Agile and Adaptable
U.S. and NATO Approaches to Russia’s Short-Term
Military Potential
AUTHORS
Lisa Aronsson
John R. Deni
CONTRIBUTOR
Hanna Notte
EDITORS
Maria Snegovaya
Max Bergmann
Tina Dolbaia
Nick Fenton
SEPTEMBER 2023
A Report of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program

Agile and Adaptable
U.S. and NATO Approaches to Russia’s Short-Term
Military Potential
AUTHORS
Lisa Aronsson
John R. Deni
CONTRIBUTOR
Hanna Notte
EDITORS
Maria Snegovaya
Max Bergmann
Tina Dolbaia
Nick Fenton
SEPTEMBER 2023
A Report of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program

III | Agile and Adaptable
About CSIS
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization
dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges.
Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. senator
Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief
executive officer since 2000.
CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship,
independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent
development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact.
CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and
recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase
the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public.
CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking
of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.
CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to
be solely those of the author(s).
© 2023 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Center for Strategic & International Studies
1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202-887-0200 | www.csis.org

IV | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to say special thanks to Hanna Notte for providing valuable contributions and
expertise through written analysis.
The authors would also like to express their gratitude toward Samuel Bendett, Mathieu Droin, T.X .
Hammes, Frank Hoffman, Sijbren de Jong, and Paul Schwartz for providing feedback on earlier drafts
of this paper. They are also grateful to the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program—especially Tina
Dolbaia, Maria Snegovaya, Nick Fenton, and Max Bergmann—for supporting this research, and to the
CSIS publications team—especially to Katherine Stark—for editing and production.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and are not an official policy or
position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S . government.

V | Agile and Adaptable
Contents
Executive Summary
1
Introduction
3
Russia’s Short-Term Military Potential
5
Reassessing the U.S . National Approach to Russia
10
Reassessing NATO’s Approach to Russia
14
Conclusion
18
About the Authors and Contributor
20
Endnotes
22

1 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
Executive Summary
R
ussia’s war in Ukraine has triggered the worst security crisis facing Europe since the end of the Cold
War. It brought a major conventional war of aggression to the European continent and enormous
human suffering, but in doing so it has also unified and reenergized the NATO alliance and accelerated
efforts to reconstitute transatlantic defense and deterrence. Assessing Russia’s performance in the war thus
far, and how the Russian military is evolving as a result, is an important part of that effort. This report assesses
changes in the Russian military threat to NATO over the short term (two to four years), and it provides analysis
on how the United States and NATO might adapt their strategies, planning, and posture in response.
Russia demonstrated considerable military weaknesses after its full-scale invasion began in February 2022, and
it faces equipment, ammunition, and manpower shortages. Moscow’s efforts to boost industrial production
and circumvent Western sanctions and export controls have not brought as much success as intended.
Building on two prior CSIS studies, Out of Stock? Assessing the Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Defense Industry,
and A War of Attrition: Assessing the Impact of Equipment Shortages on Russian Military Operations in Ukraine,
this report first examines Russia’s residual military threat to NATO. It finds this threat is reduced in the near
term, but that NATO must still grapple with Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the advanced systems it has not fully
utilized, internal instability, and operations below the threshold of armed conflict. Moreover, Russia remains
a learning adversary and its strategic objectives have not changed. Russia will adapt during the attritional war
and the reconstitution period that will follow. Additionally, it has international partners—of greatest concern is
the role of China—that may help it stagger through the war and recover its strength.
The second part of this report examines the opportunities and challenges facing the United States and its
NATO allies and partners in Europe as they adapt their defense strategies, planning, and forces in response to
the changing Russian military threat over the short term and the new security landscape in Europe. To date,
U.S. and allied strategies have focused on supporting Ukraine as much as possible, preserving strength and

2 | Agile and Adaptable
unity in NATO while managing escalation risks, and leveraging economic tools to constrain Russia’s aggression
and alter its political calculus. Russia’s near-term weakness offers the United States and NATO a window of
opportunity to right the imbalances in their own defense strategies, capabilities, and capacity while continuing
to support Ukraine. This window of opportunity will last so long as Russia is tied down in a war of attrition,
managing internal instability, and struggling to ramp up domestic production and circumvent sanctions, and
so long as China hesitates to pay the diplomatic and economic costs of fully or openly supporting Russia’s war
effort.
More specifically, this report argues that both the United States and its NATO allies ought to expand their
understanding of Russia’s domestic political environment and international partnerships, especially Russia-
China relations. Additionally, the United States should focus on forward-stationed enablers in Europe,
augmenting European efforts to counter Russia, especially with stronger counter-uncrewed aerial vehicle
(UAV), anti-armor, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, and cheaper, more ubiquitous air and missile
defense capabilities. NATO, meanwhile, must grapple with Russia’s enduring nuclear capabilities and political
instability, prepare for intensified Russian hybrid operations, strengthen undersea infrastructure defense
capabilities, and invest in increased capacity that can be realized while Moscow reconstitutes. Finally, the
entire transatlantic community should take steps now to strengthen Ukraine over the long run as a bulwark of
Euro-Atlantic defense and deterrence.
In sum, Russia’s poor conventional performance during the first year of the war provides the United States and
its NATO allies and partners with a window of opportunity to right the imbalances and shortcomings in their
military capabilities and capacity. Clearly, the Russian military retains some strengths, which the alliance must
continue to grapple with, but it has also demonstrated significant weaknesses. So long as Russia is bogged
down in a war of attrition and focused on defending its front line in eastern and southern Ukraine, the West
ought to strengthen its advantages and target Russia’s demonstrated weaknesses. Seizing the moment through
agility and adaptation is key to securing the Euro-Atlantic region today and tomorrow.

3 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
Introduction
R
ussia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, now in its second year, has triggered the worst security
crisis facing Europe since the end of the Cold War. It has also reenergized the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), brought political unity to transatlantic relations, and accelerated efforts to
reconstitute transatlantic defense and deterrence. The United States and its European allies and partners have
supported Ukraine’s resistance by investing historic sums into humanitarian, financial, and military aid for
Ukraine.
1
Their strategies have focused on arming and training Ukrainian military forces, preserving strength
and unity in NATO while managing escalation risks, and leveraging economic tools to shape the Kremlin’s
calculus and constrain its aggression. These economic tools included unprecedented sanctions on Russian
entities, export controls, efforts to cut dependence on Russian energy, and the imposition of a price cap on
Russian oil.
Early in the war, U.S. officials presented these economic tools as a means of constraining Russia’s aggression
and hastening its decline.2 This report is part of a series of CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program studies
on this topic. The first report finds that Western sanctions have had some important impacts on Russia’s
production of key weapons, especially those that require foreign-made technologies.3 It argues, however,
that Russia has proven more resilient and adaptable than expected in the West. Moscow is modernizing older
equipment, relying on prewar stockpiles, and circumventing sanctions through trade diversions and illegal
activities.4 As a result, Western-origin products still find their way into Russian weapons, even as Moscow leans
on lower-quality alternatives.5 The second report focuses on Russia’s efforts to mobilize defense production
and argues that the Kremlin can replenish its forces at levels sufficient to continue the war. However, its
manpower and equipment losses will limit Russia’s ability to engage in high-intensity, conventional operations
in Central Asia, the Middle East, or the Caucasus, at least for the near future.

4 | Agile and Adaptable
While the previous reports offer recommendations on how the United States and the European Union might
strengthen sanctions, improve sanctions implementation, and curb illegal activities, this report focuses
on Russia’s changing military threat to NATO as a result of losses in the war and its efforts to circumvent
sanctions, and it asks how the United States and NATO might adapt their military approach toward Russia as a
result. First, this study explores the implications of Russia’s performance in Ukraine and its sanctions evasion
on Russia’s threat to the Euro-Atlantic region (over the next two to four years). Russia can still field tanks,
missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities effectively in Ukraine,
though it struggles with cross-domain operations. Russia also holds some advanced systems in reserve, retains
its nuclear stockpile, and is likely to lean on hybrid challenges to NATO while it reconstitutes its conventional
military forces and attempts to restore its nuclear coercive reputation.
Additionally, Moscow has received some military support from partners, including Iran and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and tacit political support from numerous nonaligned countries across the
so-called Global South. Of greatest concern is the potential role the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could yet
play in the conflict if it decides to supply Russia’s arms. Given the outlook for Russia’s military potential over
the short term, this study explores whether, how, and to what extent the United States and its NATO allies in
Europe ought to adjust key aspects of their strategies, operational planning, defense planning, force structure,
and force posture in response. Two sections—the first on the U.S . approach to Russia, and the second on
NATO’s approach—focus on how best to respond to the changing Russian military threat over the near term to
bolster defense and deterrence for NATO while continuing to strengthen Ukraine’s military advantages on the
battlefield. Each section includes practical policy recommendations for decisionmakers.

