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Автор: Sharpe M.E.
Теги: politics history of the ussr history of russia revolution memories of events
ISBN: 1-56324-272-9
Год: 2015
Текст
RUSSIA AT THE BARRICADES
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RUSSIA AT THE BARRICADES EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF THE AUGUST 1 991 COUP EDITED BY VICTORIA E. BONNELL, ANN COOPER, AND GREGORY FREIDIN Routledge Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published1994by M.E. Sharpe Published2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park,Abingdon,Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue,New York, NY 10017,USA Routledgeis an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright© 1994 Taylor & Francis.All rights reserved. No partof this book may be reprintedor reproducedor utilised in any form or by any electronic,mechanical,or othermeans,now known or hereafterinvented, includingphotocopyingandrecording,or in any informationstorageor retrieval system,without permissionin writing from the publishers. Notices No responsibilityis assumedby the publisherfor any injury and/ordamageto personsor propertyasa matterof productsliability, negligenceor otherwise, or from any useof operationof any methods,products,instructionsor ideas containedin the materialherein. mustalwaysrely on their own experienceand Practitionersandresearchers knowledgein evaluatingandusing any information,methods,compounds,or experimentsdescribedherein.In usingsuchinformationor methodsthey should be mindful of their own safetyandthe safetyof others,including partiesfor whom they havea professionalresponsibility. Productor corporatenamesmay be trademarksor registeredtrademarks,and areusedonly for identificationandexplanationwithout intentto infringe. Library of CongressCataloging-in-PubJication Data Russiaat the barricades:eyewitnessaccountsof the August 1991 coup/ editedby Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann Cooper,andGregoryFreidin. p.cm. Includesindex. ISBN 1-56324-272-9(pbk.) ISBN 1-56324-271-0(cloth) I. SovietUnion-History-Attemptedcoup. 1991-Personainarratives. 2. SovietUnion-History-Attemptedcoup. 1991-Sources. l. Bonnell, Victoria, E. II. Cooper,Ann. Ill. Freidin, Gregory. DK292.R86 1991 947.085'4'0922--iic2093-27944 CIP ISBN 13: 9781563242724(Pbk) ISBN 13: 9781563242717(hbk)
To our children,AnnaFreidinandTom Keller
ec isp c Plirnloini a pe is Hotel niKnniKna o i l r n Pli Ukraina KaKali iKna in l a ec K sp erco P p ins Plirno Kna i n li Ka The The White White House Whit Embassy us ~ .t' ~ ns ole Sm (Novyi (NovyiArbat) Arbat) Kalinin Kalinin Prospect Prospect "Q J..."8 ~ :" ~ ~ K a lin K in al Prionin s p ePcros pe c Smolensk Square j CENTRAL MOSCOW Moscow in lin Ka c pce opse r s Po Pr Moscow City Soviet i • Kalini Prospec pec ros P inin Kal c spe Pro KREMLIN Council of Ministers CPSU] L headquarters J Lubianka Pro sp ec Hotel Hotel Moskva Moskva Ka lin in inin Kal Center? «e>« of Palace LI M LI E M K RR E K LI M LI E M K RR E K Boulevard Boulevard Ring Ring Garden Ring Road Kalinin Prospec
Contents Map of CentralMoscow vi List of Photographs xi Preface xiii Acknowledgments xv Note on TransliterationandInterpolations xvii Guideto the Print Media xix Introduction Victoria E. Bonnelland GregoryFreidin 3 I: Savingthe Old Country 31 1. ProclamationsandDecreesof the StateCommittee for the Stateof Emergency,August 19, 1991 33 DocumentJ Decreeofthe Vice Presidentof the USSR 33 Document2 Appealto the SovietPeople 33 Document3 ResolutionNo. 1 ofthe USSRStateCommittee for the Stateof Emergency 38 Document4 Resolutionofthe Chairmanof the Supreme Sovietof the USSRon the Conveningof an Extraordinary Sessionof the SupremeSovietof the USSR 41 2. The PressConferenceofthe StateCommitteefor the State of Emergency,August 19, 1991 42 vii
3. StatementsandExplanationsby the PutschistsAfter the Coup Document1 Interrogationof DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov on August22, 1991 Document2 Interrogationof SovietPrimeMinister ValentinPavlov,August30,1991 Document3 Interrogationof the Headof the USSRKGB, 55 55 63 Vladimir Kriuchkov 66 II: The Public Reacts 69 1. GregoryFreidin To the Barricades 71 2. Letter from Moscow 78 3. Victoria E. Bonnell August 19 and20 in Moscow 85 4. Lauren G. Leighton Moscow: The Morning of August21 100 5. nadimir Petrik Moscow'sM.V. Khrunichev Machine-BuildingFactoryReactsto the AugustCoup 6. SergeP. Petroff The Congressof Compatriots: Witnessto a DemocraticCounter-Revolution 111 120 7. DonaldJ. Raleigh A View from Saratov 131 8. Valerii Zavorotnyi Letter from St. Petersburg 147 III: In High Places 159 1. Mikhail S. Gorbachev What Happenedin Foros 161 2. Boris Yeltsin Proclamations,Decrees,andAppeals in Responseto the Coup,August19,1991 170 Document1 Appealto the Citizensof Russia 170 Document2 DecreeNo. 59 ofthe Presidentof the RSFSR 172 Document3 DecreeNo. 61 of the Presidentof the RSFSR 172 Document4 Appealby Boris Yeltsin, Presidentof the RSFSR,to the SoldiersandOfficers ofthe USSRArmed Forces,the USSRCommitteefor StateSecurity[KGB], andthe USSRMinistry oflnternalAffairs [MVO] 173
3. Boris Yeltsin Speechto the RussianParliament, August21, 1991 176 4. Interview with Nikolai Vorontsov BetweenRussia andthe SovietUnion-With Noteson the USSR Council of MinistersMeetingof August 19, 1991 181 5. Vladimir ShcherbakovRecountsHis Role in the Coup 195 6. Interview with YevgeniiShaposhnikovThe Coup andthe Armed Forces 201 7. Interview with Davlat Khudonazarov From Dushanbe to Moscow 209 8. Interview with Anatolii Sobchak Breakthrough: The Coupin St. Petersburg 218 9. Interview with AleksandrN. Yakovlev Our ChildrenWere on the Barricades 226 IV: Defendingthe White House 233 1. TheresaSabonis-ChafeeReflectionsfrom the Barricades 235 2. Interview with AleksandrProkhanov Concerning the Defendersof the White House 249 3. Michael Hetzer Deathon the Streets 253 4. A Man in the Crowd 256 5. E-Mailfrom AlekseiKozhevnikov On the Barricades 263 6. Conversationwith Viktor SheinisandAlla Nazimova In andAround the White House 267 V: Gettingthe NewsIn andOut 287 1. lain Elliot ThreeDaysin August: On-the-SpotImpressions 289 2. Interview with SergeiMedvedev Gettingthe News on "Vremia" 301 3. Ann Cooper The ForeignPressandthe Coup 308
4. Interviewwith TatianaMalkina The August 19 PressConference 318 S. Interviewwith Valerii Kucher A RussianReporter Remembersthe Coup 322 Chronologyof Eventsof August 19,20,21,1991 337 Indexof PersonalNames 367
List of Photographs Erectinga barricadenearthe White House 73 Civilians rushto fonn a humanchainagainstapproachingtanks on K.alinin Prospect 75 A civilian appealsto a soldiernearthe White House 76 Tankslined up on Kutuzov Prospect 80 Womenhaulingdebristo build a barricadeastanks approachthe White House 82 A barricadedstreetnearthe White House,mid-afternoonon August 19 82 Demonstratorsmarchingfrom ManezhSquareto the White House 87 A civilian confrontsan officer in ManezhSquare 89 "Yeltsin HasCalledfor a GeneralStrike" 90 "Outlaw the CPSU!"and"Put the BolshevikPutschistson Trial!" 90 Peoplegatheredfor a rally by the Hotel Moskvain Manezh Square 91 Protestleafletsat a metrostationon Kalinin Prospect 92 Peoplecarryingan enormoustricolor flag to the middayrally at the White House 94 The Tuesdayrally, with the tricolor flag drapedoverthe White Housebalcony 96 xi
xii liST OF PHOTOGRAPHS The crowd listeningto speechesat the Tuesdayrally 97 Childrenon a pro-Y eltsin tank nearthe White House 98 Defendersof the White Housesetup camp 99 Men guardingthe White HouseearlyTuesdayevening 99 A makeshiftmemorialon the spotwherea youngmanwas killed in the early morningof August21 102 Threeyoungmenwho perishedat the barricades 103 A trolleybusdamagedby an armoredvehiclein the early morningof August21 105 RevolutionSquare,Saratov:"Hangmanof Russia" 140 At the Mariinskii Palace,St. Petersburg:''No to RedFascism!" "Join the Indefinite Political Strike!" "No to the CPSU Dictatorship!" 150 Rally in PalaceSquare,August 19 152 Rally in PalaceSquare,August20 156 A soldierreadsYeltsin's appealto the armedforces 174 Defendersof the White House,Tuesdaynight 250
Preface On August 19, 1991, eight high-rankingSoviet officials took over the governmentof the USSR by force and proclaimed themselvesthe country'snew rulets. Lessthan seventy-twohours later, their attempt to seizepower had collapsed.Though short-lived,the coup produced consequences few could have foreseen.Soonafterward,the Communist Partythat had ruled Russiasince 1917was suspendedanddispossessed.Five monthsafter the coup,the SovietUnion itself had ceased to exist. The editorsof this volume had the good fortune to witnessat close rangethe monumentaleventsthat shookRussiaand the world in August 1991. Ann Cooper, the National Public Radio bureauchief in Moscow since 1986,was coveringa story in Vilnius, Lithuania, when the coup began. By the end of the day she was back in Moscow. Victoria E. Bonnell, a sociologist at the University of California, Berkeley,and GregoryFreidin, a former Muscovitewho teachesRussianliteratureat StanfordUniversity, arrivedin Moscowon August 15 to do researchandvisit friends andfamily. Experiencedthough we all were in observing and writing about Sovietaffairs, we found ourselvesoverwhelmedandastonishedby the tremendouspower of the events.With millions of othersin Moscow, St. Petersburg,and throughoutthe Soviet Union and the world, we watchedwith horror and fascinationas the junta soughtto turn back the clock to a time--a mere six years earlier!-whena corrupt and brutal Communistparty-statehadruledRussia. Severalmonthsafter the event,the threeeditors reunitedin Berkeley, California. Despitethe time that had passed,we still felt the magnetismof the Augustdays, whendemocraticreformswere suddenlyin xiii
xiv PREFACE jeopardy,andthe whole countryteeteredprecariouslyon the brink ofa civil war. To do honor to the eventsand their participantsand to preservethe vibrancy of the moment,we decidedto put togetherthis collection of eyewitnessaccountsof the three fateful daysin August. We wantedto showthe eventsfrom a variety of pointsofview~ose foreignof the plotters, the leadersof the democraticresistance,foreign and Russianjournalists, visiting emigresand scholars,military officers and ordinary citizens of diverse occupations.Our accountsconcentrateon Moscow, wheremostof the key eventswereplayedout. St.Petersburg(then still called Leningrad),the provincial city of Saratov,and the Tajik capital of Dushanbeare representedas well. We have included some documents,suchas the major declarationsanddecreesissuedby the Emergency Committeeand by RussianPresidentBoris Yeltsin, to provide the contextfor the Augustevents. Above all, we have tried to give a senseof what it was like to be there and to see with one's own eyes how the people of Russia,as George Kennan put it, ''turned their back on the manner in which they've beenruled-notjust in the Soviet period but in the centuries before.... Even 1917 had nothing quite like this" (New York Times, August24, 1991).
Acknowledgments The editors would like to thank GeorgeBreslauer,who gave us the idea for this volume. Gail Lapidusprovidedvaluableand timely support for the projectthroughthe Berkeley-StanfordProgramon Soviet and Post-SovietStudies. Without researchassistance,the volume would havebeenfar longerin the making. When we beganwork on the volume, we placed a notice in the newsletterof the AmericanAssociationfor the Advancementof Slavic Studies inviting contributions. We received quite a number of responses,andsomeof themhavebeenincludedhere.We regretthat we could not publish all of them, and we thank thosecontributorswhose work did not fit the final format of the book. Dorothy Atkinson was especiallyhelpful in alerting us to material and potential authorsfor the volume. The project benefitedgreatly from the assistanceof severalBerkeley graduatestudents.Specialthanksto Howard Allen, Jeffrey Rossman, and especially Veljko Vujacic. George Breslauer, Victor Zaslavsky,and Veljko Vujacic gave us valuable commentsand suggestionson the introduction.We also appreciatethe help we received from Donald J. Raleigh, David Hartsough,and Irina Mikhaleva and MariannaFreidinain Moscow. Most of the translationsfrom Russianthat appearin this volumeare by GregoryFreidin. We havefound it necessary,in manyinstances,to retranslatewell-known documentsand speechesbecauseof inadequacies in wire-serviceandnewspapertranslations.HowardAllen, Jeffrey Rossman,andVeljko Vujacic alsocontributedto the translations. At M.E. Sharpe,PatriciaKolb's enthusiasmfor the project gaveus the burst of energy we neededto finish it. She provided excellent xv
xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS assistance,and we thank her and her colleaguesfor bringing out the book so expeditiously.Leona Schecteralso provided valuableadvice alongthe way. Some of the selectionsin this volume originally appearedelsewhere,mostly in Russiannewspapersandjournals.The editorswould like to thankthesepublicationsfor permissionto reprint the following articles: Gregory Freidin, "To the Barricades:A Street-LevelView of Moscow, August 19," TheNewRepublic,September30,1991. Vladimir Petrik, "Moscow'sM.V. KhrunichevMachine-BuildingFactoryReacts to the AugustCoup,"Literatumaiagazeta,January1, 1992. Nikolai Vorontsov, "Minutes of the Council of Ministers Meeting, August 19, 1991,"Komsomolskaiapravda,August24, 1991. Interview with Yevgenii Shaposhnikov,"The Coup and the Armed Forces," Nezavisimaiagazeta,September12, 1991. Interview with Anatolii Sobchak,"The Breakthrough:The Coup in St. Petersburg," MoscowNews,August26, 1991. Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Our Children Were on the Barricades," Ogonek,no. 36 (August31-September 7,1991). Interview with Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Defenders of the White House," Komsomolskaiapravda,September3,1991. Michael Hetzer,"Deathon the Streets,"Guardian,August23, 1991. "A Man in the Crowd," Ogonek,no. 41 (October5-12, 1991). lain Elliot, "Three Days in August: On-the-SpotImpressions,"RFEIRL Research Institute,Reporton the USSR,vol. 3, no. 36 (September6, 1991). Interview with TatianaMalkina, "The August 19 PressConference,"Ogonek,no. 41 (October5-12,1991). Photo Credits Cover illustration and photographson pages80, 87, 89,96,97,103, 174,and 250 courtesyof the PhotoGroupof the White House Defenders(PhotoArt, Moscow). Photographson pages73, 75, 76,82, 94, 99,102,and 105 by Gregory Freidin. Photographs.on pages90, 91, 92, and 98 by Victoria E. Bonnell and Sandor Szabo. Photographon page140by DonaldJ. Raleigh. Photographson pages150, 152, and 156 courtesyof Vladimir Zavorotnyi.
Note on Transliteration and Interpolations We follow the Library of Congresssystemfor transliteratingRussian words into English, but have madesomeexceptionsin the interestof readability. Throughout,we haveomittedsoft signs,andwe usea "Y" to begin suchnamesas Yakovlev, Yevtushenko,and Yurii. More generally, we have adoptedthe New York Times usagefor well-known names,titles, andplaces. The readerwill also note that we have usedtwo different conventions for interpolationsinto the text. If the interpolationis by the author or interviewee,it appearsin parentheses. If it was madeby the editors for the purposeof clarification or identification, it appearsin square brackets. The explanatoryfootnotesthat appearin the volume were supplied by the editors. xvii
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Guide to the Print Media The following Russianmedia are mentionedin the book undertheir Russiannames.Englishtranslationsof thesetitles areasfollows: Periodicals Argumentyifakty (ArgumentsandFacts) Den (Day) Izvestiia(Information) Kommersant(Man of Commerce) Kommunist(Communist) Komsomolskaia pravda(KomsomolTruth) Kuranty(Chimes) Literaturnaiagazeta(Literary Gazette) LiteraturnaiaRossiia(Literary Russia) Magnitogorskiirabochii (MagnitogorskWorker) Moskovskiikomsomolets (MoscowKomsomolMember) Moskovskienovosti(MoscowNews) Moskovskaiapravda(MoscowTruth) Nevskoevremia(NevaTimes) Nezavisimaiagazeta(IndependentGazette) Obshchaiagazeta(JointGazette) Ogonek(Flicker) Pravda(Truth) Rossiia(Russia) Rossiiskaiagazeta(RussianGazette) Rossiiskievesti(RussianNews) Smena(New Generation) Stolitsa(The Capital) VechemiaiaMoskva(EveningMoscow) xix
xx GUIDE TO THE PRINT MEDIA NewsAgencies TASS (TelegrafnoeagenstvoSovetskogoSoiuza): the official news agencyof the SovietUnion ITAR-TASS (InformatsionnoetelegrafnoeagenstvoRossii-TASS): the Russianwire service-TASS RIA (Rossisskoeinformatsionnoeagenstvo,or RussianInformation Agency): the official newsagencyof the RSFSR Novosti: semi-official newsagencyof the USSR Interfax: an independentnewsagency Postfactum:an independentnewsagency
RUSSIA AT THE BARRICADES
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VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN Introduction The eventsof August 1991 canbestbe understoodasa consequence of the reform programput into motion by Mikhail Gorbachevand his closestallies, AleksandrYakovlev and EduardShevardnadze, following Gorbachev'sappointmentas GeneralSecretaryof the Communist Partyof the SovietUnion in March 1985.Recognizingthat the country faced severeand intractableeconomicand social problemsthat had long been neglected,Gorbachevand his team embarkedon a series of fundamentalreforms of the Soviet system.In a December1988 meetingwith U.S. PresidentGeorgeBush, Gorbachevdescribedhis intentions: You'll see soon enoughthat I'm not doing this for show and I'm not doing this to undermineyou or to surpriseyou or to take advantageof you. I'm playing real politics. I'm doing this becauseI need to. I'm doing this becausethere'sa revolution taking place in my country. I startedit. And they all applaudedme when I startedit in 1986 andnow they don't like it so much,but it's goingto be a revolution,nonetheless. I Expertsdisagreeas to how muchof Gorbachev'srevolutionaryprogramshouldbe attributedto his team'soriginal plansandhow muchto the unanticipatedconsequences of the initial reforms.2 But few would denythatthe changesthat took placeweresignificantandfar-reaching. The introduction of glasnosl--apolicy of increasingopennessin the massmedi~irrevocably November transformedthe political cultureof the country. Beginning in November1987, Gorbachevrelinquishedthe CommunistParty'smonopolyon truth. Encouragedfrom above,intellectuals and political activists saw to it that a pluralism of ideas quickly re3
4 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN placed the Leninist idea of a single truth defined by a single party, disseminatedby propagandists, andbackedup by censorship.By 1990, with the revision of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which had guaranteedthe CommunistParty's"leadingrole" in political andsocial life, there was virtually no subjectthat could not be discussedopenly in the mediaor otherpublic forums. Societywas now ableto challenge the Party'spreeminenceon all fronts, and the Party, as was becoming increasinglyclear,was notup to the challenge. In the political sphere,the Gorbachevreformsled to a restructuring -perestroika--ofthe systemof government,which since 1917 had beenfirmly controlledby the CommunistParty.Representative bodies, from local sovietsto the SupremeSoviet of the USSR,were staffedin single-candidateelectionsand functionedas rubberstampsfor decisions taken at the higher echelonsof the CommunistParty apparatus. Gorbachevrevampedthesepseudo-democratic institutions.His first major innovation was the creation of the USSR Congressof People'sDeputiesas a national assemblythat would selectthe standing legislature----theSupremeSoviet-fromamongits members.Twothirds of the deputiesto the new Congresswere chosenin electionsin the springof 1989,and-ina radicalbreakwith the Communistpastmany of these were free elections with competing candidates.The remainderof the deputieswere selectedby so-called"public organizations," including suchstalwartsof the old regimeasthe "official" trade unionsand,of course,the CommunistParty.(Gorbachevhimselfchose to becomea deputynot by election,which he could easily havewon, but throughthe CommunistParty quota-adecisionthat deprivedhim of any popular mandate,with fateful consequences for his future in politics.) Similar legislativeinstitutionswerethencreatedat the republic level (electionsfor Russia'sCongressof People'sDeputies took placein 1990), and, for the first time, genuineelectionsfor local sovietswereheld in cities throughoutthe country. Though often dominatedby old-guard elements(including Party bureaucrats,industrial managers,and military officers), the new legislaturesprovideda powerful forum for discussionof a wide range of political opinion. Most important,they madeit possiblefor democratic politicians, like Andrei Sakharovand Boris Yeltsin, to speak directly to the Soviet public. Incessanttelevision coverageof parliamentarydebatesandpolitical commentarypracticallytook over the air waves and the print media. The secretiveor largely ceremonialpoli-
INTRODUCTION 5 ticking of the Soviet era gaveway to full-blown political theater,open to all. For a while it seemedthat the whole country was glued to television sets,watchingthe thrust and parry betweenGorbachevand Sakharovand clashesbetweenthe liberal deputiesof the Interregional Group and the conservativesof the "Soiuz" (Union) faction. In the process,the political horizons of the attentive public expandedso much that what seemedonly yesterdaya daring political move appearedtoday as an exercisein timid half-measures--and would be seentomorrowasa betrayalof democracy. The headyatmosphereof thosedayswas propitiousfor the creation of voluntary associations,and they quickly proliferated during the Gorbachevera,evolving into a multitudeof political partiesandmovementswith diverseaims. Theseopportunitiesfor openexpressionand political involvementhelpedto draw peopleinto new forms of activism in the public sphere.At first encouraged,protected,indeednurturedby glasnostandperestroika,the new political activistseventually beganto chafeunderthe restrictionsimplicit in thesepolicies.Little by little, they distancedthemselvesfrom Gorbachev,whoseposition (or, somewould say, convictions)did not allow him to stray too far from the centerof the Sovietpolitical spectrum. Nowherewas this processmore evidentthan in the Baltic republics, wherethe first advocatesof glasnostand perestroikasoonemergedas championsof national independence.In a matter of monthsafter the first free elections, this phenomenonspreadthroughout the Soviet Union, not excluding its heartland,the largestrepublic of them allthe RussianFederation. At the republic level, the·new legislative bodies, in which former dissidentssat side by side with old-style Soviet bosses,did not take long to develop their own political dynamic. The "democrats,"who were gaining in authority at the expenseof the Partybut still had little power, andParty apparatchiks,who held on to the leversof powerbut were losing their mantleof authority, found commongroundon issues of nationalism-theideological heir of communismin the modem world. Across the Soviet Union they formed powerful coalitions to challengethe authorityof ''the center,"namely,the top Sovietpolitical elite presidedover by Gorbachev.By the summerof 1991, many republics, acting through the newly electedlegislatures,had declared their sovereignty.Among them was the RussianSoviet FederatedSocialist Republic,led by its newly electedPresident,Boris Yeltsin.
6 VICTORIA E. BONNEll AND GREGORYFREIDIN For the first time sincethe revolution of 1917,the integrity of the empirewas threatenedfrom within. Whetherthey soughtdisintegration or opposedit, most responsibleand foresighted politicians, amongthem Gorbachevand Yeltsin, understoodthat the old Union structurehadto be replacedby a new arrangementthat would transfer much of the center'spower to the republics.This becameespecially clear after Moscow's attempt to overthrow the nationalist governmentin Lithuania in January1991 endedin bloodshedand failure. In an effort to institutionalizethe new statusquo in relations with the center, Gorbachevand the heads of nine republics (the Baltic states,Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia did not participate) drafted a new Union Treaty, initialed the final version of it, and agreedto have it signedon August 20, 1991. It was to preventthis from coming to passthat opponentsof changeattemptedtheir coup d'etaton August 18.3 Another important aspectof perestroikawas the programof economic restructuring. Although the Gorbachevgovernmentfailed to move decisively in the direction of a market economy,it did create opportunities for certain types of private enterprise,known by the catch-allterm kooperativy,or cooperatives.This easingof centralcontrols over economicactivity madeit possiblefor peopleto leave employment in the statesectorfor the first time sincethe 1920s,and by August 1991, new groups of private entrepreneurshad proliferated throughoutthe country. *** It should not be surprising that the policies of glasnostand perestroika found someof their most ardentsupportersamong'urban,educated,"middle-class"citizens who appreciated-and took advantage of--the new opportunitiesfor individual and collective activity in the economyand in politics. This group emergedas a critically important new force in the countryduring the Gorbachevera. At the sametime, three pillars of the old systemstill clung to the resourcesand power, if not the authority, that they had enjoyed throughoutthe Soviet era: the military-industrial complex, which included a large part of the heavy industrial sector of the command economy;the all-pervasiveCommitteefor State Security, the KGB; and above it all, the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union, or more
INTRODUCTION 7 preciselyits central apparatus,which controlledvirtually all top governmentappointmentsfrom the revolution of 1917 until August 1991. Whetherfor lack of will or lack of power,out of tacticalconsiderations or out of conviction, and most likely for all of thesereasonsat once, Gorbachevdid not break with the CommunistParty. Yet his policies continuouslyunderminedthe position and authority of the Party apparatusand fosteredthe emergenceof reform groupswithin the Party at all levelsaswell asrival political movementsoutsidethe Party. Until its suspensionon August 24, 1991,the CommunistParty was the sole political organizationspanningthe entire SovietUnion. Using the art of political maneuverof which he was a consummatepractitioner, Gorbachevtried to enlist the Partyin the causeof reform andto use its organizationalresourcesasa counterweightto the centrifugalforces that were pulling the country apart. This paradoxlies at the heart of Gorbachev'sachievement,but it wasthe causeof his failure aswell. In the yearprecedingthe coup, grassrootspolitical forcesthat Gorbachev himselfhad helpedto unleashwere becomingincreasinglyradicalized in frustration over the seeminglyslow pace of change.At the same time, conservativeelementswithin the Party were stiffening their resistanceto reform. To placatethem, Gorbachevretainedkey conservativefigures in his governmenteven as he was preparingto sign the new Union Treaty that would have dealt a fatal blow to their power. As political forces polarized,Gorbachevmoved first in one direction and then the other. The result was that Gorbachevappearedtimid and indecisive as he repeatedlydrew back from the bold strategies proposedby someof his more radicaleconomicadvisers.At the top, therewas a gradualattrition amongliberal politicians, including those most intimately associatedwith the post-1985 reforms-Aleksandr Yakovlev, EduardShevardnadze, and Vadim Bakatin. ForeignMinister Shevardnadze's resignationfrom his postdrew worldattention;yet his dramatic warning of an impending coup d'etat-"Dictatorshipis coming!"--spokenfrom the high rostrumof the Congressof People's Deputiesin December1990, seemedto fall on deafears.Gorbachev's apparentacquiescence in the useof brute force to suppressthe nationalist movementsin the Baltic republics, and, especially,.the bloody attack on Lithuania'sparliamentbuilding in January1991, cost him support among the democratswhile not winning him many friends amongthe conservatives,who hadgrown to mistrusthim personallyas
8 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN muchasthey mistrustedhis policy of reform. In the monthsprecedingthe coup there were many signs that conservativeforces---acoalition of leading officials in the RSFSRCommunist Party and key membersof the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and the armed forces, along with some well-known ultra-nationalistRussianwritersc-werecoalescingin oppositionto reformist policies.4 In mid-June,critics of perestroikain the governmentleadershipincluding future putschistsValentin Pavlov, Dmitrii Yazov, Boris Pugo, and Vladimir Kriuchkov-attemptedto carry out a "constitutional coup d'etat"by expandingthe powersof PrimeMinister Pavlov, an outspokenopponentof the new Union Treatywhich was thenbeing negotiated.Their efforts failed. On July 23, 1991, twelve Soviet leaders,including high-ranking army officers, publisheda dramaticappealin the conservativenewspaper SovetskaiaRossiiawhich called on "citizens of the Soviet Union" to resist the breakup of the country, allegedly being engineeredby greedy capitalists, foreign-directedelements,and cunning apostates. Hitherto suchchargespredictablyhad issuedfrom the lunatic fringe of the conservativeopposition.Not so this time: the signatoriesincluded suchpowerful figures as Colonel GeneralBoris Gromov, the Deputy Minister oflnternalAffairs anda heroof the Afghan War. This appeal, publishedunderthe title "A Word to the People,"prefiguredmany of the argumentsput forward by the putschistsless than a month later. With its specialreferenceto the role of the armedforces in preserving "Holy Russia,"this statementbroughtinto the openthe possibility of a military seizureof power. Both former Foreign Minister Shevardnadzeand Aleksandr Yakovlev felt sufficiently alarmedby the courseof eventsto issue repeatedwarnings of an impending coup.sIn June 1991, Secretaryof StateJamesBakerconveyedto Gorbachev,throughsecurechannels,a reportthat Pavlov,Yazov, andKriuchkov were plotting his overthrow. But Gorbachevrefusedto follow up theseand other alarm bells with decisiveaction.6 In an interview conductedin August 1991, only a few days after the attemptedcoup, Shevardnadze was askedwhy Gorbachev had failed to take action to preventa seizureof power by high-ranking officials, mostof whomhe hadappointed.Shevardnadze replied: Most likely, he did not understand;probablyhe did not want to under-
INTRODUCTION 9 stand.Thereinlies the whole tragedy, thewhole trouble. This featureis characteristicof many leaders.There are numerousexamplesthroughout history where a persondoesnot want to believethat terrible things are going on. In my opinion, this is what happenedwith Mikhail Sergeevich.And this grievesme tremendously.It has cost the country dearly? The immediatecircumstancethatprecipitatedthe coupwasthe signing ceremonyfor the new Union Treaty, scheduledfor August 20. The treaty would have grantedsupremacyto the laws of the republics in many areasand permanentlycurtailedthe power of the central government-andwith it, Communist Party rule. Conservatives, among others, were especially indignant when Gorbachevdid not make public the text of the new Union Treaty. Even cabinetministers had no accessto the text until a draft versionfell into the hands of the editors of MoscowNews,who publishedit a few days before the coup.8 There was also suspicion that Gorbachevmay have struck a secretdeal with the G7 leaderswith whom he had met in London in July, leaving Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov out of the negotiations.9 Although the impendingUnion Treaty was the galvanizing event, there were other factors that arousedthe plotters to action.lO Gorbachev'sskill at maneuveringbetweenthe oppositeends of the political spectrumhadbeenmakingconservativesseasickfor a number of years.From their point of view, the worst turn had come in April 1991. From September1990 to April 1991 it had seemedthat Gorbachevhad thrown in his lot with the old guard. How outraged they musthavebeenwhen Gorbachevsuddenlystruckan alliancewith Boris Yeltsin (who had publicly resignedfrom the CommunistParty the previousJuly) andembraceda numberof importanteconomicand political reforms in the monthsprecedingthe coup. One item high on the conservatives'bill of particularswas Yeltsin's ban on the workplaceactivities of political partiesin the RussianFederation,issuedon July 20, not long after his election as Presidentof Russia. Clearly directed againstthe CommunistParty, since it spelledan end to the Party'sgrassrootsystemof control, the bancausedgreatconsternation amongconservatives.Worse yet, their failure to force Yeltsin to rescind this decreedemonstratedunmistakablythat the Party, the erstwhile colossus,hadlost its iron grip.
10 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFRElDIN All of thesedevelopments,moreover,took place againstthe background of a deterioratingeconomicsituation. By mid-summer,there were strongindicationsof impendingshortagesof fuel andfood, asthe commandsystemcollapsedand republics and even localities set up protectionistbarriersto guardlocal supplies. Feelingincreasinglyirrelevant,afraidthat Gorbachev'snext maneuver would throw them overboard,the plotters resolvedto take action. The decisivemeetingof the conspiratorstook placeon August 16 at a KGB resorton the outskirtsof Moscow.1 1 *** When the coup beganon Sunday,August 18, 1991,Gorbachevwas vacationingwith his family in Foros, on the Crimeanpeninsula.The plotters' first act was to send a delegationto Foros--ledby Valerii Boldin, the President'sChief of Staff, along with Yurii Plekhanov, Chief of the Security Directorateof the KGB---to seek Gorbachev's own sanctionfor the takeover. Some of the plotters, it appears,believed that, although he might offer resistanceat first, Gorbachev would in the end cooperatewith them by declaring a state of emergencyin the country. After all, he hadyieldedto pressurefrom conservativesin the past.Gorbachev,however,refusedto play any part in the scheme,calling the instigators"adventurists"and using (in the words of one of the plotters) other "non-parliamentaryexpressions."Held under house arrest and with no means of communicationwith the outside world, Gorbachevand his family would remain in complete isolation, unsure of their fate, until the afternoon of Wednesday, August21. Gorbachev'srefusal to play along with their plans disorientedthe conspirators,but they decidedto proceedwith the takeover,in the hope that the countrywould welcometheir move asheraldinga respitefrom disruptivechangeandmountingdisorder. *** In the early morning of Monday, August 19, troopswere mobilized in the vicinity of Moscow and large numbersof tanks and armored personnelcarriers(APCs) beganmoving towardthe city. Beginningat 6:00 A.M. Moscow time, the country awoke to television and radio broadcastsannouncingthe formation of the State Committeefor the
INTRODUCTION J J Stateof Emergency.12Thejunta consistedof eight men, sevenof them high-ranking membersof the governmentand all of them identified with the top echelon of the party-state: Vice PresidentGennadii Yanaev; KGB chief Vladimir Kriuchkov; DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov; Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo; Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov; Oleg Baklanov, First Deputy Chairmanof the National DefenseCouncil and leaderof the military-industrial complex; Vasilii Starodubtsev,Chairmanof the Peasants'Union; andAleksandr Tiziakov, Presidentof the Associationof StateEnterprisesand Industrial Groupsin Production,Construction,Transportation,andCommunicationsandmemberof the Council of Ministers. The Committee'sfirst public statementsannouncedthe imposition of a state of emergencyin the country to rescue"our great Motherland" from the "mortal danger"that loomedover it. The form as much as the contentof thesestatementsindicatedclearly that theEmergency Committeewished to turn back the clock to an earlier era, to restore the law and order once commandedby an all-powerful Communist Party,andto preservethe SovietUnion as a unitary state. Yet it wasalsoobviousthat the conspiratorswantedto give a constitutional gloss to their actions,for the benefit of the Soviet population asmuchasthe restof the world. Although in clearviolation of the Law on the Stateof Emergency,13they claimedto be acting in accordance with certain articles of the USSR Constitution(adoptedin 1977, but much amendedsince 1988). Article 127(7) of the Constitution provided for a transferof power to the Vice Presidentof the USSRif the Presidentwas for any reason''unableto continue to executehis duties." (Throughoutthe coup,the Committeewould maintainthe pretext that Gorbachevwas incapacitatedby healthproblems.)Ironically, this effort to formulate a constitutional justification for the seizure of power suggeststhat, as one commentatorobserved,''the reform process begun by Gorbachevha[d] been effective in introducing some semblanceof the rule oflaw in the USSR."14 By mid-morningon Monday,large numbersof tanksandAPCs and truckloadsof soldiers had begunto enter the city of Moscow. Later that day, both Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg)were placedundermartial law. Although martial law was not formally imposedin the Baltic republics,troopsbeganmoving there,too, and the commanderof the Baltic Military District declaredthat he was assuming control of the region.IS
12 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDlN Popularresistanceto the takeoverdid not appearimmediately.The galvanizingforce was Boris Yeltsin, the newly electedPresidentof the RussianFederation.On Mondaymorning Yeltsin issuedan "Appeal to the Citizensof Russia,"denouncingthe takeoveras illegal and calling for popular resistance,including a generalstrike. At midday Yeltsin mounted a tank near the building known as the White House (the Houseof Soviets,which housedthe Russiangovernment)andmadean appealto soldiersand officers, exhortingthem to give their allegiance to the governmentof the RussianFederation. In the late afternoon,at around5:00 P.M. the EmergencyCommittee held a televised pressconference,open to Soviet and foreign press. Speakingin a booming,authoritativevoice, but with his handsvisibly trembling, Vice PresidentYanaev,ostensiblythe leaderof the coup, offered the junta's casefor the takeover.Without producinganyevidence for his assertion,Yanaev repeatedlydeclaredthat Gorbachev wasill andwould eventually,Yanaevhoped,resumehis duties. That sameevening,in one of thoseodd twists that aboundedduring the coup, the image of Yeltsin on a tank, capturedby a CNN camera, was beamedto millions of Soviet viewerson the newsprogram"Vremia." This icon of defiancewas part of a remarkablefive-minute segment on "Vremia" aboutthe appearanceof a democraticresistanceto the coup in the country'scapital. Put togetherby televisionjournalist SergeiMedvedev,the short segmentconveyeda vast amountof information: the tanks rolling down the streetsof Moscow, Yeltsin's "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia," the building of barricades,and the massingof peopledeterminedto defendthe White Housefrom attack. Medvedev'sreporton the eveningnews,following a tapedrebroadcast of the EmergencyCommittee'spressconference,helped to turn the tide againstthe coupd'etat.16 November As motorizedarmor convergedon the streetsof Moscow~ver six hundredpieces,not countingthe trucks carrying soldiersin full battle gear--peoplebeganerecting barricades,some in Manezh Square(a largeplazanearRed Squarewherebig rallies areheld) andmanymore outsidethe White House.In somecases,peoplestoppedthe movement of tanksandAPCsby forming a humanchain. Many amongthe first barricade-buildersunderstoodthat the putschists were using a tried-and-trueSoviet technique,one that had been usedsuccessfullyall over EasternEuropein the yearsafter World War II: while tanks surroundthe governmentheadquarters,a junta offers
INTRODUCTION J3 the alternative of "national salvation" through Party-imposedorder. Most recentlythe scenariohadbeenemployedin Vilnius, Lithuania,in January1991. This time, however--unlikeHungaryin 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Polandin 1981, where coups d'etat had been carried out under the cover of the Cold War and with totalitarian controls--Lithuaniastoodfirm. Indeed,the Lithuaniansenjoyedbroad andvocal public supportamongRussia'sintelligentsiaand democratic politicians, and the "Committeefor National Salvation" failed to take power. Thanksto the Vilnius example,and to SergeiMedvedev'sbrief but incisive "Vremia" report about the barricade-buildingin Moscow, Russiancitizens knew what they had to do: defendthe White House, the seat of their freely elected government.That the putschistsexpectedto succeedin Moscow (where closeto 80 percenthad voted to elect Yeltsin President)17with a plan that had not worked in Vilnius speaksvolumes about the plotters' generalcompetence,political imagination,andhorizons. A major changein the alignment of forces occurred as early as 10:00 P.M. on Monday night, when several tanks from the Taman Division, stationedin the vicinity of the White House,declaredtheir loyalty to Russiaand moved to defendthe building, cheeredon by a large crowd that hadbeengatheringsincethe early afternoon.An hour later, eight armoredscoutvehiclesflying the Russiantricolor arrivedto protectthe White House;they were led by Major GeneralAleksandr Lebed, under orders from the commanderof the airborne paratroop forces, Colonel GeneralPavel Grachev.18 Thesewere the first indications of divided loyaltieswithin the military. Meanwhile, in Leningrad,Mayor Anatolii Sobchakhad hastily returnedfrom Moscow to take chargeof the democraticresistance.One of his first acts was to reachan agreementwith local military officers to keep tanks and"APCs out of the city. In the eveninghe delivereda rousing televisedspeech,calling for resistanceand urging people to attenda protestrally the following day. From that time on, the Leningradtelevisionstationtransmittedinformation in supportof the democratic resistance. On August 20, the secondday of the coup, large rallies were held in LeningradandMoscow.The Leningradrally, attendedby an estimated 130,000to 300,000people,took placein PalaceSquare.The Moscow rally, variously estimatedat 70,000 to 150,000 people, was held at
14 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN noon in front of the White House.19 Yeltsin and other major political figures from the democraticresistanceaddressed the Moscowrally and appealedto citizens to defendthe White Houseagainstan imminent military attack.2oAs many as 70,000 people-amongthem students andyoungpeople,middle-classMuscovitesin their thirties andforties, and a large contingent of veteransof the war in Afghanistan--respondedto Yeltsin's call. They streamedto the White House and, despitethe curfew declaredby the Military Commandantof Moscow, they stayedtherethroughthe night, forming self-defenseunits. An attack on the White House was expectedin the early hours of Wednesdaymorning. Shortly after midnight, shotsrang out abouthalf a mile away: a column of APCs had found itself trappedby the barricadesblocking an underpassa couple of blocks from the U.S. Embassy.As the APCs tried to ram througha row of trolleycars,a melee ensuedin which three young men died defendingthe barricade.This incident notwithstanding,evidenceindicates that there was no concertedattackmountedon the seatof Russia'sgovernment,althoughan attack-abrutal one----hadbeenplannedand ordered.Soonafterward, tanks and APCs beganto departfrom the city. At 9:25 A.M., Marshal Yazov, one of the plotters,resignedhis post, and the coup leadership, or what remainedof it, rapidly collapsed. On Wednesdaymorning an emergencysessionof the SupremeSoviet of Russiaconvenedat the White House.A high-level delegation from the Russiangovernmentwas dispatchedto the Crimeato rescue Gorbachevand his family, who would return to Moscow shortly after midnight. Meanwhile,mostof the plotterswerearrested. The following day, Thursday,August 22, was officially proclaimed the Day of Freedom.Bannednewspapersbeganto publish again, and televisionandradio programsresumedtheir regularschedules.Yeltsin madean appearancebefore the Russianparliamentwhere he thanked Muscovitesfor havingdefendedthe White Houseso courageously. At noon, tens of thousandsof Muscovites gatheredat the White Housefor a victory rally and a marchto Red Square.The speechesby Yeltsin, Ivan Silaevof the RussianCouncil of Ministers,RussianVice PresidentAleksandr Rutskoi, AleksandrYakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze,andotherleadingfigures in the democraticmovementattributed the victory over the junta to the "peopleof Moscow," who heroically mobilized to defendfreedomagainst''totalitarianism.''The potentadmixture of local patriotismandRussiannationalismbroughtthe crowd
INTRODUCTION J5 to a frenzy of delight, with much flag waving and cheering. The speechescontinuedwhen the crowds reachedRed Square,but Gorbachevwas conspicuously absent. The symbols of victory were everywhere.Many people carried small tricolor flags which hadbecomethe symbol of democraticRussia. Later that day, the tricolor was madethe official flag of the Russian Republic. The squareadjoining the White House was renamed FreedomSquare. On Thursdayeveninga massivedisplay of fireworks had beenarrangedto mark the culminationof the day's events.Perhapsthe organizers of the festivities conceivedof victory day as a Russianversion of the Fourth of July or Bastille Day. But these were not the only fIreworks. In Dzerzhinskii Square----namedfor the head of the infamous revolutionary-eraCheka, precursor of the KGB--an angry crowd had gatheredin the late afternoon.Somecalled for an attackon the KGB building, the Lubianka. It was the fIrst time in four daysthat popularindignationappearedreadyto spill over into spontaneousviolence. Soon a delegationcame from the White House to calm the crowd and dissuadethem from rashactions.Somehourslater, a mammoth yellow crane,bearingthe logo "Krupp," arrivedin the squareand begandismantlingthe imposing statueof "Iron Feliks" Dzerzhinskii which stoodon a tall pedestalin the centerof the square. Gorbachevconducteda pressconferenceon Thursdayevening,his first extendedappearancesincethe conspiracyhad begun.Many were surprisedthat the Presidenthad chosenas his fIrst audiencethe press corpsandnot the Sovietpublic at large or thepeopleof Moscow, who had risked their lives to, among other things, securehis freedom. At the pressconference,Gorbachevappearedshakenby the events,even contrite, yet still unable to grasp (as his critics put it) that he had returnedto a different country. In responseto a question about the possible complicity of the CPSU leadershipin the attemptedcoup d'etat, Gorbachevequivocated.The impressionwas further amplifIed when, in responseto anotherquestion,Gorbachevlaunchedinto his all-too-familiar defenseof the "socialist idea." Still the GeneralSecretary of the CPSU,he failed to takeadvantageof what was,perhaps,the last opportunityto dissociatehimselfpublicly from a party whoseleadershiphadbetrayedhim andthe countryby remainingsilent during the coup. The action on Friday, August 23, took place in the sphereof high
16 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFRElDIN politics and on television rather than on the streets.For the first time sinceMonday, Muscovitesbecamespectatorsratherthan actorsas the drama of retribution went forward in the chambersof the Russian parliament.GorbachevandYeltsin playedthe leadingroles that day as they camefaceto face for the first time sincethe crisis began. Standinglike a deposedleaderbefore an angry crowd, Gorbachev was heckled, criticized, interrogated,and disgracedby Yeltsin and otherdeputies.After Gorbachevfinished his address,expressinggratitude to the "Russians" for their role in defeating the plot, Yeltsin walked up to him and insisted that Gorbachevnow read aloud the minutes of a meetingof the USSR Council of Ministers held on the first day of the coup, in which Gorbachev'sown cabinetbetrayedhim. Gorbachevhesitatedbecausethe authenticityand accuracyof the minutes had not beenestablished,but Yeltsin went on bUllying him, and Gorbachevsubmitted, reading what turned out to be an inaccurate transcript.ThenGorbachevtook questionsfrom the deputies. From time to time, Yeltsin interruptedthe proceedings,declaring with a broad grin that "in order to relieve accumulatedtension" he would now sign a decreewith far-reachingimplications for the future of the country. In this way he madepublic decreesorderingthe Communist Party to ceaseactivities in the armed forces serving on the territory of the RSFSR;suspendingpublicationof newspapersthat had ~th the junta; confiscatingCommunistParty publishing cooperated November houses and printing plants and placing them under the Russian government'scontrol; and sealing the headquartersof the Central Committeeandsuspendingthe activitiesof the CommunistPartyin the RussianRepublic, pendingan investigationinto its role in the coup. This last movehadmomentousconsequences, for it signaledthe endof the Party'slegal existencein Russia. On Saturdaymorning,a massivefuneral was held for the threemen who had died at the barricadesearly Wednesdaymorning. A crowd of tens of thousandsof people gatheredin Manezh Square to hear speechesmadeby major political figures, including Gorbachev.Somber and emotional, Gorbachevpaid tribute to the three men and announcedthat he had signeda decreeposthumouslyawardingthemthe title of Hero of the SovietUnion. The crowd thenproceededto Kalinin Prospectand on to the White House,pausingto hearYeltsin's funeral oration,perhapsthe mostpowerful speechof his public career.Marching in the funeral processionwere Afghan War veterans,RussianOr-
INTRODUCTION 17 thodox priests,rabbis, colorfully bedeckedCossacks,and, of course, defendersof the White Housecarrying a large tricolor flag. Later that day, Gorbachevresignedas GeneralSecretaryof the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union and suspendedthe Party'sactivities, extendingto the entirecountryY eltsin's decreebanningthe Partyon the territory of the RussianRepublic. *** How can we accountfor the rapid and ignominious defeat of the "gang of eight"? Among the important factors were the ineptitudeof the plotters,the generaldecrepitudeof the centralizedsystemof control, and, perhapsmost critical at that moment, the Emergency Committee'sinability to commandauthority among the top brassin the military and the KGB. Their ordersto arrestYeltsin and other key political figures were disobeyed(in fact, only four people were arrestedduring the coup, all of them People'sDeputies).The conspirators then failed to cut off communicationswith the White Houseeven 21 after it becamethe headquarters of the resistance. The spokesmenof the EmergencyCommitteedid not make a convincing case for themselvesat their one and only press conference, wherethey were openly ridiculed by membersof the Sovietpress---all of this broadcastlive for the benefit of the entire country. More surprising is the fact that they could not even control the contentof the one and only television news program,"Vremia," or the government newspaperIzvestiia.22 When rumors of a coup had circulatedsome months earlier, Gorbachevreportedlydismissedthe possibility on the groundsthat people like Yanaev were incapable of mastermindinga takeover. He was wrong about that, but the plot did in fact unfold like a comedy of errors. By the time it was over, two of the conspiratorshad landedin the hospital(pavlov andYazov); one had committed suicide(PugO);23 andanotherlay unconsciousin an alcoholicstupor(Yanaev). But ineptnessdoesnot precludebrutality and may evenfacilitate it. A few daysbeforethe coup began,the plottershadplacedan orderfor 250,000handcuffs,and the Moscow police commandanthad 300,000 arrest forms printed in advance.The plotters prepareda list of sixtynine people, most of them public figures, who were to be arrested. Someof the men involved in the coupgaveordersto arrestYeltsin and
18 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFRElDIN shootcivilians at the White House.Theseorderswere not obeyed,as we know now, becausecommanderssuchas Colonel GeneralGrachev (subsequentlyappointedRussia'sMinister of Defense),Major General Lebed (subsequentlythe Commanderof the FourteenthArmy), and Major General Viktor Karpukhin (at the time, Commanderof the KGB's anti-terrorist "Alpha" brigade, and under pressurefrom his subordinates)refusedto shedthe blood of their compatriots. The internal securityforcesprovidea particularlytelling exampleof the plotters' failure to mobilize key segmentsof the military behind their effort. Moscowpolicemenprovidedthe nucleusofYeltsin'ssecurity forces during the coup. The staff and cadetsat the RiazanHigher Police Academyand a Moscow platoonof the elite SpecializedDesignation Police Detachment~own November by the RussianacronymOMONthrewtheir supportbehindYeltsin. Even more critical for the defeatof the putschwas the equivocation and noncooperationwithin the KGB. An interview with Major General Karpukhin later disclosedthe extent of insubordination.According to Karpukhin, he fIrst disobeyedorders on the morning of August 19 when he was instructedto arrestYeltsin at his countly house. Although he was in a position to make the arrest ("My vehicles were stakedout aroundthe entire settlement.All roads were blocked . . ."), KarpukhinnonethelessallowedYeltsin to depart. On the evening of August 19, Karpukhin participatedin a secret meetingof commandingofficers at the USSRMinistry of Defense.At that point, Karpukhin hadoperationalcommandover elite forcesnumberingabout 15,000men.He describedthe plan of attackas follows: At 3:00 A.M. the OMON divisions would clear the square[aroundthe White House] and dispersethe crowd with gasand watercannons.Our divisions were to follow them. On the ground and from the air, using helicopterswith grenadelaunchersand other special equipment,we would takethe building. My boys were practically invulnerable.All this would have lasted fifteen minutes. Everything dependedon me in this situation. Thank God, I did not lift a hand. Had there beena battle, there would have beena bloody mess.I refused.24 Karpukhin was not aloneamongtop KGB officers who resistedthe plan for attack. Other Alpha commanderssharedKarpukhin's view that the White House could easily be seized,but only at the cost of
INTRODUCTION 19 many casualtiesamongthe defenders.To be sure, someKGB officers were initially attractedby the putschists'appeal.But by Monday evening, following the press conferenceof the EmergencyCommittee, they concluded(in the words of a KGB major general)that "this was a simple adventure,and the perplexing questions[about Gorbachev's health] multiplied."2s A numberof themviewedthe coup as "unlawful andunconstitutional."26 Insubordinationin the police,the army, andthe KGB, andespeciallyin the elite units, preventedthe putschistsfrom canyingout their plans,21 The numberof Muscoviteswho participatedpublicly in some aspect of the popular resistanceduring the three days of the coup has beenestimatedat as many as 500,000(many more joinedthe victory rally on Thursdayand the funeral on Saturday).Even this high figure representsonly a small proportionof the city's total popUlationof eight or nine million. Yet, within hoursof the coup d'etat, thejunta'sctuim to governhad beenreducedto one issue:who would control the White House?In this context, a relatively small number of people---butenough to fill to overflowing the vast spacearoundthe structure----madea tremendous difference. They stoppedthe movementof tanks with barricadesand with their own bodies. They fraternized with soldiers and officers. They protestedin the Tuesdaymassrally. They organizedself-defense units aroundthe White Houseon MondayandTuesdaynights. By these acts, ordinary people helped to demoralizesoldiers and their officers andto dissuadethemfrom carryingout thejunta'sorders. The attackon the White Houseorderedby the EmergencyCommittee nevertook place.Justas in the FebruaryRevolutionof 1917,whenthe defectionof the Cossackssealedthe fate of the "old regime," so in this casedefectionsamongarmy, police, and KGB officers preventedthe junta----ilie last holdover of the Communistold regime-fromimposing its will on the country. Although evidenceon the situation in the provinces during these events is incomplete, we know that local governmentssupported Yeltsin in a number of key cities in the RussianRepublic including Sverdlovsk, Voronezh, Khabarovsk, Tula, Novosibirsk, Rostov on Don, Arkhangelsk,and Yaroslavl. The fact is that oppositionwas considerable--enough to preventthe tanks from evenenteringLeningrad andto sendsignalsto the plottersthat compliancethroughoutthe country could not easilybe achieved.
20 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN The precedingyears of glasnost and perestroika,with unprecedentedopportunitiesfor public activism, had preparedthe ground for resistanceto the coup. First, there was no longer only one centerof power and authority in the country. Apart from the central statestructure -the governmentof the USSR-therewas now an electedgovernment of the Russian Federation,and other republic-level governmentsaswell. The governmentof Russiahadbecomeidentified with the new social forces in the country struggling to liberate themselvesfrom the Communistsystem.It stoodfor constitutionalismand democracy,headedas it was by a Presidentchosenin an open and competitive election (the only Soviet leader on Russianterritory to governby a truly popularmandate).Thejunta, by contrast,was identified with the old regimeseekingto perpetuatethe hegemony,if not of communism,then of its self-selectingpolitical elite, the Communist Partynomenklatura. The August Revolutionprovideda major test of popularallegiance in Russia:would the people,including the officers and soldiersof the armed forces, side with Russiaagainstthe central authoritiesof the Sovietparty-state?A potentmixture of democraticsentiments,Russian nationalism,and hatredfor the CommunistParty drove thousandsof peopleinto the resistancemovementagainstthe junta. In the words of a Leningradprotester,people "knew what could happen,they knew what this might leadto. They felt that they werepeople,humanbeings. They hadstoppedbeingafraid."28 *** It is surely one of history'S great paradoxesthat the August 1991 coup producedresultsdiametricallyopposedto the aims of the putschists. The coup was intendedto prevent the signing of a new Union Treaty and decentralizationof the Soviet Union. But in the aftermath of the coup, negotiationsover the treaty faltered and, barely four monthslater,the USSRhadceasedto exist. The plotters, all of them high-ranking Communist officials, also soughtto preservethe Party'suniquepositionin the country'spolitical and economiclife. Their ill-conceived and poorly executedplan had precisely the oppositeeffect. The most immediateconsequencewas the dissolution of the Communist Party, whose activities were sus-
INTRODUCTION 21 pendedin the RussianRepublic on August 23 and in the entire Soviet Union on August 24. Though Party officials and organizationsremainedimportant actorsin the monthsand years following the coup, the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union-thecountry'sruling party for morethan sevendecades---ceased to exit. The coup was led by peoplewho had come to opposemany of the political, economic,and cultural reforms inauguratedby Gorbachev. Again paradoxically,whenthe coup failed, it elevatedoneofthe boldest and most outspokenof the reformers,Boris Yeltsin, to an unprecedentedposition of powerand authority. He emergedas the hero of the August crisis-the David who smote the Communist Party Goliath once and for all. In the months following the coup, Y dtsin carried forward with renewedvigor many of the reformsthat hadbeenstalled under Gorbachev'sequivocatingleadership.The progressof these reforms has been far from easy, and Yeltsin's own popularity has sometimesplungedvery low. Nevertheless,when a legitimation crisis was precipitatedin the spring of 1993 by the conservativeopposition in Russia'sCongressof People'sDeputies, Yeltsin and his reform strategy once again won substantialpopular support in a national referendum. The seven surviving membersof the EmergencyCommittee, togetherwith five other high-ranking officials consideredcomplicit in the Committee'sactions,were arrestedand imprisonedfollowing the abortivecoup.29They were chargedwith "betrayingthe Motherland," a crime punishableby death. After remaining in jail for eighteen months,they werereleasedon bail. Sincethat time, manyof themhave given interviews,addressedpublic gatherings,andparticipatedin public rallies, including a May Day demonstrationin 1993 that endedin a bloody confrontationwith police. Meanwhile,the prosecutionprepared a caseagainstthem. After somedelays,the trial finally beganon April 14, 1993,but was suspendedalmostimmediatelywhen one of the defendants(Tiziakov) suddenlybecameill. The defenseteam raiseda numberof objections to continuation of the trial and sought dismissal of the charges.It argued that the court had no jurisdiction to try the defendantson chargesof betrayinga country(the SovietUnion) that no longerexists. The court rejectedthesearguments. On May 18, 1993, the three military judges hearing the case accepteda defensemotion to suspendthe proceedingsindefinitely. The
22 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN court hadbeenpersuadedby defenseargumentsaboutthe allegedbias of the prosecutionteam,citing the fact that Russia'sChiefProsecutor, Valentin Stepankov,and his deputy, Yevgenii Lisov, had used the materials from the pretrial investigation in their book The Kremlin Conspiracy,publishedin late 1992.30 Since the authorsof the book were unequivocalin their indictmentof the allegedconspirators(went the argumentof the defense),and the prosecutionteam was subordinate to the country'sChief Prosecutor,its memberscould not be impartial in presentingto the court the resultsof their investigation.The judgesreferredthe caseto the SupremeSovietto determinehow "real 31 The independence"of the prosecutionteam could be guaranteed. SupremeSoviet subsequentlyrejectedthe appealas unfoundedand the trial resumedyet again on July 7, 1993, only to be postponed 32 In September1993, due to the illness of one of the codefendants. the court ruled againsta motion for postponementby the prosecution and therebyremovedthe last proceduralhurdle to the resumption of the trial. Popularattitudestoward the caseare deeplydivided, mirroring different retrospectiveevaluationsof the coup itself. For some,the three daysin Augustremaininscribedas a courageousvictory for the forces of democracyandreform. For others,the takeoverwasa well-meaning but bungledeffort to rescuethe Soviet Union from chaosand disintegration. Still othersview the eventsof August 1991 as signifying little more than a shift in power from one segmentof the nomenklaturato another.A public opinion poll conductedin August 1993 showedthe generalpublic to be deeplydivided aboutthe coup andthe criminality of the plotters. A survey of 1,600 peopleconductedby the "Mnenie" opinion researchservice disclosedthat 48 percentthought the coup plotters should get "no punishment"or be formally pardoned(in the fall of 1991, only 30 percent hadfelt that way). The proportion of those who believedtheir lives would have beenbetter had the coup succeededrose from 4 percent in the fall of 1991 to 14 percent in August 1993.33 Given suchambivalentpopularattitudesaboutthe eventsof August 1991,it is hardly surprisingthat the first two anniversariesof the coup were commemoratedin a low key. The celebrationhas been deeply compromisedby an inversion of some of the symbols of the democratic resistanceto the August coup. The White Houseand the plaza behind it, renamedFreedomSquare,were once symbolically associ-
INTRODUCTION 23 atedwith Yeltsin, the Russianparliament'sresistanceto the putschists, and the crowds of Muscovites who turned out to defend freedom against resurgenttotalitarianism. BetweenAugust 1991 and August 1993,thosesymbols----theWhite House,FreedomSquare,andthe Russian parliament itself--becametransformedinto their opposites through associationwith the anti-Yeltsin opposition in the Supreme Soviet and its motley collection of supporters,including ultranationalists, pro-Communists,neo-Stalinists,neo-Nazis,anti-Semites,and others. The dismal economic conditions and political disarray at the highestlevels of the Russiangovernmentput a further damperon the celebrationof a victory that promisedfar more than it hasdeliveredto ordinarypeople. On the first anniversaryof the putsch, Yeltsin delivered a major addressto the nation praising those who, a year earlier, had been "motivatedby a noble patriotic impulsefrom the heartand by a sense of civic duty to defendfreedomand democracy."He castigatedthose who wantedto "erase[this heroic deed]from the people'smemory."34 Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popovmarkedthe first anniversarywith an extensiveand highly reflective statementaboutthe coup and its aftermath. Popovarguedthat the democrats'"main mistake[was] that they imagined they had taken power in Russia after the coup. Unfortunately, the people believed this, too." Instead, argued Popov, the democrats'victory "finally forcedthe reformistPartyapparatchiksand nomenklaturato do what they had not done [under Gorbachev}-tl:. organizethemselves,unite, cleansethemselvesof ideologicalgarbage, remove the conservativesand start making reforms." Reforms were under way, but there was still much work to be done to strengthen democraticprinciples.3s By August 1993, nearly all vestigesof the celebratoryaspectof the anniversaryhad beenextinguished.An angry confrontationof groups demonstratingfor and againstthe putschiststook placenearthe White House, with strong overtonesof latent violence. The once hallowed ground near the White House,stainedby the blood of three victims, had becomeidentified with a coalition of forces calling for the ouster of Yeltsin andthe refonD.ersandadvocatingsomeof the very measures that the plotters had tried to imposeon the country. The anniversary had been transformedinto another contestedsymbolic terrain for Russia'spolitical leadersandthe public. In early October1993,the contestescalatedinto an armedconflict,
24 VICTORIA E. BONNEll AND GREGORYFREIDIN with the White Houseonceagainbecomingthe focal point of Russia's post-communistpolitics. In reactionto Yeltsin's September21 decree disbandingthe parliamentand calling a new election for December, Ruslan Khasbulatov and other parliamentaryleaders, the renegade Vice PresidentAleksandrRutskoi, and severalthousandsof their supporters mountedan armed uprising, including lethal assaultson the nearbyMoscow Mayor's office and the Gosteleradiobuilding at Ostankino. This bloody outburstforced Yeltsin to declarea stateof emergencyin Moscowandto call in the army underDefenseMinister Pavel Grachev, who two years earlier had refused to carry out a similar order. Stormedby paratrooperson Yeltsin's orders,the White House burnedthroughthe night of October4-5, 1993. Ironically, by the spring of 1994, the causeof the August 1991 putschistshadbecomeconflatedwith that of the leadersof the October 1993 uprising-Yeltsin's erstwhile allies. In late February 1994 Russia'snewly elected StateDuma passedan amnestycovering those chargedwith crimesin connectionwith both events.The trial of the coup plotterswasterminated,andRutskoi andKhasbulatovwerereleasedfrom prison.Then,in mid-March,the casetook anotherstrangetwist. Ruling in favor of the prosecutor'sappeal,to the effect that amnestycould not be grantedto anyonewho had not been tried and convicted,the Supreme Court ordereda resumptionof the trial of the August 1991 putschists. Matterswereat this impasseasthis bookwasbeingsentto press. *** The accountsthat follow havebeendivided into five sections,each focusingon a particulargroup or aspectof the eventsof August 19-21, 1991. In selecting from a wide range of letters, reports, interviews, transcripts,and documents,the editorshaveattemptedto include in the volume accountsby men andwomen,Russiansandnon-Russians,who personallytook part in the August days. Sincewe wantedto show the eventsfrom many different angles,dependingon the location and orientationof the individual, we havetried to incorporatematerialfrom a wide spectrumof peoplefrom many walks of life, but there are some gaps. We were unableto find an accountby a veteranof the Afghan War who helpedto defendthe White House or from a businessman who provided suppliesfor the democraticresistance.The actions of thesegroupsarerecountedby others. Part I, "Saving the Old Country," is devotedto the putschists.This
INTRODUCTION 25 section includesthe major decrees,proclamations,and pronouncements of the StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergencyas well as the full transcriptof the pressconferenceconductedby membersof the Committee on August 19. Soonafter the coup, the putschistswere interrogated by governmentinvestigatorspreparing the legal case against them. We haveincludedexcerptsfrom the transcriptsof interrogations ofYazov, Pavlov, and Kriuchkov. Theseselectionsshow the motivations andoutlook of the menwho directedthe putsch. In Part II, "The Public Reacts,"eight Russiansand Americansof diverse backgroundsgive their personalimpressionsof the coup. Their accountsarebasedon observationsof andparticipationin eventsthattook placein Moscow,Leningrad,andthe provincial city of Saratov.Threeof the selectionsare by Russiancitizens(the anonymousauthorof the ''Letter from Moscow," Vladimir Petrik, and Valerii Zavorotnyi); one author is an emigre (GregoryFreidin) and anotherthe son of emigres(SergeP. Petroff); andthreemore accountsare by Americanscholars(Victoria E. Bonnell,LaurenG. Leighton,andDonaldJ. Raleigh). Part III, "In High Places,"shifts to the centersof power and influenceamongthe opponentsof the coup. Here we seehow someof the most powerful men in the country respondedto the putsch.This part beginswith Gorbachev'slengthy personalstatementabout what happened to him betweenthe afternoon of Sunday, August 18, and Wednesday,August 21, when the putschistsheld him incommunicado at his summerresidencein Foros.Gorbachev'saccountis followed by the appeal ''To the Citizens of Russia" issued by Yeltsin, Silaev, and KhasbuIatov,and other appealsand decreesissuedby Yeltsin during the first day of the coup. We have also included Yeltsin's speechto the Russianparliamenton Wednesday,August 21, when victory over the plottersseemedassured.HereYeltsin giveshis own versionof the events. Part III also containsreportsand interviews from six other leading political figures in Moscow, Leningrad,and Dushanbe.Theseauthors are generallyquite well known and influential figures in Russianpoliticallife. Among themareNikolai Vorontsov,Minister of the Environment under Gorbachev;Yevgenii Shaposhnikov,head of the Soviet Air Force at the time of the August coup; Vladimir Shcherbakov,a Deputy Prime Minister in the Gorbachevgovernment;Davlat Khudonazarov,a filmmaker from Tajikistanwho roseto political prominence under Gorbachev,serving as People'sDeputy in the USSR Supreme Soviet and a memberof the Central Committee of the Communist
26 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN Party; Anatolii Sobchak, the Mayor of Leningrad; and Aleksandr Yakovlev, a fonnerCPSUPolitburomemberanda leadingarchitectof perestroika. Part IV focuses on an event--the defenseof the White House againstmilitary assaultby the putschists.In this sectionwe have included accountsof the activities both inside and outside the White House,with particular attentionto the night of August 20-21, when threeyoung men died defendingthe barricades.Here we hopeto show the characterandcompositionof the public oppositionthat gatheredat the White Houseand the extraordinaryatmosphereamongthosewho riskedtheir lives on the barricades.The reports,letters,and interviews are from an Americanstudent,TheresaSabonis-Chafee; a well-known Russian ultranationalistwriter, Aleksandr Prokhanov; an American journalist, Michael Hetzer; an anonymousRussianman; a Russian scholar,Aleksei Kozhevnikov; a People'sDeputy to the Russianparliament and democraticpolitical activist, Viktor Sheinis,and his wife, the sociologistAlIa Nazimova. PartV of the volume, "Getting the News In andOut," is devotedto the role playedby the media.The massmedia-bothSoviet and foreign -were critically important during the putsch. Despite heavy censorship, the shutdownof most newspapersand radio stations, and the suspensionof regulartelevisionprogramming,the mediacontinuedto function outsideofficial control during the three days of the coup. As these accountsshow, adverseconditions did not prevent television, radio, and newspaperjournalistsfrom transmittingcritical information to the Sovietpeopleandabroad.The foreign pressis representedhere by lain Elliot of Radio Liberty and Ann Cooper of National Public Radio. The televisionjournalist SergeiMedvedevrecountshis experiencesreporting for "Vremia"; Valerii Kucher describesthe efforts of journaliststo publisha collectiveundergroundnewspaper;andTatiana Malkina reportson herparticipationin the August 19 pressconference. *** A Chronologyof Eventshasbeenprovidedat the conclusionof the volume with a timetableof developmentsduring the coup, day by day, hour by hour, sometimesminute by minute.This will help to guidethe readerwho is interestedin sequentialcoverageof the eventsof the threedaysandwill serveasa point of readyreference.36
INTRODUCTION 27 Notes 1. Quotedin Michael R. Beschloss'sreview of The Turnfrom the Cold War to a New Era: The United Statesand the SovietUnion, 1983-1990by Don Oberdorfer, in The New York TimesBookReview,October27,1991,p. 11. 2. For analysesof Gorbachev'srefonns,seethe essaysin AlexanderDallin and Gail Lapidus, eds., The Soviet Systemin Crisis: A Readerof Westernand Soviet Views(Boulder, SanFrancisco,Oxford, 1991); and GeorgeBreslauer,ed., Will Gorbachev'sReformsSucceed?(Berkeley,1990). 3. Valentin Stepankovand Yevgenii Lisov reportthat it was Gorbachevwho insisted on August 20 as the signing date for the Treaty; other cosignershad wantedto wait until the end of the vacation season.See Stepankovand Lisov, Kremlevskiizagovor:versiia sledstviia(Moscow, 1992),p. 83. 4. A closeobserverof the Sovietscenenotedthat in JuneandJuly 1991,"the anny-KGB-MVD troika undertook a well-orchestratedeffort to weaken Gorbachevdomesticallyand to humiliate him internationally.... [It] seemsevident that the coup leaders were laying groundwork for a move against Gorbachev [and] the anti-Gorbachevalliance was gaining experiencein working together." See Scott R. McMichael, "Moscow Prelude: Warning Signs Ignored," RFEIRL ResearchInstitute, Report on the USSR,vol. 3, no. 36 (1991), pp. 10-11. The accountthat follows drawsuponMcMichael'sarticle. 5. Yakovlev'slast warning camein an "open letter," datedAugust 16, 1991, that was publishedin Nezavisimaiagazeta on August 18. Among other things, Yakovlev wrote that "shadowstructures"had alreadybeenestablishedand were "waiting for the right momentto carry out a takeover." 6. Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykhand the U.S. Ambassadorin Moscow,JackMatlock, servedas intennediaries(David Remnick,Lenin's Tomb: The Last Daysofthe SovietEmpire [New York, 1993],pp. 436-37).Accordingto Bessmertnykh'stestimony, when he conveyedBaker's warning to Gorbachev (after AmbassadorMatlock haddonethe same),Gorbachevrespondedthat he had already had a ''talk with thesestatesmen,a tough talk" (Stepankovand Lisov, Kremlevskiizagovor,p. 79). 7. The interview, publishedunderthe title "Nachinaetsiarevoliutsiia snizu," appearedin Literaturnaia gazeta, August 28, 1991. The text may be found in English translationin RussianPolitics and Law: A Journal of Translations,vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer1992),pp. 21-26. 8. The official text of the Treaty was madepublic on August 15. Under the provisionsof the Treatythe office of USSRVice Presidentwasto be abolished,a fact that throws somelight on GennadiiYanaev'sparticipationin the plot. 9. GorbachevchoseVladimir Shcherbakov,Pavlov'sdeputy,to accompany him to the G7 meetingofleadersof the top industrialnations. 10. A comprehensivediscussionof thesefactors canbe found in Dawn Mann, "The CircumstancesSurroundingthe ConservativePutsch,"in RFEIRL Research Institute,Reporton the USSR,vol. 3, no. 36 (1991), pp.1-5. 11. StepankovandLisov, Kremlevskiizagovor,p. 85. 12. The Committee'snamewas officially abbreviatedas GKChP (pronounced Geh-Keh-Cheh-Peh), which not only soundsawkwardbut is suspiciouslyreminis-
28 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN cent of the well-known andmuch disliked acronymsfor the secretpolice---KGB, GPU, andCheka. 13. The law stipulatedthat a stateof emergencycould be declaredonly in the eventof "natural and man-madedisasters,epidemics,and large-scalepublic disorders,"eitherby the SupremeSovietof a constituentrepublic of the USSRor by the USSR President,"following the petition or consentof the Presidiumof the SupremeSovietof the USSRor constituentrepublic, or the supremeorganof the constituentrepublic." If the Presidentdecidedto declarea stateof emergencyon his own, he hadto "immediatelyseekthe approvalof the SupremeSoviet." 14. Carla Thorson,"ConstitutionalIssuesSurroundingthe Coup," in RFURL ResearchInstitute,Reporton the USSR,vol. 3, no. 36 (1991),p. 22. 15. Ibid, p. 21. 16. See Victoria E. Bonnell and Gregory Freidin, "Televorot: The Role of TelevisionCoveragein Russia'sAugust 1991 Coup," SlavicReview,vol. 52, no. 4 (Winter 1993),pp. 810-38. 17. In theRussianFederationas a whole,Yeltsin received58 percentof thevote. 18. According to GeneralLebed'srecently releasedmemoirs(publishedin the TransnistrianRepublic), the paratrooperdivision under his commandhad been orderedby GeneralGrachevto be battle ready on August 17. NeitherGrachevnor his staff disclosedto Lebedthe natureof his mission. The order for Lebedto move his division into Moscow cameat around4:00 AM. on August 19. Still in the dark about his mission,Lebed(who hadnot listenedto stateradio while on the march)reached the outskirts of Moscow at 10:30 A.M. He was soon contactedby Grachev'sstaff officer, who conveyedto him anotherorderfrom Grachev:Lebedwas "personally," and without using any communicationsequipment,to lead the 2nd Batallion to the White Houseandthere,after contactingthe headof White Housesecurity,to assume the defenseof the building. Still unawareof the coup d'etat, Lebed arrived at the White Houseat 1:30 P.M. He tried to follow Grachev'sorderbut waschasedout of the building by an irate crowd of about200 defenderswho assumedthat he was on the side of the EmergencyCommittee(at one point in the ensuingfracas,Lebedpractically had to run for his life). As a result of the confusion,Lebedwas ableto carry out his order to defend the White House only late in the evening of the 19th. See AleksandrLebed,Spe/aakJnazyvalsiaputch (Tiraspol, 1993); also excerptedin the right-wing nationalistnewspaperLiteratumaiaRossiia,September24, 1993. 19. The crowd estimatescome from the RussianInformation Agency. See Khronika putcha: chasza chasom.Sobytiia 19--22avgustaJ99J v svodkakhRossiiskagoin!ormatsionnogoagenstva(Leningrad,1991),p. 43. 20. ThroughoutTuesday,speciallyorganizedgroupsof People'sDeputiesof Russiawere dispatchedto the city's military garrisons;using their parliamentary immunity to gain access,they endeavoredto explain to army officers the unconstitutional natureof the Declarationof the Stateof Emergency.Seethe interview with Viktor SheinisandAlIa Nazimovain part IV, below. 21. In the confrontationof September-October 1993, Yeltsin did not hesitate to cut off all White Housecommunications,aswell aswaterandelectricity. 22. On "Vremia," seethe accountof SergeiMedvedev'sfilm report, above,and the interview with Medvedevin part V. For an analysisof television'srole in defeating the coup, see Bonnell and Freidin, "Televorot." The governmentnewspaper /zvestiiaalsoeludedcontrol by the putschists.Dueto internalconflictson the paper's
INTRODUCTION 29 staff, no issueof Izvestiiaappearedon August19. The issuepublishedon the morning of August 20 carried statementsfrom the EmergencyCommitteeon pageone and Yeltsin's "Appeal to the Citizensof Russia"on pagetwo. The afternoonedition on August 20 had two photographswhich showeda vast crowd canying the Russian tricolor flag at the Moscow mlly and civilians fraternizing with soldiers in tanks. Again, Yeltsin leamedhis lessonwell. After issuinghis decreedisbandingthe Russian parliamentin September1993, he took finn control of news programmingon Russiantelevision and briefly invoked presscensorshipin the wake of the October military confrontation. 23. Two other notable figures associatedwith the plotters (Marshal of the Soviet Union SergeiAkhromeev,and Nikolai Kruchina, Chief of the CPSUCentml Committee'sAdministmtiveOffice) committedsuicidesoonafterward. 24. The interview with Karpukhin appearedin Literaturnaia gazetaunderthe title "Oni otkazalis shtunnovatBelyi dom," August 28, 1991, p. 5. An English tmnslationmay be found in RussianPolitics andLaw: A Journal of Translations, vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer1992),pp. 8-11. 25. Seethe interview with Major GenemlAleksandrKorsak, "Nam byl otdan prikaz arestovatPopova,"in Literaturnaia gazeta,September11, 1991. An English tmnslationappearsin RussianPolitics andLaw: A Journal of Translations, vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer1992),pp. 16-20. 26. LieutenantcolonelsMikhail Golovatov and SergeiGoncharovof the Alpha unit madethesestatementsin the interviewwith Literaturnaiagazetacitedin note24. 27. According to the accountby the headof the investigativeteam,the Russian Federation'sProsecutorGeneralValentin Stepankovandhis deputy,Yevgenii Lisov, the plansfor the attackon the White Houseandthe decisionto proceedweremadein themiddle of thedayon August20. The attackitselfwasto commenceat 3:00AM. on the 21st andwas to be carriedout by a combinedforce of the Airborne Pamtroopers, the SpecialForcesof the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and three specialunits of the KGB--"Alpha," "Group B," and the "Wave." However,commandersof the operation soonbeganto developdoubtsaboutits wisdom,partly underthe pressureof the lower ranks; partly for fear of losing up to half of their force (accordingto one estimate)in storming what had alreadybecomea well-fortified and well-defended building; and partly from the conviction that it would be wrong to spill their compatriots'blood. According to the plan, code-named"Opemtion Thunder," the pamtrooperswere to be the first to take up their position. Their commander,Pavel Gmchev, refused to order them to advance.After talking to Gmchev, Viktor Karpukhin,the commanderof the "Alpha" unit andthe man in chargeof "Operation Thunder,"followed Gmchev'sexample,as did mostothercommanders.When in the early hoursof the morningYazov wasinfonnedaboutthe first instanceof bloodshed and the possibility of thousandsof victims if an attackwere to take place,his order wasto "halt" the entireoperation.SeeStepankovandLisov, Kremlevskiizagovor. 28. Felicity Barringer,"Chronicleof the Resistance:48 TenseHours in Leningrad," New York Times,September10,1991,p. A4. 29. The otherswere: Anatolii Lukianov, Chainnanof the USSRSupremeSoviet; Oleg Shenin, Secretaryof the CPSU Central Committee; Valentin Varennikov, Commander-in-Chiefof Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense; Yurii Plekhanov, Director of the Security Directomte of the KGB; and Viacheslav Administration. Genemlov,Directorof the KGB's SpecializedOperational-Technical
30 VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN 30. We have cited the book several times in this account(Stepankovand Lisov, Kremlevskiizagovor).To date,it is availableonly in Russian. 31. See Steven Erlanger,"Russia SuspendsCoup Trial, Citing Bias by the Prosecutor,"New York Times,May 19,1993,p. A6. 32. Seethe issuesof Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty Daily Reportfor January 27, April 15-16,May 18-19,May 27, andJuly 7, 1993. 33. "Growing Minority in RussiaWish '91 Coup Hadn't Failed" (Associated Press),SanFranciscoChronicle, August 19, 1993,p. Al3. 34. Foreign BroadcastInformation Service,Daily Report: Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-92-162,August20, 1992,p. 17. 35. Popov'sremarksappearedin Izvestiia on August21,24,25,26,1992. For an English translationseeCurrent Digestofthe Post-SovietPress,vol. 44, no. 34 1~. (September23, 1992),pp.1992, 36. Accounts of the coup and its aftermath may be found in the following English-languagesources:JamesH. Billington, Russia Transformed: Breakthrough to Hope, Moscow, August1991 (New York, 1992); Victoria E. Bonnell and Gregory Freidin, "Televorot: The Role of Television Coveragein Russia's August 1991 Coup," Slavic Review,vol. 52, no. 4 (Winter 1993); GeorgeW. Breslauer,"Bursting the Dams: Politics and Society in the USSR Since the Coup," Problemsof Communism,NovemberlDecember1991; John B. Dunlop, The RiseofRussiaand the Fall of the SovietEmpire (princeton, 1993); Mikhail Gorbachev,The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons(New York, 1991); Amy Knight, "The Coup That Never Was: Gorbachevand the Forcesof Reaction," Problems of Communism,NovemberlDecember1991; Michael Mandelbaum,"Coup de Grace: The End of the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1 (1991/2); William E. Odom, "Alternative Perspectiveson the August Coup," Problemsof Communism,NovemberlDecember1991; Lilia Shevtsova, "The August Coup and the Soviet Collapse,"Survival, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992); Anatole Shub,"The Fourth RussianRevolution: Historical Perspectives," Problemsof Communism,NovemberlDecember1991; Hedrick Smith, The New Russians,Part Seven:The SecondRussianRevolution (New York, 1991); Melor Sturua,"The Real Coup," Foreign Policy, no. 85 (Winter 1991-2); and David Remnick,Lenin'sTomb: TheLast Daysofthe SovietEmpire(New York, 1993). Russian-language sourceson the coup are as follows: Avgust-91(Moscow, 1991); . . . Deviatnadtsatoe,dvadtsatoe,dvadtsatpervoe. . . : svobodnoeradio dlia svobodnykhliudei (Moscow, 1991);Leonid Ivashov,Marshal Iazov: Rokovoi avgust19-9o (Moscow: Muzhestvo,1992); Krasnoeili beloe?Drama Avgusta·91: Fakty, gipotezy, stolknoveniemnenii (Moscow, 1991); Korichnevyi putch krasnykh avgust '91: Khronika, svidetelstvapressy, fotodokumenty(Moscow, 1991); Iu. Kazarin andBoris Iakovlev, eds.,Smertzagovora:Belaia kniga (Moscow, 1992); Khronika putcha: chas za chasom.Sobytiia 19-22 avgusta1991 v svodkakhRossiiskogoinformatsionnogoagentstva(Leningrad, n.d.); Valentin Pavlov, Gorbachev-Putch:Avgust iznutri (Moscow, 1993); Putch: Khronika trevozhnykhdnei (Moscow, 1991); Iu.S. Sidorenko,Tri dnia, kotoryeoprokinuli bolshevizm: Ispoved svidetelia, pokazaniia ochevodsta(Rostov-on-Don, 1991); V. Stepankovand E. Lisov, Kremlevskii zagovor: versiia sledstviia (Moscow, 1992).
