outside.” 10
Anwar Kim il is at pains to demonstrate that the Egyptian left started from a purely Egyptian
effort He does not discuss the ideas behind that effort Foreigners were competing with Kim il
for followers. Whenever he went to prison, foreigners would take over and make his recruits
join them. Obviously the masses did not share his objections against those foreigners. For the
historian of the communist movement R ifat AI-SaTd, KSmil’s efforts were without substance.
Those artists were living in a “melting pot with foreign ideas, foreign language, in the retreat
of art’s shell alone," unable to understand and interact with reality.11 Freedom was limited to
individual freedom. Art was not created in the service of the people or the revolution, but rather
for the sake of liberated imagination, the restoration of strong desire, and the destructive quality
of things. The Trotskyite tendency, combined with the aristocratic origin of George Henein, the
poet who was the leading figure in “Art and Freedom,” spoilt the group.12 Thus conflicts are
simply interpreted as caused by the contradiction between “aristocrats and poor,” “Egyptians
and foreigners,” or “intellectuals and workers.”11
FathT Al-RamlT and As'ad Halim, young journalists at that time, read the conflict in “Art and
Freedom” mainly as a contradiction between social underdogs and elites, though they blend in
all the other elements as well:
“We were very enthusiastic young people. We liked Marxist ideas, and we wanted
to attract many Egyptians, especially workers. So we brought them to the lectures
’Ghali Shoukri, Cet Egyptien à Paris, in: L'oeil de boeuf. Revue littéraire trimettrielle.
http://www.oeildeboeuf.com/n07.coMefy/O67 j07.html, 22.06.2001.
'°AI-SaTd 1987.693.
"A l-S ald 1988,102.
12The group Aft and Freedom was founded in 1939. In the statement “Long live decadent art,“ which was
published in December 1938, George Henein, Ramsls YQnln, Kamil al-TilmisInl, Pu Id Kimil, Anwar Kim il and
37 other artists related to the German fascists’ attack on line arts. After 1943 the group split up. RamsTs YQnln and
George Henein left for France, al-Tilmislnt went to Beirut. Al-Sald is critical of George Henein, that “Trotskyite”
o f aristocratic origin whose father was Sldiq Pasha, one of the richest men in Egypt and bis wife Pole al-Alayli,
the granddaughter of “the aristocracy’s poet Ahmad Shauqt Bey.” Herein, he claims, imposed his aristocracy on
the group, which implied imposing French, the language of the Egyptian aristocracy. And be imposed on them the
alienation from the people’s real world and its problems. A l-Sald 1988,102.
I]lbid., 107.

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203

of Ait and Freedom. The differences and contradictions began to show. They were
rich and aristocrats, foreigners and intellectuals, and we were poor. The leadership
of the group did not welcome our presence, but we thought it a question of dignity
and insisted upon coming. The aristocrats did not pay the electricity bill, and the
electric current was c u t... ”M
Were lectures about surrealism really what Egyptian workers could be interested in? Surre*
alism had shaken the cultural scene in Egypt, but it had not come to the masses. The remedy
seemed to be an independent Egyptian group which would not include those “foreign artists.”
Still, As'ad Halim emphasized the influence Marcel IsrSH had wielded among young Egyptian
leftists. Art and Freedom (al-fann wa al-hurriyya) was formed under his influence, as were
Culture and Leisure (al-thaqäfa wa al-farägh), a group directed towards intellectuals and con­
sisting mainly of foreigners, and Bread and Freedom (at khubz wa al-hurriyya). Marcel IsrfiH’s
fraction of the latter group was to develop into People’s Liberation. And though Halim is critical
of foreigners in general, he is very positive about Marcel IsrS’ 11. He was “the only source for
Marxism,” and they were “fascinated by him” because they were “fascinated” by Marxism.13
IsrSH was older, more cultured, and politically aware. He could educate his Egyptian com­
rades. Anwar KSmil, As'ad Halim, and FathI Al-Ramll all present themselves as from poor
families and in dire need of funding for their own political projects, though rejecting (occa­
sionally also being cut off from) the offers of foreigners and Egyptian aristocrats. Al-Ramll
was disinclined to work under Isrfi’fl’s control, who, though he underlined the necessity that
they should run their own business, tried to keep everything under control. Al-Ramll, therefore,
introduced a week of “free thought.”
“In that period I started a campaign against Jews and their presence and dominance
in the movement, and I made a ’hymn’ against them for which I was accused of
chauvinism. I remember some lines: ‘In our black days, khawagät and Jews col­
lected millions and we are wretches.’ ”,<
That Al-Ramll already mentioned Jews separately from the general khawagät in the begin­
ning 1940s, in a period when Jews were not singled out as the enemies of the Egyptian people,
may have been due to his early political experience with Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatäh) which
was still in its pro-Axis powers stage. Al-Ramll was not at the bottom of the social ladder,
though. Quite on the contrary, he was rather interested in displaying himself and upstaging
other figures. Dressed in a Mao suit, he had his own distinctive appearance, much like Curiel
in his famous shorts and sandals on the photograph that was published by AkhTr Stfa in 1946, a
magazine Al-Ramll worked for. He was close to Ihsfin 'Abd al-QudOs, a well-known Egyptian
jounalist and writer, who used Al-RamlTs biography and his love story with Su'fid Zuhair as
the basis for his story “FT baitinä rqjuT (There is a Man in our House) that was turned into a
film. Socialism was a magic word in the 1940s that could even fill a surùdiq, the traditional
stage for a party ralley, in a quarter like Sayyida Zainab, known for religious festivals but not
particularly for the political awareness of its inhabitants.17 This also explains why so many
young intellectuals joined the leftist trend.
MAs'ad Halim in an interview (dated 1969) with R ifat Al-Sald, in: Al-Sald 1987,721-724, here 723.

•»Ibid.,?«.
“ FathI Al-Ramll, interviewed by R ifat A l-Sald in 1973, in: A l-Satd 1987, 713-720, here 719. A l-Satd
obviously dislikes Al-Ramll. Rather he wishes to diminish his importance as a political figure which he finds
overstated by the British. His Socialist Front was anti-communist, but the British tried to damage the communist
movement by giving FathI Al-Ramll and the likes too much weight.
l7Tbough in the discourse about Communism the place occurs several times as an example from where a move-

204

CHAPTER 11. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

11.2 Students
Mustafa Haikal18, a nephew of Muhammad Husain Haikal, stayed unmoved by his uncle’s utum towards Islam. The problems that moved him were what could have been conceived as
“European matters”: fascism, war, problems of culture, and literature connected to them. Apart
from the problem of British colonialism and occupation, Egyptian intellectuals and any politi­
cally aware citizens were preoccupied with the problem of how to define freedom and progress.
This was a discussion that was not alien to Egyptian society. Haikal’s father was a member of
the Cöuncil of Leading Ulema (hai’at kibQr al-'ulämä'). He was an active cleric, who had sup­
ported Shaikh ‘AIT 'Abd al-RSziq in his argument concerning divine rules for worldly govern­
ment. Haikal had read Salama Musa, al-ManfalQtT, and ShibIT Shumfiyyil, which meant that he
had been introduced to evolution, socialism, and a concept of social justice and enlightenment
that tried to reconcile western and oriental thought. Thus he had his mind set on a progressive
track of ideas under purely Egyptian influence, while, of course, all those thinkers and intellec­
tuals had been influenced in their concept of enlightenment by direct and indirect contact with
Europe. In the beginning, the group was comprised of only eight members, among them an
Azhari, a painter, and a worker in a shipyard. They were at a loss as to how to start an organiza­
tion, and whom to turn to, and they were afraid of the police. The well-known Egyptian figures
were not of great help: they were either known to the police, or advised them to be content with
reading. Only Muhammad ‘Abdallah 'inän, from the first socialist party, ventured advice as to
how to organize in cells. Though that handful of students had no idea about Marxism or Marxist
organizations, they started to organize “popular elements” • like Curie! in the most traditional of
all environments - in Al-Azhar. But apart from that cell, they were mainly students and intellec­
tuals. Their program consisted of demands for national independence, economic independence,
and nationalization. Because they were intellectuals and students, they felt closer to Iskra than
to the EMNL, which is what workers often criticized. Middle-class Egyptians were not pro­
fessionals. They were active in an environment that made good speeches seem more important
than militant activity. For Haikal’s group, which consisted mainly of students, Iskra’s foreign
section was not a problem. Only a few refused the merger because of the foreigners. The con­
flict started when the DMNL came into being. Like other students, Haikal rejected Curiel and
favored ShuhdT 'Atiyya al-Shäffl, an Iskra intellectual.19
Muhammad AI-GindT, another Iskra member who agreed with Curiel’s line once the DMNL
had been formed, emphasizes Iskra’s impact on students. Even at the election for student bodies
(al-lijän al-tanfldhiyya li al-talaba) in the 1940s, Iskra gathered much support because it had
interesting figure heads running: LatTfa Al-ZayySt, GamSl GhSlT, ’Abd al-Min’am Al-GhazzSB,
Muhammad al-DTn ShalabT, Thurayfi Adham, Sa’d ZahrSn, and AI-GindT himself, but those
student leaders were also the hot spot of discontent in the DMNL afterwards. Members of
the EMNL and Iskra did not harmonize for social reasons, not for political reasons, AI-GindT
insists. The foreigners, the Egyptian lycée students and the Egyptianized lycée students (which
for him is synonymous with rich) and the majority of students in general, were a deterrent for
ment has to start. ThurayS Shikir mentioned it as a place for successful demonstrations, which could enlist popular
support, MahgOb 'Umar mentions it as a place that reflects the Egyptian soul. From a purely logistic point of view,
Sayyida Zainab is interesting because it is almost downtown.
"H aikal had first worked with Art and Freedom, then with the Muslim Brothers in 1941, of whom he convinced
some to join the Communists. Later he had founded his own group (The Citadel Group / tanptm al-qafa, named
after its radius of activity). First he and his friends had imagined they were the only Communists, but after meeting
Curiel and others they had discovered that there was communist activity in Egypt already. Curiel convinced them
of public work and an orientation towards workers. A l-Sald 1987,211-216. Interview 1972 in East Berlin.
»AI-SaTd 1987,211-216. Interview 1972 in East Berlin.

11.2. STUDENTS

205

EMNL members.
Even for Muhammad Sid Ahmad, the man who was least interested in contacts with the
Egyptian masses was Hillel Schwartz, the Iskra leader. But the Iskra cadres’ criticism was not
directed towards him. Schwartz, on the contrary, was involved in the splits that happened in
the DMNL. Once known to the DMNL members, they discovered him to be a normal person,
lacking Curiel’s appeal. But ShuhdT 'Atiyya and 'Abd al-Ma'bfld Al-GibailT took Schwartz’
place, and tried to cut the ground from under Curiel’s feet.20
To become a student at a university meant to struggle hard, to apply for scholarships to be
able to save on university fees. To be lower middle class meant to be from an impoverished
but literate family. The breadwinners of those families were the typical Egyptian effendiyya:
lawyers, scribes, teachers, government employees, clerks. None of the former communist stu­
dents come from a family of poor fallahin or from a working class background. The women
involved had been been educated in foreign schools as had their mothers before them, even if
they were not from the capital but from the countryside.21
1919 had meant a political revolution that affected primarily the upper and the middle
classes. Communists politicized the women’s movement, which had until then been dominated
by the personality of Huda Shaarawi, followed by STzS Nabrâwï. And even though in 19S3 a
fallaha in her traditional rural dress and with an amber necklace around her neck, Mahäsin, had
come to represent Egyptian women in an international conference in Copenhagen, in reality it
was still STzS Nabrâwï who chaired the delegation. She talked about the coming out of Egyp­
tian women after 1919. That revolution, she said, had been a revolution in the life of the middle
class. Women had taken off their veils, in 1927 they had been admitted to universities. In 1935,
women had really participated in demonstrations. Women had become engineers and lawyers,
though they still did not have the right to suffrage, or to become judges or state attorneys.22
Women had difficulties to become politically active. They sought the advice of brothers or
husbands, or at least important male figures in their life, before taking that step. Only a few of
them gained responsible positions, though it was certainly easier to engage and be promoted on
the left than in the traditional parties and organizations.
In a delta town like al-Minya the percentage of foreigners was higher than in the small
towns of Upper Egypt, due to the English consulate, French and English teachers - languages
were taught by native speakers -, employees from factories like the Anderson Riton cotton
ginnery. Though direct contact with foreigners seems scarce, it was noneless possible. YQsuf
Al-Gindf, the son of the famous emperor of Zifta, from an impoverished Wafdist landowner
family, remembers visiting an English family on a regular basis, and his brother courting the
family’s daughter. Al-GindT found it difficult to comprehend his brother’s behavior, not because
the girl was an English subject but because his brother did not propose to her. Yusuf Al-GindT
himself was during that particular stage of time more inclined to join the Muslim Brothers than
to the Communists. But European cultural influence on Egyptians was abundant, and it helped
not only to form their political ideas and outward appearance but also social relations. We have
to bear in mind, however, that especially girls were often exposed to the conservative variety of
European culture.
20Muhammad Al-Gindf, personal interview in Cairo 20th January 2000. Discussion with R ifat Al-SaTd, in:
Al-SaTd 1989,238-240.
*'Thurayl Sbikir, originally from Qena, describes even her mother as English educated, speaking good English
and French. American missionaries proselytized among Copts in Qena, and they had been successful with Thurayl’s mother who convened with them in English and was presented with books and table cloths for the Bible
verses she learnt. Other foreignen were scarce in Qena.
a Shatta 1953,27-31.

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CHAPTER 11. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

Thurayi ShSkir had been born when the Italian school in Qena had just been opened (1927).
The curriculum was ambitious and included four languages: Italian, French, English, and Ara­
bic. All the main subjects, like history and geography, were in Italian. And Italian politics did
not stop at the threshold of a school in Egypt. Every day the girls had to write “Mussolini, viva
il Duce, saluta!” The nuns, whom she remembers as “Catholic and fascist,” tried to win her
over and turn her into a novice. Their attempt was blocked by ThurayS’s mother, who, though
she herself had converted to Protestantism and fallen for the lure of American missionaries, was
not ready to see her daughter turned into a nun. Such was the direct assault of foreign powers
on Egyptian culture that pushed intellectuals like Haikal, according to Jankowski and Gershoni,
toward engaging in a discourse about Islamic history. But especially Catholic nuns were per­
ceived by later Communists as very backward forces. They pried into private family life, used
“black” pedagogy (a form of education that includes severe punishments and blackmailing to
break the child’s will), and had a distorted relation with the human body and sexuality. Com­
pared to catholic nuns, Egyptians involved in the communist movement felt rather enlightened
and modem. But in general those foreign schools are not remembered as particularly hateful
places. Even though nuns are sometimes presented as repressive, or foreign teachers as biased
towards western culture, there are also other voices who praise the tolerance of those teachers.23
And because not a majority but a minority of Egyptians received an education at all, and
even fewer a higher education, the feeling of being an elite among the uneducated masses •
especially among the women who had been educated even in foreign languages • was strong.
Religion as a practise was not widespread, and if so, more among women than among men
who might only have been inclined toward religion in their teenage years. This is obvious
from the interviews with lower middle class and workers’ activists. A religious dimension
is completely absent in the case of the upper classes. Religion was still present, though, in
habits, traditions, and social relations: the bible under the pillow, for example, marriage in
a church, certain quarters where people lived that were only inhabited by minorities (Copts),
or even a certain clannishness, a community in hardship, for example, when churches were
burnt. The social meaning of religion is more easily traced in the minority Copts than in the
majority Muslims, most of whom would declare that religion was meaningless for them; they
only respected it because it was the creed of the majority of the country, or because Islam
was transcending religious meanings and vested with positive cultural meanings, as opposed to
western culture.
Geneviève STdärüs remembers that she was active with Latifa Al-ZayySt and T niyit Adham
in a league for female students from universities and colleges (räbitatfataydt al-jämTa wa alma'Ohid), an Iskra front organization. She had not known that they were Marxists. Communists
were active everywhere at the university, also in clubs like “the English Language Gub.” She
had been hesitating to get involved with the EMNL because she was very religious, but EMNL
members assured her that there was no contradiction. ZakI M urid, one of the famous communist
activists in Egypt, emphasizes that the EMNL, on the contrary, had a positive attitude towards
religion and even religious members. It had no inclination to address the populace from that
aspect, while Iskra considered religion an important issue. From M urid’s point of view, Iskra
was a synonym for “foreign, emancipation and parties.” While the EMNL stood for “eastern
behavior, caution and respect towards women.”24
^Marfcaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1999,11-26. Geneviève SUM * had been a student of the American school.
Sbe remembers her teachers as foreigners, praising western culture.
24This statement becomes even mote pointed considering the fact that he - who had been an active member of
the DMNL and of the EMNL before - became a member of Towards a Bolshevik Party (nahsham / Nakwa hizb
bulshifi) one of the splits of the DMNL under the leadership of Hilie) Schwartz. ZakI M urid in an interview with

11.2. STUDENTS

207

Some Copts derived their political convictions from their religious convictions, as did Mus­
lims. But Copts could not take recourse to the cultural heritage Christian culture had left in
Egypt because of the cultural dimension involved in the struggle for national liberation. There­
fore AbO Saif YQsuf, a leading Coptic cadre of the Workers’ Vanguard, also emphasized that
Egyptianization did not only mean teaching (modem) Egyptian history from a workers’ and
peasants* perspective to workers and peasants, but also the acknowledgement that Islam as a
culture had an anti-imperialist content*23*As a consequence, the Workers’ Vanguard made use
of the Islamic holidays to distribute pamphlets among the people heading for the mosques,
congratulating them on the occasion of the festival and presenting their cause.26
The atmosphere of the last decades of monarchic Egypt was relatively open intellectually.
Though Communists from a lower middle class background had to struggle against the narrow­
mindedness of their families, who were mostly critical of political activities in general, the
overall atmosphere of the time, the widespread interest in politics, the prestige newspaper read­
ing had and the importance education had gained, made it easier for the most intelligent and
lively among the students to understand that education had a wider meaning than just to receive
schooling. Even at school children were encouraged to become active in geography, music, and
gymnastics clubs, Copts and Muslims alike. Education in a wider sense meant to be critical of
existing knowledge, and to gain access to different forms of knowledge.
Young Egyptian intellectuals, but also technicians and other professionals, the young Egyp­
tian effendiyya in a broad sense, from humble backgrounds, were hungry for culture. They
still went to the YMCA to listen to Salama Musa like the older generation had already done,
but the many new clubs and associations were more attractive. At the university, Louis ‘Awad
had founded the Grammophone Society in 1941, once he had returned from his scholarship in
Cambridge. Listening to classical European music was a must for comprehensive education.
Reading was focused on history, on social justice, and the theory of evolution. Because most
of the students were into natural sciences, they wanted to apply science also to their political
ideas; scientific socialism was a magic word that banished the metaphysics of religion to the
attic. The idea of social justice included not only an appreciation for human work but also the
rise of living standards in general by the use of technology. Socialism would exploit technical
energy the best possible way, and ensure material prosperity as well as cultural, spiritual, and
all other kinds of prosperity.
“The Muslim Brothers were imagining that somebody who talked liked that had to
be a materialist, lost to religious culture (thaqäfa dlniyya) and idealism (mithdliyya),
and therefore he deserved to be stoned and killed. Sometimes we clashed. But be­
cause of the friendship between me and some of them, they didn’t dare to attack
me physically. It was just discussions because we were colleagues, we were archi­
tectural engineers, all of us, and we didn’t clash physically. And I remember there
R ifat Al-Sald, in: Al-Sald 1989,240-247.
23R if at Al-Sald quotes the Iraqi historian Jiriq IsmlH as the source of the report. It is published in: Al-Sald
1989, 276- 279. Other elements are the emphasis on the progressive elements of Egyptian national history, the
demand for Arabic as a language in international conferences (as demanded at the WFTU conference in Paris in
1945) and support for the Wafd as the traditional leader of the Egyptian national movement.
ÄHilmJ Yasin, in: Al-Sald 1989,270-275. Yasin was a member of the Workers' Vanguard. He had been active
in the cultural association in Bullq and Mil ‘Uqba, and taught peasants and workers. For six yean he stayed
aaaociated without being a member. During those yean he did not hear the word communism once. He knew
Graupe Études as well as the 20th Century Publishing House (Ddr al-Qam al-'lshrtn that published the New
Dawn / al-fajr ai-jadld magazine). Al-pamTr was the workers' paper published by the W orken' Committee for
National Liberation (lajnat aj-'ummäl U al-taharrur al-qauml). Prime Minister Çidql closed both magazines in
1946.

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CHAPTER If. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM
were differences that developed into battles between the Muslim Brothers and the
Communists and the Wafdists. Sometimes we clashed.”27

Communists, in general, were against the use of physical violence in the confrontation with
their political adversaries, which some activists interpreted as a sign of weakness. To silence
the Muslim Brothers and other forces, and their unhesitating use of violence, some punching
would have been useful because experience showed that physical demonstration of force and
conviction could win followers.28 But most Communists were above such arguments. The
Muslim Brothers favored violent solutions, not only at home but also abroad. As one of my
interview partners put it, already in the mid-1940s they wanted to carry arms to free Palestine,
but Communists wanted to start with a cultural battle in Egypt.29
At the university there were basically three trends, the Muslims Brothers, the Wafdists, and
the Communists. Communists maintain that a majority of students was leaning towards the
Communists. The Wafdists were wavering between the Communists and the Muslim Brothers.
Deeper cultural changes were visible, as female communist student leaders could climb the
rostrum and win in elections for student bodies. The problem with communist activity was
that the understanding of communism mostly did not exceed an enchantment with the Soviet
Union and an ambiguous modernity. Most cadres did not have a clear communist program in
mind. Communists were not strong enough to call for demonstrations, but preferred to join
other student demonstrations and tried to raise their voice.
For many activists, the Rond Point (maktabat al-midOn), the library Henri Curiel had foun­
ded in downtown Cairo, was the first address to get in touch with communism. Jewish commu­
nist leaders were slandered later as “bookish,” but, in fact, communism was not introduced in
Egypt as a revolutionary practice but as an intellectual and ideological concept, as in most coun­
tries in the world, because communism and its ideological Marxist basis is a very complicated
texture of historical, economic, and philosophical thought English was mandatory because the
books on communism were not available in Arabic. For Egyptian students it was not easy to
read such literature. Struggling with dictionaries, they tried to cope with Lenin and Stalin, never
getting as far as Marx, and were relieved to find Stalin considerably easier. Only towards the
end of the 1940s more books appeared in Arabic.
Students looking for more than what education at a university offered were directed by
fellow students or by newspaper ads to institutions like the House of Research (Där al-Abhûth
in Munira) and New Culture (al-Thaqäfa al-Jadlda in Qasr al-Aini Street), where students could
meet, listen to lectures about subjects reaching from Egyptian history to women’s lib, and join
discussions with young intellectuals like 'Abd al-MaTjüd Al-GibailT, 'Abd al-Rahmfin N isir,
and ’Abd al-'Azïm Anis. They were the new Egyptian elite, “enlightened people,” who educated
other Egyptians.30
Often brothers and sisters became active together, as in the case of Sa(d Butrus Al-TawD,31
an electronic engineer who graduated from Cairo university in 1946. His brother Munir and his
27Interview with Fauzl HabbashI in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
a "There were at least ten or twelve Communists in that school, and there was the biggest group of Muslim
Brothers there (at the level of the students’ movement) and they were always using violence against us. There was
a non-violent tendency among the Communists in a very naive way. I remember that I rebelled against i t We went
on a strike once and then al-Fayflml came, who was the Brothers’ ringleader at school, and he pulled me and beat
me. And I beat him up and engaged in a fight with him, and the students joined us, and since then the Muslim
Brothers did not stand in our way anymore. I wrote a report for the Workers’ Vanguard arguing that the politics of
non-violent action should be reviewed.’’ Interview with Khfilid Hamza in Cairo 21st November 1999.
"Interview with Fauzl HabbashI in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
in te rv iew with Fauzl HabbashI in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
3lMarkaz al-buMth al-’arabiyya 1998,59-107.

11JL WOMEN

209

sister Su'Sd were active as well. Sa'd Butnis calls himself progressive, scientific, and liberated
concerning religion (mutaharrir düûyyan). Like Fauzl HabbashI, he was invited by a college
friend to the lectures in the House of Research (Där al-Abhûth al-'ilmiyya), an Iskra front in­
stitution.32 Both were recruited into Iskra. Iskra was attractive for students because it flattered
their intellect They were not attracted because it offered any contact with workers but because
it enhanced the feeling of growing into the new leading force in Egypt a real avantgarde. Dis­
cussions were said to have been held on a high level, among students and young university
professors or assistants. Thus descriptions by Iskra members confirm what critics had always
suspected: they were enjoying discussions on a theoretical level, and the masses were absent
from their discourse.33

113

Women

F2|ma ZakI was a typical Iskra cadre, though for her time a rare phenomenon: a female student
of natural sciences who had become politically active, and had chosen a communist group
to do so.34 GamSl Ghâlï, 'Abd al-Rahmin al-Nfisir, 'Abd al-Ma'biid Al-GibaiH, and Shuhdl
'Atiyya, all of whom she considers rich well-educated Egyptians, were the connection to the
petit bourgeois well-educated Egyptians. Contrary to comrades who had enjoyed less limelight
and self-confidence, ZakI shrugs off the importance of parties and journeys. They occurred
seldom and were useful. They were connected to international events. She remembers a party
to commemorate the October revolution on 7th November 1946. The party took place in the
house of Armand Plissé, a foreign comrade who lived in a very luxurious home in Garden City.
MI don’t deny my astonishment when I entered the place, but the important thing
was that those parties were very few, and on certain occasions only.”33
For FStma ZakI it was more important to emphasize that “those elements,” foreigners, in­
tellectuals and rich people alike, proved that they were ready for struggle and able to fight.
They were interested in educating cadres. Fätma herself spent a whole year reading Marxist
books, summarizing them, and discussing their content with a group of people. For her, that
kind of education was very useful, and she could test herself at the university. It was difficult at
first to introduce the new terms: imperialism, proletariat, bourgeoisie, but then they became the
common “new speak.” FStma ZakI and Latïfa Al-Zayyät, prominent figures among Egyptian
students, were both Iskra members. They overcame the obstacle of tradition in the fight for
leadership. But in general it was difficult to win women for communism.
“ This explanation is based on Shuhdl ‘Ajiyya’s statement in the “Qa^iyya al-shuyü'iyya al-kubra” 1946 file, pp.
600 • 609. Courtesy of R ifat Al-Satd. In 1946 Shuhdl 'Atiyya was 33 years old. He came from Alexandria and
lived in Qasral-Aini Street just around the comer of Garden City. He earned a living as a teacher in the Faculty of
Commerce. The House of Research (DOral-Abhatk) was a kind of cultural and scientific association. To become a
member, a person had to be very cultured and educated, to attend on a regular basis for one or two months, to pay
fees, to summarize books on his own initiative and to present them. A member also had the right to publish in the
news bulletin published by Dar al-AbhOik. Allegedly the editors of that bulletin changed constantly to avoid legal
daim s.
“ Personal interview with Fauzf HabbashI in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999. “Most of them ... 1
remember 'Abd al-Ma’bOd Al-GibaiD among them and ‘Abd al-Rahmin N ifir, Mustafa al-'AyOU, RamsTs 'Awad.
They were an Egyptian elite. All of them were assistants, teachers, professors on the teaching staff o f the university,
and all of them were young Egyptians who had arrived at this level at the university. Those were the leaders of the
DOr al-Abkâtk group which was headed by Schwartz."
*A1-Said 1989,310-313.
"ib id ., 310.

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CHAPTER 11. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM
“Women were difficult to recniit for the party. Even today, though al-tajammif is
a legal party, women don’t join. The propaganda against Communists was terrible,
and women were afraid.”36

F&tma ZakI remains not only positive concerning Iskra, but also concerning her experience
in the Egyptian Communist Organization (mishmish). She had been in the central committee,
together with Odette Hazan, Sidney Salomon, and Michel KSmil, who was later replaced by
Muhammad Sid Ahmad.37 For F&pna ZakI, Odette Hazan was convincing because she had
a strong personality, was devoted to work, led a spartanic life, and was a real example. She
was great in tactics and manoeuvres, though she killed any independent spirit and initiative,
playing off comrades against each other. She was repressive and violent, but ZakI confirms
that the whole group adopted that kind of behavior. Contrary to Sid Ahmad, FStma ZakI felt
neither victimized by foreign Communists nor alienated from the Egyptian masses because of
their approach to communism. She worked among workers in Alexandria. In her narrative she
shared the harbor workers’ struggles and strikes. ZakI does not complain about the contact with
workers or about difficulties. Nor does she mention the problems of Jewish girls recruiting
workers, or difficulties with languages. Though Sa'd Butrus, with whom she worked in Alexan­
dria (apart from Eric Rouleau), complains about the difficulties in recruiting workers because
“of the non-existing natural contact between the (mishmish) members, in their quality as stu­
dents and intellectuals, and the workers.”3* Fitm a ZakI only resents that they could not recruit
any more young people or intellectuals, because only workers were supposed to join.
Fitm a ZakI is different from other women who raise their voice in the written history
of the communist movement because she is not only emotionally but also intellectually in­
volved. Many of the other women convey the impression that they were sympathetic towars
communism, but not really aware of what it actually meant, and they did not play a public
part. Geneviève STdirOs, W idid MitrT, Thurayi Ibrâhîm, Thurayi Shfikir, and others describe
themselves as women who, though they were active, were not involved in decision-making or
shaping the character of the movement. They were led and misled.
Geneviève SldfirQs, a Copt, came into contact with InjT AflitQn in the Students’ League.
AflitQn took her home to the family house in Champolion Street in downtown Cairo. Sïdâriis
found difficulties in the intellectual approach to communism, she describes herself as famous for
her good heart and her naivetée. She was worried about her religious concerns, and because she
felt intellectually overtaxed. She sought Salama Musa’s advice on understanding the lectures
in the House of Research (Dar al-AbhOth), who sent her to the YMCA to gain some analytical
knowledge.39
Geneviève remained involved with Iskra and attended trainings. But for her social milieu
that involvement was not easy to take. Once she had started to play a prominent role at the
“ Thurayi Ibrihlm, in: Maikaz al-bubûlh al-'arabiyya 1998,19-26.
37According to Fitm a ZakI the Egyptian Communist Organisation developed from an opposition to the line of
the national democratic forces announced by Curiel in the DMNL. They demanded the possibility to criticize the
leadership. The Voice of the Opposition (Saus al-mu'ärada) was a publication. FIpna ZakI was oo the editors’ com­
mittee together with Odette Hazan, Sidney Salomon. MahmOd al-MislakiwI, Sa'd Butrus AJ-Tswfl, Muhammad
Sid Ahmad, Rida Iskandar. They joined Towards a Bolshevist Organization (Nahwa munauama bulshifiyya) and
by the end of 1948 the central committee was elected.
MSa‘d Butrus Al-Jawfl, in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'armbiyya 1998,39-107.
“ For Copts in the movement a religious background was often a motivation to get involved in die Communist
movement. FransTs Klrilus emphasizes the role of Christian education for his sympathies with the poor and the role
of other Copts. Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1999,89. For Geneviève SldirOs Salama Musa had an important
role, for FauzIHabbaahl his uncle Louis'Awad was important, for Widid M itri'A dd BarsOm, another CopL Ibid.,
193.