5 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
Russia’s Short-Term
Military Potential
T
he mutiny of Wagner forces against the Russian government potentially carries serious implications
for the Russian military, its war effort in Ukraine, and the threat it poses to the West. In the short run,
the fact that Wagner has essentially left the battlefield could lessen the disunity of command that has
plagued Russian forces since the earliest weeks of the war.6 In theory, this development could strengthen
the hand of the Kremlin as it directs the war effort. However, the withdrawal of most Wagner forces from
the front—at this point, it remains unclear how many will take up the Kremlin’s offer of Defence Ministry
contracts—means that Moscow could have 25,000 fewer experienced and capable fighters available for its war
effort and who could theoretically be utilized against the West.
7
This would aggravate the already challenging
manpower situation that confronts the Russian military. Hence, drawing definitive conclusions regarding the
mutiny’s short-term operational impact is still difficult at this early stage.
In contrast, six other factors stand out as relevant for evaluating changes to Russia’s near-term military threat
to NATO. First, sanctions have restricted the flow of some sensitive dual-use technologies into Russia, including
technologies with U.S.- origin products, and they raised Russia’s costs for acquiring them.
8
During the latter
half of 2022 and throughout 2023, Russia struggled to find spare parts for tanks and satellites, and its defense
industry proved unable to produce the arms necessary to meet basic needs on the battlefield.9 In particular,
the restrictions constrained Russia’s access to high-quality optical systems, ball bearings, machine tools,
engines, and microchips. Russia has been unsuccessful in pivoting to large-scale domestic production for these
items, and that has imposed some limitations on its ability to field higher-end military capabilities in the war.
For example, Russia’s ability to produce advanced Kinzhal hypersonic missiles has fallen from roughly 30 per
month to about 10 per month.10 Therefore, because of sanctions, Russia’s doctrinal emphasis on indirect fires
should continue, even as the quantity, quality, and accuracy of those fires diminishes over time.

6 | Agile and Adaptable
Six factors stand out in evaluating changes to Russia’s near-term military threat:
1. the impact of sanctions in restricting technology flows into Russia;
2. the Kremlin’s attempts to circumvent sanctions and export controls;
3. Russia’s decision to keep some ground and air systems in reserve;
4. Russia’s limited ability to synchronize cross-domain operations;
5. additional Russian capabilities generally underutilized in what is mostly a land war; and
6. the role of third-party suppliers.
Second, despite the sanctions’ ability to achieve some success in limiting Russia’s industrial capacity, the
Kremlin has “created new ways to circumvent export-control restrictions and secure much-needed foreign
components to sustain and produce its weapons systems and wage war on Ukraine.”
11 This has occurred
through the “Eurasian roundabout”—patterns of trade diversion through the Caucasus and Central Asia.12 In
particular, Russia has succeeded in routing sanctioned items and dual-use trade through the Balkans, Turkey,
Iran, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China. This has resulted in a continued supply of rudimentary drones,
microchip components, aircraft engine parts, jamming technology, and navigation equipment, among others.
Clearly, Moscow’s new sanctions-evading supply chain will not permit Russia to acquire or produce equipment
at prewar levels of quality or quantity. Nonetheless, the limited but steady flow of sanctioned items indicates
that Moscow could continue an attritional approach to the war. Russia assumes time is on its side vis-à-vis
Ukraine’s manpower and the West’s ability and will to continue supplying Ukraine.
Third, the Kremlin has kept some of Russia’s ground and air systems in reserve, despite the ostensible utility
such systems might have in its war against Ukraine. Russia is fielding older models of its tanks after taking
heavy losses of T-72B3 MBTs, including some that predate Russia’s 2011-initiated modernization program.13
Meanwhile, its advanced tanks, including the T-14 Armata and the T-90M Proryv, have seen only limited use
in the war.
14
Similarly, Russia’s advanced Su-57 Felon aircraft—a fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter—made
only limited appearances in the war, and typically from outside Ukraine’s borders.15 There may not be enough
of these systems for Moscow to make effective use of them in the war. However, there are other plausible
reasons Moscow might limit the use of these systems in Ukraine: to reserve them for defense and deterrence
against the perceived threat from NATO, to limit their exposure to Western intelligence gathering, or to prevent
embarrassment—and lost foreign military sales revenue—if these systems fail to perform on the battlefield
as advertised.
16
Regardless, the United States and its NATO allies must prepare for their potential use in the
Ukraine war or if Russia escalates horizontally elsewhere.
Fourth, Russia’s ability to synchronize cross-domain operations has proven low, and it is likely to remain very
limited over the near term. Cross- or joint multi-domain operations entail the use of capabilities across all the
warfighting domains—ground, air, sea, cyber, and space—to create and exploit relative advantages to defeat
enemy forces or achieve other objectives. Russia’s military refers to this as “multi-sphere” warfare and treats
it as more of a strategic concept than an operational one.17 Early in the war, Russian forces failed to effectively
coordinate between land power, air power, and long-range fires, explaining at least in part Moscow’s inability
to leverage military advances and retain seized territory.18 More recently, Russia’s inability to synchronize
operations does not appear to have improved, reflecting the persistence of cross-domain shortcomings, long-
standing organizational and leadership challenges, and the high casualty rate among Russia’s better-trained

7 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
military personnel.19 Despite
the removal of the Wagner
organization from the battlefield,
these weaknesses cannot likely
be overcome in the foreseeable
future.
Fifth, Russia has capabilities that
appear to be of limited utility in
the land war against Ukraine,
but which remain potent and
must be taken into consideration
by the United States and NATO.
This is especially the case for
Russia’s undersea capabilities,
cyber capabilities, anti-satellite
capabilities, and its nuclear
arsenal. Russia still holds
significant undersea capabilities
with which it can challenge NATO, including its Kilo-class attack submarines and its Borey-class ballistic missile
submarines. Collectively, these subs can perform a wide array of military activities of concern for the alliance,
including conventional cruise missile launches, undersea infrastructure attacks, nuclear deterrence, espionage,
minelaying, or other attacks against adversary surface fleets.
20
In the cyber domain, Western analysts disagree over whether Russia has fully exploited its cyber capabilities
in the war in Ukraine.
21
Russia launched the ViaSat attack—aimed at impacting Ukraine’s communications
systems—an hour prior to its full-scale invasion, and it launched other early attacks, but they were effectively
countered.
22
However, it can also be argued that Russia’s cyber capabilities can be diverse and creative. For
instance, Russia’s APT28, a cyber spy group active since 2007 and also known as Fancy Bear, successfully
targeted foreign government and military organizations, most notably the 2016 Democratic National
Committee.
23
Another hacker group known as APT29 or Cozy Bear, part of Russia’s foreign intelligence,
previously breached the U.S. Departments of Treasury and Commerce along with other government
agencies.24 Western knowledge of Russia’s cyber capabilities tends to be more speculative than it is for other
weapons systems. Some argue these groups are reinforced by a cadre of civilian engineers in service of the
Kremlin, yet there are reasons to believe Moscow’s cyber capabilities are weaker than previously assumed
because of organizational infighting, the number of those fleeing Russia, and other challenges.25
Over the last several years, the Russian military has also developed and tested anti-satellite weapons, including
direct-ascent and on-orbit weapons.26 Experts argue that Russia seeks to exploit perceived U.S. reliance on a
variety of satellites for navigation, targeting, and intelligence gathering.
27
Developing and fielding anti-satellite
capabilities is viewed within the Russian military as a key element in preventing an incapacitating first strike by
U.S. hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missiles, all of which are aided by satellite-enabled data.28 Although Moscow
has certainly used its EW capabilities to jam satellite communications and has threatened to attack “quasi-
civilian” satellites that it deems are aiding Kyiv’s efforts, Russia has yet to leverage its anti-satellite capabilities in
the war.29 Regardless, they remain a significant threat to U.S. and allied systems that depend on satellites.30
Soldiers of the Russian navy stand on a Kilo-class submarine
as they take part in the Navy Day parade, celebrating the
325th anniversary of the Russian navy in July 2021.
Photo: ALEXEY NIKOLSKY/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images