I Saving the Old Country In the early morning of August 19, 1991, eight high-ranking Soviet officials made an announcementthat stunnedthe country and the world: PresidentMikhail Gorbachevhad resigneddue to illness, and his governmenthadbeentakenover by a StateCommitteefor the State of Emergency(GKChP). The committee included Vice President GennadiiYanaev(who was namedActing President);KGB headVladimir Kriuchkov; DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov; Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo; Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov; 01eg Baklanov, First Deputy Chairmanof the National DefenseCouncil and leaderof the military-industrial complex; Vasilii Starodubtsev,chairmanof the Peasants'Union; and AleksandrTiziakov, Presidentof the USSRAssociation of State Enterprisesand Industrial Groups in Production, Construction,Transportation,andCommunications. Throughtheir proclamationsand appeals,their one and only press conference,andtheir subsequentintetviewswith interrogators,the members of the EmergencyCommittee articulated their version of the eventsleadingup to andduring the Augustcrisis.
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1 Proclamations and Decreesof the State Committee for the State of Emergency,August 19, 1991 On thefirst day ofthe coup, the membersofthe StateCommitteefor the StateofEmergencyissuedseveraldocuments justifyingtheir actionsandexplainingtheir policies. ThefolloWing textswere transmittedby the TASSnewsagencyandreadrepeatedlyoverthe SovietUnion's centralbroadcastfacilities beginningthe morningof August19. Document1: Decreeof the Vice Presidentofthe USSR In connection with Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev'sinability, for healthreasons,to carry out the responsibilitiesof the Presidentof the USSR, and in accordancewith Article 127(7) of the USSR Constitution, responsibilitiesof the USSR Presidenthave beentransferredto the USSR Vice President,Gennadii Yanaev, beginning August 19, 1991. Vice Presidentof the USSR,GennadiiYanaev August 18, 1991 Document2: Appealto the SovietPeople Compatriots, Citizensof the SovietUnion, We are addressingyou at a grave,critical hour for the destiniesof our Fatherlandand our peoples.A mortal dangerlooms large over our greatMotherland. 33
34 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE The policy ofrefonns,launchedat Mikhail S. Gorbachev'sinitiative and designedto ensurethe country's dynamic developmentand the democratizationof social life, has, for a numberof reasons,run into a deadend. Lack of faith, apathy,and despairhavereplacedthe original enthusiasmand hopes.Authorities at all levels have lost the population's trust. In public life, political gameshave replacedconcernfor the fate of the Fatherlandand the citizen. An attitude of malicious contempttoward all state institutions is being imposed.The country hasin effect becomeungovernable. Taking advantageof the liberties that havebeengranted,and trampling on the first shootsof democracy,extremistforceshaveemerged, embarkingon a coursetowardliquidating the SovietUnion, ruining the state,and seizing power at any cost. They trampledon the results of the nationwidereferendumon the unity of the Fatherland.*The cynical exploitationof nationalfeelingsservesmerelyasa coverfor satisfying personal ambition. Political adventurersare worried neither by the misfortunesthat their peoplesare experiencingtoday nor by thosein the future. Creating an atmosphereof moral and political terror, and seekingto hide behindthe shield of the people'strust, they forget that the ties being condemnedand severedby them were establishedon the basisof far broaderpopularsupport,which, furthennore,hasstood the test of many centuriesof history. Today, those who are working towardthe overt::-:;.w "fthe constitutionalsystemshouldbe broughtto accountbefore mothersand fathers for the deathsof the hundredsof victims of interethnicconflicts. The brokendestiniesof more than half a million refugeesare on their conscience.They are to blame for the loss of tranquility and joy of tens of millions of Soviet people, who only yesterdaylived in a united family, but today find themselves living asoutcastsin their own home. People must decide what kind of social system should be established,but attemptsarebeingmadeto deprivethe peopleof this choice. Insteadof showingconcernfor the securityand well-being of every citizen and all society,personswho have come to positionsof power frequently use it for interestsalien to the people,as a meansfor unscrupulousself-assertion.Torrentsof words and piles of declarations and promisesonly underline the scanty and meagernature of their *On March 17, 1991, a nationwidereferendumwas held on the future of the Union. The majority of citizensvotedfor the preservationof the USSR.
APPEAL TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE 35 practicaldeeds.The inflation of authority, which is the most terrifying type of inflation, is destroyingour stateand society. Every citizen is feeling increasinguncertaintyabouttomorrow and deepconcernabout the future of his or her children. The crisis of power has had a catastrophiceffect on the economy. The chaotic,elementaldescentalong the slippery slopetoward a market economyhasled to an explosionof egotismat allievels--regional, institutional,collective,andpersonal.The war oflaws· andthe promotion of centrifugal forces have causedthe disintegrationof a unified economic systemthat it has taken decadesto create.The result is a sharp decline in the standardof living for the majority of the Soviet peopleandthe spreadof speculationandblack marketeering.It is high time peopleweretold the truth: if urgentanddecisivemeasuresare not adoptedto stabilize the economy,hunger and another spiral of impoverishmentare imminentin the nearfuture, and from thereit is but a single stepto massmanifestationsof elementaldiscontent,with devastating consequences. Only irresponsiblepeoplecan put their hopesin some kind of aid from abroad.No handoutscan solve our problems. Our rescueis in our own hands.The time has come to measurethe influenceof eachindividual or organizationby its real contributionto the developmentof our economy. For many years,we have beenhearing incantationsfrom all sides about this or that politician's commitmentto the interestsof the individual, his rights, and his social protection.In fact, what hashappened is that the individual hasbeenhumiliated,his actualrights and opportunities have been constrained,and he has been driven to despair. Right before our eyes,all the democraticinstitutions, createdon the basisof the will of the people,are losing their authority. All of this is the result of the systematicactivity of thosewho, in grossviolation of the FundamentalLaw of [the Constitution] the USSR, are, in fact, carryingout an unconstitutionalcoupd' etat,pursuingthe goal of unrestrainedpersonaldictatorship.The prefectures, mayoralties, and other unlawful structureshave beenincreasinglyusurpingthe power of the popularlyelectedsoviets. ·"War of laws" is the phraseusedto characterizethe jurisdictional disputes that followed upon unilateral declarationsby some republics and even lower political units that in the eventof a conflict betweenUnion legislation and local law, the latter shouldprevail.
36 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE An offensive is under way againstthe rights of working people. The rights to work, education,health, housing, and leisure are in jeopardy. Even the elementarypersonal security of people is increasingly underthreat. Crime is rising fast, becomingorganizedand politicized. The country is sinking into an abyss of violence and lawlessness. Never before in the nation's history has the propagandaof sex and violence assumedsuch a scale, threateningthe health and lives of future generations.Millions of peoplearedemandingmeasuresagainst the octopusof crime andflagrant immorality. The increasingdestabilizationof the political and economicsituation in the Soviet Union is undercuttingour position in the world. Revanchistnotes are to be heard in some places,and demandsare being made for a review of our borders.Voices can even be heard speakingof dismemberingthe Soviet Union and of the possibility of establishingan internationalprotectorateover certainfacilities and regions of the country. Suchis the bitter reality. Only yesterdaya Soviet personfinding himselfabroadfelt himselfa worthy citizen of an influential and respectedstate. Now he is often a second-classforeigner, whosetreatmentbearsthe imprint of disdainor pity. The pride and honor of Soviet people must be restoredin full measure. The State Committeefor the Stateof Emergencyin the USSR is fully awareof the depth of the crisis that has afflicted the country. It takesresponsibilityfor the fate of the country and is fully determined to take the most seriousmeasuresto pull the stateand societyout of the crisis as soonaspossible. We promiseto hold a nationwidediscussionof the new draft Union treaty.Eachindividual will havethe right andopportunityto think over this importantact anddeterminehis attitudetowardit, becausethe fate of the numerouspeoplesof our greatMotherlandwill dependon what the SovietUnion will be like. We intend, without delay, to restorelaw and order, end bloodshed, declarea mercilesswar againstthe criminal world, and eradicatethe shamefulphenomenathat discreditour societyanddegradeSovietcitizens.We shall cleanour cities' streetsof criminal elementsandput an endto the tyrannyof thosewho pillage the people'swealth. We standfor truly democraticprocessesand for a consistentpolicy of reforms,which shouldleadto a renewalin our Motherlandandto an
APPEAL TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE 37 economic and social efflorescencethat will enable her to take her rightful placein the world communityof nations. A nation'sdevelopmentmust not be basedon a drop in the living standardsof its citizens.In a healthysociety,constantimprovementof the living standardsshall becomethe norm. Without slackeningin our devotionto the strengtheningandprotection of the rights of individuals, we shall concentrateour attentionon protectingthe rights of the populationat large, thosewho have been hurt the mostby inflation, disorganizationof production,corruption, andcrime. Developingthe multitiered characterof the national economy,we shall supportprivate enterprise,grantingit the necessaryopportunities for developingproductionandservices. Our prime concernshall be solving the food and housingproblems. All availableforces will be mobilizedto meetthese,the most essential needsofthe people. We are calling on workers,peasants,the working intelligentsia,and all Soviet people,within the shortestperiod of time, to restorelabor discipline and order and to raise the level of production, in order to march forward resolutely.Our life and the future of our children and grandchildren,aswell asthe fate of the Fatherland,dependon this. We are a peace-lovingcountry, and we shall steadfastlyhonor all our commitments.We makeno claimsagainstanyone.We wish to live with all in peaceand friendship.But we firmly declarethat no one will ever be allowed to encroachupon our sovereignty,independence,or territorial integrity. All attemptsto speakthe languageof diktat to our country,no matterwherethey originate,will be resolutelyrepelled. Our multinational people has lived for centuriesin pride of their Motherland. We have never been ashamedof our patriotic feelings, and we hold it to be natural and right to raise the presentand future generationsof citizensof this greatpowerin this spirit. To remaininactive at this hour of crisis for the fate of the Motherland meansto take upon oneselfheavy responsibility for tragic, truly unpredictableconsequences. Each individual who holds our Motherland dear, who wants to live and work in peaceand confidence,who doesnot acquiescein the continuationof bloody interethnicconflicts, who seeshis Fatherlandindependentandprosperingin the future, must makethe only correctchoice.We call on all true patriotsandpeopleof goodwill to put an endto the presenttime of troubles.
38 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE We appealto all citizensof the SovietUnion to recognizetheir duty before the Motherland and extend all possible support to the State Committeefor the Stateof Emergencyand its efforts to leadthe country out of the crisis. Constructiveproposalsof public and political organizations,work collectives,and individuals will be gratefully acceptedas an expression of their patriotic readinessto take an active part in the restoration of the age-oldfriendship in the unified family of fraternal peoplesand the revival ofthe Fatherland. The StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency August 18, 1991 Document3: ResolutionNo.1 ofthe USSR StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency In order to securethe vital interestof the peoplesand citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,the independenceand territorial integrity of the country,the restorationof law and order,the stabilization of the situation, to overcomethe most acute crisis and prevent chaos,anarchy,and fratricidal civil war, the StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergencyhasresolvedas follows: 1. All political and administrative organsof the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublicsandof union andautonomousrepublics,territories, regions,cities, districts,towns,andvillagesmustfollow without deviation the regimeof the stateof emergencyin accordancewith the USSR Law "On the Legal Regimeof the Stateof Emergency"andresolutions of the USSR State Committee for the State of Emergency.In those caseswhere the specifiedorgansprove unable to conform to this regime, their powers are suspendedand the implementationof their function is entrustedto personsspeciallyappointedby the USSRState Committeefor the Stateof Emergency. 2. To disbandwithout delay thosepower and administrativestructures and paramilitaryunits acting contraryto the USSR Constitution andthe laws ofthe USSR. 3. Immediatelyto renderinvalid all laws and decisionsadoptedby organsof powerthat contradictthe USSRConstitutionandthe laws of the USSR. 4. To suspendthe activities of political parties, public organiza-
RESOLUTIONNO. 1 39 tions, andmassmovementsthat interferewith the nonnalizationof the situation. 5. Due to the temporaryassumptionby the USSRStateCommittee for the State of Emergencyof the functions of the USSR Security Council, the activity of the latter is suspended. 6. Citizens,institutions, and organizationsmust without delay give up all illegally held firearms of all types,ammunition,explosivematerials, military equipmentand materiel. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, andthe USSRMinistry of Defenseareto provide strict enforcementof this requirement.In caseof resistance,the aboveitems mustbe confiscatedby force andthe violators prosecutedby the criminal andadministrativejusticesystems. 7. The Prosecutor'sOffice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, and the USSR Ministry of Defenseare to organize efficient coordinationof the organsof law and orderwith the Armed Forcesin their effort to establishpublic order and maintain the security of the state,society, and citizens in accordancewith the USSRlaw "On the Legal Regimeof the State of Emergency" andthe resolutionsof the USSRStateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency. Public rallies, marches,and demonstrationsas well as strikes are prohibited. When necessary,a curfew is to be introducedas well as patrols, inspections,and a strengtheningof measuresto enforcethe borderand customsregime. To assumecontrol of, and when necessaryto defend,the most important state and economic organizationsas well as essentiallifesupportingfacilities. To curb decisively the spreadof all destabilizingrumors, actions provoking the violation of law and order and contributingto interethnic strife, and insubordinationin dealing with the official personsresponsiblefor the maintenanceof the stateof emergencyregime. 8. To establishoontrol over the massmedia,this control function to be assumedby a special arm of the USSR State Committeefor the Stateof Emergencywhich is being setup for this purpose. 9. Organsof powerand administrationandthe headsof institutions and enterprisesmust undertakemeasuresto increasecoordination, order, and discipline in all spheresof our society. They must secure conditionsfor the normal functioning of enterprisesin all branchesof the economy;strict observanceof the measuresdirectedat strengthen-
40 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE ing horizontal andvertical links amongall economicsubjectsthroughout the entire territory of the USSR; and unflagging fulfillment of designatedquotasin productionand deliveriesof raw materials,products,andspareparts. To establisha regime of strict economyof technical,material, and hard currency resources,to design and carry out concretemeasures againstsquanderingof people'swealth. To struggle decisively with the shadoweconomy,to prosecuteassiduouslyinstancesof corruption,theft, speCUlation,hoarding,squandering,andotherviolationsin the economicsphere. To createfavorableconditionsfor the expansionof the contribution to the country'seconomyandthe vital needsof its citizensmadeby all typesof privateenterpriseoperatingwithin the laws of the USSR. 10. To makeholding a full-time governmentpost incompatiblewith privateenterpriseactivity. 11. The USSR Council of Ministers is to carry out in a period of sevendays a completeinventory of all availablefoodstuffs and basic consumergoods; report to the peoplewhat the country has at its disposal;and assumethe strictestcontrol over the storageanddistribution of theseresources. To removeall obstaclesto the movementthroughoutthe territory of the USSR of foodstuffs, consumergoods,and material necessaryfor their manufacture;to assumestrict control overthis sphere. Special attentionmust be paid and first priority assignedto supplying preschool children's establishments,orphanages,schools, intermediary-,specialized-intermediary, and higher-educationalinstitutions,andhospitalsaswell aspensionersandthe disabled. In the periodof one weekto prepareproposalsfor stabilizing, freezing, and lowering prices for certaintypes of industrial and food products, first and foremost those that are meant for children, consumer services,and public food services,and for increasingsalaries,pensions,subsidies,andcompensations for variouscategoriesof citizens. Within two weeks to design measuresfor streamliningthe salary structure for the top-managementpersonnelat all levels of state, public, cooperative,andotherestablishments, organizations,andenterprises. 12. Taking into accountthe critical situation with the harvestand the threatof hunger,to takeextraordinarymeasuresto organizesupply, storage,andprocessingof agriculturalproducts.To help the rural toil-
RESOLUTIONOF THE SUPREMESOVIET CHAIRMAN 41 ers asmuch aspossibleby providing themwith equipment,spareparts, lubricating materials, fuels, etc. To organize without delay the dispatching,in requisitenumbers,of blue- and white-collar workers, students,and servicemento rural areas[to help with the harvest]. 13. Within one week, the Council of Ministers is to preparea resolution making it possibleto provide in the courseof 1991-1992all willing city dwellerswith gardeningplots of 0.15 hectare. 14. Within two weeks,the USSR Council of Ministers is to complete plans for solving the crisis in the country'senergyindustry and preparingfor the winter. 15. Within one month, it is to prepareconcretemeasuresfor radically improving the housingsituation in the country and report to the peopleaboutthem. In the course of six months, to develop a concreteprogram for accelerateddevelopmentof state,cooperative,and individual housing constructionfor a five-yearperiod. 16. To make it a duty of the organsof power in the centerand in localities to give first priority to the basic needsof the population.To locate additional resourcesfor improving free medical care and free education. [Pravda, August20,1991] Document4: Resolutionof the Chairman ofthe SupremeSovietof the USSRon the Conveningof an ExtraordinarySession of the SupremeSovietofthe USSR In connectionwith the petition directedto the USSR SupremeSoviet to confirm the decision to introduce a state of emergencyin certain localities in the USSR, it is resolvedto convenean extraordinarysession of the SupremeSoviet of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics in the city of Moscowon August26,1991. Chairmanof the SupremeSovietof the USSRA. Lukianov Moscow,the Kremlin, August 19, 1991
2 The PressConferenceof the State Committee for the State of Emergency,August 19, 1991 On the eveningofMonday, August19,five ofthe eightplotters (Yanaev,Baklanov,Pugo, Starodubtsev,and Tiziakov) heldtheirfirst andonlypressconferenceat the Foreign Ministry's presscenterin centralMoscow.Millions ofpeoplegatheredby their televisionsand radios to learn moreaboutthefate oftheir country. With visibly tremblinghandsandevidentconfusion,GennadiiYanaevcame forward as spokesman for the EmergencyStateCommitteeandActing President.Belowis a slightly abridgedtranslation ofthe transcript of thepressconference. Yanaev: Ladies and gentlemen,friends and comrades:As you already know from media reports, becauseMikhail Sergeevich Gorbachevis unable,owing to the stateof his health,to dischargethe dutiesof Presidentof the USSR,the USSRVice Presidenthastemporarily takenover the performanceof the duties of the Presidenton the basisof Article 127(7)of the USSRConstitution. I addressyou today, ladies and gentlemen,at a moment that is crucial for the destiniesof the SovietUnion andthe internationalsituation throughoutthe world. Having embarkedon the path of profoundreformsand having gone a considerableway in this direction, the SovietUnion hasnow reached a point at which it finds itself faced with a deep crisis, the further developmentof which could both place in questionthe courseof reforms itself andleadto seriouscataclysmsin internationallife. 42
PRESSCONFERENCE 43 It is of courseno secretto you that a sharp drop in the country's output, which has so far not beencompensatedfor by the activity of the alternativeindustrial and agricultural structures,is creatinga real threat to the further existenceand developmentof the peoplesof the SovietUnion. A situationof ungovernabilityandmultiple authorityhas arisenin the country. All of this cannotfail to arouseextensive dissatisfaction amongthe people.A real threatto the country'sintegrity has also arisen,with a consequentcollapseof the unified economic space, the unified spacefor civil rights, a unified defense,and a unified foreignpolicy. Undersuchconditionsnormal life is impossible.In many regionsof the USSR,as a result of interethnicclashes,blood is being spilled, and the collapseof the USSRwould have the most seriousconsequences, not only internally, but also internationally.In suchconditionswe have no alternativebut to takedecisivestepsto stopthe countryfrom sliding into disaster. As you know, in order to govern the country and to realize most effectively the regime of the stateof emergency,a decisionhas been madeto set up the StateCommittee.for the Stateof Emergencyin the USSR,consistingof the following members:ComradeBaklanov,First DeputyChairmanof the USSRDefenseCouncil; ComradeKriuchkov, Chairmanofthe USSRKGB; ComradePavlov,the USSRPrime Minister; ComradePugo, Ministerof Internal Affairs of the USSR; Comrade Starodubtsev,Chairmanof the USSRPeasants'Union; Comrade Tiziakov, Presidentof the USSRAssociationof StateEnterprisesand Industrial Groups in Production, Construction,Transportation,and Communications;Comrade Yazov, the USSR Minister of Defense; andActing Presidentof the USSRYanaev. I would like to makea statementtodaythat the EmergencyCommittee is fully awareof the depthof the crisis that has struckour country. It assumesresponsibilityfor the fate of the Motherlandand is full of resolve to undertakethe strongestmeasuresin order to enable the countryandthe stateto overcomethe crisis in the shortesttime possible. We promise to conduct a broad-basedpopular discussionof the draft of the new Union Treaty. Eachcitizen of the USSRwill havethe right and the opportunityto analyzethis most important documentin circumstancesof tranquillity andto define his own position,for it is on the future shapeof the Union that the fate of the multitude of peoples of our greatMotherlandshall depend.
44 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE [Yanaevthen repeatsverbatim many of the points containedin the EmergencyCommittee'sAppealto the SovietPeople.] NewsweekcorrespondentCarroll Bogert: Whereis Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev?What is he sick with? Specifically and concretely, what diseasedoes he have?And againstwhom are the tanks that we see on the streetsof Moscow directed?What is the purposeof those tanks?Thankyou. Yanaev:I haveto say that Mikhail SergeevichGorbachevpresently is on vacationandundergoingtreatmentin the Crimea.He has,indeed, grown very tired over thesepastyears,and he will needsometime to put his healthin order.I would like to saythat we hopethat when he is recovered,Mikhail Sergeevichwill return to carrying out his duties. And at any rate, we will continue to follow the course begun by Mikhail SergeevichGorbachevin 1985. As for the stateof emergency,it goeswithout sayingthat the stateof emergencyis being introduced,as I have alreadysaid, at a very difficult time, and to avoid excessesof any kind, we have been forced to take somemeasuresfor the safetyof our citizens. Correspondentfrom Pravda: I have two questions.Perestroikahas not producedtangible results for many reasons,primarily becauseit possessedno precisetactical and strategicplan for its realization. Do you have at presenta concreteplan for reviving the country's economy? More specifically, will the previously adoptedlaws continueto function?Will the movementto a marketeconomycontinue? My secondquestion: The RussianInformation Agency has broadcasttoday an appealto the peopleof Russiafrom Yeltsin, Silaev, and Khasbulatov.In it, the eventsof the past night are defined asa rightwing, reactionary,anticonstitutionalcoup d'etat.What is your reaction to this statement? And the secondpart of that samequestion:This appealcontaineda call for a generalstrike. In my opinion, suchstatementscan leadto the mosttragic consequences. Are you planningto take any concretemeasuresin this regard? Yanaev:I'll answerthe secondquestion,andComradeTiziakov will answerthe first. Tiziakov: Indeed,the policy of perestroika,announcedin 1985, has not, as you know, yielded the results we had expected.Our economy
PRESSCONFERENCE 45 today is in a most difficult state.The decline in productionis continuing becauseof a whole seriesof factors.Of course,we havegot to take into accountthe fact that restructuringon such a scalewas being carried out by us for the first time. Of course,we are and have been seekingthe right way, and any searchinvolves somemistakesor omissions.This situationwhich has come aboutis what constitutesthe main reasonfor the introductionof the stateof emergency. You know that the horizontal links among enterpriseshave been badly damaged.Many of those who are presenthere probably know that at the end of 1990,there was a conferenceof enterprisedirectors which focusedpreciselyon the issue of creating a network covering enterprisesof all the regions. We have managedto move this matter forward in a seriousway. By the beginningof January,we alreadyhad 85 percent[of the enterprises]sign agreements,and those are agreementsthat actuallyyield products.It would seemthis shouldcreatethe properconditions. But as time went on, becauseof a whole slew of measuresthat had been carried out with regard to the so-called sovereigntymatter, a numberof bordersbetweenrepublicswere closed.In particular, such republicsas Ukraine, Belorussia,and the Baltic republicsblockedthe cross-borderflow of productsfrom their enterprises. This hascreatedan extremelydifficult situationfor our enterprises. Our enterprisesstartedspinningtheir wheelsin their work. This led to production stoppages,creatingan atmosphereof uncertaintyin work collectives. What are our actions? First of all, we will direct our efforts at stabilizing the economy,and, naturally, we are not rejecting our reforms, which are to effect our transition to a market economy. We believethat this is the right way, but we must study it in greaterdetail andorganizeit at a higherlevel, taking into accountall our activities. Yanaev:I will now answerthe secondquestion.Indeed,today,when the Soviet peoplewerebeing informedabout thecreationof the Emergency Committee,I, along with someof the other members,had contact with the leadersof all nine republics that had expressedtheir readinessto becomemembersof the new Union Federation.We have had contactwith the leadershipof many regionsand territories of the Soviet Union. And I can state that, on the whole, they support the creationofthe EmergencyCommitteeandthe Committee'sattemptsto
46 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE enablethe countryto overcomethe crisis we find ourselvesin. I havetalked today to Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. I am awareof the statementmade by Boris Nikolaevich, Comrade Khasbulatov, and ComradeSilaev, and I would like to emphasizetoday that the Emergency Committeeis ready to cooperatewith the leadershipof the republics, regions, and territories in accordancewith our desire to find such adequateforms of developmentof our democracy,our economic growth, developmentof culture, and guaranteesof humanrights that could makeit possiblefor us to solve most effectively thoseproblems we are now confronting. I believe that if the leadershipof Russiais ready to cooperatewith us on such a basis, we will be able to find ways of effecting suchcooperation.I considerthe call for an indefinite generalstrike an irresponsiblestatement,and we probably cannotafford sucha luxury now that the country is in chaos,the luxury of some kind of political games.Ultimately, thesepolitical gameshurt our longsuffering people.If we are not indifferent to the fate of the Fatherland, the fate of Russia,we mustseekout real forms of cooperation. Correspondentfrom the Italian newspaperLa Stampa: Two questions for Mr. Yanaev.The first question:Can you tell us, what is the stateof your health?·The secondquestion:According to the Constitution, a state of emergencycan be introducedby the Presidentof the country, or by the USSR SupremeSoviet Presidium,with mandatory agreementfrom the republics.Which of thesethreepartiesparticipated in this decision?And are thereplansto set up somenational salvation committee?tDo you intend to convenea meeting of the USSR SupremeSovietimmediately? Yanaev:As for my health,I think it is all right, it allows me to work 16-17 hours a day, and as you can see,I am alive, sitting here before you. I do not look too bad, despitethe fact that we really did have a sleeplessnight last night. *This was a doubleentendrequestion,referring not only to the allegedillness of Gorbachev,but also to the answerYanaevgave when he was askedabouthis health at the USSR SupremeSoviet at the time he was being consideredfor the post of Vice President."My health is all right," he responded,"My wife ain't complaining." tThe National SalvationCommitteeof Lithuania was a shadoworganization in whosenamedie-hardCommunists,aidedby the SovietArmy, wereplanningto takeover Lithuaniain January1991.
PRESSCONFERENCE 47 As for the introduction of the state of emergency,we took as our premiseand do proceedfrom this fact, that therecan be critical situations requiring immediate actions, and we intend to ask the USSR SupremeSoviet,which will be convenedon August 27, to confirm our mandateto introducethe stateof emergency. SovietTelevision:I havea questionfor GennadiiIvanovichYanaev. In its addressto the people,the EmergencyCommitteehas statedthat it would, first of all, takecareof the interestsof the public at large and would seekto solvethe food and housingproblems.Could you please tell us what concretemeasuresyou are planning to undertakein this regard, and what are the resourcesat the disposalof the Emergency Committee? Yanaev:You know, this is really a very interesting,very important question.The first step we are planning to undertakeis to do everything possibleto savethe harvest.Probablytomorrow,we will issuean appropriatedocument, which will be oriented toward undertaking emergencymeasuresto savethe harvest.Further, we intend to utilize all the resourcesof the state in order, first, to carry out a special inventory of everythingthat we have in the country and, as you recall from our statement,after we have completedthis inventory, we will tell the people what we have at our disposal. This will include the materialresourceswhich we will be able to mobilize in orderto solve the housingproblem. In the lastthreeyears,we have not done a goodjob building housing, and many citizens who expectedthat we would carry out the programthat we hadannouncedat the outsetof perestroika[havebeen disappointed].Unfortunately,as it turned out, we were not up to the job, which is why I think we are now confrontedwith three major tasks.The first is food; the secondis housing;andthe third is transportation andenergy,becausewe are moving towardwinter. The situation in the energy industry is now very tense, and there, too, we need extraordinarymeasuresif we are to avoid plunging the country into a difficult situationbecauseof the winter. Argumentyi fakty: Apart from his post as President,M.S. Gorbachevalso holdsthe postof GeneralSecretaryof the Central Committee of the CPSU.Who will be dischargingthe dutiesof the GeneralSecretary of the CentralCommittee?And my secondquestion:As we have
48 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE learnedtoday, a seriesof newspapers,including Argumentyi fakty, Moskovskienovosti, Kuranty, Stolitsa, and a few others have been declaredclosed.For how long arethey to remainclosed,andwhenwill they be opened?Thankyou. Yanaev:I think that sincewe areintroducingthe regimeof a stateof emergency,we will have to re-registersome of our mass-circulation publications.Re-register.We are not talking aboutclosingdown newspapers;we are talking aboutre-registration,becausethis chaosthat has overtakenthe country is due, in part, to someof the mass-circulation organs. As to the post of the General Secretary,I would not like to commenton that. We have a Deputy General Secretary.He is fully capableof functioning, he is working, and I think that the plenary sessionof the CentralCommitteeor a PartyCongresscan resolvethis issue.I am now dischargingthe duties of the Acting Presidentof the country, and I would not like to use my authority, or lack thereof, in orderto influencethe decisionmakingof party organs. Question:Mr. Yanaev, sir, what responsedid you get to your appeals to the headsof state and the SecretaryGeneralof the United Nations? Yanaev:I must statethat we are analyzingvery carefully the statementsof foreign statesmenand politicians, and I must statethat their reaction is rather restrained,because,apparently,there are very few facts availableat this point to takea definitive stand.I am familiar with the last statementby PresidentBush, wherehe expresseshis hopethat those foreign policy commitmentsthat the Soviet Union had made would be adheredto in the future, which is what I have confirmed today, speakingbeforethis audience,which is what we affirmed in our statementright afterthe EmergencyCommitteehadbeensetup. Novosti InformationAgency: I have two questionsto Boris Karlovich Pugo and to ComradeStarodubtsev.A lot has beenwritten and said lately about the war on crime. Boris Karlovich, what new measuresare you planning to undertakein this regard?And the question for ComradeStarodubtsev:Do you havethe supportof the massof the peasantry,anddo you think that the massof the peasantrywill support the EmergencyCommittee? Pugo: In answerto your question,I would saythat it is unlikely that we will be able to find any new, entirely new ways for combating
PRESSCONFERENCE 49 crime that have not beenused before. I believe that first of all, the organsof law and order, all of them, must improve their work. We must be more demandingwith law-and-orderpersonnel.They must improve their work to a considerabledegree.We must createthe conditions so that professionalscan be more effective. I especiallystress professionalism--thisis my credo.Working in the Ministry ofIntemal Affairs, I believe that we can do a lot following this precept. As to concretemeasures,I think that suchmethodsasjoint [ militia-military] patrolsof city streetshavebroughtsubstantialresults,as evidencedby the experienceof over fifty cities. You may recall that at first, this measurewas met with somesort of suspicion,but it hasdemonstrated its effectiveness.Indeed,recently eventhe Mayor of Leningrad,Sobchak,hasresortedto this methodof policing. We must restoreour ties to the community, but, above all, in my opinion, we must work with the leadershipof law-and-orderorgansin sucha way that all the potentialof our personnelcanbe realized. Starodubtsev:The greatestlossesduring the period of perestroika have, of course,beensustainedby the peasantry;especiallythis year, the blow has beenmost crushing. The majority of the collective and statefarms, along with the nascentindividual farms, are today on the brink of disaster.The price equilibrium betweenthe city andthe countryside has beenundermined.Lack of fuel and sparepartsand a sharp reductionin othertechnicalsupplieshavecreateda very difficult situation for the peasantry. I think that the peasants,driven to despair,hope that, at long last, order will be restored,and that our society will turn its gaze to the peasantryand will help peasantsto find a firm footing, to experience revival. Nezavisimaiagazeta correspondentTatiana Malkina: Could you pleasesaywhetheror not you understandthat last night you carriedout a coup d'etat?Which comparisonseemsmoreapt to you---thecomparison with 1917or with 1964?*This is the first question. The secondquestion concernsnewspapers.First, how long will it taketo re-registernewspapers, andwhat criteria will decidewhetheror not a particular publication should be re-registered?Who will deal *Referenceis to the abruptremoval of Soviet leaderNikita Khrushchevfrom powerin 1964.
50 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE with this? Will political censorshipbe introducedin the re-registered publications?Thankyou. Yanaev: With regardto the re-registrationof newspapers,we will try not to drag out this process.I would not like to commentnow on the criteriathat will be usedasthe basisfor this re-registration. As for your allegation that a coup d'etat was stagedlast night, I would beg to disagreewith you, inasmuchas we are following constitutional nonns.And I assumethat confinnationby the USSRSupreme Soviet of the decisions we have made will enable us to state that absolutelyall the juridical and, so to speak,constitutionalnorms have beenobserved. It does not seemto me correct to draw a comparisonwith either 1917or 1964.I believeany analogyhereis simply dangerous. Correspondentfrom the Italian newspaperCorriere della Sera: A questionabout Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev.Did you discusswith the Presidentyour takeoverof power?Did he agreewith you? Why.is there no medical reporton the stateof his health?And a secondquestion: Bearing in mind the wording of your communique,did you ask for advicefrom GeneralPinochet?*Thankyou. [Laughterin the audience.] [Yurii Gremitskikh, an official of the PressCenter: "Pleaserefrain from displayingemotion.This is a pressconference."] Yanaev: I imagine that at some time we will publish the medical findings on Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev'sstate of health. As concernsyour assertionthat we took power from PresidentGorbachev,I would like to express disagreement with that, too, becausewhat we are talking about is a temporaryinability on the part of the Presidentto fulfill his dutiesby virtue of the stateof his health.And in accordance with the Constitution,the duties of the Presidentpasstemporarily to the Vice Presidentor the Chainnanofthe SupremeSoviet. ADN [GennanNews Agency]: Will the introduction of the stateof emergencyaffect the agreementswith Gennany;specifically,the timetable for the withdrawalof Soviettroopsfrom Germany?HasChancellor Kohl reactedin any way? • A military junta led by GeneralAugusto PinochetoverthrewChilean President SalvadorAllende in 1973.
PRESSCONFERENCE 51 Yanaev:I havealreadystatedthis in my openingstatement,andthe EmergencyCommitteehas madeits statementon this matter: We afftrm all the commitmentswhich the Soviet Union has assumedin the sphereof foreign policy, including our obligationswith respectto Germany. [ ...] Soviet Television:GennadiiIvanovich [Yanaev], could you please elaborateon the statementthat "in certainareas,a stateof emergency hasbeenintroduced"?What does"in certainareas"mean,and what is the geographicallocation?And the secondquestion:Whenwill reportersbe ableto meetwith Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev? Yanaev: You know, as soon as Mikhail Sergeevich'shealth improves,I am sure hewill be happyto meetwith reportersandrepresentatives of the massmedia. As to the stateof emergency,I believe we have no needto introduce it throughoutthe entire country. There are regions which have such problemsthat cannotbe solved without the introduction of the state of emergency.At the, sametime, I see that neitherKazakhstannor Uzbekistanrequiresa stateof emergency,becausethe situationthereis stableenough. So far, I cannot put a number on all such places. I believe that Moscow is one, and beginning today a state of emergencywill be introducedin Moscow. [ ...] Question:HonorableComradeYanaev [...], I have thefollowing question:Are you preparedto undertakesomeform of legal, constitutional measuresagainstYeltsin's decreeaimed at removingthe Party not only from societybut alsofrom the tradeunion structures?* Yanaev:I believethat all the decreesand ordersthat are issuedwill be screenedfrom the point of view of the stateof emergencythat we are introducingin the country.But taking advantageof this questionof yours, I would like to emphasize:what theRussianFederationleadership is doing now-buildingbarricades,calling forFederation disobedienc~is Federation a very dangerouspolicy. *Earlier in the summerof 1991, RussianPresidentBoris Yeltsin had issueda decree prohibiting all political parties,including the CommunistParty,from locating their chaptersat workplacesanywhereon theterritoty of theRussianFederation.
52 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE This policy may lead to someform of military provocationso that later the blame for this tension,for this excesswhich may take place, can be put on the EmergencyCommittee. Soviet citizens should be forewarned,especiallythe inhabitantsof Moscow, where a state of emergencyhasbeenintroduced.We hopethat peaceand orderwill be guaranteed. [ ...] Correspondentfrom Al-Ittihad, United Arab Emirates:Mr. Yanaev, this is now the first newsconferencegiven by the interim Presidentof the USSR,and your obligationsinclude many things. At this time can you give us a guarantee-oryour word, an oath to the public---that everything will be all right with the health of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev? Yanaev:I must tell you that Mikhail SergeevichGorbachevis completely safe.Thereis no dangerto him. The only thing is that a certain amountof time is neededfor him simply to recoverhis strength.Ladies and gentlemen,working in a regime like the one that President Gorbachevhas been working in these past six years, the organism naturally ... gets somewhatworn out. I hopethat my friend President Gorbachevwill return to the ranks and that we will work together again. Interfax [news agency]: You have mentionedthat every citizen of the USSRwill havean opportunityto think over the new Union Treaty in peaceand determinehis position. In what way do you plan to find out what this position really is? Do you meanthat you are planningto hold a referendum?And one more: What is the position of the Emergency Committee with regard to the Baltic republics and Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova, which do not intend to sign the new Union Treaty? And did Mikhail Sergeevich[Gorbachev] know that today a stateof emergencyis being introducedandthe EmergencyCommittee hasbeenformed?Thankyou. Yanaev:As to the formation of this Committee,as one of my colleagueshasalreadynoted,the Committeewas setup today in the early hours of the morning. I believethat PresidentGorbachevunderstands and will understandthat, indeed,at a momentwhen the countryis in a critical situation, we will have to find some effective measuresthat would allow us to overcomethis crisis.
PRESSCONFERENCE 53 With regardto the Baltic republics,Moldova, Georgia,andArmenia --that is, thoserepublicsthat have statedthey were not ready to sign the Union Treaty~urNovember position is unaltered.PresidentGorbachevhas statedit repeatedly.We will respectthe will of the people.You know, I think we will find a way of finding out what the mood of the people is with regardto the Union Treaty. I do not know what form this will eventually tak~whether Novembera referendumor somethingelse-butwe will do our bestto havethe Union Treaty,on which the future developmentof our country depends,be discussedand acceptedby our people in its entirety. [ ...] Novosti correspondentVladimir Riabinnikov: My question is to Boris Karlovich Pugo. So, today, from approximately 15:00 in the afternoon, residentsof Moscow are looking at the tanks standing aroundthe PressCenter.How do you technicallyseethe organization of this emergencyregime----asI understoodfrom the reply given by GennadiiIvanovich-inMoscow,given the situationthat existstoday? Hundreds,maybethousandsof peoplewill start for the airports today and for placesfar away from the capital. How is this regime going to be put into effect? Pugo: The introductionof military hardware,evenincluding troops, onto the territory of Moscow-well, it is already completelyevident that this is a measurewholly forced on us by the circumstances.It has been takenonly to prevent any disturbanceof order in Moscow, to preventany casualties.That is our chief purpose.As for how things will be controlled, I see the developmentof eventsin the following way: Provided nobody forces us to extend it or to make it too longterm an arrangement,we would favor withdrawing all military units andhardwarefrom Moscowas soonaspossible. Yanaev:We do not envisagea curfew. Pugo: But that is somethingthat comeswithin thejurisdiction of the Moscow commandant.If it should suddenlycome about that this is necessary,well, that is within his jurisdiction. But we did not plan for this. We did not considerit necessaryto do that today. Postfactum[news agency]: Gennadii Ivanovich, your Committee consists of eight people. It's an even number, which makes voting difficult. How are you going to deal with this issue?Perhapsit would
54 THE EMERGENCYCOMMI1TEE be a good idea to bring in another person, say Anatolii Ivanovich Lukianov [Chairmanofthe USSRSupremeSoviet]? And the secondquestion. Is it possible that the role of Mikhail SergeevichGorbachevin, say, the Tenghiz oil fields deal, will be investigated? Yanaev:I believe we will be making our decisionsin a consensus fashion. Your recommendationwith regard to ComradeLukianov is takenunderadvisement,but we believethat theremustbe a separation of functions,andthe Chairmanof the SupremeSovietshouldbe Chairmanofthe SupremeSoviet. I can't tell you anything about the oil deal. I believe that Mikhail Sergeevichhas made an immeasurablecontribution to launchingthe democraticprocessesthat were launchedin 1985. This is a man who deservesall possibleforms of respect,not an investigation. You know I can'tsayanythingaboutthis oil. ... Question:But is an investigationof this type possibleat all? Yanaev:I believe that Mikhail Sergeevichhas madean immeasurable contributionto the developmentof the democraticprocesseson a large scalethroughoutthe countrybeginningin 1985.He is a man who deservesall respect,and not, pardonme, an investigation.He is not a statecriminal. He is a man who has doneeverythingso that we could embarkon this democraticpath.Onelast question? AssociatedPress:Canyou pleasetell us whetheryour committeeis preparedto order the use of force againstcivilians? And under what conditionswould force be usedagainstcivilians? Yanaev:First, I would like to do everythingto ensurethat the useof force againstcivilians is not required.We must do everythingto prevent any excesses.And what we are envisagingnow--someextraordinary measures-theyare not at all linked with any attack on human rights. On the contrary, we want to protect humanrights as much as possible. And I would like to hope very much that we will not be compelled,we will not be provoked, into using some kind of force againstthe civilian population.
3 Statementsand Explanations by the PutschistsAfter the Coup Document1: Interrogationof DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov on August22, 1991 In a post-coupinterrogationheldon August22 by stateinvestigators LeganovandSychev,former DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov confirmedthat the coupattemptbeganwhenit did becausethe plotterswantedto preventthesigningofa new Union Treaty, a documentthat Yazovandhis co-conspiratorsbelievedwouldbring the political deathoftheSovietUnion. Perhapsbetterthan any other document,the interrogationshowsthe mentalityofthepeoplewho broughtthe countryto the brink ofcatastrophe.This transcriptofthe interrogationfirst appearedin Der Spiegelandwassubsequently reprintedin Izvestiia(October10, 1991).It is reproducedherein English translationwith only minor omissions. [ ...] Investigator: You must understandthat you are being interrogated in connectionwith your role in a crime that is defined as treason, conspiracywith the aim of seizing power, abuse of office. Now I would like to know how you respondto this accusation. Yazov: I have a somewhatdifferent view of what constitutestreason, and I don't want to hide this. Betrayalof the President,perhaps,but I did not betraymy peopleor my country. I haveknown Gorbachevfor a long time. We haveworkedtogether,solvedmanyproblemstogether. Personally, I like Gorbachevvery much. There must have been compelling reasonsfor me to go againstthe Commander-in-Chiefof 55
56 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE our Armed Forces.Many, including myself,begandevelopinga negative emotional attitude to Gorbachev.The reasonfor this was the decline in the standardof living of our people, the collapseof our economy, and the intensification of ethnic conflict and conflicts among the republics. In certain Party leadershipcircles, people begandiscussing[Gorbachev].Gradually,the opinion emergedthat Gorbachevhad run his courseas an active statesman.Somefelt that he had either run out of steamor lost direction. His economicpolicy consistedof begging for foreign credits, running up foreign debt, but he did very little inside the country to repair the economy.We talked about this with Mikhail Sergeevichin the [CPSU] Central Committee andat [USSR] SupremeSoviet sessions.But he kept to the samecourse:solving economicproblemsthrough foreign policy. He and his governmentpractically ignored economicproblemsinside the country. Our economicmechanismhas grown threadbare, and the country is on the vergeof disintegration.On August 20, the Union Treaty was supposedto be signed.... It becameapparentto me and many other comradeswith whom I discussedthis matterthat we were facing the disintegrationof the country. Everybody had beensupportingthe Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics,and all of a suddenwe get the draft of a treaty of sovereignstates! We were convincedthat this was not just a mistakebut purposeful activity aimed at doing away with the Union, substituting for it a confederationof republics,eachwith its own president. Investigator: [ ...] But why did you decideto removethe President by unconstitutionalmeans? Yazov:I neverthoughtthat it was necessaryto removethe President from power. I am guilty of this crime to the extentthat my participation in all of this madeit possible.I could havepreventedit all; I ought to have informed the Presidentaboutall of this. On Sunday,August 18, we decidedthat five peoplewould fly to seehim and to talk to him about a voluntary resignation,with the proviso that Vice President Yanaev would assumethe function of the President.Unfortunately, I did not know Yanaev. I just supportedeverything without going into details.I regretall of this very much. This was, I believe,a very gravemistake. Investigator: This soundspretty naive,coming from an experienced statesmanlike you, the Minister of Defense.
INTERROGATIONOF DMITRII YAZOV 57 Yazov:Discussionsof this sort hadtakenplacebefore,underdifferent circumstances.More often than not, ComradesKriuchkov, Baklanov, and Boldin were presentat thesediscussions.We would talk aboutthe situationin the country,aboutthe disintegrationof the Party, the economy, growing foreign debt, impoverishmentof the people. Shouldn'tsomeonebe responsiblefor all that? Gradually, wecameto the conclusionthat the blame for all this lay with the Presidentof the country because,as some said, he had put distancebetweenhimself andthe Party,or asotherssaid,he hadbetrayedthe army.... Investigator:Canyou be specificaboutwho wassayingthosethings? Yazov: Not really. Thesewere just discussions.Of late, conversations tendedto dwell on the fact that Gorbachevhad been going on foreign tours too much in recentyears,andthat we often did not know what important mattershe was discussingthere. For example, what kind of speechdid Gorbachevmakein London at the G7 meeting[July 1991]?We did not have a good idea about what he was saying there. Until that time at least,we usedto discusstheseissuesin the [CPSU] Politburoor in the PresidentialCouncil or the SecurityCouncil. Investigator:It was betterwhen all thesedecisionswere madein an openforum? Yazov: Well, perhapssuch an approachis not constructive,but all the decisionswere madecollectively.... Of coursewe were not ready to becomeevenmore dependenton the United Statespolitically, economically, andmilitarily. Investigator:So what decisiondid you cometo? Yazov:We hadneithera plan nor a conspiracy.We just got together on Saturday.... Investigator:Who calledthe meeting? Yazov:Kriuchkov. Investigator:Where? Yazov:At one of the military installationsin Moscow, at the end of Leninskii Prospect, closeto the traffic police post, on a side street. Kriuchkov called at the end of the day and said: ''There is something we must discuss." And I went there. After me, came Shenin and Baklanov.... That's when it all began. They were saying, "Well, maybewe should goand seeGorbachev,talk to him...."
58 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE Investigator:Why wereyou in sucha hurry? Is it becausethe Union Treaty wasaboutto be signed? Yazov: Of course,we were doing this becausewe were unhappy aboutthe draft treaty, we did not want the stateto fall apart.I saidthat I was readyto provide them with an airplane.The five peoplewere to take off from Chkalovskoe [military airfield]: Shenin, V arennikov, Boldin, Plekhanov,and Baklanov.Plekhanovwas the man who knew the entire security systemthere. I alreadyunderstoodthat Kriuchkov hadorderedPlekhanovto replaceall the guards. Investigator:What for? Yazov: In order to persuadeGorbachev.... And if he refused,then we would haveto take decisivemeasures. Investigator: So whoseideawas it-to fly there,to try andpersuade Gorbachev,to breakall communications,to switch the guards? Yazov: I believe this was a collective decision. For my part, I had always been skeptical. I doubtedwhether we should undertakeanything at all. I had my own doubts. When they came back, we were sitting in the Kremlin, in Pavlov'soffice. [ ...] Yanaevcameat about 8:00 P.M. The five cameat about nine.... The Committeewas set up after the emissariesreturned in a pretty gloomy mood from seeing Gorbachev.He hadpracticallykicked themout. He saidto them: "You must decide by yourself what you are going to do." So when they reportedthis to us, when they told us that they had shottheir wad, that the original ideawas unrealizable,then it becameclear: Yanaevwould haveto sign the paper.SinceGorbachevwasnot sick, we were,first, to declarehim sick. That's when we realizedthat our original plan had collapsed. Investigator:How wasthe EmergencyCommitteeformed? Yazov:We were sitting in Pavlov'soffice. Yanaevarrived at around nine. Then came Lukianov. He arrived by plane, recalled from his vacation.Lukianov said that he could not becomea memberof some committeeor other. He was the Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet, the legislativeorganthat ruled supremeover everything."The only thing I could do," he said, "is to makea statementaboutthe unconstitutionality of the new Union Treaty." By that time Yanaevwas quite drunkthat is, he hadby that time hadquite a bit of fun.
INTERROGATIONOF DMITRII YAZOV 59 Investigator:WasKriuchkov drunk,too? Yazov:Pugo,myself, andKriuchkov. We told Pugothat we hadsent peopleto Gorbachev,but that Gorbachevwould not receivethem for a whole hour. He was,at the time, seeingsomedoctorwho hadwith him somevaccineor other. And if Gorbachevagreed[to our terms], then Yanaevwould for sometime carry out his duties. Investigator:And what ifhe did not agree? Yazov:If you aretalking aboutthe completeremoval,liquidation, or somethinglike that ... I assureyou that was neverdiscussed.Around eleven o'clock, we were joined by the Foreign Minister, Bessmertnykh. He said: "If you put my nameon this Committee,that will be the end of all foreign affairs." I was home at Bakovka about half pastmidnight. I got up at 5:30 andwentto my office. Investigator:Had you issuedany ordersbeforethat? Yazov:No, I did not give any ordersin the eveninguntil the documentswere signed.The TV Centerstoppedfunctioning beginningat 6:00 A.M. We sentour own troopsthere. [ ...] Investigator: From a psychologicalpoint of view, the introduction of troops into the city was precisely what made people suspicious aboutthe President'sallegedillness. Yazov: Our President--heis invincible, and the introduction of the troops,too, wasprobablya mistake.Falserumorshadbeencirculating: Gorbachevis abusinghis office, thereis someonebehindhim manipulating him. Possiblytheserumors pushedus to undertakethis action, this risky business. [ ...] Investigator:Thenyou sawthat you had gottentoo entangledin this caper,that it wastime to get out. Yazov:Yes, of course.I begantaking certainstepsearly on. Things were going downhill, and fast. Those people at first agreedthat the Committeewould meettwice a day. But on the secondday, it met only once.And the following day, I did not evenattendthe meeting. Investigator:You meanthe 21st of August? Yazov:Yes, yesterday.I beganwithdrawingthe troops.
60 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE Investigator: If you realizedafter the pressconferencethat you had gonetoo far, that you had committeda crime, why did you go on with it? I have in mind the decisionto bring the tanksin on the night of the 20th and early morning of the 21st,the introductionof the curfew, the appointmentof the city's military commandant. Yazov: It just happenedthat way. I'll speakfrankly, and I always speakfrankly. When the state of emergencywas introduced,rumors begin to circulate that there would be a curfew, too. This Vice President, this Yanaev,introducedthe stateof emergencyonly on the second day.· And when the state of emergencywas fmally introduced,and I appointedGeneralKalinin to be the Moscow Military Commandant,he required verydifferent meansand forces, becausea stateof emergency anda curfew aretwo differentthings. And that'sexactlyhow it happened. It was only on the eveningof the 20th that he was able to issuehis order introducinga curfew. That requiredadditionalforces-----adifficult situation given the pouringrain andthe politicizationof the people. Investigator: Who could have proposedto Yanaev to introduce a curfew in Moscow?After all, he could not havecomeup with the idea himself, he is not a military man. Yazov: [ ...] Yanaevintroducedthe stateof emergencyin Moscow, andCommandantKalinin orderedthe curfew. Investigator:Who suggestedit? Yazov:I did. Investigator: Was it your recommendationto dispersethe forces defendingthe White House? Youwould havehad a formal excuse:by 11:00 P.M. everybodyoughtto havebeenat home. Yazov:Therewere 70,000peoplethere. Investigator:But thereweretankspatrollingthe city. Yazov: Yes, they were, but I prohibited the use of fire power. All they were supposedto do wasto block streets. [...] Investigator: Did you rotatethe troops,for examplethosethat were stationednear the White House?And was it becausethe men were *According to Yanaev'sstatementat the pressconference,the stateof emergencywasto be introducedin Moscowon August 19.
INTERROGATIONOF DMITRII YAZOY 61 entering into contact with the people and were becomingpolitically unreliable? Yazov:Therewas a battalionfrom the Tula Division there.Its commander was formerly the commanderof the division, and he was Yeltsin's personalfriend. Well, he withdrew his battalion-;iustto relieve the tension. [ ...] Then we sent in anotherunit, from the same division. After all, the mencould not staythereall the time, they hadto eat, sleep.That's why we had plannedto rotate them. And when the secondday began,I saw a whole busloadof vodka being brought to them. That's how they tried to encouragethe soldiersto betray their duty. Justimagine drunks in the armoredpersonnelcarriers! That'sa whole different sort of danger. Investigator:Whendid you realize thatthis putsch,this coupd'etat... Yazov: How can you call this a coup d'etat?We said to Yanaev: "This is a joke, isn't it?" At the end of the pressconferencehe presentedeverything as some kind of a joke. Didn't he say, "Mikhail Sergeevichis a friend of mine, and when he recovers,he will resume carryingout his duties"?That wasdoneto calm people. Investigator: It was then that you decidedto withdraw the troops and,practically,embarkon the roadto repentance. Yazov:For God'ssake,very early in the morning·I issuedthe order to withdraw the troops and, along with that, to help with the dismantling of the barricades,so that we could put an end to this shameful business.It was in accordancewith my own will, my own decision, that the troopsbeganto withdraw. I knew that one must not play such jokeswith the people. Investigator: Now tell me honestly,when you plannedthis whole thing, you thoughtthatpeoplewould swallow it without a peep? Yazov:I think suchan outcomewould not havebeenpossible.I am speakingfrankly. Investigator: Supposepeople had swallowed it, what would you havedonewith Gorbachevthen? Yazov:I think we would haverestoredthe communicationsthenand would have returnedGorbachevto his duties, becausethose people who took over from him wereincapableof governing. *The orderto withdraw wasissuedby Yazov on the morningof August21.
62 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE Investigator: But a man whose honor had been violated, who had beenarrestedtogetherwith his whole family, how would he havebeen ableto continueafterthat? Yazov:.This is a legitimate question. I am now torturing myself becauseof this. Investigator: But you had to think things through, considerthe options for the future. Yazov:We thoughtaboutnothing,eitherin the shortor the long run. Investigator:But in caseof your success,you hadto havean ideaof what todo with Gorbachev. Yazov:Nobodythoughtaboutthat. My positionwasthat Gorbachev mustbe allowedto return. Investigator:So that you could persuadehim [to changehis mind]? Yazov:I did not plan for this, but I did counton it. Investigator: How, then, were you planningto win over the people to your side? Yazov: We counted on some goods, some reserves,some stocks hiddenaway somewhere.For this reason,we called in [Deputy Prime Minister] Shcherbakov.He said: "What you want doesnot exist. There may be somein the republics,but we have none of it. We don't have .... Our requestsfor creditswill be rejected,and in five such-and-such days,we'll be bayinglike wolves from hunger." Investigator:What wasthe causeof Pavlov'sillness? Yazov: I think it was alcohol abuse. I think he was doing this purposefully,to get out of the game. I saw him two or three times, and eachtime he was deaddrunk. When he called me [for the first time], I realizedthis just from his voice. He said: "Arrest them all." This was after the meeting of the Cabinet on the evening of the 19th. [...] Investigator:What role do you now envisionfor yourself? Yazov:The bestthing for me now ... I wish the earthcould part and swallow me up. I am suffering terribly. I would like to beg Mikhail Sergeevichfor forgiveness.I realizemy guilt beforethe people. [ ...]