11.4. STUDENTS, WORKERS AND ARISTOCRATS

211

university, liabilities grew. Her arrest at a private apartment in 1947, together with other men
and women, was described in a newspaper article as having occurred late at night Her female
colleagues at the university turned their anger against her rather than against the newspaper
or the double standards of Egyptian society. They started to cut her, fearing for their own
reputation. To save her reputation, SïdSrQs insisted on a reply in the newspapers, quoting the
police report that the arrest had taken place in the afternoon. SldfirOs had also been a member
in the Egyptian Communist Organization (mishmish).
“They asked me to recruit workers. They told me: ‘Stand in front of the factory!’ I told
them: ‘A girl that stays at the factory’s door? They have to say that she’s a girl flirting with men.
And even if I were successful and recruited one of die workers, how could I know whether he’s
the best? What would prevent him from dealing with me as a girl only?* During that time I was
tepsonsible for a very important worker in the railway workshop. Then they made a foreign girl
responsible. But because he lived in a popular area his wife fiercely opposed that and asked that
be be returned to my responsiblity.”40

11.4 Students, Workers and Aristocrats
Recruiting workers thus turned out to be a difficult task even for “real” Egyptians, men and
women, not only for “foreigners,” though “their” difficulties dominate the discourse. Ahmad
Nabil al HiliH speaks about the ridiculous effort of foreign girls and aristocratic youngsters to
recruit workers at factory doors. Fakhrî Labib recalls a meeting in the house of Farid Haddäd
with what seemed to him the foreign section of the Revolutionary Bloc, one of the DMNL splits.
“They were Armenians, Greeks, Spanish, French, full of enthusiasm without any
common language with the Egyptian people. I told them frankly: I am an Egyptian
intellectual, and in spite of that you don’t find a common language with me. What
about the masses of the people.”41
Most of those foreigners did not know Arabic, according to Labib. And he himself refused
to speak any other language. One of them translated for the others. After a long discussion, in
which they demanded to play a role among the masses, especially among the workers, he told
them that since they did not know Arabic they could not speak to workers. Their role would be
to give financial assistance, to hide people on the run and to take care of the technical apparatus.
But since the idea of a 100% workers’ party dominated the discussion, they became angry and
left, ready to join the Egyptian Communist Organization (mishmish).*2 Fauzl Girgis and many
^Geneviève SMlrOa, in: Marlcaz al-bubOth al-'arabiyya 2000,16.
4lFalchif Labib. in: A l-Sald 1989,322.
^L aU b, in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1999, 64. Fakhrf Labib, a former Islam member and a university
student, had joined the Revolutionary Bloc with Anwar *Abd al-Malik and Shuhdt ‘Atiyya. A part of the Revolu­
tionary Bloc formed the Vanguard of Egyptian Communists (Ulfat al-shuyifTyTn al-misrtyot). Labib, a geologist,
himself had an oral history project about the relation between Communists and Abdel-Nasir. The Revolutionary
Bloc had split into Towards a Bolshevist Organization (Nahwa munazzama bulshifiyya led by Fauzl Girgis), and the
Voice of the Opposition (Saut al-mu'dnada), some had joined the Workers’ Vanguard (Farid Haddäd, FathI Khalil,
Farid and Labib Ramzl) and others the Egyptian Communist Party (at-rùya) (Sa'd Zahrftn arid Da’Qd ‘Aziz). The
aim of the Communist Vanguard (talfat al shuyiftyfn) was to recruit an elite of educated Egyptians, workers and
peasants. Foreigners were not allowed to join. The recruitment of relatives was not allowed. The Egyptian Com­
munist Organization and the DMNL were rejected because of their political line and the role of foreigners. The
influence of the Communist Vanguard on workers though was almost zero. The most interesting member of the
group was 'Umar al-MakklwI, a pious student o f medicine. He had volunteered for the war in Palestine with a

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others agreed with him.*43
But Fakhrt Lablb also found himself unable to recruit workers. After college he would
put on old clothes, sit in a café, and talk to workers in Shubra and Imbaba, pretending to be
unemployed and one of them. The performance was ruined when he met Mahmud al-'AskarTs
(the Workers* Vanguard’s) men, who reacted hostile towards him once they heard that he had
been a DMNL member.
“They regarded us as something polluted that had to be exterminated. In their
opinion, the DMNL was similiar to Klot Bey4445. When the government closed it
down, secret prostitution had spread throughout Cairo and polluted all of the city.
That was their attitude and their opinion of others.“43
Thus problems existed on several levels, on a social level first, on an intellectual level sec­
ond, and on the level of political culture third, because communist groups fought each other
probably with more bitterness than they fought their political enemies.
But problems were not limited to factory doors. The lower middle class Communists were
faced with problems at the bottom and at the top of society. Thurayä Shäkir’s assessment of
Iskra is completely different from Fâtma ZakTs. She was introduced to politics by her husband,
FauzT HabbashT. InjT Aflätün had been the first representative she met. Thus Thurayä was one
of the girls Aflätün felt bad about because she had a wardrobe full of dresses at home, which
those girls could not afford. For Shäkir the social difference as such became a major problem.
She had to summarize books Aflätün gave to her, and to discuss them with her. Aflätün would
explain the parts Thurayä did not understand.
“... and then she took me to clubs. There was a club at the pyramids. Most of them
were Jews, speaking French all the time and very westernized (mutafarangln / also
liberated), wearing shorts and wearing I don’t know what and those things were a
shock for me. Not a shock, but a big change. I couldn’t harmonize with them. I
left. She took me to this thing basically to make me join that group, but I couldn’t
There was no conformity. I felt that 1 was a stranger.”46
Shäkir could not get accustomed to the different environment. She felt that the people she
met had more in common with each other than with her. There was a typical in-group behavior
“... they were doing sports and going out and this boy becomes friends with that
girl, and this girl becomes friends with that boy, and such things. I’m very far from
this atmosphere. I didn’t try this atmosphere at all. And we come from Upper
Egypt, very closed off, and I couldn’t.”47
group of friends. In Palestine he discovered to which extent the Palestinians were betrayed by Arab governments
and colonialism. Makkkw! thought about going to Vietnam with his friends, but then he decided to return to Egypt
and they joined the Communist Vanguard. Apart from being very active, Makklwf had the advantage of being
rather affluent. FakhiT Labib, personal interview in Cairo 14th December 1999.
43Ahmad Nablt al-Hil&li, in: AI-SaTd 1989,315; Fakhrf Lablb, personal interview in Cairo 14th December 1999
and Marfcaz al-buhQth al-‘arabiyya 1999, S3-86; Al-Sald 1989,322-325.
44A classical red light district in Cairo.
45Personal interview with Thurayt Shakir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999; Marfcaz al-buhOth
al'arabiyya 1999,65.
^Personal interview with ThurayS ShAkir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
47Personal interview with Thurayl Shikir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.

11.4. STUDENTS. WORKERS AND ARISTOCRATS

213

InjT Aflätün pleaded with her to continue in the same cell, but Shäkir refused. For her die
social gap was too big. Even though she herself had been educated at a foreign school, she was
not on the same cultural and intellectual level as the people she was supposed to do politics
with.
“I told her “They talk to me as if they are condescending to talk to me.* I felt like
that. I was not content. Everybody was talking in French, all of them, there was
nobody not speaking French. And she herself was speaking French with them. And
I was forced to speak as well, but I don’t speak French well. I didn’t know how to
get along with them. Maybe somebody doesn’t know French and I talk to him, you
understand, because he is not going to know wrong from right I couldn’t get along
with them. In this society she was bringing me to I felt that their traditions and their
customs were strange to me, different and then she was asking me ... well that’s
not im portant... I started to get organized in a group.”41
The distance between InjT Aflätün and “her people,” the so-called "aristocratic” members
of the communist movement was never really overcome. Even in prison the difference was
still felt and the suspicion that "those” might not be really up to the task they had set for
themselves and the struggle they had entered upon. Thus Thurayâ Ibrâhîm remarks concerning
InjT AflâtQn’s participation in a hunger strike, " ... and though the late InjT Aflätün was Pasha’s
daughter, her stamina caused admiration and pride among all of us.”49
Shikir became active among Communists because of her future husband’s influence on her.
She was a capable organizer, but only on a secondary level, connected to the framework of the
party. She became active at work (in a pharmaceutical company), defending workers’ rights,
and she was a good orator, but within the framework of different communist groups she never
became a public figure. The leaders decided about everything, they even interfered in love
affairs and ordered comrades to stop a relationship and to get engaged with somebody else
more acceptable for society. They decided who was going to be a leader and they wanted to
make InjT Aflätün one.
" ... Because once she was going be a leader, a zaTma. Because they told her that
she would be a leader, but how? You don’t know more than two or three words
in Arabic. Before she didn’t know Arabic well. We taught her Arabic in prison,
when she entered prison with us. She was good material, really good material. Her
social position was like that. She was an aristocratic woman by birth, and lived
an aristocratie life, and so on. She didn’t leam Arabic. Because Arabic was the
language they used for talking to the servants only. And then they did her wrong,
when they told her ’No, you are going to be a leader’. Okay, what leader? What
do you think are a leader’s qualities? What is this leader supposed to be? Not only
because he is married to somebody, or I don’t know what. He has to know how to
give a speech ... to know how to talk ... to know the language of the country. ...
How are you going to be the leader of the communist movement in a country like
Egypt, and you don’t know how to speak its language?”50
Thus criticism directed against the “aristocracy” in the movement is focused again on the
ability to speak the language, and to convey the message in the right way. But for Shäkir, it was
^Personal interview with Tburayä Shäkir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
4*Thuray8 Ibrihlm, in: Maikaz al-buhûth al-'anbiyya 1999,19-26, here 19.
“ Personal interview with Thurayl Shikir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.

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CHAPTER 11. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

not only AflitQn’s poor Arabic • which in Aflfitün’s own narrative had stopped to be a problem
already in the late 1940s and not only ten years later*, but her environment
Muhammad Sid Ahmad had been right when he spoke about the the harm parties or even
meetings, where men and women gathered, had done to the Communists’ reputation because it
was against Egyptian tradition.
‘‘Yes, of course, compared to our time in the 1940s, and so on the situation was
really different from now, and now mingling (of the sexes) has increased, but then
there wasn’t any. For example, in the faculty of engineering there were no women,
no one entered i t The first one to enter the faculty of engineering was Amina alH ifnf in 1949. It was not forbidden___And with regard to the ordinary man in the
street with his naive understanding, it meant that a mixed society was an immoral
society.”51
Higher education for women was still in its beginnings, though at the faculty of law and the
faculty of literature many women had enrolled already. Shfikir was not only critical about Iskra
but also about the Egyptian Communist Organization (mishmish). As in all the other cases,
her narrative about her experience in the communist movement concentrates on the late 1940s
and beginning 1950s first, and on her experience in prison second. The Egyptian Communist
Organization forced women to behave in a way that alienated their families. One of the women52
had to many a man in order to stay with him in a apartment legally, and to be protected from
the vice squad.
“She married him on paper, a sham marriage, without her family knowing it, and
without their consent and without them knowing anything at all. Because in case
she’s found out in one place with the man she can say ‘That’s my husband,’ to avoid
problems with the vice squad. I was a member of mimshinmim. And when I had
differences with Fauzl (he was a member of al-'ummäliyya al-thauriyya first, and
then in 1950 of al-nigm al-ahmar), Odette used to tell me to divorce him because
he’s a police agent and a traitor.”
Fauzl was a detainee during that time, and Thurayfi Shfikir used to come to visit and try to
convince him. Odette Hazan went as far as suggesting another marriage to her.
“And I told her ‘That’s something. You are imagining things. That’s not going
to happen, and then it’s unbearable that we are tiring a fighter who’s struggling in
prison, and who’s tortured in prison, and we sit and say ’That’s right and that’s
wrong, and we leave him and marry’ that’s rubbish.’ But it happened really. One
woman left her husband and married another one. Another woman did I don’t
know what. That’s what was held against the Communists, and what damaged their
reputation.”53
Thurayfi Shfikir ended up excluded from the group without an official explanation. She was
simply ostracized, and it took her some time until she joined the same group Fauzl was active in.
Shfikir emphasized that the mingling of sexes that had happened at the communist parties was
not common among ordinary people. People would say that those were habits adopted from the
West. They would talk about illegitimate relationships among Communists, even if there were
only one or two cases. It would have been better if Communists had stayed with tradition.
1'Personal interview with Thurayi Shikir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
,2Name known to the author.
53Personal interview with Thurayi Shikir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.

11.5. THE REAL PEOPLE AND THE SCUM

215

“Who brought all those ideas? People from the West brought those ideas. And in
the West they had those traditions that they wanted to push through here. It was
wrong that they practised it at once without lim it That’s how I see i t and that’s
what made people talk about the Communists, they say immorality, and marriage,
and I don’t know what [marriage in this case means sexual relationship out of the
wedlock I.S.].”54
Her husband, Fauzl HabbashI, rejected that impression of immoral behavior in Iskra circles.
He participated in those parties.
“I’m a man. I didn’t observe the immoral behavior (inhilal) that Thurayi observed
at all. I believe that a woman in Egypt can be a leader... easily? to a degree that in
the 1940s one of the leaders in the communist movement was Latïfa Al-2Layyit. She
gave speeches in universitiy in front of thousands of students, and all of us would
applaud h er... and we felt her real leadership... And she’s a woman... accordingly
it’s not certain that the common presence of women and men leads to immorality,
or is accompanied by it.”*3
Fauzl HabbashI was uneasy with Thurayi Shikir’s sudden outburst, which seemed to con­
firm what critics had always said. He also objected against Muhammad Sid Ahmad’s negative
judgement:
“He was not from the Workers’ Vanguard, for example, where our traditions were
stronger than theirs. He was a member of the Egyptian Communist Organization.
They were very narrow-minded. And they were completely bourgeois, without
any ties to a popular milieu. There’s a big difference between the members of that
organization. They dressed in overalls to recruit workers, the bourgeois guy dressed
in an overall, the aristocrat, and sat at the factory’s door to recruit workers. Very
primitive style, not a natural style at all.”16
Actually Fauzl HabbashI and Muhammad Sid Ahmad had both been affiliated with Iskra.
But in this discussion Sid Ahmad was put in a different camp and portrayed as being unable to
recruit workers not because he was a foreigner but because he was an aristocrat or a bourgeois.

11.5 The Real People and the Scum
The communist movement as a whole existed in bourgeois circles, not in the popular milieu.
Communism was strong among students, and to a certain degree among professionals, among
engineers and doctors. The Muslim Brothers had not found their way into the syndicates yet.
But in the popular quarters they were active and successful. FathI Al-RamlTs performance in
Sayyida Zainab, however, shows that Communists could have some appeal even in popular
quarters. ThurayS Shakir felt that the demonstration that preceded her first arrest should have
taken place in Sayyida Zainab, not in downtown Cairo. She believed Curiel responsible for the
place of the demonstration, though experience shows that downtown areas are usually chosen
“ Personal interview with Thurayi Shlkir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
“ Personal interview with Fauzl HabbashI in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
“ Personal interview with Fauzl HabbashI in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.

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CHAPTER 11. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

for a demonstration because it is staged to challenge the power centers, therefore it has to be
staged in the urban districts where that power is located.
Relations with the “ordinary” people were put on trial when the women were sent to alQanStir prison. They were only 26, compared to more than a 1,000 men, who were in their
majority transferred to the oasis of Kharja to a camp they shared only with other political pris­
oners from the Muslim Brothers, but not with criminals. Occasionally women had already come
in conflict with the justice system. ThurayS Shfikir remembered three incidents, short arrests at
police stations in Cairo, and once in Upper Egypt Her first arrest had gained her an insight into
the world of prostitution decent Egyptian women knew nothing about First men and women
had been put in an arrest cell together. Then ThurayS Shakir was brought to the Gamaliya po­
lice station. Prostitutes had to call on the station and to spend the night there. There might have
been around 100 or ISO of those prostitutes. When the political prisoners arrived, they made the
prostitutes leave the cell, and confined them in a narrow yard. Their room was “dreadful, filthy,
rotten." There were also men on parole who had to report to the police station, and spend the
night there. The guards would be bribed by those men to let them have a look at the women.
“Yes, the women, those sluts, and they make movements and thingamajig, and he
gives her money and tells her ‘Do that!’ It was the first time that a word like that
came to our minds. And you see a dreadful scenery. All of them undressed, almost
naked, each of them putting her underskirt only on the flesh, even without panties or
something, and sitting like that and som ething... a scenery ... dreadful. Unusually
dreadful. We were stuck all night long with that scene, and then we looked, and
found in the morning- of course we didn’t sleep- we looked, and we found that all
the prison was empty.”
The second impression concerning prison inmates was not better either. The female political
prisoners stuck together. They even integrated Marcelle Nino, the woman who had allegedly
masterminded “Operation Susannah” in 1954. Relations with ordinary prisoners were more
difficult. Women who were imprisoned for criminal offences were used to put down a prison
revolt by the female political prisoners. According to ThurayS ShSkir each of those could “cut
ten of us into pieces.” Solidarity was impossible.
“No, those prisoners are people. I mean there were some who were good people.
But they were the scum. You gather the scum of society. Those were not political
people you could deal with, those were the scum. A woman used to committing
crimes, I mean, having entered prison 15 times, prison is not important for her.
And they have a m entality... She stretches her arm and tells you ‘Who ever wants
to come and talk to me comes and takes a beating!’ First we quarreled and then
... We were still new, newcomers. And from the beginning we were taking sides
against the prison inmates. Then we started to be acquainted with them. And there
were people among them who were human, but, of course, in limits.”
The contact with the populace was not only difficult when it came to the “scum.” “Natural
contact” between students or intellectuals and workers did not exist37 Some examples from
R ifat Al-SaTd’s novel “Living on the high floors” (al-sakanftal-adwär al- ’allya) may illustrate
what it meant to get in touch with al-sha'blytn. He wrote it in 1978, and told me in an interview
that none of his historical oeuvres had gained him as much recognition as this novel which was
published in Beirut.57
57Sa'd Butrus Al-Jawrt, in: Mwfcaz al-buhOih al-'arabiyya 1998,64.

11.5. THE REAL PEOPLE AND THE SCUM

217

Al-SaTd describes a Communist who goes into hiding from the police. He is sent to an
apartment with little money, a few cigarettes and a new identity, which he has to learn by heart
and must never forget. He even has to give up his private life.
“Hasan’s instructions. Don’t lock the door from inside except when you go to sleep.
The people here share everything.”58
And really, his neighbors come one by one to call upon him. They sit down without invita­
tion. They talk to him in simple affectionate language:
“Good evening, light of my eyes," the first lady, in fact the owner of the house, Ummu Luza,
opens the dialogue. And she takes a seat on his bed, simply taking off her slippers and sitting
down cross-legged. Her presence is at once sexually charged, the real image of femininity, and
familiar, just a sister or a good friend. And she is beautiful even with the heavily kajal-painted
eyes and her hair dyed blond (!). After a few days it becomes a habit that all the women spend
their mornings in Midhat’s room. An image that represents equality between the sexes, and
social equality. The women smoke a waterpipe, and Midhat gives up his cigarettes (western
style) for the goza (eastern style) because his order is to live with the inhabitants of the house,
to become one of them, to be protected by them and to protect them. In his weakest moments,
though, he cannot help feeling alienated, longing for his past.
“I remembered myself. My true self, not Midhat. My luxurious woolen pyjamas,
my family, the robe du chambre in winter nights, my father and my mother, our
house and my lover."
He becomes aware of the ugly place, the dirty sheets, the tom towels, the potatoes boiling
in a small pot over the kerosine stove, the value of perfumed soap for those people. But the
human warmth and the women’s open sexuality make it up to him. For a middle class man
used to women dressed European style, a baladi woman is the source of romantic feelings that
center on the way she dresses. The beauty of the miläya la ff whose praises Sa'd DarwTsh sang,
its quality of covering and exposing at once, ignites the middle class man’s imagination. It
is perceived as an originally Egyptian way of dressing, different from the ugly Islamic style
dresses that were introduced into Egypt from the Arab peninsula in the 1970s. Midhat, the
prototype of a communist cadre, can become close to and loved by such a woman (though he
would not choose her as a companion for life, but rather meet her secretly like an adolescent on
the roof top, or seduce her quickly). Neither the Egyptian aristocrat nor the well-off communist
Jew will ever approach her. Still, Midhat despairs of the people:
"The people are asleep. They even demonstrate against us. Against us who arouse
the breezes of our life for them. Everything seems without meaning. We are sacri­
ficing our lives for people who don’t want our sacrifice. And we talk to those who
don’t listen. And we argue with those who don’t accept anything except absolute
obedience. The picture seems really dramatic. If the people would even feel that
our torture m atten it would be easier. All the torture would weigh more lightly.
But the people are far away from us. Our words are of no avail. Do they convince
anybody?”59*
“ Al-Sald 1975,8.
**Ibid.,24.

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CHAPTER il. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

A woman at the bottom of society saves him from despair. Ummu Luza, who was a pros­
titute in Klot Bey, specialized in British, Australian, and New Zealand soldiers. She saves him
from his desperation with her physical intimacy, giving him for free what soldiers had to pay
for.40
In close contact with the “real people,“ the Communist learns about the simple people’s
worries and their living conditions, and (ideally) Midhat has the possibility to change their
life. He helps to improve relations between husbands and wives, he gives a hand in personality
development, and establishes a relation of mutual trust that finally helps to protect him from the
police.
One of the house tenants, MagdT, becomes particularly im portant He is a musician, harbOn,
on the run like M idhat His story illustrates two different aspects. The first is the role of die
workers’ movement in Kafr ad-Dawar.6061*It is not difficult to understand why the author chooses
that place. It is the place where the Egyptian revolution of 1952 demanded its first victims. In
fact fiction merges with reality. MagdT becomes the nephew of a workers’ leader, a syndicalist
the most perfect and idealized person in the whole story, though only present through M agdfs
tale. R ifat gives a description of the “people”: they don’t listen because listening would make
them aware of their pain. They escape into small talk. They want to avoid a close look at their
lives, at their misery. They avoid thinking, they raise their voices, tell dirty jokes, and curse,
just to forget all the desperate details of their lives.42
A real workers’ leader like MagdTs uncle was different His work lifted him from among
the “people.” He worked in a factory. He was a syndicalist He played with MagdT. He listened
to MagdT playing music and encouraged him. He read a lot of books about politics. Then there
was the strike, and they arrested him, and he was sentenced to death, and sent MagdT just one
message: that he should continue to play music since music was the language of the future.42
For the regime, music and books were a threat while for the Communists, culture was em­
bodied in music and books. Though they were critical towards Umm al-Kulthflm and 'Abd
al-Wahh&b, for the intellectuals among them it was typical to have been in some circle that
acquainted them with • western - classical music, and to read all the - western • literature avail­
able. In the novel, a worker assumes the role of the leading cultured figure. This happens in
congruence with Batatu’s assessment of the factory as forming the character that is able to lead,
an image repeated in workers’ narratives about the nobility of factory work which elevates a
man from the mass of people. (See following chapter)
MagdTs uncle is not one of the simple sha'bt people anymore, he is superior even to the
typical intellectual. He is an example of the new class that will lead the revolution, combining
human qualities and an uncompromising will in his breast Ready to die for his belief in social
justice, and yet not forgetting the beauty of life.44
MagdT plays one of the traditional Egyptian instruments, the lute, and the violin as well.
Since the days of Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhib, who experienced his heyday before the rcvo60Ibid., 32.
“ For the DMNL, to whom Rifat Al-SaTd belonged. Kafr al-Dawwlr has a particular meaning became the
DMNL was accused by other communitt groupa of acquiescence in the represskm of an independent labor move­
ment. Some even go at far as accusing DMNL member* of having triumphed at the tight of the workers* leaden,
al-KhaiHfo and al-Baqil being eliminated. See for details: Beinin and Lockman 1988.
"AI-SaTd 1975,47.
“ ibid., 52.
“ Certainly Rifat Al-SaTds own experience as a prisoner has a big part in this since it is he for whom music was
one of the biggest pleasures in life. He told me in an interview that be was responsible for the water supply in the
desert camp, which made him go a long distance from the camp to the well where the detainees had also hidden a
radio. So he would listen to the latest news and then to music, classical music, before he relumed to the camp.

11.5. THE REAL PEOPLE AND THE SCUM

219

lution and aroused nationalist sentiments with his songs in the 1950s, many western elements
have entered Arabic music.
The problem of language is omnipresent How to meld with the people, how to become one
of them, “a fish in the water." MagdT, for example, does not know how to insult. He cannot
express himself the way a “real” man would by baladT standards, but uses a polite way that
is normally reserved for women (though not the baladT women). Language is a problem also
for middle class Egyptian intellectuals. The people are ready to deal with them, but a distance
remains and presents itself in many details: language, food, habits, dress.
The differences are also evident inside the communist organizations. In the novel. Midhat
meets the comrade who takes him to his hiding. Midhat scrutinizes him, and notices the thick
cheap glasses, the unattractive face, the cheap pants, clean, but suffering from too many unpro­
fessional washings, the sweater with its faded colors, which, had they been vivid, would not
have matched the pants, the shining shoes, a shine so bright, in fact, that it gave away the fact
that the man himself had brought it about.63
This is certainly not only fiction. R ifat al-Sa’id was a nice boy. In his memoirs he describes
himself as a young man, dressed meticulously and chic. In Sharif HatSta’s memories there also
is a passage about his encounter with a proletarian cadre who stole one of his two shirts because
he felt entitled to take from the rich, even if they were his own comrades. In the novel, practical
solidarity, though, is what counts above all and what saves the hero from the hands of the police.
Midhat, the hero, is warned by one of the young girls in the house, NadyS, that the police
are waiting for him. She accompanies him to the edge of the quarter, farther she can’t go. As
she is a prisoner of her gender, he is a prisoner of his own choice. A party member. He has to
spend the day idle, to kill the hours, just to become active at night.
“When the sun feels compassion for you, it goes. Your real day comes, your life,
your comrades, your party, your struggle, the assemblies, the discussions. You
forget Midhat and that old other, which was once your real name, and you be­
come a third person. You just remember that you are one of a battalion. That you
are another person, that you live another life, for another aim. You speak another
language, you pronounce words in a different way from the way you speak with
Sa'dTya and Sona. You breathe differently.”66
But still the real people hold on to him. Before she leaves him, Nady8 asks him:
“BithabbinI yS si Midhat? Do you love me, Midhat?”67 How to translate “SI Midhat”?
It is an expression of respect, not reserved for intellectuals but for the the mu'allim, the shop
owner and craftsman in Naguib Mahfouz’ trilogy as well. Women address their masters that
way. NadyS goes on to say that if he loves her, he has to take the money from the people in the
house, and she names them one by one, herself included. He knows it is all she has saved, she
wants to give to him, and he does not really need it. But he is forced to take the money in order
not to hurt her, and then to leave.
“It is a debt of a different kind that is not repaid to certain people, but grows to
become hope, sweat, and blood."66
“ Al-Ssld 1975,4.
“ Ibid., 73-74.
67Ibid., 77.
“ Ibid.

CHAPTER 11. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

220

Thai is the bittersweet relation between the middle class Egyptian intellectual and “his”
people, al-sha'b. Though he claims to be one of the people, he is n o t Education and prosperity
have alienated him from the people. His taste is different as are his language, his habits. Ids
dress, his cultural preferences, gender relations, and the way he socializes. The relation with
the people is complicated, oscillating between attraction and repulsion from both sides. It is
not an equal relation, but it is a tale of the simple goodnatured people who practise a good deal
of what is party theory, though in the end they are not educated enough to really get involved.
Involvement is - as we mentioned before • reserved for the workers and - nominally • for the
peasants who have - as Salih Abu S aifs “al-areT tries to show • an instinctive motivation to act
as a community, but they are too weak to form a movement and too far from urbanization and
culture to be reached by theoretical ideas.

11.6 Jews
In the discourse about Jews in general, and the Jewish leadership of the communist movement
in particular, the lack of close relations with the people is emphasized. Curiel, as well as Marcel
IsräH Ceresi, articulated their concern that they could not disappear among the people. They
could never turn into Mao’s famous fish. Their outward appearance already gave them away.
The Egyptian aristocracy was faced with the same problem. In her autobiography InjI Aflitfln
describes an attempt to lose herself among the people. She disguised herself with the black
wrap, worn by traditional women (milOya laff), and dyed her hair. But she had to remain silent
because her language would have given her away. In reality, though, many of the Communists
did not go into hiding in a completely strange environment but found shelter at the homes of
friends and relatives.
Communists have difficulties to describe why Jews were different The most convenient
way to get at that difference was for Egyptian communist militants to talk about their relation
with the state of Israel.
In the narratives there is a difference between the cadres who joined the communist groups
in the 1940s and the younger members who became attracted by communist ideology only in
the 1950s. For the latter ones the big splits in the DMNL, and the “foreigners” in the com­
munist organizations, were already no more than a myth. A few of them would take recourse
to their personal experience with Jews to talk about their role in Egypt and in the communist
movement.69 Those memories are used to point out that there were no racial tensions in Egypt,
and that the social fabric was intact. Geneviève Sîdfirüs, whose church is rather biased against
Jews, maintains that relations with Jews were good. The Egyptian Communist Organization
(mishmish) had many Jewish members and she hid at a Jewish family’s place when the police
was looking for her.
For STdärGs, the partition plan for Palestine had not been a particular problem:
“They were saying that the workers who would come from Europe to Palestine
were progressive and would be of use to the miserable Middle East”10
Geneviève Sïdârüs did not question the leadership’s wise attitude, because she and a major­
ity of Communists had been used to obey party orders and follow a political line they had had
no share in shaping.
in terv iew s with Khfilid Hamza and N agU 'Abd al-Magld.
’“Geneviève SftUrfis, in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 2000,18.

I t.6. JEW S

221

For ThurayS Ibrihlm , who had joined the Communists in 1954, the issue was different
though not more reflected. Asked about her attitude towards Jews and foreigners in the move­
ment, she answered:
“I hoped it would be 100% Egyptian.”
“Did they have a role in the organization?”
“No, not at all. That was before our time.”71
Two pages later the interviewer then asks her about Palestine:
“What is your position concerning the Palestinian cause?”
“We are people who were breastfed with a hatred towards Israel. We were with the
Palestinian resistance under all circumstances.”72
Su'äd Zuhair has a more detailed description about die turn in her relationship with Jewish
comrades. She had been married to FathI Al-RamU for many years, and out of consideration for
his dislike of Curiel as a person she had not joined communist groups, as long as the marriage
kept going. Once they had separated, though, she joined the Communists. For Curiel she
harbored a deep respect because she considered him a man who knew how to evaluate and
appreciate people, and employ the right person in the right place. Curiel recruited her for public
activities among women, sent her to an international conference aiming at the foundation of
an International Democratic Women’s Union (al-ittihäd al-nisä'T al-dïmuqrâtî al-'älamt). She
worked as a jounalist for a number of magazines, among them ROz al-YQsuf and Bint al-Nil.
She, together with InjT AflfitOn, was part of a delegation going to Paris. But while InjT, who
was an Iskra member then, was representing students (räbitat fatayût al-jOmfa wa al-ma'Ohid
al-'ulyû / the Girls’ University and College League), Su’Sd Zuhair arrived as bint al-sha'b. She
was scheduled to speak about the situation of women and workers in Egypt Not that she knew
much about workers. Rosette Aladjem, Curiel’s wife and one of the DMNL activists, had to
take her around by car to visit the factories and find support for her nomination.
Apart from Zuhair’s positive experience with an individual communist leader, Curiel, she
had a more collective experience in prison that shaped her view of the difference between “them
and us.” In 1948 she was held in the foreigners’ prison (sijn al-ajOnib), together with “foreign
women.” She had been arrested because she had produced a pamphlet with her husband, warn­
ing of a conspiracy awaiting the Egyptian troops in Israel, which was aimed at turning their
attention from the British occupation of Egypt to the struggle with Zionists in Palestine which
was basically also the political line the DMNL had announced.73
The other women received her and her two children joyfully. Su'fid Zuhair knew several of
them, though she does not give names. They shared responsibilities for the children. But the
battle for Palestine changed their relationship. When the newspapers started to announce Israeli
TIThutayl IbfihTm, in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1999,20.
n Thurayl IbrShlm, in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1999,22.
73Su'ld Zuhair remembers the text as running “We have a responsibility towards the Palestinian people, but
we also have to know General Clark’s scheme, which he developed with King 'Abdallah and the Serail, as it was
published in al-Baligh newspaper. Details of the documents are about to emerge. The Arab League's troops are
going to be used as a cat’s claw by British colonialism in a new adventure that fascist immigrants and the Muslim
Brotherhood paved the way for with hundreds of speeches overboarding with enthusiasm. False slogans were
followed by dozens of movements. Oh Egyptian people, do not forget your cause. Your cause is directed against
British occupation. The British arranged that story of Israel. They gave them their weapons and their facilities
before they left“ Su'ld Zuhair, in: Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 2000,127-128.

CHAPTER 11. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

222

instead of Arab victories, those “foreign women” turned into yahüdiyyât, Jews. They had asked
Su'ad Zuhair to deal with the administration because she was Egyptian. She read the Arabic
newspapers to them.
"First they listened to the news without comment. When the battle started to turn
against the Arabs, they felt satisfaction and expressed it frankly. That assured me
that a foreigner cannot possibly harbor patriotic feelings. The guard comprehended
their change of mind even before I did. One day she came and took me aside. She
was very agitated. ‘Please, the newspaper? I bring it to you, but you mustn't give it
to them!’ ‘Why not?' I asked. She said: ‘Don’t you see the Jews? When they won,
they sang and danced. If you give them the newspaper once more, I won’t bring it
anymore.’ And I felt that the wardress was closer to me at that moment than the
comrades I was related to ideologically and worked with.”7475
Su'äd had also experienced what Jews were to expect at the hands of the Muslim Broth­
ers. Visiting FathT Al-RamlT in the Huckstep internment camp, she had to pass a training camp
for the Muslim Brothers preparing to fight in Palestine. Some ran after her, insulting her be­
cause they believed her to be Jewish. Still, Palestine was the dividing line that assured her that
Egyptians and Jews did not feel alike.
Other comrades agree. They maintain that there was not a cultural but a political difference
from Jews.
“I don’t see really that there is a cultural difference. And I remember from my
discussions with Curiel personally during the times of the foundation of the state
of Israel... that’s a long time ago, around 1947, during the days of partition... He
would talk to me and say that it will be the oasis of democracy in the region. That’s
Curiel personally with me. And, of course, I was against the partition. It was my
opinion... In the beginning I was against it, but after discussions and a lot of give
and take I started to support that partition, as being the best of the worst.”79
In the discussion, Curiel’s opposition to the Anti Zionist League is even presented as a
position the Egyptian government did not share.
“The government encouraged it and Henri Curiel attacked it, and he told me per­
sonally in a discussion in 1948 during the days of the first Palestinian war. He was
talking to me with sympathy about the foundation of the state of Israel. And I was
completely against the state of Israel from an exclusively scientific point of view.
My point of view was to refuse a state that was built on a theocratic religious basis.
There can’t be a state on an Israeli-Jewish basis. And he discussed with me very
frankly that this state would be and will be an oasis of democracy in the Arab re­
gion which doesn’t know democracy. Those are the words of Henri Curiel, that’s
what he told me personally, that’s why I like to make clear that his stand towards
Zionism that when he says that he was always fighting Zionism that’s not a very
exact position.”76
74Ibid., 123-155, here 128-129.
75Person«! interview with FauzJ Habbashf in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.