8 | Agile and Adaptable
Meanwhile, in the nuclear realm, Russia remains a superpower. As of early 2023, Russia is estimated to
maintain a stockpile of approximately 4,489 nuclear warheads assigned for use by its long-range strategic
launchers and shorter-range non-strategic nuclear forces.
31
It is likely that Russia remained under the New
START warhead limit through 2022, though Moscow’s suspension of the treaty will complicate any U.S.
assessments of its warhead declarations in the future.
32
Given the poor performance of Russia’s ground forces
and long-range conventional capability in Ukraine, Russia is likely to enhance its reliance on nuclear weapons
for deterrence and defense going forward. Concretely, this will most likely manifest in Russia’s continued
modernization of its nuclear forces, versatile efforts to restore the credibility of its nuclear coercive reputation,
and adjustments to its deterrence posture.
In the nuclear realm, Russia remains a superpower.
Russia’s process of nuclear modernization is set to continue in both the strategic and non-strategic domains,
with a focus on enhanced defense penetration capabilities.33 For example, Russia is set to produce a
new version of its RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a harder-to-intercept warhead
configuration.
34
Modernization efforts also extend to the missile defense domain, with new systems under
development intended to supplement and in some cases replace older systems. It is possible that Russia’s
nuclear saber-rattling—intended not only to deter NATO’s direct entry into the Ukraine war but also to slow
or prevent Western military support for Ukraine—has worn itself out. If so, Russia may go beyond nuclear
rhetoric to restore its coercive reputation. It could conceivably conduct a nuclear test.35 Its military may
also be contemplating intermediate rungs on the escalation ladder, such as new ways to manipulate alert
levels, or “strategic gestures” including demonstrative activities involving its nuclear forces.
36
Some Russian
intellectuals have moved to call more openly for reviving the fear of nuclear war in the West and for moving
up the escalation ladder.
37
While these voices do not officially represent the government, the Kremlin may be
engaging in strategic messaging through the Moscow-based expert community. Moreover, Moscow is highly
unlikely to resume full implementation of New START, and it may be less likely to agree to negotiated limits
on its overall nuclear arsenal.
38
Should Russia decide to exceed New START limits, before or after 2026, its
capacity to increase deployed warheads without adding a single additional delivery system is estimated to be
considerable, even though some posit Russia is economically ill-positioned to sustain a nuclear arms race.39
In terms of doctrine, Russian military analysts have written a flurry of reflections over the past year on
deterrence and escalation in an era of U.S. “prompt global strike,” betraying a continued concern with the U.S.
ability to attack strategic or nuclear targets in Russia without resorting to nuclear use.
40
It remains conceivable
that Russia will consider limited nuclear use if faced with what it deems to be threats to regime survival. It
maintains a formidable and diverse set of theater-range nuclear weapons, and understandings of what it
considers existential threats to the Russian Federation per its nuclear doctrine may well expand as its leaders’
sense of conventional weakness and vulnerability increases.41 Russia’s pursuit of a wide range of nuclear
weapons suited for both deterrence and regional war fighting reinforces this threat, as does its purported/
announced deployment of short-range nuclear weapons to Belarus.
42
Finally, in addition to these Russia-centric factors that help elucidate Moscow’s changing military potential
over the near term, the role of third-party suppliers is very significant. With loitering munitions from Iran,
artillery shells from North Korea, and arms and ammunition from South Africa, Moscow is leveraging

9 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
relationships with other regimes to address what even Putin acknowledges as shortcomings in capacity.43
These suppliers could play a role in helping Russia endure Ukraine’s counteroffensives and solidify its
battlefield gains. Of potentially greater significance, though, is the role that the PRC might play. It is possible
the PRC will continue to eschew becoming (or being seen to become) an explicit source of arms and militarily
relevant technology for Russia to avoid the resulting costs to its economy. The PRC may, however, continue to
facilitate or quietly acquiesce to trade diversions and the illegal activities Russia is exploiting, including trade
through Hong Kong.44 Judging by official statements, as well as by Beijing’s apparent desire to position itself as
a peacemaker, this may remain the extent of its involvement.
45 On the other hand, if Beijing fails to maintain
its balancing act—supporting Russia while trying to avoid Western sanctions—the PRC could become a more
explicit facilitator of Russia’s war effort.46 Its rise as an “arsenal of authoritarianism” would have profound
effects on the West’s efforts to deter Russia in the short run.
With these six factors and Russia’s near-term threat to the Euro-Atlantic region in mind, the rest of this report
will examine the military implications for the United States and its NATO allies. Specifically, it will address
whether, how, and to what extent the transatlantic community should adjust key aspects of its strategies,
operational plans, defense plans, force structure, and force posture over the near term to strengthen defense
and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia while continuing to support Ukraine and strengthen other vulnerable partners.
To accomplish this, the report will first examine how the United States might adapt its approach to Russia’s
military threat to Europe, given Washington’s focus on its pacing challenge in the Indo-Pacific theater. Second,
it will examine how NATO as a whole might alter its strategy, planning, and posture to reflect the changing
Russian threat over the next two to four years.

10 | Agile and Adaptable
Reassessing the U.S.
National Approach to
Russia
T
he U.S. approach to Russia is driven by the Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy
(NDS), which was released to the public in October of last year and woven together with two other
important defense strategy documents—the Missile Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR)—to achieve a coherent approach across the Department of Defense.47 Though the complete versions
of all three documents remain classified, the 80-page unclassified compilation paints a clear picture of
the administration’s strategic approach toward Russia. The following section analyzes its strengths and
weaknesses over the near term, given preliminary lessons learned during the war in Ukraine and the failure of
Western sanctions and export controls to radically reshape the Kremlin’s political calculus or thwart Russia’s
aggression. It asks whether the U.S . approach is fit for purpose as Washington seeks to parry Russia’s efforts to
threaten U.S . vital interests in Europe and elsewhere.
The 2022 NDS characterizes Russia as an “acute threat,” and it commits the United States to providing
leadership, enabling capabilities, and deepening interoperability with its NATO allies and partners to deter
Russia’s aggression against U.S. interests and treaty allies and to strengthen vulnerable partners. Russia’s acute
threat is not on the same level of what the same strategy identifies as the “pacing challenge” posed to U.S.
interests by the PRC. This prioritization in the 2022 NDS has reignited robust debate in Washington about the
relationship between the PRC and Russia, important linkages between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters,
and the trade-offs that may be required to deter both adversaries sequentially or simultaneously across these
theaters.48 The prioritization makes sense given several factors: Russia’s demonstrated military weaknesses;
evidence of fissures within its political and military elites (as borne out by the Wagner mutiny); the size of the
PRC’s economy and population; the growing capacity and capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army; and
the NDS’s assessments of Beijing’s “coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific
region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.”
49

11 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
The Ukraine war shows that the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are in fact more closely connected
than described in the NDS. This is not only because of uncertainty about the PRC’s intentions and its
potential role as an arms supplier for Russia; it is also about the potential, persistent synergies Moscow
and Beijing might realize from increased cooperation, and even coordination, in exploiting U.S. and allied
vulnerabilities and in weakening Washington’s ability to safeguard its vital interests in both theaters.
Somewhat ironically, Taiwan recently urged Washington to stay the course in Ukraine, in part because its
leaders recognize the interconnectedness of the threats in the two theaters.50 And yet, the unclassified
version of the NDS devotes a single line to the PRC-Russia relationship, noting that while its depth may
remain limited due to mistrust, its breadth appears to be growing. Even if the depth of the relationship
remains constrained, the negative implications for Beijing if Russia experiences a strategic defeat in Ukraine
are difficult to overstate.
In the nuclear realm, the 2022 NPR reflects a thorough understanding of Russia’s threat. Appropriately, it
retains a high bar for U.S. nuclear employment, and it affirms the U.S. nuclear modernization effort (while
canceling unnecessarily redundant components, like nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles). It also
commits the United States to strengthened, regionally tailored extended deterrence and allied assurance,
while preserving nuclear arms control and risk reduction strategies to reduce the dangers of miscalculation.51
Since Russia's suspension of its participation in New START in February 2023, the Biden administration has
left the door open for Russia’s return to the treaty and publicly countered Russian disinformation about the
causes of suspension.52 The United States has also committed to abiding by the central limits of New START
for as long as Russia does so and has professed a willingness to engage Russia without preconditions on a
post-2026 arms control framework.53 That willingness may well go unanswered: Russia is unlikely to return to
compartmentalizing nuclear arms control for as long as it is waging war against Ukraine. Still, the United States
should continue to present itself as a responsible nuclear actor in order to rally international opinion against
Russia’s rogue behavior. In response to Russia's announced nuclear deployment in Belarus and insinuations
about nuclear testing, Washington should try to anticipate further steps Russia might take to raise the
credibility of its nuclear coercion and continuously share its assessments with allies and partners to enhance
assurance. Finally, it is worth continuously reassessing whether the modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad
sufficiently addresses not just Russia’s modernization in strategic offensive arms but also its versatile arsenal of
theatre-range nuclear systems and prospective Russian missile defense capabilities.
Below the strategic level, Russia’s changing military threat to Europe over the near term holds implications for
how the United States operationalizes the NDS in Europe, especially in terms of refining U.S . force structure,
posture, and security cooperation with allies and partners. After Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine, Washington
responded to the crisis by surging 20,000 service members to Europe, bringing the total to more than
100,000 U.S. troops on the continent. It also sent additional warships to Spain, deployed jet squadrons to the
United Kingdom, moved additional troops to Romania, shifted air defense units to Germany and Italy, and sent
a range of assets to the Baltic states.54 These decisions reflected a sense of crisis early in the conflict, as well as
some uncertainty about Putin’s unpredictable decisionmaking in the wake of his full-scale invasion.55 Now that
the war has entered its second year and Russia’s military potential has evolved as a result, the United States
might consider refining its forward-stationed and rotationally deployed capabilities as well as their specific
locations. Broadly, Washington should focus on augmenting capabilities or capacities that counter residual
Russian conventional strengths, but which are in short supply among European allies.