INTERROGATIONOF VALENTIN PAVLOV 63 Investigator: You have the opportunity now to senda messageto PresidentGorbachev. Yazov: In November,it will be fifty yearssince I joined the armed forces, and I, an old fool, took part in this ... caper. Now I realize what a nightmareI causedyou. I regretit very much.But it is probably too late after all I have done, bringing troops into the streetsof Moscow. I know you as a man with a kind heart who shows so much understanding.I fought in the war, I was woundedtwice. I would like to pleadwith you not to court-martialme, but insteadsimply to send me into retirement.I denouncethis plot, and I will keep denouncingit until the end of my days, along with my complicity in doing harm to you, to our countryandour people. Document2: Interrogationof SovietPrimeMinister Valentin Pavlov,August30,1991 In an August30 interrogation,formerSovietPrime Minister Valentin Pavlovtold an investigator"No, " whenaskedwhetherhe acknowledged his guilt in the coup. Pavlovinsistedtherehadbeenno advanceplotting. He soughtto portray himselfas an innocentdupe taken in by otherscloserto Gorbachev,who deceivedhim with tales ofGorbachev'sillnessandinability to rule the country. Pavlov insistedthat he himselfgrew ill at an August18 meeting,whenthe coup leadersagreedto form theEmergencyCommittee.The transcript wasfirst publishedin Der Spiegel;it wasreprintedin Izvestiia(October10,1991). [ ...] Pavlov: Yanaevalso statedthat he was assumingthe functions of the Presidentonly until the meeting of the SupremeSoviet or the return of the President.On Sundaynight [August 18], we were saying that we ought to call the SupremeSoviet into sessionon Tuesday. We-myself,Yanaev,and others--;>roposed this to Lukianov. He replied that it was not possiblefor purely technicalreasonsand that the sessionwould probablyconveneon September16, andtheneverything would be finalized. We responded:If it is not possibleto convenethe SupremeSoviet on Tuesday,then it shouldbe doneon Wednesdayat the latest.What this meansis that, as we were creatingthe Emergency
64 THE EMERGENCYCOMMI7TEE Committee,we thoughtwe would needtwo or three daysto convene the SupremeSoviet. Then, either power would then be vestedin the EmergencyCommittee,or the SupremeSovietwould orderothersteps to betaken. During the meetingat which the Committeewas formed, I developed a powerful headache,my blood pressureshot up, and I had to take my pills. They are called "Valimeton" or something.I always carry themwith me. During thosevery sharpdebates,they broughtus more coffee, and some alcohol to go with it. After some time, I apparentlylost consciousness.My guardstold me that they carriedme from the restroom, where I was lying on the sofa. So, to put it mildly, I couldn't move independently.They hadto carry me to my car. I was simply incapable of taking part in discussionsor debates.My only activity was on Monday night, when I was able, with the help of my doctors,to go to the Council of Ministers meeting. There, people were supposedto say what they wanted, butmy condition wasno better. This is the truth. And I would like to draw attention to the fact that I heard nothing aboutbringing in troops,aboutstormingthe White Houseor anything of the kind, or about depriving the Russianleadershipof power. If therewassucha discussion,I was in no conditionto graspit. Investigator: When one listensto you, one comesto the conclusion thatyou fully denyyour guilt. Pavlov: It's possiblethat I alreadycarry this guilt. Investigator:Couldyou explain? Pavlov: At the time of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, I said, "No confrontationshould be allowed, no stoppageof an enterprise, no bloodshed,no thievery or looting on the streetsand in the stores."I could and shouldhavetaken a more active position. I could haveunitedwith the otherside,which was defendingthe White House. Investigator: You meanyou could have beenamongthe defenders oftheWhite House? Pavlov: Probably.But I was very sick, and as my doctor told me, my blood pressurewas 200 over 100. I am repeatingonce again: for me the only justification is the stateof my health. Investigator: Your earlier testimony suggeststhat you were aware that the Presidentrefusedto yield to the pressureexertedon him.
INTERROGATIONOF VALENTIN PAVLOV 65 Pavlov: The group that had come back from the Crimea reported: "The Presidentis incapableof doing anything in the state he is in today. He refusedto sign anything.He is incapacitated,andonecannot even have a conversationwith him." That's what they said. Besides, they saidthat they had hadto wait over an hour to be receivedby him, and that they saw his family, who were in a state of shock as if someonewere gravely ill. He had doctors there. And only after the doctorshad left.... He was in no shape.He threw out Plekhanov,the headof the PresidentialSecurityForce.He would not evenspeakwith him. He ragedandraged,andPlekhanovwas forcedto leavethe premises.It wassimply impossibleto havea conversationwith him. He was out of shape,he wasn't a normal humanbeing. Which is why he did not sign anything. Investigator: How am I to interpret your testimony of last Friday when you said: "I was informed that the Presidenthad categorically refusedto sign any papersthat had anything to do with the state of emergency. " Pavlov: The peoplefrom that group said that it was not possibleto havea conversationwith him at all. [ ...] Investigator: One of the participantssaid: "So, we have completely exposedourselvesby that visit [to Gorbachev].Everybody who is presentherenow is implicatedin it. Now we mustmakea decision."In otherwords, you thoughtthat sinceyou had gonethat far already,you would haveto take the next step: to take over completelyand transfer to Yanaevall the functionsof the President. Pavlov: Underthosecircumstances[ ...] I could not help believing Boldin that it wasimpossibleto explainanythingto the President. [...] Investigator:You didn't try to phonethe President,did you? Pavlov: I wasn't in any condition to do so, since in the middle of this meeting, I was already lying down and not participating. Physically, I simply couldnot havecalled. Investigator:Did you haveany alcohol or coffeein the afternoon? Pavlov: No, no.
66 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE Investigator:Your bodyguardsaretestifying otherwise. Pavlov: I meanwe hadcoffee and a little alcohol. Now I know that it was whisky, becausea bottle of whisky stood on the table. And I probablytook a gulp. [ ...] Investigator:Wasthis all an attemptto seizepower? Pavlov: I am firmly convincedthat no one intendedto deprive the Presidentof power. That was not the point. There was an attempt to convince the Presidentthat decisive steps ought to be taken. Nobody believedthatYanaevwastrying to takepowerawayfrom the President. Document3: Interrogationof the Headof the USSRKGB, Vladimir Kriuchkov Arrestedon Wednesday,August21, Vladimir Kriuchkov was interrogatedthefollowing day. Belowis an excerptfrom the transcript ofhis interrogation. It appearedfirstin Der Spiegel,and wassubsequentlyreprintedin Izvestiia(October10, 1991). Investigator: Describe,please,the circumstancesunder which you decidedto fly to the Crimeato seethe President. Kriuchkov: We were planning to say it straight to Gorbachevthat after his departurefor a vacation we had come to a conclusion: the country is paralyzed.For example,take sugarbeets.It was complete irresponsibility. All deliveries were off. And if we did not take immediatemeasuresto stabilizeour state,then we would havean imminent collapseofthe state.We wantedto inform him aboutthis. Besides, we were interestedin hearinghis position, and after that, in our opinion, we had to undertakestabilization measures.We were going to proposestemmeasures,but we saw no other way out. We wantedto do everythingto havefull employment,to reducethe numberof factories that neededto be closed.The situation appearedto be so critical that it was not possibleto drag things out until Septemberor October. And we were planningto tell Gorbachevthat it might be a goodidea if he, for some period of time, would relieve himself of his duties and then,later, would assumethemagain.
INTERROGATIONOF VLADIMIR KRIUCHKOV 67 Investigator:You wantedhim to announcehis own resignation? Kriuchkov: We wantedhim to delegatehis dutiesto Vice President Yanaev, temporarily. But we knew that Gorbachevwould soon.... According to Article 127, Paragraph1, of the Constitution,he could havetransferredhis dutiesto somebodyelse. Investigator: So it had nothing to do with someillness or other,but Gorbachevsimply refusedto delegatehis authority to someone.Is that true? Kriuchkov: He said: "You may try, but nothingwill comeof it." He also saidthat he wasnot feeling well. But today,of course,nobodycan say that he is feeling well. We switchedoff the communicationschannelsto maintainorder,in our terms,andreinforcedthe security. [ ...] Investigator:Did you instructPlekhanovto do this? Kriuchkov: Yes, I did, personally. [ ...] Investigator: [ ...] You testified that at first the discussion[with Gorbachev]wasvery heated. Kriuchkov: We proposedthat he declarea stateof emergencyand transferpower to Yanaev,temporarily, so that he could return to his dutiesat somelater date.His reactionto this proposalwasvery stormy. After a while, though, he calmed down, but he did not changehis position: he would nevergive consentto this. So it had nothing to do with depriving the Presidentof his powers.This is an importantpoint: we did not breathea word aboutit in any ofthe discussions. Investigator:You meanphysicalliquidation? Kriuchkov: What areyou talking about?!We did not evendiscussor think aboutwhat you are implying. Never. Gorbachevwas to continue living. Whenwe discussedYanaev,we all understoodvery well that he could serveonly for a very shortperiod.We knew in advancethat if it came to [armed] confrontationand the like, then we would have to resignright away,or takea completelydifferenttack. Investigator: Were there any written or verbal ordersto storm the White House?Did you enterinto negotiationwith Yeltsin's people? Kriuchkov: Our EmergencyCommitteedid not undertakeanyac-
68 THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE tions that would in any way be directed againstRussiaor Russia's leadership.We wereawarethat no force would be sufficient [for that]. Investigator:Were thereany attemptsmadeto preventYeltsin from leavinghis dachafor Moscow? Kriuchkov: Nothing of the sort. We knew that he had left his dacha and was on his way. We were not watching him, though, we were simply awareof it. Investigator:Did you activateyour armedforces? Kriuchkov: In Moscow,we strengthened the Kremlin securityforce. We did it on the 19th. We weren'tprepared.And we issuedno orders on the morning of the 19th. Everythingwas postponedtill manana.Of the things we planned for the 19th, nothing was realized. We took thosemeasureslater. You are sayingnow that the peoplewere against us, etc. But the peoplereactedambiguously.The first reactionresembled an expressionof trust, emerginghopes.Peopledid not respondto the calls to go on strike. Somewhere,four mineswent on strike: one in the Komi Republic,the othersin the Sverdlovskregion. But the country as a whole reactedfar more calmly than one could haveexpected. However,the next day, the situationchangedconsiderably.And yet, in industry, things did not go as far as strikes, just public rallies. The biggestrally was held in Leningrad,andthereare reasonsfor that. But Moscowwasmuchweaker;it hadonly 160,000demonstrators.[ ...]
II The Public Reacts All over the SovietUnion, newsof the coup caughtpeopleby surprise on Monday morning, August 19, 1991.Thoughmanypeopleremained watchfully on the sidelinesduring the crisis, othersthrust themselves into the fray. The accountsin this sectiontell the storiesof peoplewho felt passionatelyaboutthe coup and gravitatedto the centersof action wherethey witnessed,and to someextentparticipatedin, the momentous events.
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GREGORYFREIDIN 1 To the Barricades WhentheAugustcouptookplace, GregoryFreidin, a professorof Russianliterature at StanfordUniversity, wasmakinghisfourth visit to Moscowsinceemigratingto the United Statesin 1971.He has written extensivelyaboutSovietliterature andculture as well as contemporaryaffairs. He producedthis pieceoriginally for The New Republic. As she stuck her hand through a police barrier, a heavy-setmiddleagedwoman whisperedto a pimply young sentry guardinga bevy of mean-lookingarmoredpersonnelcarriers (APCs) lined up near Red Square: "Sonny, hey sonny, here's a candy bar, go ahead,take it, please." "Against regulations," he muttered, shaking his head, his hands gripping a Kalashnikov,and then addedalmostinaudibly, "Stick it in my pocket,fast." The hand lunged forward-and a tiny chocolate bardisappeared into the pantspocketof the soldier'sfatigues.Furtheron, more of the same:chocolates,cigarettes,sandwichessliding into the pocketsof the young soldiers standing guard before their APCs, as their officers by the soldiers' mendicancy looked the other way, both embarrassed and moved by the crowd's considerationand warmth. An occasional latecomerto the revolution, anxious to show his militant resolve,elbows his way to the barrierandbeginsto beratethe soldiers,exhorting themto comeover to the people'sside,to join Yeltsin andRussia.The soldiers, mostly Slavic-looking, wink and smile at him indulgently from undertheir rain hoods. possiblydisposedot:On Monday morning, having deposed-and the country'sPresident,the self-appointedEmergencyCommitteede71
72 GREGORYFRElDlN elaredan all-out war on the opposition.It was hard to imagineat 8:30 A.M. that there was anotherpower in the Soviet Union that could accept the challengeof thosewho had takenover the omnipotentcentral state.Yet the recentlyinstalledmechanismof the separationof powers was alreadyworking. By late morning,Yeltsin was climbing a tank~ November big tank dispatchedto bring this big man to his knees--tothunder away at the junta and to pronounceits actionsillegal. A lone member of the Union Cabinet,Minister of the EnvironmentNikolai Vorontsov, a People'sDeputy from Russia, joined Yeltsin on the tank to the cheers,as he told me later that day, of a hundredor so people.For a spacethe sizeof the Capitol steps,this was a sparsecrowd. No more than an hour earlier, on my way to the writers' enclavein Peredelkino,I askedmy taxi driver to circle once aroundthe White House,the seatof Russia'sparliament.All was calm and ordinary as befits a governmentbuilding on a sleepyMonday morning in August (inside, Yeltsin, Khasbulatov,and Silaev were denouncingthe Committee as unconstitutionalto the Moscow presscorps). As we drove west through the outskirts of the city, a column of tanks, APCs, and trucks full of armed soldiers was rumbling in the oppositedirection. By the time we turnedoff the main highway half an hour later, I had counted150tanksandAPes. "This is my fourth coup d'etat," confided the ninety-two-year-old writer I had goneto Peredelkinoto visit. I inscribedfor her a copy of my Russiantranslation of The Federalist Papers, published a few monthsearlierin the United States:"To TamaraIvanova,on the day of her fourth coup d'etat."Starvedfor news,we turnedon the TV only to be treatedto a splendiferousBolshoi production of Swan Lake. The sole channelthat was broadcastingover most of the country was teasing the viewers---atthe brink of a civil waF-with a well-preserved vestigeof Russia'simperial adornment.The high-brow newsblackout lasted pretty much throughout the coup, but on the secondday an inventive soul in programmingran a concerthall productionof Boris Godunov-anoperaticblastat regicides,silent majorities,andpretenders. "Now, cometo think of it, I have lived through six coupsd'etat," Ivanova correctedherselfas we were parting. I amendedmy inscription accordingly.The book now seemedno more than a cruel reminder of yet anotherchancethat Russiahadmissed. Part of the tank column I had run into earlier was alreadyparkedin the centerlane on the Kalinin Bridgejust oppositethe White House.A
TO THE BARRICADES 73 Erectinga barricadenearthe WhiteHouse cop was blocking the traffic, but in sucha dazedand half-heartedway that my taxi driver jumpedthe curb under his very noseand spedon without looking back to the other end of the bridge. There,something strangewas going on. The column of tanks had stoppedshort of a flimsy barrier madeof sectionsof wire-meshfencing, behindwhich a dozen or so people were silently pushing an empty trolleybus. "It must'vestalled,"I said to myself, and wonderedwhy they were pushing it at a right angle to the line of traffic. Next to the trolleybus, a womenand several small crowd, consistingof two respectable-looking men in businesssuits carrying attachecases,was pursuinga weaving milk truck. One of the menmanagedto jump onto the stepof the cabin but was immediatelypushedoff by the irate and foulmoutheddriver: "You fuckers,I'm the one who'll be paying for it, not you...." They weretrying to commandeerthe truck.·Only thendid it dawnon me that what I was witnessingwasthe constructionof a barricade. Further up, where the bridge formed a thoroughfarewith the road leading to the embankmentand the White House,half a dozentanks had already taken up positions, their gun barrels trained quizzically onto an empty patch of overcastsky betweenRussia'sWhite House
74 GREGORYFREIDIN andthe ghosttower of the new AmericanEmbassybuilding. The leading tank peakedout dinosaur-likefrom behinda barricadeconsisting solely of a ten-foot-Iong gardenbench. Up close you could see the insignia of one of Moscow's two elite tank divisions. A helmeted soldier sitting on top of the gun turret displayedthat intenselysullen and distantlook that one readily associateswith the actual Soviet man engagedin actual socialist construction.Before long, neighborhood kids were crawling all over the armor, their presencetransformingthe tank, if not into ploughshares,then into a heavy-dutytenementjungle gym. Taking in this scene,my eye pausedto registera few inch-thick metal bars,usedfor reinforcing concrete,sticking out of the wheelsof the tank treads.The barsdisabledthe vehicle,but the soldierswere in no hurry to takethemout. A young man in his twentieswas now climbing on top of the tank. Leaningagainstthe gun barrel and without any regardfor the soldier, he beganwaving Russia'snon-Communisttricolor flag. "Folks in the White Housesay you ought to stick anotherflag into the gun barrel," an unassumingelderly woman whisperedloudly to the flag-waver. "Tell 'em I can't do it: the gun is sheathed,"he hissedback, his face showing that he was at the limit of his pluck, and with addedfervor went on making figure eights with his giant tricolor. Did the people holed up in the White House, for whose benefit the flag was being waved,find in this sightthe neededencouragement? The news spreadthat more tanks werecoming along Kalinin Prospect from the direction of the city center. By 3:00 P.M. the crowd, which hadswelledto a few hundred,rushedto the end of the avenue, which openedonto the White House.Men and women, mostly welldressedtypes in their thirties and forties, scurriedaroundin searchof barricade-buildingdebris. As barricade building goes, Moscow is Europe'smost efficient city. You don't needto overturncarsor newspaperbooths,or tear up roads for the sakeof the archetypalcobblestones, becausethe city's construction bosseshave unwittingly positionedstoresof debris within everybody'seasyreach.Unfinished buildings, tom-up roads,and moundsof fragmentsof reinforcedconcrete are as plentiful in Moscow as outdoor cafes in Paris. Past me marcheda teamof severalmen shoulderinga heavypipe, their shopping bagsandattachecasesswayingin unison. A column of light tanks and heavy APCs was rumbling along Kalinin Prospect.The fortification, intendedto block their passage,
TO THE BARRlCADES 75 Civilians rush to form a humanchain againstapproachingtanks on Kalinin Prospect consistedof wire mesh screensstrung acrossthe street,held erect by some sort of telepathyor magic. To shield this contraptionfrom the catexpillartreads,men and womenjoined handsto form a chain across the breadthof the avenue.The approachingcolumn, headedby a tanklike thing without a turret, slowedto a crawl. It halteda few feet before the human chain, filling the air with the noise and stench of idling diesel engines.Peoplerushedaroundthe leading vehicle, someshouting heart-rendingpleasnot to shoot, othershurling insults at the helmetedheadof the convoycommanderwhich was sticking forlornly out of the vehicle'stop hatch. "Shame!" "Don't shoot at your own people!" "Yeltsin is your President!""Lackeys of the junta!" "Murderers!" "Be with the people!" The commanderclimbed halfway out of the hatch. This exhausted wiry man of aboutforty was wearinga paratrooper'suniform with the two starsof a lieutenantcolonel. Crouchingbehindhim was a junior officer, a beefy young man with an anxious smile, cradling in his enormousarms a handy little automaticrifle. Red-eyed,his face the color of dust-coveredasphalt,the commanderhad the tormentedlook of a rudely awakenedman who was orderedto choosebetweenhis
76 GREGORYFREIDIN A civilian appealsto a soldiernear the White House duty as an annyofficer andkilling his own mother.The worst was still to come.Waving his half-empty string bag at the commander,a grizzled diminutive man---a lifetime of labor stampedindelibly into his demeanor-elbowed his way to the side of the tank. He was shaking with rage. Almost bursting to make himself heard over the engine noise, he shouted:"I've worked all my life, you see,all my life I've paid for this anny,andnow you'veturnedagainstme, you're shooting at me!" "Shame,shame!"the crowd was egginghim on. Severalpeople were pressinginto the officer's handsphotocopiesof the Russian government'sfIrst appeal,issuedat 9:00 A.M., calling the Emergency Committee''unconstitutional,''its members"putschists,"anddeclaring an "indefInite generalstrike." Many were yelling: "You did vote for Yeltsin, didn't you? You yourselfvoted for Yeltsin, and now you've got your gunspointing at him." The officer would not takethe bait, but
TO THE BARRICADES 77 his gold-toothedsmile madeit clearthat he did not mind beingcounted amongYeltsin'ssupporters. A young man in bluejeansclimbed on top of the tank, helpingonto the armortwo very good-looking,stylish young women.Like many in the crowdsaroundthe White House,all threehadaboutthemthe air of peoplewho "ownedthe place."Nonchalantly,they took surveysof the tank's top, locateda comfortablespot, and without much ado settled down, park-benchstyle, for a chatanda smoke.But beforetheir charm could beginto melt the armor,a corpulentmatron,her grayinghair in a tight bun, wrestledher way to the front of the tank andbeganto bellow at the officers. Gesticulatingforcefully, as if unawarethat her hands were ensnaredby a braceof string bags,shepointedto her breastand roared:"I've nurturedyou, bastards,andnow you will be shootingme in this breast!" A vein on the commander'stemple, which had been pulsating visibly throughoutthe encounter,swelled enormously;his dust-coveredface grew ruddy,jawsclenched,but the eyeswereclearly pleading to sparehim this unbearableordeal. His aide let go of the rifle, and it disappeareddown the hatch. "Cut off the engine, commander,saveyour fuel for the crops!" The enginewas stopped,and minutes latereveryvehiclein the convoyfollowed suit. No, he will not obey if orderedto shootat the people,he said to a Frenchreporterin reply to the questionon everybody'smind. The family reunion was now in full swing. The paratroopershad not eaten for twenty-four hours and had been on the march since leaving their basein Riazantwo days ago. The contentsof the barricadebuilders' shoppingbags-thoseunprepossessing horns-of-plenty stuffedwith sausage,bread,candy,cartonsof milk-flowed freely into the openhatchesof the paratroopers'tanks and APCs. An hour or so later, an order came for the convoy to leave. The streetgrew empty, exposingto all the vicissitudesof a revolutionthe still flimsy barricade and the wearied,vulnerablemen and womenwho had the determination to build it. Therewere the people,therewas their electedgovernment, which the people had gatheredto defend, and there was the enemy,epitomizedby the old Communiststate.Therewas a nation in the making.
2 Letter from Moscow At the time ofthe coup, the author ofthis letter was in Moscowwith her daughter,Masha.Her sonArtemwas in Czechoslovakia,andher husband,Volodia, was ona concerttrip in Nizhnii Tagil. Shewrote this letter to a friend in Berkeley,California, andprefersto remain anonymous. On the 19th, when our neighborwoke me up at 8:00 A.M. andsaidvery rudely, "We have a military coup, and you're just lying around," it becameclear that I had to act independently.On televisionthey were broadcastingonly Beethoven.Radio Russiaand Moscow Echo were already silent, and the ''voices'' [Western radio broadcasts]were already jammed. I was frightened becauseit had happenedso quickly and so easily. I telephonedArtem andtold him not to comehome,as I was afraid thesebastardswould announcea military draft. It turnedout that the Europeancountrieshad alreadyclosedthe borders,and Artem askedme not to losemy head,that he would try to fly back. I was surprisedthe entire time that the telephonekept working. I beganto telephonearound,and I learnedthat the tanks were already moving on Lenin and Kutuzov Prospects,and that they had long since surroundedour White House. I finally reachedthe people at Nezavisimaiagazeta,and there I heardthe first consoling news: that Yeltsin had alreadywritten an appealand that peoplewere askedto gatheron ManezhSquare.I tried to phoneanyoneI could, just to tell them the news. I found a place for Mashato stay, and then, with the only (!) person who agreed to go with me, I headedfor Manezh Square. It was 12:00 noon. Trolleybuseswere still running along Tverskaia Street, and they were selling television sets and washing machinesin the storesWITHOUT SPECIAL COUPONS(I). People 78
LEITER FROM MOSCOW 79 were standingin huge lines for gasolineand food, and the rest of the city looked as though nothing were going on. There were peopleeverywhere,and it seemedto me there was no alarm on their faces.We took a trolley to ManezhSquare.... There were not a lot of peopleon the square--morethan the 150 that "Vremia" [the newsprogram] mentioned,but no more than 500. Everyonefelt lost, and some man was shouting into a loudspeaker that Yeltsin had not askedpeopleto come to the square,and that it wasjust a provocation.I told him: "Don't get hysterical.Peoplewill come here anyway. Tell us what to do." No one knew anything.No one understoodanything. Deputies of the Moscow City Council appeared,but although they were wearing their deputy pins, they somehowlooked small in their beardsand jeans.They didn't look serious.But they brought the text of Yeltsin's appealand beganto call us to go to the White House. Someonesaid that THIS was a provocation.I askedwhetherthey couldn't find someonemore serious to explain everything to us. At that moment we all heard a terrible noiseand saw that on two sides--ManezhSquareand Revolution Square----tankswere coming and trying to surroundthe square and us. It was terrible (one of the most terrible moments).I stood with my eyes closedand kept saying, "I'm frightened, I'm afraid!" An elderly Georgian who was holding me by the shoulder said, "Everything is okay." Thenthe tankscomingfrom the sideof RevolutionSquarestopped, and thosefrom the side of ManezhSquarecontinuedto move and we ran there.When we ran up to them, the tanksthat were surroundedby people had already stopped, and the people immediately began to climb on them. What the hell (I was wearing a skirt). One of the officers emergedfrom a tank and said that he gave his word as a Russianofficer that theydid not haveweaponsandtheir gunswere not loaded. This was met with terrible shouts and whistles. He said the magazinesof their guns were empty. I said, we already know about empty stores [Russian: magaziny]! In a word, there was a terrible ruckus,with everyonespeakingat once. Then a Deputy appearedagainwith a loudspeaker.We all followed him to the White House.Everyonewas sayingthat the stormingof the White Housewould begin at 16:00,and we shouldbuild barricades.It was really pouringrain. Whenwe cameto the embankmenttherewere somepeoplealreadythere(very few!) and we learnedthat Yeltsin had
80 LEITER FROM MOSCOW Tankslined up on KutuzovProspect already spoken,that he had read his appeal.We were all standingin the rain andtherewas a rumor that Yeltsin was alreadyarrested.Later, he appearedon the balcony. Everyoneshoutedfor him to leave becausetheremight be snipersaround. Tanks appearedfrom the side of the bridge that connectsKutuzov and Kalinin Prospects.Everyonebeganto screamhorribly and many, including myself, beganto weep.Then we saw how peoplewho were on the other side were weeping and sitting down on the bridge, blocking the path of the tanks. The tanks stoppedand I heard some man in civilian clothesyelling hystericallyinto a radio transmitterthat they couldn't move forward becausepeoplewere lying down in front of the tanks, and that if the tanks all stayedon the bridge, it would collapse. Then I saw somethingthat mademy hair standon end. A Japanese man(!), carryinghis child abovehis head,beganto approachthe tanks. I rushedto him and screamedlike mad, in English: "You must come out!" I don't rememberhow many times I repeatedthis, seizing his elbow, before I heardhim say, "Why?" I screamedagain, pointing at the tanks: "This is our things!" At this moment, everyonescreamed
LEITER FROM MOSCOW 81 that the OMON [specialpolice] hadarrived,andeveryoneran to them. The crowd carriedme to the othersideof the White House,the sideby the Krasnopresnenskaia embankment. I describeto you the most horrible, scary moments,though now I understandthat the incident with the Japaneseman was really funny. God only knows what he thought of me (I mean,what he thought of my English). In a calmersituationI probablywould have said''This is our problem," not ''This is our things." I'm afraid he probablythought that we didn't wantto give him our tanks.... There were indeed two cars full of OMON at the entrance.We surroundedthemandbeganto rock them. They shoutedbackthat they were RussianOMON, but no one believedthem, and peoplesaidthat decentpeoplewould neverjoin OMON. Then Rutskoi cameout and said that they did belong to the RussianOMON. Everyoneshouted "Hurrah" andapplauded,andsaid "Letthe carsgo." Thenwe beganto build barricades.Guesswho wascarryingthe first logs and boxes?That'sright, our women.Then the menjoined us and began to carry logs from the park. Then we uprooted a telephone booth-andwe were sorry that night, becausewe had to go to the metro stationto makecalls. It was five o'clock. After six, we all began to disperse.We all went home to put on somethingwarmer for the night and to get food. I also went home to changeclothes, to feed Masha,to find a placefor her to spendthe night, andto write a note to Volodia. My mood was terrible. I didn't want to listen to the radio, becauseat that time they were broadcastingthe pressconferenceof this new committee. Lenka called me from somewherearound the White Houseandsaidthat everythingwasquiet so far. Shecameto see me, to leaveher bagsand to dry off. We cried togethera little bit, got everything in order, and then went to the White House for the night with my sisterandanotherman. The crowd grew. To my surpriseI saw many young people.They were setting up tents and making campfires.Tanks were standingat the White Houseunderthe Russianflag, andeveryonewas discussing the new heroes--theofficers who took the side of Yeltsin. Threecars of soldiers arrived, and everyonehurried to give them food, tea, or coffee. The radio of the White House was working. There weren't really that many people,but we had a feeling of organization.There were persistentrumors that at four o'clock in the morning the storming would begin. So we began to strengthenthe barricades.
82 LEITER FROM MOSCOW Women hauling debris to build a barricade as tanks approach the White House A barricadedstreetnearthe White House,mid-afternoonon August19
LEITER FROM MOSCOW 83 Then an announcementwas madeon the radio that really scaredme. They reportedthat in hospitalsandclinics, toxicological and intensive careunits were being freed up, and it was explainedwhat one should do during a gasattack. And I didn't evenhave a handkerchief.People who had some suppliesdistributed bandagesand rags. I said that I would not soakthoseragsin a rain puddle-itwasn'tclean.The experiencedpeoplesaid that we should not soak the rags in water, but in urine! I should tell you that I was peeing in the bushesall the time, becauseI was really scared,and when you're scared,you have to. Everyonetried to get me to savethis valuableliquid, or at leastput it all in onebottle. We were all waiting for four 0'clock. The tensionwas so greatthat we could actually hear the hum of arriving tanks, though in reality, they weren'tthere.... When it got lighter, everyoneunderstoodtherewould be no storming. I felt cold and bored. We were waiting for the metro to open, hoping that replacementswould arrive to give us a rest. And I only went homewhen I sawthat a thin streamand then a currentof people wasarriving. As I was climbing over the barricadeI lookedback andsawpeople running to and fro. SuddenlyI thought:"I love themall!" And I'm not afraidto sayit; it wasa momentof truth. What cameafter that, I really don't have the strengthto write. It was the end of the most terrible, nerve-rackingday. The unknown was terrible. The night was sleepless. Iwas worried about Volodia. (He arrived on the morning of the 20th and went to the White House.)Desperation,hope, inhumanhatred.But there were already many of us. Now I understandthat we had many amusingmoments.For example, on the 20th, the day of the storming, an army of taxis and gypsy cabscameto the barricades.The ownersof the new carswere using them to form part of the barricades.Co-operators[private businessmen]in Volvos and Mercedesbrought boxes of imported beer and American cigarettes.I can't describeit all. In short, life went on. As Berezhkovsaid, the last two days of communismwere terribly rainy.... We didn't go to the celebrationmeeting. We just turned off the telephoneand finally had a good sleep. We didn't have a crumb of food in the house.We had eatenit all up or takenit to the barricades.
84 LETTER FROM MOSCOW The shopswere empty. My apartmentwas a mess.Thank God it's all over. Howeverstrangeit may seemto you, I don't feel anyjoy. Things are very confusedand unclear.I will never forget the fear and terror. Volodia went to Lubiankaand cut a pieceof graniteoff of Feliks.* We shouldhavehada drink; thenwe would havefelt better.Mashacries at night, andit makesme feel terribly guilty. But all the same,God is with us. *This is a referenceto the toppling of the statue of Feliks Dzerzhinskii, founderofthe secretpolice,on Thursdayevening.
VICTORIA E. BONNELL 3 August 19 and 20 in Moscow Victoria E. Bonnell, a sociologistat the UniversityofCalifornia, Berkeley,madeherfirst visit to the SovietUnion in J970. Shehas written extensivelyaboutthe Russianlabor movementon the eveof the J9J 7 revolution, but neverimaginedshewouldwitnesspersonally a major upheavalin Russia.At the time ofthe coup, shewas in Moscowcompletingthe researchfor a studyofSovietpolitical art. DAY ONE "Wake up, there's been a coup," were the fIrst words I heard that Monday. I was blissfully asleepwhen my husbandrushed into the bedroomto announcethe news. "So what?"I said,still half asleep,"What do you mean,a coup?" He was visibly agitated. "Gorbachevhas been declaredill, and power is now in the handsof someemergencycommittee.Don't you understand,it's civil war now!" The seriousnessof the situation was beginning to sink in. Still, somehowthe newsdid not quite fIt with what I knew aboutthe country. "Don't be so sure," I said, summoningwhat little remainedof my Americancool. "The SovietUnion is no bananarepublic." He was notconvinced. My husbandand I had met in Moscow in 1970, two years after Soviet tanks put an end to the PragueSpring. For the Russiansof his generationand outlook (he was involved in the dissidentmovement), that was the harshestblow, and now, it seemed,he was destinedto witnessa replayof it all with a twenty-yeardelay. We were visiting our in-laws in Moscow, andhadbroughtour fiveyear-olddaughterwith us. Now the whole family gatheredaroundthe 85
86 VICTORIA E. BONNELL small white plasticradio with a single station.A Sovietannouncerwas readingthe proclamationsof the newly createdEmergencyCommittee. His word-of-God style of delivery, seldom heard since the onset of glasnost,arousedunpleasantmemories.Gorbachev,while on vacation at his dachain the Crimea,had beentakenill, and was being replaced by Vice President Gennadii Yanaev.Yanaevand sevenothertop governmentofficials had formed a StateCommitteefor the StateofEmergencyto rescuethe "greatMotherland"from chaos. My in-Iaws----Gita Samuilovna,a retired doctor, and Monos Grigorievich, a retired engineer, both in their mid-seventies-Iooked stricken by the news. Shaking their heads,they mutteredagain and again that it was uzhasno (frightful), really uzhasno,and shuffled around the apartmentwith bewilderedexpressions.And truly, the news was hard to assimilate.No one in our family believed for a moment that Gorbachevhad steppeddown becauseof illness. But what did it all mean?Our fears that first morning were almost too terrible to contemplate.Yet one thing seemedclear: the long expectedright-wing coup, predictedby Shevardnadzeand others,had finally takenplace. Soon the immensity of the eventsbore down on us. Gita Samuilovna turned on the television and found a test patterninsteadof the usual morning programs.The mute television had a profoundly disturbing effect on my in-laws, who dependon it for a steadystreamof informationandentertainmentthroughoutthe day. Somewhatlater, the blank screenyieldedto films of operaand ballet, andthat evening,the televisioncarriedthe eveningnewsand a broadcastof the junta'sfirst and only press conference.Inexplicably, even children's programs were suspendedon Monday and for the duration of the crisis. For seventy-twohours,the regular routine of televisionbroadcastson the four availablestationsalmostentirelydisappeared. Monos Grigorievich quickly dressedand went to visit the local newspaperkiosk. He returnedsoonafterwardwith his lips tightly pursedanda frightenedlook in his eyes:the kiosks were closedand rumors had it that the non-CommunistParty presshad beenshut down. As we later discovered,only Party-controlledpaperssuchas Pravda continuedto publish during the threedaysof the coup. The country'sastonishingly successfulindependentnewspapers--Argumenty i fakty, Nezavisimaia gazeta,Kommersant,and Komsomolskaiapravda--vanishedfor the durationof the crisis. The junta'sappropriationof the medianot only
AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 87 Demonstratorsmarching/romManezhSquareto the White House disruptedthe senseof normalcybut also arousedtremendousindignation among educatedmiddle-classpeople, such as my in-laws, who havecometo cherishfreedomof informationandcommunication. At about2:00 P.M., I arrived in downtownMoscow. As I cameout of the Lenin Library metro station, I saw a crowd of peoplemoving throughManezhSquareandup Kalinin Prospectin the directionof the White House,headquartersfor Yeltsin and the SupremeSoviet of the RussianFederation.ManezhSquareis an immenseareaextendingthe length of severalcity blocks, adjacentto Red Squareand the Kremlin, and flanked by the Manezh(a large exhibition hall that had oncebeen a tsarist stable) on one end and the Hotel Moskva on the other. The militia had closed off the entire squareand nearby streetsto traffic. The demonstrators-numbering from one to two thousandpeople--marchedwithout interference.They were a somberand well-dressed crowd; many of the men wore suits and carried briefcases.As subse-
88 VICTORIA E. BONNELL quent events conftmled, the protest movementagainst the coup in Moscowwas overwhelminglya middle-classaffair. I stoppeda tall manwith a bushybeard--thekind of personI might encounterin my hometownof Berkeley, California---andaskedwhat was going on. He told me that Yeltsin had called for a generalstrike againstthejunta. What did he think this was all about,I asked.He said with great conviction that Gorbachevhad orchestratedthe coup and was now pretendingto be under arrest while watching to see if it succeeded.When I expressedsome skepticismover this scenario,he insistedthat Gorbachevwas not a victim but a perpetratorof the plot againstYeltsin and the country'sdemocraticforces. This conspiracy theory circulatedrather widely until Thursdaymorning, when a haggard Gorbachevreappearedin Moscow,togetherwith detailedreports of his incarcerationandthe illnessof his wife. Turning away from the demonstration,I crossedthe street into Manezh Square,savoring the marvelous,almost illicit sensationof crossingabovegroundon streetsusually reservedfor Ladasand Volthroughwhich Muscogas,insteadof in the undergroundpassageways vites are obliged to shuffle like moles. On this Monday afternoon, amid intermittentrain showers,the squarewas filled with demonstrators, strollers, curious bystanders,people fraternizing with soldiers, young couplesholding hands,and peopleeatingice cream.The line at the popularjoint-venturePenguinice cream store, next to the Hotel Moskva, never slackenedthat afternoon.The atmospheremight have seemedalmost festive had it not been for the presenceof the tanks, armoredpersonnelcarriers(APCs),andmilitary trucksthat hadmoved in so suddenlythat morning. The sight of all the hardwarewas awesome.A long line of APCs extendedfrom the Moscow Riverinto ManezhSquare.Besidesthe armed soldiers, equippedwith Kalashnikovmachineguns, severalbusloadsof OMON special forces ("black berets") blocked the entranceto Red Square.APCs,ratherthantanks,dominatedthe scenearoundthe Manezh. I later learnedthat many tankshadbeenmovedinto Red Square.Similar concentrationsof APCs and tanks--severalhundred in all-could be found aroundthe Central Telephoneand Telegraphoffice on Tverskaia Street,in SovetskaiaSquare,andin the vicinity of the White House. The spectacleof so many military vehicles and soldiersreminded me of the monumentalvictory paradesheld in Red Squaretwice each yearsince 1918 on the occasionsof May Day andNovember7. Yet the
AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 89 A civilian confrontsan officer in ManezhSquare sceneon this overcastafternoonof August 19 was dramaticallydifferent. The vehicleswere going nowhere;the young soldierswho occupied them, though fully armed, appeareddazedand confused.As it turned out, they were also hungry and had no bathrooms.The APCs seemedoddly unprotectedandevenvulnerable. Even more astonishing---almostsurreal-wasthe lively fraternization betweencivilians and soldiers.By the time I arrived in Manezh Square,fraternizationwasalreadywell underway, leavenedby cigarettes, chocolates,and other goodies. Civilians, even some children, were perchedon APCs or circled around them. Most of the soldiers-very young men with Central Asian or Ukrainian namesimprinted on their ammunitionpouches-stoodmute but not hostile. Since they had been told that their presencein Moscow was neededto preventa left-wing coupagainstthe government,they wereunderstandablyperplexed.
90 VICTORIA E. BONNELL "Yeltsin Has Calledfor a GeneralStrike" "Outlaw the CPSU!" and "Put the BolshevikPutschistson Trial!"
AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 91 Peoplegatheredfora rally by the Hotel Moskvain ManezhSquare That day, neitherthe officers, nor soldiers,nor Moscow militiamen (generally sparseand aloof) interferedwith the protestersor tried to protectthe APCs from civilian intrusion. People tookadvantageof the situationand scrawledchalk sloganson APCs, suchas "Shameon the CPSU" and "Yazov on Trial." Two young men stood on one APC holding placardswith the messagethat Yeltsin hadcalledfor a general strike. Not far from them, someonehad paintedsloganson the pavementin largewhite letters:"Outlaw the CPSU"and"Put the Bolshevik Putschistson Trial." Officers must havehadsecondthoughtsaboutthe fraternizationbecausethe next day the areaaroundthe APCs hadbeen cordonedoff. But on Monday civilians had easyaccessto the APCs, which werebedeckedwith flowers, protestsigns,andofferingsof food and cigarettes.The mighty defendersof the old regimeof communism hadalreadylost someof their auraof invincibility. As I moved toward the far end of Manezh Squarein front of the Hotel Moskva-ahotel reservedfor membersof the SupremeSoviet and other governmentdignitaries---arally was in progress.An earlier rally organizedhere around 11:00 A.M. had alreadymoved on to the White House, and new people,perhapsfive hundredor more, were
92 VICTORIA E. BONNELL Protestleafletsat a metrostationon Kalinin Prospect gatheredaround the platform. We strainedto hear speechesby four men, including severalmembersof the Moscow City Soviet, who exhorted people to support Yeltsin and defy the junta with a general strike. From time to time the crowd erupted into rhythmic chants: "Yeltsin, Russia,GeneralStrike." Behind the speakersstood a small but visible flag of the Russian Republic,a tricolor with horizontalbandsof white, blue, and red. The flag has a long history in Russia,dating back to 1799, when it was introducedas the country'smerchantflag. In 1883 it becamean alternative civil flag, and in 1914 Tsar Nicholas II addedto it a doubleheadedeagle, symbol of the monarchy. The flag, minus the eagle, servedthe ProvisionalGovernmentbut was abandonedafter the Bolsheviks seized power. During Russia'sAugustRevolution,the tricolor flag becamea potentsymbolof Russiandemocraticresistance. A scruffy manappearedandbeganto hawk photocopiesofYeltsin's appeal, ''To the Citizens of Russia," for fifty kopecks each. Some peoplegrumbledand complainedabout paying for the proclamation, but therewas no shortageof buyers.I later noticedidentical photocopies of the proclamationpostedon the walls of metro stationsin central
AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 93 Moscow, providing many people with their first information about Yeltsin's opposition to the coup. Only the most determinedcitizens could take advantageof this form of communication,since the typescript was extremelysmall andpoorly spaced.During the next critical forty-eight hours,communicationsdid not flow easilyin this sprawling city of nearly nine million people.Word of mouth-atplacesof work and residence,in the streets,and over the telephone-probablytransmitted more informationthanany otherchannelsof communication. As I returnedhome late that afternoon,I looked at Muscovite faces -weary,stolid, care-linedfaces,eyesaverted-andwondered:Will these people mobilize to resist the attack on their freedomand their fledgling democraticinstitutions?How will they overcometheir dispersionin this enormouscity, their poor communications,the apparentabsenceof networks for organization?That first day, I did not see a single instanceof leafletingor proselytizingin public places,exceptat the White Houseand around Manezh Square.My fears intensified when I got back to my in-laws' district of Sokol, abouthalf an hour from the centerof the city. There,peoplewere going abouttheir businessasusual.The White House andthe barricadessuddenlyseemedvery remote. When I put my daughterto bed, she asked about ''the war" and whetherwe would be takento prison. Unthinkingly, I assuredher that foreignerswould not be arrested,which sheinterpreted,quite logically, to meanthat Muscovitesmight be. "Will they comeandtake babushka and dedushkaaway?" she asked with a grave look. No, I told her, _certainlynot your grandparents,for they are old andhavedonenothing but sit at home. "We're all safe," I said in my most reassuringvoice, stifling my own alarm. Later my husbandandI talked aboutevacuationif things continued to deteriorate.We were relievedto learn earlier that air travel had not been interrupted. But we were not ready to leave yet. The situation seemedtoo ambiguousand our emotions--amixture of caution and daring, hope and despair,exhilarationat being there and fear for our personalsafetyandthat of our family-weretoo contradictoryto guide us towarddecisiveaction. DAY Two On Tuesdaymorning the situation seemedunchangedexceptthat a major public rally was scheduledto take placeat the White Houseat noon. The announcementcameover the Moscow Echo radio station
94 VICTORIA E. BONNELL Peoplecarrying an enormoustricolor flag to the midday rally at the White House andshortwavebroadcasts.I sawnoticesof the meetingon the walls in somemetro stationswith instructionsaboutwhich stationto exit from. Since the junta had taken almost complete control over the mass media, communicationnetworks remainedextremely restricted and manyMuscovitesneverfound out aboutthe rally. Tuesdaywas sunny. Enormouscrowds of peoplestreamedtoward the White House,coveringthe entire areaof the parking lot behindit. They spreadout on the lawn beyondthe parking lot and into nearby streets.Somepeopleperchedon the pedestalof a huge sculptureof a womanwaving a Soviet flag, flanked by a soldier with a rifle. Others stoodon ledgesof nearbybuildings. Peoplecrowdedonto the tanks that had goneover to Yeltsin the eveningbefore,now deckedwith flowers andheapedwith milk cartons,bread,potatoes,andcannedfood. The sight of so many people--perhapsas many as one hundred thousand--gaveme hope,for the first time sincethe coup began,that Muscoviteswould mount significant resistanceto the junta. The size and determinationof the crowd andthe tone of the rally remindedme of civil rights and antiwar demonstrationsI had participatedin during the late 1960sand the1970s.This was no randomcollectionof ordinary
AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 95 Muscovites.Judgingby their faces,clothes,and deportment,the vast majority werepeoplewith highereducation,solidly middle classintellectuals and white-collar workers. Apart from the Afghan vets who came to defend the White House, few of the demonstratorslooked like factory workers. Although there were someyoung people,especiallystudents,the vast majority of the participantsin the demonstrationwere in their thirties andforties. Photographswe took at the time confinnthis impression. There were women in the crowd, but noticeably fewer than men. ''They're probably standing in line somewhere,"I thought to myself. Political figures andpublic speakersduring the coupwerenearlyall male. At the Tuesdaydemonstration,only one woman spokepublicly: Yelena Bonner,the widow of Andrei Sakharov,a featuredspeakerat the rally. Peopledid not come in organizedpolitical groups,and there were few placards.The crowd consistedof individuals, brought there by a commonoppositionto the junta, their allegianceto Yeltsin, and Russian nationalism. Three chants that periodically rang out over the square conveyedthe mood of the crowd: "Put the junta on trial," "Yeltsin, we supportyou," "Russiais alive" (the latter proclaimedat the rally by the poetY evtushenko). For threehours,speakerafter speakertook the microphoneto exhort peopleto resistance.They remindedthe crowd of the long history of submissionto unjust authority (mention was madeof Czechoslovakia in 1968,the millions who hadbeenarrestedandsentto camps,andso on) and urged each citizen to take a stand againstthe coup. Others spoke aboutthe illegality of the junta, its violation of Article 62 of the Constitution of the USSR and the criminal code, its unlawful introduction of martial law, and the necessityfor proper legal proceedingsagainstits members.Onephrasewasrepeatedoverandover: ''Putthejuntaon trial." Speakerafter speakerpraisedthe peopleof Moscow and Russians more generally, giving the rally a strong nationalist tone. This was most vividly symbolizedby the arrival of a gigantic tricolor flag, carried by several hundred people and hung along the balcony of the White Housethat servedasthe speakers'platform. A few smallerflags werealso sprinkledthroughoutthe crowd. Eloquentand moving speeches,such as the one deliveredby Bonner, arousedstrongfeelings of allegianceto Moscow andRussia.Bonner beganwith an anecdotefrom her daysof exile in Gorky. Shehadaskeda KGB officer: ''Why do you write lies aboutmy husband'sactivities?" "It is written not for 'us,' " he replied, but for 'the rabble' [bydlo-literally,
96 VICTORIA E. BONNELL The Tuesdayrally, with the tricolor flag drapedover the WhiteHousebalcony cattle]." The junta is the same,Bonner continued. Everything they have said and written is for the "rabble." "They think we are rabble." All putschesandrevolutionsaredecidedin the capital,andMuscovites must demonstrate that they are not rabbleandcannotbe boughtwith a salami paid for with a Pavlov ruble-areferenceto the terrible inflation that devaluedthe ruble following the appointmentof Valentin Pavlov as Prime Minister in January 1991. This statementelicited tremendousapplause. Relentlessly,Bonnerexhortedthe crowd, calling on themto defend the Russianparliament,the RussianPresident,andthe Presidentof the USSR.For althoughhe wassometimesmistaken,Gorbachevwas,after all, "our President"(applause).We must not give over our countryto a "gang of crooks"; we must resist as we did in 1941. She concluded with a paeanto Moscow, so dearto Russianhearts,whereshechoseto live even though she could have moved anywhere (prolonged applause).Shespokewith greatauthorityandelegance. Some speakersmentionedthe general strike, but this was not a major themeat the rally. The timetablefor the beginningof the general strike, vague on Monday, becomeeven more uncertainon Tuesday. The tactical issue on Tuesdaywas not the generalstrike but the de-
AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 97 The crowdlisteningto speeches at the Tuesdayrally fenseof the White Houseagainstwhat manybelievedto be an imminent military attack. An extraordinarysessionof the RSFSRSupreme Soviethadbeenscheduledto beginthereon the following day. The mood of the departingcrowd was tense,determined,and somber as it movedaway from the White Housein a disciplinedmanner.I was struck by the fact that therehadbeenno disturbancesor incidents, no hint of violence during the entire afternoon,despitethe fact that policemen were conspicuously absentand no informal networks of civilians hadbeencreatedto guideandregulatethe crowd. The junta had declareda curfew in effect from 11:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M .. This, it seemed,wasthe preludeto an attackon the White House. Speakershadurgedpeopleto remainand defendthe White House,and some five or ten thousandpeople heededtheir call. Around five 0'clock they beganto form self-defense units. A groupof somefifty or sixty Ukrainian men gatheredin front of the White Houseto discuss procedures.Some political groups had units, such as the anarchists, andthe supportersof Memorial, an organizationdevotedto the preservation of information about Stalin'sterror. Other units consistedsimply of volunteers without any common allegiance except their oppositionto the junta. As night fell, small groupsset up camp in the
98 VICTORIA E. BONNELL Children on a pro-Yeltsin tank near the White House (Anna Freidin, the author'sdaughter,is at center) area,makingfires, eatingfood, listeningto radios;sometook naps. Having collectedmy daughterat the AmericanEmbassy,whereshe was in daycare,and photographingher standingon a friendly tank, I departedfor home.Everyonein my family was glued to the radio that evening.Therewas a feeling of intenseapprehensionand foreboding. We all expecteda confrontationlater thatnight. Around nine o'clock I put a call throughto my father in California, my first sincethe coup began.He wept on the phone as he told me how frightened he had been for our safety. We were not in physical danger,I told him, but tonight would probablyleadto violence.It was hardexplainingto him that so far most of the city remained unaffected by the coup. Despite the high probability of violence aroundthe White House,our neighborhoodpresentedno dangerswhatsoever. My father's alarm gave me a senseof how ominous the situation must appearto the outside world. With memoriesstill vivid of the governmentattacksin Lithuania and Latvia as well as the Tiananmen massacre,a major loss of life and even a civil war seemedlikely. I went to sleepthat night with a heavyheart.
AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 99 Defendersofthe WhiteHousesetup camp Men guardingthe WhiteHouseearly Tuesdayevening
LAUREN G. LEIGHTON 4 Moscow: The Morning of August 21 Lauren G. Leighton,who teachesRussianliterature at the University ofIllinois at Chicago,is the authorofmanyscholarlyworks, essays, andtranslations.He lived in Russia duringmostofthe two years precedingthe coupandin 1991-92wasa Fulbright Exchange Teacherat the MoscowPedagogicalUniversity. I was in the orchardtaking a lukewarm showerin a cold rain at the dacha near Kharkov, in Ukraine, when the EmergencyCommittee madeits now well-known statementthat it hadtakenpower. The voice over the radio soundedlike it is supposedto soundat such a moment: spooky, without human quality,distanced,ominous. It had the Party Old Guardring of a lie to it-not the words themselves,but the presumptiveeasewith which the Old Guard lies for its view of history. My wife, her father, and I immediatelydecidedto return to Moscow, not out of any senseof apprehension,but becausewe knew that the future would be decidedthereandwe wantedto seeit. When we arrived in Moscow we got a glimpse of tanks near the Kremlin and passeda standingcolumn of armoredtroop carriers on our way home,but the city seemedcalm and our taxi driver reported that most of the city had not reacted.Life also continuedas usual in our neighborhood,and I saw no signs of military control when I walked downto look at the Ostankinotelevision center. Radio Free Europe reportedresistance,but the impressionwe receivedwas that peoplehad not reacted.So far as we could tell throughoutthe remainto be in control; we hadplenty der of August20, the putschists seemed of time to decidewhat, if anything,we could do. 100
AUGUST21 IN MOSCOW 101 In this we erred,of course,and it was only in the evening,with rain pouring down and public transportationhalted, that we learnedfrom friends that we had lost anotherday. We tried to makeour way across the city on foot, but finally turned back, wet and feeling foolish. We spentthe rest of the night listening to the reportsof the confrontation on the Garden Ring Road near the American Embassy.I had spent most of the previoustwo yearsin Russiabecause,as a colleagueonce remarked,"History is happeningthere and it would be shamefulto miss it." Now we weremissingit. The rain was still alternatelydrizzling and pouring on the morning of August 21. We were able to make our way by trolleybus to the Garden Ring Road at the junction with Tverskaia Street and then walked about a mile to the American Embassy.We had to make our way throughtwo columnsof light tanks,enginesrunning, the air thick with dieselfumes.Peoplesurroundedthe tanks,beggingthe soldiersto return to their barracks.("Pleasego home, children," is the way one womanput it.) The streetin front of the embassywas littered with the remnantsof the confrontation.Further along the Ring stood the first outer barricade:smashedtrucks and trolleybuses,huge blocks of cement, iron rods, boards,glass.We climbed with difficulty throughthe massof junk, and were helpedby irregularly dressedRSFSRsoldiers, Afghanistanvetsin their distinctivecombatfatigues,andyoungmen in pseudo-militarydressof every description. Russiansof all ageswelcomedus. Peoplestoppedeachotherto exchangeinformation. Further along,wherethe lane alongthe centerof the Ring descendsbeneathan overpassat the junction with Kalinin Prospect,we cameupon the now well-known site of the "Three Fallen," massesof flowers and candles, andpeoplecrossingthemselvesandkneelingin prayer. A graduatestudentreportedthe first of manycontradictoryexplanations of the clash: the tanks had been orderedto pull back, took the wrong direction, and descendedinto the underpass.When the soldiers realizedthey weretrappedby the high walls, they panickedandtried to smashtheir way throughthe row of trolleybuses.The "barrikadniki," assumingthat this was the long-awaitedattack,panickedin turn. Further along, anotheryoung Russiantold us that eageryoung tankers,or their commanders,had acted on their own. Later that day we were assuredthat theincidentwasa last-minuteprovocation.Onereportwas that it was a diversion to draw attention from an assaultby a KGB teamthroughthe heatingtunnelsinto the White House.
102 LA UREN G. LEIGHTON A makeshiftmemorialon the spotwherea youngman was killed in the early morningofAugust21
AUGUST 21 IN MOSCOW 103 The threeyoungmen who perishedat the barricades(photofrom thefuneral procession,Saturday,August24)
/04 LAUREN G. LEIGHTON The moodwithin the perimeterwasa mixture of defianceand anticipation, but not fear. The expectationwasthat the real attemptto storm the White Housewould occur after dark. Until then a lull. There was hopethat a tank columnapproachingalongthe LeningradHighway the night before had stoppednot under orders of juntists experiencing secondthoughts,but in outright refusal to confront the troops of the RussianRepublicand crowdsof unarmedcitizensstandingin the way. That hope becamewhat I considera litany of the three days: Russian soldiersmustnot fire on Russianpeople,Russiansoldiersmustnot kill Russiansoldiers.I am impressedby what we saw only later on television: Peoplesurroundedthe tankson Red Squareand elsewherein the city centerfor the whole threedays,beggedthe soldiersnot to obeythe ordersof the putschists,paintedsloganson the tanksandcoveredthem with flowers, and fed the soldiers when they realized they were not being supplied. For their part the soldiers-inmost casesnaive and provincial-wereinitially hostile,thensullen,thenconfused.Most had no idea why they had beencalled into the city. Only one soldier declaredhe was preparedto obeyordersto shoot.Many showedas much interestin their legendarysurroundingsas any othertourist in Moscow for the first time. All clearly enjoyed the unexpectedabundanceof food, candy,cigarettes,andsouvenirsgiven by oneandall. Among the first things we noticed as we approachedthe White House were the pun-sloganscovering windows and barricadejunk. "We are not afraid ofPugo-Pugach"(a pun on the surnameof Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo and the Russianword for a toy gun). "Put the putschiststo a people'strial!" "Let's put the putschistsa putschin the tush." More than a few sloganswere plays on the word khunta Gunta) and khui (prick). Many sloganswere straightforward: "Yazov is a piece of shit!" All were defiant: "Defend Russia!" "Russia! Lithuania is with you!" "They tried to drive us back into the barn, but we won't go!" "Traitors, out of Russia!"In severalplacesgarbage cans were markedwith signs "Party cards here." During those three daysandafter, hundredsof Partymembershipcardswerethrown at the front door of Partyheadquarters on Staraia(Old) Square.Interestingly, there were no anti-Gorbachevslogans,but as soon as the Presidentwas safe,a numberof extremelybitter signsappeared,including one reminding Yeltsin that ''theonly curefor a hunchback[gorbatyll is the grave." We had to make our way through three barricadesbefore reaching the huge marble White House standing back from the long curved
AUGUST21 1N MOSCOW 105 A trolleybusdamagedby an annoredvehiclein the early morningofAugust21 embankmentof the MoscowRiver abouttwo miles to the northwestof the Kremlin. It can be approachedfrom the Kremlin along Kalinin Prospectpast the GardenRing Road. Adjacent on a rise at its southwest comer standsthe American Embassy,which obviously figured prominently in the defense.The juntist troops would have to forgo approachesalongtwo streetsfrom that direction, for fear of causingan international incident. Both streetswere left open, as if daring the juntists to risk that approach.The bridge acrossthe river was barricadedby largevehiclesandheavyconstructionmachineryof all kinds. The river itself was blockedby bargesand ships.All other approaches on all sideswere similarly barricadedthreetimes: trucks, trolleybuses, constructionmachinery,beamsand pipes, boardsand beams,glass, blocks of cement,piles of bricks and cobblestones,anything and everything that could be piled up to halt and delay tanks. Many people rememberthe double and triple rows of public transportationvehicles that formed the strongest barriers; I rememberthe long concrete-
/06 LA UREN G. LEIGHTON reinforcementrods that stuck out in all directionslike straws.Around the Soviet-stylemonumentto the workerswho barricadedthis areain 1917, the straws had been arrangedwith pleasinggrace, as if with artistic forethought. Units of armedcitizens,MVD militiamen and MVD specialpolice troops (OMON), young men andwomen, and curious onlookerssurroundedevery area control post, each markedby a campfire for hot tea, tents, and sleepingquartersjerry-rigged in vehicles. Within the center stood ten tanks arrangedat strategicpoints aroundthe White House.Regulararmy soldiers,Afghanistanersandother veterans,studentsand young workersof both sexes--Muscovites of all ages--had cometo defendthis last and only andbestdefenseof Russia'sdemocracy. Many were obviouslytired. They slept in groupsunderwhatever shelterthey could find or build, or noddedaroundthe fires. The seats of some vehicles were filled with people sleepingin every possible uncomfortableposition. One young couple had a trolleybus all to themselves.While he sleptwith his headon her shoulder,shesmoked andfrowned at the rain. Later, whenmy wife complimenteda groupof Afghanistanerssurroundinga tank, they protestedthat they were only standingin for exhaustedregular soldierssleepingsomewhereinside the White House. Even as we arrived, so also did hundredsof others,and soonthousandsbeganarriving. Everybodytried to bring along anotherpieceof junk to throw on the barricades. Theflow was down on the Ring Road and Kalinin Prospect,throughthe barricades,and directly through the centerofthe squarebehindthe White House.Peoplelookedwith wonder at the splendidchaosof the barricades,and turnedto anyonewho looked like an experiencedbarricaderfor inside news of what was happeningor might happen. Sometimearound ten 0'clock, others beganto arrive too. Loudspeakerswelcomedthem and peoplerushed to hug them: busloadsof heavily armedmilitia units from other cities --Orel, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Rostov, Novgorod, Smolensk. People clappedthem on the shouldersand helped carry their equipment. Togetherwith them throughoutthe rest of the day, groups of soldiers of the regular army strode self-consciously,embarrassedby shouts of praise, "to the side of Russia," against"the junta," "the putschists,""the Communists,""the traitors," as they were calledby one and all. We shouldhave known then that the outcomehad been decided.By the end of the day over a half a million people were
AUGUST21 IN MOSCOW 107 there,andin the city as a whole severalmillion peoplehadtakento the streets.Peoplewere also taking to the streetsin other cities; the demonstrationon St. Petersburg'sWinter PalaceSquarewas anotherimpressiveevent. But the generalview at that momentwas that severaltank divisions were in Moscow, and eventhoughmost of the troopsmight refuseto fIre on their own people, theplain damnsizeofthe confrontationcould leadto bloodshed.No onethoughtthat ten tankscould stop a division. No one could be surethat the juntists would not musterthe courageto solve their dilemma "Lenin-style." That did not seem likelyYanaev'sshaking hands at the press conferencethe day before revealedthe true characterof the putschists-butit did seempossible that they would issuefatal ordersout of desperation.Therewas every expectationthat when the time came,the army would come crashing through, with no regardfor the civilians determinedto standin their way. If the tanksdid come,there could be no way out of that massof peopleandmetal. Rain, fog, the smoke of campfIres.Women, children, old people, students,and streettoughs.Earnestyoung men in suits and ties----the "new businessmen."Tents, ambulances,medical stations, tables of food free for all. Many peoplehadbroughttheir children, and fortifIed sheltershad been built for them. The organizationwas impressive: peoplehad beendivided into sectorswith commandposts,complete with colored arm bands to mark position, function, and authority. Weaponshad beengiven only to civilians who clearly knew how to carry them. Vodka was conspicuousonly by its absence.And the rain camedown. The long, high balconyon the side of the White Housefacing away from the river was lined with people.Someonewas speakingover the loudspeakers,but we could see no one speakingfrom the balcony. Resolutionswere being proposedand voted on, and the crowd on the squarevoted eagerlyandunanimously.It took us sometime to realize we were listening to the proceedingsof the SupremeSoviet of the RSFSRinside, and peopleon the squarewere voting along with their deputies!Thereis no denyingthat this was the world centerof democracy at that momentin our time. We walked around,and I took lots of pictures.As an obvious foreigner I was recognizedwhereverwe went, even given the special favor of climbing up on a tank to posefor a photo. I was gladly shown
J08 LAUREN G. LEIGHTON the interior, and the annamentwas explainedto me. Newsweeklater reportedthat a few tanks nearthe White Househad turnedtheir guns symbolically in the other direction, and that they were not anned.In fact, the tanks had gone early on to the side of Russia,and now they were inside, not outside,the barricades.Peoplewantedto know who I was and how an American came to be there. But no one was particularly talkative: there was too much tension,and though people knew the world sympathizedwith them, they also understood that they were alone. It cannotbe said that spirits were high. Even as peoplejeeredand cheered,arguedand orated,they were solemn and serious. I tried an experiment.WhenI smiledat someone,thatpersonsmiled back. If I held out my hand,someoneshookit. WhenI madea V sign, the sign was immediatelyreturnedwith a smile. WhereverI pointed my camera,peopleassumedwhateverposethey thought seemedappropriate to the day. Peoplereadily answeredquestions,and took a momentto tell us who they were and why they were there.Most of us were spectatorsthat day--therewasclearly a differencebetweenexperiencedbarricadersandthosewho hadarrivedtoo late to be given a job to do-but solidarity is still the bestword in any languageto describe the morale that day. The barricadersat one post immediately made room for me to sit with them while I changedfilm. The young men in chargeof areashelpedme reacha bettervantagepoint, and showedby their polite mannerthat they wantedRussiaandRussiansto be seenin their bestlight by foreigners. So, on the morning of August 21 the tanks in the centerof Moscow would have to passthrough massivecrowds of people before reachingthe White House.Troops had moved away from the Moscow City Soviet, where Mayor Gavriil Popov and his government had also barricadedthemselves.Tank columns had halted on the roadsinto Moscow, and thoseon Red Squareshowedno indications of leaving or acting. The army had refused orders to advanceon Leningrad. Several cities remained under the control of the still strongParty rule, but crowds had takento the streetsin many cities. By this time anyone who was anyone had arrived to support the Yeltsin government: Gorbachev'sformer political adviser AIeksandrYakovlev, Vadim Bakatin (one of Yeltsin's opponentsin the spring election campaign), Eduard Shevardnadze,Andrei Sakharov'swidow YelenaBonner,and poet Yevgenii Yevtushtenko.
AUGUST21 IN MOSCOW 109 Mstislav Rostropovichflew in from Paris the moment he received word of the coup. Later that day he walkedthroughcrowdsof adoring Russians. Somethings never change.Russiansonly half joke when they say that the worst scourgeof the Soviet period was not Stalin, but the little old ladies who appointedthemselvesguardiansof Socialist Morality in every neighborhood.Nowadaysthey are called keepers of social or civil propriety. While we watcheda tank maneuverits way through a barricade,it knockedover a tree. The usual band of little old ladiescamerunning forth to scoldthe soldiers,who madea hastyretreat. As in any country, where the action is, there the little boys are. Somehad fashionedfor themselvesthe mostimpressivemilitary wear. All were everywhereandinto everything.Their appointedduty wasto hand out sandwichesfrom trays, and perhapsa sign of the patriotism of those days was that they seemednot to have found a way to sell what they were supposedto give. Thosewho were there on their own were of course envied by those who had to endure accompanying parents. Old people were there too, many of them wearing the medalsof their World War II generation.They helpedmaketeaaroundthe campfIres, carried signs, stoppedbarricadersto offer words of encouragement. Onewell-known TV clip showsan elderly womandeterminedly carryingcobblestones to the constructionof a barricade. The end cameso swiftly and in suchunlikely fashion that no one really believedit, neitherthen nor later. RuslanKhasbulatov,acting presiding officer of the SupremeSoviet of the RSFSR,simply announcedthat the putschistshad made a run for V nukovo Airport. There were loud cheers,and then the SupremeSoviet beganissuing orders: The MVD and KGB were to arrestthe putschists.The army was to submit immediately to the governmentof the RSFSR, and troops were to return to their barracks.A delegationformed under the leadershipof RSFSRVice PresidentAleksandrRutskoi was to go to the Crimea and free Gorbachev.Another delegationwas sent to take control of the Kremlin. All local sovietsthat supportedthe junta were to be dismissedimmediately. The headquartersof the CentralCommitteeof the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union was seized.All press,radio, and television personnelwere immediately to resumecontrol of their reporting facilities. A delegationwas sent
110 LAUREN G. LEIGHTON to KGB headquarters on Lubiankato take control. The Black Beretsin Lithuaniaweretold to ceaseand desist. When we left the White Housethat evening,the sun was shining. I do not rememberwhenthe rain stopped.On Novyi Arbat, peoplestood as if frozen to the sidewalks,listening to the proceedingsof the SupremeSoviet of the RSFSRbeing broadcastfrom loudspeakersevery hundredfeet or so along the promenade.Every face showedthe same expression.I have tried ever since to find a word to describethat expression.Thoughtfulis the onethat fits the best.
VLADIMIR PETRIK 5 Moscow's M.V. Khrunichev Machine-BuDding Factory Reacts to the August Coup At the time ofthe coup, Vladimir Petrik waschiefofthe assembly division at the M V. KhrunichevMachine-BuildingFactory. Petrik's division ofthefactory built the Mir spacestationandassembledthe Proton rocketlauncher. Whatfollows is his story ofthe coupas it was recordedby a staffwriter at Literatumaiagazeta.It waspublishedon January1, 1992. "I beganmy careerthirty yearsago in this factory," saysPetrik. "Back then, the factory was devotedto aviation and was simply called 'P.O. Box 222.'· A little later, after the introductionof an 'open,'consumer goodssection,they gaveit a second,parallelname[...]. And so it was also known as the M.V. KhrunichevMoscow Machine-BuildingFactory." THE MORNING OF THE TWENTIETH August 20, 9:00 A.M. The secondday of the coup. An executivemeeting of the factory administration.Seventypeoplein attendance.All are from uppermanagement. The bosses.The elite. Kiselev,the directorof the factory, rises.He hasa copy of Pravdain his hands. [Here is Petrik'saccountof whatoccurredat the meeting:] "Have you hada chanceyet to familiarize yourselveswith Resolution No.1 of the GKChP?"[askedKiselev]. Silencein the hall. *As a rule, military enterpriseswerereferredto by postoffice addresses. 111
112 VLADIMIR PETRIK "Now then. Some eventshave transpired.Our job is not to get involved in politics. On the 26th, the SupremeSoviet will convene and reacha decisionon the legality of everythingthat has occurred.Until then, we must not give way to panic! Everything is functioning normally. Our task is to makesurethat the factory continuesto operate." Everythinghe said was correct. The factory must continueto operate.But there seemedto be somesort of misunderstanding. The President-whoafter all is the headof the entire stateapparatus -wasjust dischargedfrom his duties in a very peculiarmanner, and the director of the factory-who is the highest-rankingstate authority in this small sliver of our country'sterrito~a1mly highest-ranking declaresthat nothingspecialhashappened. The instructionscontinue on how we are to behave.Special dutiesare assigned.Deputy chiefs of eachdivision are to remain at their posts until eight in the evening; division headsstay on until midnight. Security is to be doubledacrossthe factory. The chemicaldepotsareto be speciallyprotected. Similar measureswere taken in all factories at this time. One got the feeling that not even a tiny group of officials were angeredby events,but ratherthat all of them were expectingsome sort of major military attack by international imperialism or world Zionism--orperhapsby Arab terrorism. Finally, at threeo'clock camethe director'sspeech-ageneral discussionand lamentabouthow difficult the times are now and how unfortunatethe factory's lot. All aroundus there is nothing but anarchy,everythingis a mess.There'sno programfor conversion.Thereare no supplies.Eachrepublic is trying to pull the blanket to its own side. All contractsare violated. Supplies of metal are stalled. "All of you here---chiefsof the divisions and departmentsthink about how you can get your divisions out of this mess. Create small-scale[private] enterprises.Perhapsit would be worthwhile to setup a concern...." The speechended. Any questions?The director's mouth was already open and about to utter the concludingphrase:"That's all, the executivemeetingis over." Petrik raisedhis hand."I haveonequestion."