74Ibid.

11.6. JEWS

223

The detention camp had three parts: one part for the Egyptian Communists and another one
for the communist Jews, among diem Curiel and Ezra Harari, and a third part for the Zionist
Jews, among them were Ovadiya Salim and Chicorell and the rich Jews.
“Oh yes, the Zionists were very ric h ... all the capital of the country... the owners
of Saidnawi and the owners of Chicorell ...a n d that group ...A n d the commu­
nist Jews had individual meetings with us, the Egyptian Communists, among them
Curiel and Ezra and that group, and during that time we met a lo t”77
Thus in the discourse about Jews in the communist movement in Egypt the economic influ­
ence of Jews, the political engagement of Zionists, and the role of communist Jews become all
intermingled. Even in the detention camp there is a difference between the Egyptian communist
detainees and the communist Jews. This difference was certainly exacerbated by the Egyptian
administration, which offered communist Jews an earlier release as mentioned in the chapter
about Curiel.
Curiel remains at the center of the discourse. He is thought to be directly responsible for
all the woes of the movement In the discussion about Iskra, an important difference between
Fauzi Habbashf and Thurayfi Shfikir becomes obvious. Fauzl rejects Thurayi’s criticism and the
claim that Iskra was partying excessively, and that girls and boys mingled indiscriminately:
“Those are the ones who try to besmirch the reputation of this trend. The ones who
defend Henri C uriel... and those are elements, I think, they are looking to Henri
Curiel considering him a god, like ThurSya said.”
For students from Iskra, Curiel was a remote figure. Most had only heard of him, but not
seen him personally. Fauzl HabbashI met him only in the detention camp. Many others were
influenced by radical opinions about him. After he had been God he became a fallen Lucifer.
“I didn’t see him. I just heard about him. That he was something very big, like
God, for example .”
“From whom did you hear that?’
“From the people we were meeting with. And I thought him to be God ...th a t’s
God. And it’s not possible to meet him since we are small, sughaiyirTn."7*
Personality cults, it should be added, though, were a problem that did not stop with the
ousting of the Jewish leaders. According to Fauzl Girgis, a personality cult was celebrated with
regard to Fu’id MursT, the leader of the Egyptian Communist Party, culminating in the slogan
'Ash al-rafiq Khdlid alf'Om! (“May comrade KhSlid live a thousand years!”), and the claim that
his articles had helped to educate “millions of workers.”79
Most Egyptian Communists believe that the leader of the communist movement had to be a
representative of the majority. He didn’t only have to be a “real” Egyptian but also an Egyptian
Muslim, which was indirectly acknowledged by the Jewish leaders of the Workers’ Vanguard
when they converted to Islam. A communist leader could not only be not a Jew, but also not a
C opt*71
77Ibid.
71Personal interview with Thurayl Shlkir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
"Personal interview with Ramsli Lablb hi Cairo 3th December 1999; Fauzl Girgis in an interview with Rifat
Al-Sald. 17.1.1976, in: AI-SaTd 1989,248-232.

224

CHAPTER II. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM
“Because he leads a people who is Muslim in its majority. It’s not wise that the
leader who symbolizes the whole organization has a different religion, and espe­
cially since the Egyptian Communist Party was the candidate for the leadership of
the whole region, the whole Arab region, because it was the communist party in the
biggest Arab state. None of the Arab states would have swallowed a Christian at
the top of the leading party of the superpower in the Arab region as a whole, that
was my opinion. And I discussed it with AbQ Saif Yflsuf himself. His opinion was
different ...T h a t religion shouldn’t interfere with politics in this way ...A n d that
religion was something personal, and that politics was something public.”80

Communists were not against Arab nationalism. They would argue that the Arab nation
could be the home of different religions because a nation could not be built on a religious basis.
Religion was supposed to be a private issue. Yet with concern to the leadership it stopped to be
a personal issue. But a leader had to be similiar to the people he led. If there was a difference
in religion it might influence the opinion of the man in the street.
“The difference is there?”
“It’s there from birth.”
“But it’s there in the man of the street’s head.”
“Yes, of course, in his head. Because I don’t imagine that AbQ Saif YQsuf makes
any difference in dealing with a Christian or a Muslim. I don’t think that.”
“Why?”
“Because he’s a (politically) conscious man. But the man of the street may see a
point of difference in AbQ Saif YQsufs being a Christian. For example, the man
goes to pray in the mosque. He is going to go to pray on Friday. He’s going to go
and find that AbQ Saif YQsuf didn’t enter and sit with him, for example.”
“But the communist leaders weren’t going to pray, were they?”
“No, they weren’t supposed to, but the man in the street is going to feel that AbQ
Saif YQsuf is going to pray in church on Sunday. That is a weak point The re­
lation between religion and politics. Not religion itself, no. The relation between
religion and politics, that’s what has to be weaker and has to be eliminated, in a
way that religion doesn’t have a relation with politics. The man in the street who’s
not enlightened... It will probably not weaken quickly... It might take some time.
That’s why I was among the ones who opposed the plan that AbQ Saif YQsuf would
become the party’s secretary general. Of course, in the long run I’m of the opinion
that AbQ Saif YQsuf or any human being can be the communist party’s secretary
general. But concerning the present, concerning then ... I didn’t encourage him
and I discussed this matter with Aba Saif personally.”81
This is a statement about the Egypt of 1958, under the regime of Abdel Nasir which pursued
secular politics and restrained Islamists. Following this line of argument among the political
trend that was to the left of Nasir and supposed to be the most secularist trend of all political
trends, Makram 'Ubaid has to be considered an accident in Egyptian history. Probably 'Ubaid
could appear on the Egyptian political landscape for a number of reasons. The most important
“ Personal interview with FauZI HabbashT in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999.
81Ibid.

11.6. JEWS

225

one was that the Wafd had a mass basis, and the second important one was that it had a sound
basis among Egyptian landowners and among the Egyptian elite, both of whom were in favor of
a secularist state modelled after the European pattern. 'Ubaid became politically active within
the framework of an Egyptian nation that could be a home to different creeds and give all its
citizens, as Egyptian citizens not as Muslims pertaining to a Muslim umma, the same rights.
Still, it must be remembered that • as Afaf Lutfi assumed - Saad Zaghlul’s personality was
crucial in this endeavor, and that only he could convince the Egyptian public of his secularist
political project because they believed him to be a good Muslim. (Though there might have
been also other reasons.)
In the case of the Jewish leadership the discussion is even more heated, because Jews, as
opposed to Copts, are supposed to be non-Egyptian. It is often maintained, however, that the
discussion about ousting Jews from the leadership in 1937 concerned only the Jews who were
Curiel’s followers, Jews who had been in the DMNL and were suspected of continuous loyalty
towards Curiel.
‘They meant the elements of a certain group, because they were doubting Curiel’s
position towards Zionism. There were elements accusing him of being a Zionist.
And that’s the reason that made them insist on excluding them from the merger of
8th of January.”82
Still, in further discussions it becomes obvious that Zizek’s factor X dominates Egyptian
thought about Jews. FauzT HabbashT had many Jewish friends. He mentioned Ezra Harärf, with
whom he used to play chess in the detention camp in 1948, and whom he visited in Paris. He
mentioned YQsuf DarwTsh as well. He was not against their religion, or even against atheists. To
demonstrate his open-mindedness, a Buddhist friend from WW II is recalled. Thurayä Shakir
and FauzT HabbashT insist, in contrast to other voices, that most of the Jews in Egypt were
speaking Arabic. Odette Hazan, as well as Curiel, could hold a discussion in Arabic. (“Yes, of
course, in Arabic”) To speak broken Arabic, in Thurayä’s and Fauzfs narrative meant a kind
of Arabic that “shows the listener at once that it is a second language, not the first language."
(FauzT and Thurayä compared Curiel’s Arabic to mine: “You speak Arabic, but it is your second
language not the first one and Curiel was like you”) And Thurayä added that Odette basically
spoke French, and she was speaking Arabic as a second language as well. The Jewish activists
in the communist movement were all, or at least in their majority, Egyptians, Thurayä believes.
And FauzT added:
“But Egyptians because of their second language .. .ya'nt Egyptian foreigners or
in another sense, Egyptians living in a foreign way of life in Egypt. Even Yüsuf is
until now more French than Arabic.”81
The YQsuf he is speaking about is YQsuf DarwTsh, the only known Karaite Jew among the
Jews involved in the communist movement. For FauzT and Thurayä it is clear that even YQsuf
speaks more French than Arabic. Yes, in his group they spoke Arabic very well, better than
Curiel and those people, but still, it was their second language, not the first. For example, when
DarwTsh quarreled he would curse in French. Sädiq Sa'd’s native tongue remained French, even
though he “tried to change everything, even religion, and called himself Ahmad and all that” It
was not the language that made an Egyptian, but it was one of the elements. The language and
the “rest” of the behavior were important. Behavior meant how to deal with people, and what
traditions to observe.
“ Ibid.

“ Ibid.

CHAPTER I I. MIDDLE CLASS COMMUNISM

226

“You don’t feel that he’s Egyptian.*44
Asked about Egyptian traditions, definition was difficult. Food was mentioned:
“The Jews, for example, don’t eat pork. And they eat oil, they cook with oil, Jews
have certain things.”
“And people like Curiel and Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd had those traditions?”
“Yes, of course, they couldn’t stop them. They had those traditions, for example,
they paid lipservice to Islam and pretended that they had left their Jewish religion,
but that was not true, in their innermost self they w oe Jews, in their homes they
were Jews.”15
The factor X that Zizek talked about, which differentiates “us” from “them,” is hidden in
those remarks. Jews were different What it is that made them different was not exactly clear,
but even if they would not show their differences in public, in the privacy of their homes they
would certainly do something that was not Egyptian.

"ibid.
“ Ibid.

Chapter 12
Workers
In communist ideology the proletariat was the power of the day. It would win the class struggle
under the leadership of the communist party, which, in turn, was its organized political will.
Of course, this meant that the majority of party members were workers, and ideally the leader­
ship of the party was composed of workers as well. Certainly, this ideal has not been realized
anywhere in the world, instead lawyers, philosophers, and many teachers have climbed up to
communist party leadership. The Egyptian communist movement suffered from the discrepancy
between ideology and reality. Egypt was not a highly industrialized country with a mass pro­
letariat On the contrary, it was an agricultural society with few industrial centers, like Shubra
al-Khaima, al-Mahalla al-Kubra, or Hilwan.

12.1 Workers and Intellectuals
Though the demand for a communist party, consisting of a 100% workers, had become loud, it
was difficult to recruit workers to the ranks of the Communists. It was even more difficult to
promote workers to leadership. From Curiel’s point of view, a worker would prove his ability to
lead on the shop floor. Iskra intellectuals wanted potential proletarian leaders to undergo sound
theoretical training. Many have spoken for and about workers, but in the historiography of the
Egyptian communist movement there have been few workers’ voices. Only recently has their
number increased.1
The Workers’ Vanguard, led by a Jewish triumvirate, was the group that kept the closest ties
to syndicalists. A lecture from 19462 provides us with an impression of the way the Workers’
Vanguard assessed its own role. It is depicted as the representative of the independent work­
ers’ movement. Not only is that movement supported by workers but its leadership also lies in
workers’ hands. The workers’ class is independent from the classes who own property. Work­
ers in Egypt are believed to be fit to accept more responsibility, not only to fight for narrow
social aims but to engage in political struggle and to assume a role in national struggle. The
misery of the people is due to the failure of the Egyptian upper classes. They are traitors who
'This is particularly due to the publication of the oral history project on Egyptian Communists, a project shared
by the Center for Arabic Studies and ok) Egyptian Communists from different organizations. In his interviews
Rifat Al-SaTd concentrated mainly on intellectuals. Taha Sa'd *1)0111110 has been the most prolific writer among
Egyptian workers, though the memoirs of MahmQd al-'Askari and Muhammad YQsuf al-Mudarrik have been se­
rialized und published in Proletarian Culture (al-thaqCfa al-'ummältyya), published by the Workers' Education
Association between 1967 and 1978. See for details: Beinin and Lockman 1988; Personal interviews with Taha
Sa'd 'Uthmin in Shubra al-Khaima 29th November, 14th and 27th December 1999.

2YQsuf2000,144-149.

227

228

CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

collaborate with the British. In its program the Workers’ Vanguard refers to the heritage of
the national movement in Egypt, starting with the craftsmen in Cairo who rebelled against the
French in 18th century, passing by the free thinkers (al-mufakkirQn al-ahrär), like al-TahtSwf,
'Abdallah al-Nadim, and others, and ending up with the workers who struck against the British
in 1919. Confronted with the better educated and more intellectual members of communist
groups, workers felt easily intimidated.
“The poor did not go to college. They were all middle-class, those intellectuals.
They were not really professionals, most of them were students, which made it
worse. For them it was no problem, once they disagreed, they split, bought a print­
ing press and started anew. For workers it was very different”3
Taha Sa'd ‘Uthmàn who belonged to the Workers* Vanguard complains that intellectuals
spoilt workers by attracting them to their groups, bribing them with material benefits, and in­
cluding them in the system of cliques and competing groups, while the workers’ movement had
to act unified to triumph. ThurayS Shikir and many others support his view:
“The workers, they made them bourgeois. For example, after somebody was a
simple worker, they made him a bourgeois. They gave him money, and made him
go by car, and so on, and he became a bourgeois, a human being without any
interest, neither in workers nor in peasants.”45
As we know from the chapter about Curiel, be shared this view and accused Iskra of buying
workers, while the Workers’ Vanguard, in turn, was critical of any other group • including the
DMNL and Curiel.
Ahmad Khidr, a workers’ leader, does not blame the “bourgeois” leadership but is angry
with the Egyptian comrades, former students, who left the movement after a few years of
engagement. They radicalized the movement, forced splits, and by the sheer power o f their
rhetoric, attracted workers, only to vanish afterwards and study abroad. It was easier for those
intellectuals to arrange themselves with the Nasirist system, which wanted to coopt critical intel­
lectuals but not uncomfortable workers.3 They could find good jobs. Even after the dissolution
of the Egyptian Communist Party in 1964 they would find it easier to join the secret progressive
organization, the Avantgarde, (al-talfa), which Abdel Nasir had promised as a substitute for the
dissolved party and a vehicle for change.
In the narrative of workers themselves, workers are presented as the backbone of the com­
munist movement and supposed to be its leaders, because they have their own vanguard of
educated people. In the Workers’ Vanguard it had been the workers, the basis, who had voted
against the partition of Palestine in 1947, and the leadership had to revise its position after it
initially approved of partition. Workers had been with the revolution of 19S2 until it unmasked
itself with the execution of al-Khammis and al-Baqri and it turned out that the Free Officers
would not support the workers in their demands. Few students joined workers at their daily
job.6
3Personal interview with Taha Sa’d TJthmin in Shubra al-Khaima 29th November, 14th and 27th December
1999.
'Personal interview with ThurayS Shikir in Cairo 20th October and 18th November 1999. Shlkir’s view it
supported by many other voices, sometimes the money is substiuted by golden watches that were allegedly given
to workers.
5See: Abd al-Malek 1971.
6Hikmat al-GhazSIT was the example of a student (she had studied khidma ijtimS'iyya / social work), who not
only stood in front of the factory and agitated workers, but went to work in the factory halL

12.2. THE EDUCATED WORKER

229

“Educated people are always in a burry. They translated the books, and we would
compare them to our reality.”
Taha Sa'd claimed that the ultimate gauge for the credibility of Marxist theories were work­
ers and their circumstances, a view shared by important figures like Yusuf DarwTsh and Henri
Curiel in the communist movement. But even though the relationship between the intellectuals
and the workers was crucial for the communist movement, Abu Saif’s volume about the his­
tory of Workers’ Vanguard and his collection of documents (1150 pages) comprises only one
attempt of tackling this subject. It is a reflection on the role of “Free intellectuals in the national
movement” (<al-muthaqqafûn al-ahrârf i al-haraka al-wataniyya), after there had been difficul­
ties in the cooperation between workers and students in the National Committee of Workers
and Students7 in 1946. The article stresses that the popular classes went out to fight, without
waiting for the bourgeois to order them to do so. That “independent” movement seemed a big
step forward towards the complete “independence” of the popular classes, with workers in their
lead. But for the time being, the popular classes had not totally got rid of the influence of the
bourgeois, and were not yet able to stand on their own feet. The task of the New Dawn (al-fajr
al-jadid, the Workers’ Vanguard’s magazine in 1946) was, therefore, to express the opinion
of the politically conscious trend in the national movement, and to analyze the national move­
ment. “Free intellectuals” had to direct the masses, to transform them from a spontaneous to
a politically aware movement, able to realize the aims of the popular classes. It was their duty
to present a realistic understanding of political and social issues on a global and a local level.
And it fell into their responsibility to charge the popular classes with a consciousness that made
them recognize the scientific rules for social development. Scientific philosophy would explain
the links between local and global players, and the role of the different classes in their struggle
for freedom and welfare. The spontaneous national movement was important as a basis for the
scientific structure to grow, though spontaneous movement as such was void of any scientific
content. Intellectuals were to give the movement its scientific depth, though the proletariat was
the leading force.8
Who were those proletarians, and how did they see themselves in relation to the communist
intellectuals, their role in the communist movement and the role of Jews in that movement?

12.2 The Educated Worker
Ahmad Khidr9 represents a missing link between the first generation of Communists and the
second because he was deeply influenced by his father, who had been a skilled worker and syn­
7The National Committee of Workers and Students had been formed on February 18th and 19th 1946, after
several meetings between the representatives of the Students* Higher Executive Committee (lajnat al-talaba altanfldhiyya al-'ulyä), which included elected members from the Fu’âd al-Awwal University in Cairo and the FarQq
al-Awwal University in Alexandria, from colleges and secondary schools - some contemporaries add, from AlAzhar as well - and representatives of the Conference of Workers* Syndicates in Egypt (mu’tamar niqûbùtcummäl
al-qatar al-misrt). The 21st of February 1946 was declared “evacuation day** for the British troops by students and
workers, and the committee called for a strike in all the public facilities and institutions. It was a day of widespread
national agitation and movement, with several clashes with the British occupation forces. The committee is often
presented as a major achievement of communist activity in Egypt. For the declaration concerning “evacuation
day** see: 'Uthmfin 1988,257. For further information concerning those events and the struggle for the annullment
of the Angk>-Egypcian agreement of 1936 see: Markaz al-buhûth al-'arabiyya; Al-DisQqT (ed.) 1998; Jean Pierre
Thieck, La journée du 21 février dans Phistoire du mouvement national égyptien. Mémoire de D.E.S., Université
de Paris, VII, 1973.
slbrfthlm al-Kftshif, Daur al-muthaqafîn al-ahrftr fl al-haraka al-wataniyya, Cairo 1946, in: Yüsuf 2000,86-88.
9Markaz al-buhflth al-'arabiyya 1998,41-57.

230

CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

dicalist. His political activities had brought a lot of hardship on the family. The family was
constantly on the move because the father was fired several times. A graduate of the industrial
school in Bulaq (department of fitters and turners) and a railway worker, Khidr senior, a strong
supporter of the Wafd, had participated in the revolution of 1919, and had been sacked because
he refused to go back to work and chose to continue with the revolution. He had not been a
member of the first communist party, but he had read their pamphlets, and was a convinced
workers’ activist. He went with his family to Sudan to work at the railways, and participated
in the revolution of 1924-23. In 1928 the father was dismissed again - he had been working as
a fitter • because he had agitated the fallahin. He was out of work many times, and the family
spent days without food. Still, Khidr senior remained connected to independent syndicalist pol­
itics, and a thorn in the flesh of any company’s management. Ahmad Khidr’s father represented
what Muhammad DQwTdir and 'Abd al-Rahmân Fadl tried to defend in Moscow: an Egyptian
worker’s ethics and consciousness that was very different from the fallahin's way of life. Work­
ers were not, like peasants, bound to their villages and to their families of origin. They did not
primarily define themselves in a context of clan ties but by virtue of their working conditions
and in relation to their colleagues. Khidr’s father engaged in the workers’ struggle wherever
he went, and identified with the cause of the class he belonged to while he was by no means
at the bottom of that class. Compared to the mass of the people, Khidr’s father was already a
highly qualified man who had received a more than average education at a time when school­
ing was not even compulsory in Egypt He was connected to the industrial revolution, a man
able to maintain and to work with modem machinery, while the mass of Egyptian fallahin was
still working the earth with the fa ’s, as their ancestors had done. Still, the family went through
considerable hardship, which connected it to the poor and wretched of society.
Ahmad Khidr himself became another example of a skilled worker fit enough to organize
and manage a new factory, starting from the decision about the kind of weaving stools being
used to the mode of introducing new workers to personal management, and workers’ advocacy
in confrontation with the boss. This dimension of independence is absent in a discussion about
peasants because the peasant’s knowledge is appreciated as a matter of fact, handed down by
tradition, not learnt in school. The peasant is likely to be the victim of the big landowners or the
shaikhs. In Egypt there was no peasants’ rebellion that set a signal for intellectuals to join. The
peasant was a victim and had to be liberated since he was not going to do that himself. In the end,
the state had come to rescue him. Even the peasants in the Dinshaway incident became famous
for their suffering, not for their action. What made intellectuals become interested, however, in
the workers’ movement in Egypt was not an existing rebellious movement but rather the wish
to become its godfathers.
The industrial schools produced an Egyptian workers’ elite, which, because of its intellec­
tual and professional abilities, became connected to political movements outside Egypt, and
raised its voice for workers’ demands. In Ahmad Khidr’s narrative the conditions of daily life
in the factory decided the struggle he undertook. His adversary was first of all the factory
owner, though Ahmad Khidr’s work ethics - as in the case of Taha Sa'd and others - gained him
recognition.
There was a difference between workers like Ahmad Khidr, Taha Sa'd, and others, who
were the prime movers in the workers’ movement and their followers. The classical Egyptian
workers were of peasant origin, like 'Abd al-'Al Al-BastfiwTsI, with a father owning only 1,5
feddan. Most of tire villagers would go and work for the feudalists in the north and the east of
the Delta, especially in Daqhiliyya and Kafr al-Shaikh. Al-Bastäwlsl10 is an exception among
l0Maikaz «1-buhflth al-'arabiyya2000,189-212.

12.2. THE EDUCATED WORKER

231

the voices talking about workers in the communist movement. At the age of 14, he left the
village to work in al-Mahalla al-Kubra, 18 km away. The wages were low, no laws protected
the workers, owners followed a hire and fire policy to avoid paying compensations to workers
who had worked for periods exceeding a year. Relatives helped Al-BastâwïsT to find new jobs.
He was attracted by the Shubra al-Khaima area more than other industrial areas, like D ir alSalim, for example, in Cairo. In Shubra al-Khaima there were cafes and places where to meet,
and there were fighters. Al-Bast&wîsï dropped in and out of work many times. The Muslim
Brothers did not offer workers anything, therefore he looked for a different organization. Finally
he joined the Workers’ Vanguard for a simple reason. The news of other dominant communist
organizations, like the Egyptian Communist Party (al-räya), were too difficult for him. They
talked about Nasir as a dictator and a fascist leader, and he could not grasp the meanings. It was
only later in prison that he learnt to read and write properly.
Taha Sa'd 'Uthmfin, the most prolific writer among workers, still lives in Shubra al-Khaima,
where he has spent most of his life working and struggling for the workers’ cause. He considers
himself an “educated worker” ('Omit muthaqqaf). Nowadays he resides in a house that carries
a nameplate: Country Estate of Sa’d 'Uthmân, and he receives guests sitting behind a desk with
another nameplate: Engineer Sa’d 'Uthmân. After many years of struggle and prison, earning
that degree may be comparable to the honorary doctors’ degree for other politicians. Taha Sa’d
is, like al-BastiwîsT, from a family offallahin, but his paternal grandfather had already managed
to make sure that two of his sons got an education: one had become a bäsh lamargT, a nursing
assistant, and worked in Bani Suaif, while the other was a teacher in Assiut. Both those uncles
would come to visit the other brothers in the village during their vacations. The difference in
life style was obvious: their children and their wives dressed in European style, with urban chic.
Taha Sa'd’s father was determined to have his sons educated, in order to spare them the lot
of a poorfallah. Even though Taha Sa’d was an intelligent student, bright enough to succeed in
secondary education and eventually go to university, he had to opt for education at one of the
technical colleges, first in Bani Suaif and then in Cairo, at the school of applied arts (madrasat
al-funün al-tafbTqiyya), like many other skilled workers. Taha Sa'd’s origin is typical for work­
ers who became engaged in the communist movement Many of them would be workers who
were not only able to read and write, but also were open to new ideas and studying on their
own. They were the sons of grocers, soldiers, small fallahin who could not afford an academic
career for their sons, but still wanted them to be educated. They were convinced that they could
lead the workers and would do so. Their extraordinary position among the Egyptian labor force
becomes even clearer in view of the fact that literacy among workers had reached only 10% in
the 1940s."
In his history of the Workers’ Vanguard, AbQ Saif YQsuf describes the two leading figures
in the workers’ movement: Muhammad Ahmad al-Najfir, known as al-Mudarrik (1902-1977)
und MahmQd al-'Askari (1916-1987). Both of them fit in the pattern of the kind of workers the
Egyptian communist movement predominantly attracted: they were educated sons of a carpen­
ter (al-Mudarrik) and a railway worker (al-'AskarT), and in both cases, poverty prevented them
from completing their education. Both of them went on studying as autodidacts and reached the
point where they participated in the editorship of magazines, and in al-Mudarrik’s case, became
a writer for an active workers’ press between 1935 and 1942.12 Both of them became actively
engaged in union work. Al-'Askarf as a textile worker, al-Mudarrik as a shop clerk in the shop
clerks’ union. Both were full of mistrust of political parties and people who tried to hijack1*
11About living conditions in general, see: Beinin and Lockman 1988,272.
"al-Wijib, al-Madlna, Hurriyyat al-shutlb, Ibn al-balad, al-MisS’ and JarTdat Shubra were among those maga­
zines, see: YQsuf 2000,56-57.

CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

232

the workers’ movement, and, therefore, they were not easily drawn into the communist ranks.
Both were active on the battleground, organizing demonstrations, strikes, and hungerstrikes.
Al-Mudarrik, in particular, was in touch with the old socialist workers’ guard: ShacbSn Hfifiz,
'Abd al-Rahmän Fad!, and Muhammad Hasanain SrOjT, who had been sent to the Tbilers of the
East University.

12.2.1

Workers* Education

Technical schools had been introduced in Egypt in order to create a local skilled labor force
to replace the foreign workers and to extend industrial activity. In the beginning, their stu­
dents from the second year onwards were even paid a small salary to encourage them. Taha
Sa'd’s brother, a railway worker, had been among those who received i t From the second year
onwards, he had been paid IS piasters per month to complete his education, which took five
years. But when Taha Sa'd enrolled in school, that privilege had been recinded. The director
and most of the teachers were foreigners. The first Egyptian director was only appointed in
1937. The School for Applied Arts in Cairo, which later was to be transformed into one of the
university departments, was the only one of its kind in Egypt. The annual fees were 12 L.E.13
Taha Sa'd used to bring food from home, his brother paid the transport fares, during school
holidays he worked in a factory to cover other expenses. In the Technical College (al-madrasa
al-sana'iyya) in Bani Suaif the students were taught English, in the College for Applied Arts
they learnt French as well. The Technical College14 in Bani Suaif also had Coptic students,
though no Jews. In general, few Jews were at home in Bani Suaif - only a few employees or
merchants, or the notorious moneylenders (buyüt al-ribä).
Ahmad Khidr had been educated at a boarding school. Founded in 1931, it was a secondary
technical school, financed by an Islamic foundation and meant to be an alternative to the tra­
ditional orphanage. Sayyid 'Abd al-W ahhibls, bom in the countryside in the delta, had been
enrolled in the same school in 'Abissiyya as Khidr because of his family’s precarious financial
situation, but he does not mention any details about the school. He just recalls that he spent five
years there, and graduated as a weaver in 1939. Unlike Taha Sa'd, Ahmad Khidr was not taught
English. The boys and girls (Ahmad speaks about roughly 200) were there not only to leant a
profession but also to be educated in a wider sense. They could read in the library, and there
were instruments for musical education. It was not a “Jane Eyre” style boarding school. Food
was abundant, the children were well-dressed, they had their own beds and blankets, and were
in many respects, compared to modern conditions in Egypt, well cared for. Khidr’s damage was
psychological, because growing up in a boarding school, being fed and educated by a charity
organization, was a blemish in Egyptian society, even among workers. The library at school
gave Khidr the opportunity to get acquainted with history and politics, to get a first inkling of
analysis. As we have seen, for most (male) Communists, books in general have been mentioned
as an important factor in developing an individual outlook on life in Egypt first, and in joining
the Communists second.15
15To understand that 12 L.E. were a big sum of money in the 1930s faha Sa'd told me that aJ-ghqfiral-nizdml,
i.e. the local guard in a village would receive only 3 L.E.
"Concerning industrial schools, we learn from Bcinin and Lockman that the Egyptian government had estab­
lished an industrial school in Bulaq (Cairo) in 1839, which closed a decade later, but reopened in 1876. It trained
skilled workers and technicians for government service, the army and private industry, arid was supplemented af­
ter 1900 by privately funded Muslim and Coptic industrial schools and state-sponsored “model workshops" and
apprenticeship programs. Beinin and Lockman 1988,34.
lsMarkaz al-buh0th al-'arabiyya 1999,27-30. Sayyid 'Abd al-Wahhib Nadi, born in 1926, was first a member
of the EMNL then of the Red Star (al-nqjm al-ahmar).

12.3. FOREIGN LABOR AND FACTORY OWNERS

233

Mustafa Tiba16, who had received the same education as Taha Sa'd 'Uthmän, describes
Salama Musa’s readings as crucial in his introduction to socialism. When he had finished school
and started to work, he joined the EMNL in 1946. But for him, the cultural clubs also played
a big part He used to go to the House of Scientific Research (dar al-abhäth al-'ilmlyla), to the
Association for the Dissemination of modem Culture (jam ifat nashr al-thaqäfa al-hadttha),
and to the Umm Durman Club to receive and to complete his learning. He was attracted also
because the call for independence rang loud in those establishments, and British colonialism
was rejected.

123

Egyptian Labor, Foreign Labor, Factory Owners, and
Capitalists

When Taha Sa(d started at his first job, at the Henri Pierre factory, understanding with the for­
eign engineers was mostly by gestures instead of communication through language. There were,
of course, engineers who spoke Arabic, though with a foreign accent, foreign skilled workers
who spoke Arabic, and Egyptian clerks and mutamassirtn - a word that in Taha Sa'd’s imagina­
tion denotes Lebanese, Syrians and Algerians who spoke Arabic -, who could translate.17*
Skilled workers were suffering from unemployment during the 1930s. But when Taha Sa’d
had finished his education. World War II had started, and foreigners had left to enlist in the
armies of their home countries, above all the French and the British. Italians were interned."
Therefore Taha Sa'd and some others offered themselves to replace those foreign workers.
“When they started to complain that the factories could not work because there were
no technicians and skilled laborers to do the job, we went to the labor exchange
(maslahat al-'amat), and told them that there were enough Egyptian skilled workers
who could do their jobs.”
They would even improve production because they were better suited to cope with the dif­
ficult and sometimes bad working conditions in Egyptian factories. After World War 0 , “the
liberation of the Egyptian industry from foreign technicians, and their replacement with Egyp­
tian experts” was one of the demands of the “Workers’ Committee for National Liberation,” a
predecessor of the Workers’ Vanguard.19
Egyptian workers accused the foreign companies of bringing in their own skilled labor and
refusing to either train Egyptians properly or to employ well-trained Egyptians. Especially
in the spinning and weaving companies, workers complained that foreigners received higher
wages. Therefore, among the demands of the workers that were brought before the government
"Muftafa T<ba, bom 1924, interview with Rifat Al-SaTd, 8.10.1978. A part of the interview was originally
conducted with Selma Botman. Al-Sald 1989,342-347. T>ba interfered in the debate about Henri Curiel as well,
see chapter Reactions to Curie!. He published a contribution to the history of the Egyptian Communist movement:
al-hanka al-shuyO'iyya al-misriyya. Ru“ya rttldiiliyya. 1943-1963, Cairo 1990. TO» also has a number of other
publications, among them letters from prison. Tiba 1980.
l7“At Bella's factory, an Italian owned factory, there were people who knew Arabic, not fluent may be, but
they were Egyptianized (mutamassirih), Lebanese, Syrians, and Algerians.” Personal interview with Taha Sa'd
TJthmln, Shubra al-Khaima 14th November 1999.
"1,700 French men between 18 and 30 yean old were called to arms in Egypt 700 left on 8th September, the
m l would follow soon. al-Ahram, 17th September 1939.
'*Ulhmln 1988.67.