12 | Agile and Adaptable
Washington should focus on augmenting capabilities or
capacities that counter residual Russian conventional
strengths, but which are in short supply among European
allies.
This includes prioritizing the recapitalization of allied militaries and working to strengthen counter-UAV, anti-
armor, and EW capabilities for the alliance and, also, for Ukraine.56 EW remains an integral and growing part
of Russia’s demonstrated way of war. Despite some operational limitations, Russia has effectively used EW
to down Ukrainian UAVs in high numbers, intercept and decrypt Ukrainian communications, and create fake
UAV targets to consume Ukrainian supplies.57 Significantly bolstered counter-EW capabilities in Europe are
necessary given Russia’s heavy reliance on jamming networks and systems, both military and commercial.58
Meanwhile, effective U.S. and allied offensive EW could dramatically worsen Russia’s already poor cross-
domain command and control, inhibiting its ability to coordinate, especially between air and ground assets.
This could be achieved through more rapid fielding of the U.S. Army’s most advanced EW tactical platforms—
like the Terrestrial Layer System-Brigade Combat Team—as well as by making those platforms available to key
European allies, including in northeastern Europe.59
Washington should also look to bolster its air and missile defense capabilities in Europe. While residual
Russian long-range fires may lack precision and ubiquity given the challenges posed to Moscow by sanctions
and export controls, Russia maintains some capacity for missile launches—including hypersonic missiles—
and loitering uncrewed airborne munitions. The key will be to field relatively cheap air and missile defense
capabilities in Europe—such as directed energy weapons—versus more high-demand, low-density assets like
Patriot units.
60
European programs such as the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative are focused on
filling some of these gaps with off-the-shelf solutions from outside the European Union. Ubiquitous, effective,
and relatively cheap air and missile defense capabilities could help keep the long-range threat at bay, frustrate
Russian intentions, and support allied efforts to acquire interoperable systems in a critical capability area.
61
Such short-term planning must be balanced, however, by efforts at the European level to foster more EU
cooperative development of such systems and strengthen and consolidate the European industrial base.62
In terms of U.S. force posture, frontline allies—especially the Baltic states, Romania, and Poland—are eager
to retain continuous U.S. military presence on their territory. For some capabilities, this makes sense
operationally. For instance, establishing a forward-stationed U.S . corps headquarters is necessary for
command and control of Europe-based U.S. assets and deployed Europe-bound assets, as well as for allied
leadership. Similarly, returning at least one armored brigade to Europe permanently would likely prove less
costly than rotating a similar unit from the continental United States, necessary in any case for countering
Russian armor.63 Additional capabilities that might be forward-stationed include enablers such as air and
missile defense units, long-range fires resident in multi-domain task forces, corps-level ISR and logistics
capabilities, and combat aviation units—all capabilities that Europeans lack, or at least lack enough of.
64
From a
fiscal perspective, the expenses associated with transoceanic movement of these equipment-intensive units as
well as the necessity of specialized regional knowledge and relationships make forward stationing a preferable
alternative to rotational stationing. Moreover, given the willingness of Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania to
host U.S. forces, cost-sharing arrangements make one-time infrastructure expenses relatively low.65

13 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
Finally, the United States should accelerate plans to strengthen Ukraine’s military and turn it into a bulwark
of qualitative advantage relative to Russia over the longer term. Given Russia’s challenges on the battlefield in
2022 and its lackluster offensive in early 2023, it is appealing to think that Ukraine might achieve a strategic
victory, bringing about a quick end to the conflict.66 However, there is still the potential for a protracted
stalemate across eastern and southeast Ukraine with sporadic violence. In this regard, the recently announced
commitment to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s is a step in the right direction. Beyond this and over the
medium term, Washington should consider transferring to Ukraine more border monitoring capabilities that
could strengthen defenses against and canalize overt or covert invasion forces; static and mobile ground- and
air-domain awareness capabilities to strengthen border control; and offensive cyber and EW capabilities to
exploit poor Russian cross-domain command and control. Washington should focus on building Ukraine’s
edge as quickly as possible while exploiting Russia’s weaknesses, especially its access to advanced Western
technology, which is currently limited.

14 | Agile and Adaptable
Reassessing NATO’s
Approach to Russia
N
ATO’s approach to Russia is guided by the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s main decisionmaking
body, and by the interests of its 31 independent member states. NATO’s approach is then expressed in
its Strategic Concept, an overarching strategy document which has been updated approximately once
per decade since the end of the Cold War. NATO’s new 2022 Strategic Concept marked a dramatic shift in the
alliance’s overall approach to Russia. The previous strategy, adopted in 2010, sought a strategic partnership
with Russia. It described the Euro-Atlantic region as “at peace” and NATO’s purpose as safeguarding freedom
and security for its members.67 In contrast, the 2022 Strategic Concept acknowledged Europe is not at peace
and it declared Russia to be the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability
in the Euro-Atlantic.”
68
The new strategy updated NATO’s purpose—collective defense—and its three core
tasks—defense and deterrence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security—to reflect this
new reality.
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept prioritizes Russia as the central, direct threat to the Euro-Atlantic region,
followed by the continuing threat of terrorism, which is especially important for allies across NATO’s southern
borders; however, it identifies the PRC as a mere “challenge” to NATO’s interests, security, and values.69
Much like the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, NATO’s Strategic Concept commits only a single line to
cooperation or the synergies between Russia and the PRC, and it suggests allies need to improve their shared
awareness and build resilience against PRC attempts to divide NATO and undermine the rules-based order.
Though European assessments of the threat posed by China are rapidly moving closer to the U.S . view, some
European allies still hesitate to consider the PRC a security threat to the Euro-Atlantic region. This divides the
transatlantic community, and it weakens NATO’s ability to address the problems Beijing poses today in Europe,
as well as the potential synergistic impact of Sino-Russian cooperation on Russia’s military threat to the Euro-
Atlantic over the next two to four years.
70

15 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
Since the release of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Russia has demonstrated considerable weaknesses and
poor performance on the battlefield in Ukraine, especially its inability to leverage its substantial quantitative
advantages in manpower and in nearly every capability area. Moreover, the Wagner mutiny of June 2023
potentially cast into doubt perceptions of Russia as a unitary adversary. These weaknesses have prompted some
allies, especially those in southern Europe who are more focused on terrorism and other challenges emanating
from the Middle East or North Africa, to question the centrality of the Russian threat in NATO’s new strategy.
71
There are also voices in the United States and in Western European capitals that express the same concerns.
They recognize the need to respond to Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, but they want to ensure that
NATO retains its other core tasks and its ability to address very different security challenges in southern Europe.
72
Nonetheless, given Russia’s residual military potential over the short run as outlined previously, NATO’s decision
to place strategic focus on Russia—while preserving and updating its other core tasks—is appropriate and prudent.
In the nuclear realm, NATO’s Strategic Concept downgrades arms control as a tool for managing conflict,
instead opening the aperture wide on ways to prevent unintentional conflict through nuclear risk reduction,
transparency, conflict management, and confidence-building measures. NATO might continue to hone its
focus on strategic risk reduction with Russia, taking unilateral steps that reduce the risk of nuclear war without
compromising allied defense and deterrence. While NATO should factor Russia’s announced deployment of
nuclear weapons to Belarus into its future posture planning, the alliance should resist the urge to abandon
its “three nos”—no intention, no plan, and no reason—to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new
members. During the current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, the allies might also consider
adopting a more forward-leaning approach in discussing their nuclear-sharing arrangements to counter
misinformation, including among nonaligned states—not only regarding Russia’s planned nuclear deployments
to Belarus, but also regarding the U.S . trilateral security pact with the United Kingdom and Australia (AUKUS)
and the nature of the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea.
Regarding conventional forces, NATO has finalized its new regional and domain-specific operational plans
based on the threats posed by Russia as well as by other state and potential non-state actors considered
important by the 31 NATO allies. These plans mark a new direction for the alliance, and they reflect the fact
that collective defense and deterrence has, once again, become NATO’s top priority, just as it was during the
Cold War. The plans also reflect a relatively new approach to defense and deterrence; previously, the alliance
based its operational planning on somewhat more vague operational typologies.
73
Given developments on the
battlefield in Ukraine, the Wagner mutiny, and the war’s short-term impact on the Russian military, however,
the assumptions underpinning NATO’s new plans should not be based on a static picture of Russia’s military
potential. The alliance needs to ensure that its plans are not only credible but that they are agile, and that
they can evolve, especially in the short term. To do this, NATO should routinely exercise its plans in tabletop
training events; frequently incorporate intelligence on Russian capabilities and capacity, military morale, and
cohesion; and fold the lessons learned back into plan refinement.
In addition to testing, exercising, and regularly refining its operational plans with updated assessments of
Russia’s changing military potential, NATO should recalibrate its defense planning efforts to prioritize the
acquisition of the capabilities and capacities best suited to leverage Russia’s demonstrated weaknesses in the
Ukraine war and account for its residual strengths. For example, given Moscow’s undersea capabilities and its
likely increased willingness to engage in hybrid operations against the alliance, NATO member states should
strengthen subsurface situational awareness, particularly when it comes to critical undersea communications
and energy linkages. This is especially true in the Black Sea given European interests in extending ties to the
South Caucasus.
74
NATO’s new undersea infrastructure coordination cell should help in this regard, but beyond
information sharing it remains to be seen whether NATO’s littoral states will or can acquire the capabilities to