THE M.V. KHRUNICHEV FACTORY Il3 SUICIDE "I don't rememberexactly what 1 said," recalls Petrik, "but it was somethinglike this: 'Of course,we have supply problems,staff turnover, and we needto think aboutthe creationof small enterprisesand concems-theseare all very important questions.But the most important question today is, what will the factory do now that anticonstitutionalactionshavebeencarriedout--essentiallya coupd'etat?'" What???What is this??? "I understand,Anatolii Ivanovich," continuedPetrik, ''that you are expressingyour personalopinion. . . ." Kiselev was known to have been one of the signatoriesto the unforgettableLetter of 53, which calleduponGorbachevto tightenthe screwson democracy. At this point Kiselev interrupted:"This is not my personalposition. I am a servantof the state.My responsibilityis the factory. We must not allow any panichere." "Sure, but didn't we vote for Yeltsin in June?Didn't we elect him President?I introducea concreteproposal:Let's continueour meeting for anotherfifteen minutes and work out the position of the factory leadership.And there is only one standwe can take: supportYeltsin, the legally electedPresident,and declarea symbolic two-hour strike without interrupting any of the operationsthat require a continuous cycle of production.In short,makeit clearwhosesidewe're on. After all, we are widely viewedas oneof the pillars of the military-industrial complex." The director leanedback in his armchair. The initial shock had passed.He was eveninterestedin finding out what the reactionof the audiencewould be. Oneof the division chiefsrose. "This is demagoguery!He's for Yeltsin.... And what are we to do? We are on military duty. What doesit meanto declarea strike?Leave the countrywithout missiles,without the nuclearshield?" Anotherpersonstoodup, from the consumergoodsdivision. He had otherarguments.They employ"guestworkers" there.If they declarea strike for just two hours, those guys won't get back to work for two weeks. Two morespokeout. No support. The director, calm by now, brought the meeting to a close. "Has everyonehad a chanceto speak?Everythingis understood.The situation is clear.Everyoneto his post."
114 VLADIMIR PETRIK After executivemeetingspeopleusually swarmaroundPetrik. The chief of the assemblydivision is an important person. In a sense, everyoneworks for him. If in a conferencehe asks someonean unpleasantquestion or tells a person to hastena delivery-it's like a reprimandor a signal that the factory might be facing an emergency. Suchmattersarealwaysbetterdiscussedandsettledbeforehand. This time as he left ... therewas a vacuumaroundhim. A complete void. Peopleavertedtheir gaze. They turned away. He was now an outcast.A death-rowinmate.A goner. It was then that fear beganto set in. "I was standingthere, smoking. Do people really have this much fear?It's beensix yearsnow. Wasit all for nothing?" True, one persondid approachand congratulatehim. "Well, you're quite a fellow!" They stood for a moment and chatted.Then, once more,Petrik wasalone. Now the director was leaving. As he did so, he mockingly slapped Petrik on the back: "For today'sspeechandthe call for a strike,you've alreadyearnedfive yearsin prison. The materialjust hasto be turned over to the prosecutor'soffice." Petrik wantedto respond:"Better five yearsin prison than seventyfour consecutiveyears of slavery." But the director had already descendedthe stairs.He wasoff to a meetingwith someAmericans. "AN INDIVIDUAL STRIKE OF PROTEST" Petrik returnedto his division and sat in his office. To hell with work! He had received no support, none. What would he do now? He grabbeda sheetof thick draftsman'spaperand with a magic marker wrote in largeprint: "As a sign of protestagainstthe anti-constitutional coup d'etat carried out on 19.08.91 by the so-called GKChP (CC CPSU) ..." ("I understoodintuitively even then that the Central Committeeof the CPSUstoodbehindthe GKChP," saysPetrik), " ... 1 declarean individual strike on 20 August beginningat 11:30 A.M." He underlinedthe word "individual" twice. He signedhis name,and then he glued the announcement to his door, firmly, so that it could not be removed. He thensatdown andaddressed a statementto the director: "I bring it to your attentionthat on accountof the anti-constitutional, anti-statecoup d'etatcarriedout by the GKChP (CC CPSU),an indi-
THE MV. KHRUNICHEV FACTORY 115 vidual strike is herebydeclaredby myself beginningon 20 August at 11 :30 A.M. My demands:(1) the membersof the so-calledand self-appointed GKChP must be brought to justice; (2) the legally elected Presidentof the USSR,M.S. Gorbachev,mustbe restoredto power." 1 summonedmy secretary.She was thoroughly frightened; the rumors had alreadyreachedher. According to procedure,1 listed the declarationin her registry to make everythingofficial. 1 did not want to wait for interoffice mail and so 1 senther off at a trot to the administrationheadquarters. After a while chief engineerGorodnichevplaceda call to me by direct line, via the factory line: "I haveyour declarationin my hand.Haveyou lost your mind?" "Yurii Petrovich,how did you get hold of it? It was addressed to the director.How arbitrary,how out of bounds!" ''Well, the secretarybroughtit to me He was a little embarrassed. ... beforeputting it on the director'sdesk."A "friendly" admonition ensued:"I have my doubts, too, you understand.This ... well, this Yanaev.Let's just say, his handswere shakingas ifhe hadjust madeoff with a neighbor'shen...." "So, this meansthatyou ... What exactlyis your position?" He didn't answerthat. "All the same,you would be betteroff taking backthis declaration." "Excuseme, but what do you take me for, a little boy? This is my clear and consciouschoice, and 1 will not back down from it." Fifteen minutes later, 1 receiveda more ominous call---from the local KGB officer, the deputy director for security procedures. ''They gave me an order, here ... ," he said. "To take measureswith regardto you." "Well, if they gaveyou orders,you'dbettercarry themout." "None of this seemsvery seriousnow," saysPetrik, "but at the time 1 was certain they were going to arrestme. After all, it is a military enterprise.A 'P.O. Box' factory. 1 thoughtto myself: They will carry out the order immediately. They will call for a black Maria [KGB car] and shove me in--only 1 don't know whetherthey'll be using handcuffs.To the 'Sailors' Peace'[detentioncenter],or somewhere closer."
116 VLADIMIR PETRIK The [deputy director's] voice dropped a half-tone. "Is your division bringing operationsto a halt?" Well, how could a work stoppagebe permittedin our division? That would be tantamountto closing down the entire factory! Holes would immediately appearin our nuclear shield. There would be gapsin our programof spaceexploration. ''No, the division hasnot broughtoperationsto a halt," Petrik reassuredthe KGB officer. "The division is at work. The strike I declared is an individual one." LET THE CIRCUS SHOW BEGIN Thenthe streamof visitors began.Lengthy excursionsto the office of the chiefofthe twenty-seconddivision. At least factory efficiency was dented somewhat:people were distracted from their work. They read the declaration. Some laughed,somecried.... That'show it was. Two women looked into my office in tears: "What have you done?They will crush anddestroyyou!" "Well, listen," respondedPetrik, "sometimesyou haveto get up off your knees!Or are we supposedto remainthis way forever?"But most of the time, of course,they just laughed.One could hear everything throughthe door. How odd! Never beforehad they seenanythinglike this in the factory. At that point, someinterestingthings were taking place in the factory headquarters.Once the declarationwas read, orderswent out to the legal departmentto preparea casefor Petrik'sdismissal.The documentswere to be conveyedimmediatelyto the prosecutor'soffice. At this stage,however, a small problem arose: the legal departmentrefusedto go alongandwould not budge. I had known this young woman,Olia Pobedinskaia--she was the entire legal department-forabouta year.I alwaysthought... how factory lawshouldI put it? ... that shewas your standard-issue yer: they tell her to do something,she does it. The bow-andscrapetype. But now, if you can imagine,shedisplayedher true character.
THE M.v. KHRUNICHEV FACTORY 117 "There are no grounds for dismissal," she told them. "And evenlessfor contactingthe prosecutor'soffice." Undoubtedly,the administrationwas shockedby her response: well, well, what in the world arewe to do?! It is well known, however,that there are no obstaclesthat Bolsheviks cannotovercome.So they turned the task over to the personnel department.And this time there was no problem. The order was greetedwith a salute. The paperswere drawn up. Later, the director showedthemto Petrik. . . . Working hourswere drawing to a close.Vitalii Lukich Tverskoi, the chairmanof the factory trade union committeeand a respectedmanin the factory, cameto my office. "The director telephonedme. Go, he said, and explain everything to him. I cannot speakwith him myself. This was with regardto you, Petrik." Oh, God, how well I know this overbearing,paternalistic,excessivelyfamiliar, lord-of-the-manorintonationof Sovietbosses. The embodimentof higherwisdom,inaccessibleto meremortals. We talked for a while. "Well now, you're in favor ofYeltsin? Or is it Gorbachev?" "It's not the namesthat are importantto me now," I said,"but the process--theprocessof achievingfreedom as such. I mean completeemancipation,not one that hides behind some sort of socialism-whetherwith a humanface, without a face, or with a behind.... This is a unique chance,and we have only to make surethat it doesn'tslip throughour fingers." We discussedeverything and understoodone another very clearly. The trade union man then went to seethe director--to persuadehim not to issue the order. As they say, trade union officials mustdefendthe workers. . . . Vladimir spentthe night of 20-21 August in the vicinity of the White House,wherehe workedalongsideoneof the groupsof students. THE PLODDING GAIT OF THE DINOSAURS Vladimir Petrik is no politician. He's not on the left or the right, and he'sneithera democratnor a conservative.He reachedhis decisionby
lIB VLADIMIR PETRIK using commonsense.As he himself puts it, commonsenseand pragmatismarehis mostsalienttraits. "My evolutiontook placebeginningin 1986 with the publicationof information on what hastakenplacein our country, our history. I had not yet lost my analytical abilities. I was never a dogmaticthinker. I neveridolizedthis sacredcow--theCPSU." Shortly beforethe eventsof August,Petrik visited France.It was his fIrst trip abroad.In the old days, of course,this was unheardof; only the top bossescould travel beyondthe border. But now the door was open. A full-scale model of the Mir spacerocket was being put on displayat La BourgerExhibition. "We had a good time" [Petrik recalls]. "At fIrst, of course,you feel like a completeass,but then ... you feel as though you'd beenborn prematurely.Of course,I had alwaysassumedthat life would be completely different there. That much was clear from the newspapersand television. But to seeit with your own eyes--that'sa different matter altogether.Whenyou look into one of thoseAlgerian shopsandseean array of goods that you would never dream of seeing in GUM or TsUM [Moscow'smain departmentstores].... Obviously,this had an impact.I felt thenthat I would no longerbe ableto live asbefore." It is more or lessclearwhy Petrik spokeout at the executivemeeting. But what madehim leave the factory after August?After all, no one drove him out. (The order to sack him was quickly withdrawn.) Wasthe directorto blame? "It wasn'tjust the director. It was the feeling of being in a 'dead zone,' a vacuum,when I left the executive meetingafter my speech, and the belatedapproval,when everythingwas over: 'Well now, that was really great! .. .' Worst of all, however,was when someoneset out to make a hero out of me for the sole purposeof using me as a batteringram in the battleof oneclique againstanother.All of this was disgustingto me." I don't know whetherthe 1:70 ratio-remember,there were about seventypeopleat the executivemeeting-accurately reflectsthe actual level of supportfor the GKChP within the military-industrialcomplex. I have no doubt, however, that the balancewas entirely in favor of YanaevandCompany-ormore precisely,in favor of the "ideals" that inspired them to act (nobody gives a damn about Yanaev). What is especiallydisturbing is that this level of support continuesto grow with each and every passingweek. This was certainly evident from
THE MY. KHRUNICHEV FACTORY 119 Rutskoi's recent trip to Siberia and the Altai region. (Incidentally, noticethe paradox:the erstwhileopponentof the GKChP, it seems,has virtually beentransformedinto a vehicle for a new confrontatioIl--Qr somethinglike that. We certainlyhaveour luck with vice presidents!) I fear that the numberof peoplepossessingPetrik'sframe of mind is not much greaterin the organizationsof the military-industrial complex than it is in the Army. Some, like Petrik, leave of their own accord;othersare askedto leave,oneway or another. Vladimir hasnow setup his own small business. "My goal is not to run one of those 'Russianbusinesses'that buys goodsat oneprice andsellsthemat another.I want to makethings."
SERGEP. PETROFF 6 The Congressof Compatriots: Witness to a Democratic Counter-Revolution SergeP. PetrofJwasborn in Harbin, China, into afamily ofRussian emigreswhofled Russiain 1922.He grew up in Japanandthe United Statesandhashada careeras a businessexecutiveandhistorian. The authorofa bookaboutthe late CommunistParty ideologistMikhail Suslov,he is currentlycompletingresearchon theRussianCivil War. PetrofJhasvisitedRussiamanytimesandis promotingU.S.-Russian businesscontacts. I By bizarrecoincidence,the August 1991 coup in Moscow occurredon the sameday as the openingof the First Congressof Compatriot!rMonday, August 19. Convenedwith PresidentYeltsin's blessing,the Congressof Compatriotswas organizedby the SupremeSoviet of the RussianFederationto servetwo objectives:to establisha communication channel for overseasRussians,and to create for the Russian governmenta supporting network of foreign businessmenand professionalsof Russianorigin. Eight hundredmen and women came from twenty-sevendifferent countries, representingall three waves of Russianemigration since 1917. By far the largest number came from the United Statesand France, and more than half were descendantsof the first wave of emigreswho fled communismin the wake of the OctoberRevolution andthe ensuingcivil war. "Heavenfrom all creatureshidesthe book of fate," Shakespeare wrote, and so it seemedto many of the congress 120
THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 121 delegates----especially to thosewhosefamily backgroundsembraceda history of fierce anticommunism.They cameto Moscowto reestablish long-severedcontacts,but found themselvesinsteadin the midst of a coupthat triggeredthe endof Communistrule in Russia. From the very beginning, the organizationof the congresswas steepedin controversy.The advancepublicity andthe programagenda had a decidedlynationalist-patriotictenor. Someemigresencouraged this; othersfelt that the organizingcommitteewas placing too much emphasison national rebirth. A number of prominent emigreswere convincedthat it was mostly a public relationsgesture,and therefore chosenot to attendat all. I, too, had seriousreservations.As a liberal democratnot unmindful of Russiannationalism,I was not sure that I would be comfortablein the companyof flag-wavingemigresandtheir ultrapatriotic Russianhosts.But as a Russian-Americanvitally interestedin the future of Russia,I felt a powerful pull to attendthe congress.I had traveledto the Soviet Union regularly since 1983, and I was trying to make senseout of perestroika'stortuous course.I had watchedBoris Yeltsin's gradualrise to powerand was anxiousto find out for myselfwho Yeltsin actually was. Was he a democrat,a populist, a Westemizer,or a Russiannationalist?In August 1991 therewere still no reliable answersto this question,and the Congressof Compatriots seemeda perfectpoint of reference,particularly since many of Yeltsin'ssupporterswerescheduledto participatein the program. The Congressof Compatriotswas plannedas an importantand gala political milestone.The Russiangovernmentallocatedeighteenmillion rublesfor it. Anothertwelve million rubleswereraisedby variousnew Russianbusinessorganizations,the Russianbranch of the Union of USSRLeaseholdersand Entrepreneurscoming throughwith the largest contribution. Giant bannerswith the inscription "Welcome, Compatriots" were hung along many of Moscow'smain thoroughfares.To mark the eventand maximizepublicity, PresidentYeltsin was to open the congress,and it was rumoredthat he would use the occasionto acknowledgeCommunistoppressionandoffer a public apologyfor all the indignities thrust upon the Russiannation during nearly seventyfive yearsof Communistrule. II The official openingof the Congressof Compatriotswas scheduledfor 7:00 P.M. at TchaikovskyConcertHall. But the day'seventscasta dark
122 SERGEP. PETROFF shadowover the plannedfestivities. Due to heavy traffic and crowds alongTverskaiaStreet,the congressdid not openuntil 8:30 P.M. President Yeltsin, who had escapedarrestand was now directing the opposition from the White House,obviously could not attend.In his place, USSR SupremeSoviet Deputy Mikhail Tolstoi, grandnephewof the Russianwriter Aleksei Tolstoi, openedthe meetingwith a readingof PresidentYeltsin's bold proclamationaboutthe unlawful andunconstitutional seizureof powerby the self-appointedEmergencyCommittee and a brief commenton the eventsof the day. The organizingcommittee had put togetheran ambitious cultural programof music, dance, and theatrical performancesfeaturing a variety of artists from the multiethnic RussianFederation.The hall was packedwith officials, delegates,guests,membersof the Leaseholdersand Entrepreneurs Union, and representativesof the Russianpress,many of whom had come to Moscow from such faraway placesas Perm, Yekaterinburg, and Novosibirsk to find out what their overseascompatriotslooked like andwhat they hadto sayaboutthe changingface of Russia. Without Yeltsin'spresence,the openingceremonywould havebeen of little consequence,despitethe quality and richnessof the cultural program.But an incidentthat took placeearly in the programmadean enormousdifference.A Russian-Americandelegate-Ifound out later that he wasthe New York avant-gardeartist Smorchevskii-Butterbr~ November November arrivedat the concerthall from the barricadesoutsidethe White House and askedto be recognized.His moving remarkselectrified the audience:"Democracyhasbeenslain, and Gorbachev,too, may be dead-killed in the Crimea," he announced,alleging that he had heard the newsaboutGorbachevfrom a reputablesourceonly an hour before. Throughoutthe day rumorsaboutGorbachevwere flying, but nothing as drastic as this had been suggested.There were also informal discussionson how the congressshould officially react to the coup. Should it go on record with a declarationin support of Yeltsin or should it and its delegates--most of whom were not Soviet citizens-refrain from participationin Soviet internal affairs? Despitea general feeling of supportfor Yeltsin, genuineconsensuswashardto comeby. Congressofficials were on the whole pro-Y eltsin, but did not want to take a firm positionwithout further deliberation.Five yearsof glasnostandembryonicdemocracyhadnot yet erasedcompletelythe longnurtured habit of caution and equivocation.Delegatesalso found it difficult to reach a conclusion.Although their sympathieswere with
THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 123 Yeltsin, they hesitatedto takea decisiveposition,fearingthat the Party and the KGB could easily defeat the opposition. The most resolute responsecame from the unofficial hosts of the congress----thenew Russianbusinessmen.As former technocratsand Party apparatchiks who only recentlyhadexchangedtheir Partyprivilegesfor the promise of unrestrictedwealth and personalindependence,they knew how far the centralSovietapparatushadalreadydisintegrated.They hadstrong doubtsthat the gray menof the EmergencyCommitteewerecapableof accomplishinganything, let alone governing a tired and raucousnation. They also had a greatdeal to lose if the old "command-administrative system"were put in force again. Many of them had spokenin the early hours of the coup to their home bases,and had satisfied themselvesthat their employeeswere also supportingYeltsin. It was not surprisingthereforethat they favoreda strongstatementof support for Yeltsin. Somewere certainthat the "putschwould ultimately misfIre," but the best forecastcamefrom a constructioncompanyowner from Tver who gave the junta "a maximum of one week before they would destroythemselves." The stagingof the congressin the midst of a coup presentedformidable problems. In many ways, the congresswas a "pir vo vremia chumy" (a feast during a pestilence),as one of the Russianbusinessmencalledit, usingthe title of a shortplay by Pushkin.On the first day of the coupit was still very difficult to be unequivocal,andno sensible responseto the artist'sstatement~xplicit Novemberor implicit--seemedappropriate. Trying to relievethe built-up tension,Mikhail Tolstoi askedthe audienceto standup and observea momentof silence.Most did, but a numberof prominent Soviet leadersand intellectualsin the audience declinedto follow his call. If thereeverwas a momentof truth during the entirecongress,this wasit. I don't know what promptedme to speakout andbreakthe silence. It may have been a suddenflash of emotion in protestagainstthose who refusedto standup. It may have had somethingto do with the distressingdefeatismof the artist's commentsand Mikhail Tolstoi's indecisivereaction.Or it may have beeninfluencedby more rational thinking aboutwhat I hadwitnessedandassimilatedduringthe day. I had spent most of the day walking the streets and squaresof Moscow trying to ascertainfor myself the extent of support for Yeltsin, and I cameto the conclusionthat the oddswere in his favor. The attitudeof the troops,the vitality of the crowdssupportingYeltsin,
124 SERGEP. PETROFF the rapidity and thoroughnesswith which Moscow had mobilized its anti-putschforces, the continuing transmissionof clandestineradio stations,the disseminationof anti-putschliterature, and the favorable reportsfrom the provincesall pointedto the conclusionthat therewas in Russiaa large enoughcritical massto sustainpressureagainstthe junta. In the words of one "sidewalk philosopher"who knew his Lermontov, "Yeltsin as still 'the hero of his time,' despitethe yelping of the drunksfor the goodold days." Whateverit was,the momentof silencedid not satisfyme. I felt that a more affirmative statementwas called for, and I stoodup to demand one."There is no sanereasonfor a requiem,"I cried out. "It's too early to bury Gorbachevand write off Yeltsin. What is neededis a declaration of solidarity with them." The hall explodedin a suddenrumble of voices. Some felt that my statementwas too confrontational,others agreedwith me, and still othersdid not hear what I had said. In the end,no positive actionwastakenthat evening,althoughat an 8:00 P.M. meetingon August 20, after a heateddiscussionof who shouldreceive the letter of protest,the congressdid sendone to the USSR Supreme Sovietwith a copy to the UnitedNations. My demonstrativeresponseto the incident did not pass without consequences. On the positive side, I had suddenlybecomea celebrity for whom doors were now open where they had beenclosedbefore, giving me an opportunityin the aftermathof the failed coupto comein contactwith peoplewhoseviews and opinionsgaveme a much better understandingof what hadactuallyhappenedduring the threedays.On the negative side, I found that I was being houndedby the Russian pressand a profusion of new Russiansocial organizationsand charities. But there was also a more encompassingelementto the experience. I suddenlyrealized that, despitethe resolution of the coup in favor of democracy,there were still deep divisions in Russia,especially amongthe elite. III The morningof August20 arrivedwithout any climactic developments during the night. At the morning news briefing at the Hotel Rossiia, where the congressstaff had its headquarters,I found out that Gorbachevwas under housearrest athis dachain the Crimea. I also overheardsomeonesay that the "Soiuz" group of rightist parliamen-
THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 125 tary deputieshadbackedthe EmergencyCommittee,as did the rightist nationalist organization"Edinstvo." The defenseof the White House was almost completedand pro-Y eltsin units of the Taman Division were now guarding it. There was also confirmation that the Social Democratic Party, the RepublicanParty of Russia, the Democratic Partyof Russia,andthe ConstitutionalDemocratshadall issuedstrong statementsof protestagainstthe usurpationof constitutionalpowersby thejunta. I had agreedto participate in the Economic Round Table of the Union of Leaseholdersand Entrepreneursthat morning. Organizedin February 1990 under the leadershipof economistPavel G. Bunich, First Deputy Chairmanof the Economic Reform Commissionof the USSR SupremeSoviet, the Union of USSR Leaseholdersand Entrepreneurs(since renamedthe Union of Managersand Entrepreneurs) was establishedto protectand promotethe interestsof individual Soviet businessmen.According to GeneralDirector I.M. Baskin, in August 1991 it represented14,000 membersand 6,500,000employees. The membershipfigure was probablyaccurate,but the numberof employeeswas greatlyexaggerated.Encompassing the whole spectrumof businessactivity from small mom-and-popcontractorsto large enterprises,suchasDr. Fedorov'sEye MicrosurgeryClinic in Moscow,and including trade,construction,agriculture,transportation,and services, the Union of Leaseholdersand Entrepreneurswas at the time of the coup the undisputeddomainof the new Russiancapitalist elite. Some members,straight out of the pagesof Soviet satirists Ilf and Petrov, had been hawking wares and repairing flats for many years. But a larger and more urbanecontingentcamedirectly out of the nomenklatura, arousedto businessactivity by the new Law on Individual Enterprises. Conservative,hard-working, zealouslypatriotic, and strongly anti-Communist,they were representativesof the newly emerging bourgeoisiein Russia.Carefully groomedand projecting paramount confidence,they could easilyhavebeenmistakenfor positive-thinking Americansalesmenattendingtheir first Dale Carnegieconvention. The round table was to begin at 10:00 A.M. at SEV: one of Moscow's new modem buildings only a stone'sthrow from the White *This building, the Moscowheadquarters of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance(RussianacronymSEV), would later housethe Moscow mayoralty offices.
126 SERGEP. PETROFF House.Becauseof overturnedtram cars,barricades,and hugecrowds, it took our specially dispatchedbus more than one hour to travel the two-mile distancefrom the Hotel Rossiiato SEV. The conversationon the bus centeredon the coup, but I did not senseany undueanxiety or vacillation aboutYeltsin andhis ability to resistthe coup. Exceptfor a SanFranciscobusinessman, a Swedishagriculturalspecialistwho was the grandnephewof Leo Tolstoi, and me, everyoneon the bus was a nativeRussian. The round table had an extensiveagenda.There were a numberof formal presentations,including Dr. Tolstoi's and mine. There were also reportsfrom committeechairmen,but the mostamazingaspectof the entire meeting was the confidenceand unruffled composureof nearly four hundredLeaseholdersand Entrepreneurs.It wasas if nothing of consequence was happeningoutside.Most of the membershad apparentlyalready concludedthat the putsch would undoubtedlybe derailed and that PresidentYeltsin would emergeas the undisputed new leader. The auditorium came alive only during the vote on the declarationin supportofYeltsin. A strongstatementhadbeenprepared in advance,and it carriedunanimouslyand boisterously.The Union of Leaseholdersand Entrepreneurswas the first businessorganizationto comeout with sucha statement;other businessassociationsfollowed. By late evening,the Union of Co-operators,the Associationof Small Entrepreneurs, the Associationof CommercialBanksof the USSR,the All-RussianCommodityExchange,and most of the Moscow business clubs, including the All-Russian Club of Young Millionaires, joined the Leaseholdersand Entrepreneursin declaringtheir solidarity with the Yeltsin government. IV From the sixteenthfloor ofthe SEV building we could look diagonally at the White House.No otherplacein Moscowofferedthe sameunobstructedview, exceptperhapsthe roof of the unoccupiednew American Embassybuilding. A giant Russiantricolor wrappedaroundthe front and sides of the White House would have made even Christo proudof the handiwork,while a medium-sizedblimp flying abovethe building with an inscription in Russian-"Welcome,Compatriots"madethe vista look almost surrealistic.Below, on the ground,a large mosaicmadeup of people,rubble,overturnedtrolleys, stalledcars,and
THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 127 lines of barricadesand military equipmentrenderedan unforgettable tableauof a rebellionin progress. I left SEV a few minutesbefore3:00 P.M., maneuveringtoward the White Housethrough clustersof excitedly talking peopleand the unsightly debrisof the barricades.The barricadeshad beensubstantially improvedsinceI sawthem last, but gangsof four or five young men, carrying railroad ties, twisted rails, large cement blocks, and other objectsof obstructioncontinuedto reinforce them. The tanks and armored personnelcarriers were still deployedon the left flank of the White House, but they had turned their gun barrels away from the building. With flowers stuck in their barrelsandteenagersclambering overthem,they no longerlookedmenacing. The noon meeting in front of the White House that I had been watching from the SEV building was coming to an end. At three o'clock, PresidentYeltsin cameout to say a few words, followed by EduardShevardnadze,who receivedan equally warm ovation. More peoplewere still arriving, eventhoughthe squarein front of the White Housewasalreadypackedto its limits. The arrayof peopleandpolitical groupingswasbeyonddescription. There were young and old, men and women, Cossacksand bearded Caucasians,GreatRussians,Ukrainians,andBelorussians,Muscovites and people from the provinces,businessmen,professionals,and academics,RussianOrthodox priests and SeventhDay Adventist ministers, students,Afghan veteransin soiled fatigues,and militaryofficers in uniform, monarchistsandanarcho-syndicalists, groupsfrom the new democraticpolitical parties,andMoscowpunksanddrifters who came to seethe spectacle.Many of thesepeoplehadvoted for Yeltsin in the Juneelection and now cameout to show their continuedsupportfor him. By no stretchof the imaginationwere all of them democratically thinking liberals. They were ordinary patriotic citizens who were fed up with communismand, like their EastEuropeanneighbors,wanted to free themselvesfrom its abuse.Nor were they backersor benefactors of a "SecondRussianRevolution," as some commentatorslater classified the events of August 19-21. Like the declarationof the LeaseholdersandEntrepreneurs, their presenceon the barricadeswasa counter-revolutionarystatement.They cameto bearwitnessnot only to the abandonmentof Stalinism, asGorbachevhad beenchampioning, but to a completebreak with the revolutionary tradition of October 1917.
128 SERGEP. PETROFF There was both good news and bad news that afternoon.A great cheer went up from the crowd when it was announcedthat USSR Prime Minister and junta memberValentin Pavlov was resigning on groundsof disability. It was a suresign that the leadershipof the coup wasbeginningto falter. News wasalso receivedthat the USSRConstitutional OversightCommitteehad issueda cautiouscondemnationof the coup,· and that the All-Union Confederationof TradeUnions had alsodenouncedthe actionof the EmergencyCommittee.But reportsof a possiblestorming of the White House by the special Alpha forces were also spreading,as was the news that an 11:00 P.M. curfew had beenannounced.At about6:00 P.M., thesereportswere officially confirmed by the White House. At around 7:00 P.M., the White House commandissuednew instructionsto the crowd. To providemoreroom for maneuvering,the crowd was askedto move farther away from the front of the building. Severalmonthslater, a participantin the defense of the White Housetold me that the credit for the successfuldefenseof the White Houseshouldgo to RussianVice PresidentAleksandrRutskoi. According to my friend, it was Rutskoi who establisheda military headquarters that coordinatedthe work of the volunteerswith the proYeltsin elementsof the Army and the KGB. Yeltsin generatedthe meaningand spirit of the rebellion while Rutskoi organizedthe defenseof it. If this was indeedthe case,then, ironically, it was a symbiotic relationshipnot unlike that of Lenin andTrotskii in 1917. A light rain had beenfalling throughoutthe day, but at 6:00 P.M. it beganraining harder.Peoplewere getting thoroughly soaked,and the largecrowd was slowly dwindling. It was alsotime for me to go home. At 8:30 P.M. I arrived at the hotel, tired and hungry, only to find that I hadmissedthe regulardinnerhour and now hadto scroungefor something to eat. V The atmospherein the hotel pressroom on Wednesdaymorning was tense.Word had gotten outthat therewere casualtiesduring the night. Mikhail Tolstoi, who had taken chargeof the morning briefing, confirmed that there had been three fatalities near Smolensk Square, *According to S. Alekseev, the head of the committee,the version of the reportas it appearedin /zvestiiahadbeenheavily amendedby the censor.
THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 129 where a confrontationhad taken place betweenpicketsdefendingthe outer barricadesof the White Houseand the armoredpersonnelcarriers of the 27th Brigade.The White Houseitself had not beenstormed, however,and the Tamanand Kantemir Tank Divisions were moving out of Moscow. The night's official khronika (chronicle of events),a copy of which I was ableto obtain,testifiedto the defenders'courage, but its salient messagewas more poignant. During that night, one Soviet organizationafter another--government, civilian, and religious -badfallen in line in supportofYeltsin. Even if the dull-witted "gang of eight" had given the orderto storm the White House,it is doubtful that it would have beenfollowed. By midnight of August 20-21, the rank and file of the KGB and the military had declaredfor Yeltsin, refusingto supportthe EmergencyCommittee. The final resolutionofthe couptook placefive or six hourslater. At the barricades--aseveryoneby now referred to the area around the White House--ahuge crowd had gatheredin the afternoon.It was so large and so compactthat it was physically impossibleto move from one side of the squareto the other. Along the embankment,a whole city of tents and makeshift sheltershad sprungup during the night; a soup kitchen, organizedby the SeventhDay Adventists,was dispensing food to a line of tired "defenders,"while a first-aid station was administeringto the old and the frail. Along the barrier facing the White House,young men and women--somewith guitars and some singing-addedcolor andgaietyto the excitedcrowd. The atmosphere wasdistinctly festive. The climax cameat around3:00 P.M. Until then it was still hearsay, but a few minutesafter three, PresidentYeltsin, surroundedby Gennadii Burbulis, RuslanKhasbulatov,AleksandrRutskoi, andotherloyalists, cameout to announcethat it wasall over. Exceptfor Boris Pugo (who, I discoveredlater, had committed suicide), the men who had tried to turn the clock back were all under arrest. A thunderousyell went up from the anxiously awaiting crowd. Some people laughed, others cried. I must admit that I had a difficult time controlling my emotions.My parentshadbeenimplacablefoes of Bolshevism.In June 1918, my father, a careerofficer, had taken part in a similar demonstration of anti-Communistsentimentby backing the democratic anti-Bolshevikgovernmentorganizedby Socialist Revolutionariesin Samara.My mother, an army nurse,joined the anti-Bolshevikmovement in the Urals six months later. Together,they spentnearly four
130 SERGEP. PETROFF yearsin the ranksof the White Army. They neverregrettedtheir decisions, even in times of great despairand privation. Nor did they ever give up hopethat someday communismwould be discredited.Standing transfixed in front of the RussianWhite House with the tricolor waving in the wind, I could not but think of them,wonderinghow they would havefelt hadthey lived to seewhat I witnessed--theundeniable groundswellof a democraticcounter-revolution.
DONALD 1. RALEIGH 7 A View from Saratov Donald1. Raleighis professorofRussianhistoryat the Universityof North Carolina at ChapelHill. He haswritten a historyofthe 1917 revolution in Saratovandwasworkingon a sequelto that studyat the time ofthe coup. Afterafifteen-yearbattle to gain admissionto that closedcity, he visitedSaratovfor thefirst time in 1990as a participantin an official academicexchangeprogram.Raleigh returnedto Saratovon the eveofthe coupto edit a Russian translationofhis book,Revolutionon the Volga: 1917in Saratov,and to conductresearchin local archivesfor his currentproject. The announcer'svoice was cheerless,calm, soothing.Gorbachevwas in "ill health." The measures''would be in force for only six months." Not meantas a rejection of reform, they were "necessaryto savethe economyfrom completecollapse.""Apathy, despair,andlack of faith" had seized hold of the population. "The country," in essence,"had becomeungovernable."Peopledemanded"law and order." Responding to popularpressures,the ''temporary''leadershipwould assigntop priority to assuringadequatefood suppliesandhousing. It was 9:00 A.M., Saratovtime, Monday, August 19, 1991. Viktor Ivanovich, my host, aboutwhom more will be said later, hadjust left with my passportand visato registerme with the police, a necessary ritual that could not be attendedto the day before when I arrived in Saratov,a "closed"city, albeitone inthe processof opening. Viktor Ivanovich phonedtwice from the police station, but both times my line went dead.I listenednervouslyto ResolutionNo. 1 of the cumbersomelynamedStateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency. I harboredno doubts about what I had just heard. Recalling Eduard Shevardnadze's resignationas Gorbachev'sforeign affairs ministerthe 131
132 DONALD J. RALEIGH previous Decemberand his warning that "dictatorship is coming," I sawnew meaningin the abruptrejectionofStanislavShatalin'splan to move to a market economyin five hundreddays, in the violence in Lithuaniaback in January,and in reformerAleksandrYakovlev'ssinister forecasta few days before that a conspiracywas in the air. But how could this gambit by (as would soonbecomeevident) a group of blunderingPartyapparatchikipossiblywork in a countrywhoseentire belief systemhadbeenshatteredby yearsof fermentandendlessrevelations aboutthe tragedyof Soviethistory?Although vulnerable,civil societyhad emergedupon the sceneand had to be reckonedwith. My thoughtsthen focusedon my own predicament:I was a lone foreigner in Saratov;I was living in what I suspectedwas a KGB flat; I had no documents.Would I be forced to leave for Moscow?The broadcasts ended.Funeralmusic followed. Then the announcements and proclamationswererepeated. National radio broadcastfour documentsthat morning: a decreeof Vice PresidentGennadiiI. Yanaevthat he had assumedthe duties of Acting Presidentbecauseof Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev'sincapacity; a statementby the eight-personcommitteeexplaining why it had decidedto introducea six-monthstateof emergency;ResolutionNo. 1 of the committee,spelling out what specific measuresit was taking to "normalize" the country; and a messagefrom Yanaev to foreign leaders,emphasizingthe temporarynatureof the emergencymeasures, which would not affect the USSR's international commitments.I switchedon the TV: ballet. The Saratovstationwasoff the air. The long-awaitedring at the door came.The police had registered me. "For now," Viktor Ivanovich cautioned.I then rushedto the nearby kiosks in the squareadjacentto the large coveredmarket,but there were no Saratovpapersto be had.Proceedingto the centralpostoffice, accompaniedby Viktor Ivanovich, I cabledmy family that I had arrived safely and askedmy wife to phoneme from ChapelHill, North Carolina. I wonderedwhetherthe ill-manneredand surly postal clerk had taken a dislike to me or whether theday's news had ruined her morning.Peopleseemedtenseandirritable. At first glancenothing seemedto distinguishthe outwardappearance of the city from the previous, "normal day." But when I observed things more closely, I realized that people had clustered togetherin the parks and on streetcomers,absorbedin serious,and quiet, conversation.It was as if the volume control for streetsounds
VIEW FROM SARATOV /33 andnoiseshadbeenturneddown. I took notice of the police, but had no way of knowing whether there were more of them than usual; what was different about today was that I was merely awareof their presence. Feeling vulnerable,I did what most peopledid that day: I went to work. I droppedin at the publishinghousethat is putting out a Russianlanguageedition of my book Revolution on the Volga. There, staff membersdescribedtheir feeling as one of shock, dismay, sadness, numbness.No one seemedfearful. No one caredto work. An editor friend took me to meeta visiting Pole, not only in the hopesof getting servedsome exotic tea, but also becauseGdansk-bornHenryk knew aboutmartial law firsthand.The waterin Henryk's apartmenthadbeen turnedoff altogether,so insteadof herbata,we drank in his prophetic words that the introductionof martial law would not last. But this was hard to believe, no matterhow much we wantedto, as the only news came from national broadcastswhich gave no hint of the opposition that had taken to the streetsin Moscow. The SaratovParty organizations, at both the city andregionallevels, failed to respondpublicly to the events. Lack of any news from the outside, other than the official broadcastsaired that morning, not only createdan anxiousatmospherebut also guaranteedthe spreadof rumorsandrelentlessspeculation.Where was Gorbachev?Had the very people he had selectedto govern betrayed him? Or had he hatchedthe plot himself? Why were thereonly eight membersof the State Committee insteadof a ninth neededto break any tie votes if the Committeereachedan impasse?Who had mastermindedthe plot? Anatolii Lukianov, Gorbachev'schoice for Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet? Or had he beeninvited to join the group but declined?Was Yeltsin dead?Gorbachev?Why hadn't the CentralCommitteeof the CommunistPartyissueda statement?Whose side was the army on? Had the leadersof Saratov's democraticmovement been arrested?Why were local leaderssilent? Had the events takenthemby surprisetoo? Those with whom I sharedmy fears on August 19 expressedtheir outragenot only at the attemptby a group of mediocrepersonalitiesto derail Russia'sunsteadynew order, but also at the return to the old paradigms,the old language,the old lies. Although conversations, overheardin lines or on crowdedbuses,urged law and order, no one with whom I spokethat day-andI spentthe entire day in conversation
134 DONALD J. RALEIGH --supportedthe action of the State Committee.But for Saratov,the reactionto the official decreesfor now belongedto the private sphere, somethingsharedwith family and friends. Peopledid not rush into the streets,as in Moscow, to defend any concretesymbol of Russia's shakydemocracy,becausethat which neededtheir protection,for then, remainedan abstraction. I later learnedthat at 4:15 P.M. the local committeefor radio and televisionhadreceiveda copy of PresidentYeltsin'sdecree,calling the activities of the StateCommitteeunconstitutional,but apparentlyhad little enthusiasmfor publicizing it. When a small group of deputies from the city and regional soviets sought out the head of the local committee,A.P. Zotov, they found him deepin conversationwith his assistantand with a representativeof the KGB, who made a tasteful exit when the deputiesannouncedthemselves.In postponinghis reaction to Yeltsin's decree,the unpopularZotov further discreditedhimselfin the eyesof Saratov's progressiveelements,who during the local power struggle in the year precedingthe coup had come to resent Zotov's conservatismand outright hostility toward glasnostand its consequences. Saratov newspapersafterward revealedthat at roughly the same time PresidentYeltsin's decreereachedSaratov,the local department of health receiveda messagefrom the Ministry of Health ordering officials to put two additional emergencymedical crews on duty that night. Although I learnedlittle about the coup until that evening,I updated my knowledgeof the course of perestroikain Saratovsince my first visit the year before, in May-June 1990. Back then, my stay helped broadenmy overall perspectiveon the reform movement by adding a sorely needed"provincial" correctiveto the views articulated in Moscow. I had left Moscow for Saratovpuzzled by the nonstopreferenceto imminent civil war. A month later I left Saratovfor Moscow, cautiouslyoptimistic about the country'sfuture. Although Saratovlacked the frenetic political atmosphereof the capital cities, I realized how wrong it was to dismiss this as a fact of life in provincial Russia. Still in control of local politics, reactionaryParty apparatchikihad repressedpublic demonstrations in Februaryand May 1990, and they still ran the major newspaper, which was as dull as they come. Yet I could not help but wonder whethertheir remainingin power hadsomethingto do with the fact
VIEW FROM SARATOV /35 that local food supplieswere significantlybetterthan in Moscow. The country had alreadybrokenapartinto local economicunits, and city authoritieshad to attendto local needsfirst. Moreover,beneaththe superficial calm agitateda civil societythat measurablypushedthe limits of the permissible.New faceshad beenelectedto the Saratov Soviet-peoplewho had campaignedto end the local Party apparatus'smonopoly of power and to open the city to the outside world. While I was in town, the first issuesof severalindependent newspapersappeared.Volga Germansand the local Tatar community pressedfor reform and recognition. People exchangedviews freely, and I found no forbidden topics of conversation.More important, local sentimentsand broad social phenomenaparalleled those in the capitals becausethey made sensein terms of local conditions.Saratovsocietysufferedthe familiar crisis in confidence as it searcheddesperatelyfor somethingto believein. As elsewhere, a nostalgicand uncritical interestin the tsarist past filled the spiritual vacuum,as did a revival of religious or other spiritual activity, which included a fascination with the occult. The political lineup among the local intelligentsia did not differ from that of Moscow (i.e., Sakharovwas a hero, Yeltsin was popular, Gorbachevwas neither). In other words, I sensedthat the old guard still in charge felt more accountablethan ever to its local constituency,whose passivitycould no longer be taken for granted.Although the political mood in Saratov wasfar from uniform, I nonethelessdetected broad public agreementon the most vital political and socioeconomic issue:systemicreform hadto continue. During the day'sintensediscussionson August 19, 1991,I realized the extent to which years of ferment and revelations about the country'stragic history had discreditedSoviet power in many circles. Basedin the city's Polytechnic Institute,the DemocraticRussiamovement had formed a caucuswithin the city soviet, which soon splintered. Battles over local rule had broken out in some of the neighborhoodsovietsas the formerly disenfranchisedsoughtto exercisetheir rights. I heardandreadabouthungerstrikes,anarchists,Hari Krishnas,the openingof soupkitchensandSundayschools.The spring 1991 electionshad given the "democraticforces" greatervisibility and one of their spokesmen,V.G. Golovachev-soonto emergeas "Saratov'sYeltsin"-hadbeenelectedchairmanof the soviet,to the dismay of the council's executive committee. The official paper,
/36 DONALD J. RALEIGH Kommunist,maintainedits conservativeline, but Saratov, one of the severalnew publicationsdebutingthat year-abadly produced,officially reviled, and disrespectfulbiweekly-backedGolovachev and the demokraty. It was unclear whether Golovachev, like many of the country's reformers,hadbeena Communistby convictionor by convenience.In either case,he had donewell beforeperestroika,and seemedto know how to adapthimselfnow. Golovachevsidedwith the city's reformers on all issuesthat challengedthe powerof the entrenchedapparatchiki. He and his supportersencounteredbitter resistancefrom the chairman of the city soviet'sexecutive committee, from the ruling cliquessettled in someof the neighborhoodsoviets,from the regional soviet and its ruling organs,and from the local regional Party boss,K.D. Murenin, whoseautocraticinclinations and egotism,so reminiscentof thoseof Romania'sformer leader,Ceausescu, earnedhim the nicknameMurenescu.Murenin hadactuallybeena favorite topic of conversationsince June,whenthe granddaughter of Saratov-bornNikolai Chernyshevskii, who servedas director of the local ChernyshevskiiMuseumthat honored Saratov'srevolutionaryson, had committedsuicide by plunging to her deathfrom a window in Murenin's apartment.Therewas much speculationas to what haddriven her to suchdesperation,the more so since her son died by his own hand three days later after poisoning himself. Now rumorscirculatedthat the unsavoryMurenin had left on a Volga cruise--and,in fact, he had. That evening'snationally televisedpressconferenceorganizedby the ringleadersof the coup may mark one of the great historic momentsin the history of the Sovietmedia.Reminiscentin manyways of the impact television had had in Romaniathe year before, when a dazedpopulationheardresentfulcrowdsdemandthe overthrowof the despisedCeausescu,the broadcastillustratesthe extent to which the media had becomean autonomousforce both reflecting and shaping public opinion in the Soviet Union. No one could misreadthe Soviet media'sdisdain for the organizersof the coup. A sniffling Gennadii Yanaev, his face swollen by fatigue and alcohol, had a tough time fielding the combativequestions.His trembling handsand quivering voice conveyedan image of impotence,mediocrity, and falsehood;he appearedas a caricatureof the quintessential,boozed-upParty functionary from the Brezhnevera.Minister of InternalAffairs Boris Pugo, who normally seemedsteely cold, tough, and loathsome,seemed
VIEW FROM SARATOV 137 merely loathsomewhen stripped of his usual confidence. Vasilii Starodubtsev,the head of Russia'sunimportant Peasants'Union, didn't seem to know what all the disagreementwas about. If the stunning spectacleexposedthese mediocrities to public scrutiny, then the news program following the pressconferenceclearedup any remaining uncertainty viewers may have nursed: it showed tanksrumbling throughthe streetsof Moscow and it reportedon the forceful oppositionof Boris Yeltsin and other membersof the Russian parliament,who had declaredthe actionsof the StateCommittee treasonous.My phonerang off the hook for the next hour or so; the significanceof the momentwas lost on no one. Although I could not reach Moscow or Leningradby phone that evening, I went to bed with the sensethat Yanaev and his associateshad seized not power,but merelyits illusion. The vivid imageof tanksin Moscow convincedme that I would be departinginto uncertaintyif I left Saratov.Phoningfrom ChapelHill, North Carolina, at 3:00 A.M. Saratovtime, my wife, Karen, urgedme to stay put, informed me of the reactionto the coup in Leningradand someof the republics,and updatedme on the responseat home.Anxious telephoneconversationswith friends in Moscow servedas a sort of spiritual breakfastthat got me throughthe next morning. They reconfirmed what I had heardfrom my wife, and informed me of the valiant oppositionof the well-informed Muscovites,some of whom followed eventsby watchingCNN. I spentthe next hour calling people in Saratovand receiving calls from those who had additional word from othercities. Therewas somethingcomplicitousand sweetlydefiant in registeringour indignationoverthe telephone.Despitethe strain the technologicallyimpoverishedSoviet telephonesystemwas under, it held up remarkablewell: it enabledpeopleto reachout to friends and family following the historic pressconference.To a certain extent, oppositionto the putschspreadby telephone,and, as I later learned, with the help of teletypeandfax machinesaswell. On Tuesday,August 20, the coup beganto unfold locally. Saratovites who went to the newspaperkiosks that morning could no longer remainindifferent to the attemptto setthe political clock back, for the official newspaper,Kommunist,and the "progressive"organ,Saratov, had hit the newsstands.Kommunistpublished all of the previousday's documentsissuedby the State Committeeas well as a statementby Lukianov that further discussionof the new Union Treaty, scheduled
138 DONALD J. RALEIGH to be voted on that week, had to be postponed.Popular suspicions that conservativeelementssaw the new Union Treaty as equivalent to the breakupof the Party's centralizedpower, and thus had decided to act before it was voted on, now seemedvalidated. The papercarriedno statementswhatsoeverfrom the local Party organization or from the city council, and I suspectthat only a handful of apparatchikihad beenin the know beforehand.My eyesfixed upon the one photographin the issue, which depictedthe main agronomist and tractor driver from the ChapaevCollective Farm. In contrast, Saratovpublishedportraits of Yeltsin and Gorbachev,as well as statementsby Yeltsin, Acting Chairmanof the RussianSupreme Soviet RuslanKhasbulatov,and Chairmanof the Council of Ministers of the RussianRepublicIvan Silaev.PresidentYeltsin's historic decreecalling the actions of the State Committeefor the State of Emergencyillegal andunconstitutionaldeclaredunambiguouslythat those who supportedthis crime againstthe state would be prosecuted. A headlinemade referenceto Khrushchev'sousterin 1964. The cartoondepictedthe USSR inside a cage.An editorial queried: "Can it really be that the hunk of sausagethey toss at us from their reserveswill prompt us, the people,to deceiveourselvesand sink back into the swamponceagain... ?" "A dark cloud hangsover the entire country," flashedthe headline. As on Monday, I spentthe day in heated,relentless,collective speculation anddiscussion,aswell aseating,andconsuminglargeamounts of alcohol. The comfort of being with kindred souls wasdissipatedby their reportsthat my visit to Saratovthe yearbefore,after a seventeenyear campaignto get there,had arouseddeepsuspicionson the part of the KGB, who insistedI was "no merehistorian." For this reason,the coup attempt seemeddirected as much againstme; I had a personal stakein how it unfolded. That eveningthe coup beganto play itself out in Saratov.Meeting that afternoon,regional authoritiescould do no more than to issuea bland appealto the local populationto remain calm. As one of them, Yu.G. Slepov,so ironically put it, "Taking a positiononly complicates the situation." Peoplewith whom I cameinto contactunderstoodthis restraintfor what it was: a sign of divisiveness,andan indicationthat a local power strugglehad begunin earnest.In fact, having learnedthe reaction of Boris Yeltsin, leadersof the Kirov neighborhoodsoviet expressedtheir support for the popular RussianPresident,although
VIEW FROM SARATOV /39 they opposedhis call for a generalstrike without the sanctionof the SupremeSoviet. Such respectfor the rule of law and constitutional orderreassuredme. By 7:00 P.M. a crowd, eventually estimatedto be ten to twelve thousandstrong,beganto assembleon Revolution Square,the largest squarein Saratov,locatedin the heartof town, acrossthe streetfrom the splendid(tsarist)building that housesthe SaratovCity Soviet.Borderedon the north by Lenin Prospect,the city's major thoroughfare, which runs from the Volga River on the eastto the railroadstationand the hills that nestle up against the city on the west, the square is Saratov'sequivalent of Moscow's Red Square.A tasteless,clunky Lenin monumenttowersover the large expanse.Lenin's slightly limp, outstretchedright hand seemedto be pointing an accusingfinger at those who fell under his stony gaze. As well it should. For in a few short days Lenin would no longer be standingin Revolution Square, but in Theater Square,as it was called before the revolution. The irreverentwould be collecting signatureson a petition demandinghis removal, while a few scandalizedwar veteranswould try in vain to preventvandalsfrom defamingthe icon by sprayingin blood-redpaint on the monument'spedestal,"Hangmanof Russia." Deputiesfrom the city and oblastsoviets,with the assistanceof the emergencycouncil of the local branchof the DemocraticRussiamovement, a broadcaucusformed earlier in the year that broughttogether the numerousstrandsof the country'sdemocraticopposition,organized the public meeting on the eveningof August 20. The gathering turned into a public expressionof support for PresidentYeltsin and popular rejection of the leadershipof the regional soviet, which was synonymouswith the local leadershipof the CommunistParty. A successionof emotionalspeakersreadYeltsin's decrees;demandedGorbachev'sreturn to Moscow and the arrestof his turncoat comrades; insistedthat the leadershipof the region clarify its attitudetoward the eventsand lift the "information blockade"from Saratov;called for an immediateconvocationof the regional and city soviets and for the dismissalof the executivecommitteeof the city soviet,headedby V.S. Agapov, for supportingthe putschists. Others thirstedfor the blood of the overseerof the local radio andtelevisionchannels,A.P. Zotov, and of the editor of Kommunist,N.F. Zorin, for settingup the information blockade.Golovachevurgedapprovalof a resolutionof supportfor the RussianPresident.The crowdendorsedthe ideaaswell ascalls to post
140 DONALD J. RALEIGH RevolutionSquare,Saratov: "HangmanofRussia"
VIEW FROM SARATOV 14I guardsover the local television and radio stationsand the city soviet. Thosewho were unawareof the public meetingthat night must have senseda shift in the local balanceof forces, nonetheless,for that evening Channel5, the Saratovstation,beganbroadcastingofficial communiquesfrom the Russian,that is, Yeltsin, government. Several observationsneed to be made about the meeting on the eveningof August20. The KGB andpolice did not interfereat all. The crowd was heterogeneous, althoughmembersof the intelligentsiapredominated.City sovietdeputyV. Zhavoronskii,an activist in the Democratic Russiamovement,and "mayor" Golovachevpresidedover the meeting. The former undoubtedlysaw the public demonstrationas a vehicle to strengthenthe handof democraticelementsin town, a goal undoubtedlysharedby Golovachev,who also had a personalstakein the matter,ashe andAgapovandCo. hadbeensparringall year. The herbal sleeping aid given to me by friends did not work. I welcomedmorning becauseit endedmy sustaineddialogue with my subconsciousand deepestfears, and despitethe uneasinessI felt when I recalledthat Victor Ivanovich was due to show up ''to fix a broken kitchen faucet." No doubtsremainedin my mind that he worked for the KGB; consequently,the fact that he did not drop in or phoneboth relieved me and gave me somethingelse to mull over. A call from Moscowinforming me that threeMuscoviteshaddiedthe night before deepenedmy gloom, althoughit was reassuringto learnthat the radio station Moscow Echo kept peoplethere well informed. My efforts to placea call to friends in Leningradonceagainfailed. Eagerto learn if there had beenany repercussionsto the previous night's massrally, I set out in searchof fresh newspapers.Kommunist carrieda spateof statementsand announcements from the StateCommittee (referredto in Russianby its difficult-to-pronounceacronym, Novemberassertionsthat foreign Geh-keh-cheh-peh),including hard~to-believe powers understoodthe need for the adoption of extraordinarymeasures. Another announcementcommentedbriefly on the opposition centeredaroundBoris Yeltsin, Ivan Silaev, and RuslanKhasbulatov, but insistedthatthe GKChPwaspatientlycooperatingwith these"confused patriots." I read as well that the SupremeSoviet was scheduled to meeton August 26 to discussthe measurestakenby the GKChP. A samplingof local public opinion included remarksby only five individuals, four of whom supportedthe extraordinarymeasures.The fifth individual insistedthe country'sproblemshad to be solvedon a legal
142 DONALD J. RALEIGH basis.All of thosecanvassedstressedthe needfor law andorder. Since the report on Monday evening'spressconferencedid not at all accurately reflect what viewers had witnessed,I could readily dismissthe survey. Kommunistrepeatedthe ''temporary''ban on all but an approvedlist of newspapers.Among the short articles on health,beauty tips, and how-to-fix-it columnswas tuckedaway a modestnotice that Soviet citizens could no longer buy foreign currency.This, in effect, would preventmost peoplefrom being able to travel abroad.I sawno mention of the eventsin Moscow or elsewhere.The day's obligatory photo portrayedF. Alimov, a machineoperatorat the Bannerof the Red OctoberCollective Farm,who for four summersnow had stacked fodderin an exemplarymanner. Despitethe ban on non-Partynewspapers,Saratovput out a special edition that morningaswell. The tonereflectedBoris Yeltsin's spirited defiance. Demandingthat an internationalteam of doctors examine Gorbachev,Yeltsin volunteeredto havethe RussianRepublicpay the medicalbill from its depletedhard-currencyreserves.Once againemphasizingthe unconstitutionalnatureof the attemptedcoup, Saratov's Golovachevcalledupon Saratovitesto upholdall ofYeltsin'sdecrees, and upon city, regional, and neighborhoodsoviet leadersto back Yeltsin. Golovachevalso propheticallystatedthat the coup would fail. Other articles assessedpublic opinion in the capitals as well as in Saratov.A roving reporter who took the First Secretaryof the City Committeeof the CommunistParty, S. Slepov,by surprise,let Slepov's cautiousand insipid remarks about the legality of the extraordinary measuresspeakfor themselves. A probing article analyzedthe putschitself and why it was failing. Posingquestionsthat were on many people'sminds about the ineptnessof the coup'sorganizers,the authorobservedthat their last chance to save themselveswas a two-thirds vote of support within the SupremeSoviet, scheduledto meeton the 26th, or a decisionto resortto force. A relatedpiecedecriedthe cheappopulismof the coup'sorganizers as expressedin their vaguepromisesto improve food supplies andhousing,andlower prices.No happyworkersadornedSaratov,but insteada cartoonof a jowly Party apparatchikwith the caption,''The measuresthat I want to proposeare unpopular,but, believeme, comrades,they'renecessary." In readingthe paper,I could not help but think that Soviet society hadbeenasclosedto thosewho constituteit, including its leaders,as it
VIEW FROM SARATOV 143 hadbeento me. How elsecanwe accountfor the colossalineptitude of Russia's"Pinochets," as the newspaperSaratov began calling GennadiiYanaevand his accomplices?Back in 1917Lenin actually had a much betterappreciationof the public mood out in the provinces than did those who had calculatedon overthrowing M.S. Gorbachev.Had they takenthe pulse of the Russianheartlandbeforehand, they probably would have reconsideredtheir plans or abandonedthem altogether.It seemedto me that the putschistshad beendeludedby the widespreadview that, apartfrom a few exceptions, the provincesrepresenteda bulwark of conservatism,and by illusions of a yet sound centralizedpower that had the clout to compelthe provincesto comply with the center'swishes.Failing to see that the old guard's ability to survive contrived elections in many provincial centerstold us virtually nothing about prevailing attitudes in these settings, the putschistsbecamevictims of their own self-deception. Emboldenedby the tone of Saratov, I decidedto drop in unannouncedat the SaratovRegional Party Archive, located a short distancefrom my apartment.A month or so beforemy departurefor the Soviet Union, I had written to the director of the archive, requesting permissionto use its holdings during my forthcoming visit. Although laws forbadenon-Communistsfrom working in Partyarchives,several American and Europeanscholarshad been grantedaccessto central Party archivesin Moscowduring the previousmonths.As I was about to beginwriting a book on the Civil War in SaratovRegion(1918-22), I wishedto takeadvantageof the lifting of restrictionsregardingaccess to vital materialsthat heretoforewereoff-limits, in the hopeof obtaining accessto Party archives, which, in effect, remainedthe only sourcesI had notyet examined. Unable to tell from looking at the gray brick building how to find the entrance,let alone the director, I deliberatelywhisked past the armedguard without making eye contact.As I expected,he collared me, briefly questionedme, and pointed me to the correct passage. Once inside, I locatedthe director'soffice and assuredhis perplexed secretarythat I was willing to wait as long as necessaryin orderto see him. "Where did you say you were from?" she prodded.My answer sent her scurrying, and momentarilyI was introducing myself to Mr. Lobanov. Lobanov'ssweatyoutstretchedhand made a hesitanthandshake.I
144 DONALD J. RALEIGH smelledfear. Yes, I told him, I knew that it was illegal for me to use Party archives,but he and I both realized that current practice had changedall that. And, yes, I had beentold that Lobanovhad assumed his postjust a shortwhile ago. "Too bad your letter took so long in getting hereand too bad your university colleaguessentus written supportof your requestjust yesterday. We in Saratovlook quite favorably upon your appeal,but we can'tlet you work herewithout the pennissionof the CentralCommittee. Unfortunately,I doubt that we will receive a reply to the letter I sentto Moscowbeforeyou leaveSaratov." "Excuseme," I pressed."There'sa telephoneon your desk. Let's call Moscow.I'll be happyto arguemy case." "I'll call Moscowmyself," Lobanovrepliedwith somehostility. "Should I come back tomorrow?" I asked,knowing full well what his answerwould be. "Don't bother.You cancall me." I left frustrated by my meeting with the soft-spoken,timid Lobanov,who to me epitomizedthe bland, morally neutraltype that used to make a careerwithin the Party establishmentby being disagreeablyagreeable.On my way to the statearchiveto report on my visit with Lobanov, I stoppedin at the Volga Publishing House to leave somematerialswith my editor. There I had a chanceencounter with an eccentricold man who had publisheda book on local medicinal herbs--aparticularly timely subject, owing not only to the keen public interestin anything not given its due in the past, but also to the lack of pharmaceuticals.Genuine, sincere, and unpretentious, this veterinarian-turned-herbalist had dreamedfor yearsof meetinga real Americanwith flashy white teeth,and I walked into his dreamthe momentI enteredmy editor'sbasementoffice, which servedas work station, reception area, trade center, and diner. My new self-proclaimedfriend had one uselesseye (he had beenkicked by a horse), and the other twinkled at me impishly from behind smudgedspectacles. His spontaneousdisplay of emotionand affection lightenedmy heart, and once again directedmy thoughtsto the many fine qualities of the Soviet people I find so disarmingly endearing.They deservedbetter than Yanaevand his ilk, I thought to myself. Even Lobanov. Thesequalitieswerejust as evidentat the statearchiveon Kutiakov Street, where archivists put a desk at my disposal in a room they
VIEW FROM SARATOV 145 occupiedon the secondfloor. They invited me to work there, rather than in the Lilliputian public reading room, so that casualacquaintanceswould not botherme, asthey hadduring my first visit to Saratov the yearbefore.The archivists,four women,joked that the deskavailable to me was a partingpresentfrom one of their coworkerswho had recentlyemigratedto Israel.They servedme tea,pastries,andfruit and vegetablesfrom the plots they worked on weekends.And they shared their food and drink with me not just that day, but during the coming weeksas well. For now, we worked together,listenedto radio broadcaststogether,and discussedlocal and national politics together.We got to know abouteachother'sfamilies andillnesses.In today'sidiom, we bonded.From things they said, and from the way they saidthem, I came to understandthe meaning of the coup from this provincial perspective. In the early afternoonI met friends for lunch at the Volga Hotel Restaurant,consideredthe bestrestaurantin town. Serviceis horrible and the menu limited. While dining, one can observethe waitresses andwaiterspeddlingor swappingrationed(andexpensive)hard liquor for who knows what favors. The Volga's attraction is that the high priceskeepit off-limits to most. As this was our first visit together,my friends and I soughtto catchup on eachother'slives and families, but no matter how hard we tried, talk reverted again and again to the political situation andto speculatingabouthow long this frightful setbackcould last. Shortly after I returnedto my cozy comerin the archive,an agitated archivist burst into the room to announcethat someof the organizers of the coup had beenarrested.We broke into spontaneousapplause. There were tears and phone calls. We turned up the volume of the radio, congratulatingourselvesfor suggestingearlier that the coup could not last. Experiencingboundlessrelief and yearning for more concretenews, we left for home to listen to the latest information. I heardthe 6:00 P.M. broadcastat the Volga PublishingHouse,wherethe umestrainedgoodwill and lightheartedness reigningthere infectedme. Later I was to fmd out that a block away from my publisher'sat the very sametime, eighty-threedeputiesof the city soviet, abouttwenty shy of a quorum, had convened.Golovachevread a statementabout the arrestsand aboutYeltsin'sauthorityto deal with the coup'sconsequences.All but four or five of the deputiesdemonstratedtheir pleasure with the outcomeof the coup by standingwhen congratulatory
146 DONALD J. RALEIGH telegramswere read.The deputiesresolvedto hold an emergencysession that eveningand to issuean official announcementto the people ofSaratov. A much welcomedchangeon the evening of Wednesday,August 21, was that conversationnow centeredon family, friends, and other personalmatters,ratherthan on politics and the country'sprecarious future. We switched the TV off, not wishing to have the congenial ambiencedestroyedby any unexpectedannouncements. It was hard to believethat all we had lived throughhad beencompressedinto a few days.
VALERII ZAVOROTNYI 8 Letter from St. Petersburg Born andraisedin Leningrad(now St. Petersburg),wherehewas trainedas a computerscientist,Valerii Zavorotnyihasbeenactively involvedin the city's democraticmovementsince1988as a participant, political observer,andcommentator.Overtheyearshe computer hastried his handat variousprofessions-filmmaker, scientist,sculptor, writer-beforeturning to public life. His writings on public affairs appearedin numerousLeningradpublications during the Gorbachevyears. I woke up on the 19th when my phonerang anda voice informed me: "Everything is going to hell. Gorbachevwas arrested,emergencyrule hasbeenintroduced."I mumbledsomethinginto the receiverandhung up. Let me tell you, it is a horrible thing to be awakenedby a phone call like that. What to do? I had to get up and turn on the TV. All I learnedwas that the samesymphonyorchestrawas playing the samepiece onall threechannels.For a Sovietbeing,this representsa clear signal that a sharpturn in policy in the belovedcountry is in the offmg. Ten minutes later, an announcerbeganto read with a stony face, first, Lukianov's statement,then the Appeal to the Soviet People,and Decree No.1 of the EmergencyCommittee.... I hadno more questions. Now, hard as I try, I cannotrecall what I felt in thosemoments.I guessit was somekind of temporarynumbnessof feeling. I washed,I dressed,I drank coffee, I tried to collect thoughtsthat I did not have. But this statedid not last long. Gradually,my brain regainedits agility. Under thesecircumstancesI did not expectany more news, and, sure enough, the TV merely repeatedthe earlier statement,followed by moremusic. 147
148 VALERII ZA VOROTNYI That morningI hada datewith two Frenchhistorianswho hadbeen invited by the Memorial Society.·They had just come from Novosibirsk, and I had promisedto show them the city. What a day for an excursion! I gave the mattersomethought and decidedto go to their place, pick them up, and take a walk with them to the Mariinskii Palace[the LeningradCity Soviet]. If anythingat all wereto happen,it wasmostlikely to happenthere. I left home expectingto be greetedif not by tanks,then by heavy police patrols.Therewas nothing of the sort, nothing at all that would distinguishthis morning from any other workday morning. Peoplewere rushingto their jobs, city busescameandwent, and the ownersof co-op businesses wereopeningup their stallsoutsidethe subwaystation.... It was then that, for the first time that morning, my mood really soured."It looks like we are going to swallow this one, too," I saidto myself. I took the subwayto Vasilevskii Island, where the French couple was staying.The first thing they askedme when they openedthe door was,"Do you think we canstayherelonger?"It would havebeenmore appropriatefor them toask me whetherthey would be able to get out of here. We chatteda little over a cup of coffee in the kitchen and I beganlooking at my watch, angling to get out of their apartmentas soon as possible. At the same time I felt badly about leaving two foreignersin that kind of a situation. "What do you think will happen next?" askedAlain (his wife's name was Sonya). I wished I knew someonewho could answerthis question."Do you think the West will be able to help?" he continued.I wantedvery muchto assumea proud pose and answer,"No, we'll take care of it ourselves."However, I immediatelythought of the sceneon the street,where everybodywas going about their businessas if nothing had happened.Perhapsthe West is our only hope, I said to myself, and mumbledin responseto Alain's question somethinglike, "We've gotten ourselvesinto this mess,and we'll have to take care of it ourselves."I rememberthis conversationvery well andrememberalso thatI wasentirely disingenuous. What I was saying to myself ran differently: "What nonsense! Theyhaveall the power-thearmy, the KGB-which meansthey will be entrenchedfor years.Onceagain,the only free speechwill be in the *Memorial is a voluntary associationdedicatedto the history and rehabilitation of the victims of repression.