234

CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

in 1946, equal wages for equal work took a prominent place.20 Sometimes foreign workers
received five times the wages of an Egyptian worker. The representative of the spinning and
weaving workers on the committee complained that the number of foreigners working in textile
factories had increased once mote after the end of World War n , and that they had forced out the
Egyptians who had replaced them during the war. He demanded that foreigners’ work contracts
should be cancelled entirely.21
Taha Sa'd was bringing in even mote damning proof against the negative aspects of employ­
ing foreign labor. They were tantamount to a fifth column, designed to prevent the Egyptian
efforts from rising to the level of industrialized nations, and to destroy them.
“Concerning the foreigners’ attitude towards industrialization in Egypt, even if they
were English or French workers, I mention here a story that was confirmed by
several colleagues who worked for the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in
al-Mahalla al-Kubra. The foreign engineers would commit terrible acts of sabo­
tage and destruction, especially with the spare parts. One of them, for example, a
French, fetched new shuttles from the storeroom, claiming he would use them in­
stead of the old ones. But then he broke them and used them as fuel for the heating
in winter. Any Egyptian who would oppose such a behavior would be confronted
with a painful beating by the factory’s guards and lose his job in the company.”22
In Taha Sa'd’s narrative, the different interests of Egyptians and foreigners with regard to
workers also became apparent in the policies of the EMNL and Iskra. While the Workers’
Vanguard acted according to what was in the interest of the Egyptian workers’ movement, the
other two organizations wanted to push their opinion and their people through. There were
several incidents that seemed to prove that contradiction to him, although he obviously did
not trace it back to the special ethnic character of the other organizations but rather to the
majority of intellectuals and the lesser influence of workers. In 1943, for example, several trade
union leaders, among them Taha Sa*d, al-'Askari, and al-Mudarrik, established a preparatory
committee to send an Egyptian workers’ representative to the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) Congress in Paris in August 1945.23 At the preparatory conference for the Congress
in London, Walter Laqueur, who had attended as a representative of the Histadnit (the General
Federation of Hebrew Workers in Palestine) had been appointed the Middle East representative
on the WFTU executive committee. This development, which Palestinian trade unionists had
warned of, made it even more urgent for Egyptians to attend. Al-Mudarrik won the support of 32
unions, and was elected to travel to Paris to represent Egyptian labor. The opposing candidate,
David Nahum, had been favored by the EMNL and Iskra. David Nahum was from Taha Sa(d’s
point of view “not an Egyptian but a Jew, and not a production worker.”24
In fact, he was the representative of the Congress of Private Sector Trade Unions (CPSTU),
a white collar workers’ union that included a large proportion of foreign workers. It was mainly
20A special committee had been formed to confront workers’ unrest and preserve the relative tranquility that
had been imposed on the country by prime minister SidqPs repression: the Higher Ministerial Committee for the
Research of Workers’ Demands / al-tajna al-'ulyä li-bahth mafttlib al-'ummäl.

2,Afabttdir wa taqarir al-lajna al-wizäriyya al-'ulyä al-mukawwanaf t yûtyü 1947 li battth mafttlib al-'ummttl,
Cairo 1946; Personal interview with T*h* Sa’d Uthmln in Shubra al-Khaima 29th November, 14th and 27th
December 1999; TJthmin 1988,67; Beinin and Lockman 1988,350.
B’UthmSn 1983,27.
23The Shubra al-Khayma Textile Workers’ Union had been dissolved by the government in 1945.
24According to Walter Laqueur, who had met him at the WFTU congress in Paris, his full name was David P a id
Nahum, which indicates that his parents had sympathies for the Egyptian monarchy and an affinity to the country.
Laqueur 1956,48.

12.3. FOREIGN LABOR AND FACTORY OWNERS

235

based on the clerks of the fashinonable department stores in Cairo, like Cicurel, Chemla, Sidnawi, Addas, and Benzion.23 Though Nahum lost against YQsuf al-Mudarrik, “the first labor
petitioner in Egypt, and the able workers’ umpire”26 he insisted on travelling, not at the ex­
pense of the workers but at his own expense. Thus in Taha Sa'd’s narrative, the discourse about
“foreigners and Jews” in the Egyptian communist movement gains a special dimension with
regard to workers. He depicts them as supporting “white collar workers” against “blue collar
workers,” while white collar workers are associated with the Jewish owned department stores in
the “European” downtown section of Cairo, whose owners figure in other narratives as the “rich
Zionists.” Nahum’s proposal to travel at his own expense, while workers had collected money
to make al-Mudarrik travel, supports the claim that he was completely out of touch with the
workers’ movement, he did not even know how to behave like a worker but behaved like a typ­
ical individualist bourgeois. Al-Mudarrik, of course, was not only the representative chosen by
many trade unions, but belonged also to the same communist fraction as Taha Sa'd. That Zion­
ists were about to become the representatives of the Middle East in the WFTU, adds another
dramatic dimension to the incident
The preponderance of Jewish capital is stressed in many narratives. Sayyid 'Abd al-Wahhfib
remembers a number of famous factories (Michel Iliyfis, Lskandar George Averino, Sibâhî one
and two, Francois N isir, George Aswad, Gharib Latlf, etc.) and stresses th a t even though
companies were nominally the property of members of the Egyptian governm ent in reality
they belonged to Jews.27
The names mentioned above, though, would suggest that those companies were the property
of Syrian Christians. The discourse about the influence of Jewish capital on Egyptian economy
is very generalizing, and in Egypt it has become common knowledge that:
“Jews had penetrated Egyptian economy deeply, and in some factories and eco­
nomic projects in Egypt the whole adminstration, from the director to the typist,
consisted of Jews. The degree to which Jews had penetrated Egyptian economy
becomes evident from the fact that 98% of the brokers were Jews, apart from the
fact that Jews completely dominated 103 Egyptian companies, out of a total of 308
companies.”28
Jews are said to have conquered ground in Egyptian economy with their “well-known Jew­
ish ways and style.”29 What could those well-known ways be? Probably what Berque listed
as attributes for successful Coptic, Syrian, and Jewish middlemen with foreign banks in the
19th century: tact, linguistic virtuosity, family connections, and the security of foreign consular
protection through blackmail or bribery, because big business deals in Egypt implied cosmopoli­
tanism.30

SâPÂsiôiirï^TSI
»al-Sirtfl 1992.
»Maifcaz al-buhOth al-'anbiyya 1999,30.
a Hu*nI 1993,33-36. See also chapter about Minorities and Jews.
29See also the chapter on Jews.
®Berque 1972, 186. The Economic Council, which was instituted in 1922 to control the rate of prices, in­
vestment and economic circuits in Egypt was comprised of six government members, ten Egyptians and seven
Europeans (2 Italians, 2 Britons, 1 Frenchman and one Belgian). Jews are not mentioned. In a list of contrac­
tors for building materials, Berque finds among fifty names only three eastern names. He considers Nicolas Diab,
Mosaeri, Curiel & Co. and Salim Rabbat locals, yet non-Muslims. Ibid., 293. In import and export trade foreigners
and a handful of Levantine dominated. But in 1943 foreign wealth represented only 6-7% of Egypt’s wealth, a
third of the proportion it reached in 1914. Ibid., 397.

236

CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

12.4 Elites among Workers
Taha Sa'd really only worked as a weaver for a very short period in his life. He was soon
promoted to become the foreman of a department (rä’is qism), later of a complete factory. Then
he worked as a teacher, but he never lost touch with the workers and their struggle, and decided
to continue on that path.
Muhammad FakhrT, who had received a diploma in technology and industry in 1931, and
started to work in the National Weaving Company in Alexandria, then in a factory producing
artificial silk, finally worked as the general manager of the office for cement sales in the ministry
of housing and building.31
Tiba did not go to work in a factory at all. He was an administrative employee in the min­
istry of war, and worked as an EMNL cadre mainly among railway workers. His promotion to
the administration was not unusual for a skilled worker. MitwallT Muhammad Bahr, a Nubian
worker in the Salt and Soda Factory in Alexandria, completed secondary education at a night
school in Alexandria (where he met Shaikh Safwin AbO’l-Fath, who had been in the first com­
munist movement as a teacher). MitwallT Muhammad Bahr later became the secretary of the
Oahriyya school in Buhaira.32
From a skilled worker in a factory Ahmad Khidr advanced to what we would nowadays call
a manager in a factory in Upper Egypt, responsible for the setting up of a new weaving factory,
the administration, and the introduction of workers to the profession of weaving. The factory
owner was not an Egyptian but a khawaga, speaking fluent Arabic, even Egyptian dialect
In comparison, Sayyid 'Abd al-Wahhäb’s memories of work are rather gloomy: he used to
work for 16 hours in the beginning. There were no busses to take the workers, they had to march
long ways on foot to reach the factories. Sudanese guards were used as security personnel inside
the factories, and they beat the workers mercilessly. In 1941 workers asked to reduce the lunch
break, in order to save a quarter of an hour to be able to leave earlier and ride home by train.
Police was called in. They tied the workers to horses and made them run to the police station,
where they were kept in the stables for three days.
Though there were differences among workers concerning origin and education, the hierar­
chy in the factory helped a lot in dividing the ranks. Taha Sa’d was elected to the board of the
Shubra al-Khayma Mechanized Textile Workers’ Union (SKMTWU) in 1938, at the age of only
22. Until 1941 workers and foremen (ru’asä’) had been united in one syndicate. The foremen
were used by factory owners as a whip to keep workers in check. Though factory owners were
still foreigners, or mutamassirin, in their majority (Taha Sa'd believes 90%)33, Egyptians had
taken over leading positions on the shop floor by the end of WW II. But they still felt threatened
by their foreign colleagues. Foremen held a certificate from the School of Applied Arts or the
Technical School. They would sack workers, note latecomers, collect fines, punish workers
who spent too much time in the lavatories, and cut wages. Of 25 members of the board of the
SKMTWU, 16 held certificates and were foremen.
31Muhammad ‘AITFahml Fakhrf, bom 1932, joined the communist movement at the age of fifteen in 1947,first
the DMNL and then a number of different groups. He remained loyal to the idea of communism even after the
dissolution of the party in 1964. Markaz al-buhflth al-'arabiyya 1999,113-139.
32MitwaltI Muhammad Bahr. born 1930, a member of the Egyptian Communist Party (al-rOya). Markaz albuhOth al-'arabiyya 1999.103-110.
13Egyptian statistics and books show that between 1933 and 1948 311 companies, out of 347, were nominally
Egyptian, and their capital amounted to 74,8 million L.E., out of 87,1 million L.E. invested in industrial enterprises
in Egypt Yet the board of directors in Egyptian companies was shared between Egyptians, mutamassirin and
foreigners, with the percentage of Egyptians reaching 37,5%, mutamassirin 10,5% and foreigners 52%. MitwaW
1974.

12J . WORKERS AND MUSLIM BROTHERS

237

“There was the idea of an intelligentsia. The foremen thought the workers stupid,
second rate. T m an effendi, my father spent money on me.’ ”
Therefore, when workers started to turn against foremen, and did not elect the “bad” ones
to the board anymore, they founded a syndicate of their own, the syndicate of foremen and their
assistants, open only to those.
“Workers had reservations against those foremen. When they nominated them­
selves for the elections, they did not vote for them. But there were foremen the
workers elected to the board of the syndicate, the ones who defended the workers.
As I told you, they were 16 out of the 23 qualified who were holding certificates
and foremen of departments. I was the foreman of the silk department, FadfilT the
foreman of a shift, Muhammad al-Fawâkhrî the foreman of a department in the
SibShT factory, M ukhtir al-HawSrl was the foreman of a department and all of us
were connected to the workers.”34
Taha Sa'd 'UthmSn believes that the educated skilled worker {al-muthaqqaf al-mihnT) was
an important link to the mass workers and the leading figure. The ideal workers’ leader was
not only educated but also religious and committed (mutadayyin and multazim), fearing God,
and taking care not only of his wordly life but also of his life in the hereafter, working for the
poor and against the rich. Taha Sa'd 'UthmSn himself was such a man. Therefore, workers were
able to consider him a good example of a Marxist and proof that what the Muslim Brothers and
much of the press said about Communists was not true.

12.5 Workers and Muslim Brothers
Taha Sa'd 'UthmSn has a very traditional and deeply religious background. As a teenager he had
been active as a teenager in the Sharieih Association and fought against the shaikhs, i.e. the AlAzhar establishment who exploited the misery of the people, convincing them that a visit to the
grave of some holy man, a vow, or holding a zdr (a typical popular Egyptian ritual to exorcize an
evil spirit), always combined with a gift to the shaikh, would relieve them from their anxieties
and help them solve daily problems. Taha Sa'd, like religious and secularist leaders of his time,
was against such practices. This was not the right Islam, not Islam as the scripture taught it.
Like Gellner, the ethnologist mentioned in the first chapter, Taha Sa'd believed that the spread of
education and the power of the printing press, as well as the progress of industrialization, would
bring the victory of Islamic high culture over low popular culture. For Taha Sa'd 'UthmSn,
Islam was the religion of the poor, it supported the poor and their rights. Islam was against the
rich, who tyrannized the poor. In the Koran, people were measured by their devotion. They had
34Personal interview with Taha Sa'd 'Uthmln Shubra al-Khaima 14th November 1999. Details about Taha
Sa'd are also based on handwritten manuscripts, handed over by him to the author : QirO'afl ba'd al-watha'iq li

munazuunat lalTat al-'ummOl; al-tabaqa al-'âmila wa al-qadiyya al-wataniyya, al-slra al-dhtoiyya li al-mawHtin
al-imsrfjaha Sa'd'UthmOn. For details on the workers* movement see: Beinin and Lockman 1988; ‘Abbâs 1967.
In 1945 the workers' syndicate was dissolved and the foremen's syndicate remained, and later trade unions based
on professions were founded (ittihad mihnl) and workers and foremen were again organized together. But the
subject of this study is not the development of the syndicalist movement in Egypt, but the discourse about the
communist movement and the different social classes and political groups involved in it. I refer, therefore, to the
above mentioned basic studies for further information about the syndicalist movement, though in Arabic there are
many more about separate aspects and events.

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an equal right to water, air, and the satisfaction of all their needs. Taha Sa'd found communism
close to those ideas.
Taha Sa'd TJthmân had joined the Muslim Brothers in 1933. During that period, the Muslim
Brothers were considered “the community of the poor and the wretched of the earth.” Taha Sa'd
joined and became a member of one of the battalions.
“We would go on Thursdays at night, pray, and then enter our room. Everybody
from the family31 would take all his money out of his pocket and put it together on
a handkerchief. Some had a lot, some had little, some did not have anything. We
wanted to buy supper. We went out all of us and bought tea, if we wanted anything
we got it all together, and then we sat down to study.”36
Taha Sa'd’s studies with the Muslim Brothers were not limited to religious studies, he read
books about history as well, and they discussed about the British and the Egyptian national
movement. When they left at the end of the night, everyone would receive his transport fares,
and the rest of the money would be shared equally. Taha Sa'd joined the Muslim Brothers
because he believed that they wanted all society to become that way, a society of brothers.
And he turned against them when he discovered that “the rich” joined them and dominated the
organization. They started to be against workers and their demands.
“People even directed the police towards active workers to arrest them.”
He completely broke up with the Muslim Brothers in 1946. Workers were on strike, and
the Muslim Brothers would spread the news among the people that a strike was against the
prescriptions of Islam. People were supposed to be content with what God had given them. He
who was not satisfied was a kafir, an unbeliever, and an enemy of Islam.
“And they said that who ate a Jew’s bread would die from a Jew’s sword.”
All that alienated not only Taha Sa'd but people in Shubra al-Khaima in general from the
Muslim Brothers.
Taha Sa'd was not the only worker who had felt attracted by the Muslim Brothers. Ahmad
al-Gibâlï37 felt attracted by the Muslim Brothers and the rovers, and he even bought their uni­
form. He loved their military drill, but their role in the strike in 1946 disenchanted him with the
movement because the Muslim Brothers engaged strike breakers and burst through the picket­
ing line. 1948 stayed in his memory not because of the first war in Palestine, but because the
workers he had admired and lived with in one house had been arrested because they were Com­
munists. He started to learn and to read by himself, and after they had been released from prison
MJaha Sa'd himself called it usm, but since he joined the Muslim Brothers in 1935 and the family system
was only introduced in the 1940s, he must have been refering to the kato’ib system. According to that system
three groups numbering forty each would meet at night to keep a vigil. Workers, students, civil servants and
merchants were organized in different groups. They spent together one night a week, with a minimum of sleep and
a maximum of common and private prayer and meditation. Hasan al-Banna himself would deliver lectures during
those sessions. Members of those battalions were supposed to be trained in ’action, obedience, and silence.’ In
1943 only, the family system was established (nizAm al-usar). The active members among the Muslim Brothers
were divided into ‘families’ of first five, later ten members each. Socially, the Brothers were advised to make
the most of ‘the brotherly’ relationships of the family, financially, members of the family were made ‘mutually
responsible* for each other, sharing each other’s burdens, needs and gains. Mitchell 1969,197-198.
34Personal interview with Taha Sa'd, Shubra al-Khaima 14th November 1999. If not further indicated the
following quotations are also from the interview with Taha Sa'd.
37Markaz al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1998,147-133.

12.6. WORKERS AND COMMUNISTS

239

(Sayyid ‘Abd al-Wahhäb Nadda, LutfT ‘Abd al-Rahmfin, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Gawfid al-Qutn,
and others) he joined their organization, the Workers’ Vanguard.38
Other workers, like Sayyid 'Abd al-WahhSb or Ahmad Khidr, did not feel anything but dis­
dain for the Muslim Brothers. The Muslim Brothers were admonishing workers to be obedient
to God and the prophet and the guardians, in this case the factory owners. The Muslim Brothers
used a militia dressed in khaki, and terrorized workers in the street According to Sayyid 'Abd
al-Wahhfib, the Muslim Brothers even took hold of a syndicate in 1946, and made it a condition
for membership that workers had to be members of their organization to join. They deprived
workers of their right to strike, and became the political police’s henchmen.

12.6 Workers and Communists
The Muslim Brothers had a language that was understood by workers. Communists were more
difficult to understand because they did not convey their message in an easy way. They used
terms like “imperialism” and “liberalism” or “feudalism.” Taha Sa'd is convinced that people
used such expressions to show off. It would have been much better to say “the landowners”
instead of “feudalists,” or the “owners of the palaces,” or simply: “those who live in Garden
City.”
It was not easy to recruit workers for a political movement. Personal contacts played a big
part because of the lack of legal means to disseminate propaganda material, and because of the
poverty of the environment and the illiteracy of the clientele. Most of the workers in Shubra alKhaima, as in other regions in Egypt, came from the villages surrounding the industrial area. In
fact, they were peasants who worked their shift and then returned to their fields. Easiest to orga­
nize and most militant were the workers who were literate, the busdrivers, the tramway workers,
especially the conductors. Contacts extending from the factories to the villages were very few,
attempts to organize fallahin difficult. Even though many workers had a rural background, they
would concentrate their efforts to organize militant action on the factory. In theory, Taha Sa'd’s
organization, the Workers’ Vanguard, also believed that fallahin, because of their sheer num­
ber and the misery of their living conditions, were the army of the revolution, but to organize
them seemed to be too difficult a task. Theorizing about fallahin was much easier than taking
action. Workers could have different backgrounds, they came from the School of Applied Arts,
they could have spent two or three years in secondary school, or directly come from the fields
to the factories. But in a factory there would be several hundred or more workers sharing the
same interests, being united in one demand, suffering from the same conditions, and earning the
same wages. Police surveillance and the pressure of factory owners made movement outside
that environment difficult. Workers tended to concentrate on their own economic interests.
“To gather three or fourfallahin around one problem was very difficult, and to work
with them even more.”*
* Ahmad Al-GiMITs narrative ia interesting because he talks about a conflict at the factory that appears in no
other narrative. In the beginning of 1951 the Da’Od Addas factory in Shubra was divided in two sections, one
belonged to the Muslims, and the other to the Christians. In a fight against the administration, that wanted to
dismiss the old workers who received high wages, and employ new workers or even old ones with new contracts,
werken joined the Greater Cairo Mechanized Textile Workers' Union. But that was not the main victory, it seems
more important u> Ahmad Al-Gibah that the workers' division among Muslims and Christians was ended, and
finally joint committees were formed. This narrative adds a new dimension to the conflict, and it contradicts
the discourse that presents workers and socially deprived groups in Egyptian society as Muslims only, hence
demanding an approach solely rooted in Islamic culture and tradition.

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Taha Sa'd had come in touch with Communists between 1942 and 1943. Martial law made
political activity very difficult.
“We thought about forming a secret committee to see to our interests, because po­
litical police were persecuting us, and the government was persecuting us, and the
factory owners were after us, and most of them were foreigners. So we formed
a small committee, called the Committee of the Workers’ Vanguard (lajnat ta lfat
al-'ummät). We sat together a few times, issued three or four pamphlets about un­
employment, about workers’ interests that were harmed by the war, about the high
prices. Those were pamphlets issued under the name of the Workers’ Vanguard,
but they were not distributed in public. YQsuf DarwTsh had contacted us between
1942-43.”
It was important for Taha Sa'd to point out that workers in Shubra had already started a
magazine of their own, majallat Shubra. MahmQd al-'Askaii was the chief-editor and Taha Sa'd
was on the board of editors. Money was the main problem. In the narrative about subsequent
activities in the 1940s, the engagement in the elections, and the candidacy of FadâÏÏ 'Abd alMagld, a worker, for parliament, and the preparations for the World Congress of Trade Unions
in Paris in 1943, Taha Sa'd bypasses any contacts or interferences of non-workers. On the
contrary, to admit the involvement of elements other than workers in those activities would
have offended sensibilities. Therefore, YQsuf DarwTsh’s activity in the Workers’ Committee for
National Liberation (lajnat al-'ummâl li al-tahrtr al-qauml), which was founded in 1943, was
kept secret:
“YQsuf DarwTsh was a lawyer in the mixed courts, and then a lawyer in the national
Egyptian courts, after he had received a license to practice law from the Univer­
sity of Alexandria. He played a big part in defending workers in labor trials for
a number of syndicates because a big part of the factory owners were foreigners
who enjoyed the privileges given to foreigners before they were abolished. He had
converted to Islam, and was deeply linked to the workers. In spite of his enthusi­
asm in defending their rights without worrying about being paid for his efforts, as
other lawyers were • in many cases he even refused to be paid, and took a symbolic
payment only - in spite of all that, there was a sensitivity concerning non-workers
engaging in workers’ affairs and their organizations. And apart from that, there was
the wish to establish a backup to the leadership in the committee that was unknown
to the public, to be able to continue work in case the known leaders were thrown
into prison or something like that, which was to be expected.”
All that led to the unanimous agreement that YQsuf DarWTsh’s name would not be among
the signatures on the declaration of the committee and its program.39
Sayyid 'Abd al-Wahhäb’s urge to get organized politically was based on his wish to defend
the workers against the foremen, who would order them to be tortured. Therefore he became a
syndicalist in 1942, and in 1943 he joined the EMNL.
M*Uthmfn 1988,34-62, here p. 43. In 1943 the Wochen* Committee for National Liberation was announced
the day after martial law had been lifted (8th October 1943). The program concentrated on the liberation of the
popular classes from colonialism and exploitation. The committee was supposed to become a political platform
for workers. To call it a “party" would have caused confusion because ‘AbbSs Halim’s Workers’ Party already
existed. Taha Sa'd presents the committee as a workers’ initiative, based publicly on the shoulders of six men:
MahmOd al-'Askarf, MahmOd Muhammad Qutb, Muhammad MadbOH Sullmin, Jaha Sa'd Uthmin, Muhammad
YQsuf, and MahmOd Hamza. YQsuf DarwTsh was a member of the committee as well, though a secret one.

12.6. WORKERS AND COMMUNISTS

241

Ahmad Khidr had held some admiration for Hiller, and it took until 1943 that he came in
touch with communism. Ahmad had been in and out of work many times, and he had been
the leader of a strike in one of the weaving factories. A man came and sat with him in a café
to discuss the strike. That man, HilmI Hamid, did not only talk with him, but also gave him
material to read, and Ahmad became convinced of communist ideas and joined the EMNL.
Ahmad Khidr was a committed comrade. Much of his work took place in cafés, as did the work
of the Muslim Brothers. He met workers, he invited them for a drink, he went to special places
to meet them, and he paid part of his salary to the organization.
In 1944, following a strike at the Kum and Qubani Weaving Company, he was fired, harrassed by the police, and his name was put on a blacklist of people who were not to be employed
anymore. He stayed without work for 25 months. He did not take money from his organization,
on the contrary, he was proud not to have been a burden to them but to have lived on the finan­
cial contributions of normal workers, who helped him because of his commitment. His father
supported him because of his appreciation for Ahmad Khidr as a fighter, and because finally
they had become very close. Solidarity reached across party lines, and Muhammad al-'Askarl
helped him through though, at the time he was affiliated with the Young Men’s Association for
Popular Culture (jam 'iyyat al-shabâb li al-thaqâfa al-sha'biyya), which later developed into the
Workers’ Vanguard.
In 1946 he was charged with vagrancy and thrown into prison. He started a hunger strike,
and members of parliament, journalists, and artists, like the communist poet 'Abd al-Rahmin
Al-SharqiwT and the Wafdist Muhammad MandQr, supported him in public. Finally, the judge
reached the conclusion that the political police had fabricated a case against Khidr. In the 1940s,
a trade unionist, even a known Communist, could hope for a sympathetic public, a critical press,
and an independent, unbiased judge.40
Ahmad Khidr was successful in recruiting workers and peasants to the communist ranks.
After he had won his case in 1946, he intensified his political activities and came to many vil­
lages and factories: to the workers in the bus company in al Minya, to the irrigation workers,
and even to Assiut and Sohag. He did not stop at the doors of the Muslim Youth Organiza­
tion nor at the threshold of the Young Men Christian Association in al-Minya, and managed to
recruit new elements who were not necessarily only workers but students as well.41 In his nar­
rative he stresses that he managed to forge ties with Wafdist personalities also, and to challenge
established competitive forces.42
In the 1950s, Ahmad Khidr became the leader of the groups he was involved in, in 1957, he
was also a member of the central committee of the Egyptian Communist Party. Being always
active as a militant “on the ground,” he suffered from the splits in the movement. He had not
paid much attention to the merger between Iskra and the EMNL. But when the DMNL became
divided, he joined the Iskra renegades - all of them students - and became a member of one of
the fractions, the Revolutionary Workers Bloc (al-ummOliyya al-thauriyya), which later became
the Red Star (al-najm al-ahmar). He felt disappointed because the brilliant students, who had
made him leave his old EMNL comrades, left the country after a short while to complete their
doctorates in France or England. And he favored a new merger with the DMNL, against other
voices who were more inclined to the Workers’ Vanguard whom Khidr experienced as a group
always about to sow dissent
From Taha Sa'd’s point of view, the Workers’ Vanguard was the real representative of work« ta riu z al-fauptth al-'arabiyya 1998.46-47.
4l1b establish the contact with the YMCA, he needed the help of Louis Ishlq, however, who was a Copt himself.
^H e mentions Prince ’AbMs HalTm and his influence in Upper Egypt See for deuils on ‘Abbts Hallrn footnote

«36.

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CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

ers’ demands. It held the principle of democratic centralism really high. Workers’ demands
were heard and respected. Leaders of his organization, like Ahmad Sidiq Sa'd, however, ad­
mitted in other interviews that democratic centralism was theory but not practice. The Workers*
Vanguard had been a democratic and nationalist force, but it had difficulties, like other groups,
to turn into a workers* party, and make workers instead of students the leading force.43 When
the students’ section caused problems in 1951, the organization reacted strictly and closed down
the whole section, not a very democratic behavior. Only once, in 1957, elections took place,
from the rank and file to the top.44
Workers had a culture of their own, they used to say zagal, i.e. poems in stanzas, recited in
local dialect. They used to sing together. They loved Sayyid DarwTsh’s songs of the craftsmen,
and identified with them. Still, in many cases the identification with the home village or the
home region was stronger than the common identity as workers, and led to conflicts. In Shubra
al-Khaima they had a way of solving conflicts that engaged the majlis al-'am b, which meant
that representatives of the conflicting groups would come and sit together, and follow a ritual
of having tea first, saying a mawwOl, discussing the problem, and, in case there was still time
left, reciting more poetry or singing. This was a culture that was still more related to the village
than to the city, and it was distinct from the culture of the middle classes and the elite. Workers
had their own cafes to sit in, they lived in their own neighborhoods, close to the factories,
like Shubra al-Khaima. Though there were also workers who lived in downtown areas, like
Rud al-Farag or Sayyida Zainab. If they had to go to Shubra al-Khaima for work, they would
gather for the factory bus to take them from the old Opera Square. Workers were confronted
with different lifestyles, the lifestyle and the tradition of the village and the city. They were
confronted with those differences in their environment, but even more so when they became
organized in communist groups.
The cadres’ school (madrvsat al-kawüdir) that had been brought to life by Henri Curiel and
the EMNL and was continued in the DMNL caused disturbances among workers. Curiel’s first
school, though, had not been focused on workers only. But once the DMNL had come into
being and the demand for proletarization became louder, mainly former Iskra members pushed
for workers to receive sound theoretical training, in order to become future leaders.
Marxism is an ideology based on the belief in science. Man can change nature and alter the
course of history. Freedom is the ultimate promise. Once alienation has been overcome, the
only limit of man’s activity will be those laws of nature which have not yet been overcome.
The belief in science was also prevalent in the Egyptian communist movement, though strict
adherence to scientific explanations clashed with the traditional metaphysical explanation of the
world. As in Bolshewism, Egyptian Communists cherished the image of the proletarian party
43They lent workers to the national committee in 1946, while other groupa sent only students, and they had
workers' support in many cities and places like Alexandria, Port Said and Kafr al-Dawwir. YOsuf al-Mudarrik
had been sent to the WFTU congress with the endorsement of 70,000 workers, who could have been used as a
mass basis for the organization. It was only after the magazines al-jamlr and al-fajr al-jadld had been forbidden
in 1946 that YOsuf DarwTsh, Sidiq Sa'd, Raymond Douek, MahmOd al-'Askarf and perhaps al-Mudarrik agreed
to form the Popular Vanguard (al-talta al-sha'biyya). Sidiq Sa'd and YOsuf DarwTsh, al-'Askaif and later Ahmad
Rushdl Silih, an Egyptian journalist were central committee members. The name of the organization remained
secret. Differences with other groups had to be cleared up in practice, which would naturally lead to the formation
of a single organization. Ahmad §idiq Sa'd in an interview with Rifs'! Al-Sald, dated from 1973, published in:
Al-Sald 1989,253-269.
44The group’s first name, the Popular Vanguard for Liberation (al-falla al-sha'biyya Ual-taharrur / fisht) was
soon changed into the Workers’ Vanguard (talfat al-'ummdl) to express a class position. Other people called them
the Popular Democracy (al-dbnuqrdtiyya al-sha'biyya) because they had adopted Mao’s theory about the new
democracy. And they were called the New Dawn (al-fajr al-jadld) as well. Personal interview with YOsuf Darwtsfa
in Cairo 14th November and 20th December 1999.

12.6. WORKERS AND COMMUNISTS

243

as an army of engineers, at once acting in accordance with the laws of history and struggling to
force their will on the process of history.
“Extreme voluntarism and scienticism w oe the insignia of an elite that forces an
obstinate mass into a new direction.”45
Sayyid 'Abd al-Wahhäb was among the workers who joined the cadre school after the foun­
dation of the DMNL (though he had been an EMNL member since 1943). The cadre school
was supposed to prepare workers for leading functions.46
Curiel and the EMNL were against those courses because they argued that real education
was through struggle, and theory would be gained in discussions. ’Abd al-WahhSb took several
training courses. The difference, compared to the first cadre school initiated by Curiel himself,
was that the teachers were now Islcra members (’Abd al-Rahmin Nâsir, ‘Abd al-Ma'bQd AlGibaill, and others), students, whose attempt to educate workers in Marxist theory was certainly
tinged with the wish to assert their own supremacy in that realm, since they could not compete
with workers concerning experience in class struggle, or even experience in life and contact to
the masses. In all the workers’ narratives, Iskra receives a very bad rating. It did not fight but
was only interested in education and “journeys” (rihlat).47
Workers imbued with the logic of dialectic materialism would feel arrogant towards their
colleagues, they attacked religious values in public, bragged about their newly acquired insights,
and mocked the belief in God once they discovered the secret of surplus value. They fought with
the 'Askariyün, the workers who were followers of MahmQd al-'Askari, Taha Sa‘d, YQsuf alMudarrik, workers who were eager to defend what they considered to be the Egyptian workers’
culture and tradition, the values of religion. They felt offended and hurt, and even worse, they
were angry because they found the cause of communism violated, and the Muslim Brothers
furnished with new ammunition to attack communist workers.
Communism was neither about atheism nor about loose ethics. It did not mean promiscuity.
On the contrary, it meant to cling to a strict set of ethics. Slogans like “Attract with sex and bind
with theory” (igzib bil-jins wa urbuf bil-nazariyya) became famous, though it is not known
who really brought them up. They were probably bom by juvenile foolishness, or circulated
to illustrate what were allegedly Iskra practices. Those practices (parties, journeys, etc.) were
portrayed as totally alien to the milieu Egyptian workers lived in, and harmful to the commu­
nist organizations themselves. Especially Taha Sa*d emphasizes that workers were particularly
conservative.
There might have been other differences, though, which prompted the Workers’ Vanguard’s
members to attack other communist workers. Within the framework of the discussion about the
relation between intellectuals and workers, the Workers’ Vanguard had the most dogmatic view.
It was against Communists being active in workers’ strongholds because they were mainly in­
tellectuals. (But according to Ahmad Khidr, the Workers’ Vanguard was only interested in
economical questions and in attacking others Communists. The group consisted only of a few
intellectuals behind a theoretical magazine, and could not boast of mass work or pamphlets.)4*
In prison in 1948, MahmOd al-’Askarf was the spokesman of a trend in the workers’ movement
45Thylor 1987,729.
46According to Sayyid 'Abd al-Wahhib Nadi, about 30 worker» joined the cadre school, among them ‘AdH
Girgia, Muhammad Shaga, 'Abd al-Min’am al-ShaAT, Mustafa Baqahbh and Sayyid himself. They studied for six
months.
47Ahmad Khajr's comment on Iskm in an interview with Rifat Al-Sald, 23rd February 1976, and following
report about the Red Star (td-nqjm al-ahmar), in: Al-SaTd 1989,333-341.