16 | Agile and Adaptable
deter and defend against Russian vessels conducting hybrid operations in particular.75
Similarly, NATO might focus on efforts to counter other Russian tools of hybrid warfare, including those related
to media control or manipulation and information warfare, not only in allied territory but among vulnerable
partners in the post-Soviet space. This might include media literacy support, efforts to boost transparency in
ownership, or efforts to replicate the role that Starlink has played in facilitating access to the internet and other
media in authoritarian states or regions occupied by authoritarian states.76 Beyond this, however, allies are likely
to remain reluctant to agree on a more forward-leaning or offensive operational approach to hybrid warfare
outside the context of a crisis or conflict.77 Although NATO adopted a counter-hybrid strategy in 2015, its toolbox
for countering hybrid threats is almost exclusively defensive—and, ultimately, the allied nations still have primary
responsibility for addressing these threats.
78
It is more likely that those allies with offensive hybrid capabilities
might take responsibility for conducting such operations individually or in coordination with other like-minded
allies. NATO might provide a venue for the coordination or deconfliction of such activities.
Additionally, given the role sanctions evasion plays in facilitating Russia’s production or acquisition of
tanks, missiles, UAVs, aircraft, and EW capabilities, NATO defense planning should prioritize capabilities to
counter conventional Russian military strengths at scale. Allies have increased their defense spending since
2014 primarily to modernize their national forces, not necessarily to build additional capacity. The legacies
of low investment, diverging national interests, and the sheer number of systems produced to different
national specifications all combine to prevent the European allies from achieving economies of scale or surge
capacity.79 NATO should be the primary standards setter and a catalyst (alongside the European Union) for
more multinational and multiyear procurement processes.
The challenges associated with force projection and the weakness Russia continues to evince in command
and control of multi-domain operations suggest that the most significant threats are to those allies
contiguous to Russian territory—especially Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Given the
difficulty of reinforcing these states from the Atlantic during a crisis or heightened tensions, in-place
sustainment capabilities—
including resupply of
ammunition, spare parts,
and fuel, as well as combat
support capabilities such
as communications, EW,
and intelligence-collecting
platforms—should be ranked
especially high on NATO’s
capabilities target list for
the near term. NATO might
also support stronger border
security, particularly for allies
that border Russia (and Belarus)
as a means of repelling small-
scale incursions by Russian
special forces, especially those
that might ostensibly begin as
exercises.
80
Soldiers of the U.S. Army stand to attention at the military
base of the Latvian armed forces in Adazi, Latvia, on February
25, 2022, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Photo: GINTS IVUSKANS/AFP via Getty Images

17 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
Achieving these defense planning objectives at scale is particularly important given the possibility of a
contingency in the Indo-Pacific theater. In such a scenario, the United States might need to shift some assets
from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, not unlike it did during the Vietnam War era. As was the case then, the United
States would expect European allies to fill any gaps, and it might expect certain allies—such as the United
Kingdom and France—to make some contributions to military efforts in the Indo-Pacific. The gaps in Europe
could be acute in terms of air and missile defense, long-range fires, medium and heavy airlift, combat aircraft,
command and control, ammunition, and spare parts for a wide variety of systems and platforms. NATO might
leverage its defense planning process now to build up large-scale hardened stores of critical supplies and
equipment, as well as to plan for the larger European troop formations necessary to achieve deterrence by
denial in the Baltic region and to respond to a large-scale conventional crisis.
In terms of how and where NATO arrays its capabilities, as foreshadowed above, the alliance would be better
prepared to counter Russia’s changing military potential in the next two to four years if it embraced a true
deterrence-by-denial force posture along the eastern flank— especially in the Baltic states, by stationing full
brigades in each. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania lack the strategic depth of Poland or Finland, and therefore
their defense and reinforcement is inherently more challenging, especially in a crisis’s early stages when
key alliance members may still be reluctant to engage in a large-scale reinforcement effort for fear of it being
perceived as escalatory. In-place forces are therefore critical.
NATO must also preserve political unity, so efforts to assist Ukraine through NATO structures and processes
will likely remain limited. This means that, aside from consistent messaging of long-term political support for
Ukraine, the Comprehensive Assistance Package, and potentially more support for resilience and capacity
building, NATO will continue to play a limited role in the war. For some observers, it might appear as if the
alliance is hamstrung, and to some degree this may be a valid criticism. Nonetheless, NATO functions as the
critical framework within which mini-lateral or ad hoc coalitions among like-minded allies can occur.
81
It is
partly because of the day-to-day experience of working together that the allies have been able to orchestrate
such significant assistance to Ukraine through the U.S.- led Ramstein Group. NATO’s limited formal role also
protects it from fulfilling the Kremlin’s false narrative, which frames the war as a conflict between Russia and
NATO, rather than as Moscow’s effort to destroy Ukrainian statehood and national identity.
NATO’s limited formal role also protects it from fulfilling the
Kremlin’s false narrative, which frames the war as a conflict
between Russia and NATO, rather than as Moscow’s effort to
destroy Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

18 | Agile and Adaptable
Conclusion
R
ussia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has already had devastating consequences for the Ukrainian state,
its economy, and its people; it will take generations to recover from this war. The war is also completely
transforming the European security landscape, upending nearly all of the assumptions that previously
guided U.S. and European—particularly Western European—strategies and policies toward Russia and eastern
Europe.
82
The war in Ukraine is now at the center of what is likely to be a long-term political confrontation
pitting Russia against the United States and its allies and partners.
83
Because battlefield circumstances are
changing rapidly and the war’s outcome is still unpredictable, it is critical that the United States and NATO
continuously reassess the conflict’s impact on Russia’s military potential and its evolving military threat to the
Euro-Atlantic region.
It is impossible to predict when or how the war in Ukraine might end, so trying to gauge Russia’s evolving
military potential over the next two to four years with any precision is very challenging. Ukraine could break
through Russia’s defenses; a war of attrition could continue for the foreseeable future; Russia could bow out
due to political divisions exemplified by the Wagner mutiny; or the conflict could freeze along the front lines,
which would enable Russia to rearm, regroup, and try again to achieve its strategic objectives in the future.
What is certain, though, is that the challenges that Russia’s military presents to the Euro-Atlantic region are
changing because of developments in the war, Russia’s growing experience with the conflict and its own
learning processes, and its ability to circumvent some U.S. and EU sanctions and export controls. Russia’s
military has demonstrated operational weaknesses and it has lost manpower and equipment; still, Moscow
retains important capabilities—some of which have not been touched by the war—and it is finding ways to field
older equipment effectively. Russia’s military threat to the West is reduced in the short run, but to be sure, it is
neither minimal nor one-dimensional.
In particular, Russia's nuclear arsenal; the advanced air and ground systems it holds in reserve; and its

19 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
significant EW, undersea, anti-satellite, cyber, and information warfare capabilities all still pose major
challenges to the United States and its NATO allies. Meanwhile, given where Western sanctions have had some
impact, it seems likely Russia will continue to pursue a strategy of attrition, leveraging its limited precision or
advanced weaponry and its ubiquitous older, lower-quality weapon systems. Russia is a learning adversary,
however, and it will likely devote significant resources to adaptation and to its military reconstitution. The
United States and its European allies have also struggled to ramp up their own domestic industrial production,
and they are facing urgent needs to fill gaps, replenish stockpiles, and make good on their promises to support
Ukraine for as long as it takes. As a result, the short-term military challenge that Russia poses to the West is
much different than it appeared in late 2021 or in early 2022.
To some degree, the 2022 U.S. and NATO strategies account for the dramatic changes in the European security
environment—but implementing them will require agility and adaptation. Broadly, the United States and the
NATO alliance should adapt their short-term approaches in ways that target Russia’s weaknesses and offer
defense and deterrence against Russia’s remaining strengths, especially in the EW, cyber, and nuclear realms.
The U.S. strategy could better account for the interconnectedness of the European and Indo-Pacific theaters,
recognize potential debilitating fissures in Russian society, and focus on augmenting capabilities and capacities
to counter Russian strengths, especially those that are in short supply in Europe. NATO allies, on the other
hand, should also collectively grapple with the Russia-China relationship in their strategies, acknowledge the
potential for divisions within Russia to destabilize Europe, and adapt their defense and operational planning
to acquire and exercise the capabilities and capacities that are best suited to leverage Russia’s short-term
weaknesses and account for its residual strengths.
The short-term military challenge that Russia poses to the
West is much different than it appeared in late 2021 or early
2022.
Over the long run, the United States and its NATO allies and partners in Europe hold significant structural
advantages over Russia. They have much larger and more dynamic economies. They have much larger
populations and more favorable demographic trends, and, perhaps most importantly, they are united by
principles and values—such as individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These values
may be the West’s most powerful tools; authoritarian leaders are having to take increasingly draconian
measures to control and suppress their populations. The longer-term balance of power favors the West, but
Washington and its NATO allies and partners cannot be complacent vis-à -vis a changing Russian military threat
to the Euro-Atlantic region, especially while such a brutal and consequential war is underway in the heart
of Europe. Understanding and responding to the evolving nature of Russia’s military potential is critical to
transatlantic security both today and tomorrow.