LEITER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 149 kitchen; onceagain,we'll haveto handcopy the samizdat,onceagain we'll haveto fear police searchesandworty while reading clandestine literature...." We decidedto take a walk in the city together.I thought I would take them toSt. Isaac'sCathedralandwhile thereI would take a peak at the Mariinskii PalaceSquareto seeif anythingwasafoot. Nevskii Prospectwas busy as usual: therewas traffic, retail kiosks were doing a brisk business,shopswereopen.... Alain, though,noted that people were gloomier than usual. I disagreed,saying that Leningradersare quite gloomy as rule. We walked all the way to HerzenStreetwithout encounteringanythingunusual.Only after turning the comer did we come acrossa small band of young people, marchingtogether,holding handsanddisplayinga handmadeplacard: "Down with Dictatorship!"An old womanhissed:"Damnyou all! You made a messand now you'll pay for it." About a dozen pedestrians crossedto the other side of the street.Otherstried to avert their eyes and walked pastas quickly as possible.Alain got out his cameraand took a picture of the marchers,trying to be as inconspicuousas possible. Here we go again, I thoughtto myself,'back to ''you ought to be ashamedin front of the foreigner"; "foreign spies"; "clandestineCIA operations";"the Iron Curtain." Finally we reachedSt. Isaac's,I took them inside, showedthe way to the top, and told them thatI would be waiting for them in front of the Mariinskii Palace,on the SenateSquare. I expectedthe Mariinskii to be surroundedby soldiers or OMON specialmilitia troops---theway they did it in Vilnius backin Januarybut there was nothing of the sort. What I saw was about a hundred peoplemilling aboutunderthe columnswith Russia'stricolor flag and a few placards.It was then that I saw for the first time the mentionof the junta and a call for a general strike.One column was decorated with a big portrait of Yeltsin, the other sporteda sign: "No to Red Fascism."A few militiamen were amongthe crowd. The palacedoors were open and peoplekept going in and out. Finally, I spotteda few guys in gray OMON uniforms, but they were unarmed.I walkedup to oneof them."What'sup, officer?" He did not answerme. We stood for a while, in silence.''Thereis somethingamiss here," I said to myself. "Things are a messeverywhere. Still, this is a coup d'etat,after all. Could it be that they don't havethe brainsto pull this off either?"
150 VALERII ZAVOROTNYI At the Mariinskii Palace, St. Petersburg: "No to Red Fascism!" "Join the Indefinite Political Strike!" "No to the CPSUDictatorship!" Soon after Alain and Sonyarejoined me, I spotteda Deputy I knew from the dayswhen we worked togetherfor the PopularFront.· He was exactlywhat I neededthen. I quickly saidgood-byeto my Frenchfriends, promisedto call them later that evening,andran off to catchthe Deputy. Tenminuteslater,I wasinsidethe palace,climbing the marblestaircaseto the secondfloor, having no idea whatsoeverthat I would not leavethis building until threedayslater. Thus beganthe most exciting andperhaps the bestthreedaysof my life in the last severalyears. I was not lucky enoughto find a job right away, though everyone therehadplenty to do. At first, we were busy duplicatingleaflets (we were afraid that newspaperswould be closed down). TV and radio were closedtight, and our only hope was the photocopymachinesat the palace.Newscameovertwo telephonelines andwaswritten down longhand.We had only two fax machines.Yeltsin's first decreesand *This was a grassroots,Gorbachev-encouraged democraticmovementof the early yearsof perestroika.
LEITER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 151 addressescameover them from Moscow. Later in the day, two newspapers,Smenaand Nevskoevremia, managedto come out by some miracle (the deputieshadto "musclein" on the censors).Day andnight during these days we kept getting leaflets, statements,and decrees from Moscow,kept duplicatingthemanddistributingthemall throughout the city. On the eveningof the 19th we found out that twocolumnsof troops and equipmentwere moving toward the city from the direction of Pskov. At the same time, we learned that a Special Forces storm trooperunit of six hundredmenhadenteredthe city andwas quartered at a military college on Voinov Street. Other military units regularly stationedaroundLeningradwere put on alert but were staying putfor the time being. Severalgroups,headedby deputiesfrom the city soviet, went to thosebasesas well as to the military collegesand to the navy bases.Many of those who came to the squarelater, especially former soldiers, organizedthemselvesinto groups and also went to speakto the military. The staff headquartersorganizedat the palace was recruiting reserveofficers from amongthosewho cameto the square(by that time, over a thousandpeoplehad alreadygatheredthere). Pretendingto be oneofthosebravereserveofficers (thoughI nevergot beyondthe rank of sergeant),I managedto get myself admitted into one of these groups.I adaptedto the role so well that three hours later I was promoted to group commander.They even issued me a very powerful mandate.I am sorry I will not haveany grandchildren,for this pieceof paperis exactly what one would like to frame and put on the wall for the sakeof one'sdescendants. What happenedduring the following two nights and two days is a long story. On the morning of the 19th, deputiesandall thosewho had helpedthem to get electedbeganto streaminto the palace.All of this resembled[the election campaignof] 1989, when people were only beginningto come out of hibernation,feel like actual humanbeings, andrealizethat they could makea difference.Many were simply those "men in the street"who had once madeit possiblefor the deputiesto be elected.As in 1989, the division betweenthose who were voting and thosewho were being voted into office becameblurred. This was all the more remarkablebecausejust a few daysago it looked as if all factional infighting amongthe newly electeddeputieswould lead to a deadend.The attitudetowardthe "democrats"hadbeenchanging,and,
152 VALERII ZAVOROTNYI Rally in PalaceSquare,August19 sad to say, not in their favor. And, God knows, this was understandable,just as it was clearthat the deputieshadnot had any prior experience of democraticgovernment,no political culture, and, saddestof all, were not alwaysawareof their deficiencies.Who can blamethem, though.Onecould not askhistory to slow down. I hadneverbeenenthusiasticaboutpolitics. It is interestingto study and analyzepolitics as a form of the relation betweenthe government andsociety,but to be an actorin it was not for me. In any case,politics is not a cleanbusiness,it neveris. However,at certainmoments,many things becomedifferent; otherwise,we would not have had Sakharov or many other men and women I have encounteredwhose integrity I neverdoubted. Our greatpoliticianswho thoughtup this coupd'etat(oh, thesewise men!) had made all the correct calculations,including the public's growing disappointmentin the "democrats."But once again, they failed to take into accountthe "minutiae." They forgot that peoplehad alreadyhada tasteof freedomandthat they might not wish to go back. They might elect a bad government.But, having obtainedthe right to
LETJ'ER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 153 choosetheir own government,evenif they subsequentlydamnit with four-letter words, they would not wish to part with this right. For the fIrst time in decades,indeed,centuries,this was their government--a flawed governmentto be sure (''this fucking government!"),but the governmentthat theythemselveselected.And thosepeoplecameout to safeguardthis government,that is to say,to safeguardthemselves . ... I can also tell you that despitethe almost completeinformation blackout,with the radio and TV continuouslyspreadinglies, we managedto set up the production,duplication,and distribution throughout the city of thousandsof leafletsandnewssummaries.In manyoffices, where the authoritieshad not yet shut down duplicating equipment, dozensof different peopledid their bestto producea few hundred,a few thousandcopies.... Dozensdrove their carsto the palaceto pick up stacksof leaflets andthen distributedthem in their neighborhoods or at military bases. At a certain point, after we had learnedabout the troops moving toward Leningradalong the Tallinn Highway but did not know anything aboutthe otherapproaches to the city, a taxi droveright up to the palace.A strappingfellow got out of it and, cutting throughthe crowd andthe volunteerchainsurroundingthe palace,addressed me: "Listen, commander,here is what's happeningoutsidethe city...." When I askedhim how he hadfound aboutwhat was going on, he told me that a few dozentaxi drivers had gottentogetherand went scoutingin the suburbs,communicatingwith each other on their taxi radios. These were our taxi drivers--thesameguys who will not budgeunlessyou wavea few large-denomination billsor a packofMarlborosin front of their noses! On the fIrst evening, a group of doctors came to the palace, equippedwith all the fIrst-aid stuff-medicines,bandages,andso onand they stayedto the end, readyto minister to the wounded.People broughtfood. Among themtherewere not only older womenwho had managedto scrapetogethera coupleof sandwichesmadewith rationed sausageandthe last packetof tea,but alsothe "new biznesmeny,"who hauled in cartons and cartons of delicacieswe had forgotten even existed.Outsidethe palace,peoplewho knew eachothergot together and setup little improvisedcafes,treatingthe demonstratorsto hot tea andcoffee--gratis. Throughoutthe crisis, we kept receiving calls from "co-operators" (this is the term for small businessmenhere), who would offer and
154 VALERIl ZA VOROTNYl then deliver copying equipment,paper,computers.... In recenttimes, this categoryof peopleon the whole, thoughwith someexceptions,has not enjoyedgreatrespectamongthe population.Indeed,a savagemarket economyis not a pretty sight. The crazy inflation destroyingthe value of money,and the opportunityto grab this samemoneyin large quantities from an inept state, has been correctly describedby one Westernobserveras a gang rape of the stateby its citizens. I might add,though,that this statehasdoneplenty of raping of its citizensand cannotexpectto be treatedproperlyby them; consideralso thedecades of inexcusablelying, thievery,andcorruptionby the state,andyou will understandwhy peopledo not put much stock in businessethics and commondecency.And of course,it is the commonmanwho mustfoot the bill. Still, there was nothing we could expect. Alas, a civilized marketeconomyalwaysevolvesfrom a savageone. Be that as it may, theseco-op ownershad alreadyseparatedthemselvesfrom the system,though they tendedto duplicate some of its traits, unlike, for example,the dissidents,the so-called"sixties people," who did not want to haveanythingin commonwith the systemor to acceptany of the rules by which it playedits game.The dissidents were guided exclusively by the idea of moral resistanceagainstthe system,while those co-op owners had already developeda taste for having their own autonomousbusinesses.They understoodwell that what was happeningnow might affect their right to continue to run their own lives. And the stand they took during those days made a significantcontribution. I recall oneof thoseguys,who hadbeensupplyingus with paperfor leaflets,sayingto me: "Hang in there,boys. We know that if you keel over, we will, too." Of course,this is not to say that they fonned the majority of those who came to the square.The majority were commonfolk, ordinary people of different generations.Many of them had probably never thought they would ever wind up in such a crowd. And still, they came. On the eveningof the 19th, a bunchof very youngpeopleorganized work teamsand beganbuilding barricades.They, too, had their own commanders,even their own "boot camp." A young man of twenty, Maksim Poliakov,presidedover this whole enterprise.He and I had a lot of dealingstogether,and I rememberhim well. Two strandscuriously intertwined in his life: the August crisis in Petersburgand the
LEITER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 155 Januaryone in Vilnius. Back in February,he and a few other young men formed a Petersburgdetachmentand went to Vilnius to guardthe Lithuanianparliamentbuilding. He camebackto Petersburgon August 18 for a brief vacation, and on the 19th he was already organizing people at the square.For all those three days, he walked aroundthe square in his Lithuanian "uniform" of the "Regional Protection Forces."I had the opportunityto observeMaksim as he was teaching the guys how to build barricadesaccording to the design he had learnedwhile erectingbarricadeson the roof of the Lithuanianparliament building to guard againsta paratrooperlanding. And they followed his instructions,settingup the "antiparatroop"contraptionsand thenthe ordinary kind----at fIrst funny and awkward-lookingand in the end,solid ones,madeof blocksof concreteandloadedtrucks. The militia and the OMON troops did joint guard duty. Here in Leningrad, both of them took our side from the beginning. Maksim was shaking hishead, saying that only a crazy man could have predicted that he would be drinking tea with the OMON trooperson the samebarricade.The guys from OMON told us what to do if we were gassed(they were sure that gas would be usedin caseof an attack). We had nevergiven this a thought.But while we were scratchingour heads,trying to figure out what to do, a truck belongingto some"small business"beganunloadinggasmasks.This was living proofof mental telepathy, and nobody doubted at that moment that the science of extrasensoryphenomenawasno lesstrue to naturethanMarxism. On the eveningof the 19th,a whole caravanof watertrucksblocked the approachesto the square.The drivers came to see us and said: "Well, folks, you'll be safe for now-we parkedthem in such a way that a tank will bust before it movesthem. We're going to turn in for the night: tomorrow is anotherworkday for us." This self-generated organizedactivity was a commonoccurrenceat the square.Therewere dozensof suchgrassrootsorganizations,uniting very different people, and they actedwithout waiting for anyoneto tell them what to do. As hours went by, it was becomingincreasinglyclear that even if those others were to win, they would not be able to clamp down on us as before,to takebackthe pastsix years. The peopledid not have fear in their eyes.They were anxiousand tense,yes, but they were not frightened. At a certain point, as I was standingguard,Deputy Salewalked out onto the square.Right away a circle formed aroundher. It did not look like shewaspreparedto make
/56 VALERiI ZA VOROTNYI Rally in PalaceSquare,August20 a speech,and a bit awkwardly, she said: "Well, my fellow citizens of Petersburg,havewe gottenourselvesinto trouble!" Therewasuproarious laughter.She told me later that that was the momentshe realized the putschhad failed. Just think: a few years ago many of thosewho were laughing would not have daredto leavetheir homesat a time of such crisis. And there they were now, standing in the middle of a squarethat might soonbe attackedby tanks,laughing. I am not one to idealize what happened,and I am aware that changeshave touchedonly a segmentof our society, the most active segment,but a segmentnonetheless.Yet in momentsof such great stress,it is the mostactivepart of societythat playsthe decisiverole. There were many military men on the square.On the first day they camewearingtheir civilian clothes,but on the secondday they hadput on their uniforms. Theyjoined the staff headquarters andpaid visits to the military bases.The Afghan veteransstoodguardin the squareand in a few other strategiclocationsin the city. One of them said to me: "WhenI returnedfrom Afghanistanbackthen and sawwhat was going on in our society, I said to myself that there would soon come a time
LEITER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 157 when I would be settingtankson fire in the streetsof our city." Those werehis exactwords. I was fortunateenoughto meetthere,nearthe palace,manyremarkable peopleand to experiencethings I would neverhave experienced had it not been for those three days. I am aware that some of my recollectionsmight seemromantic. But I want to convey the atmosphereof those days with all possibleauthenticity. I want you to be able to seethe faces of thosepeoplewho, after all is said and done, wereresponsiblefor the outcome. When we beganreceiving the news from Moscow that the tanks were leaving the White House,and realizedthat this might be the last night of the coup d'etat,a new type of rumor startedcirculating at the square:"Yazov shot himself, the EmergencyCommitteehas beenarrested,the Baltic Fleet has struck againstthe putsch." (All the Baltic fleet had actually done at the time was declare its neutrality in the conflict.) That is when the public addresssystemat the Mariinskii Palace,its windows wide open, beganto play Glier's "Hymn to the Great City." I cannotbeginto conveyto you what it was like to be in the squareduring those moments.. .. Whateverhappensin the next few years-andanythingcan happen-tbememoryof that last night in the square-ringedby the barricades,illuminated by the yellow street lamps,with the black silhouetteof the cathedralin the background,the dark sky above, and the Glier hymn floating through the air-4he memoryof that night will stay with peoplefor a long time. Many will rememberit forever.
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III In High Places BetweenAugust 19 and 21, the barricadeserectedon the streetsof MoscowandLeningradcameto signifY the greatdivide that separated advocatesof democraticreform from defendersof the old Communist order. In no group was this great divide more visible and wrenching than in the political elite--am.ongthose at the apex of the country's governmentinstitutions, the CommunistParty, and the military. For them, the coupwas a momentof reckoning.Part III revealshow some of the leadingfigures in the Sovietpolitical elite facedthis challenge.
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NITKEUULS.GORBACHEV 1 What Happened in Foros After returningfromhis summerresidencein the Crimea, wherehe washeldincommunicado for threedays, Gorbachevheldhisfirst pressconferenceon ThursdaYiAugust22. He devotedmostofhis long openingstatementto an accountofhis andhisfamily's isolation at the Presidentialcompoundin Foros, his dealingswith the conspirators, andhis attemptsto resisttheir will. He spokewithoutnotesand withoutpausing,ignoring the occasionalgentletugsofhispressaide, Vitalii Ignatenko.It is this account,extractedfrom the opening statement,that we reproducein its entirety. [ ...] On August 18, at 4:50 P.M., I was infonned by the head of [Presidential]securitythat a group of personshad come down to the compoundand demandedto meetwith me. I saidthat I was expecting no one, that I had not invited anyone,and that nobodyhad told me to expectanyone.The headof security,too, told me that he did not know anythingabout it either. "Then why did you let them in?" "Because," was his answer,''they had the headof the SecurityDirectorateof the KGB, [Yurii] Plekhanov,with them." Otherwisethe security people would not have let them passinto the President'sresidence.Such are the rules;they aretoughbut necessary. I decidedto find out who might havesentthem here.Nothing could be simpler, since I have at my disposalall meansof communication: the ordinary [telephone] line, the governmentnetwork, the strategic network,the satellitelinks, etc.... I pickedup one of the telephonesI was working in my office just then---andit was dead. I picked up anotherphone,a third, a fourth, a fifth; they wereall dead.I pickedup the internaltelephone-disconnected. That wasit. I was isolated. I realizedthat this missionwas not going to be the kind of mission 161
162 MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV we deal with ordinarily. I askedmy wife [RaisaMaksimovna],daughter [Irina], and son-in-law [Anatolii] to gather together and said to them: "Here is what hasjust happened .... I don't needany additional information. I can see that somethingvery seriousis going on. Evidently they are going to try and blackmail me into something,or they will try to arrestme, or kidnap me, or somethingelse.In otherwords, anythingcanhappen." I told RaisaMaksimovna,Irina, andAnatolii that if it wasa question of the most importantmatter~f policies, of [our political] courstr-I November would standmy groundto the end. I would not give in to any blackmail, any threats,or any pressure,and I would not make any other decisions. I consideredit necessaryto say this, and you understandwhy: anything at all could happennext ... and especially,consideringthe consequences for the membersof my family .... We understoodthat, too. The whole family said that the decision was up to me: they were readyto sharewith me whatevermight happen,right to the end. That wasthe endof our [family] council. I walked out to invite the visitors in, but they, led by [Valerii] Boldin, the President'schiefof staff, hadalreadygoneup to the office breachof protocol. on their own--anunprecedented The Presidentwas given an ultimatum to hand over his powers to the Vice President.I said: "Before I startansweringquestions,I would like to askyou: Who sentyou?" The answerwas : "The committee." "What committee?" "Well, the committeeto deal with the emergencysituation in the country." "Who createdthis committee?I didn't createit, the SupremeSoviet didn't createit, so who createdit?" I was told that people [in the leadership] had already joined together, and that now a decreefrom the Presidentwas needed.The matterwas formulatedlike this: "Either you issuea decree[establishing the state of emergency]and remain here, or else you hand over your powersto the Vice President." "Why is the issueformulatedin this manner?" "The situation in the country is such-thecountry is sliding toward a catastrophe----that it is necessaryto take measures,a stateof emergencyis needed.Other measurescan no longer savethe situa-
WHAT HAPPENED IN FOROS 163 tion; we canno longerindulgeourselvesin illusions...." And so it went, on andon. In reply I said to them that I knew better than all of them the political, economic,and social situation inthe country, the conditions of people'slives, all the caresthat burdenthem now. Further, [I said] that we hadapproachedthe phasewhenall that is necessaryto improve life mustbe donefasterand with more decisiveness.But I am a determined opponent-andnot only for political and moral reasons-of thosemethodsof dealingwith problems,methodsthat havealwaysled to the deathsof hundreds,thousands,millions of people. We must reject [thosemethods]onceand for all. Otherwise,we would haveto betray and bury everything that we have startedto implement and resignourselvesto launchinganotherroundof bloodshed. That'swhy I said: "Both you and thosewho sentyou are adventurists. You will destroyyourselves-butthe hell with you, that's your own business-mostimportant, you will destroythe country, everything we haveworked for. We have now reachedthe point when it is possibleto sign the [Union] Treaty. After the signing--andwe have worked on [this agenda]for a whole month--majordecisionswill be takenregardingthe problemswith fuel, food, and financesso that we can quickly stabilizethe political andeconomicsituation,speedup the transitionto a marketeconomy,andcreateopportunitiesfor our people to apply themselvesfreely in all walks of life. And [you havecomeup with] all this just as we are aboutto reachagreement!·True enough,it is not a perfect agreement,and we have not yet gotten rid of our suspicions-oneither side. We see it in the relations betweenthe Union [government]and the republics,and betweenpolitical and social movements.All that is true. But the only way todealwith this is to seekaccord.Accord is emerging,andwe havebegunto move forward. Only thosebenton suicidecanproposeat this point the introductionof a totalitarianregimein our country." Therewasa demand:"Resign!" I said: "You'll neverseeme do eitherone.Tell this to all thosewho sent you here. There won't be any more conversationsbetweenus. You may say that the Presidentis readyto put his signatureunderany telegram,at once.And we havea reason:on the 20th, we are signinga newUnion Treaty." *That is, amongthe prospectivecosignersof the Union Treaty.
164 MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV (By the way, this was the end of Sunday,and I was finishing work on my speechfor this solemnoccasion;as late as four o'clock, [Georgii] Shakhnazarovand I were exchangingopinionsaboutit in the presence of my otheraide,Anatolii Cherniaev,who wasnot at this meeting.) "So, therewe canmeetwith many leaders;andfor the 21st, we have scheduleda meetingof the FederationCouncil----that'swherewe will discussall of thesequestions.[There] we will seekagreements[on the issues]that haveeludedus on the governmentlevel.· "Here they are for you, the centralissues,"1 said. "That'swherewe must hammerout solutions,and not the way you propose.So, tomorrow you want to declarea stateof emergency,do you? And then what? Why don't you try to predict one day ahead,four movesahead.What then?The country will reject it, it won't supportthesemeasures.You are trying to exploit the difficulties, the fact that peopleare tired, that they might supportany dictator...." (Incidentally, during the past few days 1 had been working with ComradeCherniaevon a very long article--it was shapingup to be thirty-two pages.There was a scenarioof this sort in it, and now its cast of charactershad shown up in person.My argumentconcerning this scenariowas that it spelledruin for society, it was a deadend, it would throw societybackwardandbury everythingthat we now have.) [I said:] "I am readyto convenethe Congressof People'sDeputies and the SupremeSoviet, if somein the leadershiphave doubts. Let's meet, let's discussthings. The Deputiesare all in their districts, they know what'sgoing on there,let's adoptan emergencyresolution,take other measures.1 will defend the path of concord, the path toward deepeningthe reforms and cooperatingwith the West--theseare the three main areas,and now they needto be synchronizedand coordinated.Especiallysince there is a correspondingdesire on the part of othernationsto cooperatewith us at this decisivestage." But it was a conversationwith deaf-mutes.Evidently they had already prepared.The machineryhad been set in motion---that'sclear now. 1 said: "That's it, there can be nothing more for us to talk about. Reportthat 1 am categoricallyopposed,and that you will be defeated. But 1 am concernedfor the peopleand for what we haveaccomplished overtheseyears...." And that'show it ended. *That is, in the old Union government.
WHAT HAPPENED IN FOROS 165 But after their ultimatum had been answeredby my categorical demandthat they report my conclusions,everythingstartedto develop accordingto the logic of conflict. Total isolationby seaand land. I still hadthirty-two of my guardswith me. They decidedto standfirm to the end. They dividedup all the areasof defense,including my family, and assignedall the different posts. When I found out that it had been statedat the coup committee'spressconferencethat I was seriouslyill and unlikely to return to a normal life, it becameclear to me that the next thing would be to make reality correspondto this statement.The guardsrealizedthis aswell. A decisionwasmadenot to orderany food from outside and to live on what we had on hand. I was absolutely composed,althoughI was deeply shakenand angeredby the political blindnessand irresponsibility of these criminals. I was sure, I was convinced,that all of this couldn't last long, that they wouldn't get awaywith it. Seventy-twohoursof completeisolation, of struggle.I think that it was all done in order to break the Presidentpsychologically.It was hard.What morecanI say? Every day, morning and evening,I madeand transmitteddemands that communicationsbe restoredand that an airplane be sent immediatelyto fly me backto Moscow, backto my job. After the press conference,I addedthe demandthat a retraction of the false report about the stateof my health be published--thereport madeby those oh-so-healthypeople whose handswere shaking as they faced you. [Laughterand applausefrom the reporters.]You raisedgoodquestions andmockedthem.It wasa farce. Everything was cut off. But the resourcefullads found some old radio receiversin the servicequarters,rigged up antennas,and started to tune in whateverthey could. The BBC andRadioLiberty broadcasts camein bestof all. Thenthe Voice of Americacamein-at least,that is what I wastold, what they reportedto me. [ ...] Peopletook a civic, responsibleposition, and did not collaborate with the EmergencyCommittee.What happenedwas doneby force. I know, I havealreadybeentold a lot aboutwhat went on. I want to say here, before you, that I am really with you. We all have seenthat it was not in vain that for the last six years,with such difficulties and so painfully, we have beenlooking for ways to move forward. Our society rejectedthe putschists.In the end, they were isolated.They did not succeedin turning the army againstthe people.
166 MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV The anny came into contact with the people, and after that no one could doanything.They [the putschists]realizedthat theyhadfailed. The republicsadoptedthe right position. In this regard,I must give credit where credit is due--themost principled position was adopted by Russia'sParliament,Russia'sdeputies,Russia'sgovernment,and aboveall an outstandingrole wasplayedby Boris NikolaevichYeltsin. I must sayalso that today we must give credit wherecredit is due-to the principledpositionof Muscovites,Leningraders,and inhabitants of many other regions.The [putschists']attemptto createthe impression that the country was virtually supportingthem ... Well, they did find some[support].Thesedaysin our country,you canfind anything. But on the whole, the country rejectedthis road to bloodshed.I don't think it is possibleto get a betterargument,a betterplebiscite, testifying to the true positionof the people.[ ...] When it becameclear that uncompromisingposition had been adoptedby Russia,her leadership,otherrepublics,the people,andthat the army had not moved againstthe people,they panickedand began to look for a way out. I was informed that a group of conspiratorshad arrived in the Crimeaon the Presidentialplanein orderto takethe Presidentto Moscow. When they came,I said [to my securitypeople]: take them to another building, put themunderguard,and conveyto themmy demandthat I will not speakto any of themuntil the governmentcommunication line is restored.Their responsewas that this would take a long time. "Take your time," I replied,"at this point I am not rushinganywhere." Communicationswere restored,and I begantalking to the country. First thing, I talkedto Boris Nikolaevich [Yeltsin]. I called[Nursultan] Nazarbaev,[Leonid] Kravchuk, [Nikolai] Dementei,and [Islam] Karimov! I said to them: "I'm holding the fort here with my garrison." [Laughterin the audience.]But that wasexactlywhat was going on: 72 hours of such terrible tension. The security people at a certain point feared that we might be overtaken from the sea. But, as we have learned,the sailors were giving the Presidenta sign that they would rescuehim. The Navy did not participatein the conspiracy. After that, I went to work. I ordered[Mikhail] Moiseev [Chief of the GeneralStaff] to take over the leadershipat the Ministry of Defense (he had been earlier called away from the Crimea) and im·Theleadersof, respectively,Kazakhstan,Ukraine,Belarus,andUzbekistan.
WHAT HAPPENED IN FOROS 167 mediatelyto haveall the troopsreturnto their barracks,to their bases, and to announcethat [Dmitrii] Yazov was being removed from his postandwould be arrested. All of this has been carried out. I found the Commandantof the Kremlin and askedhim under whose commandthe [Kremlin] KGB regimentwas, and I requestedthat the regiment'scommanderbe summoned.He wassummoned.I gavean orderoverthe phone:"Submitto no one'sauthority exceptmine andthat of the Kremlin Commandant." He said: "Yes, sir." In general,I startedcalling all the mostimportantpoints, to block off everythingall at once, becausethings were still dangerous.They could do awaywith me en route,or whereverthey chose.I decidednot to leave. Then I was told that a planewas on its way with a delegationfrom the RussianFederation.I said I would receivethembeforedoing anything else. I called [Civil Aviation] Minister Boris Paniukov and Moiseev and said that the plane should land not in Simferopol--orit would takethemthreehoursto get to me-butat the military airfield. I gave a commandthat they be met and that transportationbe arranged to bring themto me. The delegationarrived,andwe talked for a while and found we had a high degree of understanding.I think that what we have lived throughhasgiven us not only experience,but also greaterunderstanding. This is what it meanswhen democraticforces are united, and this is what it meanswhen they are disunited. Just think, sometimeswe haverammedour headsfighting over someissueandpracticallycalled eachotherenemies. We startedthinking abouthow to makeour way out of there.ThenI had to issue a lot more instructions. Ivashko and Lukianov arrived separately.They got there, even though no transportationhad been providedfor them. I receivedthem. I did not receivethe conspirators, did not see them, and do not want to see them. We divided among different planesandtook thembackto Moscow; andwhenthey left the planesthey were all arrestedand incarcerated.I gave an order to the Kremlin Commandantnot to admit anyonewho had cooperatedwith them. I have scheduledfor tomorrow a meetingof the nine republic leaders who have worked out the Treaty and preparedit for signing. Tomorrow we shallbe meetingandwe mustdiscusseverything.
168 MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV These were painful lessons,and for me personally, very painful indeed.This is simply a mostpainful traumafor me. I think that tomorrow we will start discussing,thinking over and working out positionson the issuesinvolved in moving forward andon new stepsto take. We needto seein this not only the misfortunethat befell us, but also the immense opportunity that these events have revealed.They have revealedthe true position of our people. In my conversationswith the leadersof foreign states,they all focusedattention specifically on the fact that the position of the people and the positionof the army showedthat irreversiblechangeshavetakenplace in the Union. Therefore,they arehopingthat we will takeadvantageof all theseopportunities.They all said that they would cooperate,and they believethat this cooperationshouldtake more active, more decisive forms. Today I receivedtwelve ambassadors from the EEC countries. They declaredtheir solidarityandsupport. What decisionshavebeenmade?I've issueda decree... Oh, by the way, you know, at the time, it lookedas if they might do away with me, with my family, with everybodywho was there with me, and then issue a lie that the Presidenthad taken such and such position and, moreover,that they were acting on his behalf. This is why I saw through all this treacheryduring their press conference, howeverprimitive andcrude.As onecomradefrom the RussianFederation said, they are just as incapableof doing this right as anything else: I decidedto makea video recordingright away. I madefour recordings. The kids, Irina and Anatolii, cut up the tapeinto four pieces,and we startedlooking for channels,someonewe could trust, to sendthis tapeout. Here is one of them. I'm turning it over to [Vitalii] Ignatenko,let him havea look. The othertapesmay turn up, becausethey did go out despitethe obstacles.My physician wrote out severalcopies of his medical opinion, andwe gave them out and distributedthem so that everyonewould know the true state of the President'shealth. And finally, I put forward four points in written form andaddedsomething by hand so it would be clear that I had written it (the four points had beentypedon a typewriter),andI signedmy own statement. *Gorbachev is echoing comedian Gennadii Khazanov'smemorablequip, "Theseguysof ours,they can'tevenstagea putschcorrectly."
WHAT HAPPENED IN FOROS 169 The first point: Yanaev'staking upon himself my responsibilities underthe pretextof my illness, [my] inability to carry out my duties, representsa deceptionof the people,and forthat reasoncannotconstitute anythingbut a coupd'etat. Second.This meansthat all subsequent actionsare illegal andwithout legitimacy: neitherthe Presidentnor theCongressof People's Deputieshasgiven Yanaevsuchauthority. Third. I askthat it be conveyedto Lukianov that I demandan urgent conveningof the USSRSupremeSoviet andthe Congressof People's Deputies sothat they might considerthe presentsituation, for they alonehavethe right, after analyzingthe situation,to passa decisionon necessarymeasuresandthe mechanismfor their implementation. Fourth. I demandthat the activities of the StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergencybe suspendedimmediatelyuntil suchtime as the aforementioneddecisionsare taken by the SupremeSoviet and the Congressof People'sDeputies.The continuationof theseactivitiesand further escalationof the measuresbeingtakenby the EmergencyCommittee may result in tragedy for all peoples,exacerbatethe situation still further, and perhapswreck totally the coordinatedefforts to bring the countryout of the crisis that hasbeeninitiated by the centerandthe republics. I demandedan answer.I wastold: "Wait, you will get one." At first, therewas no responseat all. ThenI was told: "The answeris coming." But I receivednothing. That wasthe situation. Now the most importantthing is that decisionshaveto be made.I have rescindedall the orders given by the Vice President,and the [Emergency]Committee,andthe Cabinetover the pastfew days.With my authority as President,I removedthem from office and dismissed them, and that which requiresthe decisionof the SupremeSoviet has been submitted for its consideration.The USSR Prosecutorhas informed me that he instituted criminal proceedingsyesterday,and we haveagreedthat the investigativeteamwill consistof USSRand RussianFederationinvestigators.[ ...]
BORIS YELTSIN 2 Proclamations, Decrees,and Appeals in Responseto the Coup, August 19, 1991 Boris Yeltsin, thefirst freely electedPresidentofthe Russian Republic,issuedthefollowing "Appealto the CitizensofRussia," on the morningofthefirst day ofthe coup. Yeltsin's proclamationwas thefirst public responseofany kind to the announcement ofthe State Committeeon the StateofEmergency.It wassoonreproducedon photocopymachinesandpostedin metrostationsandelsewhere throughoutthe city. Later that day, Yeltsin issuedseveraldecreesand appeals,someofwhich are reprintedbelow. Ofspecialimportance washis appealto officersandsoldiersto forsaketheplottersand submitto the authority ofthe Russiangovernment. Document1. Appeal to the Citizensof Russia (issuedat 9:00 A.M. on August 19, 1991) Citizensof Russia: On the night of August 1&-19, 1991,the legally electedPresidentof the countrywasremovedfrom power. Regardlessof the reasonsgiven for his removal,we are dealingwith a rightist, reactionary,anticonstitutionalcoup. Despiteall the difficulties and severetrials being experiencedby the people,the democratic processin the country is acquiringan increasinglybroadsweepandan irreversiblecharacter. The peoplesof Russiaare becomingmastersof their destiny. The uncontrolledpowersof unconstitutionalorganshavebeenlimited considerably,andthis includesparty organs. 170
APPEAL TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA 171 The leadershipof Russia has adopteda resolute position on the Union Treaty, striving for the unity of the Soviet Union and the unity of Russia.Our positionon this issuepermitteda considerableacceleration of the preparationof this treaty, coordinationwith all the republics, and the decisionthat the date for signing would be August 20. Tomorrow'ssigninghasbeencanceled. These developmentsgave rise to angry reactionary forces, and pushedthem to irresponsibleand adventuristattemptsto solve the most complicatedpolitical and economic problems by methods of force. Attemptsto realizea couphavebeentried earlier. We consideredand considerthat such methodsof force are unacceptable.They discredit the Union in the eyes of the whole world, undermineour prestigein the world community,and return us to the cold war era along with the isolation of Soviet Union in the world community. All of this forces us to proclaim that the so-calledcommittee'sascendancy to poweris unlawful. Accordingly, weproclaimall decisionsandinstructionsof this committeeto be unlawful. We are confident that the organs of local power will unswervingly adhereto constitutionallaws and decreesof the Presidentof Russia. We appeal to citizens of Russia to give a fitting rebuff to the putschistsand demand a return to normal constitutional development. Undoubtedly,it is essentialto give the country's President,Gorbachev, an opportunity to addressthe people. Today he has been blockaded.I havebeendeniedcommunicationswith him. We demand an immediateconvocationof the Congressof People'sDeputiesof the Union. We are absolutelyconfidentthat our countrymenwill not permit the sanctioningof the tyranny and lawlessnessof the putschists, who have lost all shameand conscience.We addressan appeal to servicemento manifestlofty civic duty and not take part in the reactionary coup. Until thesedemandsare met, we appealfor an indefinite general strike.... Yeltsin, Presidentof Russia Silaev,Chairmanof the RSFSRCouncil of Ministers Khasbulatov,Acting Chairmanof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet
172 BORIS YELTSIN Document2: DecreeNo. S9 of the Presidentof the RSFSR (issuedat 1:44 P.M. on August 19, 1991) In connectionwith the actions of a group of individuals who proclaimedthemselvesthe StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency,I orderthat: 1. The work of saidCommitteebe deemedillegal andthe actionsof its organizersbe regardedas constitutinga coup d'etat,which is none otherthan a crime againstthe state. 2. All decisionsmade in the name of this so-calledCommitteefor the Stateof Emergencybe regardedas illegal and carrying no force of law on the territory of the RSFSR. The territory of the RSFSR is governedby the lawfully elected governmentin the personsof the President,the SupremeSoviet, the Chairmanof the Council of Ministers, and all stateand local governingand administrativeorgansof the RSFSR. 3. Actions of governmentofficials who carry out the ordersof said Committee are subject to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and are liable to criminal prosecutionaccordingto law. The presentdecreebecomeslaw at the time of its signing. Presidentof the RSFSR,B.Yeltsin Document3: DecreeNo. 61 of the Presidentof the RSFSR (issuedat 4:47 P.M. on August 19, 1991) An attemptto carry out a coup d'etathas beenmade;the Presidentof the USSR, who is the SupremeCommanderof the USSR Armed Forces, has been removed from office; the Vice Presidentof the USSR,the Prime Minister of the USSR,the Chairmanof the Committee for StateSecurity[KGB] of the USSR,and the USSRMinisters of Defenseand of Internal Affairs havejoined an unconstitutionalorgan and have therebycommitteda crime againstthe state. As a result of these actions, the work of the lawfully elected executive branch of governmentof the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublicshas beenparalyzed. In this extraordinarysituation,I decreethat: 1. Until the conveningof the extraordinaryCongressof the USSR People'sDeputies, all organs of executive power of the USSR that
APPEAL TO SOLDIERSAND OFFICERS 173 operate on the territory of the RSFSR, including the KGB of the USSR,the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR,and the Ministry of Defenseof the USSR,becomesubjectto direct rule by the popularly electedPresidentof the RSFSR. 2. The RSFSRCommitteeon State Security, the RSFSRMinistry of Internal Affairs, and the RSFSRStateCommitteefor Defensetemporarily carry out the functions of the correspondingUnion government organs on the territory of the RSFSR. All regional and other organsof the USSRKGB andthe USSRMinistries oflnternal Affairs andDefensethat operateon the territory of the RSFSRshall be subject to direct rule by the decreesand dispositionsof the RSFSRPresident, the RSFSRCouncil of Ministers, the RSFSRKGB and Ministry of InternalAffairs, andthe RSFSRStateCommitteefor Defense. 3. All organs,officials, citizensof the RSFSRmusttake immediate action to preventthe implementationof any andall ordersof the unconstitutionalCommittee for the State of Emergency.Officials who follow the ordersof this Committeeare removedfrom office in accordance with the Constitution of the RSFSR. Organs of the RSFSR Prosecutor'sOffice musttake immediatemeasuresto initiate criminal proceedingsagainstthe aforesaidpersons. Presidentof the RSFSR,B.Yeltsin Document4: Appealby Boris Yeltsin, Presidentof the RSFSR,to the Soldiers andOfficers of the USSRArmed Forces, the USSRCommitteefor StateSecurity[KGB], and the USSRMinistry of InternalAffairs [MVO] Servicemen! Countrymen! An attempthas beenmadeto stagea coup d'etat. The Presidentof the country, the Commander-in-Chiefof the Armed Forces of the USSR,has beenremovedfrom power. The Vice President,the Chairman of the KGB, andthe First DeputyChairmanof the DefenseCouncil [of the USSR] have formed an unconstitutionalbody, and have therebycommittedthe most seriouscrime againstthe state.The country is faced with the threat of terror. The "order" promised by the
174 BORIS YELTSIN A soldierreadsYeltsin'sappealto the armedforces
APPEAL TO SOLDIERSAND OFFICERS 175 self-appointedsaviorsof the Fatherlandwill result in tragedy: wholesale repressionof dissent,concentrationcamps,nighttime arrests."A better life" will remain a propagandalie. Soldiersand officers, at this tragic hour I appealto you. Do not let yourselvesbe snaredin the web of lies, promises,and demagogicargumentsabout the soldier'sduty. Do not allow yourselvesto becomea blind weaponof the criminal will of a group of adventurerswho have violated the Constitutionand the laws of the USSR. Soldiers! I appealto you. Think aboutyour loved ones,your friends, andyour people.At this difficult hour of decision,rememberthat you have taken an oath of allegianceto your people, the people against whom you arebeing forcedto turn your weapons. A throne can be erectedusing bayonets,but it is not possibleto sit on bayonetsfor long. The daysof the conspiratorsarenumbered. Soldiers, officers,generals!An hour ago I appointedthe headof the RSFSRCommitteefor Defense.He is your comrade-in-arms,Colonel GeneralK.I. Kobets. I have issueda decreeplacing all the territorial and other organsof the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, and the Ministry of Defense[of the USSR] deployedon the territory of the RSFSRwithout delay underthe commandof the Presidentof the RussianFederation,the Ministry ofInternalAffairs of the RussianFederation, andthe StateCommitteefor Defenseof the RussianFederation. Dark clouds of terror and dictatorshiphave gatheredover Russia. But they will not becomean eternalnight. Rule of law shall triumph in our land, andour long-sufferingpeoplewill gain freedom.This tim~ for now andforever! Soldiers, I trust that in this tragic hour you will make the right decision.The honor andthe glory of Russianarms shall not turncrimsonwith the blood of the people. Boris Yeltsin, Presidentof the RussianFederation 5:10p.M.
BORIS YELTSIN 3 Speechto the Russian Parliament, August 21, 1991 Boris Yeltsincamebeforethe Russianparliamentat 12:55P.M. on Wednesday,August21. By then, theplottershadbeenroutedand were attemptingto flee. Reprintedbelowis the completetextofYeltsin's speech. Distinguishedpeople,deputies. Russiaand the country, as a whole, are living through a dramatic, perhapstragic, periodin its history. In the history of our country there have been severalattemptsto stagea coup,at a time when it would haveseemedthat democracywas on the rise and gathering momentum.Right-wing forces have tried severaltimesto stagea coupd'etat,andthey haveat last succeeded. You will recall that the first attempttook placeat the beginningof the year,but at that time they were scaredoff by the statementmadeby the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze,and the correspondingreactionof public opinionin Russia,the country, andthe world. You all recall the sessionof the USSR SupremeSoviet, when the samepeople--Pavlov,Kriuchkov, Yazov--trled to extract for themselves some special powers at the expenseof the authority of the Presidentof the country,which virtually amountedto his removalfrom office, andso forth. But this secondattempt,too, failed: the SupremeSoviet gavethem no support. And finally, the third, this time successful,attemptcamewhen the Presidentwasvacationingawayfrom Moscow.Now he is no longeron vacation; he is forcibly isolatedat his dachain Foros, in the Crimea. /76
SPEECH TO THE RUSSIANPARLIAMENT 177 What happenedis an unconstitutionalcoupd'etat.It is unconstitutional becausethere have beenno statementsmade by the Presidentof the country, either in writing or orally on television or radio. There has beenno medicalexamination,eitherby Soviet doctorsor international experts,statingthat he is unableto performhis functions. Information at our disposalspeaksto the contrary.The President'spersonalphysician sawhim on the 19thbut was subsequentlydisallowedcontactwith the President.[According to him,] the Presidentwas in good health, except for a minor arthritic condition, so there·can be no question abouthis not beingableto dischargehis duties. In circumstanceswhen democracyin our country is on the rise, theseactionsareunprecedented andconstitutean arrogantcoup d'etat. Let me point out that all of thesepeoplecomefrom the political right. They were unable to find even a couple of individuals among the pseudo-democrats willing to join them, to give a little political variety to the membershipoftheir Committee.They tried, we know, but failed to find anybody.The peoplethey approachedrefusedto cooperatewith them,refusedto takepart in this unconstitutionalplot. Now what measuresdid we undertakeon our part? First, early in the morning of the 19th, we issueda statementto the people of Russiawhich was signedby myself and ComradesSilaev and Khasbulatov.Although the massmediaof the RussianFederation havebeenplacedundera virtual blackout,we have set up a powerful radio station right in this building, we have talked to people on the phone, and we have succeededin broadcastingthat statement,along with the subsequent Decreeof the Presidentof the RussianFederation, to otherregionsof the country. During the first twenty-four hours a seriesof other decreeswere broadcastin this manner,including a decree[no. 59] proclaimingtheir Committeeunconstitutional;a decreesetting up Russia'sCommittee for Defense;a decreegiving Russia'sPresidentauthority over all the executivebranchesof the USSR governmentsituatedon the territory of the RussianFederation,including the USSRKGB, the USSRMinistry ofInternalAffairs, andthe USSRMinistry of Defense. In the absenceof the Commander-in-Chief,andtaking into account the fact that the Minister of Defenseis a criminal, it was our duty to assumeresponsibility for the USSR armed forces stationedon the territory of the RussianFederation.Further,we issueda decreesetting up a specialgroup headedby the First Deputy Prime Minister of the
178 BORIS YELTSIN RussianFederation.This group was sentto the heartlandof Russiaand therebeganpreparationsfor assumingpower in caseRussia'sgovernment had beenseizedand eliminatedlast night (and, who knows, this dangermay still exist). And now regardingthe actionsofYanaev,Pavlov,and others,there was a decreeon the armedforces.The Presidentof the RussianFederation hasassumedauthorityover the armedforces.The Tamanandthe Kantemirov divisions and the airborne ParatrooperUnit have gone over to the side of the RussianFederation,and they are acting on ordersof the Presidentof the RussianFederation. What are the reasonsfor the failure of the attemptsto isolate or, to usethis junta'scynical phrase,to "intern" the leadershipof the Russian Federation---thePresident,the Chairmanof the Council of Ministers, andthe Acting Chairmanofthe SupremeSovietofthe RussianFederation? The reasonsare that the Tula Airborne ParatrooperDivision, instead of storming and seizing the building of the Russian Federation'sparliament,took it undertheir protectionand guardedit from attackfor twenty-four hours.We are grateful to this Division, its commandingofficers, and its Commander,GeneralLebed. Of course, he is facing certaindangernow, but accordingto my Presidentialdecree, and since GeneralLebed is now residenton the territory of the RussianFederation,I have placed him under the protection of the Presidentof Russia,safeguardinghim from possibleprosecutionon the partof the USSRorgansoflaw andorder. I have also signeda decreeon the operationof enterpriseson the territory of the RussianFederation,a decreeon the economicsovereignty of the RussianFederation.Let me elaborateon this. Taking into accountthat the Union Treaty was to be signedon the 20th andthat we hadan agreementwith the Presidentof the Union that on the 21st and 22nd, he would be signing a decreetransferringthe propertyand the enterpriseson the territory of the RussianFederation to the jurisdiction of the RussianFederation,we hadprepareda decree placing thoseenterprisesunderthe jurisdiction of the RussianFederation. But now that the Union Treatywas not signedyesterday,because of the actionstakenby an unconstitutional·group of rebels, andsince the Presidentis incommunicado,I have signeda decreeproviding for the economic sovereigntyof the RussianFederation,stating that all propertyon the territory of the RussianFederationis placedunderthe jurisdictionofthe RussianFederation.
SPEECH TO THE RUSSIANPARLIAMENT 179 In light of the curfew imposedin Moscow and Leningrad, I have removedthe commandersof the Moscow and Leningradmilitary districts and I have appointeddifferent personswho act on orders of appropriateauthorities,and I have also appointedthe Minister of Defense for the RussianFederation,Colonel GeneralKonstantinIvanovich Kobets. I have also signed several appeals:to the citizens of Russia, to PresidentBush, to servicemen,and to his Holiness the Patriarchof Moscow and All Russia,Aleksii II. The last appealwas deliveredby hand,by Vice PresidentRutskoi, andthe Patriarchhas supportedus at this difficult periodof time, andhe saidthat the faithful would support us at this difficult time. As RuslanImranovich [Khasbulatov] said earlier, we have formulated an ultimatum and discussedit with Lukianov... , thoughI must say that we cannot believe Lukianov when he says that he did not participate and did not even know that this group was planning an imminentcoup. Further, I have issueda directive to put the Houseof Soviets["the White House"] underguard.This decisionwas fully justified, because therewereplansto launchan attackon the parliamentbuilding, precise planswith everythingworkedout hour by hour andminute by minute. It is only thanksto our decisiveactionsandthe actionsofthe peopleof Moscow who stagedan all-day vigil at the building---we were inside the building and the people of Moscow were outside in the rain-it was largely thanks to them, when they stoppedtanks and armored personnelcarriersandthe specialforcesthat hadbeensentto stormthe building and arrestthe membersof the Russiangovernment.We must thank the people of Moscow, who deservepraise for such resolute actions. The [RSFSR]Minister of ForeignAffairs, Kozyrev, hasbeensentto the United Nationsto inform Peresde Cuellar andthe UnitedNations about the unconstitutionaldevelopmentsin our country and what the RussianFederationplansto do aboutthem. I must say that Bush, Mitterrand, and others were firm in their denunciationof the coup d'etatand the actionsof this Committeefor the State of Emergency.They do not acknowledgeits decisions,but they supportthe actionsof the Russiangovernment,and thereforewill seeto it that the world communityoffers us supportand expressesits opinion with regardto what hashappened.
180 BORIS YELTSIN I askedthemthat they, for their part, demandto be put in touchwith the Presidentof the Union [Gorbachev].But of course,communications with him are brokenor, rather,blocked in Foros, in the Crimea, by the forces of the Union KGB, the Navy, and his own Presidential securitydetail, which is alsoKGB. So he hasthreerings aroundhim. My conversationsover the telephonewith Yanaevand Kriuchkov haveshownthat they are trying to justifY their actions,sayingthat they havebeenacting constitutionally,that Gorbachevis unableto perform his functions,but this is not true. Today, around three o'clock in the morning, Kriuchkov canceled, for the durationof this night, the actionsdirectedat isolating and then taking by stormthe Houseof Soviets[the White House].He agreedto my proposal-thathe and I togetherfly to Foros and bring back the President.But I needyour permissionfor this. [Voices of the deputies:"No, don't go!"] Khasbulatov:Well, this is what I, too, havebeentelling the President. In accordancewith our request,Kriuchkov mustcomehereat 13:00 hours.* As to the idea of flying there,I don't think there is anotherway of finding out what the objectivesituation is.Needlessto say, Kriuchkov mustgive his guarantees. [Voices: "What kind of guarantees?"] I repeat:this is the situation,but the decisionis yours. So this is the situation as of now. The leadershipof the Russian Federation,the Presidentandthe leadershipof the SupremeSoviet and the Council of Ministers, have been acting energetically;there is no panic,thereis no despair,andwe do hopethat the daysof the junta are numbered,and they must be removedfrom power. This Committee must be dissolved,and all of its eight membersmust be brought to justice. *Kriuchkov nevercame.
INTERVIEW WITH NIKOLAI VORONTSOV 4 BetweenRussia and the Soviet Union-With Notes on the USSR Counell of Ministers Meeting of August 19, 1991 Nikolai Vorontsov,the USSRMinister ofEnvironmentandNatural ResourcesManagementanda People'sDeputyofthe Russian Federation,wasoneoftwo cabinetministersto objectto the coup during the meetingofthe USSRCouncilofMinisters on August19, 1991.Becauseno official minuteswerekept, Vorontsovtookhis own notes,which are to this day the only survivingrecordofthe ministers' individualpositionsregardingthe coup. The eventsofthis particular meetinggainedpublic notorietyat thesessionofRussia'sSupreme Sovietheldon August23, 1991, which wasattendedby Gorbachev. After Gorbachevfinishedhis addressto the Russianparliament,Boris Yeltsincajoledhim into readinga transcript ofthecabinetmeeting basedon Vorontsov'snotes-alitany ofbetrayalby the ministers appointedto high officeby Gorbachevhimself.Thetranscript was publishedin Komsomolskaiapravdaon August24, 1991. Vorontsovwasinterviewedby GregoryFreidin in Berkeley,California, in April 1993. Both this interview and Vorontsov'stranscript of the cabinetmeeting,including his parentheticalcomments,are reproducedbelow. Interview with Nikolai Vorontsov, April 1993 Vorontsov: For two weeks before the coup, I was on sick leave becauseof high blood pressure,and was living at the government 181
182 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV sanatoriumin the village of Uspenskoe.Needlessto say, this was a working sick leave.Papersfrom my Ministry arrived every day, and a coupleof times I went to Moscow to attendexecutiveboardmeetings. That Monday, August 19, I was planningto come to Moscow, among otherthings,to attendthe Congressof Compatriotsto which I hadbeen invited as a guestof honor. [ ...] At 9:30 that morning, therewasto be a specialmassat UspenskiiCathedralin the Kremlin in honor of the congress.An event of this sort is both colorful and rare, and I would not miss it for anything. My driver, Volodia, cameto pick me up at 8:00 A.M. "Have you listenedto the radio?"he askedme as soonashe greetedme. "What happened?"I shotback, andhe told me the whole story, that Gorbachevhad taken ill and on and on.... I decidedright away that my wife, YelenaAlekseevnaLiapunova,andI shouldgo to Moscowat once, straight to the Kremlin, to the Uspenskii Cathedral.The mass was to be attendedby Boris Yeltsin, Gavriil Popov [Mayor of Moscow], Anatolii Sobchak[Mayor of Leningrad}-in other words, the leading democraticpolitical figures. While on the way to Moscow, I called the Ministry and askedthem whetherthere had beenany communicationsfrom the Council of Ministers or other governmentalorgans. There was nothing. I told them where I was going and how to reach me. During the next few hours, I called them regularly to let them know where I was and to receive any important information. Only at 3:00 P.M., or evenlater, at 3:30, was I informedthat the Union Council of Ministers had been scheduledto meet that evening at 6 o'clock. We arrived at the Kremlin on time. The sceneat the cathedralwas quite confused; people did not know what was happening.Among them,therewere many"compatriots"--secondor third-generationdescendantsof Russianemigres,who had come to Russiafor the first time in their life, and there, waiting for them, was this nice little surprise. I saw the Patriarch,I saw Mikhail Nikitich Tolstoi, a People's Deputyandthe organizerof the Congressof the Compatriots,but none of the big-time politicianswere in attendance.I askedmy wife to keep in touch with me and left the cathedralfor the White House.While on the way there, I telephonedthe Ministry once again, and once again therewas no communicationfrom the Prime Minister's office or from the EmergencyCommittee,or, for that matter,anyoneelse. I arrived at the White House at 9:50. Yeltsin was not there, and
COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING 183 neitherwere Khasbulatovor Silaev. Nobody knew wherethey were. I droppedby the office of GennadiiBurbulis [Yeltsin's chief of staff]. There I ran into Academician Yurii Alekseevich Ryzhov, a USSR People'sDeputy andDeputy of the USSRSupremeSoviet. I was very happy to see him there. As a rule he was the only member of the [USSR] SupremeSoviet Presidiumto attendrallies organizedby the democrats,just as I was thereas the only memberof the Union Council of Ministers. I also ran into Aleksei Vladimirovich Yablokov, who told me the previousweekthat he hadbeenappointedby Yeltsin as his principal adviseron ecologicalmatters. The three of us, along with Burbulis, proceededto the office of [Vice PresidentAleksandr] Rutskoi, who was the only top representative of the governmentin the White House. As we walked into his office, Rutskoi wasdrafting by handthe appealby the Russiangovernment, alonglines that he hadjust discussedwith Yeltsin andKhasbulatov. They had given him the main points overthe telephone,and now he wasdrafting the final versionof the text by hand. At Rutskoi's, we learned that the meeting of the Presidium of Russia'sSupremeSoviet had been scheduledfor 10 o'clock in the morning, with the sole purposeof immediately conveningan emergency sessionof the SupremeSoviet of the RussianFederation.The leadership--Yeltsin,Silaev, Khasbulatov-werestill in Arkhangelskoe [at Yeltsin's dacha],and one must give credit to Rutskoi for his decisivenessand courage.He was readyto issuethe famousappealto the citizens of Russiaon his own responsibility, if anything were to happento the otherson their way to the White House. At around10 or 10:15,we enteredthe meetingroom ofthe Supreme SovietPresidium.Therewereaboutfifteen memberssitting aroundthe table, one short of the quorum(sixteenout ofthe thirty memberswere needed).Rutskoi satdown in the Chairman'sseat.Yablokov, Ryzhov, and I, too, sat ourselvesat the table-justas an expressionof solidarity. No soonerhad we sat down than in walked Yeltsin, Silaev, and Khasbulatov.The doorsremainedopened,andthe room wasbeginning to be filled by deputiesof the Russianparliamentas well as Union deputies-practicallyall of themmembersof the InterregionalGroup" *The InterregionalGroup,madeup of abouttwo hundredliberal-mindeddeputies, fonned after the first free electionsof the new USSR Congressof People's Deputiesin 1989.The groupwasoriginally headedby SakharovandYeltsin.
184 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV Now, with Khasbulatovpresent,there was a quorum,and the decision of the Presidiumcould be binding. Khasbulatovchairedthe meeting and did so, one must say, in the bestand most dignified manner. He proposedthe convening of an [emergency] sessionof Russia's SupremeSoviet. However, when Khasbulatov'smotion was put to a vote, deputiesVladimir Isalmv, Vice Chairmanof Russia'sparliament, and Boris Isaev,Chairmanof the Council of Nationalitiesof the Russianparliament,votedto abstain.·The motion, consequently,could not be adopted(a majority of all the membersof the Presidiumwas required for passage).Khasbulatovwas undauntedand announcedthat he was nevertheless calling an emergencysessionof the SupremeSoviet on his own responsibility. A press conferenceof the Russianleadershipwas scheduledfor 11:00 A.M. By that time, we could alreadyseeout of the window that tanks were arriving from the direction of Kutuzovskii Prospect.Fearing that nobodywould be able to attendthe pressconferencebecause of possiblecordons,we decidedto invite foreign ambassadors to attend the pressconferencealong with reporters.We thought that the presenceof ambassadoriallimousines,flags and all, would make it possible for the reportersto breakthroughto the White House. A few moments later, Yeltsin, Yablokov, Ryzhov, and I were marchingto the SupremeSoviet hall where the pressconferencehad already started. The person presiding over it, as we saw when we walked in, was Silaev. Let me point out that Silaev is a man without any political ambitions,just an honestand very capableadministrator. Only extraordinarycircumstancescould have promptedhim to take charge.He must have arrived somethree minutes before Yeltsin did and, not knowing what might havehappenedto him, openedthe press conferenceand beganreadingthe text of the governmentappeal,the one signedby [Russia's] President,the Chairmanof the Council of Ministers [Silaev himself], and the Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet [Khasbulatov]. Silaev'svoice projectedsuch a remarkableforce that, for a moment,Yeltsin wastakenabackandpausedin the doorway.But • According to the RussianInformation Agency, both Isakov and Isaev voted againstKhasbulatov'smotion. The personwho abstainedwas Yurii Voronin, the headof the ParliamentaryCommitteeon Budget, Taxes,and Prices. SeePutch: Khronika trevoznykhdnei, with an introduction by A. Vinogradov and G. Pavlikovskii (Moscow: Progress,1991),p. 59.
COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING 185 this lasted only a split second,and a moment later, we all took our seatson the podium-Yeltsin, Rutskoi, Khasbulatov,Silaev, Yablokov, Ryzhov, and I. Yeltsin read out the "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia," sharply worded and unequivocal.There were practically no questions,or, perhaps,we simply did not take any question,for obviousreasons .... Freidin: Werethereany ambassadors there? Vorontsov:Yes. I rememberthe Italian ambassador andthe ambassadorfrom the Netherlands.I don't recall, though,whether[U.S. Ambassador]Matlock wasthere.I think thosewho learnedaboutthe press conferencein time to attend did come, but eventswere unfolding at sucha madpacethat somemay havemissedit throughno fault of their own. Therewere, I recall, at leasteight big ambassadoriallimousines, with their country'sflags, parkedoutsidethe White House. After the pressconference,the questionwas: what to do next?There was a meeting at the office of SergeiNikolaevich Krasavchenko.*It wason the third floor, with a view of the embankment.I think Burbulis was there, too. The question was: what did we have in the White House?The answer:nothing. We had no autonomouscommunication system,no radio station, and there was no public addresssystemthat we could use to communicatewith the outside.The list was long. It was an utterly dismal picture. In the meantime,someof the Supreme Soviet staff membersand governmentofficials beganto leavethe building. I evenrecall runninginto a vice premierof the RussianGovernment. Freidin: What washis name? Vorontsov:G.V. Kulik. I must say, though,that all the membersof Russia'scabinet,including [Kulik], had voted to supporttheir Prime Minister [Silaev]. And yet, during thosedays,neitherKulik nor Gavrilov was anywhereto be found. Prime Minister Silaev was highly visible, but the two vice premierswereunheardandunseen. Back to Krasavchenko' s office. The questionwas how to distribute the governmentappeal.It was clear that it would not be broadcastby the media.t The solution, of course,was to use the copying machines ·Chairmanof the RussianSupremeSoviet'sCommitteefor EconomicReform andmemberof the Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet. tTbe text of the appealswas publishedthe following day, August 20, in /zvestiia.
186 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV of the SupremeSoviet. But who would be doing the copying?We did not want to compromisethe membersof the supportstaff--say,some woman clerk who was responsiblefor the copier-if the Emergency Committeereally took over. To be askingthe clerks to do this job, we decided,would be simply immoral. So we took a small copying mas office, and the two chine from the receptionroom of Krasavchenko' of us begancopyingthe fIrst appeals(fIve pagesaltogether)on a little Canonmachineat the rate of no more than six copies a minute. We stapledthem by hand and then, taking a stack (twenty-fIve or thirty copies),I marchedout of the White Houseand distributedthem there amongthe people.And peoplehadalreadybegun to arrive. They were practicallytearingthe sheetsright out of my hands,but I tried to give them only to thosewho promisedto make more copies anddistribute them further. So somepromisedto make more copieson their office copiers, some on their typewriters, and some,simply by hand, "fIve copiesusingcarbonpaper."I kept going backandforth, makinga total of four or fIve trips. During one of thesetrips, I saw from the window that therewas a commotion outside and a tank was being surroundedby a small crowd. I rushed downstairs.By the time I got there, I saw Boris Nikolaevich alreadystandingon the tank. I elbowedmy way to the tank and then I, too, clamberedup on it. Who else was on it? Apart from Yeltsin and his bodyguards,there was People'sDeputy Mikhail Grigorievich Arutiunov; Deputy V.P. Mironov; Viacheslav Bragin, who until recentlychairedthe Committeeon the Press;·and USSR Deputy Yaroshenko,who was Minister of Economics in Silaev'sgovernment.When Yeltsin went to the United Statesfor the first time, it was Yaroshenko who helped him to organize the planeloadof disposableneedlesand medicinesthat Yeltsin had purchasedwith his speakingfees.Thosewere all the deputieswho were on the tank. After Yeltsin madehis famousspeech,I decidedto makemy own brief statement.I saidthat peopleassumedthat the USSRgovernment supportedthe EmergencyCommittee."It is not that way at all," I said. "I am a memberof the USSR government,and I can assureyou that it's not that way at all." ·Bragin was subsequentlyappointedhead of the StateCommitteefor Television andRadioBroadcasting(formerly Gosteleradio).
COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING 187 You see,I hadalreadyhada similar experiencebackin March 1991 when there was an attempt to establisha state of emergencyat a meetingof the Council of Ministers. At that time, three people-the Minister of Geology,G. Gabrieliants;DeputyPrimeMinister for Fossil Fuels and Electrical Energy, L. Riabev; and I-managedto stop this attemptin its tracks. The only differencebetweenthat time and now wasthat in March 1991 Gorbachevwasstill sitting in the Kremlin. Freidin: Who demandedthe introduction of a state of emergency then? Vorontsov:That whole story happenedon the day of the openingof Russia'sCongressof People'sDeputies,when massiverallies were beingheld all over Moscow. The threefigures who were pushingfor a state of emergencywere Pugo, Kriuchkov, and Yazov. Rather passively andvaguely,Pavlov,too, was in favor of it. I havemy recordof that meeting, and most of the ministers presentsaid somethinglike this: Yes, it is necessaryto introducea stateof emergency,but. ..." I decidedto speakout, but beforemy turn came,Gabrieliantsgot up and made a very good speech(during the putsch,he was in the Crimea). He said: "What are you doing? Do you want to go back to the old days?" I spoke after him, and the third to come to our side was Deputy Prime Minister Riabev. After the three of us had spoken,the attemptsomehowdid not go any further. This is what I wasthinking of as I stood on the tank. If only the Council of Ministers had met, I thought, we would have been able to convince the membersof the cabinet,as we had done in March, not to go along with the state of emergency. On the tank, I beganby introducingmyselfas a People'sDeputy of Russiaandthe USSRMinister of Environment,a memberof the Union cabinet.I said: "I want to inform Y01l-{)fficially-that therehasbeen no meetingof the USSRCouncil of Ministers andas of now, nonehas beenscheduled.So you must understandthat if anyonespeaksin the nameof the USSRgovernment[in supportof the EmergencyCommittee], that personis lying. The Soviet governmentis a collegial body, and I assureyou that it has not madeany collective decision [on the state of emergency]."That was all. After me spoke Colonel General Kobets, Russia'sDeputy and Minister of Defense.He made a good speech,invoking the soldier's honor, saying that our soldiers would neverraise armsagainstthe people.Thesewere very importantwords
188 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV and, like his otheractionsin thosedays,they playeda major role in the defenseof the White House. Look, here was this career officer, a general,who had madehis choice, and that was very impressiveand reassuring. [ ...] Sometimearound3:30 P.M., whenI calledthe Ministry again,I wastold that the EmergencyCommittee'spressconferencewas scheduled for 5:00 P.M. andthat the Council of Ministers would be meeting at six. I was still with Ryzhov then, and both of us decidedthat we shouldtry to find EduardShevardnadze.[After stoppingat the Hotel Minsk], we found him finally at his newly renovatedtown house. When we drove up (by then we hadbeenjoined by A.P. Vladislavlev, Deputy Chairman of the Scientific-Industrial Union), we were surprised that accessto the building was not blocked by anything or anyone.Peoplecould go in and out as they pleased.Inside, Shevardnadze,completelyalone,was facing a groupof foreign correspondents. Therewere no interpreters,and someof the reporterswho knew Russian were doubling as translators.We were all very glad to seeeach other. He embracedevery one of us and then introduced us to the reporters. They began to ask us questions,and first Vladislavlev, whoseEnglishwas muchbetterthanmine, andthenI madestatements. I know newspapersreportedon this impromptupressconference. Soonit wastime to go to the Council of Ministersmeeting.As I was approachingthe building on Pushkin Streeta little after six, I had a strong feeling that I would soonbe arrested.I had had plenty of exposure--thetank speech,the press conferencewith Shevardnadze .... There was more than enoughfor an arrest. To my surprise,nothing happened.One by one ministerswere arriving, greetingeachother as thoughnothinghadhappened. I walked up to Vitalii KhuseinovichDoguzhiev,then First Deputy Prime Minister, and shook his hand for a long time and especially warmly. In March, he was simply Deputy Prime Minister, with a special responsibilityfor large-scaledisasters.In that capacity,he was my immediatesuperior.Back in March, when there was that push for the state of emergency,I had had a meetingwith Lukianov, who rudely rejectedmy entreaties,sayingthat there was nothing specialgoing on and that I shouldmind my own business.After that I had goneto the Council of Ministers building and tried to get in touch with [Prime Minister] Pavlov. He was not there. The cabinethad met the day before, anda massrally [in supportof Yeltsin andRussia]was scheduled
COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING 189 to take place the next day. I felt that since I was both a memberof Russia'sParliamentand a USSR Minister, I should try to serve as a channelof communicationbetweenthe two antagonistsandkeepboth sidestalking. I sawMikhail SergeevichShkabardnia,the chief aide of the outgoinggovernmentof [USSR] PrimeMinister Ryzhkovwho was then clearing his office. I said to him: "Listen, there might be bloodshedin the streets,we mustdo something." "I cannothelp you," he said,"I am clearingout of here." Still, he offeredthe useof his specialgovernmentphoneline [with direct accessto the membersof the Cabinet]. With Shkabardnia'sassistance,I got hold of Doguzhiev, which was a feat in itself, and pleadedwith him to do somethingto help preventbloodshed.He respondedwith proper concern,even thankedme for the information, and promisedto do all he could to help diffuse the situation. Now I was hoping that my handshakewould remind him of his position during the March days.[ ...] The notes I took at the Council meetinghave beenpublished,and they tell the story of what happenedthere. Noteson the USSRCouncil of Ministers Meetingof August19, 1991 The extraordinarysessionof the Cabinetof Ministers beganat 6:05 P.M. As usual,the Ministers of Defense,ForeignAffairs, and Internal Affairs, andthe chairmanof the KGB were absent[from the meeting]. V. Pavlov, Prime Minister: Are you preparedto work under emergencyconditions?We had alreadycometo an agreementwith you in principle (he was alluding to specialmeasuresto bolsterthe economy). But today the situation is as follows: that which we had agreedupon, our decisions,are not carriedout. As a result, therewill come a point when production will simply come to a halt. This is not a political matter-wehaveno interestin political slogans. Are you in agreementwith the declarationof the Presidiumof the USSRCabinetof Ministers? (This meetingof the Presidiumhad takenplace late in the evening on Saturday,August 17. It was attendedby the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and heads of the Presidium apparat. At that meeting, there was dissatisfactionex-
190 N1KOLA1 VORONTSOV presse~in my November opinion justified-aboutthe fact that the Cabinetof Ministershadnot receivedthe text of the Union Treaty; eventhe Prime Minister learnedits text from the newspapers.In any case,we had not receivedthe text of what the Presidiumdecided.And it is yet to be explainedwhat relation this meeting had to the preparationsfor the putsch.) K. Katushev,Minister ofExternal EconomicAffairs: An expanded meetingof our Ministry's executiveboardwas held. We listenedto the leadership'sdeclarationand put it into operation.We are carrying out the tasksthat have beenassignedto us by the GKChP. We have also informedour traderepresentatives abroad. V. Orlov, Minister of Finance: We are operatingunder a special securitysystemto preventthe misappropriationof funds. Sychev,StateBoard ofStandards:No one hasthe right to refuseto .... The stateof emergency follow the All-Union systemof standards oughtto havebeenintroducedearlier. Lev Ivanovich (headofone ofthe new ministries): We supportyou. Our societyneedslaw and order. We havebeenwaiting for this measurefor a long time. L. Davletova,Committeefor Light Industry: Light industry is on the vergeof collapsebecauseof the sovereigntydeclarationsby the republics. The directorsof light industryare indignantoverthe fact that light industrywasnot includedin the text of the Union Treaty. V. Gusev,Chairman ofthe StateCommitteefor Chemistryand Biotechnology: I contacted100 enterprises.All of them supportthe appealsof the GKChP. But it would be foolish to think that everything's fine. I'm worried aboutthe "Azot" factory in Kemerovoandthe plants in Bashkiria,wherestrikesmay breakout. On the questionof politics: If we retreatan inch, we will lose our positionsandour lives. We will not haveanotherchance. B. Paniukov,Minister ofCivil Aviation: We were late in introducing the stateof emergency.We musthavelaw andorderin the country. An offiCial from the Ministry ofthe Machine-BuildingIndustry: All machine-buildingenterprisesof the SovietUnion, theUSSRAcademy of Sciences,and the EngineeringAcademyare in favor of the stateof emergency.We sawwhattook placeout on ManezhSquare-nomore than 700 peopleshowedup. We mustpushaheaddecisively. V. Pavlov, Prime Minister: But I am againsttanks! Let peopleget out into the streets,let themtalk....
COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING 191 One of the ministers: Everything was fme in our industry before lunch. But after the lunch break,leafletsfrom the Russiangovernment beganto appear. Sychev,StateBoardofStandards:Thank:God for the StateofEmergency. V. Pavlov, Prime Minister: Yes, sometroublemakersare strolling abouton ManezhSquare.But you cannotcomparethe ZIL factory and the "Uralmash"[factory complex]to ManezhSquare.... DeputyMinister ofPowerSupply:The moodis normal,thereare no accidents,and the Moscow power stations have been secured-all without a hitch. DeputyMinister ofAgriculture and Food Supply: The situation in food supply will be difficult. We will haveto inventory what we have. The Westwill give us nothing. An offiCial from the Ministry of Communications:Everything is undercontrol in our industry. A. Tiziakov, a memberof the GKChP: Everyonewants order.... Democracy has brought us down to a state of ... (several people interject: "Yea, enoughalready!"). N. Vorontsov, Minister of Environmentand Natural Resources Management:Our executiveboardtook measuresto assurethe continued functioning of the economicmechanism.Unified economic,including ecological,functioning, requiresthat the centerwork with the republics. With regardto my positionon what hastranspired.I askmyselfone question:in what situation do I find myself? I was nominatedby the SupremeSoviet of the USSR and appointedto my position by President Gorbachev.All the ministersshouldaskthemselvesthis question. I don'tunderstandwhy we havebeenavoidingit. The White House has issueda seriesof decreesthat speakof the illegality of what has transpired. Since among the membersof the central governmentI alone am a Deputy of the Russianparliament,I am preparedto provide communications,to serveas a shuttlebetween the White Houseandthe Cabinetof Ministers, so that we can avoid a further deteriorationof the situation. (My servicesin this regardwere nevercalledupon.) V. Shcherbakov,Deputy Prime Minister: The national economy must continue to operateno matter what. We will not be receiving credits in the next few hours or days. We will have to switch to the
192 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV regime of operationunder emergencyconditions. With the exception of Moscow, we should notsummondirectorsfrom their plants, or we risk disruptingthe economy. No one here cameto work for a specific individual. The policy of the leadersof the GKChP is still not clear to me. I will continue to work honestly.As for my personalposition I will determineit later. I am in favor of discipline,but without a returnto the methodsof 1929. Yu. Masliukov, DeputyPrime Minister: We musthavesupport from the personnel in industry and finance. Let's put an end to staff reductions. (An argumentbetweenMasliukov and Pavlov ensuesconcerning variouseconomicproblems.) L. Riabev,DeputyPrimeMinister: We mustmovetowardobserving the Constitutionas strictlyaspossible. (Incidentally, it was the views of Riabev, Vorontsov, and Gabrieliants,the Minister of GeologicalResources,at an earliermeetingthat had preventedagreementon the useof force againstthe striking miners. Pugo, Yazov, and Kriuchkov had attendedthat session,in violation of the rules.) V. Doguzhiev,First Deputy Prime Minister: I am in favor of the Union Treaty,though it requiressomemodification. As to the stateof emergency,we havediscussedthe needfor emergencymeasuresmany timesoverthe years. What hastranspireddoesnot signifY a return to totalitarianism.The centermust assumethe function of guaranteeinghumanrights, including economicrights. Drastic economicmeasuresare takenin capitalist countries,too.... We needto reviseour approachto the 1992plan and strengthencentralization. N. Gubenko,Minister of Culture: My industry is not engagedin material production,but it doeshave a lot to do with moral and spiritual values.True, amongthe creativeintelligentsiathere are provocateurs who want to shedblood, but I am not speakingabout them. At this point, all that hastranspiredis beyondthe boundsof the law. M Shchadov,Minister of the Coal Industry: The situation in the country is very complex,and yet, somecomradesare oversimplifYing matters.The situationis changingby the hour. If a stateof emergency is not introducedtoday in the Kuzbassand Vorkuta regions,then tomorrow the miners will strike and their blood will flow. The Kemerovo RegionSoviethasdecidedto havethe minersgo on strike.
COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING 193 V. Pavlov, Prime Minister: Comrades!Why arewe discussingpolitical issues?There will be a Congressof People'sDeputies(he has in mind the sessionof the SupremeSoviet), and it will decideeverything. We must support theUnion Treaty, but amendmentswill be necessary. As professionals,we have views about the unified economic space,about theneedto provide the country with breadand fuel. We have run out of com: 5 percentof the cows and 10 percentof the total numberof pigs havebeenslaughtered. *** Note by G.V. Uronov of Komsomolskaia pravda: This was the only cabinet-levelmeetingheld during the coup.In the courseof thosedays, N. Vorontsov and the Minister of the Chemicaland Oil Refining Industry, SalambekKhadzhiev,decidedto transfertheir ministriestemporarily to Y eltsin's authority. Vorontsov: "I decidedto inform the cabinet of this decision, but Pavlov was goneand Doguzhievwas too busy. AnotherDeputyPrime Minister, the AcademicianLaverov, to this day maintainssilence.Almost every minister is---to one degreeor another--areal professional in his field, but if this is a professionalismtotally devoid of civic and political convictions,we mustfear suchprofessionals." Interview with Nikolai Vorontsov,April 1993 Freidin: There was at least one other version of your notes that circulatedin thosedays. Vorontsov:During the sessionof Russia'sSupremeSoviet on August 22, I madea statement,sayingthat I had notesfrom the meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers on August 19 and that I would be happyto readthem to anyonewho would like to hearthem. During a break in the session,I held an impromptu pressconferenceand read my notes outloud to a group of reportersand deputies.This was how an unfortunateerror crept in, and the Minister for ChemicalIndustry, Khadzhiev,becameassociatedwith the supportersof the putscheven though he was not presentat the Council meetingandjoined the Yeltsin forces as soon as he cameback to Moscow on August 20. Some reporter must have confusedhim with the new Fuel Oil Minister
194 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV whosenameI could not recall then. It was this unfortunatetranscript thatmadeits way onto Yeltsin'sdesk. Freidin: You mean the version that Yeltsin forced Gorbachevto readout loud beforethe sessionof Russia'sSupremeSoviet? Vorontsov: Yes. But even that unfortunateversion gave one the senseof how much Gorbachevhad beenbetrayedby his government. That was Yeltsin's point, and the transcript,evenin a corrupt version, drove it home. Freidin: WasPavlovdrunk during the Council meetingon the 19th? Vorontsov:It is hard to say. His speechwas slurred,he was clearly having difficulty speaking,but somedrugs for hypertensionhave this effect, and my impressionwas that it was those drugs rather than alcohol.But I could be wrong. Freidin: I recall that when I saw you that evening,you mentioned somethingaboutthe reasonPavlovgavefor the suddenintroductionof the state of emergency,somethingabout Stinger missiles and urban terrorists? Vorontsov: It was rather incoherent,but, referring to Kriuchkov [headof the KGB] as his source,he said that a "left" coup d'etatwas imminent, that terrorists, armed to the teeth, even equippedwith Stingermissiles,were lining up all along the GardenRing Road, and that if it had not been for the state of emergency,the entire Soviet governmentwould havebeenin danger.As I said,Pavlov was borderline incoherentwhen he was giving this preposterousinformation, and I did not takehis words seriously. Freidin: What happenedafterthe Council meeting? Vorontsov: I went briefly to the Congressof Compatriotsand then home,whereI was very glad to seemy very worried wife, andyou as well--this quite aside from any personalsympathies.I thought that you might be the last personfrom the outsideworld to seeme alive, or free, the last link. I am gladthosefearsdid not materialize....
5 Vladimir Shcherbakov Recounts His Role in the Coup Vladimir IvanovichShcherbakov,First DeputyPrimeMinister ofthe SovietUnion, explainedhis actionsduring the coupto an extraordinarysessionoftheSupremeSovieton August28, 1991. His speechwasbroadcaston MoscowCentral Television. I assert,quite unequivocally,that the Soviet government,the Soviet Council of Ministers,as a collectivebody of government,asthe executive power,did not takepart in any secretconspiraciesbehindthe back of the President,the SupremeSoviet, and the people.And as a collective body, we did not commit any anticonstitutionalactions. Prime Minister Pavlov, who turned us into .hostagesof his decision--the investigationwi11look into how this took place-and the three Council ministers,Y azov, Pugo,and Kriuchkov, are another matter.... During the periodof August 19-22,I confirm that we took no single unconstitutionalor illegal action. Moreover, we did not implement a single decisionof the StateEmergencyCommittee.As of the 20th and 21st,we beganrefusingto implementthesedecisionsofficially. On the 20th, we reachedagreementfirst with Comrade Vitalii Doguzhiev [First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR] and then at the Presidium on the 21st, at 13:30--whenthe tanks, incidentally, were still on the streetsand nothing was clear as regardsGorbachev'shealthand what was the matter with him. We refused to carry out the Emergency Committee'sinstructionsin the economicsphere:on lowering prices for children'sgoods,on parity of pricesbetweenthe city and countryside, on housing, and other such foolishness.We said that this was 195
196 VLADIMIR SHCHERBAKOV adventurism,that it was yet anotherattemptto make the economya hostageof political passions,andwe refusedto do this. Second,we regardedthe instructionsof the Council of Ministers issuedby Vice PresidentY anaev,on the introductionof censorshipand on organizing the re-registrationof the mass media, as unconstitutional, andrefusedto carry themout. Third, we adopteda statementin which the following was laid down: We, the USSRgovernment,statethat underthesecircumstances we submit only to the Constitutionand the laws of the USSRand we undertakestrictly to carry themout, and are accountableonly to PresidentGorbachevandthe SupremeSoviet. I regret that we removedthe secondphrase,but it was there. Further, it was written that underthesecircumstances,we refusedto carry out the decisionsof the Vice ... of the Acting President,Yanaev,and of the EmergencyCommittee.It was madeclear to us that we might not recognizethe Acting President,but that underthe Constitutionwe were bound to recognizethe Vice President,and that if we adopted sucha statement,it would be unconstitutional. [Inaudiblecall from the hall; Shcherbakovpausesandsighsdeeply.] Further, what actually happenedat the session[of the Council of Ministers] on August 191 First, none of us knew; that morning, all of us learnedof this from the radio and the television,eachin his own way. In the morning, the Presidiummet, and we phonedeachother. No one knew anything,not a singleministerknew anything.... We went our separateways, all trying to figure out what was going on. Somesort of additionalinfonnationat leastneededto be collected. We agreedto meeta little later. At this time, I phoned Yanaev and put three questionsto him. "Gennadii Ivanovich, I ask you to answer,quite clearly and comprehensibly, three questions.First, do you really have trustworthy informationthat PresidentGorbachevis ill andis not in a conditionto carry out his duties?"He gaveme not a word of proof, becauseit was clear that by that very eveningthe situation would be quite different. The secondquestion: "Was the text of all these statements[of the State EmergencyCommittee] not distorted?"I never read them becauseit was all from the radio. But from what I had heard,it was clear to me
HIS ROLE IN THE COUP 197 that therewas so much nonsenseandso much of everythingtherethat, again,it did not bode well. And the third: "You haveadopteda statement, you the Soviet leadership.Three of you signed, but probably more of you got to discuss it." But at this point, I was no longer speaking.I knew, roughly, who had signed,and of course,if they sit down with a bottle, thosekinds of peoplemay sign anythingyou want. I askedhim: ''Therewere probablymoreof you peoplethere--atleast, tell me who was there. And in general,how is all this to be understood?" He answeredall threequestionsin the affmnative. I askedhim: "Is ComradeLukianov with you?" He said: "Yes, he is." "Doeshe support this?" "Yes, he does." I askedhim: "Then explain to me, GennadiiIvanovich. Surely you know that you havesteamrolledthe stateof emergency;nothing is left standing.How is all this to be understood?Lukianov could not have sanctionedthis." He said: "We reachedagreementthat we will explain everythingat the session[of the USSRSupremeSoviet]. Anyway," he asked,"what areyou planningto do?" I said: "You know, in general,this is a dubiousaffair, andso, for the present,I don't know-I have no information. I will carry out my duties until the session[of the SupremeSoviet], but at presentI will deal exclusively with the economy.The situationthere is such that it will explodeany momentnow." He saidto me, "That'sright. Okay, Pavlov will tell you the details. This is not for the telephone...." [Shcherbakov,Pavlov and other membersof the Council of Ministers met on the evening of August 19. According to Shcherbakov's account,Pavlov beganby asking Council memberstheir attitude toward the text of the Union Treaty. Then, accordingto Shcherbakov, Pavlovaskedthe ministersto give their opinionsaboutthe introduction of the stateof emergency.ShcherbakovdescribesPavlov'sreport.] Pavlov said that a critical situation had been brewing for a long time, but that of late, a military coup had been prepared.A large number of armed fighters had been concentratedwithin the Garden Ring Road. Their weaponswere just hand-heldgrenadelaunchersfor three battalions.He said a list of people [from the governmentand
198 VLADIMIR SHCHERBAKOV Party leadership]to be removedin this situationhad beenseizedfrom them-----andthat all of us, membersof the sitting government,were on theselists, on different lists, but certainly on them. "But," Pavlovwent on, "we have avertedall this by introducing the state of emergency. Now, each of you, expressyour position. What is your attitude to this?" That is how the questionwasposed.... I, of course, did not understandwhat was going on. My first thoughtswere that this was a Khrushchev-modelcoup. So, on the first day, I was of courseinterestedmost of all in the healthof Gorbachev, becausethis was a sort of hopefor his return. Give all this, say,a week or two, andeverythingcan be restored.I phoneda lot of peoplein the RussianRepublic and tried somehowto understand.There was no information. And I cameto the conclusion,after a conversationwith Pavlov at night, when all membersof the Presidium had left, that somethinghad indeedhappenedto Gorbachev.After the full Council met, the Presidiumcontinuedthe debate.We neverreachedagreement and decidedto part for the day. Pavlov and I went down to his office, and he told me what had in fact happened.How he explainedit I will discussfurther. [Pavlov] saidto me that on August 18, he and his son-whohad to fly off-were sitting anddrinking. [Then, accordingto Pavlov]: "Kriuchkov called: 'Come urgently and immediately to the Kremlin-there is an emergency.An armedcoup is being prepared.Membersof the securityforceshaveto makea decisionon introducinga stateof emergency.' "I askedhim, 'Whereis Lukianov?' "He saidLukianov wasoff to Valdai. " 'But how can such a matterbe decidedwithout Lukianov? Let's senda helicopterimmediately.' "We gatheredtogether.In cameBaklanov,Shenin,Plekhanov, and, most important,Boldin. They saidthey hadjust gottenback from the Crimea.That they had waited in the President'sreception room for an hour. They were unableto get in becausethere weredoctorswith him. That RaisaMaksimovnawasalsounwell, a most serioussituation.They were let in for fifteen minutes.The Presidentwas in bed, was in effect not respondingto words, in general was inactive. 'So we askedthe doctors, "Is it a heart attackor a strokeor everythingtogether?"They said, "We don't
HIS ROLE IN THE COUP 199 know." But in general it becameclear to us that it was not a minor matter,but that generallyhe would not be aroundfor some time, and so we camebackimmediately.That, comrades,is what we reportto you.' " I still doubtedthat this was a military coup. I was thinking: they are not idiots, after all. They have set a date for a session[of the Supreme Soviet] and they understandthat they cannotput the country on its kneesin a week. Most important, if that is what they want, then why havethey not arrestedanyone? All the same,on the 20th I startedto understand.We maintained communicationwith all the presidentsof the republicsand, roughly at lunch time, I finally cameto the conclusionthat it was necessaryto do something.The situation was so unclear and all of us-the USSR government-had becomehostagesin this situation.In political terms, we wereunableto takea stepeitherto the left or the right. To begin, it was necessaryto removethe Prime Minister [Pavlov] from the EmergencyCommittee,to untie his handsandto showhim to everyone,becauseas long as the Prime Minister was included in the EmergencyCommittee, the whole world might think that we [the Council of Ministers] supportedthem [the EmergencyCommittee].It was necessaryfor everyoneto understandthat we did not; nor did the headof stateof the USSRgovernment. So I tried various routes. At first, I tried to reach an agreement simply that Pavlov was not being releasedfrom his home. That never worked. Then I went to him and we agreedthat we would officially publish a statementon his illness and that his duties would be transIt was not that I was afraid; it wasjust ferred to ComradeDo~hiev. November that Doguzhievwas more experiencedand strongerand knew how to govern, unlike myself.· In the government,our responsibilitiesare fairly clear. I deal with all kinds of analytical, economic,and social problems,andDoguzhievdealswith the rest. ... But the final thing: Coming out to this rostrum for the last time--I havespenta lot of time in this hall-I want to tell you what I think, not lectureyou. The mostdifficult tasksstill lie ahead,after all. An assessment of the plot has been given, yet we still do not grasp its cata·Shcherbakovis referring hereto the fact that both he and Doguzhievwere first deputy primeministersandthat eithermight havereplacedPavlov.
200 VLADIMIR SHCHERBAKOV strophicconsequences. I do not absolveourselves,the government,or myselfpersonally,of the blame.In general,I think that our main fault, and our main tragedy,is that we did not understandwhat Gorbachev was doing. We did not understandit andhadnot evaluatedit. We understoodthat there was a build-up of forces under way on both sides.But we did not understandGorbachev'sefforts to achieve political stabilizationthroughthe Union Treaty,economicstabilization through a joint program,and internationaleconomicrelationsthrough the London accords.We were always grumbling in the government, "What is being agreedto behindour backs?Things are not right." We failed to put the collectivesin the right frame of mind. This was our majormistake.
INTERVIEW WITH YEVGENII SHAPOSHNIKOV 6 The Coup and the Armed Forces At the time oftheAugustcoup, YevgeniiShaposhnikov commanded the SovietAir Force. Following the coup, he wasappointedDefense Minister ofthe USSRandAir Marshal. This interviewwasconducted by SovietjournalistAndreiKaraulovandwaspublishedin Nezavisimaiagazetaon September 12, 1991. Nezavisimaiagazeta:Having workedfor a long time alongsideyour predecessor, MarshalYazov, were you surprisedto seehim amongthe membersof the StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency? Shaposhnikov:Look at his date of birth: 1923. That meansthat Yazov was educatedand grew up under Stalinism. Then cameperestroika,democratization,and glasnost.And the further it went, the less he liked it. He waspatientfor a long time. But the Union was cracking, the armed forces were breaking apart and allying themselveswith separaterepublics,andthe economywas prey to chaos.So Yazov, the marshal,was seizedby doubt. Yes, he would say to himself, we must live in a new way, speakin a new way, feel in a new way.... But what if this meantthe destructionof all thosethings he has spenthis whole life with? I think he was confused... I meanliterally, confused,becausehe never,but never,went all the way. He would not haveshotat people.I am convincedaboutthat. Here are a few facts. On the morning of the 19th he convenedthe [Defense] Ministry's Collegium [of departmentheads]:a stateof emergencywas beingintroduced,aswell for the armedforces throughoutthe as a higher level of preparedness Union; somecities, including Moscow, were to be occupiedby military units. "Watch out," he added,"don't do stupid things. There are peoplewho would throw themselvesundertanks,or try to setthemon fIre; we don't want blood." Thosewere his words.That is why, I think, 201
202 YEVGENII SHAPOSHNIKOV the soldiersdid not receivethat most seriousorder. All they were told was: Go in, and stay in such-and-sucha place, and that's it. I understoodalreadyon the morning of the 19th that Yazov would not order the troopsto shootat civilians. In the final analysis, Ithink that is in his favor. Nezavisimaiagazeta:But they hadlive shellsin thosetanks! Shaposhnikov:Shells, yes, but as to shooting . .. Yazov was not capableof this. That is what I think. Nezavisimaiagazeta:Were relationsbetweenyou not the best? Shaposhnikov:We were not close, personally. Our dealingswere purely professional.Yazov always had his own viewpoint on everything; he thought he knew everything better than anyone else. On August 19, at the meetingof the Collegium, we were all in a stateof shock, appalled, if that is the way to put it. There we were, sitting there, not knowing what to do or say. In fact, he did not give us any time to reflect; he spoketersely,no more than ten to fifteen minutes.I noticedthathe wasnot at all enthusiastic-rather, depressed, evena bit disoriented,I'd say. He marchedin, told us that Gorbachevhad taken ill, that the signing of the Union Treaty, scheduledfor the following day, could not take placeunderthe circumstances.But he did not saya kind word to put people at ease-somethinglike, well, the state of emergencyis being introduced,but we will continueour work, we'll hope.... Instead,he just said: "Armed Forces----upgrade statusto battle ready,proceed!"He did not allow any questions,andin any case,to be honest, nobody showedany wish to ask. "That is all," he said, "Carry out your orders." The atmospherewithin the Collegiumis far from friendly. That was the main problem.I think if the Collegiumhad a bit of a humaneatmospherein it, we would havesharedour thoughtsWith eachother. During my tenure,a relatively brief one to be sure,I cannotrecall a single time whenwe would simply get togetherandspeakwith eachotherhonestly aboutour worries.Not once.And not that time, either.We walkedout. I was going down the stairs next to the Deputy Commanderof the Navy. Among the armedforces, the Air Force and the Navy are consideredto be the most democraticallyorientedservices.I askedhim: "Ivan Matveevich,what do you think? I feel really troubledby this. I feel it in my gut. It's somekind of foul play-lookslike a coupd'etat."
THE ARMED FORCES 203 "I can'tfigure it out either,"he said,"On the onehandthey are from the Gorbachevteam,andthen,all of a sudden,they announcea stateof emergency ...." We left the building and eachgot into his own car. That was the end of our conversation.We were all afraid of one another-Stalin's legacy. Let me tell you a story aboutYazov. On August20 the radio station MoscowEcho announcedmy arrest.[LeningradMayor] Sobchaksaid at a meeting in Leningradthat the whole of the Air Force had sided with Yeltsin. Foreign radio stationsreportedthe same.At that time I was in my office. Suddenlythe telephonerang. It was Yazov, summoningme. Nezavisimaiagazeta:You riskednevercomingback... Shaposhnikov:My attitude was this: They did not know exactly which side I was on. I had receivedsomephonecalls from the KGB: "We haveheardreportsof insinuationsagainstyou. You must issue a denial." I played dumb. "I cannot deny somethingthat I have not heard directly," I said. "But accordingto Sobchak..." "No," I said, "I don't know anything about it. Let's just hang up, both of us. There'sno point in going on with this conversation."In other words, Yazov could not have had any evidenceabout me. So I went to the Ministry, waited there for almost an hour. Then I called him in his car. "I'll be theresoon;wait for me!" he replied. So, for the first time in many years,I saw a Yazov with a human face. He cameout to greet me: "Forgive me for being late, Yevgenii Ivanovich,but you understandthetimesaretough.Pleasesit down." He sat down oppositeme. None of this, I thought, bodedwell. He was simply planningto use a different approachwith me. Instead,he tilted his headto the side,put his handunderhis cheekandsaid: "What do you think I shoulddo? Tell me honestly." So I told him honestly. I told him that it was necessaryto try to resolvethe situation.How? With dignity, of course. "Do you know a dignified way out?" "Yes. Withdraw the troops from the city, cancel the state of emergency ...." I decidedto go all the way: we werealone,after all.
204 YEVGENII SHAPOSHNIKOV "SupposeI do," he said,"What will happento the Committee?" "Dissolve the Committee and to hell with it. Declare it illegal. Transferpower to the SupremeSoviet. And bring Gorbachevback to Moscow...." No soonerhad I spokenthese words than three membersof the Military Collegium enteredthe office. Yazov changedimmediately, his face becameentirely different. He askedthe three to sit down and saidto me: "Do you know why I askedyou here?"I felt my blood run cold. It hadbeena mistakefor me to speakto him openly. But he said to me: ''There are too many democratsin the Air Force. You can expectanything from them at any time. Are you surethat you control thesepeople?" "Yes, I'm sure." "So takethe necessarymeasuresandattendto your business." Nezavisimaiagazeta:How do you explainthis strangemeeting? Shaposhnikov:He haddoubts.My impressionis that whenthe three generalsenteredthe office he wanted to defend me from them, to protectme. In fact I hadthe clearimpressionthat he was looking for a way out. After the meetingI returnedto my office and summonedmy senior aides. "Well, men,what do you think ofthis? Let's put our headstogether and forget for a momentaboutour epaulets."In the Air Force,people relate to one another in such a way that it is possibleto look one anotherin the eye."So what'sto be done?What'syour opinion?" As I expected,the reply was unanimous:we've got to end this business. "Very well," I replied,"it's all clear.Comewhat may, you will obey ordersonly from me and from nobody else,no matterwho it is." The sameorderwasissuedto the troops. As night approachedon August20, I heardthat an attackwas being plannedon the White House.I calledColonel GeneralGrachev."What areyou going to do?" I askedhim. "I've got the feeling that I'm holding the short end of the stick: thesebastardswant me to issueorders[to attackthe White House]." "And what will you do?" "Well," saidGrachev,"I'm going to resign." "They won't acceptyour resignation--it'sa stateof emergency."
THE ARMED FORCES 205 "Well, thento hell with it-I'll just shootmyself!" "Grachev," I said to him, "hold your fire for the time being. I'd ratheryou andI makea visit to the White House.I've discussedit with my wife, though, and she thinks that if I were to go to the White House,Y azov might simply fire me, and I might lose all control over my troops.So the effect would be the oppositeof what I intended. "Grachev,"I went on, ''you've got such an incredible force on the ground.... Let's take the paratroopersand surroundthe Kremlin, Of-betterstill-let's arrestthejunta ourselves." He said: "Yes, we've got enoughpower, but neitheryou nor I have enoughof the otherstuff." "Like what?" He said: "How manytimes haveyou beeninsidethe Kremlin?" "Threetimes,I think." "And I," said Grachev,"have beenthere only once. So we'll send the paratroopersthere, and the KGB security guys will take us off easily from aroundthe comer. Don't you think they have done their prepwork?" I agreedwith Grachev. He continued: "Let's just sit by the telephonesand try to avert any stupid trouble. When the night is over, things will becomeclearer.If we move on the Kremlin, we may just get too entangledin this whole mess,risk the lives of a lot of people.... Let'sjust wait a little longer." As soonas we finished, I got an ideaof what to do. If they orderthe storming of the White House (regardlessof who issuesit-Yazov, Kriuchkov, Yanaev,it did not matter),I will go to themwith an ultimatum: "Rescindthe order or else; and if I do not get back to headquarterswithin ten minutesor if I do not call headquarters ten minutesfrom now, the bombersare going to take off and bomb you to kingdom come.This is the Air Force--nojoke. Whatdo you sayto me now?" We maintainedcontinuouscommunicationwith the Russians,the White House.OnceI said to [GeneralKobets'saide] Colonel Tsalko: "Aleksandr Valerianovich, please come to my office-! don't feel comfortablediscussingthis with you overthe telephone." He said he would comeright away. Fifteen minuteslater, he called andsaid: "Yevgenii Ivanovich,we havebeensurroundedby suchcare, such watchful care ... , that I don't think I can leave the White House." Then I had a conversationwith Kedrov, one of Yeltsin's aides. I
206 YEVGENlI SHAPOSHNIKOV said to him: "I guaranteethat neitherthe Air Force nor the Airborne Paratrooperswill take a single step in your direction. Everything will be all right-thereis nothingto fear." He stuck the telephonereceiverout of the window: "Do you hear what is going on outside?" And I heardthe crowd chanting:"Russia!Russia!" On the 21st, early in the morning, I receiveda phonecall: "You are orderedto attend a Collegium meeting with Minister Y azov at 9:00 A.M." Yazov took a long time to explainthe situation,andthe explanation itself was ratherdisjointed,which was somethingunusualfor him. He spokedisparaginglyabout Yanaevand Pavlov, saying: "Oh those guys are bad; they are drunkards; they have draggedme into this without even knowing wherethey are going; and I have draggedyou in, and you draggedin the soldiers,who are now sitting there in their tanks-theArmy has beendisgraced!"And he askedus to offer our opinionsaboutwhat to do. I got up and said: "According to the RussianArmy tradition that the youngestshould go first (I was the youngestamongthe membersof the Collegium),I requestpermissionto speak." But Moiseev· intervened."Wait, I have important information," he saidandbeganto talk aboutsomething. SuddenlyYazov interruptedhim: "Mikhail Alekseevich,everybody knowsthat. Pleaselet Yevgenii Ivanovichspeak." I began: "In the name of rescuing the reputation of the Armed Forces,we must give the order for the troopsto leaveMoscow." And thenI repeatedeverythingI hadsaidto Y azovthe previousday. Practically everyonein the Collegiumsupportedmy position. "Well," said Yazov, "I understandyour position. The Emergency Committeeis meetingright now, but I decidednot to attend.However, I will inform them about it. I will probably ... give the order to withdraw the troops from Moscow. But I would like to tell you that I will remain a memberof the EmergencyCommittee. I cannot be a traitor twice. This is my cross,andI will bearit to the end...." You see,Y azov could have switchedsides,but he would not do it. We proposedthen: "Dmitrii Timofeevich, we must announceyour decisionat once.The sessionof Russia'sSupremeSovietis to convene *GeneralM.A. Moiseev,the Chief of the GeneralStaff, was retired from the servicetwo daysafterthe endof the putsch.
THE ARMED FORCES 207 at 11:00 A.M. Let the deputiesdo their work in peace,in a nonnal environment." It lookedlike he agreed,but thenagainsomethingstrangeseemedto be going on. I returnedto my office, I was waiting for the order,but no order was forthcoming. I called Rutskoi's secretary(the sessionhad alreadybegun) and dictatedto him a note saying that the Army was withdrawing from Moscow andwould no longertake part in this business. I saw Rutskoi read the note on television. It was, however, Bakatin who madethe [public] announcement,saying that the Collegium of the Ministry of Defensehadmadethis decision. Nezavisimaiagazeta:So who stoppedthe putsch? Shaposhnikov:I believe many things came together at the same time. In general--pardonme for sayingsomethingso banal--thetimes stoppedthe putsch. Nezavisimaiagazeta:But was this really a putsch?This questionis beingaskedwith increasingfrequency. Shaposhnikov:Yes, it was. I see it this way: The action [of the EmergencyCommittee]had not beenseriouslythought out, whatever angleyou approachit from. But someriddlesremain,you areright. To be honestwith you, I don't quite understandit either.This is one of the more enigmatic pagesin this century'shistory. But sooneror later, peoplewill solvethis riddle. [ ...] Nezavisimaiagazeta:Do you think that somegeneralor other--say, GeneralMakashov·--couldhavehadhis divisionsmarchinto Moscow without an order? Shaposhnikov:No. This is a different matter, though. All of us in the army are burdenedwith this one word: orders. And if someone violateshis ordersor, worse,decidesto go into combatcontraryto his orders,he will be stopped,which is not so hard to do. On the 22nd I sawYeltsin in the Kremlin. He was leavingGorbachev'soffice while I was standingin the receptionroom having a drink of water. I could *GeneraI Makashevwas known for his right-wing views and his association with the putschists.
208 YEVGENII SHAPOSHNIKOV hearYeltsin say into the receiver: "RuslanImranovich [Khasbulatov], don't worry, I havethe situationundercontrol. If anythinghappens,I will go to the White Houseat once." I askedhim: "Would you like a drink of water,Boris Nikolaevich?" He shook my hand and said: "You're a good man, you really did hang in there. But I don't have time to drink water. Three armored columnsaremoving towardthe White Houseagain." I said: "Boris Nikolaevich, the Air Force is ready to carry out any order." "All right, thendo somethingaboutit." I called Antoshkin, the Moscow District Commanderof the Air Force:"Do you recognizemy voice?" "Yes, I do." "Well, then listen to my order: The Air Force is to be brought to combatreadinessat once.Fly your planeslow, show force, show support for the White House.But hold the fire. If necessary,call Rutskoi." That's how it was. Ten minutes later, I was called in to see Gorbachev.I enteredhis office, and there they were all sitting, all "nine plus one."· Gorbachevsaid to me in a ratherrestrainedtone of voice: "Tell us what you were doing betweenthe 19th andthe 21st." I gavea brief report. "That's what we thought you were doing," said Gorbachev."We offer you the postof Minister of Defense." [ ...] *The headsof the nine republicsthat had agreedto the Union Treaty,plus the USSRPresident,Gorbachev.
INTERVIEW WITH DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV 7 From Dushanbeto Moscow At the time ofthe coup,Davlat Khudonazarov,a nativeofTajikistan, was Chairmanofthe USSRUnion ofCinematographers.He wasa memberofthe First CongressofPeople'sDeputiesin 1989andthen a Deputyto the SupremeSovietofthe USSR.In 1990, at the Twenty-eighthParty Congress,he wasappointeda memberofthe Central Committeeofthe CommunistParty ofthe SovietUnion as part ofthe so-called"Yakovlevlist" ofliberal deputies.He was interviewedby GregoryFreidin in April 1992while visiting Hollywood, California. Freidin: Tell me aboutthe putsch.How did you fIrst fInd out about it? Khudonazarov:The morning of the 19th, in Dushanbe,I got a call from one of my friends telling me somethinghad happened."Oh stop kidding me," was my fIrst response,but when I heardthe newsmyself half an hour or so later, I fell into a sort of trance,as if my headwas suddenlyfIlled with cottonwool.I remainedin this statefor a coupleof hours. I just did not want to believethat this was for real. I wantedto believe I was simply dreamingit all. But life went on aroundme, the sun was shining, and finally the reality of it sankin. ThenI hadto wait for a couple of hours until I could rouse out of bed my contactsin Moscow. I telephonedMaria Zverevaand Andrei Razumovskii,my deputies at the Cinematographers' Union. "Listen, folks, pleaseget togetherin the union, invite [Andrei] Smirnov[a former chairmanof the Union of Cinematographers] andanyoneSmirnovconsidersimportant." They met, and soonafterwardwe agreedover the telephonethat we all understoodwhat kind of charactershad seizedpower and that we 209
210 DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV must actively get involved in resistance.I also told them that I would be flying to Moscowandthat they shouldexpectme the next morning. So all was settled. There was one detail, however.My family and I had the tickets to fly to the Pamirthe next day" But my wife said, "You know, Davlat, we'll fly to Moscowtomorrowwith you." This wasvery ironic. For the lastthreeyearsI hadbeenpressingher to cometo Moscowwith me andbring the children. So I said,"Why is it that you did not want to come with me then, when all was quiet in Moscow,but now you wantto come?" "Well," shesaid,"now thereare tanksin the streets,and if anything happensto you, we want to be nearby." To make a long story short, after a little family altercation,I said: "Okay, tomorrowI'm flying to the Pamirwith you." As soon as I said that, I dialed my secretaryin Moscow again and told her, "Masha, I am cancelingmy Moscow trip tomorrow. I'll be flying to the Pamirinstead." After a long pause,shesaid slowly, "You know, Davlat, I think you havemadethe right choice-thereare tanks all aroundhere,it will be betterin the mountains."I smiled to myselfand hung up. So my wife calmeddown. While in Dushanbeon the 19th, I madeseveralphonecalls to Moscow. And during my third phonecall there---Iwastalking to an official at the Cinematographers' Uniorr--I heardhim say: "Listen, there are tanks here, you know, perhapswe should be a little more cautious now." When I heardthat I simply blew my stack."How can you saythat? When we used to organizedemonstrationsand rallies we knew that even though we were criticizing Gorbachev,we were still under his protection.And now, when he is locked up somewhere,you are suggestingthat we shouldkeep quiet aboutthose dirty bastards!..." I was saying this on the intercity phone line. "You are suggestingwe hide! Under no circumstances.We mustbe completelyopenaboutour opposition." When I hung up the phone,my wife said: "Listen, you havealways beenoutspoken,but this time I think you havegonea little too far." *Khudonazarovcomesfrom Gornyi Badakhshan,a regionof the Tajik Republic that is high in the PamirMountains,closeto Afghanistan.
FROM DUSHANBE TO MOSCOW 211 And one more detail. One of the Tajik Cinematographers'Union officials I was with on the 19th was Rubit Karimov, the Executive Secretaryof the Union. This was in the morning shortly after I found out aboutthe eventsandI was still feeling dumbfounded.Karimov (he is a manin his early forties) wasriding with me in the car. He spoketo me softly, almost confidentially: "Davlat, as I recall, you, too, have spokenout againstGorbachev." My mind was sort of wanderingat that time, but all of a suddenI realizedthat he was throwing me a line, giving me the opportunityto changesides. I said: "What? Me? You meanhave I ever spokenout againstGorbachev?I can'tremember...." "Why yes," he was quick to remind me. "Last Januaryyou were organizing the protest,the letter of 196, you were accusinghim [of responsibilityfor the bloodshedin Lithuania]." "Don't you understand?"I said, "We were attackingfrom another side-theoppositeside." We were at the Tajik Film Studio that morning, and there, too, I noticedsomepeopleavertingtheir eyes,pretendingnot to notice me-anything not to greet me, becausethen they would have had to say something.Peopledid not want to be pinned down. And the atmospherewas strange.Insteadof regular programming,the radio was repeatingover and over again the melody that precededimportant announcements. And from time to time, they would readthe text of the EmergencyCommittee'sor Lukianov'sstatement.That sameevening, the EmergencyCommitteepeoplewent on television, and it became clearwhat kind peoplethey truly were. Twice I receivedcalls from the editor of a small Tajik independent newspaper."Master," he said,using aTajik form of address,ustot,''we have reachedthe SupremeSoviet of Russia--Yeltsin is there." Later on, he called me and said that he had spokenwith the Moscow City Sovietandthat [Mayor] Gavriil Popov,too, was there.This editor was a wonderful fellow. He was surethat the coup would not work. Later, in the fall, when we lost the election,* he broke down crying at the pressconference. The next morning, on the 20th, I got up early, packedthe bags,and by 6 o'clock we were at the airport. I passedmy [five-year-old] sonon who wasboardingthe plane-thiswasa small to oneof the passengers *K.hudonazarovwasanunsuccessfulcandidatefor presidentof Tajikistan.
212 DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV Yak-4O--andhe was soon seated;my [seventeen-year-old]daughter followed. It was my wife's turn now-we were the last to board. I said: "Pleaseforgive me, but I've got to go to Moscow." Before she could even openher mouth, theflight attendantbeganto rush her to board the plane. So she had to get on board, and so we said goodbye. I went to the ticket office to try and get a ticket to Moscow. It was about 6:15 in the morning by then (3:15 A.M. in Moscow). The flight for Moscow was to departsoon.The planewas alreadyon the tarmac. There was a lot of agitation aroundthe boarding gate, which clearly meantthat the big bosseswere flying to Moscow. I had madeup my mind, of course,that I shouldtry to be as inconspicuousas possible,so I avoided the special reservationsoffice for Deputiesand VIPs (they might report my whereabouts).My plan had beento get off the plane in Moscow unnoticedand get to the city by the suburbantrain and subway, insteadof hiring a taxi. Alas, there wereno tickets for ordinaryfolks. In the meantime,I saw that the airport was filling up with very of the Tajik CommunistParty Central important people--Secretaries Committeeand peoplelike that. They were standingin a small crowd talking to each other, laughing heartily, making a lot of noise. They were clearly euphoricaboutsomething.I took asideone of their sidekicks who was weaving in and out of the crowd, and askedhim what the commotionwas all about. ''They are all going to the [CPSU] Central CommitteePlenumin Moscow," he replied. On the spur of the moment, I walked up to one of the Second Secretariesof the Central Committeeand said to him: "What's going on? You are going to the Plenumin Moscow and you have not even informedme?" "Well," he looked at me with somemixture of surpriseand condescension,''we didn't evenknow that you werehere." Needlessto say,they hadno desireto havepeoplelike me attendthe Plenum,and sinceI did not representthe republic'sCommunistParty organization,they werenot obligatedto includeme in their delegation. "Get me a ticket," I said, "help me." He beganto hem and haw, but I noticedthat he was looking at me in a rather strangeway. The eyes were saying somethinglike: "You may be still hustling, Davlat, but soonyou'll be a deadman." For them,I was alreadya corpse,really. SuddenlyI noticeda limousinedrive up to the entrance,andout of it
FROM DUSHANBE TO MOSCOW 213 steppedthe headof the Committeefor State Security and, with him, Kakham Makkhamov, First Secretaryof the Tajik CommunistParty andthe Presidentofthe Republic.So I turnedto him: "KakhamMakkhamovich,no one hasinformedme aboutthe Plenum,and now I can't evenget on the plane---thereareno more seatsleft." He, too, was all excited,eveneuphoric."Don't worry-I can yield my seatto you." "Thank you," I said, "but I'd rather you keep your own seat and help me get mine." Thenhe turnedto someoneelse. I waited but nobody volunteeredto assistme. The placewas teaming with VIP aides, who under any other circumstanceswould have fallen all over themselvesto get a ticket for a memberof the Central Committeeof the CPSUandDeputyof the USSRSupremeSoviet.But nobodymadea move.They knew who was standingbeforethem. Fortunately,a good colleagueof mine, Bozaruli Safarov,a member of the SupremeSoviet and formerly a functionary in Aeroflot, saw what was happeningand came to my aid. He took my papers,disappeared,and a few momentslater broughtme back a ticket. That's how I boardedthe plane. We were airborne.I was sitting in an empty row. All of a sudden, Makkhamovgot up from his seatand cameand sat down right next to me. Then,the headof his securitydetail got up andtook a seatnext to him. Strangely,he proceededto go to sleep. Soon, though, the food was brought in, and after we finished eating, I askedhim: "Kakham Makkhamovich,what do thoseguys think they are doing? I think it's real adventurism.I hopethereis going to be a meetingof the Politburo before the Plenum. I think it would be a good idea to draw the line betweenthemandthe Party." He hemmedand hawed:"Well, yes, I think things havebeengoing more or less all right, but the Treaty-thechangein the country's name is very unfortunate:It's very hard to take." And so on. It was clear he was not too eagerto answermy questions,so he got up and excusedhimself to go have a smoke in the pilot's cabin. He did not comeout until the planelandedin Moscow an hour and forty minutes later. In the meantime,I was having a chat with his securityman, and he agreedwith me completely,calling the coup leaders"adventurists *This is a referenceto the proposedchangein the nameof the country to the "Union of SovereignRepublics."
214 DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV and idiots." He was an officer in the KGB! I can'trememberhis name, but he was a manin his mid-thirties. After we arrived at the airport in Moscow, I ran into the group of peoplewho were going to serveas Russia'sprovisionalgovernmentin caseMoscow was lost. Aleksei Yablokov was there, and a few other people--Ican't recall their names.With them was a group of military men of various ranks and ages.I walked up to them and asked:"Are we hangingin there,fellows?" "Sure," they said, ''we're going to kick them out of here"-theymeantthe putschists.About thirty or forty of them were there, counting both the civilians and the military. They demandeda plane but got no responsefor a few hours. Finally they were given a planeandflew off to Sverdlovsk. There was a lot of traffic on the road, and it took us a long time to get to Moscow fromthe airport. When I finally reachedmy hotel, my secre'" tary at the Cinematographers' Union informed me that headsof the creative artsunionsweregatheringat [Minister of Culture] Gubenko'soffice. I rushedthere at once. What they were trying to do was to coordinate the position of the creativeintelligentsia.Gubenkoaddressedme fIrst. I responded:''Theseare putschistsand usurpers--that'swhat our position should be." I rememberusing these very words. Gubenko askedmy opinion; I respondedunambiguouslyandsharply. "Well," he said,"I wonderif this sort of opinion is sharedby everybody." Other peoplespoke,including the Chairmanof the Architects' Union, Platonov. He essentiallyexpressedthe samesentiments,if in rathermore delicateterms. Finally, Gubenkospoke."I feel closer to Platonov'sopinion. I am for a softer approach.It is inappropriateto be unequivocallike Khudonazarov.Everything is much more complicated.As I was madeto understand,there is nothing simple about this." He went on in this vein, makingthings soundmore andmore ambiguous. As soonas I realizedthat he was going to befuddlethe issue,I broke in saying, "I have a documenthere with me." By that time I already had an official statementof the Cinematographers' Union. So I said: "Here is my union'sposition.Would you like to join us in condemning the putsch?"I did not get either''yes''or "no" then. Later on, Platonov and I kept in touch and tried to coordinateour actions. We even convinced Tikhon Khrennikov [Chairman of the Composers'Union] to sign an appeal,and he thankedme later for the opportunity.
FROM DUSHANBE TO MOSCOW 215 The meeting withGubenkowas at aroundnoon. After leaving Gubenko,I went to the Cinematographers' Union to makephonecalls. I called Sobchakand asked him how things were in Petersburg.He reassuredme that everything was quiet. I askedhim to get hold of Lavrov, the theaterunion chairman,whosesignatureI neededfor the appeal.He told me that he thought it was importantto have as many peoplearoundthe White Houseaspossible. At somepoint, I found out that the CentralCommitteePlenumwas not going to take placefor a variety of reasons.It hadbeenin preparation, though. The main reasonit never convenedwas that Gorbachev could have run the risk of being removedfrom his post of General Secretary.For that reason,Gorbachev'ssupporterswere not very eager to seeit convene.My position was different. I was an advocateof the split. Evenif only a small grouphadsplit from the Party,I still felt that it would have beenimportant for it to make its statementagainstthe coup. I called the Central Committee Secretariesover and over again, beginningwith Ivashko [Gorbachev'sDeputy Party Secretary].Their aideswould pick up the phoneandtell me that they were in a meeting or away from their offices. This went on till the evening.I, a member of the Central Committee,could not make contactwith the organization. In the evening, Platonovjoined me for a fifth round of phone calls. All in vain. Finally, it occurredto me that we could use a fax. I calledthe Central Committeeagain andaskedthem for their fax number. They said: "What fax? We don't have any fax around here." I calledanotherCentralCommitteeSecretary'soffice. They didn't have a fax either.I calledanother,still another.The answerwasthe same. Finally, I figured it out: the Secretaryin charge of International Affairs, Falin, must have a fax machine.So Platonovand I sent our proteststatementcareof Falin. But the aideon duty there,the onewho gaveme the fax number,said: "You know, there is nobodythereright now to receiveyour fax." "How come?"I said. "It's after five o'c1ock--theworkdayis over." "I hope they switch it to automatic," I said to him and hung up, chuckling to myself: "There is a coup d'etat, but they've done their nine to five andgonehome.What a wonderful life they have!" The fax had been switched to automatic,and the next day I did learn from Ivashko'saidesthat the statementPlatonovandI had senthim was put
216 DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV on his deskin the morning [of the 21st]. But I could not reachIvashko himself. He was in a meeting,probably discussingour statementtogetherwith other similar documents(I was sureLatsis had sentthem his own).· That day,the 20th, I also calleda few peopleat the CentralCommittee, including Andrei Grachev,who would later becomeGorbachev's presssecretary,and Vladimir Yegorov, who was Gorbachev'sadviser for cultural affairs. In other words, I tried to reachthe decentpeopleI knew there and offer them some supportin a humansort of way, so that they would not loseheartin that deadzone. On the eveningof the 20th, I went to the White Houseand stayed there until 2:30 in the morning, leaving after it becameclear that nothing untowardwas going to happen.I was there in a group with otherdeputies;Vladimir Volkov decidedto staytill the end. I will not go into the atmosphereat the White Housethat night-it is all too well known. A lot of people there looked rather operatic. Someclutchedsubmachinegunsandhadterribly seriousfaces.At one point, I noticed a row of bottles filled with light-colored liquid. I thoughtit was whitewine, but it turnedout to be incendiaryliquid. AleksandrGelmanhaswonderful stories.He was in Burbulis's office at night andthey hadquite a few drinks there.So at one point they askedKobetst to call his buddiesat the [Union] Ministry of Defense and ask them whetherthey were going to attack the White Houseor not. He called. They told him that they wantedto attackbut could not becausetheir scoutshad told them that there were too many people aroundthe White House. You shouldask Gelman,although,I don't know,perhapshe would be too embarrassed to write this up for publication.But his story is that after they hadfinishedonebottle,they startedlooking for more,asking aroundto seewhetheranyonehadanything stashed away somewhere. GeneralKobetsownedup to it andbroughtonefrom his office. Lots of funny stories.But I was nottheremyself. After I left the White House, I walked to my hotel [the Hotel Moskva] in the drizzle, in the middle of the curfew, but, of course, nobodystoppedme. The streetswereabsolutelyempty. *Otto Latsis,a liberal reformerandan editorof thejournal Kommunist. tColonel GeneralKobetswas Russia'sChief Military Liaison with the Union DefenseMinistry.
FROM DUSHANBE TO MOSCOW 217 The next day, or, rather,a few hours later, I was back in the White HousewhereVorontsovand I tried to organizethe temporarytransfer of Union governmentstructuresto Russianjurisdiction. We convinced the Minister of the ChemicalandOil Refining Industry,Khadzhiev,to join with Vorontsov's Ministry [of Environment] and my [Cinematographers'] union in this venture. We were trying to convince Gubenkoto do the same,but he refusedto join us, sayingthat he was going to do thingshis own way. *** And now, a few thoughtson what happenedafter the putsch.Right away there appearedlists of heroes.At one point, in the union, I was given a pieceof paperwith names."What is this?" I asked. "Thesearethe namesof the activists." "What kind of activists?" "Thesearethe peoplewho took part in the events." "So what," I said. "What shall we do with them? Does this mean that otherpeopledid not takepart, or thatthesearetrue revolutionaries and that others,who are not on the list, were counter-revolutionaries? Let's agreeonceand for all that I have not seenthis list and that you did not prepareit." I know that later somepeoplewere given days off and bonusesat work for having defendedthe White House.It's ludicrous! As if that werewhy peopledecidedto resist!
INTERVIEW WITH ANATOLII SOBCHAK. 8 Breakthrough: The Coup in St. Petersburg Anatolii Sobchak,a well-knownlawyer andpublicfigure, was the Mayor ofLeningrad(now St. Petersburg)andoneofthe most prominentmembersofthe SupremeSovietofthe USSRwhenthe coup tookplace. He was interviewedon August26, 1991, by A. Golovkova andA. Chernovafor Moskovskienovosti. The night of August 18-191 spentin my Moscow official apartment.· Early on Monday morning I was awakenedby a telephonecall. It was my friends from Kazakhstancalling to inform. me aboutthe military coup (thanksto the differencein time zones!). My first move was to look out the window to see whether the building was surrounded.It was not. Otherwise,I would have had to go to my neighbors.The official building in Krylatskoewas filled with membersof the USSR SupremeSoviet. 1 telephonedfor the car and my bodyguard.Oleg was on duty that day (I will not divulge his last name for understandablereasons),but the actual guardingwas being doneby the boyson Yeltsin'steam. 1 found out that Yeltsin was expectingme at his dachain Usovo, which is beyondArkhangelskoe. Tankswere rolling along the OuterRing Road.What a pitiful sight. Right there on the highway shoulder,a tank was burning. No, nobody had set it on fire. It was burning by. itself. Far more unpleasant:1 ran into a group of paratroopersas 1 turned off the Outer Ring Road. But they did not stop me. *Many membersof the USSRSupremeSoviet who were not permanentresidentsof Moscowhadspecialapartmentsin the capital for official use. 218
IN ST. PETERSBURG 219 Yeltsin'sdachawasbeingguardedby no morethansix or eight men with machineguns. I entered-andfroze in surprise.The whole Russian leadershipwas in the room. One platoonof specialforces would havebeenenoughto dealwith our Russianstatehood. Yeltsin askedwhat I could suggest. I said: "We must call a sessionof Russia'sparliament.And the sessionshouldlast aroundthe clock." Yeltsin: "We have already decidedto do just that. Any moment now, they will bring the text of the Appeal to the Citizens of Russia. After that, we'll decidewhetherto stayhereor leave." Opinionsweredivided. Either alternativewasdangerous. Khasbulatov:"I'm leaving as soonas I get the text. You decidefor yourself." The text was brought in. The headof the RussianSupremeSoviet [Khasbulatov]left for the White House.He was using a private car, it seems.He did not want to be recognized. I beganto insist: "We should break through after Khasbulatov.Is thereanotherroad?I am very worried aboutthe specialforces guys at the OuterRing Roadturnoff." They saidtherewasno otherway out, exceptby foot. I: "After all, this is the presidentialentourage .... Let's fly the flag andoffwe go. The soonerthe better." They put a bulletproofveston Boris Nikolaevich.His daughtersaid: "Papa,don'tworry. Now everythingdependson you alone." By the way, no one displayedany visible signs of agitation. Not eventhe President'swife, Nainalosifovna. I askedYeltsin whetherI was neededin the White Houseor could I go backto Leningrad.He said,"You may go." I made myselfclear: "I will follow you all the way to Kutuzovskii Prospect,and from there on, I'll decidedependingon the situation. If we slip through, I'll double back to the Outer Ring Road and ride to the Sheremetevo Airport." Thank God, the special forces were alreadygone. Either they had goneto catchus but missed,or anothergroupchargedwith arrestingus arrived too late at the dachain Usovo. (As we found out later, it was the latter: they arrivedtenminutestoo late.) We were driving fast. In front of us was the Traffic Police car, so others let us pass.Ditto the tanks and the armoredpersonnelcarriers
220 ANATOL/I SOBCHAK (APCs). Yeltsin's guardswere coveringboth sides of his limousine. We whippedthroughthe Ring Road in ten minutes.Rublev Highway was next. The road is narrow, and it was full of tanks and APCs, but seeingour flag, they, too, moved to the shoulder.Fortunately,there weren'tmanyof them. We had broken through! Now, I had to turn off for Sheremetevo. Oncethere,I leamedthat the next planeto Petersburgwould leave in two anda half hours. Later on I found out that an order to arrest me had in fact been issued.But they did not botherto senda specialforces unit after me. The order was issuedto the airport KGB agents.They agreed-in word only. When I was sitting in the deputies'VIP lounge,threemen camein. The conciergeaskedthem to show their identification. They showedtheir papers. I saidto Oleg, "Get ready." He saidto me, "I know oneoftheseguys." The threepassedinto the cafeteria.Oleg followed them. They came back together,said that they were from the specialunit fighting currency speculation,andthat they intendedto guardme all the way until I got on the tarmac. Now I had four bodyguards.Three of them had machineguns. In order not to wastetime, I got on the line to Petersburgand gave instructionsto the OMON [specialpolice] to protectthe building of the LeningradTelevision Station. I tried to assessthe situation. In a live broadcast,the Commanderof the LeningradMilitary District, General Samsonov,had already declaredthat he was taking all power in the city in his own hands.As for the rest, it seemedquiet; there were no troopsin the city itself. Later I discoveredthat they also had a plan to arrest me at the PulkovoAirport [in Leningrad].But, on his own initiative, the chiefof the LeningradPolice,Arkadii Kramarev,had alreadysenta car for me with OMON troops. My assistantsfrom the Mayor's Office cameto meetme at the airport aswell. I dove into the car and went straight to the headquartersof the LeningradMilitary District. My guardsstayeddownstairs.Later they told me how one of Gidaspov'sguards,who was hangingout in the hallway of the headquarters,beamedwith joy and from behind my backstuckhis tongueout at them.
IN ST. PETERSBURG 221 The office of the Commander-in-Chiefis on the secondfloor. The door was not locked, the room was empty. I yelled at the top of my voice so that the whole building could hear: "What kind of crap is this? Why isn't there anybody guarding the office of the District Commander!" A frightened lieutenant colonel ran out of some place or other. Under a different set of circumstances,he would not have let me in, but now he was standing at attention. I went on: "Take me to the Commander-in-Chiefl" "Yes, sir. They aremeetingright in there,sir...." "Take me thereat once!" We went down to the groundfloor. They were all sitting there,the little dears: Samsonov,Kurkov (head of the KGB), Savin (Interior Forces),Viktorov (headof the NorthwesternMilitary District), and, of course,Gidaspov,the first Communistof the region. And finally, the loyal democratandour benefactor,Arkadii Kramarev.He wasthe only oneof us. I noticedthat they were surprisedby my suddenappearance,and I did not let them opentheir mouths.Right away, I gave them a whole speech,remindedthemaboutGeneralShaposhnikov,who hadrefused to shoot the people in Novocherkasskin 1962.* I explainedto them that, from a legal standpoint,they wereall conspirators,andthat if they movedso muchas a finger, they would be tried--just like the Nazis at Nuremberg. I reproachedSamsonov:"Well, General,rememberTbilisi. t ... On April 9, 1989, you were just about the only one there who behaved rationally. You avoidedcarryingout illegal orders,you remainedin the shadow.... What's happeningwith you now? Have you decidedto join that criminal gang?... That EmergencyCommitteeis illegal!" Samsonov:And why is it illegal? I havean order... [Sobchak]: You know very well that I am one of the people who draftedthe Law on the Stateof Emergency.Thereare only four situations in which it may be imposedon a specified territory, namely: *Sobchakis referring to the bloody suppressionof a strike and massprotests triggered by longstandinggrievancesin the southern,largely Cossackcity of Novocherkassk.The story of theseeventswas aired and debatedduring the early glasnostperiod. tUnarmeddemonstratorsin the Georgiancapital were massacredby Soviet troopsin the springof 1989.
222 ANATOLII SOBCHAK humanepidemics,cattle epidemics,earthquakes,and massdisorders. Which oneof theseis taking place? Samsonov:But we are introducingthe stateof emergencyjust in case. I havean order.Thereis a codedtelegram.... [Sobchak]: Showit to me. Samsonov:I can't.It's secret. [Sobchak]: Then answer,doesit containthe following words: "Introducemartial law in the city of Leningrad"? Samsonov:No, thereareno wordslike that. ... [Sobchak]: I know therearen't.And you'd betterrememberGeneral Rodionov· during the First Congressof People'sDeputies.On April 9th he, too, oversteppedhis orders.All he was orderedto do wasprotect military installations,but insteadhe threw in his troopsagainstthe people.Are you taking the samepath? Gidaspov:Why areyou raisingyour voice at us? [Sobchak]: And you would be betteroff not speakingat all. Don't you understandthat by your very presenceyou are destroyingyour own party? Instead of sitting here now you ought to be running throughthe streetsyelling that the CPSUhasnothingto do with this. Gidaspov:But we havean economiccollapse,industrialproduction is falling .... [Sobchak]: That's a lie. In the fIrst six monthsof this year Leningrad'sindustryoverfulfIlled the quota. I turnedto Samsonov:"Viktor Nikolaevich, I ask you to do everything in your powerto preventthe army from enteringthe city." He said:"All right, I'll do it." I went to the Mariinskii Palace,the City Hall. There I learnedthat our Vice Mayor, RearAdmiral ViacheslavShcherbakov,wasreturning from his trip. I held a meetingwith the Chairmanof the Leningrad City Soviet, AleksandrBeliaev. I said, "We shouldcall a sessionof the Soviet." He said, "We alreadyhave, and the deputieshave been informed." I made arrangementswith the television station to make a live appearance on the program"Fact." My appearancewas scheduledfor 7:20p.M. I showedup at the studio fIve minutesbeforethe broadcast,accom*GeneralRodionovwasin chargeof the troopsat Tbilisi.
IN ST. PETERSBURG 223 paniedby ViacheslavShcherbakovand Yurii Yarov, the Chairmanof the RegionalSoviet; the putschistshad includedboth of them in their EmergencyCommittee without ever asking them. The presidentof LeningradTV, Boris Petrov, even secureda satellite connection,so viewersfar beyondthe Leningradcity limit watchedus. I had the idea of referring to the Moscow putschistsas "ex" (exVice President,ex-Ministerof Defense,andso forth), andthenalso,of prefacingtheir nameswith the title "Citizen," as if they had already takentheir seatsin the dock.· If until that eveningtherehad beenno sign of popularresistanceto the putsch (the sessionof the Leningrad Soviet had not yet taken place), the joint appearanceof the Mayor, the Vice Mayor, and the Chairmanof the RegionalSoviet dispelledthe suffocatingatmosphere anddisorientationall the moreeffectively. After the televisionbroadcastwe calledin additionalOMON forces. Here too, Kramarevshowedthat he was more than equal to his task. Shcherbakovwasshuttlingbetweenthe Mariinskii Palaceandthe Military District Headquarters .... Samsonovall the while was undertremendouspressurefrom Moscow. Hysterical,the putschistswere screamingat him over the phone, accusinghim of selling out to the democrats. In the meantime,two columns of armoredvehicles were moving toward the city from the south. Their movementswere closely monitored by the Traffic Police, who remainedloyal to democracy.Barricadeshad to be erected,but we did not have enoughtime. The tanks were expectedwithin an hour. We figured out that we could block the approacheswith the heavy earth-movingequipmentbasedat the airport. But after the tanks had passedthe town of Gatchina,Samsonov gaveme his officer's word of honorthat he would not let the armored vehiclesinto the city. He orderedthe column to move from Gatchina toward Siverskaia.There,in the birthplaceof Pushkin'sancestorsand his nanny, on the groundsof the military airport, those tanks would remainstationedfor threefull days. How, and with what arguments,did Shcherbakovand I succeedin persuadingSamsonov?I don't know, but I think it was commonsense. *"Comrade"wasthe usualfonn of official addressin the SovietUnion. Ironically, only peoplewhoserights were suspended----because they weresuspectedof breakingor hadbrokenthe law-wereaddressed officially as"Citizen."
224 ANATOLII SOBCHAK We said to him: "Don't you see,General,what nonentitiesthesepeople are?Evenif they takepower,they will not be ableto hold on to it." The tension had easedsomewhat.I got on the line with Y eltsin. Then I took a nap for an hour on the little couch in my office. And at six o'clock in the morning, I went to the Putilov factory. I managedto arrive before the shift started.There, at the factory gate, a car with a megaphonewas alreadywaiting. We held a rally. After that, I went to the managementoffice in orderto ensurethat everyonewho wantedto join the rally in the city could receivea pass.As I was leaving, a large group of the Putilov workers, three or four thousand,was already marchingdown StachechnyiProspect[literally, the Avenueof Strikes]. I myself shouldhave beenleadingthosepeopleall the way to Palace Square,but my securitypeopletold me that, given the information at their disposal,I oughtnot. The whole city was on PalaceSquareat 10:00A.M. Whole columns of people had to be turned away even before they could reach the square.Howeverbroadthe square,the humanseahad turnedout to be evenbroader.We decidedthat peopleshouldgo backto their placesof work by 1:00 P.M. That was exactly what happened.There were no no-shows. They told me later that evenprisonersaskedto go to the barricades, promisingthey would turn themselvesin afterward. One of the speakerswas Drnitrii SergeevichLikhachev, the most seniorscholarand a patriot, a memberof the Academy[of Sciences], andnow a popularhero aswell. It was clearthat putschistswould not succeedin Petersburg. Toward theevening,I had a heaven-sentidea. Our problemscould be solved if Yeltsin appointedShcherbakovto be the Military Commandantof the City of Leningradand the LeningradRegion,and also making him the personalrepresentativeof both the RussianPresident andthe DefenseCommitteeof the RussianFederation.· What kind of a teamdoesYeltsin havethere?A fax arrived with a decreeappointingShcherbakovheadof the LeningradMilitary District [General Sarnsonov'sposition]. That was almost a catastrophe:now Sarnsonovwould really go out of bounds.. . . Besides,such an ap• At that time the RussianFederationhad not yet establisheda Ministry of Defense,andthe relevantfunctionswerecarriedout by a Committeefor Defense.
IN ST. PETERSBURG 225 pointmentdid not solveany problems,sincein additionto the Military District we alsohada navalbaseanda BorderMilitary District. ... I was right. ... Samsonovcalledme: "What areyou plotting behind my back?" I reassuredhim: there was a mistake,we'll correctit immediately. But the radio was alreadytransmittingthe newsof this-for us-fatal appointment.I explainedover the phoneseveraltimes what kind of text we needed. Finally, the necessarydocument arrived from Moscow. At three in the morning, still more news arrived. A unit of the Military District's special forces was being deployedalong Kaliaev Street and was moving in the direction of City Hall. Previously the unit's missionwasto recaptureairplaneshijackedby terrorists. Shcherbakovsaid: "The whole of the OMON andyour police force will be no obstacleto those guys. They'll take care of them in five minutes." We decided to go separateways. I went to the Putilov factory, calledout the director,explainedthe situation. ThankGodtherewas noneedto rousethe Putilov workers....
INTERVIEW WITH ALEKSANDR N. YAKOVLEV 9 Our Chlldren Were on the Barricades AleksandrN. Yakovlev,along with Mikhail GorbachevandEduard Shevardnadze, wasoneofthefoundingfathersofperestroikaand glasnost.A closeassociateofGorbachev's, he becamea full member oftheParty Politburo in 1987andsoonearneda reputationas the mostoutspokenadvocateofradical change.Increasinglyfrustrated with the conservativeParty apparat, he resignedfrom the Politburo at the Twenty-eighthParty Congressin the summerof1990, remaininga prominent,thoughat timesdistantandcritical, memberof Gorbachev'scircle ofadvisers.Four daysbeforethe coup, he was expelledfrom the Party. Thefollowing interviewwasconductedbyA. Shcherbakov,reporterfor the magazineOgonek,whereit appearedin the issuefor August31-September7, 1991.During a visit to Berkeley andStanfordin February1993, Yakovlevaddedsomedetails to his accountofthe coup in an interviewwith GregoryFreidin. Excerpts from that conversationhavebeeninterpolatedinto the Ogonek interview. Yakovlev: I was awakenedat 4:30 in the morning by the fonner generalof the KGB, Oleg Kalugin, who told me the newsofthe coup d'etat.I saidto him: "Oleg, are you in your right mind?" "Saneas sane canbe" was his answer.I got out of bedandlookedout of the window: on both sides of the street,there were unmarkedcars filled with the "boys." I called Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. He orderedViktor Barannikov, Russia'sMinister of Internal Affairs, to take the necessary steps,andbeforelong, a unit of Russia'ssecurityforces arrived at my door. 226
OUR CHILDREN WERE ON THE BARRICADES 227 [A few of themrushedinto my apartmentandtold me that the place was now undertheir control and that I had nothing to worry about."I can defend myself, too," I said to them, ''just give me one of your machineguns." "That's againstour rules," their chief replied, "If you arearmed,we won't be ableto protectyou."] Soon,the "boys" who had hadme undersurveillanceearlierturned around and sped away. And then the reporterscame, some of them offering help take me into hiding. I receivedmany such offers, more than twenty, as I recall, some coming from people I was not even acquaintedwith. Ogonek: Why did you decide not to attemptto escapefrom what wasa probablestrike againstyou? Yakovlev:I hadto work. Ogonek:But you could have continuedwith your work in a more secureplacethanyour Moscowapartment. Yakovlev:In circumstancesof this sort, you must work in public view, so that peoplecan seeyou, so that they can understandyou are not hiding. This makesit easierfor them to believe in their eventual victory. Few things are as significant as making a speechat the Moscow Soviet---beforea hugecrowd of people,just a few hoursafter the putsch,to sayto peoplesomethingthat might inspire them: The other side had tanks and weaponsat its disposal,and all our side had was enthusiasmandfaith that we were in the right. Ogonek:I heardover Moscow Echo that someonehad spottedyou in the White Housewith a pistol in onehandanda radio in the other. Yakovlev:Well, that was a small episode,and not a very important oneeither. Ogonek: Do you believe that the putsch,or attemptedputsch,was inevitable--waspredetermined,asit were,by the logic of events? Yakovlev:This is onepossibleexplanationfor what happened.But I prefer to look at things from a different perspective.The split in our society-in terms of the ideology, politics, psychology, structure-beganto be felt in 1985. *This is exactlywhat Yakovlevdid on the afternoonof the August19.