“ Ibid.

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CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

- which was close to the Workers’ Vanguard - and which considered the appearance of Commu­
nists in Shubra al-Khaima a “catastrophe” for the Egyptian working class. He demanded that
Communists keep away from factories. The trade union movement and the workers’ movement
had to be independent of all political trends among Egyptian intellectuals, including the Com­
munists. Other communist groups did not share this view but insisted on communist activities
among workers. Intellectuals had the task of disseminating communist thought among work­
ers to strengthen political awareness. They were convinced that the working class could not
develop a political consciousness unless they were helped by an external catalyst49
The problem between workers and intellectuals, though, was not confined to the Workers’
Vanguard. By the end of 1952, it was also one of the reasons for a split in the DMNL over the
future political line, with a further pursuit of legal political activity and a further cooperation
with national democratic forces being the most contested issues. The DMNL had favored die
foundation of mass organizations linked to the international community, like women’s orga­
nizations and students’ organization. The activity of DMNL (and other communist) cadres in
support of the Stockholm appeal fell also within this framework.*30 But legal political activity,
like the peace movement, was a volatile issue because many intellectuals were involved, and it
was an activity likely to attract • and to need - big names and social capital, which, from the
beginning, excluded people from a humble background, and workers.91
4*Mubirak 'Abdu Fadl in his memories, published in: Al-Sa’id 1989,123-210, here 140-141. MuMrak ’Abdu
Fadl (bom in 1927) had been a Nubian student at Al-Azhar since 1942, and had been active in the EMNL, later in
the DMNL. He came from the poorest section of Egyptian society, experiencing not only the hardship of poverty,
but also of racial discrimination against the Nubians in Egyptian society. See also chapter about Curiel.
30When in April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union started a massive peace cam­
paign aimed at the non-communist governments and public opinion in the western world. The First World Peace
Congress took place in Paris in April 1949, and was followed in 1950 by the Stockholm appeal, the first mass
signature campaign, which was initiated in March 1950. The signatures were handed to the UN. Among the 500
million signatures, 15 million came from France and 17 million from Italy, and the entire Soviet adult population
had signed the appeal. See: Nigel Gould Davies, Pacifist Blowback? New Evidence on the Soviet Peace Cam­
paign in the Early 1950s. cwihp-document 03/99 Bulletin 11-cold war flashpoints, under cwhip.s.cdu. Cold War
International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
51After the DMNL had supported the July revolution because some of the officers had been close to the orga­
nization, it started to attack the army and demand its retreat to the barracks. In the communist movement, the
DMNL had come under attack as the army's supporter. The DMNL in its majority still was in favor of the coop­
eration with the national democratic forces and with legal work, while the then secretary genera) SuITmfin al-Riflff
(Badr) supported revolutionary committees at a grassroot basis and was against the line of the national democratic
forces. Since he could not find a majority, he split with HamdT 'Abd al-Gawfid and Fu’fid 'Abd al-Hallm to found
the Revolutionary Trend (al-tayyfir al-thaurî). Mubfirak 'Abdu Fadl believes that SuITmän al-RiflTs oppositional
policy was due to his sensitivity towards intellectuals. “At that time Badr campaigned strongly against the intel­
lectuals and especially against Kamil ‘Abd al-Hallm, ZakI Murid and Ahmad al-RiflT. The three of them were
very important in the activities of the peace movement. Badr's violent campaign against their public relations work
was based mainly on (alleging) that they exhausted their energy in that public relations work and did not harbor
enough interest for party work. Therefore he drew close to Muslim (Sayyid Khalil Türk) as a worker, and tried to
approach Muhammad ‘All Amir though he did not succeed. There were a lot of problems. For example, by the
end of 1951 there was a conflict when Kamil 'Abd al-Hallm suggested the promotion of ‘AIT al-Shalqinl to the
central committee because of his broad public relations work in the peace movement Badr was against i t His
opposition was correct but he expressed it in an incorrect manner, since it took the form of a campaign against
intellectuals and against public relations work." Badr's aversion against intellectuals had begun earlier than 1952,
Mubirak 'Abdu Fadl claims. He believes that Badr also played a role in the relegation of the second man in the
DMNL hiérarchie, Kamfil Sha'bfin (ShauqT), in 1950. Interview with Mubfirak 'Abdu Fadl published in: Al-Sa'fd
1989,365-370, here p. 365. The conflict between the DMNL secretary general, Sulïmfin al-RiffcT, and intellectu­
als is mentioned many times in the first part of the interview. In his memories, Mubfirak 'Abdu Fadl reiterates the
same ideas about the conflict between intellectuals and workers. 'AIT al-Shalqfinl is again mentioned as a source of
dissent. Kamfil 'Abd al-Hallm voted in favor of his promotion to the central committee because he was so active

12.7. WORKERS, FOREIGNERS, AND JEWS

245

12.7 Workers, foreigners, and Jews
Fixation on sexuality as an instrument of corruption is a repeated subject in the discourse about
the communist movement in Egypt Workers in their original environment - as the popular
masses in general - were supposed to be immune from corruption, pure, in a state of native
virginity. This view reflected the impression of the British colonialists that education, above all
western education, spoilt the natives, and that the true inhabitants of Egypt were the fallah and
in the peace movement Reasons against him were that he had spent the critical years between 1948-51 in Paris.
Mubftrak (Abdu Fadl was against him, as was SutTmän al-RifäT because they doubted his stamina and his qualities
as a fighter. In spite of their opposition he became a central committee member and as they had expected was a
complete failure. After Cairo burnt he left the communist movement “In spite of the non-existence of political
theoretical conflicts in the DMNL the absence of Curiel from the DMNL, with his property of being the spiritual
father and the politically responsible person in the DMNL, let certain contradictions in the leadership of the three
(Sayyid SulTmän al-RifäT, Kamäl *Abd al-HalTm, and Muhammad Shatta) come to the foreground, especially after
Kamäl Sha'bän had retreated completely. It could be observed that Shatta did not offer himself openly as a com­
petitor to Sayyid SulTmän because conditions did not allow him to do so. He had defected from the DMNL to the
Revolutionary Proletariat (al-'ummdliyya al-thauriyya) and then returned to the camp, criticizing himself. But he
sided with Kamäl (Abd al-Hallm in some situations.“ Ibid., 197-198. Still, SulTmän al-RifäT, who was supported
by medium cadres, was not successful in managing conflicts in the central committee. He built up a confrontation
line, maintaining that there were two trends in the DMNL, one revolutionary, led by him, including Sayyid Türk
and other workers, as well as his colleagues from the airforce (Fu’äd HabbashT, Yusuf Mustafa and al-Gunaid
'AIT Umar) and an opportunist trend led by Kamäl 'Abd al-Haßm, including some intellectuals. After Curiel had
been banned from Egypt the central committee was comprised of Sayyid SulTmän al-RifäT, YQsuf Mustafa, alGunaid 'AIT Umar and Mubärak 'Abdu Fadl. They met on a daily basis. Kamäl 'Abd al-Hafim and Kamäl Sha'bän
were absent because 'Abd al-HalTm was busy with his public relations work in the peace movement, and Sha'bän
wanted to stop being a professional politician for private reasons. Kamäl Sha'bän had been a very good organizer.
When he left, SulTmän al-RifäT was the politically responsible person and responsibility for the organization was
shared by 'Abdu Fadl and YQsuf Mustafa, sometimes al-RifäT as well. Problems existed mainly between Sayyid
SulTmän al-RifäT and Kamäl 'Abd al-Halîm about the amount of work invested in public relations. Actually it
was a natural contradiction between somebody engaged in public activity and visible and somebody else working
behind the scenery. SulTmän al-Rifl'T considered his position in the DMNL more important He saw himself fit to
lead because of his activity in the organization and his working class origin. This idea clashed with the behavior
of Iskra activists in the organization, and SulTmän believed that Kamäl 'Abd al-HalTm not only refused him the
respect he deserved, but also competed with him for a leading position. Al-Sayyid SulTmän al-RifäT came from
a petit bourgeois family. His father had been a subaltern police officer of rural origin. Al-RifäT went to a tech­
nical college (al-madresa al-çan'iyya) and joined the airforce, hoping to become a pilot But contrary to previous
promises, the aircraft mechanics were not allowed to develop their flying skills. This frustrated him and the other
(175) volunteers - who, after all, had a diploma - considerably. In 1943 SulTmän al-RifäT joined the EMNL. A
year later, 80 colleagues had joined the organization. They came from the workshops and the squadron and were
civilians in their majority. Recruitment in the army itself started only afterwards. According to al-RifäT, IbrähTm
al 'Affär, a pilot, recruited his brother Mukhtär, who was a fine arts student and recruited students at his faculty,
among otheres also Kamäl Sha'bän. Allegedly Mukhtär al-'Attär also began to work at Al-Azhar university and
recruited one of the Azharis which would contradict Mubärak 'Abdu Fadl’s narrative. SulTmän al-RifäT had been
in the first cadre school, together with IbrähTm and Mukhtär al-'Attär, Sayyid Häfiz, Shaikh 'Abd al-Rahmän alThaqäfT, and Kamäl Sha'bän. Their teachers were ZakT Häshim, Ahmad Dimardäsh, TahsTn Al-Masrf and Joe
Million. Interestingly, SulTmän does not mention Curiel. In Perrault*s book, though, he is quoted as complaining
about Curiel’s Arabic, but finding him the most intelligible among the intellectuals. Perrault 1991, 136. Having
finished the course he became a central committee member (along with Curiel, al-Masri and others) and a living
proof for successful proletarization. SulTmän underlines that they were all Egyptian Muslims, apart from Curiel
and Matalon. In 1946 Muhammad Shatta (a Shubra al-Khaima textile worker) became another central committee
member. “Proletarization (ta'mll) was only understood as making workers join the leadership, while in reality it
means that serious and active cadres, crucial figures in the working class join. When we merged with Iskra and the
DMNL was established, the slogan was abused. Iskra suggested elements for the leadership that were unimportant
and of no value for the leadership. When we opposed them we were accused of being against proletarization.“
al-RifäT in: Al-SaTd 1989,113. In the EMNL die central committee was directly connected to the sections. Peo-

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the humble people in the cities.12
Temptation lurked not only in the communist intellectuals’ approach to workers, or worse,
in the contact with the bourgeois and the foreigners in the city’s expensive quarters, it could
even occur at work. In his first volume about the history of the workers' struggle in Egypt Jah a
Sa'd 'Uthmän gives us a vivid description of such a case. Because of his activities as a labor
militant and a syndicalist, the British factory director, who had taken over after Henri Pierre
travelled to France to join the French troups, tried to divert him from action.
“He started to seduce me with alcohol and women and sexuality, starting to direct
some of the madames, the female workers, who were working in the factory with us,
to flirt with me and to seduce me. They offered me to visit them in their apartment,
which was located in a villa on the compound of the factory, normally reserved
for foreigners. Then Peck invited me to his house to discuss workers’ issues and
tried the same thing with me [i.e. seducing him I.S.]. (The madames had not
succeeded.) He offered me girls who worked in the department store of Ben Zion,
who were very beautiful and seductive, but my strong belief and my fear of God’s
wrath protected me from visiting his house inspite of his insistence. Especially
because I was imagining that he was pushing me to meet sick women, in order for
me to contract some secret infection, and before my inner eye all the misery of die
museum of hygienics that I had seen in 'Abtfin unfolded.’’13
The factory director did not stop at th at He also tried to bribe Jaha Sa’d with money, and
in the end he threatened him with dismissal. Though in the interviews Taha Sa’d presented
several foreigners he dealt with in the factories as pitifully bad Arabic speakers, Mr Peck even
expresses himself in classical Arabic when be warns him of the consequences of his stubborn
insistence on workers* rights and syndicalist politics.
“He said it in classical Arabic, slowly, with a lot of emphasis on some words,
making his intention really tangible.“14
Whenever it comes to dealing with foreigners, this issue turns up again. In the context of
historiography and the discourse about communist groups in Egypt, it is reiterated frequently as
well. It plays a big part in the anti-Israeli press coverage in Egypt Jaha Sa’d’s allegation that his
director wanted him to contract a sexual disease smacks of Mossad conspiratory schemes which
pie could only reach the central committee when activity expanded in a certain field and there was a real basil,
like in Al-Azhar, the airforce or among the Nubians. The EMNL did not have a special section for foreigners
because there were only about 10. The rest were partisans. But those ten had important activities like Joe Matalun,
David Nahum (Int Union of Commercial Establishment Employees/ CPTSU), Susu Hazan and Shahlta Harfln.
In Iskra there were about 400 foreigners. The first EMNL contacts were with relatively privileged workers. The
EMNL paid more attention to the dissemination of Marxist ideology than the New Dawn group did. It actively
recruited members from all classes of society. Beinin and Lockman believe that because of the higher priority the
EMNL placed on the assimilation of Marxism the first workers who joined were more educated and influenced by
European political ideas than workers in the New Dawn's orbit David Nahum proves their thesis. MNahum himself
was Jewish and had friends and relatives active in the French left, a personal situation much untypical for Egyptian
workers. The CPTSU was based among workers employed by huge and profitable monopoly or semimooopoly
corporations, mainly owned by foreigners. The members of those unions already enjoyed better wages and work­
ing conditions than most Egyptian workers." Beinin and Lockman 1988,329. Their source is an interview with
MahmOd al-'Askarf. See also:'Abbfts 1967,119-120.
52See also chapter about culture.
"'U thm ta 1983,36-37.
*Ibid.

12.7. WORKERS, FOREIGNERS, AND JEWS

247

aie every now and then uncovered in Egypt and in recent times involved Callgirls infected with
AIDS. It is indirectly understood that the women offered to Taha Sa'd were foreigners. In his
personal interview Taha Sa'd claimed that back in the late 1930s there were no female workers
in the working places he was employed in. Contact between men and women was very limited
in the workers’ milieu in Shubra al-Khayma. Taha Sa'd had married a woman from the same
village. Hasan al-Banna, the head of the Muslim Brothers, even attended his wedding. The
woman did not go out to work. Whenever friends came to visit Taha Sa'd, friends he knew from
Technical School and the School of Applied Arts, his wife would not appear. The apartment
was big enough to allow for segregation. In his book published in 1983, Taha Sa'd sets great
store by the fact that:
.. inspite of the friendship between me and Mahmud al-'Askaiî and the comrade­
ship that was stronger than a fraternal bond, we were totally conservative in our
homes. Until be was arrested I had not seen his wife, nor had he seen mine. All our
meetings took place in the house of the syndicate close to both our apartments, and
we would very seldom, and only in case of emergency, meet at home.”33
In 1946 Abfl Saif YQsuf wrote an answer to 'AbbSs Al-'AqqSd’s claim that Nazism and
communism were close to each other, and Marxism a stumbling block for individual initiative,
restricting personal freedom and robbing people of the dignity to decide their own fate. In turn,
Abu Saif lectured Al-'Aqqid about communist morality. Society was at the basis of ethics.
But ethics was no more than imagination, imperatives and prohibitions, ruling good and bad.
Society changed, and so did ethics and its contents. The main difference lay in the economic
system. In a capitalist society ethics served the capitalist, and were a tool to dominate. Real
problems, economic problems, were hidden under the cloak of ethics and religion. There was
talk about honor, shame, honesty, and dignity, and some even returned to the "good forefathers”
and their culture, while others wanted the rich to care for the poor. Fascist organizations were
abusing the ignorance of the people and the weak culture of the educated to stage a “rescue
operation,” attacking bars and coffee-houses, or shouting obscure slogans, instilling fear in
people, and awe and enthusiasm at the same time. Only the socialist state could realize a proper
life for all its citizens.
AbQ Saif’s concept of ethics was obviously very different from Taha Sa'd’s, though they
were in the same communist group, and AbQ Saif was a leading member. Obviously in the
Workers’ Vanguard, as in other communist groups, the moral concept of an intellectual and
journalist like AbQ Saif, and the concept of a skilled worker like Taha Sa'd, were different. This
was not only the difference between an intellectual and a worker. It was also the difference
between a Muslim worker who referred to his religious background, and a Copt intellectual,
for whom exactly that background and the political forces who exploited it were a matter of
challenge and struggle.36
Relations with women was a main mark of difference, not only between Egyptians and
foreigners, as is often claimed in the discourse about the communist movement, but mainly also
among Egyptians themselves. The position of women in a society is a clue to the degree of
industrialization, the relation with modernity, and the role of a monotheistic religion buttressing
a patriarchal society. Though it would be wrong to assume that the development is linear.
Women are not necessarily more repressed in a rural society than they are in a rudimentary
industrial society. In the case of Egypt, two developments are true: in Taha Sa'd’s narrative
“ Ibid., 103.
*Y0**uf 1946,23. See alio: Meijer 1990.112-188.

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CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

there is a basic tendency to stress the conservatism of workers, while at the same time stressing
the active and more equal position of women back in the village.
FikrT Al-KhülTs autobiographical novel, which appeared in the same period as Taha Sa'd’s
writings (the beginning 1980s), stresses a different aspect, namely the wish to escape the narrow
bounds of his village background and to engage in more liberal relations with women. All the
aspects Taha Sacd links to foreign influence - seduction, attraction, sexuality, alcohol - are in
FikiT Al-KhüITs novel an integral part of the Egyptian workers’ community. The differences and
the clefts inside Egyptian society are as much a part of the difficulties in the Egyptian communist
movement as the problems with “non-Egyptian” counterparts. Workers were living on the edge
of change from a rural society that was governed by a regime of customs and traditions, strong
social control and metaphysics, village solidarity and social immobility. Moving to the city
meant a confrontation and a challenge for religious belief, familiar and regional bonds, social
positions and ethics. The move to the city was generated by the ambition for a higher social
rank and a better prestige.
Relations with women were altered, though not always more liberal. Taha Sa'd came from
an Egyptian village. In the village, women worked in the fields and shared their daily activities
with men. Though they wore a headscarf, their faces remained uncovered, and social contact
between men and women was common. Families would invite each other in the fields to eat and
have tea together, though men and women would sit separately, and inside the house women
would not sit down in the men’s council or eat with them. They were not equal, but without
them the village economy could not function. The status of a worker’s wife was different
Taha Sa'd married a woman from his traditional environment. When he started to work in
textile factories, female workers were not the rule. According to him, there was a single female
worker at Henri Pierre, and she came to work in a mlOyat laff, the traditional garment Workers
did not welcome women in the factories. To mix the two sexes was very difficult In Shubra
al-Khaima there was no school for girls. Even at home in the village, though Jaha Sa'd’s sisters
went to school for a few years, they had to leave it once they were 12 or 13 years old, and had
to stay at home, inside the house, to protea the family’s honor. They could leave the house
only once they were married. Workers in Shubra al-Khaima warned each other not to marry
a woman with the letter “mbn,” i.e. mumarriddt (nurses) or mudarrisät (teachers), the only
professions that were really open to Egyptian women. Female students did not appear in the
workers’ environment because girls were not educated, and universities were the domain of the
middle and upper classes. Taha Sa'd considered himself an example of the fact that communism
did not mean promiscuity. None of his friends ever saw his wife. Women in Shubra al-Khaima
would not dress European style; in Cairo they did, but not in Shubra al-Khaima. The situation
changed with the wave of arrests in 1948. Jaha Sa'd had been arrested before, his family had
been paid his salary. In 1948, because of the large scale of arrests, women became active.
They staged protests at publishing houses and newspapers, they went to demonstrations. In a
demonstration they could not wear a milâyat laff. The mixing of the two sexes became less of
an issue and less problematic. The situation for Taha Sa'd’s wife became even more dramatic
when he was arrested in 1959. As tradition demanded, she went home to the village for his
family to support her. But the secret service went after her and told the family that she was
supported from Moscow, receiving a monthly salary. Denial did not help. She was forced to
return to Shubra al-Khaima, to start working as a seamstress, to take her sons out of school and
send them to work to make ends meet. Her status was changed by sheer force.
In the discourse of workers about the Egyptian communist movement, Jews are much less
of an issue than in the discourse of the upper or the middle classes. For workers, the conflict
with foremen, engineers, and factory directors, the fight for their jobs was far more important

12.7. WORKERS, FOREIGNERS. AND JEWS

249

than ideological straggle. Taha Sa'd mentioned that “people” would try to say that the Work­
e rs' Vanguard was led by Jews, but it was not true. There were no more than three Jews. Two
o f them, SSdiq Sa'd and YOsuf Darwlsh, had converted to Islam, while Raymond Douek37 re­
mained a Jew, but all the test were non-Jews. Details about foreigners, the famous “corridor”
as a phase of testing for non-Egyptian members, the activities of students in the Workers' Van­
guard, were not in Taha Sa'd’s focus. In Iskra and the EMNL there were many Jews, especially
in the leadership. But there were a lot of Copts in the communist movement, and many rela­
tives, which was natural because the movement was a secret one and people had to protect each
other. What better shield from betrayal than family bonds? In the regional committee of the
Egyptian Communist Party in al-Minya eight out of eleven members were Copts, among them
three cousins even: Louis Ishaq, who had been killed, 'AdH 'Aziz, and Anwar Ibrahim.
For Taha Sa'd, Jews are a prominent issue only with regard to other organizations, and with
regard to the negative impact of foreign capitalists on Egypt Khidr talked about Jews once he
remembered his activities in Upper Egypt:
“One of the Jewish colleagues, who left for France, - he had been with me in alMinya for some time • sent me a present and a postcard ten years ago, reminding
me of the beautiful days when we were working together in al-Minya.”3*
Khidr cannot remember his comrade’s name, but what is remarkable about his comment is
that he remembers a Jewish comrade, not a leader, who shared his political activities in Upper
Egypt, i.e. in a rural environment among workers and peasants mainly. This contradicts the
image of the foreign cultured Jew, who remained in his European ghetto in the urban centers,
unable to communicate with the populace. Khidr himself does not mention any cultural differ­
ence or difficulty. Such sensitivities were obviously more important for the middle classes who
were determined to protect the masses from damaging foreign influences.
The Palestinian cause does not figure in any of the workers’ narratives. Certainly the strag­
gle against British imperialism, as a material clash with soldiers and policemen, is present,
but none of the interviewed workers mentions Palestine as a hot topic occupying their minds.
Though in the propaganda war that accompanied the battle on the ground, workers like Khidr
were affected. He had just won a labor battle against his employer and then:
“A few days after this incident, the war in Palestine started, and on its first page,
on the 15th May 1948, al-MisrT newspaper published that a plane was sent out at
two a clock in the morning to arrest the dangerous worker Ahmad 'AH Khidr, who
works for Zionism in Egypt And really, I was arrested on the 15th of May 1948 at
six a'clock in the morning, and brought to Cairo to be imprisoned there.”39
In Khidr’s narrative the point of being slandered as a "Zionist” is not particularly stressed.
On the contrary, he emphasized that his boss, al-khawaga KSmil (probably a Lebanese) came
to the train station in al-Minya to see him off and provide him with enough provisions for the
journey to feed “five people for two days.” He gave him a two months salary, and assured him
that he was not involved in his arrest but, on the contrary, he appreciated him for his professional
skills. And in the end he told him good-bye and kissed him, which in Egypt is a sign of real
tolerance and forgiveness after a conflict.57*
57Compare the YOsuf Darwlsh interview: §idiq Sa'd and Raymond Douek converted to Islam shortly before the
union of 8th of January 1958.
»Markaz al-buhOth al-'arnbiyya 1998,48.
»Ibid.

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CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

Thus in Khidr’s narrative, instead of a trench opening that would swallow former compro­
mises and sympathies, the police assault actually reconciled him with his employer. Ahmad
Khidr’s experience at work is notably different from other workers because he is not primar­
ily concerned with Jewish bosses or exploitation. Though the entrepreneur is a khawaga, they
communicate in Khidr’s native tongue. There are no foreign engineers to compete with him. He
fights the ignorance and arrogance of Egyptian colleagues, and then takes over the responsibil­
ity for a small factory himself. Khidr’s discourse is centered on economic conflict at work and
inner-Egyptian political conflict, but not on a worker-intellectual dichotomy, nor on a foreignerEgyptian dichotomy.60.
Khidr had originally been an EMNL member- in court he had even described himself as one
of the founding fathers - and emphasizes that EMNL had a strategy, tactics, and a party program
that was primarily concerned with workers and peasants and the popular masses. From his point
of view, Curiel had offered the most important study concerning the situation in Egypt and its
development, with his theory about the two stages, from a democratic state to a socialist one.
All the other organizations, Khidr complained, had attacked this theory without scrutinizing it
The older he grew, the more he was convinced that Curiel’s approach was not a rightist deviation
but could have helped the communist movement to judge events differently and to gain more
ground. Thus Khidr steps out of line and refuses to join the chorus of voices who see Curiel at
the root of all the evil that befell the communist movement in Egypt.
In retrospective, Khidr is also not against the presence of Jews who lived in Egypt, in the
communist movement. He was even against cutting ties with Curiel in exile because he thought
that Jews and foreigners who did not live in Egypt might be useful as sympathizers. In the
turmoil of 1948 Khidr had changed sides. Like the majority of Communists, he had not been
involved in discussions leading up to the divisions in the DMNL. He had been a busy activist
in al-Minya, hardly even noticing the merger between Iskra and the EMNL. During his intern­
ment in the Huckstep detention camp, the political infighting led him to join forces with the
renegades. Even though Curiel himself approached him several times to talk to him, he refused
any contact. But once he had matured politically, he discovered that Curiel had been the most
far-sighted leader politically, faithful, and without any personal greed.61
“ In the middle of 1949 the DMNL was divided into the Revolutionary Bloc (al-takattul al-thauri), Ibwards
a Communist Party (nahwa hizb shuyitT) and the Revolutionary Proletariat (al-'ummdliyya al-thauriyya). The
Revolutionary Proletariat split into the Red Star (al-najm al-ahmar) and adherents of Towards a Communist Party,
which had been at first under the leadership of Hillel Schwartz. United with Revolutionary Proletariat elements the
new group was called Towards an Egyptian Communist Party (nahwa hizb shuyitt misri). The Red Star existed
for five years until 1955, when it joined with other groups again. Ahmad Khidr was one of the main cadres
of the Red Star. Unemployment was a big issue, as was workers* insurance. Workers staged a restaurant sit-in
that the press wrote about, and shared in the peace movement, gathering signatures. Their program included the
demand for international peace, an end to colonialism, feudalism and monopolies, the foundation of a democratic
peoples* republic, independent syndicates, a 40hrs work week, equality between men and women in rights and
salaries, kindergartens, restaurants and laundries and an unemployment insurance. They wanted a land reform,
cooperatives, community farming, better education and freedom of religion. A worker would remain a candidate
for three months, while others had to wait for six months. Ahmad Khidr in an interview with Rifat Al-SaTd, in:
Al-SaTd 1989, 336-341.
61Ahmad Khidr, in: Markaz al-buhQth al-'arabiyya 1998, 51. His personal experience with the new selfappointed leaders might have contributed to that insight because Khidr had followed 'Abd al-MacbOd Al-GibailT
and 'Abd al-Rahmfin al-Nfisir and become a member of the Revolutionary Proletariat, a group that gained fiune be­
cause its intellectual leaders, like the aforementioned two personalities, soon left the group and traveled to France
and England to complete their doctorates. Workers were particularly critical of students for whom political en­
gagement seemed to be part of the rites of passage, soon forgotten once they had reached maturity. The accusation,
particularly against the Revolutionary Proletariat, has been widespread, even that Fu'ld Sirftg al-Dfn offered gen­
erous grants to the students to leave the country and complete their education. The mere fact that students had such

12.7. WORKERS, FOREIGNERS. AND JEWS

251

Curiel himself had been convinced that the secretary general of a future communist party
should be a Muslim because of the Muslim majority in Egypt, according to Khidr, and he had
been in favor of a large majority of workers and peasants in the party’s central committee.
The leftish slogans had attracted many enthusiastic young people, but at the same time they
had prevented the definition of a sound policy and helped the splits in 1948/49, and the split
in 1958. The lack of real connection to the masses, and most of all the workers and the poor
peasants, helped the intellectuals in the leadership of the party (most of all the intellectuals from
Iskra) to bring about the splits.
Sayyid 'Abd al-Wahh&b is even clearer than Khidr when it comes to Curiel and the part Jews
played in the communist movement.
“Some ask about the attitude of the organization [i.e. the Red Star, al-najm alahmar I.S.] towards foreigners and Jews, and their part in the communist move­
m ent That is a strange question. Has there been any organization that Jews did
not have a place in to some extent? Jews are the founders, and they were at least
a starting point. The question itself is somewhat racist or hypocritical. At the top
of the EMNL there were Henri Curiel and other Jews. The Workers’ Vanguard had
Jewish leaders, Iskra as well. In short, they were the beginning, and we can’t say
that there has been an organization without Jews in the beginning of its develop­
m ent We shared in the movements that Jews had founded. The question does not
have any meaning here. The Jewish question was raised in the organization when
the Egyptian cadres had been formed and demanded their right to the leadership,
and the ousting of Jews from those centers. The EMNL cadres continued to defend
Henri Curiel’s right to remain a member of the Central Committee until the Central
Committee dissolved in IMS.”62
Not all former EMNL members, though, remained faithful to Curiel and threw their weight
behind Jewish presence in the communist movement.
Mustafa Jlba was also an EMNL activist in the beginning. The activity among workers was
important but limited to the airforce mechanics, the textile workers in al-Mahalla al-Kubra and
Shubra al-Khaima, and the railway workers, from his point of view, the EMNL was a radical
national party, not a communist one. Colonialism was the main enemy. Tiba, as mentioned
before, had been drawn into the communist movement by the cultural clubs the communist
groups had set up. Being an activist himself, he soon became a member of one of the commit­
tees (the Cairo City Committee of the DMNL), supposed to deal with the intellectuals he had
admired before in their lectures on an equal basis (Shuhdî 'Atiyya, ’Abd al-Ma'büd Al-GibaiH,
’Abd al-Rahmfin Nfisir, and Gamil GhfilT), all of them Iskra intellectuals. Upon R ifat Al-Sa*Id’s
question: “I discover that all the leadership of the Cairo committee were Egyptians, where were
die foreigners?” Tiba answers not only that the EMNL • i.e. Curiel’s fraction of the DMNL had been made up of Egyptians, petit bourgeois and a few workers in is majority, but that the
educated people in the EMNL came from popular areas (abnä’ al-ahyfl’ al-sha'biyya). Among
the students were many Azharis, i.e. students from the very poor strata of society. But Iskra had
had a high average of foreigners and of educated Egyptians, graduates from foreign schools,
an opportunity and could escape social pressure by completing education was, of course, a decisive difference
between students and workers who could only hope to improve their lot by lighting for better working conditions
and higher salaries, regardless of the real figure of the students who seized the opportunity and left The discourse
reveals more than real facts the ideas social groups and individuals have about other groups and/or individuals.
Those perceptions prove often harder to correct than facts.
w Sayyid ‘Abd al-Wahhlb Nadi in: Maricaz al-buhOth al-’arabiyya 1999,44.