20 | Agile and Adaptable
About the Authors and
Contributor
Lisa Aronsson is a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies at National Defense University. Her research focuses on European security and transatlantic defense
cooperation, and her interests include NATO, the European Union, NATO partnerships, Black Sea security,
and gender. She is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, where she is affiliated with the
Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Prior to joining CSR, Lisa
worked as an analyst for the Congressional Research Service. She has more than 10 years of experience
working in think tanks, government, and universities in the United States and Europe. She worked as a
research fellow and program head at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies
(RUSI) in London from 2008 to 2014. Prior to joining RUSI, Lisa completed a PhD in international relations and
an MA in international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She began her career
as a newsroom assistant at the Associated Press Bureau in Rome after completing her BA at Wellesley College.
John R. Deni is a research professor of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational ( JIIM)
security studies at the U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). He is also a non-
resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, an associate fellow at the NATO Defense College, and an adjunct
lecturer at American University’s School of International Service. Previously, he worked for eight years
as a political adviser to senior U.S. military commanders in Europe. Prior to that, he spent two years as a
strategic planner specializing in U.S . security cooperation and military-to-military relations. While working
for the U.S. military in Europe, Dr. Deni was also an adjunct lecturer at Heidelberg University’s Institute of
Political Science, where he taught graduate and undergraduate courses on U.S. foreign and security policy,
NATO, European security, and alliance theory and practice. With degrees from the College of William & Mary,
American University, and George Washington University, Dr. Deni has spoken at conferences and symposia
throughout Europe and North America. He is the author, editor, or coeditor of seven books, including NATO

21 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
and Article 5 (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), along with authoring several peer-reviewed monographs and
journal articles.
Hanna Notte is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Her expertise is on Russian foreign policy, the Middle East, and
arms control and nonproliferation. She is a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). Notte holds a doctorate and MPhil in international relations from Oxford
University and a BA in social and political sciences from Cambridge University. Her contributions have
appeared in the Nonproliferation Review, Foreign Policy, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and War
on the Rocks, among others. She is the coauthor of Death Dust: The Rise, Demise, and Future of Radiological
Weapons Programs, forthcoming with Stanford University Press (2023). Notte previously worked with the
Shaikh Group, an NGO focused on informal diplomacy in Middle East conflicts, supporting its engagement
with Russia. During her doctoral studies, she was a visiting researcher in 2015–2016 with the Institute of
Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Carnegie Moscow Center. Her current work
focuses on Russian foreign policy, Russia’s relations with the Global South broadly and the Middle East in
particular, Russian approaches to arms control and nonproliferation, and Russian military innovation. She is
proficient in Russian and Arabic. Notte is based in Berlin.

22 | Agile and Adaptable
Endnotes
1 “Ukraine Support Tracker Database,” Kiel Institute for the World Economy, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/
war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/.
2 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Anthony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Press release, March 2,
2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-14/.
3 Max Bergmann, Maria Snegovaya, Tina Dolbaia, Nick Fenton, and Samuel Bendett, Out of Stock? Assessing
the Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Defense Industry (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, April 14, 2023), https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-
defense-industry.
4 For example, see Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s Old Bombs Elude Ukraine’s Modern
Defenses,” New York Times, May 25, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/25/world/europe/russia-
ukraine-soviet-bombs.html.
5 Ana Swanson and Matina Stevis-Gridneff, “Russia Is Importing Western Weapons Technology, Bypassing
Sanctions,” New York Times, April 18, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/18/business/economy/us-
russia-chips-sanctions.html.
6 Mark Galeotti, Pavel Baev, and Graeme P. Herd, “Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias, Morale, and the Ukraine
War,” Strategic Competition Seminar Series #2, Marshall Center, November 15, 2022, https://www.
marshallcenter.org/en/publications/clock-tower-security-series/strategic-competition-seminar-series-fy23/
militaries-mercenaries-militias-morale-and-ukraine-war.
7 Cédric Pietralunga, “Wagner troops’ departure ‘a calculated risk’ for Moscow,” Le Monde, June 26, 2023,
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/06/26/wagner-troops-departure-a-calculated-risk-
for-moscow_6037751_4 .html.

23 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
8 Bergmann et al., Out of Stock.
9 Michael Schwirtz et al., “Putin’s War,” New York Times, December 16, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/russia-putin-war-failures-ukraine.html.
10 Bergmann et al., Out of Stock, 7; “Russian Kinzhal missile production ramps up fivefold - Defense Express,”
New Voice of Ukraine, May 20, 2023, https://english.nv.ua/nation/russian-kinzhal-production-ramps-up-
fivefold-defense-express-50325913.html.
11 Bergmann et al., Out of Stock, 2.
12 See Maxim Chupilkin, Beata Javorcik, and Alexander Plekhanov, “The Eurasian Roundabout: Trade Flows
into Russia through the Caucasus and Central Asia” (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Working Paper No. 276), https://www.ebrd.com/publications/working-papers/the-eurasian-roundabout.
13 Bergmann et al., Out of Stock, 5.
14 “Russia’s new T-14 Armata battle tank debuts in Ukraine,” Reuters, April 25, 2023, https://www.reuters.
com/world/europe/russias-new-t -14 -armata-battle-tank-debuts-ukraine-ria-2023 -04-25/; Ellie Cook, “How
Russia’s Advanced T-90M Proryv Compares to the U.S . M1 Abrams Tank,” Newsweek, March 21, 2023,
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-t90m-proryv-main-battle-tank-us-m1-abrams-ukraine-1789143.
15 Alex Hollings, “British Intelligence Reveals Russia’s Su-57 Felon Is Bombing Ukraine,” The National Interest,
January 13, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/british-intelligence-reveals-russia%E2%80%99s-
su-57-felon-bombing-ukraine-206107.
16 Russia is also preparing to fight against NATO more broadly. Russia’s army mobilization and renovation
program is oriented directly against NATO, in the Western direction. See “Gerasimov: Russia’s Army Plans
may consider NATO expansion,” AlJazeera, January 24, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/24/
russian-military-reforms-respond-to-western-involvement-general.
17 Michael Kofman et al., Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts (Arlington, VA: CNA,
2021), https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/russian-military-strategy-core-tenets-and-operational-
concepts.pdf.
18 Patrick Tucker and Tara Copp, “Russia’s Rocket Barrages Reveal Bad Planning, Cruelty—and the Absence
of Crucial Skills,” Defense One, March 8, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/russias-
rocket-barrages-reveal-bad-planning-crueltyand-absence-crucial-skills/362911/; Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s
Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare,” CSIS, CSIS Briefs, June 2022, https://www.csis.
org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare.
19 Michael Kofman, “Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgian War Revisited,” War on the Rocks,
September 4, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/russian-performance-in-the-russo-georgian-
war-revisited/; Seth G. Jones, Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer, “Ukrainian Innovation in a War of
Attrition,” CSIS, CSIS Briefs, February 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-
attrition; Tim Lister, “Russia may be close to capturing Bakhmut. But a victory could come at a heavy
cost,” CNN, March 6, 2023, https://www.cnn .com/2023/03/06/europe/russia-ukraine-bakhmut-analysis-
intl/index.html.
20 Russia’s Black Sea Fleet includes four Project 636 (Kilo) and Project 877 (Improved Kilo) submarines,
which have to date been used primarily as launch platforms for cruise missiles. See Sidharth Kaushal and
Kevin Rowlands, “Tackling the Underwater Threat: How Ukraine Can Combat Russian Submarines,” RUSI,
Commentary, March 7, 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/tackling-
underwater-threat-how-ukraine-can-combat-russian-submarines.
21 Matthias Schulze and Mika Kerttunen, “Cyber Operations in Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Uses,