228 ALEKSANDRN YAKOVLEV Roughly,two main trendsemerged.One wasobjective: it expressed the desirefor changeon the part of the peopleandtheir realizationthat it was not possibleto live the old way any longer. The othertrend was reactionarythrough and through: to sabotageperestroikaand change. This reactionarytrendbecameespeciallystrongwhen the issueof free electionsbeganto be debatedin earnestand when people beganto demandthe removal of the Party from the structuresof state power. It was then that the Party becamethe main engine of resistanceto perestroika. In this regard,I was very much taken abackby the effort of President Gorbachev(I guessin this case,he was acting as the General Secretaryof the Party) to whitewashthe Party's leadership----people who did not utter a single word in public against the coup d'etat, againstthe seizureof the President,againstthe murder of the three individuals. As he presentsit, membersof the Party leadershipwere locked inan inner struggle. I, for my part, couldn't carelesswhereand how they were arguing among themselves.I now hear that so-and-sohad inner objections againstthe putsch. But what does that mean---innerobjections?My son, who is the father of three children, spentthe fateful night on the barricades.And so did my daughterand her husband.But the highranking leadershiphadinner objections!In my opinion, this is no way to takea stand. Ogonek: Would it be fair to summarizeyour position as follows: Totalitarianismin our countrywill not be vanquishedaslong asa party that believes in the idea of violence as the main political force-namelythe CommunistPartyof the SovietUnion-is alive andwell? Yakovlev:I agree. Ogonek: One of the key questionsdebatedamong the democrats even before the putsch was the question of what kind of political organizationswe are going to promote:whetherit would be preferable to have a strongly disciplined organization,possibly with a narrow base,or a looser,more broadlybasedmovement.How doesthe putsch affectyour thinking on this issue? Yakovlev:I canonly give you my own opinion. Before the putsch,I was slightly more inclined (say, 51 to 49) toward a broadly based movement.And now I have reversedmy position. I am inclined to
OUR CHILDREN WERE ON THE BARRICADES 229 think that we needa well-organizedforce that might serveas a guarantor againstthings like the putsch. Let me tell you, though, that the overwhelmingmajority of the leadershipof the Movementfor Democratic Reform· provedthemselvesto be capableof taking a strongand unequivocalstand.Therewereexceptions,but theywereinsignificant. I was in constantcommunicationwith Gavriil Popov,Yeltsin, Shevardnadze,and Laptev [Deputy Chairmanof the USSR SupremeSoviet]. It was Laptev who continuouslyinformed us aboutthe situation in the Kremlin. I was in touch with one official (I did not know him personally)who informedme of what was going on in the Emergency Committee,whattheir planswere.This wasvital information. [I had anotherold friend in the Kremlin, a technical worker, who kept me informedaboutwhat he could seefrom his window-whether the limousineswere coming in or out, how many, and so forth. One time he called me and said that the limousines were moving in a strangeway: a cortegeof themwould startmoving in onedirectionand then, all of a sudden,would turn back.. .. I rememberhis words: "AleksandrNikolaevich,they are like eelson a hot griddle." That, too, was important information, becauseit gave you some senseof the moodinsidethe Kremlin, andthe moodwasoneof confusion.] One of myoid friends from the CentralCommitteekept calling me on the phoneandtelling me what was happeningthereandhow and in what way the leadershipwas planning to offer supportto the EmergencyCommittee. Ogonek:Let's talk aboutthe individuals from the othercamp.Were thereany surprisesfor you whenyou learnedaboutthe compositionof the EmergencyCommittee? Yakovlev: No surprises,except for one. I was both shockedand offendedto find Yazov among them. He is a World War n veteran who fought in the trenches,a soldier,a unit commander.He andI were neighborsat the front. He is a real soldier, and this was always apparent in his attitudesandactions.How this mancould havedonewhat he did is still a psychologicalriddle for me. It is possiblethat he was influencedby the military, who are usedto measuringthe might of a *Referenceis to a loose political movementthat AleksandrYakovlev, along with former USSR Foreign Minister EduardShevardnadzeand Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov,beganto organizein the springof 1991.
230 ALEKSANDRN. YAKOVLEV nation by counting rocketsand bombs.The more shells, guns, rifles, androcketsyou have,the more influential is the voice of your country. In their opinion, the Soviet Union underStalin--atotalitariancountry an practicingmassrepressionandre-enserfmentof the peasantry-was "influential" power. But as soonas we embarkedon the roadto disarmament,tried to breakout of our isolationandjoin the civilized world, we became,in their opinion, a second-ratepower.... Do you comprehendthe meaningof this basepropaganda? Ogonek: The putschists' game was a gangsters'game-without rules. Why, then, did they, to put it simply, make a messof things? Why didn't they clamp down on the leadersof the democraticmovement,who areso popularamongthe people? Yakovlev:First of all, I believethey were frightenedby the possible reactionto such a move. Further, I suspectthat thesevery mediocre individuals-who,moreover,had lost touch with the people---thought that, given the stressesof our socioeconomiccrisis, all they neededto do was to make the first move and that after that, everybodywould simply sigh a sigh of relief and say: at last, we'll have order, we'll have food. As enemiesof democracyand freedom, they could not comprehend--theydid not possessthe mentality necessaryto understand-thereality of our own day, the fact that the senseof being free andliving in a democracyis moreimportantfor our people. After all, how could they haveexpectedthat so many would ignore the instructionsissuedby the commandants, ignore the banon demonstrationsandstrikes?... [Early on, Gavriil Popovgot in touchwith the directorsof severalof Moscow's major factories and the city's transportationdepartments, including the Moscow metro, and elicited from them an agreementto go on strike at a moment'snotice, pendinga signal from the Mayor's Office. The EmergencyCommitteewas duly informedof this arrangement. The quid pro quo with the Military Commandantwas that the city would continueto function normally as long as the securityforces did not interferewith the demonstrators.] They could not evenbeginto imaginethat peoplein Moscowwould begin building barricades.And they certainly did not supposethat during the fIrst hours of the coup d'etat, some military units would refuseto shoot at peopleand that someof them would evenjoin the democraticforces.
OUR CHILDREN WERE ON THE BARRICADES 231 Now, every one of the putschistsmust bear his responsibility for what took place.But this shouldbe donewith strict adherenceto law! We must not stoop to revenge,to a settling of accounts,to summary justice.... Since we are for the rule of law, we must follow it to the letter. Ogonek:I think that someof the democrats,carriedaway by their zealto restorejustice,may crossthe boundsof democracyandlaw. Yakovlev: The word democratdoes not fit such individuals. You can'tbe a democratandadvocatesmashing,crushing,bashing.... Ogonek: Some people even today believe that the putsch was a game, orchestratedfrom behind the scenesby Gorbachevand the leftists.... Yakovlev:By the left? This is fantastic.... How could the left have doneit? Do you meanto saythey could have goneto Pugoor Kriuchkov and said, "Hey, fellows, let's organize a junta"? This is pure nonsense.As to the secondpossibility . . . I do not think that Gorbachevhadanythingto do with this conspiracy.I do not want to think otherwise!
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IV Defending the White House Almost from the inception,the White Housebecamethe strategiccenter of confrontation during the August coup. The democratic resistance, led by Boris Yeltsin, was concentratedat the White House. From there, they communicatedwith the rest of the country and the world via telephone,fax, and radio broadcasts.It soonbecameapparent that control of the country couldnot be securedwithout taking over the building that housedthe Russiangovernment-agovernmentthat had becomevirtually synonymouswith opposition to the putsch. In this section,we concentrateon eventsin and aroundthe White House, with special attention to the early hours of Wednesday,August 21, whenthousandsof Muscovitespreparedto defendthe building against what they believedto be an imminentattack.
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THERESASABONIS-CHAFEE 1 Reflectionsfrom the Barricades TheresaSabonis-Chafee, thena graduatestudentin International Relationsat the WoodrowWilson SchoolofPublic Policy at Princeton University, wasin Moscowwhenthe couptookplacein August1991. Shehadarrived therein January1991 to work at the World Laboratory,an internationalsciencepolicy organization. It occurredto me on the metro at 12:15 A.M. that I did not really know what I was doing, that I was likely to be deported, and that my Russian-languageskills (which had been nonexistentseven months earlier) could charitablybe describedas "poor," but I resolvednot to think about it too much. I am a studentof internationalrelations, a teacherof Soviet history, and a tax-payingresidentof Moscow, I reminded myself. How could I do anything else?As my train spedtoward the center of town, closer to the home of the government,I reflectedon the day'seventsso far. I had awakenedearly and travelednearly two hoursto my Russian teacher'ssummerhome, as I had done severaltimes a week for the pastfew months.The villagewasstill andnervous,andradioscould be heardfrom everyfront yard. I noticedit wasnot the usualprogram,but was unawareof the Soviettradition of playing solemnclassicswhen a headof state or important official has died. I was later told that the music usually continuesfor hours or even days before it is supplemented with information. This time, however, the information had beenreleasedpromptly. My teacher,Natalia, was startledto seeme. "Oh, Terry," she said, ''you didn't listen to the news this morning." Then, as she preparedbreakfast,she slowly explainedwhat had happened. We ate a tense meal, listening to the radio announcer.In a funerealvoice, he was readingthe samebrief statementthat had been 235
236 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE repeatedsince 6:00 A.M.: The Presidentis ill. A provisional government will run the country. The announcementwas repeatedregularly for the next few hours,interspersedwith movementsfrom SwanLake. Tchaikovskyis one of the few greatartiststo be acceptedaspolitically correct by every Russianadministration,and so, althoughthe provisional governmentdid not once mention the word "socialism," their style wasunmistakable.The pasthadseizedpower. Natalia decidedto return to Moscow to assessthe situation and to wait for instructionsfrom her office. While the family packed,neighbors arrived with their office telephonenumbers.They askedNatalia to phoneand inquire when they would be called out to help with the harvest.1 sat outside,staring at the snapdragons,wondering whether the notoriouspatienceof the Russianpeoplewould allow for eventhis. Radioscould be heardfrom all the neighboringyards,and SwanLake contributedto the surrealismof the morning. War or stateoppression, which would it be?Which wasbetter?How could therebe civil war in a city of nine million? What would that look like? 1 thoughtaboutthe overthrowof Khrushchevand his reforms. Although it seemedinconceivable,maybeperestroikaandglasnostcould be reversed. At a demonstrationduring the hungry winter months, I had seena woman carrying a sign that proclaimed,"I would trade this governmentfor a kilogram of macaroni."How manypeoplewould be content to tradethis struggling democracyfor a governmentthat was more in control? Could the new governmentfeed the people--andif it could, would that be enough? Nataliaand1 traveledtogetherinto Moscow,wherewe partedat the river port. 1 went to the embassyto try to get some news. At every metro station and in many metro train cars, young peoplewere diligently postingan announcement from Yeltsin denouncingthe coupand calling for resistance.Crowds of subduedpeople strainedto read the documentin all the placeswhere it was posted,but 1 saw no signs of real resistance.At the embassytherewas little news.Americanswere not yet being advisedto evacuate,but they were requestedto file their whereaboutsimmediately.Many American citizens were there filling out registrations,last-minute documentsfor marriageto Soviet citizens, and official invitations for Soviet friends to visit them in the United States. 1 went to my office building and looked for my friend Zhenia, who workedin the office next door. Raisedon bannedbooksandAmerican
REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 237 movies in the Brezhnevyears, Zhenia is a communicationsengineer who also translatestechnicalmanualsandis involved in many international cooperationprojects.I had often soughthis advice on what we but he was called''the Soviet soul." I felt badly in needof reassurance, not around. In my own office, I found my friend Tania in the room we share. Shewas relievedto find me, afraid that I had goneoff on my own. We decidedto departtogetherfor Red Squareto learn what was happening. On the tram, an older man heardus speakingin English. "Someone shut up the American monkey," he shouted."We don't needher kind here anymore."The passengers staredat me in mute embarrassment. No one said anything to him. After we steppedoff the tram, Tania said to me, "You see,somepeopleare pleased.Today they feel that no onecantouchthem." The squarewas surroundedby tanksandpersonnelcarriers,andthe large exhibition hall containingan exhibit about theAfghan War was being used to house troops and equipment.It too was heavily surrounded,but peoplecrowdedaroundthe young soldiers,calling them "child" and asking them "Do you really intend to kill your own people?" I suddenlyrealizedthat the low rumble I was hearingwas the sound of tanks in motion. It vibrated the street slightly, and left the sameecho in my stomachas fireworks displays. In Manezh Square, peoplecrowdedto hear the announcements being shoutedfrom bullhorns. Organizersof the resistancewere standingon abandonedcars, urging everyoneto go to the White House,the official building of the RussianFederationgovernment,to help protectYeltsin and the deputies who were inside. We walked slowly, arriving at the White House at sunset, and watchedthe chaotic processof assemblingbarricades.A nearbyconstruction site had been cannibalized,city buses strategically abandoned,and trolleybusesderailed.Crowdsof peoplelurchedfrantically after the leaflets that were occasionally droppedfrom the upstairs floors. When it beganto grow dark, Tania insistedthat we leave, and we picked our way through the barricadestoward the metro. As we left, I listenedto an announcement askingpeopleto return in shifts. A man stoppedus on our way, inquiring aboutthe situationat the White House.As Taniadescribedthe barricades,he saidproudly, "Our trucks have been there all day." He was from the Mosfilm studio, one of many agenciesthat decidedimmediatelywhere their loyalties lay in
238 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE this crisis andjust as quickly donatedtheir shareof stateresources. At home I cookeddinner while Tania called her parentsin Leningrad. Tania's father, a retired military officer of high rank, had been pleasedwhen the coup leadersseizedcontrol. "Father was always in charge,"shesaidby way of apology."He neverfelt what it wasto be a cog in a machine--healways commandedthe machine." We watched the news, which was followed by a press conferencecalled by the eight leadersof the coup,andTaniatranslatedtheir stockanswerswith a mixture of humor and rage. "This show is from a time we thought was behind us," she said. The press conferencewas followed by a ballet production of Swan Lake. Tania left my apartmentbefore 11:00P.M. At midnight, I caught the metro train, just in time to make one transferbefore the systemclosed.I had decidedto go alone, with no one to worry about me. The train and all the stationswere empty. I wonderedif the line that connectedwith the White House would be closedfor the curfew. I was relieved to find the OctoberStation still open, but was immediately surroundedby a slightly drunk group of teenageboys, so-calledMoscow hooligans.They realizedI was foreign, and as they crowdedaroundme making rude suggestions,I wondered what I expectedto do for the resistanceif I could not even effectively chaseoff teenagers. By the time I arrived at the connectingplatform, they were circled aroundme, dancingand shouting.Seeingmy plight, an older and very severelooking man invited me to sit next to him. Therewas something familiar abouthis spare,intenselook andmanner,but I could not place it exactly. The hooliganboys seemedto afford him immediaterespect, and after exchangingquiet words with him they rushedto makeapologiesto me. He askedwhereI washeaded. "To the meeting,"I said,andhe waspleased. "Let's go together.You arean American?But you speakRussian?" "Yes, some,"I replied,hoping I knew enoughto maintaina conversation. I did not want to lose sight of him now that I had found someoneconfident. He recognizedmy surnameas Lithuanian,andintroducedhimselfas Leonid Konstantinovich,a journalist who had coveredthe strugglein Lithuania. He showedme his latestwork in Literaturnaia gazeta,one of the many newspapersthat had been shut down that morning. To-
REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 239 getherwith the now-subduedhooligans,we exited at the metro station closestto the White House. Ironically, the name of the station was Barrikadnaia,or "Place of the Barricades."It was an areawhere important battles had beenfought during the Revolution of 1905. I remembereda memorial on the nearby 1905 Street which bears the words,"Cobblestonesarethe weaponsof the proletariat." As we approachedthe White House,I could seethat the proletariat of 1991 was better armed. A construction crane had been commandeeredand the barricadeswere now much higher than they had been, a tangle of concretetraffic barriers,metal scrap, and vehicles. People were milling about, building ftres for warmth. "They won't help much," Leonid said, referringto the barricadesand gesturingat a few small tanks trying maneuvers,"but they are vital for the spirit." Oncewe climbedthe barricades,the boys went off in their own direction, and Leonid askedme what my plans were. I admittedthat I had none,just that I wanted''to havestoodwith Russia." August is already fall in Moscow, and the night was chilly. It was raining lightly. Leonid astonishedme by inviting me into the building. "I don't know if we cando it, but let's try," he said. We were still awaiting approvalfor entranceat 3:00 A.M. when we saw Yeltsin rush into the building. The crowd respondedenthusiastically. The guardslet us in shortly after Yeltsin. I had nopresscredentials, but Leonid kept saying to the guards,"She's not a journalist, she'sa historian. Don't you think this is history?" He later confessed that "when I met you at the metro I understoodhow I would get into the building." His own credentials,from the Lithuanian parliament building, would not havebeenenoughwithout a foreignerto give him the properair of authority. In the pressroom, an article aboutLeonid was passedaround,and I thenunderstoodwhat hadcommandedthe suddenrespectof the young hooligans.Russianssay that anyonewho has servedtime in political prison is easily recognizable,that a certain lookgrows on a man if he "sits" for a long time. Leonid Konstantinovichwore that look proudly, and had evenmaintaineda prison-stylehaircut. I am certainnow that this unspokencredential,not my passport,had gainedus accessto the seatof the now-besiegedgovernment. We toured the building with four membersof the foreign press. Peoplefrom many newspapersthat had beenshut down were camped out in the building, preparingone-pagephotocopieswith their mast-
240 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE headsand news that they had gleanedfrom the foreign press.Radio Russia,closedby the putschgovernment,had movedinto the building and was preparingits broadcastsfor the morning. A young boy who spoke some English and who looked all of seventeenwas managing the foreign press.I askedhim why he was there. "I work here." He admittedhumbly, "I alwayshandlethe press.It's just more interesting today than usual." He took us to the top floor to survey the crowd below, and apologizedto the photographersthat he could not permit themto openthe windows. Leonid interviewed the head of security for the building. At that time two agencieswere providing their services--Aleksand Kolokol Security.Both wereprivate securityagencies,with a stafflargely comprised of Afghan War veterans.They were busy with strategy,and pausedonly briefly to answerhis questions.Then we made the acquaintanceof People'sDeputy Mostovoi, a member of the Human Rights Committeeof the SupremeSovietof the RussianRepublic. DeputyMostovoi, who hadcometo the building assoonas he heard about the coup, did not want to discussthe putsch governmentor speculateaboutthe future, but he seemedpleasedto havean audience. While other deputiesnappedon their desks,he maintaineda steady several-hour-Iongmonologuefor us, reviewing his life, his family, the history of perestroika,and how much hope he had for Yeltsin. He seemedto be trying to recall how he hadcometo this point in history. I struggledto understandall his conversation,andwonderedwhy he hadthe time to botherwith us. It slowly dawnedon me that the deputies, including Mostovoi, had plenty of time-all of them were virtual prisoners,with no way to leavesafely. We had simply found a deputy with insomnia. After a few hours Mostovoiwas orderedby a stemsecretaryto get somerest, so Leonid and I went to the dining hall for a smoke.It was there I learnedthat Leonid had been imprisoned in 1986 for some articleshe had written aboutpolitical repression.He had servedthree yearsandtwo monthsin a political prison.He wasreleasedjust in time to begincoveringthe early eventsin Lithuania.We discussedour plans for the morning. He suggestedthat, sincethe metrowould opensoon,I shouldgo home for a while, then meethim back at Building Entrance No.8, at eithertwo, three,or four o'clock in the afternoon. At 6:00 A.M. sharp,Radio Russiabeganblaring the little newsthey had over the building'S loudspeakers,punctuatedby the songsof the
REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 241 lateVladimir Vysotskii, a much-lovedDylan-styleRussianfolk singer. His whiskey-ruined,desperatevoice wasrousingthe staffbackto their taskswhenI left. At home, I was barragedwith phone calls from the States,from Moscow friends, and from a friend who was on vacationin the Altai region. Everyonewantedto know what was going on. So did I. I slept for two hoursandthenwent to British Air to changemy airline tickets. I was scheduledto depart in four days for Japanand Hawaii, but I couldnot imagineleavingnow. At the embassyI hadheardan estimate that the situationwould be resolvedoneway or anotherin two weeks. It was ratherarbitrary, but it soundedright, so I canceledmy tickets, planningto reschedulethem in September.I wonderedwhat I would be leaving behindwhen I returnedto the university. The ticket agent was glad to have a seatfreed up: Americanshad not beenorderedto evacuate,but mostwerein a hurry to leave. ThenI mademy way backto the White House.Onestopaway from Barrikadnaia,I went to buy some foodandcigarettesfor Leonid. Here, peoplewerebehavingas if it were a normal day. The ubiquitouscommercial kiosks were all open,selling everythingfrom importedunderwear and tennis shoesto crystal and ice cream.As usual,the line for underwearwas short,the line for ice creamlong. I wonderedwhether the city understoodthat it was undersiegeby the past.Then I spotted clustersof peoplereadingthe one-pagenoticesthat hadbeenprepared by the Russianpress-in-exilethe night before.It gaveme a little hope, but I could not understandwhy so few people were joining in the generalstrike calledfor by Yeltsin. I got back to the White House at 3:15 P.M. A large crowd was departing. Yeltsin had just given his first public speech.One look made it clear that the situation had somehowbecomemore serious. The crowd was much larger, security tighter, and the people more frenziedas they lungedfor newsflyers. I doubtedthat I would be able to get back into the building, but Leonid met me as promisedand sweptme pastthe guards.I askedhim what he thoughtwould happen that night. "Do you play chess?"he askedsuddenly.I wastakenaback, and stammered,"Not well." He went on: "But you understand.If you area goodplayer,andI play againstyou, Tereza,andI am also good,I can anticipateyour moves.But if you begin to invent your own rules, then I'm a fool if I think I can anticipateanything: it isn't my game. And this isn't our game.We only wait."
242 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE Justbeforea scheduled6:00 P.M. pressconference,Vysotskii's singing was interruptedby a suddenorderto evacuateall the womenfrom the building and for men to claim their gas masks from the second floor. I stoodin the entryway,undecidedfor severalminutes.Many of the secretarieswere weepingas they left. Leonid offered little advice. "It's dangerous,of course,and you shouldgo, but if you want to stay we can try to find a small gas mask." I wantedto stay, but when I imagined trying to understandeverything in an emergencywith no interpreter,I reluctantlyleft with mostof the otherwomen,andjoined the crowdoutside. After I left, Leonid tried to defend the rights of the handful of women who insistedon staying, but he was soon evicted along with them. After waiting severalhours he finally succeededin re-entering the building to help RadioRussiawith their broadcasts. I wanderedamong the crowd, debating the merits of shouting, "Comrades,I need an interpreter," but decided I would rather be treatedas a RussianamongRussians.I sawan elderly man standingin the rain with his Orthodoxprayerbeads.I wantedto sendup a desperate prayertoo, but it cameout insteadas an odd, silent, appealto the crowd--"Okay everybody, let's make God proud." Security forces aroundthe building were trying to bring everythingquickly to order. They created cordons of people with their arms linked, one immediatelyaroundthe building, then a secondto help with crowd control. The first cordonwas men only, until they realizedthat therewere not enoughlarge gasmasks.Thenwomenwho could fit into the smallest sizegasmasksalsojoinedthe first cordon.I endedup in the second cordon,controlling accessto a drive-in entrance.We were to prevent people from enteringunlessthey had one of four credentials:proper documents,a badgeidentifying them as a People'sDeputy, a military uniform from Russia,or a weaponsdelivery. I felt a little hypocritical, preventingentranceto a building where I had myself spentthe night with dubious credentials, but I wantedto contributesomehow,andthis was the task I had beenassigned.The tensionof this eveningseemed quite different from the incredulity of the night before.Crowd control andsecurityhadbecomemuchmoreimportant. My arms were linked with thoseof a full-beardedman namedAIeksii (who recognizedmy accentand was greatly pleasedto meet an American)and an olderwomanwho neverintroducedherself. Instead she held my arm firmly and solemnly dedicatedher attention to in-
REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 243 spectingdocuments.She was the classic model of a Russiangrandmother,short and solid, applying all her considerablezeal to preventing peoplefrom entering.I haveencounteredmanyof her casteherein Moscow, but it was fascinatingto witnessa babushkaapplying those energiesto the defenseof Yeltsin. Sometimearound 9:00 P.M. she disappearedinto the crowd. The number of people presentwas variously estimatedas somewhere between30,000and 50,000. Thesecurityforces beganrecruiting men to join the RussianArmy, and the crowd applaudedas each new group of volunteersjoggedby. They were of all ages,and some who had arrived at the White House directly from work were now joggingby in businesssuits,taking military instructionsfrom the security guardsand Afghan War veterans.As I dutifully inspecteddocuments,I wonderedwhat we would accomplish. *** It rained intermittently, and as the sun set on the White Housethe senseof uneasegrew. Bolsheviks,so the Russianssay,preferto shoot at night. Two of the famous skyscrapersconstructedby Germanprisoners of war stood over our shoulderslike the ghost of Stalin. The barricadesaroundthe building had beenimproved, and the statueof triumphant Soviet youth that stood in the squarehad also been improved by the addition of a tricolor flag, symbol of the democratic opposition. Someonesaid that the U.S. Embassy,which was a block away,was also flying the tricolor flag. We could not seeit from where we stood,but I hopedit was true. I had still not heardthe official U.S. positionon what washappening,andwasterribly afraid thatthey were waffling. I thoughtaboutTiananmenSquare,and tried to summonall the reasonswhy this shouldbe different. I wonderedwhat I would do if a personstandingnear me was shot. For some reason,it seemed morefrighteningthanthe prospectthat I might be shot. The crowd would fall silent for eachannouncement,but there was little information.An agedcolonel general(three-stargeneral),veteran of the GreatPatriotic War (World War II), assumedcommandof the newly assembledtroops, and stood by himself in a cordonedarea, splendidly attired in his full uniform and chestof medals,awaiting the tanks--expecting,perhaps,to order them to leave. Young soldiers defecting from the Soviet forces were admitted to meet with
244 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE Russianofficers who had come over to Yeltsin's side. Casesof guns neverlearnedwherethey camefro~treamed andammunitio~INovember Novemberin through our entrance.Peoplenot standingin the cordonswere clustered around small radios. As I waved anothercaseof ammunition throughthe entrance,I suddenlyrealizedthat this wasnot going to be a slaughterof innocentprotesters,but a war--perhapsa hopelessone, but a war. I was a child during Martin Luther King's marches,and was raised with a profound respectfor nonviolent protest.It would be easierfor me to join a nonviolent protest, however doomed. I thought again aboutthe questionthat hadtroubledme all morning, aboutcivil war. I had to decide,for myself, whetherI could "standwith Russia"evenif it meantthis. I decidedto stand. There was not much nobility in it, just a slow, deepand very Russiananger.All my connectionsto the USSRhadbeenin the contextof the reforms.It was because of themthat I had changedmy careerand organizeda studentexchangeto Soviet Georgia. When my students were invited, in 1988,to help destroya decommissionedSAM missile outsideTbilisi for national TV, I had dearly hopedthat it was not an emptygesture.Back in the States,I hadgoneon to graduateschooland hadbegunto studySovietpolitics. And then I had comehere,and somewhereamid the long lines, the ''war of laws," andoften incoherentchange,two things had happened. I had really learnedhow fragile, yet how dear,were the hope and the freedombroughtby the reforms;andthis hadbecomemy home.It was my city: my friends who hadriskedtheir careersandlives in serviceof thosedreams,my studentswho were studyingto meetthe challenges of their new world--andthe putschgovernmentdaredto proclaimthe death of all our hopes, the dreams on which we had all survived throughthe winter. Three uniformed KGB officials arrived at our gate and we all fell nervously silent until they announcedthemselves"For Russia."The murmur''They'reours" rippled immediatelythroughthe crowd (to the Soviet mind, it was unimaginablethat they would lie about such a thing). After a brief interrogation,our gate commanderescortedthem that into the building. At around11:00 P.M. we heardan announcement Y azov, the Minister of Defense,had defectedto Russia. A roar of cheeringwent up in the crowd. Even thoughthe news later provedto be erroneous,it lifted everyone'sspirits immensely. We all took a
REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 245 break, and babushkasappearedfrom all directions with bliny, bread with meat slices, tea and coffee. Cartons of cigaretteswere passed around. An American film crew was searchingfor someonewho spoke English. Aleksii shoutedto our organizersthat I was an "Amerikanka." The young commanderof our group was astonished.He summoned the film crew, who askedme what the news about Y azov meant. I speculatedthat a governmentthat is trying to rule by force cannot survive if it loses its military commanders.My Russian comrades askedme to repeatwhat I had said, in Russian."If Yazov is ours, it will be our Russia,"I told them. Some of us, myself included, thought it was all over then. Our commander,Igor, was anxious to take good care of the foreign "guest." He suggestedthat I havea rest in one of the many busesthat were parkedagainstthe building. Soakedand exhausted,I agreed,and he promisedto wakeme whentherewasnews. I sleptuntil 1:00 A.M., andawoketo the RadioRussiabroadcast.But somethingwas clearlywrong outside.The cordonshad beenreformed to keeppeopleout of the roadway,andthe loudspeakerswerebooming instructions.I camerunning out of the bus, and Igor found me. "The tanks are coming," he said. I was confused."If Yazov is for us, why are the tanks still coming?" I asked.He looked grim. "Anarchy" was all he said.I wonderedwhat it would feel like to be a nineteen-year-old in one of thosetanks, ''just following orders" to crashthe barricades and come upon thousandsof my own countrymenwith their arms linked andtheir heartsresolved.I hopedit would be enough. Defensesof the building were rearranged.Gauzeand cotton makeshift gas maskswere distributed. As groupsof Afghan veteranstook over securingthe entrances,the whole crowd--no longer just those who were helping with crowd control-linked arms. Former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadzehurried through, greeting the troops. Then we waited, and the rain drummeddown. Five or six times an hour we would be called again into formation. The announcements said that one tank was coming, then that four were coming, maybe more; that they werethirty metersaway.We heardthe tank locations.I was expectingto hearthe unmistakablesoundI had learnedto recognize the day before,the soundof tanksat closerange.I knew that if we heardit here,all of our lives would be changedforever. Ira, a bilingual employeeof an international exhibition hall, was
246 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE standingnearme. I askedher what she haddoneon Monday. "I cried," shesaid. "Then I cleanedmy apartment.My friends remindedme that it was the first time in sevenyears that my home was likely to be searched,so I camehereinstead." I noticed many young people, and thought of my former student, Arkhil. His parentswere at a conferencein Italy, andhe was supposed to be stayingat his grandmother'shousenearthe centerof town, in an area now surroundedby tanks. I knew he had led a sheltered,privilegedlife. Was he all right? What did he think of this situation?I later learnedhe had spentthe night standingnot far from me. Arkhil bears the samenameas his grandfather,a famousSoviethero of World War II. He hadtakenhis grandfather'santiquerifle to the White Houseand stoodon the barricadeswith the volunteerarmy. Arkhil is sixteen. For a while I talkedwith a youngUzbeknamedLyosha.An agricultural engineer,he had worked in Moscow for six years.His company holds severalseatson the new Moscow stock exchange.Most of his colleagueswere at the White House,discussingin quiet momentswhat effectsthe coup had on the world stock market.Lyoshawas telling us about his two-month visit to the United States when he suddenly turnedto me. "I don't understandyou," he said in English. "Why are you here?It could be dangerous andtheseare not your problems."1 disagreed."I am a teacherof Soviet history and a studentof international relations---ofcoursetheseare my problems.If this can happen, it is problemfor the whole world. It is a problemof civilization." "Yes, 1 see," he replied. But he seemedunconvinced,and all night, as we received new announcementsof conflicting information, Lyosha would call to me from his placein line: "Are you afraid yet, Tereza?" We all were.We wonderedwhat washappeningin the restof Moscow. From wherewe stood,we could not hearthe shooting. We stooduntil 5:30 A.M. As the sunroseover our soggy,exhausted crowd, everyonerelaxed.In daylight, the threatseemedlessplausible. Many of us would not know until much later how closethe tanks had come: one was strandedon the barricadesjust outside the White House.At 5:30 A.M. Yeltsin announcedthat the dangerhadpassedand that we could go home, although he encouragedus to observethe general strikeand not go to work. No one was sure that victory had been won. Many people remainedon the barricadesfor anotherfull day. Arkhil remainedon guard with his grandfather'Sgun for three days-untilYeltsin's teamdepartedfor the Crimea.
REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 247 *** Thoseof us who left the White House early in the morning struggled to get informationfrom the still-exiled pressor from foreign news services.We discoveredthat Yazov had not defectedto Russia,as we had heard, and that the coup leaderswere still in power. We began trying to locatefriends who hadbeenlost in the pastfew days.When I found my teacherNatalia again, her coffee table was piled high with new books: Solzhenitsyn,Bulgakov, and all the greatliterary-political writers. Of the booksshehad selected,shesaid,"I neverboughtthem, becausethey were expensive,and I could readthem in the library. But now I haveboughtall the writers I love who will be bannedagain." Katia, who had lived with me a few months before, found me as soon as I walked into my apartment.Shebeggedme to find someone to smuggleto America somevideo film and photostaken during the previousnight. "They have to understandwhat this is," she said. She believed thatthe resistancewould be crushedby the putsch government. She explainedthat her film crew, which usually producescommercials and rock videos, had beenfilming since the coup began.A scriptwriterandproductionassistant,Katia had interviewedsoldiersin their tanks, passersby,protestersat the barricades.Sometime in the afternoonof the first day, their video equipmentwas seized.The crew managedto preservesomeof the earlier film, and continued recording eventsusinga photocamera. On the secondnight, with only a photocamera,they hadgoneto the barricadeson the GardenRing Road, not far from the White House. Katia saysthe soldiersbeganshootingjust after the flash from a crew member'scameramanagedto capturea photo of one tank aiming at the crowd. A boy who was standingnext to her and the photographer andjeering at the tanks was shot. Katia was sick, and the crew rushed to pull her away. They all fought down their own hysteriaandtogether the crew continuedphotographingall night. I promisedto try and find someoneto smuggletheir film. I spentthe day trying to find a smuggler.Late in the afternoon,I stopped in at my office and finally found Zhenia, who had been searchingfor me for two days. From him, I learnedthat the putsch governmenthad fled. I collapsedinto a chair, laughing, crying, and confused.With part of our attention still on the radio, listening for further news,we comparedstoriesof the pastfew days."Why did you,
248 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE of all people,"he asked,smiling as he quotedfrom a favorite AmericanWestern,''try to savethis miserabletown?" *** In Soviet tradition, even numbersof flowers are for sadoccasions, odd numbersfor celebration.Peoplebroughtflowers in evennumbers to the site where the young men died, and in both even and odd numbersto the barricades.The rest of the week was a celebration. Although it seemedto me that peopleof all ageshadbeenat the White House, the city officials said that most of the defendershad been young. In their honor,therewere fireworks and endlessrock concerts. At the funeral for the three boyswho died, I met an elderly woman."I am so proud of our youth," she said. "I am a teacher,and I do not understandour boys today. But all of them, the good boys, the bad boys,the hooligans---tbeywerethere." On the way to Moscow'sinternationalairport with Zhenia a week later, I spotteda famousmonumentdepicting stylized fragmentsfrom an antitankbarricade.It hadbeenerectedto commemoratethe nearest point to the city that the Nazishadoccupiedin the GreatPatrioticWar. It is chillingly near,but I was stunnedto think of how muchcloserthe putsch governmenthad come to occupying the capital city. Was it possiblethat they could havesucceeded? I shuddered,rememberingthat we had all believedit was possible. The personneldirector of Zhenia'soffice had been soconfident of a putsch victory that he had prepareda formal documentdenouncing manyof our colleagues,including (I was told) Zhenia.Onepoll, taken before the outcomeof the coup was certain, bad indicated56 percent support for the putsch government.Fearful of the temporary"attendancerules" institutedin offices, few peoplein Moscowhadjoinedthe general strike. Even Igor, the commanderof my group at the White House,was careful to arrive at work on time, going directly from the White Housedefensegroupsto his construction-sitejob. I askedZheniaone last time aboutthe stateof the Sovietsoul. "This gives us hope, of course,"he said in referenceto recentevents."But we are not finished. We have to continue. As Chekhov said, 'Every day I squeezethe slave out of myself, drop by drop.' A slave knows how to be a slave,andhe can imaginehow to be a master.But to learn to be a free man---thatis the hardestlesson.It takessometime."
INTERVIEW WITH ALEKSANDR PROKHANOV 2 Concerning the Defendersof the WhiteHouse Russianwriter AleksandrProkhanovwasoneofthe authorsof "A Word to thePeople," ahard-line Communist-Nationalist manifesto that waspublishedin SovetskaiaRossiiaon the eveofthe coupcalling for strongmeasuresto arrestthe disintegrationofthe SovietUnion. He wasinterviewedby the newspaperKomsomolskaiapravdaon September3, 1991.Somemonthsearlier, he hadbecomethe editor-in-chiefofthepremierultranationalist,violentlychauvinist newspaper,Den. AleksandrProkhanovtold Komsomolskaia pravdathat a stateof emergency was still neededin order to curb the political and economic chaosthat continuedto engulf the Soviet Union. During the Emergency Committee'sbrief reign, Prokhanovhad visited the White House,if only to observe.The biggestproblemwith the Emergency Committee--someof whose membershe knew personally as great leadersandmenof action-wasits inability to act decisivelyandcompetently. A "circus" was how he qualified their activity, declaringit to be not the work of a few highly placedconspirators,but an impersonal "provocationstagedby history itself'--an event inevitably attending the disintegrationofa largeempire.A real coupd'etat,in his informed opinion (and he had just fmished a book on the coup d'etat in Afghanistan),"ought to have beencarriedout in a single night, with all the potential opponentsroundedup and jailed and all the channels of communicationcut." "Only after that," continued Prokhanov, "should the coup leadershavebroughtout into the streetsthe military hardware--in order to depressstill further a population already 249
250 ALEKSANDRPROKHANOV Defendersofthe WhiteHouse, Tuesdaynight
THE DEFENDERSOF THE WHITE HOUSE 251 shockedanddisoriented"by what hadtranspiredduring the night. He went on: "What has taken place is incomprehensibleto me. It is beyond comprehensionin general. Nobody stormed the Palace[the White House],specialforces were taking a rest, andat the sametime, orders were given to drag all the military hardwareinto the streets,which madepeopleall excited,just as the beesget excitedwhena bearsticks his paw into a hive. And the people,who at fIrst were frightenedby this sight but soonfound out that the soldiersdid not haveany ammunition, took a seat on the tanks, stuck flowers into the empty gun barrels,beganto spoonfeedthe soldiers,and within about four hours the army hadcompletelylost its capacityto act. ... "I repeat: What has transpiredappearsto me as some sort of a sataniccircus. Indeed, look what happenedas a result of this quasiconspiracy,underthe tank treadsof which three peopleperished:the movementfor strengtheningthe stateis completelyrouted.That is why I do not want to talk aboutthis conspiracy.The courtswill passtheir judgmenton that. What I want to talk aboutis the real coup d'etatthat .... I am conwas carriedout underthe cover of the quasi-conspiracy vinced that if the peopleinvolved had actually set out to do what they are being accusedof, they would have completedthe job. I still think that the general schemeaccordingto which eventsunfolded did not include the use of violence.... The coup may have fIZzled out even before the Committee'spress conference.I suspectthat something happenedwhen GeneralVarennikov and othersflew to Foros [on the eveof the coup]--andthat somethingdoesnot fIt into the scenariothat is beingfed to us right now." Turning to the sceneat the White House, Prokhanovdivided the defendersinto four categories. "When I got there (though I was not planning to defendthe White House),the fIrst thing that struckme wasthe 'pop culture' atmosphere -somekind of a youth or rock revolution. It was the protestculture: students,hippies. It was Paris in 1968, with Sartre and Marcuse,the existentialists.And it seemsto me that they were defendingthe romanceof the situation: 'Tanks in the city, tanks in the city... .' The 'rock prophecy,'it seemed,wascomingtrue.
252 ALEKSANDRPROKHANOV "The secondcategorywas the peopledefendingtheir own way of life. The 'perestroikasegment,'as they are called, but actually the bourgeoisie,who hadsomethingto defend.If the EmergencyCommittee had triumphed,a numberof cooperativeswould, of course,have been destroyed;there might even have been expropriations.These were peoplethreatenedwith eradicationas a social class: people involved in joint ventures,membersof cooperatives,andso forth. It was with great pleasurethat I drank a bottle of Bavarianbeerat the barricadesand smokeda Camel cigarette,a treat from a defenderof the White Housewho wasstandingnext to me. "Third, of course,there were a large number of women and girls there.Oh, that remarkableMuscovitefemininity! Strangeas it may be, even the women close to me, who know my hard-line views, made runs to the barricadeswith food for the little soldiers. That was the women'smovement-inshock,struck with horror. But they were not those women of the barricades,the genie of the revolution, from Delacroix'spaintings.They were the kind of womenwho were crying out, 'Thou shaltnot kill! Stop! May the Lord protectyou!' "And the fourth, very active, segment:professionalpoliticians who marchedto the microphone,shift after shift, and directed the entire procedure."
MICHAEL HETZER 3 Death on the Streets This accountappearedin the Guardian,a weeklynewspaperfor Moscow'sforeign community,in an issuedatedAugust23, 1991. The author, MichaelHetzer,waseditor-in-chiefofthe Guardian. I was standingatop a bus about 200 yards from the advancingtanks when the pop-popof gunfire eruptedin the early minutesof Wednesday morning.I thoughtsomeonewasthrowing firecrackers. My miscalculationwas a symptom of the prevailing mood. The entirerain-soakednight seemedunreal.Surreal. I had alreadybeenat the building since 5:30 P.M. Tuesday.In the streetssurroundingthe Russianparliamentbuilding until the first shots were fired, women walked dogs, lovers strolled in tight embrace, groups of men passedvodka bottles while others munchedon food from well-stockedpicnic baskets.Undera steadyrain, peoplehuddled beneathumbrellasandclusteredaroundradiostunedto the resistance's station, Radio Liberty. Young and old cheeredwhen the news came that Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov was ill. They cheeredwhen they heardthat GeneralDmitrii Yazov also was ill. They cheeredfor every scrapof metalthat waspiled on their barricades,everycall for unity in the speeches,and every rack of black breadthat was carried into the parliament. So when,at 12:05A.M., I heardgunfire yet did not immediatelydive for coveraway from my vulnerableposition,it wasnot out of bravery, but out of seriousmisreadingof the situation. Shortly after the first shots,word spreadlike a brushfirethroughthe crowd of some 15,000that tanks were on the GardenRing Roadand hadalreadykilled severalpeople. "They're expectedto circle aroundand approachfrom along the 253
254 MICHAEL HE1ZER embankment,"saidoneof the organizersfrom his perchatop a rag-tag barricadenearthe Kutuzovskii Bridge, directly in front of the parliamentbuilding. "If you'rehereout of simplecuriosity, now is the time to leave.All menshouldtakeup positions." Thus began a systematicformation of row upon row of human chains. A disquieting hush fell over the people. They whisperedto thosearoundthem. You could hearthe scuffle of feet on the pavement andthe hissof rain dropssplashinginto the puddles. At 12:10 A.M. more shotscould be heardover the hill on the Ring Road. This time the sound,fast and regular, was unmistakablyautomatic gunfire. "They're coming!" one woman cried. "The bastardsare coming." Later there was another burst of gunfire and then severalterrific explosions. Peopleheld their positions,hand in hand, their eyesglued to the horizon. Would the tanks come acrossthe bridge?Would they come along the embankment?Would they approachfrom Barrikadnaia metro stationor along Kutuzov Prospect?Everyoneexpectedthe column of tanksto appearat any moment. As it happened,the assaultnevercame.The six tanksthat provoked the violencehardly representeda seriousattemptto take over the Russian parliamentbuilding. Rather,they were an exampleof the kind of spontaneous violencethat caneruptany time so muchweaponryis on the city streets. Within a half-hourof the final gunshotsI venturedup to the Garden shot~ andwitnessedthe aftermath:a Ring Roadin the direction of the November bloody spoton the asphaltwherea demonstratorwas crushed,a makeshift crosserectedover the site, and a heatedargumentraging in an underpassbetweendemonstratorsand soldiersof four capturedtanks aboutthe termsof surrender. According to eyewitnessaccounts,the six tankshad approacheda line of demonstratorswho had taken up positions along the Garden Ring Roadnearthe U.S. Embassy.Two tanksadvancedon the crowd, crushingtwo people.Angry demonstratorsthrew Molotov cocktailsat the remaining tanks, whose drivers halted rather than killing more people.Firesburnedatopthe leadtank. Finally, one driver openedhis hatch and peekedout his head. A demonstratorwho had climbed onto the tank tried to wrest the driver from the tank but was himselfpulled inside. The soldiersopenedfire.
DEATH ON THE STREETS 255 The man inside the tank was killed, despite attemptsby others to rescuehim. The rest of the evening stretchedlike an epilogueto theseevents. But for a few momentsaround4:45 A.M., fifteen minutes before the end of the curfew, it seemedthe feared main assaultwas coming. Suddenly,every streetlightalong the GardenRing Road went out and the roar of approachingtanks could be heard. Such a timed advance seemedto signal a seriousassault.Demonstratorstook up positionsto block the vehicles. Four armoredpersonnelcarriersapproachedthe demonstratorsand then halted. They idled a few momentsand then turned and fled. A victory cry rosefrom the demonstrators. The carriershad only beenpatrolling. And the extinguishingof the streetlights was not part of an assaultplan; it markedthe coming of dawn. SomewherealongMoscow'sGardenRing Roadan unseenelectric eyehaddetectedthe first hint of comingdaylight. The long night wasover.
4 A Man in the Crowd This accountappearedin thepopularweeklyOgonek(October5-12, 1991). Thenameofthe author waswithheldby the magazine. On the morning of August 22 a young man came to our editorial offices with a stackof photographsandbeganto tell us aboutwherehe was during the coup and what he photographed.Unfortunately, the photographswere of poor quality, but his story seemedinterestingto us---notas that of a fully objectivewitnessof thesetragic events(it is too personalfor that, and indeedhow could anyonebe objectiveback then?)--butas an interestingexampleof the awakeningof the civic consciousness in a manwho was,in all respects,well adjusted. -Alia TseninaandSergeiFilippov On Monday the 19th I walked over the bridge from the Hotel Ukraina to the White House.Everything there was unsteadysomehow.There were not many people.Appealswere postedabout.Peoplewere erecting barricades.It was evident that they were there of their own volition, without orders. Some vehicles were being deployed. On the bridge therewas a column of troops, and peoplewere speakingto the soldiers. Then I realized that they had convincedthe soldiers, won them over. The column turned around and began to depart toward Kutuzovskii Prospect.And what canI do?I wondered. There were four tanks over to the right, on the incline of the embankment.The first tank was No. 104. Therewas a major standingon top of it. His name was SergeiVladimirovich Yevdokimov. He said that he waspart of the TamanDivision. We struckup a friendship.We sharedthe samefirst name and patronymic. I spent four hours with 256
A MAN IN THE CROWD 257 him. At times 1 would departfor a short while, but 1 always returned. And each time our conversationbeganwith my asking him how he could go againstthe Presidentof Russia,who in all our history had beenthe only one electedby universalsuffrage."I am not againstthe President,but 1 have my orders,"he would reply. "I promiseyou that we will neithershootnor mow down the Russianpeople.1 do not even havelive ammunition.But 1 cannotleave.Ordersareorders." "Sergei, you're taking a big risk," 1 responded.''Think about it: they'll take away your stripes. You see, history is happeningright before our eyes ... it's being created.You'll be a part of it. You can either go down with all of them-orgo out a hero." He agreed.1 then ran over to the White Houseandyelled out that therewere sometanks that were readyto defectto our side. We had to back themup. Then a Deputy walked by-I don't rememberhis name. 1 quickly photographedhim. "How areyou preparingto defendus?"1 asked. "The people of Moscow are preparingto defend themselves,"he responded."Look, thereare somemilitia men over herewith machine guns, and over there some boys from 'Aleks' [a security flrm] are settingup defenses." "But this is really not serious,"1 shot back. "They have no hardware." "What do you propose?"he asked. "If you give me permission,"1 said, ''then 1 will bring some tanks over here right now." He liked my proposalbut said that it neededto be discussed.He brought me over to Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Yushenkov,who is also a Deputy.1 explainedmy ideato him. He,too, liked it very much. We then went to Rutskoi. Ultimately, Major Yevdokimov receiveda personalauthorizationfrom Yeltsin, and the tanks cameoverto the White House. Soonthe Presidentbeganto issuemandatesto the deputies,granting them specialpowers.Thesemandateswere signedby Yeltsin personally andstampedwith an official seal. 1 approacheda deputy."Do you needhelp?"1 asked. "Yes," he replied,"do you havea group?" "Yes, therearethousandsof peopleright thereoutside." "I don't need thousands,but 1 do need about flfty to go over to MoscowEcho.The radio stationhasgoneoff the air." 1 went outsideand ran into a group of Chechenswho had come to
258 A MAN IN THE CROWD defendKhasbulatov-well,Yeltsin too. (Before,1 hadnot gottenalong with them very well, but now 1 found them to be very agreeable.)1 draftedfifty of them. "Wait here,I'll be right back," 1 told them. Then 1joined the Deputy-whosename1 don't rememberbut whosephotograph 1 took-and togetherwe brought the group over to the area wherethe zoo is, KrasnaiaPresnia. The deputy was a bit overwhelmed."How are we going to get there?"he asked. "Look," 1 told him, "you have a mandatesignedby the President. Don't worry. Justgive us ordersandwe'll takecareof the rest." The Deputy laughed."Okay, 1 order you to securesomemeansof transportation!" We blockedthe road and stoppeda city bus. The deputypresented the mandateto the driver. The driver wasn'timpressed."I'm at work," he said,"so go and ... yourself." This goes to show that we have ignorant people in our country. Perhapshe was not againstus, but for whateverreasonhe failed to graspthe urgencyof the situation. "I order you to obey!" shoutedthe Deputy. We then grabbedthe driver by the arms and legs and carried him out of the bus. The driver grabbedhis bag from the storagecompartmentandran away. 1 sat down at the steeringwheel. We drove off. Over the microphone 1 made an announcement:"Attention, I've driven a bus only oncebefore." At the MoscowCity Sovietwe hookedup with somemoredeputies. 1 turnedoff the lights insidethe bus, andno one evenstoppedus, even though we drove onto Red Squareitself. However, we were not allowed to enter the radio station right away. First, we had to knock down the door. The militiamen who were guarding Moscow Echo resistedat first, but they backeddown as soonasthey sawthe mandate signedby Yeltsin. We took up postsin the hall where the watchman hashis station.Meanwhile,the deputiesgot in touch with the Minister of Communicationsand thirty minuteslater receivedauthorizationto put the radio stationback on the air. After that 1 returnedto the White House. By now everythingwas organizedover at the White House.Groups of volunteershad been set up. Copying machineswere spewingout leaflets.1 joined othersin distributing thesefrom the balcony when 1 suddenly rememberedthat my car was still parked at the Hotel
A MAN IN THE CROWD 259 Ukraina. "Let me take theseleafletsand distributethem to the closest military units," I said. I grabbeda large stack and left. I spoke with commanderseverywhere and explainedthe situation. And still I had an entire stack of leafletsleft over. Then I beganto post them along the street,but I was arrestedby the militia. I explainedeverythingto them. They let me go, but said: "Don't post any more of those leaflets, or else you'll be arrestedagain--andnext time you might not be released." That night I was unable to sleep very much-maybetwo or three hours. The next day I againwent to the White House,but now I could not get in, sincea stringentsecuritysystemhadalreadybeensetup. Okay, I figured, I'll go do somethingout on the street.I stoodtherethinking for a while and then got a small group together. Valerii Borisovich Pinaev,Yurii Dmitrievich Zubkov, and some othersjoined me. We were togetherfor almostthe whole day. At aboutseveno'clock on the evening of the 20th we made a large flanking motion to inspectthe approachesto the White House. Giant barricadeswere alreadybeing setup. Valerii spokeup when we were nearthe U.S. Embassyin front of the tunnel on the Garden Ring Road. "Look, Sergei. There are no barricadeshere,but only someblack Volgasthat areblocking traffic. If tanks come through here now, thesecars will separateand let them through."Recognizingthe danger,we spedbackto the White House.I explainedthe situationto somepeople.Sooneveryonebeganto shout, and after gatheringtogethera couplehundredpeople,we went over to the GardenRing Roadto build barricades.It startedto rain heavily and we got soakedto the bone.The GardenRing Roadis wide, andwe did not have many people.By now all the black Volgas had disappeared without a trace. We worked so fast we had not noticed anything. I rememberthat at onepoint a breadtruck zoomedup andthe driver told us that tankswere coming towardus from the directionof the Paveletskii Train Station. Several peopleran back to the White Houseto get reinforcements.Our hands werealreadyshakingfrom work-we were afraid we would not fmish. So we begansimply to flag down trucks that werepassingby. Drivers who refusedto cooperatewere forcibly removedfrom their vehicles, which were then incorporatedinto the barricade.We deployed a KamAZ truck, two Intourist "Icarus" tour buses,and a ZIL
260 A MAN IN THE CROWD stretch limousine. A column of street-cleaningtrucks approached. They pulled overto the side. Somemomentslater, the tanksappeared. [The incident that follows took place soon after midnight on Wednesday,August21.] Two or threethousandpeoplelinked their armstogether.Everybody was lined up in a row that stretchedacrossthe width of the Garden Ring Road.The row was not single-file----rather,it was quite deep.The tanks approachedin a column. They cameright up to the crowd and halted. Somewomen ran up to them and shouted:"Stop!" Suddenly, machineguns startedto ftre. My memory is a bit foggy, but at this point there was somekind of surgein the crowd as about 150 people threw themselves in front of the tanks."What the hell areyou doing?!" someoneshouted.I don't rememberwhat I did exactly, exceptthat I was swearing a lot, and I grabbedat the machine gun of the tank driver, who climbedup to the turret. But once he shot from undermy armpit, I quickly cameto my senses.I immediatelyjumpedback, and off the tank. The crowd, too, was dispersing."Everyone form lines!" someoneshouted.The soldierson the tankskept ftring into the air. But we were alreadydrawing back into formation and linking arms. Then, onceagain,the tanksdescended uponus. It was a miracle that so many of us managedto get out from under the tracksof the tanks.We stoodour grounduntil the end, hoping that they would stop. In single file, pushingrelentlesslyforward, the column of tankspoundedaway at our defenseslike a batteringram--and then moved onforward into the underpassto shatterour barricadeof trolleybuses.Boy, I thought,if only we could stop them there. At this point the drivers of the ZIL street-cleaningtrucks-whichwereparked on the other side----drovetheir vehiclesover to the tunnel and blocked the exit. The small tanks were alreadyramming the trolleybuses,whose wheel-baseswere lowered. A tank rammedone trolleybus, startedto crush it, and almost made it over the top----but in the end could not move it out of the way. Two vehicles went over to the side; one of them tried to breakthrough the barrier from the left, but got trapped. People immediately ran in that direction from left and right. At the sametime, oneof the armoredvehiclescut throughoneor two trolleybusesand got stuck in the center.The armoredpersonnelcarrier-it was No. 536-hadhardly run over one of the trolleybuses,however, when it beganto descendupon some people, leaving victims in its wake. But we had alreadyftgured out that they were shootinginto the
A MAN IN THE CROWD 261 air and not directly at the people,and so a bunch of hotheadsjumped down [from the sides of the underpass]onto the tanks. I was really impressedby a man who was carrying a megaphone;he was about forty-five yearsold. It was purely on his accountthat two of the small tankscameto a halt. While everyoneelsewas hiding, he stoodon the underpasswall, directly underthe barrelsof the machineguns,screaming: "Shootme, I havechildrenjust like you, but shoot,I'm not afraid, all of us areunarmedout here." Just then vehicle No. 536 destroyeda trolleybus, fired shots, and descended upon somepeople.One of the boysopeneda backdoor and tried to get to the crew for negotiations--forwhich he receiveda bullet in the forehead.The tank draggedhim backand forth for five minutes. Someoneeventuallytried to pull the body out and stick a beamor a bar in the track of the vehicle. This person also got trapped and crushed,I think. On the other side,a womanscreamed:from the other side shemusthavegottencrushed,too. [This last conjectureprovedto be incorrect.] I was also really impressedby the driver of the MAZ cranetruck. He was a very braveman: with a single motion he cut throughto the trolleybusthat the tank had movedasideandturnedit around,shoving it back in place and blocking the passage.He did this severaltimes. The peoplebelow, in the underpass, weregettingmad: they werebeing killed, and there was nothing they could do about it. Of course,the guys beganto react--theythrew stones,branches,and Molotov cocktails. Naturally, they aimed especiallyat No. 536-which burst into flames and continuedto thrashabout. The men threw a tarpaulinover it and one guy even sat down on it. The kid who sat down on the tarpaulinperished,I think. I recall that therewas an army major who was running aroundand worrying about what might happento people.When the tank caught fire, he yelled out that there might be live ammunition that could explode,in which casea lot of peoplecould die. It turnedout that he was right. There was a completeset of ammunitionin the vehicle. A shell had beenloadedinto the breach.The crew membersjumpedout andthenfought the fire on their tank. We thenextinguishedthe fire. At this point their officer, a major, a very strongman, snatcheda machine gun from a soldier, releaseda few roundsinto the air, pushedhis way through the crowd, and ran off somewherein the direction of the Kremlin.
262 A MAN IN THE CROWD The tanksthat had suddenlyhaltedwent in reverseand movedback into the underpasstunnel to protect themselvesfrom the stonesand Molotov cocktails. The soldiersstood readywith their machineguns. They understoodthey haddonesomethingterrible andstoodtherelike corneredwolf cubs.And if the peoplehadmovedany closer-manyof them saw the casualtiesand were shouting "Death to them!"-there would havebeenmany more victims. At this point the major who had warned us earlier about the explosives started talking and calming everyonedown. Then somedeputiesshowedup. Negotiationsfor surrenderbegan.Finally, the soldiers came out of the armoredvehicles wearing their [special forces] berets,medals, and decorations.They departedin formation. And they were not that young,either; they were twenty or moreyearsof age. I don't rememberhow the night ended.At sevenin the morning I went to bed and aroundnoon I was back at the White House.Again someonewas making a speechabout something.And I sensedthat victory wasours.
E-MAIL FROM ALEKSEI KOZHEVNIKOV 5 On the Barricades Dr. AlekseiKozhevnikovofthe Institutefor the History ofScienceand Technologyin Moscowwrote thefollowing account-inEnglish-toa Jrient! in Berkeley,California, on August22. He sentit by electronic mail andit waspublishedin the Daily Californian. The generalsituation is the following. Muscovitesare defendingthe hugebuilding of the Russianparliamentright nearthe AmericanEmbassy.Thereare manypoliticians inside who organizethe opposition, andRussian-including Yeltsin, membersof two parliaments-Soviet and others.The first night therewere about 10,000peoplearoundthe building. Yesterdaynoon therewas a large rally with maybe300,000 people if not more. And last night probably more than 50,000 were constantly staying in defense.Half of them were highly organized: they were divided into detachmentsand stood in lines close to each otheraroundthe walls andon the nearestbarricades.Anotherhalf were sitting or moving around.Thereare manyarmoredvehiclesin various partsof Moscow.They move in complicatedways andno one,at least outsidethe building, understands clearlythe military situation. The radio announcements andrumorsarecontradictoryandnot very reliable. Soldiers,when spokento, do not expressreadinessto fight with people.Most probably,sometroops refusedto fight and left the city, but new onesare coming. Two small detachmentsof tanks and armoredvehiclescameto thebuilding to help in defense.Besidesthese placeswith troops--someblocks in the centerof the city and around the parliamentbuilding---therest of the city is quiet and ordinary life goeson. Although a curfewwasproclaimed,it is not respectedat all. I stayedin the defenseline the first night. The secondnight I went aroundcarryinga placardwith a call to soldiersfor fraternization.The 263
264 ALEKSEI KOZHEVNIKOV ideawasto meetpossibletroopsearlierandspeakto them-everybody wasexpectinga confrontationthis night--evenbeforethey reachedthe major defenses.It turnedout that this night [Tuesday,August20] there were relatively few troops in Moscow, sincemany left the city in the evening. I guessthat thesmall battlethat took placehappenedunintentionally at about 1:00 A.M. A small detachmentof armoredvehiclesmostprobably was not trying to storm the building, but was passingby via TchaikovskyStreet(the one with the American Embassy),about 300 meters from the parliamentbuilding. There were barricadeson this streetat the two entrancesof the tunnel. Somevehicleswere stopped peacefully(I saw two, maybe there were a few more). Five of them decidedto passthroughandthey got into the tunnel rathereasily. I did not watchthis, but reportedlytherewas someshootinginto the air. The secondbarricadewas larger. Therewere sometrolleys acrossthe tunnel entrance,and finally the vehiclescould not make a hole in it and they were blocked inside. They stoppedat a place, about a hundred meterslong, with the tunnel entranceat one end, the barricadeat the other,andwalls (oneto five metershigh) on their left andright sides. About three hundredpeople,including myself, rushedto the place wherethey heardshooting.When I cameclose,five vehicleswere near the barricadeand about two dozenpeoplecamedown close to them. The soldierswere not very aggressive.In three vehiclesthey opened the hatchesand lookedout from themso that the peoplecould speakto them. The defenderswho cameto the barricadeswere not an organized detachmentbut a kind of crowd. Somepeoplebehavedpeacefully. I too came down to the vehicles with my placard and spoke to the soldiers.Someothers(mostly teenagers)wereexcitedandpsychologically ready to fight, and their words and gesturesmay have looked aggressiveandunpleasantto the soldiers. Things quickly becamemore dangerouswhen one of the vehicles with closedhatchesbeganto move, actively trying to throw off a man or two who stood on its armoredtop. A dozen boys were running aroundit, evadingits wheelsandattackingits armor,althoughthe most seriousweaponsthey hadwere iron andwoodensticks. I climbed up on the wall. Probably a minute after this one of the boys was shot. He was attacking(probably without any weapon)the vehicle from its rear; he came in contact with it, its door opened (probably from inside), and someoneshot him to deathat point blank
ON THE BARRICADES 265 range.He fell so that half of the body was inside the vehicle and the feet draggedon the ground. The vehicle continuedmoving back and forth, people were still attacking it, and those standingon the walls startedscreaming"Murderers!" After a minute the boys picked up the body, which had fallen out. The vehicle was hitting the barricade,trying to make a hole in it; a trolley was crashed,but still it could not make a hole large enoughto escape.Somereportedlater that it crushedtwo more people.I could not seethis from whereI stood,but therewas a greatdangerand a real possibility for this. Other vehicles stayedquiet, but there was generalhysteria.A soldier from one of them ran out and raisedhis hands,appealingto the peopleand apologizing.From the walls peoplethrew stonesand sticks at the aggressivevehicles;then they took somegas from a car on the streetand startedthrowing bottles of it. The vehicle beganto burn on its top. It was shootingfrom the machinegun into the air. I could do nothing more with my placard and left the place when the vehicle beganto burn. Finally, two vehicles went back into the tunnel, where the people could not attackthem from the walls above. Soldiersfrom threeother vehiclessurrenderedwith them and left their vehiclesin the handsof the boys. Probably therewere no more victims. When I visited that place an hour later, severalmembersof parliamentand a generalwho organizedthe defenseof the building werethereandthey were negotiating with the soldiers.The situationhad cooleddown a bit, and even the excitedteenagerswerehelpingto introducesomeorder. But we were still expectingthe generalattackon the building, first at 2:00 A.M., thenat 4:00 AM., andI movedbackcloserto the major defense lines. The night cameto an endquietly, althoughseveraltimestherewere announcements aboutapproachingtroops.At 6:00 A.M. I returnedhome. The presentsituationis unclear.The military madesomemore dangerous announcementson the official radio station. There are also rumors that the situation has improved greatly and that the plotters eitherescapedor werearrested.Anyway, therewill be reasonfor me to go to the [parliament] building this evening.It is 4:00 P.M. now, the rain hasstopped,andI am finishing this letter andgoing out. P.S. I was infonnedthat your letter to me of August 20 arrived. I have not readit yet. We--at leastthosewho take an active interestin
266 ALEKSEI KOZHEVNIKOV the events-havemuch information. including the leaflets. orders(both official andoppositional).free radio service(irregular).andfree newspapersin the form of leaflets. The strangestthing is how easily and naturally people find themselvesfeeling and acting in the historical situation.As if it is ordinarylife.
CONVERSATIONWITH VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLANAZIMOVA 6 In and Around the White House Viktor Sheiniswasa DeputyoftheSupremeSovietofthe Russian Federationanda keymemberofits ConstitutionalOversight Committee.He serveson the CouncilofRepresentatives ofthe DemocraticRussiaMovement.Beforeenteringpolitics during perestroika,Sheinishada careerin academicresearchin the area of economicsandpolitical economy.Alla Nazimovais a well-known labor sociologist.Like her husband,sheis an activememberof DemocraticRussia.NazimovaandSheiniswereinterviewedby GregoryFreidin in Berkeley,California, in January1992. Freidin: When did you first hearaboutthe coup andwhat was your initial reaction? Sheinis: I receiveda call from a young man who worked, among other places, for Nezavisimaiagazeta and Radio Liberty, Misha Sokolov.He woke me up. It was about7:00 A.M. He askedme if! was awareof the latestnews. There had beenplenty of news lately, and I try to keepup, so I saidcautiously:"Yes, I know the latestnews." "And what is your reaction?"he asked. "Could you more specific?"I parried. And that is when he told me whathadactuallyhappenedthatmorning. Right away, we turnedon the radio and television,and also tried to listen to the foreign broadcasts.We heardthe official announcements. Then we tried to tune in our favorite radio station,Moscow Echo,but by thattime it hadalreadybeenforced off the air. Freidin: What was your scheduleon Monday? Whom did you see,what did you do, what actions did you try to undertake?Let's 267
268 VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA startwith the schedule.Whendid you beginto act? Sheinis:Naturally, the eventsmade a completemessof my schedule. If I recall correctly, some SupremeSoviet committeeon which I had the honor of serving was scheduledto meet at the White House that morning at 11:00. What other plansI had I can't recall, but naturally, the eventscanceledthem all, and I mademy way to the White Housewith all possiblehaste.I arrivedtherecloseto 9:00 A.M. Freidin: What was the mood of the peoplearoundyou? Your own reaction? Sheinis:I must say that I was in my worst mood from about 7:00 A.M., when I found out about it, until about 11:00 A.M., when the Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet went into session.There I saw that we were preparedto resist. We took a rather uncompromisingstand. From that point on and throughoutthe crisis, I don't think I experiencedagainany depressionor senseof catastrophe. Freidin: Couldyou be morepreciseaboutthe senseof forebodingor, as you put it, catastrophe-that you had beforethat sessionof the Presidium?What wasyour greatestworry? Sheinis: The greatestworries had to do with our historical experience, especiallythe invasion of Czechoslovakiain 1968, Poland in 1981. I knew what happenedtherevery well. I was afraid that the next stepwould be the dissolutionof Russia'sparliament;Russia'sgovernmentwould ceaseto function, andthe peopleassociatedwith the democratic movement,including Yeltsin, would be interned. I suspected we were dealingwith rather conservativepeoplewho tend to follow the tried andtrue methodsof the past.In my mind then,the mostlikely outcomewasthe Polishscenarioof 1981.· Freidin: Did you think about the outbreakof violence on a large scale, the possibility of civil war? That was my biggest worry that morning. Sheinis:No, I was not thinking about civil war. My questionwas: will we be capableof organizingpassiveresistanceon a large enough scale?In Poland, they failed to organize somethingreally effective, even though in the first days of martial law there, it seemedthat the *That is, introductionof martial law.