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CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

the sons of rich people, (abnd>al-dhawät). In the DMNL, the petit bourgeois and the workers
got lost, surrounded by so many foreigners and rich. “They were fascinated by Garden City and
Zamalik.”63
For Tiba it was important to emphasize that the power foreigners • like Curiel • wielded in
the movement was also due to their wealth: “Curiel sent to me from the detention camp [in
19481.S.] and wanted me to become a professional, but I refused because I did not want to be
at their mercy and on their payroll.”64*
Muhammad 'A ll Fakhrf may serve as another example of a worker in the 1940s (we have
already hinted at the fact that he ended his career as a general manager of a department in
the Ministry of Housing and Construction) and their attitude towards Jews in the communist
movement:
“I always thought that none of those foreigners, especially not the Jews among
them, should be in a leading or a mid level position in the communist movement,
especially not as a secret movement.”
Even though Muhammad 'A ll Fakhrf had been an EMNL member in the beginning, he is
very suspicious of Henri Curiel, hinting at the many question marks behind his name, and even
considering the possibility of Curiel having been a police agent. Sfidiq Sa'd is the only Jew
of whom he concedes that he contributed to the movement with his studies, and he underlines
twice that SSdiq Sa'd converted to Islam. Sidiq Sa'd and YQsuf Darwlsh are, from his point of
view, the “only Jews who remained in Egypt,” which does not make them any more Egyptian
- just different from the Jews who left Egypt. In comparison, Muhammad 'AH Fakhrf finds
the first communist party void of any outstanding foreigners, Jews or others. All the leading
figures were Egyptians. Foreigners had to leave Egypt, and there was no place for them in a
political movement. Jews were rich, while the communist movement was supposed to appeal
to a fictional Egyptian mass of poor people, consisting of workers and fallahin.
YQsuf Darwlsh63, one of the leaders of the Workers’ Vanguard, had prepared himself to work
with syndicalists. He had gained the workers’ trust, though workers would not easily confide in
people with a higher social status for fear of being exploited for political aims. The Workers’
Vangard had a rule that out of ten newly recruited members seven had to be workers. The
leadership was determined to ensure an exemplary behavior on an individual level in public
and private life. To deal with workers meant to listen first, to learn from them, to deal with
them as one of them, to speak their language (not the language of educated people), to respect
their traditions and beliefs. Darwlsh did not discuss religion with workers. Workers reached
scientific truth through struggle. Taha Sa'd had been a Muslim Brother, and Darwlsh avoided
entering into a discussion about religion with him. The activist had to lead a life that was not
different from the life of the working class. In the 1940s, Darwlsh opened his home to his
worker comrades, teaching them English and mathematics, and offering literacy courses. At the
height of the struggle in the 1940s, the circumstances of work made him walk long distances
at late hours. The comrades suggested buying a car for him, but he refused because he did not
want to appear as a khawaga but as one of them.66 Personal austerity became the necessary
foundation for radical impulse. Darwlsh insisted that the leadership never impose any opinion
“ Al-Sald 1989,345.
44Ibid.
“ See for a further discussion about the personality of YQsuf Darwlsh the chapter about Jewish Communists.
“ YQsuf Darwlsh in: Markaz al-buhoth al-'arabiyya 1999, 173-213; personal interview with YQsuf Darwlsh in
Cairo 14th November and 20th December 1999. The episode with the car is also revealing because Henri Curiel
was famous for going around with his Renault to meet comrades.

12.8. THE VILLAGE AND THE FACTORY

253

upon workers, but just suggest its point of view in the organization and in the syndicate. As a
consequence, other organizations, and particularly the DMNL, were considered petit bourgeois.
Yet, the traditions of the workers DarwTsh and Taha Sa'd speak about, their way of life, is
never described concretely. For other commentators it is the Egyptian tradition and culture in
a general sense that was alien to Jews, but in the discussion about the workers* particular place
in Egyptian society and in the communist struggle, in the question concerning the relationship
between Egyptians as intellectuals and Egyptians as workers, a reflection concerning the culture
of workers is important. All the communist groups were suffering from a majority of educated
members, mostly students. The number of members in general, as well as the number of workers
in groups, was often exaggerated to enhance the political weight of the groups or • especially
on the occasion of mergers * to demand more positions in the central committee or in one of the
sub-committees. The world of workers was not primarily different because ethics or religion
played a more important role, as Taha Sa'd insinuates. The workers who got in touch with
the communist movement had the same ambitions as their more educated comrades from a
petit bourgeois background, they simply had been prevented from achieving the same position
because of a lack of material means. They were a class in a state of transition from a rural
background to an integration in the tissue of the urban society, and being uprooted made them
susceptible not only to revolutionary politics but also to different cultural patterns, including
changed male-female relations.

12.8 The Village and the Factory
Fikrf Al-KhQlTs novel al-rihla, hailed as the first authentic literary opus from a worker’s pen,
gives us a glimpse of that stage of transition, and of what the workers’ culture was.
“The soldiers moved, and they put shackles on the workers’ hands. Those hands
that were made to turn the machines. Those hands that were loved by Allah and
his prophet. They represented that which is most honorable in life, the value of
work.”67
Al-KhfllTs autobiographic novel mirrors the workers’ milieu. But it does not only describe
the contradiction between the workers and the factory owners, or the workers and the govern­
ment, or the workers and their fight for independent union representation. Rather, it expresses
how far a skilled worker leaves his native village and the people in the village behind him once
he has become part of the industrial society.68
He changes his customs, his way of thought, he is proud of his skills, of his relation to the
machine, his power to move it and to understand it. The skilled worker is a new element in
society, and he is crushed between two groups: on the one hand, the management becomes his
enemy, the engineers, the effendiyya, because they do not treat him as an equal. On the other
hand, he feels superior to the newly arrived villagers. He insults them as peasants, walking
like donkeys, “clover-eaters.” Education does not always pay. New technicians come and are
employed as lesser assistants only, with a lesser salary than a good worker. They refuse to
engage in the factory too much, and the workers despair because they do not help to repair a
machine.69
t7*l-KhQtt 1990. The novel ends in 1942. Fikrf AI-KhQH had been an active Communist and syndicalist in
Shubra al-Khaima, together with Muhammad Shatta and Jaha Sa'd ’Uthmân. See Muhammad Fakhrf, in: Markaz
al-buhOth al-'arabiyya 1 9 9 9 , 1 1 3 . '
“ See for example: al-KhOD 1990, second part, 107.
“ Ibid., 94.

CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

254

In FikrT Al-KhüITs description, the main contradiction is between Egyptians, not between
foreign skilled workers and foremen and natives. The narrator has come from die countryside
to work in a textile factory in the delta, in Mahalla al-Kubra. The novel tackles all the relevant
issues: the overcrowded housing, the bad working conditions, the alienation from the village
and the reluctance to return, the difficult relations between men and women. Workers’ suffering
and resistance are the main theme, their struggle to make their demands heard. The bond to
the village has not yet been cut. The workers return home every two weeks, to bring money, to
fetch food, to work in the fields, and to pay the rent for their land.
But already there is a gap between the workers from Mahalla, from the town itself, and the
fallahin workers. The urban workers earn more, they train the others, the two groups do not
mix, clashes are frequent The foremen are hated. They hit the workers, they control them. The
foremen, as well as the engineers, are Egyptian. The foremen hold a diploma from the technical
college. Their disgust for the workers is described, the way they beat them with sticks, until one
of them gets killed by a worker.
When the death is investigated, the workers try to tell the prosecuting attorney about their
misery, the machine that killed one of them. But the investigation team is deaf to their com­
plaints. It is made up of effendis, in full suits, with tarablsh on their heads. One of them is
described as a man who has “a white face with a rosy glow, green eyes and smooth blond hair.”
And even if his features would suggest that he might be a foreigner, the text does not say so, he
is Egyptian, but he is so completely different from the workers that it even shows in his outer
appearance, not only in the suit he wears but even in his physiognomy.
The same is true for the engineer who comes to check the machines. He comes in a blue
suit, with many pockets filled with spanners, and a shining white shirt.
“His appearance pleased the eye. His face was full of health and strength, his white
face, rosy cheeks that always carried a smile when he saw one of the foremen.”70
The foremen, the engineer, and the public attorney belong to “them,” to the people who
exploit the workers, who believe that workers would not do their job unless they were beaten.
“All their lives they live far from us. They live in palaces. They are mayors’ sons.
Nobody insulted them, nobody beat them. All their lives they’ve been thriving on
abusing people. They saw their fathers who took the fallahin on the farm and beat
them and made them work their land for free. They went to school and learnt, and
they have to show that they are better, because they think those workers are like
sheep, they can lead them as a shepherd does his herd.”71
The trial of the worker accused of the foreman’s murder is the culmination of the con­
flict between “a tiny elite of intellectuals” who fight for the development of Egyptian industry,
according to the public prosecutor, and the workers who are accused of base sentiments like
“jealousy and envy.”72
For workers, die court, the government, the foremen, and the students, who come to write
a study about their situation and whom they do not recognize as students in the first place but
imagine them to be government representatives, are the enemy. Though occasionally some cross
the line, like the lawyer who defends the worker in court He argues that his defendant is a victim
of his circumstances, and that in reality it is the workers who bring about industrialization.
TOIbid.,35.
71Ibid., 18.
«Ibid., 30.

12.8. THE VILLAGE AND THE FACTORY

255

The narrator discovers that probably the king and Tala'at Harb are the people who work
behind the scenes to keep workers in their pitiful condition. Workers’ efforts to resist coercion
and violence at work are uncoordinated. They are searching for a leader, for a strong man who
will punish their tormentors. Their hopes are pinned on 'Abbfis ' Abd al-Halîm, the leader of the
Workers’ Party.73
The narrator imagines him so fat that he cannot enter the factory gate. His moustache is so
big that hawks can rest on it. He will beat the foremen with his whip. Workers greet him as
their zaTm, their leader in the fight against injustice. But when 'Abbfis HalTm really arrives and
speaks to the crowd, the workers are baffled to find that they do not understand what he says.
It is not that he talks in a different language but that he talks bil-lawindr, as one of the workers
says, he talks like a toff. It is not workers’ language. Though some also doubt whether he might
be speaking khawagOtf. Why should he talk to workers at all? He would talk to people who
understand him. Finally a worker concludes that it is not faslh, classical Arabic ’Abbfis HalTm
speaks, but a language nobody can understand even if he went to Al-Azhar. Could it be that he
talks in riddles to keep the company representatives from understanding him? But why did he
not bring his whip? He did not beat anybody, no blood was shed. The man who speaks after
him invites the workers to join the syndicate. He speaks in simple words, mostly in dialect.
The political language in the Egypt of the 1930s and 1940s was classical Arabic, the lan­
guage of the educated man. Al-Nahhas Pasha was known for talking to workers in dialect.
Normally Egyptian politicians in the 1930s would not do that. But for the Egyptian masses
the Arabic Curiel and other Jewish communist activists spoke, which was more dialect than the
typical mixture between dialect and classical Arabic that Egyptian intellectuals used, may have
been good enough.
In KhQlTs novel, colonialism is mentioned only seldom and when it is, the Egyptian collab­
orators are named at once: the royal family and the Egyptian government, who did not move to
protect workers. Egyptian industry was set back by the British, but when it was reconstructed,
workers had to pay the price. Workers hear the news about the war. They feel the impact. Prices
go up, vital goods disappear from the shelves. Could it be that officers and big heads joined
the Germans? What about the Russians? But the workers’ main focus remains on workers’
rights, their right to human treatment, living and working conditions. There again, the Chicago
Haymarket incident is quoted in court as an example for the betrayal of workers worldwide, for
innocents suffering in court.
Religion is not an aspect in this novel at all. The ulema are not present. Prayer is not
mentioned, though all the workers are Muslims. Work ethics is the expression of devotion.
Workers’ tradition is strong, but it is not necessarily an Islamic one. The narrator, Fikri, is not
allowed to become “loose,” to go astray, his family holds him back. Workers are confronted
with women coming to work. Their response is rejection, until they finally comprehend that it
is dire material need that makes families send their daughters to the factory. FikiT would like
to marry one of the girls he meets in town, but his family does not allow him to do so. Even
far from the village, his mother has enough power to control him and force him into a marriage
with his cousin, to keep family ties and structures intact, though his bride does not understand
his life. She does not know anything about the factory, his bond to his colleagues, she does not
^ Abbfis Halim, a prince, mainly educated in Germany, became the leader of the National Federation of Trade
Unions in Egypt in 1930. In 1931 he formed the Egyptian Labor Party (Hizb al-'ummäl al-misrt). After severe
clashes with the government in 1934 and a split in the labor movement in 1933 - mainly because of Wafd politics
asserting its political leadership also in the labor movement and assuring the supremacy of national liberation over
any social or economic demand • ‘Abb4s HalTm retreated from the labor movement in 1936. See: Beinin and
Lockman 1988,195-217;‘Abb«s 1967,211.'

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CHAPTER 12. WORKERS

know anybody but him.
The narrator’s whole behavior towards her, the wedding night and all it includes, is dictated
by tradition, though he tries to struggle against convention. There is already the foreboding
of change: the mechanic, who warns him to proceed in the old manner and deflower the girl
by force just to pay tribute to a concept called the “family’s honor.” Workers comprehend
themselves as different from the village, as a new force in the modem nation, attracted by all
that is modem and new. The narrator buys cloth for his mother to have a garment made in the
Franks’ way, afrangl, like the women wear in Mahalla. The workers get drunk, celebrating in a
baza, a workers’ bar, crowded on benches and chairs. Girls move around them - Egyptian girls
• offering pickles and peanuts. And while the representatives of the optessors are fair-skinned
like the royal family, the workers gather in the bar, dark-skinned with big moustaches.74
The contrast between workers on the one hand and engineers and public prosecutors on the
other hand is obvious. They ate the representatives of the effendiyya, and they are as remote
from the workers* reality as any foreigner. Therefore, it is no coincidence that their outer ap­
pearance is so different from the workers. In FikrT Al-KhQlTs novel, social distinction already
begins at a much lower level, in the hierarchy among workers. The foremen belong to “them,”
they live in “palaces” compared to the simple houses of the fallahin and the overcrowded bous­
ing in the city. Neither alcohol nor a change in the relations between men and women are
ascribed to foreign occupation.
Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd, one of the leading founding members of the Workers’ Vanguard con­
cluded in February 1987, in a “revision of memories,” as he called it, that intellectuals without
any tangible relation to the toiling masses had led the liberation movement in Egypt since the
beginning of the century. They had translated dreams and demands in a distorted manner. The
stage before the advent of Nasirism had been dedicated to the expression of bourgeois interests,
the national character of those interests, which also meant a bargain with the dominant class.
Nasirism and its related popular trends had ended that era. The leadership of the liberation
movement now had finally to get rid of the intellectuals to overcome shortcomings • without
getting rid of culture, of course. The leaders had come from the rows of the toiling masses.
Inspired by the bread unrests in the 1970s, Ahmad SSdiq Sa’d set his hopes now on spontaneous
mass movements, hoping for a revolution to beget itself and be bom out of the “real” people’s
will.75

74al-Kh01I 1990.70-74.
75Ahmad SSdiq Sa'd, A revision of memoriea. February 1987, in: Al-Sald 1989,282-289.

Chapter 13
Kamshish - Organized Revolt and
Religious Discourse
This study should not end without a reflection about what authentic communism could have
meant in Egypt, since the main accusation against Jewish Communists was that their leadership
had destroyed the movement, that it had hampered the connection between the people and the
party. In communist analysis, the organization of the fallahin was mentioned frequently, but
practised little. In communist analysis, the feudalists and the Egyptian regime were cooperat­
ing. Islam and feudalism were connected in communist understanding, because they understood
Islam as the ideology of the new feudalist class that had historically reigned in the Arab Empire.
A grass root communism, based on the basic ideological convictions of the fallahin, was not
in their arsenal. Egyptian workers and students, the rich and the middle classes, they all com­
plained about the lack of authenticity in the communist movement. It did not emanate from the
heart of Egypt, the village. The fallah should have been at the centre of events, but in actuality
be remained at the periphety. To talk to him, to organize him, seemed - even to the workers
who were closest to his environment - an impossible task. The intellectuals felt that he was
so miserable that they could not reach out to him. For them, even the contact with workers,
the forthcoming revolutionary elite, was difficult to realize. Was a socialist revolution just a
mirage, the proof of how far anybody who stepped out of the traditional order of the village
and the verses of Islam was alienated from social reality? Could authenticity only be gained
from a social revolutionary cum Islamic approach? A look at the events in one of the villages in
the Egyptian delta, Kamshish, can further the debate about the possibility of an authentic rural
communist movement in Egypt.1
The events in Kamshish remind us of the “republic of Zifta,” that famous island of organized
insurgency in the Egyptian Delta, stubbornly resisting British occupation, and taking the revo­
lution of 1919 as the true beginning of an independent Egypt, if only in a single spot. Ahmad
SSdiq Sa'd (from the Workers’ Vanguard) pointed out that all the social classes in Egypt could
relate to the countryside. And even though poverty was widespread among fallahin, they were
not poor, wretched, senseless people, prone to be indebted, and unable to revolt. They had a
sense for nationalism. The resistance against the French occupation had been centered in rural
'A few yean ago Kamshish reappeared as an issue in the Egyptian press. See for example: al-Ahram Weekly,
1-7 October 1998, No, 397: “Kamshish: take two,“ by Fetemah Farag. The article mentions the village in the
context of a new law regulating tenant fanning in Egypt It describes the efforts of the al-Fiql landlord family
to repossess land farmen had rented. The clashes between the old landlords and their tenants seem to bear all
the marks of the old conflict, stones were hurled, automatic rifles came into use etc. The case of Kamshish is
mentioned as well in Y.M. Sadowski, Political vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of
Egyptian Agriculture, p. 79. The Brookings Institution, Washington 1991.

257

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CHAPTER 13. KAMSHISH

areas, and it had been driven by a national spirit. The nucleus of resistance had been the guild
members in the cities and the merchants, the lower classes of the people. Fallahin had played
a big part in 1919. They had proved their readiness to “sacrifice themselves for the sake o f
the nation's renaissance and its progress.”2 Yet Egypt had not reached that stage of “culture
and civilization” that would become its history and resources. A just social system and a land
reform still had to improve living conditions. Landowners and British colonizers had put the
small peasantry in the position of the losers. A fallah had to learn, to become educated, to
be concerned about his rights. But the conservatives feared that educated peasants would not
remain on their plot of land, that the virtues of peasantry would suffer. In the name of Islam, as
a religion and a set of morals, the conservatives refused any progress.3
KamshTsh was a place that was once described as the Mecca of the Left, to which Che Gue­
vara, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir paid homage. A village on the threshold o f
a socialist revolution that would hopefully spread forward to the whole country, if not to the
whole region.45Still the story of KamshTsh does not belong to the canon of successful commu­
nist work in Egypt, because the leading figures did not fit the pantheon of communist heroes.
Asked about the meaning of KamshTsh in the context of the history of the communist move­
ment in Egypt, R ifat Al-Sa'Id avoided a direct answer, and referred me to Shahinda Maqlad.
SalSh Husain, her late husband, the leading figure in the events in KamshTsh in the 1950s and
1960s, receives only a secondary place in al-Sa'id’s biographical notes about “leftist fighters.”3
The kind of communism practised in KamshTsh is referred to as a special “KamshTsh brand o f
communism.”
ÇalSh Husain was the prominent figure in the struggle for KamshTsh, a place later taken by
his widow Shahinda Maqlad. They were relatives, both from wealthy land-owning families.
Shahinda had much in common with the upper class girls in Cairo. Like InjT Aflätün, she
spent a few years at a French school, the Sacre Coeur, and describes herself as neither knowing
how to prepare tea nor how to cook an egg. Saläh Husain was committed to the liberation of the
Egyptian peasants. They were married in 1957. By then, Shahinda had gathered experience with
political struggle, mainly with the help of Wid&d Mitri, who was a teacher for philosophy and
national education. Widfid was known to be a Communist, but Shahinda was neither interested
in the organization she belonged to, nor did she have any idea of the political differences among
Communists. Together with Widad, she engaged in campaigns for women’s suffrage, supplied
the fighters in the Canal Zone with blankets and other necessities during the crisis of 1956, and
trained for the nursing of the wounded and the use of fire arms.
Fire arms played a big part in the struggle for KamshTsh, an important difference to com­
munist struggle elsewhere in Egypt. Urban Communists were eager to point out that they were
against terrorist activities. They even preferred not to enter into physical clashes with the Mus­
lim Brothers.
Shahinda Maqlad and Salih Husain belonged to one of the leading families in the village.
The Fiqïs and the Maqlads were the two important families in KamshTsh, taking turns at the
'umOdiyya6, the office of the mayor, that included mediation between the fallahin as well as
the representation of the village’s interests. The difference between the two families also had
a nationalist context. The FiqTs were known as traitors to the nationalist cause. Their grand­
father was said to have betrayed 'Uräbl, and therefore to have been endowed with land outside
2Sa'd 1945,18.
3Ibid„ 57-58.
4Ansari 1986.
5Al-Sa'Id 1999.
6Baer 1962 and 1982;WaMda 1950.

259
Kamshish by the British. Between 1945 and 1948, the al-Fiql family seized a great deal of
fallahin lands. The sukhra system (corvée), once meant to have fallahin come to the service of
the state and leave their crops at any required time, was once again enforced in the service of
that family of landlords.
"From any house in the village fallahin had to work for them for free, without any
compensation. In case you cannot go you have to hire somebody. If you don’t want
to do that they bum your house, or the field, and arrest you. They had a private
prison where they kept people.”7*
Until 1955 there was no police station in Kamshish. Security was guaranteed by the lumda,
the mayor. The living conditions of the fallahin in Kamshish were abominable. After the
revolution in 1952, it seemed that a rebellion could become successful. FaUahin had tried to
rebel before in different locations though their rebellion had lacked organization, and had often
taken the individualist shape of banditry. Schulze put the 1919 revolution in this context, and
read it not as a “national awakening” of fallahin, but as an attempt to overthrow unjust regional
power structures and to bring about social justice* After 1952, the power base of the coalition
between government, money, the big landowners, the British, and the monarchy was shaken.
But the deep-rooted change the officers had promised had not taken place.
Salih Husain’s political experience had not been shaped by communist groups. On the
contrary. In the beginning of his political career he had belonged to the opposite camp. He had
been sympathizing and working with Egyptian nationalists as well as with the Muslim Brothers.
He had always been a militant, a man who believed in the fence of arms as much as in the force
o f words. He was friends with Husain Tauflq, who was involved in the assassination of Amin
'Uthmân.9 He had fought with the Muslim Brothers in Palestine, and later in the Canal Zone.
“Those people who had returned from Palestine, the ones who had brains, under­
stood that the battleground was not over there in Palestine. It was here. There were
traitors in Egypt Egypt had to be liberated from colonialism and its collabora­
tors. Who were the collaborators of the colonialists? The King, the feudalists, the
pashas, and so on. That’s how they started to fight and prepared themselves for
struggle in Kamshish.” 10
7Shahinda Maqlad, personal interview, Cairo 11.12.1999.
'Schulze 1992.
’Amin 1111111110 had been an intermediary in the negotiations between the Wafd and the British. He was a very
pro-British Egyptian politician and became a target of Egyptian nationalists after he had founded an organization
(ribitat al-nahda) to foster Anglo-Egyptian ties in 1944. He was famous for the description of the Anglo-Egyptian
relation as a ‘‘Catholic marriage that could not be separated.” In 194S he went to London to donate 100,000 L.E.
from the Egyptian people to the British government for the reconstruction of an English village that had been
destroyed during the war. Rumours were ripe that he was to be the next Egyptian prime minister. On the 6th of
January 1946 Amin 'Uthmân was assassinated by three young men in downtown Cairo. Husain Tawfiq, a member
of the National Party’s youth organization and one of the accused, managed to escape to Saudi Arabia. In December
1945 there had been an attempt on the life of Mustafa Al-Nahhls. See for more information: 'AIT 1978.
l0Shahinda Maqlad, personal interview, Cairo 11.12.1999. Shahinda told me that Muhammad Taha had ac­
quainted Salih Husain with Marxism in Cairo. The only Muhammad Taha I found mentioned in other interviews
was a fallah from Dakamas, a village in the Delta, who had received only elementary education and was active
tmoogfaUahin as a member of the DMNL. He was younger than Salih Husain though in his development there are
certain similarities. Muhammad Taha had also been a Muslim Brother and close to Sufis, he had been introduced to
Marxism by a secondary school Azhari student, 'Abd al-Salim al-Khashin. Al-Sald 1999,529-535. Furthermore
Shahinda mentioned that Salih Husain had spent his time in prison from 1954 to 1956 in a cell with Mustafa flb a
and ShauqT Galil. She insisted that the latter two had been Muslim Brothers as well. In Jlb a’s autobiography such
a period is not mentioned. Only in an interview with al-Sald, conducted in 1978, he mentions that be had been
close to Young Egypt first, and then had been a Muslim Brother, but for a few days only. al-Sald 1989,342-347.

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CHAPTER 13. KAMSHISH

That point of view was much in agreement with what Communists had said in their argument
against going to Palestine in the first place. For SaUh Husain and his friends, religion was a
very important issue and, apart from nationalism, the force that moved them. In fact, though,
according to Shahinda, Salfih Husain had become interested in Marxism early, and had started
to read about it, he had been taken aback when he discovered that Marxism was not really in
favor of religion. His former companions, friends of Husain Taufîq, warned him that it was an
ideology opposing the belief he cherished. Though still the main ideas of Marxism concerning
the unjust distribution of wealth, the surplus value work added to products, the simple notion
that without a fallah's work the fields would stay barren, and that those who worked the land
should own it, were right. The revolution of 1952 brought about a change in the balance of
power in the countryside. It had been accompanied by many slogans against the feudalists
and the capitalists, and the monarchy had really been overthrown. SalSh Husain and his circle
took the change seriously and decided to announce the end of feudalism in the village. They
were arrested and thrown into the Fiqls’ prison. A case was filed against them, but the public
prosecutors refused to act. They simply did not record what those students - because they were
students, all of them - had to say. The Fiqls were very influential, their arm reached the police
as well as the public prosecutors. Therefore, Salih Husain and his men started to direct their
complaints about the local “feudalists" (cd-iqUtiyOn) to the government by sending telegrams.11
After they had originally been only a loose group of students coming from the village, they now
became organized.
What al-Sa'id has called “the Kamshlsh variety of Marxism” started at that time. Those
who started it were not communist cadres, nor factory workers, nor the poor, nor the landless
peasants, let alone the agricultural workers. They were a group of students, exactly as had been
in the case of the communist groups in Cairo. The first activists were the sons of the well-off
fallahin in the village. People from the medium stratum offallahin.
“In Kamshlsh you really couldn’t count on the very poor peasants. It was the middle
class peasants who were discriminated against and repressed, their resistance had
to be strengthened. There had to be an army to start the struggle, and those who
were ready to fight were the middle class peasants.”12
The Fiqls did not permit a school in the village. According to their reasoning, if all the
children were educated there would be nobody left to work.13 But they could not force all the
people in the village to comply with their edict. There were about twenty families who would
simply send their children to another place to receive their education. Whenever one of those
students returned to the village, he was obliged to take off his tarboush and put on the täqiyya.14
He had to rise when one of the Fiqls passed. When somebody from the Fiqî family died, all
the village had to keep mourning for one year, no weddings, no holidays. Even listening to the
radio was forbidden.
Shahinda did not receive a religious education. She had been to a French school; at home
the atmosphere was free, the social obligation to observe Islam was not as strong then as it is
nowadays.
" I am well aware of the difference between European feudalism and conditions in Egypt, but the terms are
rendered here as they are used in the Egyptian discourse.
l2Shahinda Maqlad, personal interview, 11.12.1999.
’’This was also Muhammad Husain Haikals argument. The fallahin should be guided by educated people, to
educatefallahin would disturb the traditional order of things and respectful cohabitation. Smith 1982,121-155.
l4The täqiyya, a skull cap, is only worn by lower class men, by fallahin in the countryside, and by men in
popular areas in urban context.

261
“I do not have a religious culture [thaqOfa dtniyya, which can also be read as re­
ligious education, I.S.]. Therefore I cannot afford religious rhetoric. Just a bit in
the beginning, when I gave my first speech, I talked about women and their role in
Islamic history, about sittinû 'Aisha and about Shagarat al-Durr.”15
Salih Husain's experience and education were different He had gained a thorough knowl­
edge of the Koran and tafslr (exegesis) during his affiliation with the Muslim Brothers. He
thought about using the mosque16 as a place for unleashing a campaign of civil disobedience
to the FiqTs. Demonstrations would go out from the mosque, because fatlahin would naturally
meet there. Friday prayers became occasions to polarize public opinion in the village. Salih
Husain had won the students over by prodding them to refuse an upright salute to the FiqTes,
and to remain seated when they passed. He picked the young men who were able and willing
to show that humble form of resistance. They would be recruited into preaching to the fallahin about Islam’s impatience with injustice at Friday prayers, and at the prayers during the
holidays. The FiqTs had a special place for prayer in the mosque, a certain carpet reserved for
their family. That state of affairs contradicted Islamic practice, since Muslims are proud to say
that any social difference between people ceases upon entering the mosque. The carpet had to
remain unoccupied when the Fiqls did not attend prayer. One Friday, Salih Husain stepped on
the carpet and prayed on i t In the following weeks several students did likewise. The FiqTs kept
silent because Salih Husain was the offspring of a “feudalist family."17 They kept silent as well
when the other students committed the sacrilege. But when thefallahin usurped the carpet, they
stopped coining to the mosque altogether and built one only for themselves. The fallahin had
used their carpet, that was highly symbolic. They had desecrated the place of worship reserved
for the big landlords, and had driven them out of the mosque. Religious discourse played a
big part in rallying people around the cause, in educating them, and in increasing their political
awareness.
The government felt compelled to intervene when a major clash occurred that left three men
dead: “thugs,” Shahinda said, who had provoked the fallahin and worked for the landlords.
The fallahin had attacked them collectively. The arbitration committee that arrived in 1954
was led by Anwar al-Sadat, who was from the same area (Minufiyya). Al-Sadat could not
find the perpetrators. There were no witnesses, no individual complaints. In the course of the
investigation, the fallahin were threatened with the gallows, and SO feddans were returned to
peasant families. But the scores remained unsettled. A leaflet was circulated in Alexandria and
other cities. It read:

“Ayyûhà al-fallOh, into tushaqqu al-ard bi-fa’sikafa-li-mädha lä tushaqqu bihi al-zälimln ?! ”
(Oh peasant, you split the soil with your hoe, why don’t you then split your oppressors with
’’Shahinda Maqlad, personal interview, 28.11.1999.
“ One of my interview partners, Khilid Hamza, alto uaed the moaque to deliver hi* group's demanda to the Free
Officers in 19S2. T h e 25th of July was a Friday and I had formed a national committee in the BuMq Aba al-'lla
quarter, and I got in touch with them to convene a conference in the mosque of Sultln AbO al-Tla. And really I
succeeded in convening the conference and I gave a speech at the conference directly after the prayer. But a plain
clothes officer from the Buliq police department noticed that I was wanted and tried to arrest me. He stood behind
me and I made a mistake because I spoke to the people and they were around me and then I let a comrade from the
national committee take the floor and I sneaked away. He followed me. When I had moved away from the people,
he seized me and I shouted ‘Political police, political police!’. The people who pray keep their shoes near to them.
So the crowd came running and beat the officer. Unfortunately the officer fell on me and overwhelmed me. And
the soldiers entered the mosque and did not bother to take their shoes off. They just grabbed me and threw me into
the police car." Personal interview with Khilid Hamza.
"That is Shahinda’s expression.

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CHAPTER 13. KAMSHISH

it?!)1*
Salih Husain and others were banned from Kamshlsh. The Egyptian government has fre­
quently used banishment to remove troublemakers from the countryside. In 1954 during the
big round up in the power struggle between Nasir and Najib, SaiSh Husain was arrested for his
connection to the Muslim Brothers, and confined to prison until 1956, although his ties with
the Muslim Brothers had been severed by then already. He had used them to furnish his men
with arms. His political circle (halqa) was now supported by a “secret apparatus.” The Muslim
Brothers did not approve of his actions. Revelations by the al-Fiqï landlord family about the use
the arms were put to turned their friendship into enmity. It had never been part of the Muslim
Brothers’ vision to encourage rural unrest against wealthy landowners.19 The wretched of the
earth were to be supported by zakit, not by a forceful redistribution of wealth.
The armed branch of the Salih Husain’s halqa of students and fallahin was an important
instrument in the struggle. Its members were anonymous. They did not engage in public ac­
tivity or appear at discussion rounds. While the members of the political circle were studying
Marxism and planning political activity, the fighters had to remain in hiding.
“There had to be armed resistance, not because of Marxism. Marxism doesn’t
use force until the day of the revolution. But in that actual situation, confronted
with a violent counterpart, peasants had to be offered a protection. To reach out
for support from them demanded that they, in turn, were offered something. They
needed protection. They could only be asked to rise against the feudalists if you
were ready to offer that backing. Somebody’s cow was poisoned, the Fiqls found
their own cow poisoned. Crops were burnt, the Fiqls’ fields caught fire. A fallah
was killed, they found one of their own kith and kin slain. An eye for an eye.”20
Once the fallahin felt that they were protected and revenged, they offered support In 1956
Salih Husain was released from prison. The Suez crisis ensued and demanded a temporary stop
of activities in the countryside. Together with about 50 men from the village, Salih Husain
formed a suicide command (katlba intihdriyya), still much in the Islamic and the village tradi­
tion, though it did not really engage in military action since the crisis proved to be short-lived.
The activists in Kamshlsh considered themselves Marxists, but till 1958 they refused to join one
of the communist groups because the Communists were divided.
The men used to gather openly at the Maqlads’ house in the village. A classical communist
organization in the village was impossible. Everybody knew everybody else, secret names, or
secret organizational structures were not a viable way to operate. The experience with other
Communists was very short lived, about a year only. They joined the United Egyptian Commu­
nist Party in 1958, imagining that a real party would be a solid organization, speaking only with
one tongue, and very effective. What they found was the opposite. They were lucky because
the man who had recruited them, Ma’mQn al-BasTlI, did not integrate their cell into the network
of the party. When the government clamped down on the Communists, they remained undis­
turbed. Their political activity in Kamshlsh had been autonomous anyway, self-financed and
self-sustained. The village provided itself with arms, some had even come from the Fiqls’ arms
cache. For further activities they collected money among themselves. The peasants would sell
chickens and eggs, Salih Husain and others would give part of their salaries to make ends meet.
'*The leaflet it lost Shahinda Maqlad believed that this expression goes back to Gamil al-Dln al-Afghinl,
which I could not verify.
■’ See for the Muslim Brothers: Mitchell 1969; Lia 1998. See also chapter on workers.
“ Shahinda Maqlad, personal interview, 11.12.1999.