24 | Agile and Adaptable
Limitations, and Lessons Learned So Far,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comment 23 (April 2023),
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2023C23_CyberOperations_UkraineWar.pdf.
22 See Patrick Howell O’Neill, “Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour Before the Ukraine
Invasion,” MIT Technology Review, May 10, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/05/10/1051973/
russia-hack-viasat-satellite-ukraine-invasion/.
23 Emil Sayegh, “APT28 Aka Fancy Bear: A Familiar Foe By Many Names,” Forbes, February 28, 2023,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilsayegh/2023/02/28/apt28-aka-fancy-bear-a-familiar-foe-by-many-
names/?sh=2cd99fe759ad.
24 Ellen Nakashima and Craig Timberg, “Russian Government Hackers are Behind a Broad Espionage
Campaign that has Compromised U.S. Agencies, Including Treasury and Commerce,” Washington Post,
December 14, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-government-spies-
are-behind-a-broad-hacking-campaign-that-has-breached-us -agencies-and-a-top-cyber-firm/2020/12/13/
d5a53b88-3d7d-11eb-9453-fc36ba051781_story.html.
25 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, Russian Cyberwarfare: Unpacking the Kremlin’s Capabilities
(Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, September 8, 2022), 25.
26 Aaron Mehta, “America’s adversaries keep investing in weapons to take out satellites,” Defense News,
March 30, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/03/29/countries-keep-
investing-in-weapons-to-take-out-satellites/; U.S. Space Command Public Affairs Office, “Russia conducts
space-based anti-satellite weapons test,” News release, July 23, 2020, https://www.spacecom.mil/
Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/2285098/russia-conducts-space-based-anti-satellite-weapons-
test/; U.S. Space Command Public Affairs Office, “Russian direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test creates
significant, long-lasting space debris,” News release, November 15, 2021, https://www.spacecom.mil/
Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/2842957/russian-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile-test-creates-
significant-long-last/; Ashish Dangwal, “Russia To Arm Its MiG-31D Jet With Anti-Satellite Missiles, IL-76
With Combat Lasers To Down Hostile Space Assets,” Eurasian Times, April 7, 2023, https://eurasiantimes.
com/russia-to-arm-its-mig-31d-jet-with-anti-satellite-missiles-il-7/.
27 Jaganath Sankaran, “Russia’s anti-satellite weapons: A hedging and offsetting strategy to deter
Western aerospace forces,” Contemporary Security Policy 43, no. 3 (2022): 436–463, DOI:
10.1080/13523260.2022 .2090070.
28 Jaganath Sankaran, “Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapons: An Asymmetric Response to U.S . Aerospace
Superiority,” Arms Control Today, March 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-03/features/russias-
anti-satellite-weapons-asymmetric-response-us -aerospace-superiority.
29 Joey Roulette, “Russia’s anti-satellite threat tests laws of war in space,” Reuters, October 28, 2022, https://
www.reuters.com/world/russias-anti-satellite-threat-tests-laws-war-space-2022 -10-28/.
30 Chelsea Gohd, “Russia tests anti-satellite missile and the US Space Force is not happy,” Space.com, August
10, 2022, https://www.space.com/russia-anti-satellite-missile-test-2020.html; David Vergun, “Official
Details Space-Based Threats and U.S. Countermeasures,” U.S . Department of Defense, April 26, 2023,
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3375577/official-details-space-based-threats-
and-us -countermeasures/.
31 Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian nuclear weapons,
2 0 2 3 ,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 3, (2023): 174–199.
32 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty (Washington, DC:
Department of State, January 31, 2023), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2022-New-
START-Implementation-Report.pdf.

25 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
33 Kristensen, Korda, and Reynolds, “Nuclear Notebook.”
34 Thomas Newdick, “Russia To Get Yars-M Ballistic Missiles With Novel Warhead Delivery System: Reports,”
The Drive, May 16, 2023, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russia-to-get-yars-m -ballistic-missiles-
with-novel-warhead-delivery-system-reports.
35 In his presidential address to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 21, 2023, President Putin warned
that “some politicians in Washington are already pondering live nuclear tests” and therefore instructed
the Defence Ministry and Rosatom to “make everything ready for Russia to conduct nuclear tests.” He
said: “We will not be the first to proceed with these tests, but if the United States goes ahead with them,
we will as well.” Therefore, should Russia decide to resume nuclear testing, this would likely be preceded
by Russian allegations that the United States (which has not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty) engaged in testing activities first. Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,”
February 21, 2023, http://www.en .kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/70565. Concerns about Russian
intentions to resume nuclear testing have more recently been amplified by reporting that Russian officials
are considering the withdrawal of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, as well
as by Defense Minister Shoigu's visit to the Arctic nuclear testing facilities at Novaya Zemlya. See: “Dlya
DVZYaI prishla pora ispytanii” [It's time for testing the CTBT], Kommersant, August 3, 2023, https://
www.kommersant.ru/doc/6138276; “Russian Defense Minister Inspects Arctic Military Installations,” The
Moscow Times, August 12, 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/08/12/russian-defense-minister-
inspects-arctic-military-installations-a82132.
36 Dmitry Adamsky, “Russia’s New Nuclear Normal,” Foreign Affairs, May 19, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/russian-federation/russias-new-nuclear-normal.
37 Dmitry Trenin, “Conflict in Ukraine and Nuclear Weapons,” Russia in Global Affairs, June 22, 2023, https://
eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/ukraine-and-nuclear-weapons/; Sergei Karaganov, “A Difficult But Necessary
Decision,” Russia in Global Affairs, June 13, 2023, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-difficult-but-
necessary-decision/. For counterarguments from authors within the Russian strategic community, see for
example: Alexey Arbatov, “Упреждающий Удар Возмездия” [A Preemptive Strike of Retribution], Novaya
Gazeta, June 19, 2023, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2023/06/19/uprezhdaiushchii-udar-vozmezdiia;
Fyodor Lukyanov, “Почему У Нас Не Получится ‘Отрезвить Запад’ С Помощью Ядерной Бомбы”
[Why We Can’t ‘Sober Up the West’ With a Nuclear Bomb], Russia in Global Affairs, June 21, 2023, https://
globalaffairs.ru/articles/otrezvit-zapad/; Hanna Notte, “The West Cannot Curve Russia's Nuclear Fever,”
War on the Rocks, July 18, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/the-west-cannot-cure -russias-
nuclear-fever/.
38 Hanna Notte, “U.S .-Russian Relations Can Still Get Worse,” War on the Rocks, February 22, 2023, https://
warontherocks.com/2023/02/u-s-russian-relations-can-still-get-worse/.
39 Kristensen, Korda, and Reynolds, “Nuclear Notebook”; Alexey Arbatov in an interview with Yuri Paniev,
“О будущей архитектуре европейской безопасности можно только мечтать” [One can only
dream about a future European security architecture], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 13, 2022, https://www.
ng.ru/dipkurer/2022-03-13/9_8389_architecture.html.
40 For example, I. R . Fazletdinov and V. I . Lumpov, “Роль Ракетных Войск Стратегического
Назначения В Противодействии Стратегической Многосферной Операции НАТО” [The Role
of Strategic Missile Forces in Countering NATO’s Strategic Multi-Domain Operation], Voennaya Mysl, no. 3
(March 2023), https://limited-vm.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/479810/; Konstantin Bogdanov, “Сдерживание В
Эпоху Малых Форм” [Deterrence in an era of small forms], Russia in Global Affairs, May 1, 2023, https://
globalaffairs.ru/articles/sderzhivanie-v-epohu-malyh-form/. See also Adamsky, “Russia’s New Nuclear
Normal.”
41 Russia’s doctrine permits nuclear use under four conditions, including aggression against Russia “with