263
When Salàh’s brother, an airforce officer, died in the Yemen War, the compensation paid by
the Egyptian government helped to finance the struggle in Kamshlsh between 1962-1966. They
pressed ahead for the implementation of a comprehensive agricultural reform in Kamshïsh. Fi­
nally President Gamal Abdel Nasir gave in to the urgent requests, and the FiqTs declared all the
property they had. Not to claim it as theirs would have meant to forfeit any right to gain it back
again. Their family property was put under sequestration. But even though the government
fulfilled some of the Kamshlsh militants’ demands, it still blocked Salfih Husain and the most
active of thefallahin from political activity on a national level. They were not admitted as mem­
bers in the Socialist Union, founded in 1962 to substitute the National Union.21 In April 1966,
Salih Husain was assassinated. The investigation that followed prompted the establishment of
the Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism, which was headed by then vice-president Abd
al-Hakim Amir.
The “Kamshlsh variety of Marxism“ looks successful and enticing. An authentic movement
of resistance at grassroots’ level, developing in the countryside, in a village situated in the
Nile Delta. Tradition and demands for social justice combine to form a formidable resistance
movement, directed not only against the injustice of the big landowners and their greed, but
also against the corrupt and biased government and the courts of justice. Rebellion starts from
the mosque, the demand for equality is supported by the preachings of Islam. Submissiveness
and subservience end with the arrival of modern education in the village. Arms are taken up
against the oppressors, and under the protection of the “guerrillas for Kamshlsh“ the fallahin
finally rise up. In this local insurgency the old ruling class was overthrown, and in the name
of the old and the new values a new class seized the reins of power, the middle class fallahin.
The big landowners had neither respected the teachings of the Koran nor the representatives of
modern education, the students. In their way of living and their social behavior they were the
remnants of an old society that had been overcome by modernity.

21Abdel-Malek 1971,410.

Chapter 14
Conclusion
The discourse about Jewish Communists shows that the political participation of Jews in Egypt
was a thorny issue. Jews were (and are) perceived as immigrants and members of a minority
following its own particular interests. The impact of colonization and the foundation of the state
of Israel alienated them from the mainstream of Egyptian society. Like minorities elsewhere,
Jews differed from the majority of Egyptian citizens because they had schools and clubs of their
own. Their abilities and ambitions had gained them favorable economic positions, in numbers
that seemed unduly high compared to the Muslim majority of the country. They were identified
and identified themselves not mainly with Egyptian (and/or Jewish) tradition and culture but
with Western culture and values, though • like the Egyptian elite • with French rather than
British (the colonizers’) culture. It was a minority allied with the ruling elite and catering to its
needs, engaged in trading and banking, and profiting from its cosmopolitan outlook that could
grow only from the combined factors of an Egyptian orientation towards the West, initiated by
the Egyptian rulers, and the British occupation of the land. Therefore, Jews were perceived not
only as people belonging to a different culture, but as allied with the colonizer. The foundation
of the state of Israel made the precarious situation worse. At the end of this study we might
return to Memmi’s insight, quoted in the introduction, that during the struggle for national
identity any religious minority is out of place.
Memmi and Cosseri chose literature as a way to create an identity for themselves, and
remain what they had wanted to be all their lives, Tunisian the one, Egyptian the other. But
nature has endowed only a few people with an artistic talent. Artists try to approach life by
writing, painting, or playing music. In their artistic creation they are not primarily moved by
a desire to change the world, even if they are committed to a certain political credo. They are
moved by the wish to transmit their own reality to others and to see it taking shape on stage or
canvas.
Politicians are a different breed. Anybody who engages in politics does so because he wants
to participate actively in changing society for the better. To engage in politics means to live an
intensely communal life, to gather with people, to recruit people, to talk to people about one
aim, the struggle for change - and for power. Jewish Communists in Egypt wanted to participate
in politics and bring about a revolutionary change - not only in Egypt but world-wide.
Egyptian prime ministers from Sidql Pasha to Nuqrashi Pasha traced communist activities
in Egypt back to Jews who - they believed - could not have any interest in the Egyptian poor
because they belonged to the wealthy, but acted on the instigation of foreign powers. In the
discourse of Egyptian Communists concerning their former Jewish comrades the same opinion
can be detected: a suspected lack of interest in the lot of the Egyptian poor - because the Jewish
comrades themselves (though not all the Jews in Egypt) lacked die experience of misery - , and

265

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CHAPTER 14. CONCLUSION

the probability of acting in the name of a foreign power - not the Soviet Union though, but
Israel.
From the point of view of the British and the Egyptian authorities communist activity posed
a major threat in 1949. Curiel and his comrades were suspected to have used their time in the
internment camp to prepare their cadres for a second, even more dangerous, stage of communist
activity, guerrilla warfare. Jewish communist leaders’ engagement and the struggle of the ac­
tivists was enough then to scare the authorities, even if the communist groups were busy fighting
each other and dismissing their adversaries* political lines and leaderships as opportunist and
petit bougeois.
The Egyptian authorities were mainly concerned about how to dispose of those “foreign**
Communists without being subjected to a charge of provoking the communist countries. The
law for the registration of foreigners helped to deal with those people, and to force them out o f
the country.
Security forces and undemocratic governments in unstable countries often trace disturbing
political activities, ideas that threaten social peace and order, back to foreign influence and
resident foreigners. But a discourse on foreigners and foreign cultural, as well as political,
influence in a political movement itself is an important source for the understanding of the
mechanics of group dynamics, power struggle, and the development and transport of bias.
In the historical documents of the communist movement of the 1940s and the 1950s Jewish
Communists were not described as Zionists by their comrades though the Zionist label was
distributed generously during those years. In political analysis during those years Curiel was
not denounced as a Jew. Rather his ‘absurdities’ and ‘aberrant analysis’ haunted the party even
after Curiel had already been gone from the country for several years but in reports sent to
communist organizations abroad they were not linked to his culture or his education.
That argument was used in the more personal attacks on communist Jews and specifically
the Rome Group. Their French exile was used against them. They had become isolated, their
comrades informed them in 1957, and were out of touch with Egyptian reality at a moment
when conditions had profoundly changed in Egyptian society and politics. Such an observation
includes the suggestion that Jewish Communists had been in touch with Egyptian reality before.
Because of their European culture that had nothing in common with Egyptian culture, they were
allegedly incapable to grasp the new developments in Egypt, and totally unable to adhere to the
party line.
The framework of the modem discourse about Jewish Communists in Egypt has been laid
out during the historical experience with those comrades. But while the cautious formulation of
arguments at that time still gave them a place in the communist movement, the modem discourse
about Jewish Communists leaves many of their former comrades in bewilderment: how could it
be that foreign Jews were in the leadership of Egyptian Communist groups? That certainly had
to have been the result of foreign manipulation.
Curiel and the Rome Group had actively worked for peace between Israel and the Arabs.
They suspected that their position towards Israel might have caused conflict The discourse of
the last decades about the participation of Jews in the Egyptian communist movement seems to
prove them right in retrospect. But looking at the documents of the communist movement of the
1950s, it becomes evident that attention was not focused on Palestine and Israel. The Palestinian
cause received only marginal attention because the real confrontation with imperialism was
perceived as taking place in Egypt. Palestine was an issue among many, but not the central
issue. Hostility between Arabs and Israel • it was argued along pro-Soviet lines • had only
served the imperialists. Both Israel and the Arabs had been forced to buy western arms to keep
a balance. And the western states had seized the opportunity to intervene in their affairs. The

267

false pretext of an "Israeli threat” had made the Arab states sign a pact in 1950 that had in reality
been aimed at cementing the regional anti-Soviet alliance. A solution had to be found in the
interest of the Arab and the Jewish population in Palestine. This meant above all a solution for
the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the foundation of a Palestinian state, as recommended
by die UN in 1947, and the retreat of Israel, Jordan and Egypt from Palestinian lands.
Curiel and his comrades continued to describe France as "a foreign country,” and continued
to refer to themselves as "the Egyptian Communists abroad.” Nowhere else could they become
as succesful as communist militants. Even so many years in France were not enough to turn
Curiel and others into what some of their Egyptian communist comrades suspected them to be:
French.
With a book he wrote in 1988,32 years after he had left Tunis, Memmi hoped to close once
and for all the chapter of colonization, decolonization, and emigration in his life, and to be able
to live his "new reality.”1 Cosseri defended his determination to be an Egyptian writer living
in Paris and writing in French till the end of his days; Curiel was determined to stay involved
in Middle Eastern politics. He and his comrades had grown up in Egypt, the grandchildren
of migrants, who - even though they had looked to Europe for inspiration - were essentially
connected to Egypt as their homeland.
Today, Jewish life in Arab countries has almost come to an end. In Europe, and above all in
Germany, Jewish communities are growing again, even though Jewish life in Germany seemed
to be impossible after the holocaust. That Jews will return to Arab countries seems now equally
impossible. We are witnessing a phase of ever-growing alienation, not only between Arabs and
Jews but also between the West and the Arab/Islamic world in general. What Jewish Commu­
nists hoped to accomplish in Egypt looks like utopia now. The Socialist Bloc has disintegrated,
and the world is tom between a global economy on the one hand and bloody ethnic strife on
the other hand. In the Arab world, the national revolutionary regimes resign one by one and
the political void is filled by Islamic forces who see the "crusading” West and the Jews as an
alliance they have to fight.
The discourse about Jewish Communists in Egypt shows that the perception of minorities
is linked to the majority’s perception of its own condition. It is not tradition or culture that are
the basis for the exclusion of one group and the inclusion of another but social and economic
reasons. Islam can be interpreted in many ways, in the Koran as many verses can be found
justifying a harmonious cohabitation with people of different religions as serving as a basis for
attacks on polytheists, Christians, or Jews. In Islamic history there are examples of Jewish,
or Christian, or Kurdish, or Persian ministers, advisors and generals. Minorities are always
caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. On the one hand they have to adapt to the
majority in order to avoid friction and to secure a future for their children. On the other hand
they have to keep to themselves, to preserve their tradition, in order to protect their community
from complete assimilation.
The fate of minorities is dependent on economic and political factors. Jewish Communists
became politically active in a period when Egyptian society as a whole was in a process of
change. Where that change would lead to was open. Different political and social forces were
engaged in a power struggle. The old ruling elite was connected to the West, and trying to cope
with values like democracy, freedom of the press, and freedom of opinion. Therefore many
political forces could become active. Jews became active as Communists because communism
seemed to be the best basis for social justice and equality. Communism seemed to secure a
future where everybody was free to live and fight for a better society regardless of class, na­
1Albeit Memmi, Le Pharaon, M i 1988.

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CHAPTER 14. CONCLUSION

tionality, ethnicity, or religion. In their personal lives many of the Jewish Communists we have
talked about here remained faithful to this conviction, though during the last decades the tra­
ditional mass basis for internationalist struggle, the syndicates, the feminist unions, and the
socialist parties, have almost disappeared. The Arab countries remained economically depen­
dent on the West but became increasingly isolated from the political and cultural developments
on the other side of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Tolerance and equality are two different
concepts. The much quoted tolerance of the Islamic Empire was an attitude the caliph could
generously adopt. Equality guaranteed by the law and taught to future generations, as essential
for the development of society, is something totally different
Egyptian intellectuals are still suffering from a dual identity. They vacillate between a train­
ing in western thought and a belief in the virtues of Islamic tradition. The fusion of both has
driven Nasr HSmid Aba Zaid into exile. Egypt like other Arab countries, is now suffering from
an army of lower middle class academics, with little chance of employment dreaming about a
job in the W est and hating the West at the same time because it has all the opportunities and
riches that Egypt is lacking. The situation of that young generation seems even worse than that
of the youths of the 1930s and 1940s. The ruling elite in the Arab world is no more ready to
engage in a democratic process than the elite was then. Wealth is as unequally distributed now
as it was then.
This study has started with a reflection about the Egyptian nation state, minorities in Egypt,
and the situation of Jews in Egypt It has discussed why Jews accepted European nationalities,
and why they became part of the francophone culture in Egypt. It has demonstrated that the
upper classes belonged to the same culture as Jews. Even the middle class intellectuals who felt
the representatives of the real Egyptians were part of a culture already that was not authentic
Egyptian if authentic Egyptian was be translated into a (conservative) Arabic Islamic culture
that derives its values not from the enlightened ambiente of - let’s say Arabic Andalusia -, but a
village in Upper Egypt. Egyptian Jews even if they did not speak Arabic well, or did not speak
it at all, even if they carried an Italian passport, felt at home in Egypt Egyptian Jews were
different from French, or German, or American Jews, they were even different from Moroccan
or Iraqi Jews because they were Egyptian Jews. There are always at least three parties involved
in the perception of a minority: the minority itself, the majority of the country where that
specific minority lives, and the outside world. Egyptian Jews were perceived by non-Egyptians,
even by other Jews, as Egyptian Jews, regardless of the fact that non-Jewish Egyptians did not
want to perceive them as Egyptians and regarded them as Europeans, Italian mostly, or that
they themselves did not identify with Egypt because they found it backward, or uncivilized, or
dominated by people whom Jews could not trust - Arab Muslims. One dimension is completely
absent in the discourse about Jewish Communists though it coincides with the timezone of
Jewish political activity in Egypt: the fate of Italian Jewish Communists in Italy. Primo Levi is
completely unknown in Egypt.
In the discourse about Jewish Communists it becomes evident how Jews are perceived in
Egypt now. It shows that an Israeli-Arab dialogue has little chances to succeed. Even Egyp­
tian intellectuals, like Muhammad Sid Ahmad, are not grateful for the insight the contact with
Egyptian Jewish Communists offered them but suffer from the ambiguity it left: they know that
a dialogue would be useful but cannot engage in that dialogue because the masses would not
support i t
The Islamic camp has grown very strong after the defeat of the Arab national revolu­
tionary political trend, and it has influenced the whole political discourse. In the logic of
that discourse only the defeat of the state of Israel at the hands of the Arab-Islamic states
would allow the Arab-Islamic world to return to the tolerance of the Middle Ages, and to let

269
Atab/Israeli/Muslim/Jewish relations relax. Only then could Jews become citizens, and per­
haps ministers once more. Needless to say that it is improbable that that Islamic utopia will be
realized.
In the identification with the Palestinians more than the identification with Arab Muslims
fighting against their oppressors is at stake. It gives Egyptian (Sunni) Muslims the opportunity
to speak out against oppression in general, and to identify with the victims. Shiite mass graves,
gas attacks on Kurds do not provide that kind of identification matrix.
A Palestinian state would force the Arab states in the region to concentrate more on their
own agendas. A Palestinian state, which would be a second Qatar concerning the freedom of
mass media and a second Lebanon concerning cultural output, coexisting peacefully with Israel
and being the home to a democratic society, would relieve the Israeli psyche and at the same
time put the ball in the Arab court. The utopia of an Arab/Israeli state with Jerusalem as the
capital, shared by Muslims and Jews (and Christians), would seal the regions’ independence
from the Western world, and put it on an equal footing with Western states.
The idea that immigrants live as “guests” in a country, without demanding the right to politi­
cal participation and citizenship, is a concept that is related to the concept of the Islamic empire
and its dhimmïs, but is not compatible with the modem nation state. Arab Muslims - though
they have been living in modem (multi ethnic) nation states for generations - have difficulties
to accept that reality. The same is true for Israel. In the long run, the concept of an exclusively
Jewish state will not be sustainable. Arabs and Israelis alike have a share in the responsibility
to make the cradle of the three monotheistic religions a place where humans of all creeds can
live with equal rights, and where beside the memorial for all the Jews who perished in the mur­
derous factory of National Socialism there will be a memorial for all those Jews who gave their
lives for internationalism.

Appendix A
Inventory of Sources
A.1 Personal Interviews
Marcel IsrS’II Ceresi, 15th March and 4th April 1997.
RamsTs Lablb, 5th December 1999
‘Alä’ Shukrallah, 8th January 2000
R ifat al-Sald, 16th November, 18th, 20th, and 23rd December 1999
MahmQd Amin al-'Âlim, 27th and 28th December 1999
Taha Sa‘d *110)0180 19th and 29th November 14th December 1999
Samir Tadrus, 9th and 27th November 1999
Gamal al-Banna, 27th November 1999
Muhammad Sid Ahmad, 19th November 1999
Khalid Hamza, 21st November 1999
Fakhrf Lablb, 14th December 1999
MahgQb ‘Umar, 22nd November 1999
YOsuf DarwTsh, 14th November 1999 and 20th December 1999
Amina Rashid, 31st October 1999 and 5th January 2000
Imän Shahata, 7th January 2000
Fauzl HabbashT, 20th October and 18th November 1999
Shahinda Maqlad, 11th December 1999 and 9th January 2000
Shahata al-Nashär, 2nd Dcember 1999
'Arlyân NasTf, 26th December 1999
Ra’Qf ‘Abbas, 17th November 1999

271

272

APPENDIX A. INVENTORY OF SOURCES
Thurayä Shäkir, 20lh October and 18th November 1999
NagSfî ‘Abd al-MagJd. 15th December 1999
Sun'allah Ibrâhîm, 5tb January 2000
Sharif Hatâta, 1st November 1999 and 18th January 2000
Muhammad YQsuf al-GindT, 20th January 2000

A.2 List of Documents
A.2.1

Documents from the Centre of Arab and African Studies in Cairo

La’ihat al-hizb al-shuytFTal-misrfal-muwahhad. (The Party Statutes of the United Egyp­
tian Communist Party)
Taqrfr siyästmin al-lajna al-markaziyya lil hizb al-shuyiff al-misrf (al-takattul). A report
from August 1964 that evaluates the Free Officers’ Movement and lifts it into the tank
of an anti-imperialist national revolutionary movement that deserves communist cooper­
ation. The included self criticism alludes to the period of the early 1950s only as a period
of clique set ups and denounces the lack of Realpolitik. Emphasis is put on the national
revolution’s merit to have created a new national leadership that stems from the ranks o f
the “fallahin, the middle classes and the petit bourgeoisie.” The “progressive intellectuals
and the national officers” will become the expression of the People’s interests and stand
against international imperialism and the local bourgeoisie. (30 pages)
Min ajl haraka jamählriyya wûsFa wa munazpama tu’amminu masdr al-thaura. Min ajl
hizb talfl thaurl wOhid li bill al-quwa al-ishtirttiayya (mashrif qardr muqaddim min at•
sikritäriyya al-markaziyya), March 1965. The Party leadership announces that the united
force that will lead Egypt on the way to socialism will not be the communist Party and that
for the sake of revolutionary union the communist Party will dissolve as an independent
organization. The Party has committed many mistakes. Some problems like the constant
splitting and the distance from the masses were self made because of the petit bourgeois
character of the organizations. The Party is committed to three truths: There is only
one scientific socialism, but the Socialist principles have to be governed by the national
realities, i.e. tradition and history. “The application of those principles in our country
is ruled by the respect for the religious and the Islamic religious values. Therefore there
is no contradiction between being a socialist fighter and a religious man in the mean
time.” (12) Only in the slogans there is an allusion to Israel: “Long live the unity of all
progressive forces for the sake of the complete defeat of the old and the new imperialist
forces, the Zionist forces and the local boutgeosie!” (IS)
Qarärät al-lajna al-markaziyya al-muwassa'a lil-hizb al-shuyftf al-misrf. (al-takattul)
April 1965. (Declaration of party dissolution from al-hizb al-shuyOT al-misrf “Hadhu.”
March 1965.) The Party leadership declares the dissolution in accordance with its convic­
tion that there can be only one revolutionary party and denounces the communist history
of splits.

A.2. U ST OF DOCUMENTS

273

Haula al-ittihâd al-qaumT. Radd *aid al-sayyid Anwar al-Sâdât. Al-hizb al-shuyitl aimûrf, al-maktab al-siyâsï. 19th September 1938. (About the National Union. An answer
to Anwar al-Sadat from the Political Bureau of the Egyptian Communist Party)
Al-khutût al-ra’tsiyya li-bamâmaj al-hizb al-shuyifT al-misrt al-muwahhad. (The main
outlines of the program of the unified Egyptian Communist Party.) No date.
Bayân ilâ al-shab. Al-Hizb al-shuyifTal-misrt(al-muttahid). (Declaration to the people.)
No date.
Esquisse historique du mouvement communiste Egyptien. The first and the second part
of the report on the Egyptian Communists Marcel Isrä’il Ceresi prepared for the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) in 1933 and sent to Egypt in 1973. It includes the points:
I) es débuts du mouvement ouvrier en Egypte.
II) La fondation du Parti Communiste Egyptien et son évolution (1922-1930)
III) La création de groupes marxistes étrangers et leur activité (1934-1939)
IV) L* égyptianisation du mouvement communiste (1939-1943)
V) La lutte pour la conquête de la direction du mouvement national.
A letter from Marcel IsrfiH Ceresi to R ifat al-SaTd concerning his book on the history of
the Egyptian leftist movement between 1940 and 1930 and answers to specific questions
R ifat al-Sa'Td had asked him during a personal meeting. (The letter is handwritten and
in Arabic, approximately 40 pages). The letter contains a detailed description of the
development of the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL).
Hizb al-ummäl al-ishtirâkl al-shuyü'T li Misr. (Party Program of the First Egyptian So­
cialist Party)
Mudhakkira f t al-qadiyya al-janäya raqam 393 Muharram Bek sanat 1924 al-khâsa bi
al-shuyitiyya. 23th May 1924 (A memorandum by the plaintiff about the accusation of
11 party members.)
Mahdar tahqïq ma'a Anwar K äm t (Qadiyyat al-ishtiräkiyya / al-khubz wa al-hurriyya /
June’1942)
Bamämaj lajnat al-'ummäl lil-tahrTr âl-qauml Al-haVa al-siyâsiyya lil-tabaqa al-'dmtid.
No date.
Anwar Kämil, kitäb äl-manbüdh.
Bayân rabfat tuläb al-haraka al-dlmuqrûtiyya lil-taharrur al-watant ilâ käfat al-talaba
al-misriytn. (A declaration by the students’ league of the DMNL concerning the assault
on and the trial of students in Iraq, spring 1933.)
Al-jald’ wa siyâsat al-istPmârf i al-sharq al-'arabt (The withdrawal and imperialist pol­
itics in the Arab East. No date. No author. D&r al-Fajr Publications.)
Al-hizb al-shuyitï ai-misrl (ai-râya), al-maktab al-siyâsL 1st September 1934. (An anal­
ysis of the party situation)

APPENDIX/L INVENTORY OF SOURCES

274

lttifäq ai-bitrül al-istfm ärt Al-hizb al-shuyifT al-m isrf (al-räya), 6th February 1954.
Hizbunä yataqawi bi tafhlr sufüfihi min al-khawana wa al-intihäzIyTn, 18th August 1954.
Bayän ild ja m f al-ikhwän al-watanlyln. Al-hizb al-shuyifT al-misrf (al-räya), 31st August
1954.
Bayän min al-lajna al-wafaniyya lil-muqauma bi ghait al-'anab, October 1956 (and a
number of other documents related to resistance against the tripartite aggressioo of 1956).
Présentation des documents du Parti Communiste Egyptien (1955-1957). 8 documents
importants du PCE présentés par la direction du PCE aux deux grands partis communistes
occidentaux de l’époque, le Parti Communiste Italien et le Parti Communiste Français.
(Concernant:
I. Deux analyses • deux politiques. La situation actuélle en Egypte. Juin 1956.
H. La situation en Egypte et l’activité du Parti Communiste Egyptien après la national­
isation du Canal de Suez.

in. Le program du Parti Communiste Egyptien‘‘Uni.”
IV. Rapports du PCE.
V. Le texte intégral de la décision du Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Egyptien
“Uni.’’
VI.

Trois années de luttes paysannes en Egypte. Décembre 1955

VU. L’aspect économique du problème palestinien.

Vm. Nation arabe ou Nations arabes!
Bayän ila al-sha'b al-m isrt (al-lajna al-tahdiriyya lil-lajna al-wataniyya al-muttahida)
October 1956
Bayän ila ai-sha'b. Al-hizb al-shuyffl ai-misrT (al-muwahhad). 4th December 1956
Ayyuhâ al-muwâtinûn. Al-hizb al-shuyifT al-misrt (al-muwahhad), ta lfa t al-'ummäL No
date.
Nashaq kull mu’âmara istfmOriyya jadtda. Al-hizb al-shuyitï al-mifrt; fa tfa t al-'ummâl
- al-hizb al-shuyifl al-m isrt al-muwahhad. 12th April 1957.
Bayän ilä ai-sha'b. Al-hizb al-shuyifT al-misrt al-muwahhad • ta lfa t al-'ummOL 25th
January 1957.
Bayän ila ai-sha'b Al-hizb al-shuyifT al-misrt al-muttahid. 1st July 1957.
F tsabïl al-ifrùj *an al-masjünln al- shuyiftyüL Al-hizb al- shuyifT al-muwahhad. No date
Bayän min al-hizb al-shuyifT al-misrf (hizb 8 YanOyir). (Concerning the situation in the
Arab world and the relation between Iraq and the UAR.) 27th August 1959.
Al-hizb. bi qalam al-rafiq HamdT. Maktab al-dfdya al-markazt Al-hizb al-shuyifT almisrf. July 1958.

A.2. LIST OF DOCUMENTS

275

Mudhakkira muqaddima ila al-sayyid al-ra'ls Gamal Abdel Nasir min al-masjünïn alshuyiftyln ‘an al-mauqifmin al-masjünïn min jam ifat al-ikhwOn al-muslimln. No date.
FauzJ HabbashI, al-difif f t al-muhdkama bi al-qadiyya al-thOniyya al-jandya raqam 635
li-sanat 1961, November 1961.
Ri’Osat al-jumhüriyya al-'arabiyya al-muttahida, al-jartda al-rasmiyya. No. 89, 23rd
November 1967. Qatar ra’ts al-jumhüriyya al-(arabiyya al-muttahida raqam 2210 lisanat 1967. (A list with the names of 1406 communist prisoners)
André Gide (JamS'at al-fann wa al-hurriyya eds.), al-difif ‘an al-thaqäfa. (preface by
Salima M 0si)
Abu Saif YQsuf, Haula al-falsafa al-markisiyya. Raddun *alä al-'Aqqäd. Cairo 1946.
Notes sur l’histoire du P.C.E. (1919-1925), Groupe Rome.
Lettre au Bureau Politique, concernant la dissolution du “Groupe de Rome.” 12th January
1958 and the same letter in Arabic (khittâb ila al-maktab al-siyOst).
Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World. 1917-1958, Seattle 1959.

A.22 Personal Archives of Yüsuf Darwïsh, Taha Sa(d cUthmän and Fauzi
HabbashI
Autobiographic notes, YQsuf Darwïsh.
Autobiographic notes, Taha Sacd 'Uthmân.
Letters to the public prosecutor and other court files, Fauzf HabbashI.
Art & Liberté. March 1939, Bulletin No. 1, May 1939 Bulletin No. 2.
Al-ghad. 1st issue. May 1953. No. 2-5, June - September 1953.
Al-fallSh. Jaridat ittihid al-fallähln. 25.12.1953,20.11.1953,5.9.1954,10.1.1954.
Al-haraka al-'ummQliyya, 20.11.1953,30.9. 1954.
Al-damlr. Majalla siySsiyya ijtimäMyya thaqSfiyya tasdur lil-'ummâl. No. 272 - 283
(Octobre 1945 - January 1946)
Räyat al-sha’b. Jaridat al-hizb al-shuyQT al-misri. No. 112-116 (December 1953), 133135 (August / September 1954), 158 (6.8.1956).
Kiflh al-sha'b. No. 1 (19th April 1955) Lisin h il al-hizb al- shuyOT al-muwahhad.
al-Intisir. Jaridat al-hizb al-shuyfll al-misri (al-muttahid) No date.
al-Intisir, No. 2 , 19th December 1956. (al-Jabha al-muttahida lil-muqauma al-sha'biyya
fl Port Said).
Al-wahda. No. 1 July 1954. (edited by the committee for unity between four communist
organizations, among them the DMNL and the DMNL / revolutionary trend)

APPENDIX A. INVENTORY OF SOURCES

276

Al-talTa. Al-nashra al-dSkhiliyya lil-haraka al-d&nuqriUiyya lil-Uharur al-watanl. No.9,
23rd June 1954.
Al-kâdr. Al-nashra al-dSkhiliyya lil-hizb al-shuyST al-misri al-muwahhad. No. 21, May
1957.
HaySt al-hizb. Al-nashra al-dSkhiliyya lil-hizb al-shuyfi'T al-misrT al-muttahid. No. 1,
August 1957
Le Journal d’Egypte, 16th July 1946. Important exposé de Sedky pacha, le complot
communiste, au Sénat.
Umm Durmân, No. 12-13, Cairo 1947

K23

Government Archives

A J J .1

Stiftung Archiv der Parteien and Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bunde­
sarchiv

DY/30/TV 2/20 Aktenband 373 / 43-244 Unterlagen Ober arabische Studenten und Ar­
beiter in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik; Berichte Ober und Proteste gegen
Misshandlungen von politischen Gefangenen in Ägypten; Berichte zur Geschichte der
Kommunistischen Partei in Ägypten.
DY/30/IV2/20 Aktenband 374 / 11-295 Solidarity, Organ of Struggle for the Amnesty o f
the Egyptian Political Prisoners, April 1956; Letter by the “Committee for Help to Egyp­
tian Childhood” founded in Switzerland to help the political prisoners’ children, Geneva
18/2/56; Nouvelles Egyptiennes, 20 Juin 1953 (a series of articles from clandestine com­
munist newspapers); Papers concerning Egyptian-East German and Egyptian-Soviet for­
eign relations.
A 13J

US-State Department

Documents related to the situation of Jews and foreigners in Egypt:
774.001/4-655
774.001/2-756
774.001/10-1155
Unclassified: All Papers, June, 29,1956 / Desp. No. 42 from Cairo: verdicts in the case
of the Egyptian Communist Party.
774.001/7-1356
774.001/10-2356
Enclosure N o.l, Desp.No.692, Paris, France, For Washington : Is the Egyptian Regime
Communistic? An Arab diplomat answers the question positively for an American Friend.
September 10,1956.

A.2. LIST OF DOCUMENTS

277

Desp. No. 21, Enel. No. 1, Translation of an article in L’Unita issue of May 14,1937:
Alberto Jacoviello’s trip in the Arab World. Towards the Creation in Egypt of a Sole
Communist Party - Interview with the Members of the “Coordination Committee” of the
Various Communist Organization - A Dark Period of Splits and Bitter Struggles Comes
to an End - The Program of the Party.
774.001/9-1357
774.001/11-1257
The State Department provided a breakdown of the list of individuals arrested for com­
munism in Cairo (10/31/57) according to (presumed religion) and found that out of 18
persons arrested at least seven were Christians, one a Jew, and the rest Muslims.
774.001/9-1957
774.001/2-2658
774.003/11-3057
774.001-1256

A.2.4

Stichtag beheer IISG

Papers of the Egyptian Communists in exile (Rome Group) and Papers of Henri Curiel (19141978) 1945-1979 (-1984)
Assemblée générale 7.11.1954, Pour améliorer notre travail. (Inventory no. 13)
Henri Curiel, La lutte idéologique, 1953 (Inventory no. 18)
Noémie Canel (Laila), Lettre a Younis, 27.7.1953. (Inventory no. 21)
An answer by Henri Curiel to an article by the DMNL-Couiant Révolutionnaire on the
Henri Curiel (Younis) affair, 1954. (Inventory no. 29)
Corresponcence by Henri Curiel (Amin, Jac) and the Rome Group with Kama! Abdel
Halim (Khalil, Kelly) and other prisoners in Kharga. 1955-1966. (K hittib min Khalil 'an
tahmishihi, 28.2.1956) (Inventory no. 36)
Raymond Stambouli, Le conflit arabo-israélien à l’heure de Suez, 1956. (Inventory no.
45)
Correspondence with imprisoned comrades (Inv.nos. 72-82), especially:
Khittib shakhsl raqm 1, J i’a al-hall bini’an 'a li wad'infi al-ijtim i'T,10th May 1958;
à Jules, Lettre du 21 Décembre 1957;
Le 28 Janvier 1958 à famille Jules;
24 Mars 1958, à propos des contradictions que nous devons poser et résoudre;
Les problèmes de l’unité arabe; Khittib ili al-maktab al-siyisl, 12th January 1958;
Lettre de Robert du 10/7/1958;

APPENDIX A. INVENTORY OF SOURCES

278
Lettre No. 7 du 29.7.1958.

Pour le mot d’ordre de paix entre les Etats Arabes et Israel, by Salloum and Le Conflit
arabo-israélien à l’heure de Suez, by Gindi, 19S6. (Inventory no. 193)
Henri Curiel, La question de Palestine; Pour une lutte conséquente pour la paix, 19561957. (Inventory no. 195)
Henri Curiel, La nature du régime nassérien et role de Gamal Abdel Nasser, September
1956. (Inventory no. 302)
Nécessité des militants professionels, 1956. (Inventory no. 303)
Rapport sur la participation à l’avant-garde de la lutte armée actuelle comme étappe de la
lutte armée du peuple. 1950 (Inventory no. 327)
Note sur les relations entre Israel et les Pays Arabes, August 1953. (Inventory no. 338)
Suggestions pour le travail parmi les paysans, October 1953.(Inventory no. 340)
La question de Palestine, 1957 (Inventory no. 364)
Pour une lutte conséquente pour la paix entre Israel et les Pays Arabes, 1957. (Inventory
no. 365)
Au Comité Central du Parti communiste Egyptien Uni, 1958. (Inventory no. 373)
Lettre au Bureau Politique, January 1958. (Inventory no. 374)
Pour l’unité de la gauche Egyptienne, January 1958. (Inventory no. 375)
Attitude des communistes Egyptiens sur le conflit Israélo-Arabe, interview with Henri
Curiel by Marie Dominique Gresh, December 1976. (Inventory no. 397)

A3

Newspapers and Magazines
al-Ahram,1921-1924,1939-1948.
al-Misrl, 29.07.1945-1948.
Sautal-umma, 1945-1948.
AkhirSfi'a, 1939-1945.
al-AMU, 1988.
al-Anbff, 1988.
Cairo Times, 1999.
al-Ahram Weekly, 2001.
al-Ahram al-iqtisSdl, 1981.

A .4 . BOOKS AND ARTICLES IN ARABIC

279

al-Jamâhlr, 1947.
al-Fajr al-jadld, 194S.
HuqQq al-nâs, 1999.
Le Journal d’Egypte, 1946.
La Bourse Egyptienne, 1938.
La Bourse Egyptienne, 1924.
La Tribune juive, 1939.

A.4 Books and Articles in Arabie
’Abbis, Ra’üf (ed.): AurSq Henri Curiel wa al-haraka al-shuyü'iyya al-misriyya. Cairo
1988.
'Abbfis, RaW: al-Haraka al- ’ummâliyya fï Misr, 1899-1932. Cairo, 1967.
’Abdallah, Ahmad: al-Haraka al-tulSbiyya al-hadîtha fî Misr. Cairo, 1993.
‘Abd al-Halîm, Fu’âd, Faiïq anjaza 'amalahu. Haula nashât al-yasfir fî al-aqalîm fî alarba'InlyâL Cairo, 1999.
’Abd al-Nabîy, Muhammad Mustafa, al-’Asr al-dhahabî lil-yahud fî Misr. Cairo, 1997.
Abd al-Näsir, Huda GamSl, al-Ru’ya al-brîtâniyya lil-haraka al-wataniyya al-misriyya
1936-1952.’Cairo, 1987.
’Abd al-Rahmfin, ’AwStif, Misr wa Filastîn. Cairo, Jacques Berque, Egypt. Imperialism
and Revolution. London, 1972. 1989.
’Abd al-Rahmin, ’Awitif, al-Sahâfa al-sahyQniyya fî Misr 1897-1934. Cairo, 1980.
’Abd al-Salfim, Fahml, Curiel. Lawrence al-haraka al-shuyQ’iyya al-misriyya, in: al-Hiläl,
February 2001,121-133.
’Abdu, ’AIT IbrShlm and Qisimiyya, Khairiyya, YahQd fî al-bilfid al-’arabiyya. Munazzamat
al-tahrlr al-filastlniyya, Markaz al-abhfith, DirisSt filastîniyya, 8th June 1971.
AbO ShSdT, Ahmad ZakI, in: AdabI Yanfiyir, March 1937.
Abii Zayyid, Nasr Himid, al-KhittSb al-mu’Ssir ? Sliyyatuhu wa muntalaqfituhu al-fikriyya,
in: QadSyS fikriyya. No. 7, al-Isläm al-siyâsï. Cairo, 1989,45-78.
Aflatfln, InjI, MudhakkirSt InjT Aflätün, edited by Sa'Id Khayyil. Cairo, 1993.
Ahmad, Muhammad Sîd, al-YahQd fî al-haraka al-shuyfi’iyya al-misriyya wa al-sirä’ al'arabï al-isrtilî, in: al-H ilil, YQnyQ 1988,95th year, 21-33.

Ahmad, Muhammad STd, Ba’da an taskuta al-madSfi’. Cairo, 1977.

280

APPENDIX A. INVENTORY OF SOURCES
Ahmad, Muhammad Sid, Min wähl tajmbatï m a'a IsrSH, in: al-Qihira, Fabräyir 2000,
No. 13, Cairo, 2000,46-30.
Ahmad, Muhammad Sid, Mustaqbal al-nizim al-hizbï ft Misr. Cairo, 1984.
al-'Älim, MahmQd Amin, M a'ärik fikriyya. Cairo, 1970.
al-'Älim, MahmQd Amin and Anis, 'Abd al-'AzIm, FI al-thaqifa al-misriyya. 3rd edition
Cairo, 1989 (first edition 1953).
al-'Älim, MahmQd Amin, al-MSrkisîyOn al-misrîyün wa al-qadiyya al-'arabiyya. Cairo,
1988.
al-(Âlim, MahmQd Amin, al-Wa(y wa al-wa'y al-zS’if ft al-fikr al-'arabl al-mu’isir. Cairo,
1988.
al-'Askarï, MahmQd, Min tQrikh al-haraka al- 'ummâliyya al-misriyya, in: al-'Ummäl,
published by the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions, 9th January 1978.
Al-Bannä, Jamäl, al-Isläm wa al-haraka al-niqibiyya. Cairo, 1981.
al-Bishrî, Târiq, al-Haraka al-siySsiyya fl Misr. 1945-52. First edition Cairo, 1972, sec­
ond edition 1983.
al-BishrT, Täriq, ‘Äm 1936 fî al-târikh al-misrî, in: majallai al-talTa, Fabrâyir 1965.
al-Bishrî, Târiq, al-MuslimQn wa al-aqbit fî itär al-jamâ'a al-wataniyya. Cairo, 1982.
al-DisQqT, 'Asim (ed.), 'Ummâl wa hilib fl al-lumka al-wataniyya al-misriyya. Cairo,
1998.
al-Disuqî, 'Asim, JudhQr al-mas’ala a l-ti’ifiyya fî Misr al-hadîtha, in: Lajnat al-difS* an
al-thaqâfa al-qaumiyya. Mushkilat al-tâ’ifiyya fi Misr. Cairo, 1998,30-42.
al-DisQql, ’Asim, al-Jadl haula al-huwiyya wa al-muwitana, 1952-1999. Paper presented
at the 13th conference on Egyptian political experience in 100 years, Cairo, 4.-6. 12.
1999.
al-Fiql, Mustafa, al-Aqbit fi al-siyâsa al-misriyya. Makram 'Ubaid wa dauruhu fi alharaka al-wataniyya. Cairo, 1988.
al-FiqT, Mustafa, Tajdld al-fikr al-qauml. Cairo, 1999.
al-Ghazzàfi, ’Abd al-Mun’am, Tulkh al-haraka al-’ummâliyya al-misriyya, 1899-1952.
Cairo, 1968.
al-Gindl, Muhammad YQsuf (ed.), Henri Curie!, min ajl salim ‘Sdil fi al-sharq al-ausaL
Cairo, 1999. ’
al-Gindl, Muhammad YQsuf, Saqta. Raddun 'ala al-tashhlr lil-yasSr al-misrT. Cairo, 1999.
al-Gindl, Muhammad YQsuf, Maslrat hayâfi hattS 1964. Cairo, 2000.
al-Gindl, Muhammad YQsuf, al-Yasâr wa al-haraka al-wataniyya fi M ia1(1940-1950).
Cairo, 19%.

A.4. BOOKS AND ARTICLES IN ARABIC

281

al-GindT, Muhammad YOsuf, al-’Aulama wa al-umamiyya. Cairo, 1999.
al-Jibri, Muhammad ‘Äbid, al-A sila wa al-mu’in ra , in: al-Yaum al-sibi’, Beirut, No.92,
1988.
'AH, ‘Abd al-'AzIz, al-ThSir al-sfimit. Cairo, 1978.
‘AB, 'Arafa 'Abdu, Gîtü Is rilll fî al-Qihira. Cairo, 1990.
’AH, 'Arafa ’Abdu, YahOd Misr. BarQnit wa bu’sS’i Cairo, 1997.
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Personal Names
'Abbas, Ra’Of, 42,64.65, 89,100,132,138,
160-166,176,180
'Abd al-'AzIz, Muhammad, 84
‘Abd al-HaUm, 'Abbas, 257
'Abd al-Halim, Kamai, 118, 128,129, 246,
247
'Abd al-Malik, Anwar, 27,33,119,124,176,
180,213
'Abd al-Ràziq, 'AH, 32,82,206
'Abd al-Wahhab, Sayyid, 234,237,238,241,
242.245.253
Abdel Nasir, Gamal, 3.130,160,197,264,
265
'Abdu Fadl, Mubarak, 111-113, 128, 129,
246,247
Abu al-Fath, Safwän, 79,82,83,85
AbO Saif, Salàh, 144,194,222
Adham, Thurayä, 116,206
Adham, 'Inâyat, 208
Aflätün, InjI, 82, 116, 135, 173-177, 187,
1%, 212,214-216,222,223,260
Aghion, Raymond, 93,96,105,142
Ahmad, Muhammad Sid, 115,117,124,128,
146, 158, 173, 176-183, 196, 207,
212,216,217,270
Ahwânl, Fu’ad al-, 109,141
Al-'Aqqad. 'Abbas Mahmud, 13,36,76,80,
158,203,249'
Al-Bastäwlsl, 'Abd al-'Al, 232,233
Al-BasOsT, Bayflml, 83
Al-Bishrt, Tariq, 22, 29, 35, 37, 95, 158,
159,166-169,179
Al-Disuql, 'Asim, 34
Al-Ghazzaii, 'Abd al-Min'am, 206
Al-Giban, Ahmad, 240,241
Al-GibaiH, 'Adil 'Abd al-Ma'bOd. 120,121,
124, 146, 147, 163. 207, 210, 211,
245.252.253
Al-GindT, Muhammad YOsuf, 128,129,133,
136,139,169,199,206,207

Al-KhOH, Fikn, 145.250,255-258
Al-MasiT, TahsTn, 142,247
Al-NahMs, Mustafa, 31,32,75,257,261
Al-Ramil, FathT, 62,105,106,142,144,204,
205,217,223,224
A l-Sald, R ifat, 5, 71-73, 77, 78, 81, 87,
89.94,96,104,110,115,124,126,
127, 139, 140, 142, 145, 146, 150,
152, 153, 158, 165, 178, 197, 199,
202, 204, 205, 207, 209, 211, 218,
220, 225, 229, 235, 244, 245, 252,
253,260
Al-Shaiqawi, ‘Abd al-Rahmän, 62,145,193,
243
Al-TawH, Sa'd Butnis. 182,210,212,218
Al-'Urfbl, Husitf, 73-75,78,79,82,83,109,
111. 139,260
Al-Zayyat, LatJfa, 115, 180,206,208,211.
217
Ali, Muhammad (Pasha, 19th century), 16,
2 0 ,2 1 ,3 0 ,5 3 , 102, 111, 114, 160,
168
'Älim, Mahmud Amin al-, 129,195
Anis, 'Abd al-'Azîm, 156,195,210
Arié, Albeit, 115-117,124,177
'Atiyya, ShuhdT, 120-124,127-129,146,147,
180,1% , 206.207,211,213,253
Attrosh, MahmQd al-, 86,89-91
Auerbach, Wolfgang alias AbO Ziyam, 88,
91
Avigdor alias Constantin WeiB, 80,84,91
'Awad. Louis, 21,35.76.80,118,144,168,
177,191,203,209,212
Bakdash, Khalid, 140,153
Bakhlt, 'Abd al-Latif, 83
Banna, Hasan al-, *3,26,78,188,190,240,
249
Beiger, Joseph, 81,85,88,91
Biunyate, 22

296

297

PERSONAL NAMES
Canel, Mimi, 118
Castro, Leon, 93,93
Ceresi, Marcel IsriTl, 43, 83, 93, 96-98,
103, 106, 110, 113, 118, 139-130,
161,169,183.204,203,222
Cossen, Albert, 203,204,267,269
Cromer (Lord), 21-23,29,30,71,151
Curiel, Henri, 9,38,43.62,64,82,96-136,
139-143, 143-130, 136-166, 168,
169, 171, 173, 176, 178-181, 185,
195, 196, 202, 205-207, 210, 212,
217, 222-225, 227-231, 235, 237,
244-247,252-254,257,268,269
Curiel, Raoul, 93,141
Dahab, 'Abdu, 122,162
DarwTsh, Yüsuf, 82,96-98, 110, 112, 132,
141, 149-156, 185, 227, 231, 242,
244,251,254,255
Descombes, Paul Jacquot, 93-95,110,141,
142,149,152,153,158,169
Douek, Raymond, 39,62,96-98,110,149155,185,244,251
DdwTdfir, Muhammad, 84-87,89,232
Fadl, 'Abd al-Rahmfin, 81,83-86,110,232,
234
Farik) (King), 33,34,112,190
Fauzi, Osman, 99,102,103,126
Forte, Dîna, % , 153
Fuad I (King), 30
Gabbour, Rafiq, 81
GhâH, Butnis, 29.77
Ghâlî, Gainai. 62,124,206,211,253
Girgis, Fauzi, 213,225
HabbashT, F auzl,47,122,142,210-212,214,
216,217,224-227
Haddad,Farid, 111, 156,213
Haddad, Fu’ad, 115
Haddâd, Taufïq, 115,124
Hlfiz, Sha'ban, 79.83,234
Haikal, Muhammad Husain, 11-13,33,76,
82,142,206,262
Haikal, Mustafa, 206,208
Halim, As'ad, 142,144,145,204,205
Harari, Ezra. 105,147,225,227
Hariri, Ibrâhîm, 171

Harb, Tala'at, 257
Hartin, Shahata, 36,37,248
Hassoun, Jacques, 20,43,53-55,57
Hatata. Sharif. 128.147,169-171,221
Hazan, Odette, 98,128,181,182,212.216,
227
Henein, George, 105,143,203,204
HifnI NBsif, ’IsBm al-Dln, 62,72,77,200
Husain. Salah, 260-265
Husain. Tah* 13,76.82.158,191,203
IbrihTm, al-ShahSt, 79,84
Kamil, Anwar, 62,105,106.142-144,161,
202-205
Katz, Abram, 79,80
Kazim, Husain, 105,142
Khidr, Ahmad, 129,142,230-232,234,238,
241,243,245,251-253
Labib, Fakhri. 129,213,214
Lacoutuie, J. and S., 94,95,104
Levi, Edward, 94,95
Mahfouz, Naguib. 27,37,187,203,221
Maqlad, Shahinda. 260-264
MarighI, Mustafa al- (Shaikh al-Azhar), 32,
34,56,190
Marfln, Antfln, 74,79,82,83
Mielli, Renato, %
Misiko, Marcel, 95,96
Mudarrik, YOsuf al-, 153, 229, 237, 244,
245
M urid. ZakI, 113,129,208,246
MursT, Fu’ad, 98, 115, 159, 166, 169, 182,
187,201,225
Musa. Salama, 33, 34, 73, 75-77, 82. 83,
142,202.203,206.209,212,235
NabriwI, Slza, 135,207
Nahum Effendi, Haim, 57-60
Nahum. David. 236,237,248
Nasir al-DTn, Muhammad, 109,141
Pointée, George, 109,141
Rashid. Amina. 55,173,176,180,183,184
Rosenthal, Joseph, 73-76, 78-81, 83, 84,
162
Rossano, Didar Fauzi, 43,44,99-103,107,
126,128,134,135.152

298
SabiT, IsmOT, 115,159,166,182
Sacco, Nicola, 80
SSdiq Sa'd, Ahmad, 35, 62, 96, 98, 110,
141. 149, 150, 152-155, 194, 227,
228,244,251,254,258,259
Salomon, Sidney, 146,181,212
Sanburg, Hillel, 79,80
Sind, Hafiz, 77
SannQ', Ya'qüb, 52
Schwartz, Hillel, 96,97,110,114,115,117,
118, 121, 127, 146, 147, 158, 163,
169,181,185,207,208,211,252
Setton, Aimée, 39,116,118
Shaarawi, Huda, 19,87,207
Shäkir, Thuraya, 30,122,206-208,212,214218,225,227,230
ShalabT, Muhammad al-DTn, 206
ShukiT, GhaiT, 203
Shumayyil, ShiblT, 86,206
STdarOs, Geneviève, 208,212,213,222
SidqT, Ismail, 13,267
Tlba, Mustafa, 158-160,195-197,235,238,
253,254,261
TQsQn, Halim, 115
‘Ubaid, Makram, 28,31,32,34,37,56,109,
226,227
'Umar, MahgQb, 154,190,206
‘Uthman, Taha Sa'd, 153,22^-243,245,248251,254,255
Vanzetti, Bartolomeo, 80
Wahlda, Subhl, 67,68
WaidanI, YQsuf al-, 29
Yannakakis, Illios, 7 3 ,79,80,94, 110,145,
146
YasTn, HilmT, 154,155,199
YQsuf, AbO Saif, 141, 149, 150, 152, 154,
155,209,226,233,249
Zaghlul, Saad, 31, 56, 72, 75, 77, 78, 83,
151,179, 189,194, 198,204,227
Zahrin, Sa'd, 124, 126,127,155,178,206,
213
ZakI Abu Shâdî, Ahmad, 34
ZakI, Fatma, 181,182,211,212,214
Zuhair, Su'äd, 199,205,223,224

PERSONAL NAMES

Organizations and Parties
al-Qafa, 98

195, 196, 202, 206-208, 234-236,
238.242248,251-254
Egyptian Socialist Party, 72,74,75,81

Ait and Freedom (al-fann wa al-hurriyya),
143,202-206
Bread and Freedom (al-khubz wa al-hurriyya),
93,96,105,106,142.144,161.204,
205
Democratic Movement for National Liber­
ation (al-Haraka al-dXmuqrätiyya li
al-taharrur al-watanf), 51, 97, 98,
102, 104, 113-119, 121, 123-131,
133, 134, 142, 143, 145, 146, 155,
157-160, 162-166, 168, 169, 174,
178,180, 181,186,188, 195,1% ,
200, 201, 206-208, 212-214, 220,
222, 223, 227, 230, 238, 243-247,
252-255,261
Democratic Union (al-ittihäd al-dtmuqrätt),
93,97,105,114, *141,143

Groupe Études (jatruPat al-buhOth), 93,95,
152,209
House of Scientific Research (dar al-abhäth
al-Hlmiyya), 96,235
Iskra, 51, 96-98, 110, 114-121, 124, 125,
145-147, 155, 163, 164, 166, 168,
169, 173-180, 187,206-208,211214, 216, 217, 223, 225, 229, 230,
236.243- 245,247,248,251-253
League for the Combat of anti-Semitism, 95

Egyptian Communist Organization
(<al-munazzama al-misriyya
al-shQyffiyya / mishmish), 98, 128,
146, 164, 181,182, 201. 212, 213,
216,217,222
Egyptian Communist Patty, 7 2 ,7 3 ,7 5 ,7 7 80,82-85,89,142
Egyptian Communist Party (al-räya), 98,115,
128-131, 136, 154-156, 158, 159,
167, 169, 174, 183, 187, 195,201,
213,233,238
Egyptian Communist Party of Workers and
Peasants (hizb al-'ummOl wa alfallOhln al-shüyitTal-misrT), 98,154
Egyptian Movement for National Liberation
(ial-Haraka al-misriyya li al-taharrur
al-watanl), 9 ,8 2,96-98, 100,102,
110-114. 116-121. 125, 133, 145,
147, 160, 163-166, 168, 174, 178,

299

Muslim Brothers, 13,26,27,33,36,44,61,
62, 78, 91, 94, 95, 102, 108, 119,
133, 143, 153, 159, 163, 166-168,
171, 190, 201, 206, 207, 209, 210,
217, 218, 224, 233, 239-241, 243,
245,249,260,261,263,264
New Dawn (al-fajr al-jadtd), 96, 98, 153,
209,231,244,248
Nile Valley’s People’s Party (hizb sha'b wOdt
al-Nil), 143
Palestinian Communist Party, 85, 88, 144,
145
Peace Partisans, 93-% , 110,140-142,149,
151,152
People’s Liberation (tahrTral-sha'b), 83,97,
98,106,116,142,144,145,205
Revolutionary Bloc, The (al-takattul
al-thaurf), 98, 123-126, 146, 178,
180.213.252
Revolutionary Proletariat, The
(ial-'ummâliyya al-thauriyya), 146,
247.252

300
Rome Group (majmtfat Roma), 78, 84,97,
102, 127, 128, 130-133, 135, 148,
160,165,166,268
ShabSb Muhammad, 27,33
Tajammu' Party, 37,212
United Egyptian Communist Party (al-Muttahid),
98,130-132,155,264
Wafd, 13.24,31 -3 5 ,3 7 ,5 7 ,6 1 ,6 3 ,6 6 ,6 7 ,
72,75,77,78,80.89,95,101,107110, 113, 115, 125, 126, 140, 142,
143, 146, 151, 152, 159, 161, 180,
189, 199, 200, 207, 209, 210, 227,
232.243.257.261
Workers’ Party, 242,257
Workers’ Vanguard (tall'at al-'ummâl), 94,
96,98,116,129,141,146,149,150,
152-155, 158, 164, 191, 194, 209,
210, 213, 214, 217, 225, 229-231,
233, 235, 236, 241-246, 249, 251,
253,254,258,259
Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatäh), 13, 26, 27,
3 3 ,3 4 ,50’ 108,119,142,150,151,
159.167.168.205.261

ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTIES

Subjects
150, 154, 160, 163, 166-168, 175,
183,188,209
European, 1 -3 ,5 ,8 -1 1 ,1 5 -1 7 ,1 9 ,2 0 ,2 5 27, 29-31, 39-45, 48, 49, 55-57,
59, 64, 67-69, 74, 77, 79, 87, 88,
95,99,100,102,103,112,115,135,
139, 144, 154, 165, 167, 169, 170,
174, 177, 181-183, 185-192, 195,
198, 200, 203, 206, 207, 209, 219,
227,233, 237, 248, 250, 251, 262,
268,270

1919 revolution, 7, 19, 31, 74, 118, 131,
199,261
Al-Azhar, 1 3 ,2 0 ,2 3 ,24,32,33,56,60,78.
110-113, 117, 150, 187, 190, 191,
206,231,239,246-248,257
Anti-Semitism, 43, 90, 95, 108, 131, 147,
164,179
Antifascism, 95,96,141,167
Arabic language, 17,3 0 ,3 4 ,5 3 ,5 5 ,6 9 ,9 2 ,
100,112,113,140,145
Arabization, 57,84-91,175
Armenians, 16, 32, 47, 55, 64, 71, 73, 89,
95,114,117,118,213

Fallahin, 17, 23, 25, 26, 31, 79, 98, 123,
124, 143, 186, 194, 203, 207, 232,
233,241,254,256,258-265
Foreigners, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 16, 21, 22, 2426, 30, 37, 38, 42, 49-51, 53, 54,
56, 57, 61, 63-69, 71-73, 75-80,
83,85,90,91,94-% , 104,105,110,
113, 116-120, 123-127, 140-142,
145, 146,148, 149,151-155,157161, 163-170, 172, 178, 187-189,
191, 193, 195, 198, 202, 204-208,
211, 213, 222, 223, 227, 234-238,
242,247-249,251-254,268
French, 2, 8, 9, 15, 16, 20-26, 38-45, 48,
52-55, 57, 59, 63, 65, 67, 73, 77,
86,88-90,94-% , 99,102,104,105,
107, 111, 115, 117, 118, 127, 129,
131, 132, 134, 136, 140-144,149151, 154, 161, 166, 167, 173-177,
183, 185, 188, 192, 200, 203, 204,
207, 208, 213-215,227,230, 234237,248,259,260,262,267-270

Bolshevik, 72-74, 77, 79, 83, 86, 88, 98,
123,146,208
Bourgeoisie, 11,12,19, 20, 3 5 ,4 2 ,4 4 ,5 7 ,
80, 87-89, 96, 99, 109, 110, 117,
119, 120, 125, 134, 161-163, 185,
186,188,191-193,195,201,211
British occupation, 2 ,8 ,1 6 -2 1 ,2 4 ,2 5 ,2 8 30,38,40,51,52,55,68,112,167,
188,197,203,223,231,259,267
Colonialism, 17,195,253
Comintern, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84,
86-88,90-92,115,140,167
Cöpts, 1, 7, 10, 11, 15-19, 22, 24, 27-38,
41, 46, 48, 50, 54-58, 64, 65, 93,
109, 125,166,167,176,192,207209,212,227,251
Cosmopolitanism, 85,133
DhimmI, 15.28,41,60.99.271
Dinshawai incident, 25,26,68

Greeks, 1 ,2 ,1 5 -1 7 ,2 6 ,4 6 ,5 5 ,5 7 ,6 3 -6 5 ,
67, 71, 73, 76, 78, 80, 82, 93, 95,
106, 110, 115, 117, 118, 145, 146,
152,213

Effendiyya, 186, 188, 190, 194, 207. 209,
255,258
Egyptianization,4,30,46,57,114,115,117,
118, 120, 121, 123-125, 143, 145,

Ibn al-balad, 195.233

301

SUBJECTS

302
Immigrants, 5 ,1 7 ,1 8 ,39,43,47,53,58,63,
64, 67, 68, 91, 99, 100, 223, 267,
271
Internationalism, 159
Israel, 1 ,2 ,6 ,8 , 17,18, 20,33, 36,37,41,
42, 44, 46, 51, 56, 62, 63, 97, 98,
102, 104, 131, 134-136, 145, 148,
154, 155, 157-159, 163, 164, 166,
176- 181,183, 184,222-224, 267271
Italians, 1 ,2 ,1 7 ,4 1 ,4 4 ,4 6 ,5 5 ,6 4 ,6 5 ,6 7 ,
71,73, 78,82,115.117-119, 145,
235,237
Jews, 1-12, 15-20, 26, 30, 31, 33, 35-65,
67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 78-85, 87-89,
91-100,102-104,106-112,115,117119, 121, 123, 125, 130-134, 136,
140, 142, 144, 145, 147-151, 154,
155, 157-159, 161, 163-171, 174,
177- 184, 187, 192, 200, 201, 205,
214, 222-225, 227, 228, 231, 234,
237,247,250-255,267-271
Khawaga, 26,54,56,64,65.103,156,174,
177, 178, 195, 205, 238, 252, 254,
257
Levantines, 17,20,64,93,186
Marxism, 82,111-113,124,135,140,141,
144, 149, 150, 168, 179, 205, 206,
244,248,249.261,262,264,265
Marxism-Leninism, 90,132,135
Middle Class, 4, 11. 12, 17, 19-23, 38,46,
48, 49, 51-54, 76, 80, 86, 97, 99,
103, 116, 117, 133, 140, 146, 150,
151, 174-176, 186-190, 192-194,
197-200, 202, 207-209, 214, 219,
221, 222, 244, 250, 251, 259, 262,
265,270
Minorities, 2—4 ,6 ,8 ,1 0 —13,15—22,24,25,
27-32, 34-39, 41, 45-47, 49, 50,
53, 55-58, 61, 66, 68, 75, 85, 8893,98,101,102,117-119,131,133,
136, 139, 151, 158, 161, 164, 169,
170, 174, 185, 194, 208, 267, 269,
270

National Liberation, 8 ,9 ,1 3 ,7 1 ,7 2 ,8 9 ,9 0 ,
101, 113, 136, 159, 163. 165, 180,
200,209,257
National Movement, 2 5 ,2 6 ,4 8 ,5 7 ,6 1 ,7 8 ,
79,90,100,107,110,115,117,121,
123-125, 131, 133, 150, 168, 179,
183,200,209,230,231,240
National Socialists, Nazis, 78,271
Palestine. 1,2,26.33,40,44,50,55,58-63.
74, 75, 80, 81, 84-92,95,97, 100,
102, 104, 106, 108, 109, 123, 126,
133, 134, 136, 142, 144, 145, 150.
152, 157, 163-167, 176, 180, 210,
213, 214. 222-224, 230, 236, 240,
251,261,262,268,269
Proletarization, 83,114,118,120,127,154,
163,168,244,247
Seclusion, 19,163
Sephardim, 2,39,47,48,5 3 .5 8 ,5 9 .1 1 5
Socialism, 5, 13, 35, 75-78, 82, 83, 101,
105, 113, 123, 126, 127, 130, 142,
143, 170, 174. 178, 180, 205,206,
209,235
Spanish Civil War, 87,95,96,141,167
Suez War 1956,44,45
Syndicate. 74,75,78,79.83,141,162,217.
231,238, 239,241, 242,249,252,
255,257,270
Toilers of the East University, 84-86, 89,
234
Trade Unions, 84,236,237.239.242,257
Trotskyites, 56,84,85,90.141,202,204
TJräbl revolution, 21,25,124,168
Veil, 19,31,38,52.82,140,189,198,207
Westernization, 38,52,124,143,188, 192,
198
Xenophobia, 25-28,61
Zionists, 33,41,45,59-62,81,84

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Das historische Jubiläum
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institutionellen Mechanismus
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Verfassungsgeschichtliche
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Roger Bartlett;
Lindsey Hughes (Eds.)
R ussian Society and C ulture and
the Long Eighteenth C entury

Essays in Honour of Anthony G.
Cross
This collection of essays, which honours
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brings together contributions from
sixteen leading scholars in the field of
eighteenth-century Russian studies. They
address a wide range of topics in the
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Studien zur Zeitgeschichte des
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Regina Panzer
Identität und
Geschichtsbewußtsein
Griechisch-orthodoxe Christen im
Vorderen Orient zwischen Byzanz
und Arabertum
Die griechisch-orthodoxen Christen in
Ägypten, Jordanien, Palästina, Libanon
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nicht selten Verfechter des arabischen
Nationalismus. In Jerusalem und
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griechisch und sieht sich in der Tradition
von Byzanz. Die Orthodoxie in der
arabischen Welt muß sich diesen Formen
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Die diplom atischen Beziehungen
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1919-1936
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zwischen Deutschland und Ägypten
ab 1919 bis zu ihrem Abbruch vor
Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs. 1882
war Ägypten von Großbritannien
besetzt worden. Ende 1914 erklärte
Großbritannien es zu seinem Protektorat.
Deutschland, als Kriegsgegner
Großbritanniens, verlor jegliche Anrechte
auf Ägypten. Dieser Status wurde dann
endgültig 1919 mit dem Versailler

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Veitrag rechtlich fixiert. Ende des
Jahres 1921 wurden schließlich die
ersten konsularischen Beziehungen
Deutschlands zu Ägypten aufgenommen.
Inzwischen hatte sich der Status
Ägyptens verändert, die nationale
Freiheitsbewegung hatte 1922 zur
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Jan Asmussen
“Wir waren wie Brüder**
Zusammenleben und
Konfliktentstehung in ethnisch
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Zypemgriechen und -türken lebten
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zusammen. Basierend auf Aktenstudium
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Anzahl Interviews analysiert der Autor
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Irene Dulz
Die Yeziden im Irak
Zwischen “Modelldorf” und Flucht
Im Irak leben ca. 150.000 Yeziden, v.a.
in Sinjar und Sheikhan. 1965 begann
das irakische Regime erstmals, diese
Menschen systematisch aus ihren
angestammten Dörfern zu vertreiben
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Minderheit und ihre ethnische
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Grundrechte veranlasst irakische Yeziden
zunehmend zur Flucht nach Europa.
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Dalai Arsuzi-Elamir
Arabischer Nationalismus in Syrien
Zakï al-Arsüzî und die arabisch­
nationale Bewegung an der Peripherie
Alexandretta/Antakya 1930-1938
In der Region Alexandretta wurde der
arabische Charakter der Region durch
die Ansprüche der Türkei, die politischen
Interessen Frankreichs und die Existenz
einer großen türkischen Minderheit in
Frage gestellt. Unter diesen Bedingungen
entwickelte sich der arabische
Nationalismus an dieser Peripherie
anders als im Zentrum. In Alexandretta
versuchte man, die Ideen des arabischen
Nationalismus in die Realität umzusetzen

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