26 | Agile and Adaptable
the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” The President of the
Russian Federation, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,”
Executive Order, June 2020, https://archive.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/
disarmament/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4152094.
42 However, details remain uncertain, and some play down the implications for NATO’s deterrence posture.
See William Alberque, “Nuclear Weapons in Belarus: History Repeats Itself,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March 31, 2023, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/nuclear-weapons-belarus-history-
repeats-itself.
43 Gabriel Gavin, “Putin admits Russia doesn’t have enough weapons and drones,” Politico, June 13, 2023,
https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-russia-doesnt-have-enough-weapons-and-
drones-putin-admits/; Aamer Madhani, Colleen Long, and Zeke Miller, “Russia aims to obtain more attack
drones from Iran after depleting stockpile, White House says,” Associated Press, May 15, 2023, https://
apnews.com/article/russia-iran-military-cooperation-d982dd3faf78fbb17dfc8b9c1cb9dae7; Julian E. Barnes,
“Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to U.S . Intelligence,” New York Times, September
5, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html; Gabriele
Steinhauser, “U.S. Says South Africa Supplied Weaspons, Ammunition to Russia,” Wall Street Journal, May
11, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s -says-south-africa-supplied-weapons-ammunition-to-russia-
c2489d54.
44 Brian (Chun Hey) Kot, “Hong Kong’s Technology Lifeline to Russia,” Carnegie Endowment, May 17, 2023,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s -technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775.
45 “China vows not to sell arms to any party in Ukraine war,” Associated Press, April 14, 2023, https://apnews.
com/article/china-taiwan-weapons-germany-ukraine-2a51d2c64c12fca75683d20fbafba475; Bojan Pancevski,
Laurence Norman, and Vivian Salama, “U.S. and Allies Look at Potential China Role in Ending Ukraine
War,” Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s -and-allies-look-at-potential-china-
role-in-ending-ukraine-war-2d6cbb4d.
46 Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, “How China Could Save Putin’s War in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, April 26,
2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-china-could-save-putins-war-ukraine.
47 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Releases National Defense Strategy, Missile Defense, Nuclear
Posture Reviews,” News release, October 27, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/
Article/Article/3202438/dod-releases-national-defense-strategy-missile-defense-nuclear-posture-
reviews/#:~:text=The%202022%20National%20Defense%20Strategy,and%20partners%20on%20
shared%20objectives.
48 Luis Simón and Zack Cooper, “Rethinking Tradeoffs Between Europe and the Indo-Pacific,” War on the
Rocks, May 9, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/rethinking-tradeoffs-between-europe-and-the-
indo-pacific/.
49 U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the
2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
October 2022), 4, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-
STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.
50 Josh Rogin, “Taiwan is Urging the U.S. Not to Abandon Ukraine,” Washington Post, May 10, 2023, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/05/10/taiwan-defense-ukraine-russia-china/.
51 U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy.
52 U.S. Department of State, “Russian Noncompliance with and Invalid Suspension of the New START
Treaty,” Fact sheet, March 15, 2023, https://www.state.gov/russian-noncompliance-with-and-invalid-

27 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
suspension-of-the-new-start-treaty/; U.S . Department of State, “Release of Aggregate Numbers of Strategic
Offensive Weapons,” Press release, May 15, 2023, https://www.state.gov/release-of-aggregate-numbers-of-
strategic-offensive-weapons/.
53 “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA)
Annual Forum,” White House, June 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-
remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-
aca-annual-forum/.
54 U.S. Department of Defense, “Biden Announces Changes in U.S. Force Posture in Europe,” Press release,
June 29, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3078087/biden-announces-
changes-in-us -force-posture-in-europe/.
55 Richard Haass, “The Dangerous Decade: A Foreign Policy for a World in Crisis,” Foreign Affairs,
September-October 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/dangerous-decade-foreign-policy-
world-crisis-richard-haass.
56 Mark Pomerleau, “Army units in Europe are getting new electronic warfare equipment,” C4ISRNet, June
12, 2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2020/06/12/army-units-in-europe-are-getting-new-
electronic-warfare-equipment/; Colin Demarest, “Russia-Ukraine lessons to boost US electronic warfare,
Sen. Reed says,” C4ISRNet, February 8, 2023.
57 See Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of its Invasion of
Ukraine (London: RUSI, May 19, 2023), 18–19, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-
resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine.
58 Thomas Withington, “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities Have Had Mixed Results Against Ukraine,”
The Drive, June 16, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/this-is-whats-happened-so-far-in-
ukraines-electronic-warfare-battle.
59 Mark Pomerleau, “Army shifts procurement funding for integrated cyber, EW and signals intelligence
platform,” DefenseScoop, March 21, 2023, https://defensescoop.com/2023/03/21/army-shifts-procurement-
funding-for-integrated-cyber-ew-and-signals-intelligence-platform/; Sébastien Roblin, “The Army Is
Readying Armored Vehicles That Spy, Jam, and Hack Enemy Drones,” Popular Mechanics, April 21, 2023,
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a43657313/army-armored-vehicles-spy-jam-hack-
enemy-drones/.
60 Joseph Trevithick, “Army Offers Glimpse Of New Low-Cost Surface-To-Air Missile,” The Drive, November
10, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37532/army-offers-glimpse-of-new-low-cost-surface-
to-air-missile; Katie Davis Skelley, “Directed energy weapon system points toward the future of
warfare,” DEVCOM Aviation & Missile Center Public Affairs, September 26, 2022, https://www.army.mil/
article/260538/directed_energy_weapon_system_points_toward_the_future_of_warfare; Mark Gunzinger,
“Winning 21st century wars requires directed-energy capabilities,” Defense News, March 2, 2022, https://
www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/02/winning-21st-century-wars-requires-directed-
energy-capabilities/.
61 T.X. Hammes, “The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again,” Joint Force Quarterly 103 (fourth quarter
2021): 10–17.
62 Hannah Aries, Bastian Giegerich, and Tim Lawrenson, “The Guns of Europe: Defence-
Industrial Challenges in a Time of War,” Survival 65, no. 3 ( June–July 2023): 18, https://doi.
org/10.1080/00396338.2023 .2218716.
63 John R. Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and
Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).

28 | Agile and Adaptable
64 Simón and Cooper, “Rethinking Tradeoffs.”
65 Paul McLeary, “Poland Agrees To Pay Almost All Costs of US Troop Presence,” Breaking Defense, August 3,
2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/poland-agrees-to-pay-almost-all-costs-of-us -troop-presence/.
66 Max Boot, “I Was Just In Kyiv Under Fire. I Saw Why Ukraine Can Win,” Washington Post, May 22, 2023,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/05/22/kyiv-ukraine-resistance-russia-victory/.
67 NATO Heads of State and Government, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the
Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Lisbon: NATO, November
19–20, 2010), 10, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm.
68 NATO Heads of State and Government, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid: NATO, June 29, 2022), 4.
69 Ibid., 5.
70 Suzanne Lynch, Nahal Toosi, Barbara Moens, and Erin Banco, “The U.S. wants Europe to stand up to
China. Europe says: Not so fast,” Politico, March 8, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/08/us-
europe-china-00086204; John R. Deni, “China is a present danger to Europe. NATO’s defense plans must
respond,” New Atlanticist, June 3, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-is-a-
present-danger-to-europe-natos-defense-plans-must-respond/.
71 Henry Ridgwell, “Spain Urges NATO to Address Threats from North Africa,” VOAnews, July 5, 2022, https://
www.voanews.com/a/spain-urges-nato-to-address-threats-from-north-africa-/6645984.html.
72 Patrick Keller, “The New Status Quo Concept,” in Thierry Tardy, ed., NATO’s New Strategic Concept (Rome:
NATO Defence College, September 2022), 36.
73 “The DJSE Concept,” Allies Force Command Heidelberg, October 5, 2012, https://www.nato.int/
fchd/fchd/djse-concept.html; W. Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry, NATO Command Structure:
Considerations for the Future, Center for Technology and National Security Policy (Washington, DC: National
Defense University, September 2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/134454/DTP%2075%20NATO%20
Command%20Structure.pdf.
74 For instance, see Iulian Ernst, “EC promises to fund Romania-Georgia strategic undersea cable project,”
Romania-Insider.com, December 19, 2022, https://www.romania-insider.com/ec-promises-fund-romania-
georgia-undersea-cable.
75 Hans Uwe Mergener, “NATO Establishes Centre to Protect Critical Underwater Infrastructure,” European
Security and Defence, February 21, 2023, https://euro-sd.com/2023/02/news/29759/nato-establishes-centre-
to-protect-critical-underwater-infrastructure/.
76 Amritha Jayanti, “Starlink and the Russia-Ukraine War: A Case of Commercial Technology and Public
Purpose?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 9, 2023,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/starlink-and-russia-ukraine-war-case-commercial-technology-
and-public-purpose.
77 Lauren Speranza, A Strategic Concept for Countering Russian and Chinese Hybrid Threats (Washington,
DC: Atlantic Council, July 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/a-strategic-
concept-for-countering-russian-and-chinese-hybrid-threats/.
78 See Michael Rühle and Clare Roberts, “Enlarging NATO’s Toolbox to Counter Hybrid Threats,” NATO
Review, March 19, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/03/19/enlarging-natos-toolbox-to-
counter-hybrid-threats/index.html.
79 Aries, Giegerich, and Lawrenson, “The Guns of Europe.”

29 | Lisa Aronsson, John R. Deni, and Hanna Notte
80 Konrad Muzyka, Russia Goes to War: Exercises, Signaling, War Scares, and Military Confrontations
(Washington, DC: CSIS, July 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-goes-war-exercises-signaling-war-
scares-and-military-confrontations.
81 “Austin, defense leaders to meet again at Ramstein to pledge more support for Ukraine,” Stars and
Stripes, April 17, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2023-04-17/ukraine-meeting-ramstein-
austin-9828642.html.
82 See for example Lundén et al., Another Rude Awakening, 1 9.
83 Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “Written Remarks: Hearing on ‘What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia?”
Center for a New American Security, May 16, 2023, https://s3.us -east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/
documents/Kendall-Taylor-written-statement.pdf ?mtime=20230515133629&focal=none.

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