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 269 governmentmight be willing to make concessions.I was almost sure that the democraticleadershipwould be neutralized.That wasa matter of commonsense.Fromthat point on the questionwould be: would the society,deprivedof its democraticleadership,be capableof acting on its own? Freidin: Do you know anythingaboutthe reactionof your neighbors? Sheinis: No. At that time, I did not yet have an opportunity to discussthe eventswith neighbors. Freidin: What aboutyour family? Nazimova:In the political sense,we representa typical politicized family. We saweyeto eye as far as the eventswere concernedand did not havemuch of a discussion.I had to feed my husband,seehim off, and rush to my office. At that time, I was in the middle of my brief stint at the Union of Journalists,on the Committeefor the Defenseof Freedomof Speech.That's where I was going then. But first, I'd like to tell you aboutthe reactionof our neighbors. I must say that, living in a huge apartmentbuilding like ours, one doesnot know one'sneighbors.I don't even know all the neighbors who live on our floor. Quite unexpectedly,right after the latest news on the radio, our doorbell beganto ring. Apparently, our neighbors knew more aboutus than we did aboutthem. Right away we hadthree neighborsat our door, offering their telephonenumbersand other coordinates,saying:"If you haveany trouble,pleasecometo us. You can stay with us for as long as you need,and if there is anything we can help you with, all you needto do is saythe word." They also camein the evening--justto checkthat we wereall right. I wasreally struckby this, becausebefore we might have said hello to eachother and that wasall. That'sthe kind oflife we lead-toobusy. Freidin: Whatkind of peoplewere they?Professionals? Academics? Nazimova: Not really. One was a kind of rank-and-file engineer. The other was a single mother raising two teenagedaughters,with greatdifficulties. But the third-true-wasan old friend andcolleague of ours.The first two werea real surprisefor me. Freidin: They wereall women? Nazimova:Yes, thesewere women.But I think the reasonwas that
270 VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA their men, by that time, may have already gone to work. Besides, womenaremuchmoresocial,it's easierfor themto makecontact. Now what happenedat my work. It was 9:00 A.M. or so. I met my colleagues,and all of us had pretty much the samereaction.We were very upset.But soonI learnedcrucial information,namelythat Yeltsin, Khasbulatov,Rutskoi, and Silaev had alreadyprepareda public statement, that this statementwas absolutely uncompromising,that they were on their way to the White House,and that they had beenable to escapedetention and were about to arrive at the White House. The moodchangedas soonaswe receivedthis information. Freidin: But what were people saying before that? Was there any cynicism? Sheinis:No, absolutelynot. But, of course,I was surroundedby the deputieswho were closeto me in spirit andin political outlook. Broadly speaking,the moodwasto resist. Freidin: Werethereany specificplansto mountresistance? Sheinis:Specificplans?No, we hadnone-nothingconcrete.To my knowledge,someplansappearedonly toward theendof the day on the 19. Nazimova:WhenI arrivedat the Journalists'Union, I startedcalling the SupremeSoviet to find out the latestnews. When I first got there, SashaGutiontov-youknow the columnistfrom /zvestiiaand also the chairmanof my committee-raninto my office andtold me that Yeltsin's pressconferencehad beenscheduledfor ten o'clock. He rushed there. Viktor called me right after the Yeltsin press conferenceand dictatedto me the text ofYeltsin's statement.I typed it up and called my former employer,the Institute for the Study of the International Labor Movement.Myoid colleaguecopied it right away and pasted copies on walls. There was sort of a senseof a sharedresolve, an unwillingnessto returnto what we had hadbefore[beforeperestroika]. Perhapsthe reasonfor this is that mostemployeesof the Institute were pretty much of the samegeneration,peoplein their forties and fifties. We all rememberedvery well the times when we hadto live underthe iron heel,so to speak.Nobodywantedto returnto thosetimes. Now a few words aboutthe director of the institute, Timofeev. He submittedto the instructions issuedby the Academy of Sciencesto haveall employeesreportto their offices andrigorouslyto checkatten-
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 271 dancein order to preventpeoplefrom going to the White House.So the bossesturnedout to be real scoundrels. Freidin: I havethis question.Both of you arequite well-known public figures; your addressis known. I am sureyour nameswere on the list of thoseto be arrested.... Nazimova:Yes. Viktor wasnumberthirty. Freidin: If I were in your shoes,I would haveleft home immediately -evenbefore breakfast.Why didn't you? Was it resignationbefore the inevitable? Nazimova:I understoodthat this might happento Viktor. That'swhy I felt I had to feed him a good breakfast.Of coursewe understoodthat the risk was there. When we left home, we tried to figure out if we werebeingfollowed. Sheinis: I don't know how to explain it. But I had no sensationof fear or imminentpersonaldangerduring thosethreedays. Freidin: But you saidearlierthatyou felt real despairwhenyou first heard thenews. Nazimova:Yes, at first, there was the senseof defeat; we felt defeatedandvulnerable.The sensewas: it's all over. Freidin: You felt exposed? Sheinis: I was thinking to myself: Damn it! We're not prepared-just like the leadersof Solidarity, or like Alexander Dubcek and company! Nazimova:Let me add something.Before the events,we often said -especiallyafterwhathappenedin Vilnius-thatwe musthaveall the addressesand telephonenumbers,especiallythe addresses,because phonesmight be cut. And I remembermy first thought, too, was: Damn it. I don't evenhaveany addresses whereI can get help, except for two or three friends! We were just neverorganizedenoughto do this. Unfortunately,DemocraticRussiadoesnot havea regularprocedure for this sortof thing. As for the tanks, here's a story for you. The Committee for the Defenseof Free Speech,where I worked, is situatedon the Garden Ring Road, next to the PressCenter. And that complex of buildings wassurroundedby tanks.Besides,the GardenRing Roadis the biggest
272 VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA parkwayin the centerof the city, so therewere columnsand columns of themmoving in front of our building. I was looking out a third-floor window at a huge armoredturtle parked below. The soldiers were getting out of the hatchesvery cautiouslyand apprehensively,almost furtively. All of us, myself and my coworkers,were simply glued to the windows----thissightwasso unusualfor us. Freidin: Can you say somethingabout thecoordinationof activity amongthe demonstratorswho surroundedthe White House?Did the White House have a hand in it? Let me elaborateon my question. WhenI droveby the White Houseat 10:30that morning,the perimeter of the building was empty-I askedthe cab driver to drive aroundit. Then we drove on to the Minsk Highway, and that is wherewe met a column of tanks. I rememberI countedover 150 tanks and armored vehicles,thengaveup. I was en route to Peredelkinoat the time. When I returnedto the White Houseat aroundtwo o'clock or so, I noticed that some people from the White House were giving some kind of instructionsto the demonstrators. Sheinis:I don't know whetherthere were instructionsor not. But I can attestto the fact that AleksandrVladimirovich Rutskoi had a personal role in the goings on aroundthe White House.I could seehim comingout of the White Houseinto the inner courtyardandalso to the outside. I could see that he was giving instructions to individuals, speakingto people.I myselfwalked out of the White Houseon a few occasionsto talk to the Muscoviteswho gatheredthere. Freidin: When,approximately? Sheinis:Later in the afternoonof the fIrst day. I rememberit was drizzling, and people were holding umbrellasover me, asking questions. They were asking me about what was going on in the White House. Peoplewould say: "How come we don't have copies of the governmentstatements?"They meant the fIrst statementby Yeltsin and the appealssigned by Yeltsin, Khasbulatov,and Silaev. I went back to the White House then and knocked on all the doors, asking peopleto turn on all the photocopymachinesin the White House to make more copies. Later on, I myself took stacks of those copies outside,andpeoplewould snapthemup in a matterof seconds. Nazimova:And they would circulatethemwidely....
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 273 Freidin: I'm sorry I did not bring my own copy of the leaflet for your autograph.But you were going to say somethingaboutwhat was happeningearlier. Sheinis: Actually, it was about the sessionof the Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet, which beganat 11:00 A.M. The committeemeetingI was supposedto participatein that moming-I recall now that it was the Committeeon theUnion Treaty-didnot takeplace,understandably. The sessionof the Presidiumlastedfor aboutan hour and a half. At a certain point, we beganto discussthe text of the statementto be issuedby the Presidium.The draft was composedby Volodia Lukin.· The discussiondraggedon and on, and I was beginningto get irritated at the growing numberof amendmentsandreformulationsandso on. It was not the time to be indulging in niceties.I took the floor and said: "Respectedcitizens,we are sitting hereand discussingfme points,but the situation may changeany moment and we will have to declare, following Mirabeau,that we are herebecauseof the will of the people and we will surrenderonly at the point of the bayonet."I cannotsay that my appealimpressedmy colleaguesthat much. What I was suggestingspecificallywas that it was incumbenton us to think aboutthe measureswe would undertakeif the forces of the new ordertook the White Houseby storm.I understoodthat to discussthesemattersat the sessionof the Presidium,attendedby a lot of people,might not have beenaltogetherappropriate.But we were losing time, valuabletime! And I felt that we did not havethe luxury to be arguingaboutthe style of the statement. As soon as the sessionwas over, I called AlIa and dictated the statementto her, andthenI calledmy own institute,lMEMO [Institute of ForeignEconomiesand InternationalRelations].I called the director November ~s nameis Martynov-with whom I had hada numberof disagreements. Nevertheless,Martynov was a liberal, a man who unambiguously followed Gorbachev'scourse.This is why, incidentally, he was electedto the CommunistParty Central Committeeat the [Twentyeighth] Congress,which you yourselfattended.And althoughI did not think he wasa manof greatinfluence,I still tried to useour association to find common languagebetweenthe Russiangovernmentand the segmentof the CentralCommitteethat was faithful to Gorbachevand wasunlikely to supportthe putschists. *Vladimir Lukin, laternamedRussia'sAmbassadorto the United States.
274 VIKTOR SHEINISAND ALLA NAZIMOVA I got his secretaryftrst and after some delay she connectedme to Martynov. The conversationwas ratherbrief. There is a psychological story here.For the ftrst time in my life, and perhapsfor the last time, I was speakingwith a man who was so shaken,so disoriented,so helpless, so discombobulatedby what was going on.... Naturally, he did not supportthe coup. I gavehim the most essentialinformation about the sessionof the Presidium.My criterion for selectingthe pertinent information was the HradczanyCongressof 1968.· So I said to him: "The sessionof the SupremeSoviet [of the RussianFederation] is calledfor the day after tomorrow." He responded:"But they will not let you hold it." At the end of our conversationI promisedthat I would cometo the Institute as soonas I found the time and consultwith my colleagueson the courseof further action.t This is one of a very small numberof my promisesthat I have not been able to keep, and to this day, I regret breakingit. Freidin: You left the White Houseon severaloccasions.Could you tell me what thepeoplein the White Housethought aboutthe people aroundthe building. Sheinis: I can't speakfor everybody.I am sure-infact, I knowthat very early on certain securitymeasureswere takenand a security force was established.Military school cadetswere invited to join the securityforces,andso were the more reliable elementsof the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. Soon GeneralKobets took commandand was able to activatehis wide networkof colleaguesin the military. But this was on the peripheryof my vision, at least,during the ftrst few hours.I was then preoccupied---together with other membersof the Constitutional Committeewho were present-withdrafting the documentpreparedby Valerii Zorkin. Now he is the chairmanof our Constitutional Court, but at that time he was merely a Soviet professorserving as an expertfor our committee.In juridical terms,the text was very powerful, demonstratingthat the actionsof the putschistswere unconstitutional. As soonas the text was ready,we all signedit andhad it copied anddistributedat once. *Referenceis to an undergroundcongressof the CzechoslovakCommunist Partyafterthe countrywasinvadedby the WarsawPactarmies. tSheinishadbeennominatedby his Institutefor a seatin Russia'sparliament.
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 275 Freidin: Let me reformulatemy question.Did you feel inspiredby what was going on outsidethe White House,all that public support? Sheinis: You know this is a crucial, if not the crucial, question.I think I would be exaggeratingif I were to say that what was going on outside in any way influenced what was going on inside the White House. We had very little information. One thing I can say is that it was decidedat onepoint to send[delegationsof deputies]to the factories. But therewas no follow-up and nothing was appropriatelyorganized. Towardthe evening,anotherdecisionwasmade:to senddeputies to the army regimentsto discusswhat was going on with the military. And that evening,the deputiesI know well, those associated with the ConstitutionalCommittee,all wentto the regiments. Freidin: You werealreadyvisiting the garrisonon Mondaynight? Sheinis:Yes. Freidin: I thoughtthat washappeningon Tuesday. Sheinis:I did it on Tuesdayas well. On Tuesday,actually, I spent mostof the day going from oneregimentto another. Freidin: Can you tell me a little aboutthe call for a massrally for Tuesdayas well as the call for a generalstrike, which I rememberwas issuedat a certainpoint on Monday. Did you haveanythingto do with thesedecisions? Sheinis:It becameclearalreadyon Monday night that therewas no generalstrike. Freidin: I was outsidethe White Housewhile the issueof the general strike was being debatedinside. From time to time, someone would comeout of the White Houseto tell the crowd who was taking whatposition. Sheinis: If you have in mind the sessionof the Presidium,it took placein the morning,beginningat 11 :00 A.M. Freidin: I was there outside the White House by early afternoon, and I rememberdistinctly peoplecoming out of the White Houseand announcingthat so-and-sotook such-and-such a positionregardingthe generalstrike. I think that even someform of minutes,too, was being distributed.I think this wasaround2:00 P.M. on Monday.
276 VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA Sheinis:You are right, but it was not the Presidiumsession.Deputies were meetingregularly throughoutthe day. This was taking place in the Circular Hall, which is not the largestauditorium,andasI recall, it was not filled to capacity. There were about one hundredto two hundredpeoplesitting thereat anyonetime. Peoplewere coming and going. Not all of them were deputies--somewere assistants,experts, and so on. There,it is true, issueswere debatednonstop.That was also the placewhereimportantinformationwasbeingmadepublic as itwas arriving in the White House. The personwho played perhapsthe most importantrole in the collection and distribution of information was SergeiFilatov, now the First Deputy Chairmanof the Supreme Soviet, who was at that time the Secretaryof the SupremeSoviet Presidium. Nazimova:I mustinteIject here.It hasto be admittedthat communication betweenthe White House and Moscow public was very poor. The radio stationMoscowEchowas not broadcastingproperly.People did not know what they shouldbe doing. When on Monday eveningI camehome after all my daily labors,I had no idea what neededto be done. I calledViktor at the SupremeSoviet. The phonewas answered by Viktor's colleague,Volkov, who said, "Everyoneshould come to the White House,becausethere is a chancethat the building will be stormed." Freidin: When wasthat? Nazimova:Between7:00 and 8:00 P.M. I calledeverybodyI could. I knew a lot of people.At my former Institute,I was the chieforganizer of the DemocraticRussiaMovement.I had a list of all the telephone numbers,so I called a lot of people.Many came,and we all spentthe night outsidethe White House. Freidin: Were there any delegationssent to the factories after the call for a generalstrike wasissued? Sheinis: I don't know whetheranything was done or not, but if it was,the numberswere not very significant. Freidin: Did you participate in the discussionof the questionof generalstrike?Whatwerethe argumentspro andcon? Sheinis:If therewere any, I did not participatein them. What I can rememberas far as the issueof the strike is concernedwas the feeling
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 277 of deepdisappointmentthat the generalstrike was simply not working out. Of course,we were getting reportsthat at one factory or another outside Moscow people went on strike or put up demands,and that miners struck somewhere.I had no opportunityto verifY thesereports subsequently,but I believethat many of themwould not havechecked out. But the fact that Moscowwas not striking was completelyclearto me by the eveningof the 19th. The call for a generalstrike was unanswered,hadno effect. Freidin: Why was it that it hadno effect? Sheinis:Thereareprofoundreasonsfor this. Freidin: But let us limit ourselvesto thosedays.What did you think then? Sheinis:First of all, it hadno effect becausewe hadno organization at the factories.DemocraticRussialearnedto do two things: to mobilize huge massesof people to take part in a demonstration,and to campaignfor candidatesin elections. Nazimova:In fact, it was one and the sameorganization-thepeople in chargeof electioncampaignswere the samepeoplewho mobilized for the demonstrations.Our organizations,the voter clubs, were set up in the electionprecincts,aroundresidentialareas,not at places of work. Freidin: Very interesting.There were a few hotheadsin the crowd outside the White House calling on peopleto arm themselves,and I had a feeling that the audiencewas not entirely unreceptive.My impressionthen was that at a certain point, after the White House had made a decision not to use violence (if indeed such a decision was made),thosehotheadsdisappeared. Nazimova:Well, I can answerthis question,becauseI was making my roundsoutsidethe White Houseon Monday evening.Young men in their mid-twentieswere walking aroundin the crowd askingpeople to give up their stashesof Molotov cocktailsto have them storedin a safe place-toavoid a possibleprovocation.I evenrememberthe place they usedto collect that stuff-atthe right wing of the White House. Sheinis:I, too, was appealingto peoplewith the samerequest,but I have a very soft voice and, lacking a bullhorn, I don't think I was heardby morethana hundredpeople.
278 VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA Freidin: I recall that even the White House did not have a public addresssystem. Nazimova:True. They got one setup only late on Tuesdayevening. Freidin: Did you hear or watch the pressconferenceof the EmergencyCommittee? Sheinis:First, I heardaboutit. I was on my way to the regimentsat that time. But I watchedit early on Tuesdaymorning when it was beingrebroadcast. Freidin: Could you tell me what was taking placein the regiments? I am especiallyinterestedin, first, the mood amongthe officer corps, and second,how they explainedto themselveswhat they were doing. And who werethe deputieswho went with you? Sheinis: I don't rememberexactly, but, say, on Tuesday,at one time, I was with Bella Denisenko,at another,with Aleksei Surkov, then with SergeiYushenkov,and then with Nelazov,a teacher.There were also somedeputiesfrom the Moscow Soviet. I just don't remembertheir namesnow. Freidin: What regimentsdid you visit on Monday? Sheinis: On Monday, late in the evening, I went to the Supreme SovietMilitary Academy. Freidin: What kind of an academyis that? Sheinis:That'sjust the name.It is situatedsomewherecloseto the OuterRing Road.Then, following that, in the early hoursof the morning, I went to the OstankinoTV Tower where a regimentsurrounded the TelevisionCenter. A small detail. In the evening,when weleft the White Houseby car, the building was already pretty much surroundedby the barricades, and carshad real trouble getting out of there. On Tuesday,one could no longer drive out of the White House.Carswere parkedoutsidethe Krasnopresnenskaia metrostation. Freidin: How did the officers explainto themselveswhat they were doing? Say,thosearoundthe OstankinoTV Tower? Sheinis:Let me start with the Military Academy.There I encounteredthe samekind of feeling of disorientationthat I had earlier seen
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 279 in Director Martynov. Except that the military understoodeven less. The officers we spoketo had beentaken completely by surprise.In general (with one exception about which later), their mood can be summarizedas follows: We don't want to participatein any of this-whetheron one side or the other. At the sametime, it was clear that their loyalty to the SovietUnion hadthe upperhand.They would say: "We havetaken an oath of loyalty to Soviet power. We haveto carry out the orders. The ordersviolate the law. But it is your businessto sort this all out, and if the ordersare indeedillegal, then it is up to you to rescindthem. The army shouldnot be decidingwhich ordersit will carry out andwhich it will not." The conversationslasteda long time-anhour, two hours. By the way, as a rule, we were not allowed to enter regimentalterritory. So the conversationswere taking placein the vicinity of the guardhouse. We talkedaboutall sortsof things,aboutNuremberg... Freidin: Yes, the Nurembergtrials-that was the only thing that I could sayto the tankerswho surroundedthe White Houseon Monday. Sheinis: They would tell us that they were following Yazov's orders.We would tell them that Gorbachevwas the only one authorized to issue such orders. They would parry that they had been told that Gorbachevwas ill. And so it went. We would discussthe political situation.They were in favor of retainingthe Union,they were critical of the policy of the Russiangovernment,and on andon. Therewas not really any orderto theseconversations.But I want to sayonething: we were neverpreventedfrom distributing the statementsand decreesof the Russiangovernmentamongthe soldiers.This was true evenwhen the officers wereclearly ill-disposedtowardus. We had quite a volume of theseofficial statements,Yeltsin's ftrst decreesand so on. On Tuesdaywe even had the ultimatum of the Russiangovernmentaddressedto Lukianov [Chairman of the USSR SupremeSoviet]. Freidin: Tell me aboutthe hostileofficer. Sheinis:That was on Tuesdayin the daytime.We receivedinformation that in the vicinity of the LeningradHighway therewas a concentration of the military forcesthat were likely to be usedin attackingthe White House.And so we got into a car-BellaDenisenko,myself, and two other male deputies(I can't remembertheir names).We were
280 VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA alwaystravelingin groupsoffour, not countingthe driver. So therewe were, driving along the LeningradHighway looking for the troops. It took us a long time. At a certainpoint we were following somesort of military vehicle. Later it turned out that it was a regiment meantto guardprisons.We talked to them, probablywastingour time, because that regiment was unlikely to participate in any action against the White House.Finally, we were driving back, and all of a suddenwe saw a group of tanks flying the flag of Russia, and driving in the oppositedirection. Those were the tanks that had gone over to the Russianside late on Monday (there were about twelve of them). We wonderedwhat they were doing thereand why they had left the White House.After a while, we caughtup with them. When we askedthem why they had left the defenseof the White House,a lieutenantcolonel--I think his namewas Kobyzev,as he informedme later--toldus in a rather energeticfashion that we must leave the territory of the regiment.We told him that as deputieswe had the right to enterthe territory of any military regiment.He would not budge.So I produced a document,signedby Khasbulatov,sayingthat Sheinisis allowed to conductdiscussionsin military regimentsin orderto explainthe position of the Russiangovernment.The man took this document,looked at it, and said, "Very interesting." Then he put it in his pocket and resumedpushingus out. We askedfor permissionto takeleafletsto the soldiers.He saidhe would do it for us. We refused. They werevery rudeto Denisenko,who wasnot too passiveherself. He threatenedher, sayingthat he would orderhis boysto kick us out of there. She respondedby turning to the "boys" and saying to them, "Look I have sons your age, how can you behavelike this toward me?!" Finally, after it was clear that we were not getting anywherewith him and we decidedto leave, I asked him to return Khasbulatov's letter. "Oh, don't worry," he said to me, "Khasbulatovwill write you anotherone." Which, actually,was not that far from the truth. The fact is that they had beenphotocopied,and I had lots of them. In conclusion, he took the paperout of his pocket,tore it in half andgaveit back to me in that form. I recountedthis story at the sessionof the Supreme Soviet,which openedthe next day. Freidin: Were thereany conversationsaboutgoing undergroundon Monday?
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 281 Sheinis:No. Deputiestalkedamongthemselves,acknowledgingthat we were unprepared,but thesewere, so to speak,private conversations. And when we got togetherfor meetings,all we did was receive and exchangeinformation about what was going on where, what cables had beenreceived,and what the plan of action was. Thoseof the deputycorpswith whom I was in constantcontactwere in full agreementthat our main businesswas to visit as many military garrisonsas possible. Nazimova:Here is an interestingstory for you. This was Monday night~r rather, the early hours of Tuesdaymorning. I was standing November nearthe little bridge outsidethe White House,helping with the building of the barricadethere, when I noticed SergeiYushenkovwalking in a sort of steadfastmanner-witha column of tanksmoving behind him. I knew Yushenkovpersonally.So I begancheeringright away: "Here are our tanks, our tanks are coming!" There was a woman standingnext to me. She turned to me and said: "How can you be cheeringtanks!" She did not understandthat thosetanks had crossed over to our side, and when I explained it to her, she, too, started cheering,without evenpausing. Another interesting episode.I was going home at around six or sevenon Wednesdaymorning [after spendingthe night outside the White House]. I was in a tram car and sitting acrossthe way from me was a young man,apparentlyalso going homeafter spending thenight outside the White House. Somehow,we could recognizeeach other very quickly-we all had wet clothes,drawn faces,exhaustedlooks, dirty shoes(it wasraining). I turnedto him andsaid: "It's all over now, everythingwill be all right." He looked at me, figured out quickly the differencein our generationand said: "Only middle-agedpeoplelike you were afraid that we would not succeed.We young people we didn't haveany doubtsthat we would win." Freidin: Of course,how old could he have been---twenty? Nazimova:He wasa sophomoreor a junior in college. Freidin: In 1985,whenGorbachevtook over, he wasfourteenor so. Nazimova:He grewup in a world different from ours. Freidin: What kind of peoplewere aroundyou on Tuesdaynight andWednesdaymorning?
282 VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA Nazimova: I was really surprisedto encounterthere some of my Institute colleagues--Iwon't name names--whomI had always thought of as being, if not apolitical, then extremelycautious.It was clear that their sympathieswere on the side of democracy,but they would not allow themselvesto makeany public statementaboutit. As a rule, they neverjoined demonstrationsor attendedrallies. I neversaw them participate in meetingswhen I was organizing our chapterof DemocraticRussia.But on the secondnight of our vigil outside the White House,I found myselfstandingright next to oneof those,shall I say, utterly respectablemen. He, too, was ready [to sacrificehimself]. It was clearthat we would be sweptoff our feet by the crowd if either a tank or someother military vehicle camecloseto the perimeter.We were standingbetweena tall fence and the wall of the White House. Therewas no escapethere. Anotherdetail, indicativeof the kind of solidaritypeoplewereexperiencing. It wasraining ratherheavily. A very youngman,a boy really, came upto me and askedwhether I had anything to protect myself againstgases.We were all afraid of gasat somepoint. I saidI did not. He thenproduceda pieceof gauze,folded it into a few layers,andthen dippedit right into a puddle."Takethis," he said. "We'll yell if thereis a gasattack,andthenyou'll haveto breathethrough thisthing." People really caredabouteachother.It wasvery, very touching. Freidin: I can very well imagine that, perhaps,after we are no longeralive, revisionisthistorianswill be arguing aboutthis eventuntil they are blue in the face. Nobody will be able to understandwhy Yeltsin and companywere not arrested,why the governmentdid not cut off all the communicationsfrom the White House,and so on. Too manymiracles. Nazimova:I agree.They could havetakencareof the whole thing in oneday. Freidin: For a nonparticipant,noneof this looks like a seriousgame. Nazimova:Thereis oneexplanationthat mustbe takeninto account. The leadersof the coup were all peopleof the old school. They were usedto the idea that if someoneat the top gives an order, that order is obeyedbelow. Freidin: They were of the old school also with regard to competenceandefficiency. They did not plan thingswell andthey bungledit.
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 283 Nazimova: Nor did they have unanimity among themselves,each suspectingthe other as a potentialbetrayer.Who would be the first to betray whom? Who would be the first to go to Gorbachevand beg forgiveness?That wasthe question. Freidin: Here is my story of Mondaynight. Right beforethe putsch, I had made a date to meet Nikolai Nikolaevich Vorontsov [USSR Minister for EnvironmentandNatural ResourceManagement]and his wife, Yelena AlekseevnaLiapunova,at the Congressof Compatriots on Monday night. Vorontsov was supposedto makean openingstatementthere.I hadspentall afternoonoutsidethe White Houseandfrom there went straightto the TchaikovskyConcertHall, where the opening ceremonieswere to be held, arriving therequite wet from the rain and disheveled.Armored vehicleswere parkedall along the entrance to the Concert Hall, and right there in the middle of Mayakovsky Square,a teamof workerswastrying to launcha hot-air balloonwith a big sign: "Welcome,Compatriots!"The sign was soggy, and the balloon had gotten water-logged.It lifted up a little, hovered,and then collapsed.How symbolic,I saidto myself. Once in the concerthall, I could not find Vorontsov,but I did meet YelenaAlekseevna.Shewas very worried. Sheknew that her husband had climbed onto the tank with Yeltsin that morning, and shehad not heardfrom him since.The scenein the foyer wasvery strange:a group of female dancersin Russianpeasantdresswere steppingout through the crowd, accompaniedby three accordion-playingmen outfitted in somefake traditional garb. You didn't know whetherto laugh or cry at this sight, or both. After the bell rang, Liapunovaand I took our seats in the orchestra,to the right of the stage. There was a man sitting acrossthe aisle from us, a conceptualartist from Leningradwho had emigrated to the United States. I rememberedhis nom de plume: Smorchevskii-Butterbrod.After the openingspeecheshad beenmade, he askedto speak,and to my surprise,Mikhail Tolstoi, the masterof ceremoniesof the Congress,gave him pennission.Smorchevskiidid not mount the stage,but took a microphoneand positionedhimself right in front of it. Most peoplecould seehim. Both the way he spoke andwhat he saidwere very moving. He invited the hall to standup for a momentin honor of PresidentGorbachev,who, he said, "may have alreadybeenassassinated." Another man shoutedsomethingfrom the balcony, but I could not hear him well. The audience,most of it at
284 VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA least, got up to their feet. Some remainedseated,including a few RussianOrthodox priests sitting acrossthe hall from us. I wondered then whetherit was a political statementon their part, or perhapsthey wereafraid they might violate the dignity of the Orthodoxpriesthood.I still don'tknow. Liapunovaand I left soonafter the openingspeeches.We just could not continuesitting therewatchingall sortsof performanceswhen we did not know whetherVorontsovhad beenarrested,or worse. We got up to leave,andas we werewalking out, I stoppedto shakeSmorchevskU's hand and to thank him for his speech.He and I were approximately the sameage, middle forties. Both of us had lived throughthe invasionof Czechoslovakia,and now onceagainwe were reliving the daysof our youth. SuddenlyI heardsomebodybehindme sayin a loud whisper: "We'll break your fucking neck if you keep on doing what you are doing." Dumbfounded,I turned around: there were two tall athletic-lookingguys standingbehindme. My blood ran cold, just like the old days.I said goodbyeto Smorchevskiiand followed Liapunova out of the hall. We werenot followed. I offered to accompanyher home. Outside, automobileswere parkedsideby sidewith armoredpersonnelcarriers.I wantedto take a cab, but Liapunova insisted that we go by metro. Only later did I realize why: she wantedto be aroundpeople,just in case.The train was half empty (it was 8:30 or so). A youngish bespectacledman walked silently through our car, holding a pathetichandmadeplacard of the big rally at the White Houseon Tuesday with the announcement poker-faced,lookedat him in condemnationof the putsch.Passengers, or, for that matin silence.Therewere no gesturesof encouragement, ter, hostility. At the next stop the man walked out of the car and enteredthe next one. Soon after we arrived at the Vorontsovs,we saw the replay of the famouspressconference,anda few minuteslater Nikolai camehome. We watchedthe newstogetherand he told us aboutthe Cabinetmeeting earlier in the day and aboutsomearrests.It was time for me to go home.They walkedme out andsawme get into a cab,andaskedme to make sure to call them as soon as I got home. I did, and they were relievedto hearthat I hadgottenhomesafely. Nazimova:Here is anotherepisodeI would like to sharewith you. On TuesdayViktor had to attend a receptionat the HungarianEmbassy;he had to presenta paperor someinformation or documents.I
IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 285 drove him there in our car. Later he camehomefor a nap--it was not possibleto take a nap in the White House.That evening,we got a call from SashaGutiontov, who told us that a curfew had beendeclared. "How are you going to get to the White House?"he asked,trying unsuccessfullyto persuadeus to stay home. "You'll be arrestedright away." Well, I droppedour car off at the garagenearour house,and from thereViktor and I walked tothe metro and from the metro to the White House.The streetswere absolutelydeserted,but therewere no patrols and no one tried to stop us. In the metro, the closerwe got to the Barrikadnaiastation,the morecrowdedthe train became. Sheinis:It was absolutelyclearthat peoplewere going to the White House. Nazimova:Therewere so manypeopletherethat it was difficult to breakthroughthe crowd, andViktor hadtrouble gettinginto the White House.Finally, someonerecognizedhinr-"This is Deputy Sheinis!" -andthe crowdpartedto 1t:9t him through.
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v Getting the News In and Out One of the plotters' fIrst moveswhen they seizedpower was to take control of the country'smassmedia: the press,television, and radio. Their actionswere designedto control the flow of information and to ensurethat it flowed in the properdirection,just as their predecessors had donefor so many decadesbeforethe introductionof glasnost.The accountsthat follow, by both Sovietand foreignjournalists,show how professionaljournalistscopedwith the crisis andmanaged,evenunder highly adverseconditions,to get the newsin andout.
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lAIN ELLIOT 1 Three Days in August: On-the-Spot Impressions lain Elliott servedformanyyearsas an editorialandfeaturewriter for The TimesofLondonandan editor ofSovietAnalyst. In 1988he movedto Munich asAssociateDirector ofRadioLiberty. It was in this capacitythat he witnessedthe eventsofAugust1991 in Moscow.His accountappearedin Reporton the USSR,a publicationofthe Radio Free EuropeandRadioLiberty ResearchInstitute, in September1991. In the steadyrain of Monday afternoonon August 19, I watchedthe indignant crowds on Kalinin Bridge and the Smolenskembankment building barricadesandthrustingleafletsinto the handsof young, confusedtank crewmen.Workersdraggedconcreteblocks into placewith their trucks. Young lads carriedup stretchesof railings. Middle-aged academics,briefcasein onehand,scaffoldingpole in the other,delayed their return hometo addtheir contributionto the defenseof the White House and their electedrepresentatives.The first barriers of trolleybuseswith slashedtires grew strongerby the minute. Building sites were ransacked,and a vast supply of long steelrods for ferroconcrete constructiongave thebarricadesthe appearanceof someancientphalanx of spears.A veteranof the Afghan War saidthat suchrods were the mosteffective defense availableagainstthe tanks.At five o'clock a familiar sound caught my attention: the news from Radio Liberty emergedloud and clear from the centerof a large clusterof umbrellas at the endof the bridge. At 5:15 P.M., troop transportvehicles,which were trying to force their way throughto the makeshiftbarrieron the bridge,abandonedthe attempt,and in a dangerousoperation,turnedaroundamid the crowds 289
290 lAIN ELliOT beforedisappearingin the direction of the Hotel Ukraina. Somefrustratedsoldierinside one of the transportersfired a few roundsinto the air to frighten the crowds into clearing a path. Later, a column of severaldozenlight tanks camechargingrecklesslyarounda comerat the Smolenskmetro station.The tank officers weredesperatelywaving passersbyout of the way, but were clearly determinednot to relax speed for fear of finding themselvespinned down like so many others by leaflet-waving youngsters.Nonetheless,someonehad managedto scrawl with a piece of chalk on tank No. 073, "Freedom, not tanks!" Outside the Marx Prospectmetro station people were clustered aroundBoris Yeltsin's"Appeal to the Citizensof Russia,"postedon a wall opposite the Bolshoi Theater. In front of the nearby Moscow Hotel a large crowd was cheeringthe speechesof young deputies.A generalstrike wasspreading,therewas widespreadsupportfor Y eltsin, and Russianswere no longer preparedto give way to totalitarianism. The young deputy Dmitrii Chegodaev,a "DemocraticRussia"leader, wasparticularlyeffectivewith his megaphone,summoningthe crowds to an all-night vigil outsidethe White House. I was to speakto him againunderhappiercircumstancesan epochlater, on Thursdaynight. Still with his megaphone,he was persuadinglaughingbut determined Muscovitesto stand clear so that two powerful Krupp cranescould remove "Iron Feliks"· from his high pedestalbefore the KGB headquarters.For severalhours in the late afternoon,agile young people scrambledall over the towering statue,placing steelcablesaroundhis neck,andlinking themto an ancientyellow bus. They wereconvinced by Sergei Stankevichand other spokesmenfor Yeltsin and [Mayor] Gavriil Popovthat this day of victory shouldnot be marredby further casualties,and waited patiently until almostmidnight, when the hated symbol of KGB repressionwas eventually laid low in a safe, wellorganizedoperation. That tenseMonday evening,however,I heardfrom oneof the deputies at the White Housethat Radio RussiaandMoscowEcho hadbeen suppressed.I had visited Sergei Korzun, chief editor of the popular Moscow Echo radio stationin its crampedquartersjust that morning, shortly after KGB officers had told him to close down. He said then *Feliks Dzerzhinskii, the founder of the Soviet secret police (the Cheka), whosegiganticstatuestoodin LubiankaSquare.
ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 291 that he had no intention of obeying them since he did not recognize their authority, and it therefore seemedprobable that he had been arrested.This turned out not to be so, and Moscow Echo was soon backon air, althoughits broadcastswere interruptedmore thanoncein the grim hours that followed. I spokethat week with severaljournalists, print andradio; their experiencesvariedgreatly,as did their fascinating accountsof how they had somehowsucceededin defying the incompetentjunta's attempts to suppresstheir activities. But they sharedwith the young men who stood unarmedbefore the tanks a courageousdeterminationto do everythingin their powerto ensurethe collapseof the coup. Suddenlya dozentanks roaredpastthe Metropol Hotel and Sverdlov statue,headingfor ManezhSquare,scatteringthosewho, like me, were strolling awayfrom the speakerstowardthe line of toughOMaN paramilitarypolice blocking off RedSquare.Threetanksspedpastand on throughManezhSquare,but the fourth groundto a halt so abruptly I thought for a momentthat it had hit one of the passersby.It was a relief to realize that nothing more dramatic than engine failure had occurred.Within secondsthe snortingtankswith flak-jacketedsoldiers on top clutching their Kalashnikovswere surroundedby peoplefrom the meetingdeterminedto educatethe soldiersabout how they were being misled. Leaflets fluttered from the windows of the deputies' offices in the Hotel Moskva,but possiblyevenmoreeffectivewerethe plump, motherly Russianwomen who gave the undernourishedsoldiers everythingthey had in their baskets,from bunchesof grapesto a very largejar of stewedfruit, which an officer demandedbe promptly returned."And they make our children take part in this!" shoutedone irate woman. Confusedand unhappy,the soldiers and tank crews listenedto a range of hecklers,from lecturerson the nature of democracyto the only drunk I wasto seeamonghundredsof thousandsof demonstrators againstthe junta. Ripping openhis shirt and thrustinghis nakedchest againstthe muzzle of a Kalashnikov in the handsof a nervousteenager, he shouted: "You won't shoot us, will you? After all, we're Russian,and you're Russian."At last the rain stoppedand the setting sun madethe red bricks of the Lenin Museumglow. Tank crewmen helpedsomepretty girls climb up besidethem to decoratetheir tank with flowers. An angry officer chasedthe girls off, but agreedto withdraw the remaining tanks the way they had come, if only the
292 lAIN ELLIOT crowd would step back enoughto allow them to maneuveraround. And so the tanksleft, ignominiouslytowing backwardsthe onebroken down, the triumphantcheersof the crowd resoundingacrossManezh Squarewhile the OMON lookedon impassively. Monday set the scene for the defeat of the bungling junta. The politically aware among the populationrealized their strength,and I saw little evidenceof doubt among those on the barricadeswhether democracywould prevail. Of course all too many Muscovites kept their headsdown, waiting to see which way the wind was blowing before voicing any opinion about events. And there were severalin busesand the subwaywho even arguedin favor of the junta, hoping for a return to the Brezhnevstagnationwhen at leastthere was something to buy in the shops. On Tuesday,August 20, meetingswere taking place all over Moscow as the staffs of newspapers,factories, and other institutions decided where they stood. Some simply went about their businessas usual. Otherswere divided, and opted to sit on the fence until it becamecleareronto which side it would be in their own bestintereststo jump. For peoplein the mediathis was not really an option; thosewho did not immediately go public with a statementopposing the coup were denouncedby their more courageouscolleaguesas compromisers. But somenewspapersthat immediatelydecidedto defy the junta's ban found that they lackedthe meansto publish a normal issue---and not, in most casesthat I heardabout,becausetherewere tanksbarring the way to the printing presses.More often it was simply that the responsibleofficial for the formerly Party-controllednewspapersrefusedto provide the keys; and sinceaccessto copy machineswas still severelyrestricted,it was not alwaysa simplematterto run off several thousandleaflets or brief "emergency"issuesof a newspaper.Even obtainingsuppliesof xeroxpaperrequiredconsiderableinitiative. Under the leadershipof Irma Mameladze,AlIa Latynina, and Yurii Shekochikhin(who is also an electeddeputy), Literatumaia gazeta journalistsheld a meetingat their editorial offices in Kostianskii Lane to protestthe actionsof the junta and arrangefor joint action by the democratic media. The weekly is printed courtesy of the Pravda presses,and since they lacked the facilities to producean immediate "emergency"issuethemselves,they decidedto pile into their bus and join the demonstrationof solidarity at the Russianparliament.They were not impressedby the attitudeof their editor FedorBurlatskii, who
ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 293 stayedin the Crimean sunshineand provided no leadershipfor their protest.It was not until Wednesday,August 21, that he phonedin his protestover the closureof his newspaper,in time for the front pageof that week'sdelayedissue. Vitalii Tretiakov, editor of Nezavisimaiagazeta,produceda special issueof his newspaperby fax despitethe ban, and quickly organized undergrounddistribution of it and the following issues.When I called at his offices on the first floor of the "Voskhod" factory off Miasnitskaia Street(temporarilycalledKirov StreetunderCommunistrule), he paid tribute to all thosewho hadhelpedprovide paperand copy facilities. He expressedparticulargratitudeto the Library of ForeignLiterature; as an article in the Saturday issue pointed out, while some printing housesmade the impossible demandof an official letter of permissionfrom Minister Poltoraninbeforetaking the risk of printing the liberal newspaper,the director of the library, ViacheslavIvanov, simply said "Come." It was late when they arrived. "But no tasksare hopelesswhere Deputy Director YekaterinaGenievais concerned.If not already aware of her energy and determinationone would have beenastonishedto seehow necessarybut difficult-to-find peopleappeared;how doors,the keys to which it was impossibleto find, were opened;and so on." The newspaperpublisheda list of library staff who hadshownparticulardedication. Among the most active in producingand distributing leaflets were young membersof the Memorial Society,who took paperfrom every office they could find and producedthousandsof leaflets on their overworkedcopy machines."Suppressed"newspapersandpressagenciesprovidedtheminformationby fax, which they sentto the Westvia Pragueand Bratislava,since they were unableto fax direct. One lad had an uneasymoment when two policemenapproachedas he was distributing leafletsto tank crews. But all they askedwas, "Have you got any more for us?" On TuesdayAleksandrDaniel· had a bad moment when a truck pulled up outside [the Memorial Society'smakeshift headquarters]and a KGB officer rang the bell. They talked, and thenhe said,"It's all right, we won't shootyou." Outside the White House on Tuesdaythere was a steadyflow of speakersto inspire the thousandsof supporterswho had gatheredto *AleksandrDaniel, historian and humanrights activist, is the son of the late writer Yulii Daniel.
294 lAIN ELLIOT preventthe storming of the Russianparliament.Yeltsin, EduardShevardnadze,andYelenaBonnerwere enthusiasticallyreceived;the poet Yevgenii Yevtushenkolesswarmly, althoughhe did succeedin capturing the atmospherein his poem"19 August," which he proclaimedto the crowds: This Augustday will be rememberedin songandsaga. Todaywe are a people,no longer idiots deceived. AndtodaySakharov,shylywiping his cracked spectacles,is comingto the aid ofour parliament. Besidethe tanksthe conscienceawakens. Yeltsinclimbson a tank. Andbesidehim Not theghostsofformer Kremlin leaders, but theskilledmenofRussia,notyetvanished, Andtired women,victimsoflong queuing. No! Russiawill notagainfall on her kneesfor interminableyears. With us are Pushkin,Tolstoi. With usstandsthe wholeawakenedpeople. AndtheRussianparliament,like a woundedmarbleswanof freedom,defendedby thepeople,swimsinto immortality. Former KGB GeneralOleg Kalugin introduceda KGB lieutenant colonel who appealedto his boss"Volodia Kriuchkov" to abandonthe junta, becauseit was "aboutto collapse"anyway. Hesaidthat most of his brother officers had declaredfor Y eltsin. (The samemessagewas receivedby a BBC correspondentwho phonedthe KGB public relations office in the Lubianka."We're all for Yeltsin here!" he wastold.) At first it was announcedthat Yeltsin could not speakto his supporters outsidethe White House"becausehe had a greatmany mattersto attendto," but when he did in fact appearon the long balcony,it was clearthat therewereotherconcernsalso. He was surroundedby police shields,and at one point an armedpolicemanjumpedup on the wall in front of his president,pointing at what might havebeena sniperhigh in a nearby building. There were several false alarms about the impendingstormingof the White House,and instructionswere given on what to do in a tear gasattack.As usual,Russiansroseto the occasion with a streamof anecdotes:"Why are thesepeoplecheeringwhen we know that a column of fifty tanks is corning to crush us? They've
ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 295 probablyheardthat it's not fifty but only forty-nine!" Matchedonly by the enthusiasticreceptiongiven to Yeltsin were the cheersthat greetedthe appearanceof the popular comedianGennadiiKhazanov,who mimicked Gorbachevand causedshoutsof laughterwith his sharpcommentsaboutwould-bedictatorswith shakinghands.Therewere other, lessrepeatablejokes about"Yanasha"[Yanaev] on the walls of transportabletoilets providedfor the defendersof the Russianparliament. The first reportsfrom the TchaikovskyStreetunderpasson the night of August 20--21 were inaccurate,with as manyasten saidto be killed and dozenswounded.Katia Genieva,deputy director of the StateLibrary for ForeignLiterature,who, despitethe curfew and the tanks in the streets,wasworking throughthe night to arrangefor the printing of thousandsof copiesof an "emergency"issueof Nezavisimaiagazeta, found time to worry about my wife and me. She thought that we should catch the first plane home: "It's going to be nasty in Russia now; they'll arrest all of us; I'll help in any way I can." My wife Elizabeth,in Moscow for the BBC RussianService,thought it much too interestingto leave.Two trucks stoppingimmediatelyopposite[the library building] in the dark small hours to allow armed soldiers to jump out mademe wonderwhetherit wasnot gettingtoo interestingto stay. A dozen heavy tanks in camouflagepaint, which made them seemeven more outrageousin the centerof a city, roared along the embankmenttowardthe White House. By the time I reachedTchaikovsky Street,however, it was quiet. Grim but determined"afgantsy" [Afghan War veterans]talked about their experiencesas they stood in the persistentdrizzle beside a burned-outtrolleybus.Girls were placingflowers to coverbloodstains. There were several makeshift shrines of broken planks. Just a few yards from the reconstructed barricade I noticed a wall coveredwith leaflets. One was headed"Radio Liberty Informs" and a typed page gave a dozenitems with world reactionsto the coup. Y aroslavLeontiev, the duty editor for Radio Russia that night, had compiled a fairly comprehensivechronologyof the tragic eventsfrom the flood of phonecalls received.He told me that only information confmnedby independentsourceswas included.Although an attemptwas madeby the junta to remove Radio Russiafrom the air, its frequencieswere defiantly stuck up on walls around the city and, being on medium waves,appearedto havemostlistenerson the radiosI heardaroundthe barricades.
296 lAIN ELLIOT Radio Liberty also contributedsignificantly to defeatingthe junta's attemptto impose censorship, as Gorbachev,Yeltsin, YelenaBonner, and othershave since confirmed. EveryoneI talked to, on the barricades,at the White House,or in newspaperoffices and institutes,had warm words for Radio Liberty andfor the work of our freelancecorrespondentsin particular. SergeiMarkov, a young politics professorat Moscow University, told me how he had recordedfrom a broadcast Yeltsin's first decreeopposingthe junta. Markov cycled through the rain to the local soviet at Dubnaand had the satisfactionof watching the executive committeeput Y eltsin's instructionsimmediately into effect after they hadlistenedto the recording.Markov, who is leaderof the RussianSocial DemocraticParty, spentthe long night of August 20--21 in the White House with Radio Liberty providing a steady streamof information from Russiaand abroad. On Saturday,at the memorialmeetingon ManezhSquarefor the threevictims of the coup, I could seeover the shoulderof the man in front readinghis copy of VecherniaiaMoskva. "According to Radio Liberty," it read. Yeltsin himself heardevidenceenoughof the value of Radio Liberty broadcastingin the fraught daysof the putsch,when Radio freelancerswere broadcastingdirect from the tenth floor of the White House. On August 27 he issueda decreeproviding Radio Liberty with a Moscow bureauandfull accreditationfor its correspondents in the RSFSR. Three indispensablehumanfactors for building a solid foundation for democracyin Russiawere very much in evidencein thoseexhilarating August days. There were electedrepresentativesof the people who providedthe right leadershipat the right time. Therewas a politically conscioussectionof the population-probablynot the majority, but sufficiently numerousto prevail--thatwaspreparedto standup for democratic principles despite very real dangers.And there were enoughjournalists with the initiative and courageto ensurethat the democraticpoliticians and their supporterscould communicatewith eachother quickly and effectively to organizethe defeatof the reactionary forces. Among the politicians, Yeltsin of courseplayeda decisiverole: he appearedto be the right person in the right place at the right time. Whentherewasa very real fear of snipers,he was preparedto take the risk of speakingto the crowds from the top of a tank-a risk that provedjustified, since eventhe "Vremia" television news carried the imagearoundthe countrywith at leastsomeindication of the contents
ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 297 of his inspiring "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia." I wonderedif Yeltsin too was remindedof the statueat the Finland Stationin Leningrad,with a triumphantLenin atop an armoredcar. Yeltsin epitomized the fledgling Russian democracyin a way that no other politician could. Shevardnadze, Khasbulatov,Burbulis, and severalleadingdeputies showedsimilar courageanddedicationto defeatingthe junta. On August 20, Deputy Valerii Borshchevof the Moscow City Soviet on TverskaiaStreetdescribedto me how their building, like the White House,had becomea centerof resistance,defying the tanks gathered outside.Shevardnadze hadspokento the crowdstheretoo. I met severalof the leadersof new Russianparties---somenumerically more significant than others and with a wide range of policies, but all convincedof the benefits of a multiparty system.At a press conferenceon Thursdaymorning, August 22, Nikolai Travkin of the DemocraticPartyof Russia,Viktor Aksiuchitsof the RussianChristian Democrats,SergeiMarkov of the Social Democrats,and Vladimir Filin of the RepublicanParty of Russiadebatedissuessuchas privatization, social services,and policies on national minorities in the RSFSRand ethnic Russiansin the other republics. Their views varied greatly, of course,but they agreedon the needto put their policies into practice only through the electoral processand parliamentarydebate,and all hadprovedby their actionsin the precedingdaysthat they were united in their determinationto defenddemocraticgovernment.The Kadets (Constitutional Democrats)with their green flag embossedwith a white swanwere presentat most streetdemonstrations,althoughthey told me they had only a few hundredmembers.They stand for the samepolicies that won their party strong supportamongmiddle-class votersfor the ConstituentAssemblyof 1918. Many a true word is spokenin jest, and it was widely claimedin the streetsof Moscow that since the democraticforces had failed to prepare themselvesto deal with the hard-line putsch that everyoneexpected,gratitudefor its failure was owed more to the bungling of the junta than to the competenceof the democratic leadership.Deputy Telman Gdlian joked that Dmitrii Yazov should be shown leniency becauseby threateningstudentswith military servicehe had increased their determinationto opposea military takeover.Otherspointed out that when Boris Pugo brandedas ''traitors'' the OMON officers who pledgedtheir loyalty to Yeltsin, he merelystrengthened their resolveto fight to the end in defenseof the White House.Certainly their failure
298 lAIN ELLIOT to win the obedienceof army, KGB, and MVD units at least sufficiently to remove quickly the RSFSRleadership;their failure to cut telephonecommunications,jam radio broadcasts,andsuppressthe free press;their completeinability to inspire either trust or terror-1"ather than contempt-inthe broadmasseswho watchedtheir feeble television performancesall meant that they deservedto lose every bit as much as the RSFSRleadershipearnedits victory. Without doubt the strongline takenby PresidentBush,PrimeMinister JohnMajor, Chancellor Kohl, and other Westernleadersheartenedthe democratsand further demoralizedthejunta. All of this becameknown to thosewho mannedthe barricadesonly thanks to the democraticmedia. In addition to the ones mentioned above,I saw many "emergency"issuesof the democraticnewspapers pastedon walls and even on tanks; they certainly reachedthe troops and had the desiredeffect. AleksandrKabakov, politicalcommentator of Moskovskienovosti and author of "The Defector," a screenplay predicting the disintegrationof the USSR and armed clashesin the Moscowstreets,wastired andunshavenbut triumphantafterthe defeat of the putsch.He told me that the film of "The Defector" had received an unplannedpremiereimmediatelyafter Sobchak'sdefiant speechon Leningrad television. He also passedon four issuesof the "emergency" version of Moskovskienovosti (A3-size photocopy)that had been distributed at the height of the crisis. Issue no. 3 included an appealby the indomitable and ubiquitous Yelena Bonner for half a million Muscovitesto demonstratetheir supportfor the Russianparliament ''to showthat we are worthy of the title of citizensof the capital andof the state,ratherthanjust a crowd, interestedonly in sausage." Most of the newspapersthat appearedwith the permissionof the junta were opposedby someof their staff. In addition to the "putschist" Moskovskaiapravda, there was an "illegal" Moskovskaiapravda appearingas an A4-size leaflet, appealingto readersto ignore the normal-size"legal" issue. Moskovskiikomsomoletsmanagedto produce five "emergency" issues in the form of A3-size photocopies. Rossiia, the White House-basednewspaperof the presidium of the RSFSR SupremeSoviet, produceda seriesof A3-size leaflet issues with appealsto passthemon andreproducethem as much as possible. This activity was complementedby the radio stations ineffectively bannedby the junta: Radio Russia,Moscow Echo, and Radio 3-Anna, which gave its air waves to Radio RussiacorrespondentsLiubimov
ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 299 and Politkovskii, broadcastingfrom inside the White House. Its frequenciescouldbe seenpostedon the walls of Moscowstreets. The Westernradio stationsbroadcastingin Russianand other languagesof the former USSR spreadthis information further. Even Mikhail Gorbachev,isolatedin the Crimea,was able to follow events in Moscow and elsewherethanks, as he acknowledged,to the BBC, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America. It was gratifying to see so many tributes in the liberal Russianpressto the work of the international broadcasters.A randomsurveyof the newspapersI managedto buy, beg, or scrimmagefor in the courseof that week found information attributedto Radio Liberty in VechemiaiaMoskva (August 22), Literatumaia gazeta (August 21), and Moskovskienovosti (August 24)-whereAleksandrKabakovwrote of how he had listenedto Andrei Babitskii and Mikhail Sokolov reporting for Radio Liberty from the White House. Rossiiskaiagazeta(August 23) wrote that on the morning of August 21 the barricadesdamagedby the APC attacks were being restoredwhen, "to relieve the pickets who had lived through those heavy hours, Muscovitesbeganto arrive on the flrst metro trains, having spent the night at their receivers,listening on RadioLiberty to informationaboutthe attackthathadbegun." But for me as an observerof theseevents,the lasting impressionis of the youth of the majority of thosewho defendeddemocracyon the barricadesanddistributedleaflets,andof their convictionthat they had no alternative. As Yeltsin said in his victory speechat the rally on August 22: "It has againbeenshownhow greatare the powersof the people.The political courseof Russia,and the honor and virtue of its highestbodiesof authority, its leadership,were defendedby unarmed, peaceful citizens. It is symbolic that among those who becamethe defenseof the Constitution,the law, and humanworth, there were a great many young people. This meansthat the future courseof this reform is ensured." Many Westernspecialistsdismissedthe dissidentsof the Brezhnev era as too small in numberto have any significant impact on political reform. But the self-sacrificeof thosefew courageousindividualswho in the 1960s and 1970s placed their civic duty and the defenseof human rights above their own well-being was not wasted.Through samizdatand Western radio broadcasts,their example reachedthe post-1968generation, and it was notlost. On Saturdayevening Elizabeth and I visited Misha and Flara
300 lAIN ELliOT Litvinov, parentsof Pavel Litvinov, one of the few who demonstrated for someminuteson Red Squareagainstthe invasionof Czechoslovakia beforebeing arrested.Among thosesqueezedinto their hospitable kitchen to watch the amazing sceneson Russian television were Kronid Liubarskii and his wife, LarissaBogoraz,who hadplayedtheir part in the eventsof that week in a worthy culminationof their distinguishedlifetime work in defenseof humanrights. Onecould not avoid the conviction that it was they and their small circle that had planted the seedsthat flowered this August in Moscow. I rememberedLev Timofeev, Gleb Yakunin, Mstislav Rostropovichat the White House, but it was the words of Yelena Bonner among the representativesof that tiny band of dissidentsthat came to mind. When she spoke on August20 shecalled onMuscovitesno longerto act like bydlo (cattle) but, avoiding bloodshed,to standfor a free, democraticRussiaagainst the junta: "They cannot stand over us. We are above them, we are betterthanthey, morehonest,andwe aremany!"
INTERVIEW WITH SERGEIMEDVEDEV 2 Getting the News on "Vremia" SergeiMedvedevwasajournalistforthe centraltelevisionnews program "Vremia" whenthe coupbegan.His film report, shownon "Vremia" on Monday,August19, gavenationalcoverageto the resistancemovementmobilizedby Yeltsinagainstthejunta.From Medvedev'sreport, millions ofSovietcitizenslearnedfor thefirst time about Yeltsin's"Appealto the CitizensofRussia," andtheysawfilm clips ofYeltsinstandingcourageouslyatop a tank. Thereport also includedpicturesofthe constructionofbarricadesaroundthe White House.AlthoughMedvedevwasdismissedfrom hisjob after the airing ofhis report, he wasreinstatedon Wednesday,August21, and on Thursdayhe becamethe anchormanfor "Vremia. " He was interviewedby Bill Keller, MoscowBureauChieffor theNew York 25, 1991. Times,on September Medvedev:My wife learnedfrom the radio that a coup had taken place. Then we turnedon the television, and our program"Morning," which starts at 6:30 A.M., was not on. Announcerswere sitting there and reading the statementsof the GKChP. Of coursewe were very upset.I was particularly upset,becauseon that day I was supposedto anchorthe program"Vremia." By nine o'clock I was at work. All the bossesof "Vremia" were alreadysitting in their places.Our chief editor, Olvar Kakuchaia,said they got him up at two in the morning. They gaveKravchenko·almost no chanceto sleep;they had found him at home. He called our chief editor. Then,in the middle of the night,justasit was gettingon toward *Leonid Kravchenko was head of USSR Gosteleradio,later renamedState Companyfor TelevisionandRadioBroadcasting. 301
302 SERGEI MEDVEDEV dawn, they beganto surroundthe building with military vehiclesand paratroopers,judging by their clothing. All of this was visible from the windows of the building. There was almost nothing being broadcast. Someprogramswere closed,and others,like our newsprogram,were given a packetof documentsthat hadbeenadoptedby the putschists. Our main sourceof information onTV was CNN. [ ...] At around 11:00 A.M.-I'm afraid to say precisely, maybe it was 11:40 A.M.-I saw on CNN that tanks had enteredMoscow. But I did not seetankswhen I was going aroundthe city. I was especiallyon the lookout in the morning, but didn't seeanything. There was no one on the streets,no specialbrigadesof police. Moscowwasquiet. When the tanks arrived, my colleaguesand I beganto count them. We countedforty. We understoodthat this was very seriousbusiness. The tanks went through the center of Moscow. They came down Kalinin Prospect.Then CNN began to show the first spontaneous meetings. We tried to go out on the street. But it turned out that, startingthat morning,taking camerasout for filming wascontrolled. of the StateEmergencyCommittee,KGB employRepresentatives ees, sat at Gosteleradio.They forbade anyoneto leave. Then, in the middle of the day it becamepossibleto leaveto film with a permission signedby the chief editor-no one lower thanthat, not a deputy, no one but the chief editor. The chief editor signedsuch a statementfor me. It was interesting that no one else was making such requests. Everyonesatin the studio.Everyonesatin place.[ ...] Kakuchaiasignedthe statementfor me to go film, saying,"Be very careful.You shouldn'tgo out becauseof the tanks." I said: "All the same,we'll go." We left. We went to the otherbuilding becausethe camerasand the operatorsare there.It's in the otherdirection, acrossthe street.At first they wouldn't let us in one entrance;we got in through anotherone. We were lucky to carry out a camera,andwe went out throughthe exit without the signatureof the KGB chief who was sitting with us in the building. I think we managedto do this becausetherewas someconfusion there about who had allowed us to pass.They weren'tsure what kind of signatureswere needed.Theseparatroopersdidn't know whose signaturewasvalid andwhosewas not. Thereforewe left quietly, got in the car, and drove off. First, we went to Manezh Square.On Manezh Square,a meeting had already ended,but meetingskept occurring spontaneously,one after another.
GEITING THE NEWS ON "VREMIA" 303 Severalrows of trolleybuseswere at the entrances.We did manageto get to the square.Police were all around.I said, we are news people, from television, and we are authorizedby somekind of authority-I didn't say by whom-to film everything.The police were busy with the trolleybuses,trying to pull them away with tow trucks. And when they hadcleareda passage,we managedto get throughit. We passedthrough three or four cordons and enteredManezh Square.Military vehicleswere alreadythere.Peoplesat on the armor. We recordedall this, talked with people. We saw that there was no particulai confrontationbetweenthe peopleand the army. They were talking with eachother. Then the squarebeganto empty out, and it was explainedthat for morethanan hourpeoplehadbeengoing to the White House. [Medvedevsaysthat he then decidedto go to the White Housewith his film crew.] We drove in the car almostto the first barricades.When I saw the barricades,honestly speaking,I rejoiced, becauseI understoodthat therewould be resistance,not just in words, as often happensin Moscow-noise,shouting,but thingsdon't go further thanthat. We beganto film all of this. We beganto film meetingswith people who were building the barricades,then how the leaflets were being thrown out of the building; oratorswere speaking.We were there for quite a long time. It was alreadyalmost8:00 P.M. whenwe returnedto the studio. We returned,and I was 100 percentconvincedthat in the studio nobody had any needfor what we had filmed. And unexpectedly, the first deputy, Valentin Lazutkin, deputyto Kravchenko,said, "Get the materialreadyaboutwhat is going on today in Moscow." We sat down very quickly and beganto edit. He said: "Later I'll look to seewhatyou have." About five minutes before 9:00 P.M., as the information program was about to begin, we didn't have anything ready. At that time, he enteredandsaid,"Let's havea look." I said: "Valentin Valentinovich, we're not ready yet. We've only donehalf of it. We can showyou what we have,but without sound."I readto him from the script. Therewasno soundyet. We showed him the first part of our report. There was the big statementfrom Yeltsin, with an appealto the people.This appealwas about four minuteslong. Lazutkin looked at all this and said: "What comesnext?"
304 SERGEIMEDVEDEV I said: "Well, we'll showthe barricadesandthe peoplethere." He said: "You must shorten Yeltsin." He didn't say take it out completely, but it had to be shortenedto the minimum. Out of four minutes,maybeforty secondswereleft, maybea minute. I said: ''Therestof what [Y eltsin] saidI will try to put in my script." He said: "Okay." After this I ran to the editing room. We finished the report, with interviews,with the barricades.In generaleverythingwasthere. Then, when the report was broadcast,it was as though the ceiling crashedin on my head. All the telephonesbeganto explode. Yurii Prokofiev, the Secretaryof the Moscow Party Committee,phoned. AleksandrDzasokhovphoned-he'sa Central CommitteeSecretary. Boris Pugo phoned.I don't rememberwho else for sure, becauseI didn't talk with them. Lazutkin talked with them. Kravchenkophoned -Lazutkin later told me aboutthis-Kravchenkophonedandsaidthis report was a direct appealto cometo the barricades;it was instigating material. But judging by everything,he was repeatingsomeoneelse's words, becauseLazutkin said it appeared[Kravchenko] had not seen the material. I didn't wait around to see how everything would come out, although before I left, one of the deputy editors beganto shout at me: "How could you deceiveus? You gave an interview to peoplein the opposition."He blamedme for a phraseat the endof the report: "If we have the chance,we will give you additional information later about what is happeningin Moscow." Everyoneblamedme for this phrase. Later, I learnedthat manywho defendedthe White Housefound out whereto go and what to do preciselyfrom this report.But at that time, I didn't know any of this. I just went home.I didn't want to wait. I just slammedthe door and went home to my wife and child. We put our daughterto bed,andI saidto my wife: "Let's go to the White House." She said: "It's terrible to leavethe child." She was sleepingon the balcony. Usually she sleepsvery soundly, so we put her to bed and left. We left the car at the Hotel Ukraina [acrossfrom the White House], and we were going along, and the first personI saw was my friend Paul Hofheinz from Fortunemagazine,who shouldhavebeenin Italy on vacation.We greetedeachother.We went aroundtogether. Peoplecameup andcongratulatedme, slappedme on the shoulders. I understoodthatthey would protectme. I felt reassured.
GEITING THE NEWS ON "VREMIA" 305 The next morning,a big meetingtook placeof the leadersof television, wherethey considered,amongotherthings,the questionof what to do with me. Kravchenkoorderedour chiefeditorto demoteme from the position of commentatorto senior editor. In monetaryterms, the salaryis half as much.And I wasdeprivedof the right to appearon the air. Thenthe chiefeditor saidto me, "Listen, Seryozha,you haveto go hide somewhere,becauseI don'tknow what will happennext. Go take a vacationimmediately." I didn't say anything againstit. I got my papersall in order for a vacationleave.But the next day I took a cameraandwe went out again to film. I don't know why they gave it to us. It was simply a coincidence,andwe wentto the White Houseagainandshoteverything. But of coursewhenwe returned,they saidto me, "You're still here? Surelyyou can'tmakea report." The next day, we went againto the White House,this time inside the building. We talkedwith manypeople,met manyfriends.Meetings were going on. It was alreadyclearthat eventswere developingin the otherdirectionnow. On August 22, accordingto the schedule,I should have beenthe anchor on "Vremia." Although I was on vacation, there was still a schedule.I phonedLazutkin at home and asked,"Am I working, or not?" He said,"What? You don't know that I tore up Kravchenko'sorder in front of your bosses?" I said,"CanI comeandanchor'Vremia'?" He said,"Yes, you can." I arrived at the office, took what I had filmed, which had not been broadcast,edited it and put it on the air on the 22nd. It was very emotional.It wasthe first "free" programsincethe 19th. Keller: Why didn't the putschistsgettougher? Medvedev:Today,there are very many versionsaboutthis. Things really wereunclearfor us, at least.We waitedall the time for someone to cometo the office and explain what was to be broadcastand what was not. But no one came,althoughthey closedsomeof the newspapers.But I don't think they were incompetent,becauseamongthe top leaderswas Kriuchkov. His office knows what to do. So it could not havebeenthe incompetence.I think that theremight be two versions. The first is that they did not feel confidencein themselves.They tried
306 SERGEIMEDVEDEV [to carry out the COUp] more or less in a democraticway, to createa facadeof democracy. This explanationis plausiblebecausethe next day Prokofiev called again aboutmy report and said "It was nothing terrible." No one understoodthe meaningof his phonecall. We objectively showedwhat was going on in Moscow. I think this might be the explanationfor the fact thatthey didn't apply censorship. Keller: Maybe they were used to the fact that the leaders of Gosteleradiowerealwaysobedient. Medvedev: Yes, never before had there been a situation where someonegave a commandand TV did not fulfill it. I don't remember sucha caseever.At leastnot consciously. Keller: Did you feel that among the leadersat Gosteleradiothere wasa wish to get correctinformationon the air? Medvedev:Yes, therewas sucha desire,and therewas uncertainty, this I observed.Somekind of paralysisaffectedpeople.Therewere all kinds of reactionsfrom different people-fear,uncertainty,readiness to fight back. Keller: After the putsch,do you feel the atmospherehere is really free? Medvedev:It's a very complicatedsituation,becausea new leadership, Yegor Yakovlev, has arrived. Eduard Sagalaev·is back. Obviously so far there is no worry. "Give people the chanceto work. Please.Give them what they need." But now there is a struggle of those who worked here earlier--for twenty, twenty-five years-with thosewho havejust arrived, becausethey feel that the new leadership would like to get rid of them. This feeling of concernaboutone'sfate, one'ssituationat work, hasunited people.This is unusualfor any TV operation,becausethere'salwayslots of jealousy. Keller: Would you comparethe psychologyof the older and younger generations? Medvedev:I think the main difference is that the veterans----those who have worked here a long time-they feel an internal censor.It *EduardSagalaevran "Vremia" duringthe heydayof perestroika.
GETTING THE NEWS ON "VREMIA" 307 interferes in what they say and show, that which might have been done.Somethinginsidejust says"no, that won't fly," evenifhe wants to do it. All the same,it won't work out. I speakthis way becauseI also work in this system.I beganunderBrezhnev.I worked for seven yearsin radio, andI, too, havethis feeling. I was born in the former city of Konigsberg [now Kaliningrad], which in 1946went from EastPrussiato Russia,to the SovietUnion. I was born there in 1958. My parentswent there from Leningradafter they graduated.My mother is a teacher.My father used to work in television; he was director of a TV studio, then he becamethe chairman of the television and radio committeeof Kaliningrad. Now he's retired. I graduatedfrom Moscow StateUniversity, the journalismfaculty. After graduationin 1981,I worked at Gosteleradio.Until 1987 I worked on radio, and since 1987 on "Vremia." I worked, for a few monthsonly, on a newspaperin Kaliningrad. I love radio and television a lot. Keller: Was therea periodduring the coup whenyou thoughtit was the endof freedom? Medvedev:There was a momentin the morning, when I heardthe radio andturnedon the TV. But the further eventsdeveloped,the more certainI becamethat it would not last long, especiallywhen I learned that a portion of troops had gone over to the side of Yeltsin and machinesand tanks that supportedYeltsin had moved in aroundthe White House.Then I was absolutelyconvincedthat it would be really hardfor the putschists,andthey would not be victorious.
ANN COOPER 3 The Foreign Press and the Coup Ann Cooperreportedfrom Moscowfor NationalPublic Radiofrom 1986through 1991. "Boy, haveI got badnews,"announcedmy husband,Bill Keller, when I answeredhis phonecall from Moscow. It was early morning, August 19, 1991,andI wasstill in my room at the Hotel Lietuva in Vilnius. For Moscow correspondents,August was normally a welcome respite from the crushof political news.Kremlin leaderswent off to their Black Seabeachresorts,andforeign correspondents could safely leave for their own vacations---orfor businesstrips, like the one I was on to gather material for a retrospectivepiece about Lithuania's independencecampaign. Bill quickly describedthe announcementof Gorbachev'sphony illness and the membershipof the ominous State of Emergency Committee. "This is not a joke," he concluded,knowing that I might needa little convincing after living through several years of rumors and false alarmsaboutconservativeplots to oustMikhail Gorbachev. We talked briefly aboutthe crudenessof the scheme.The goal was obvious: Gennadii Yanaev and his fellow thugs, relics of the Soviet past, wantedto reversethe breathtakingtransformationsof the Gorbachevera and preservetheir own cozy world of power. Their use of the absurd"Gorbachevis sick" story, andtheir appealsto a false Soviet patriotism,indicatedhow thoroughlyout of touch they were. The lies of the pastwereno longercalmly acceptedby an obedientsociety;indeed,it seemedto us that the putchisty,as the coup plotterscameto be known in Russian,would needan unthinkableamountof force to imposetheir will on a public now accustomedto speakingits own mind. 308
THE FOREIGN PRESS 309 Lithuania had already shown us that tanks and bullets were not alwaysenoughto tramplea buddingdemocracy.Sevenmonthsearlier, Bill and I had watchedin horror as the Soviet military shot its way through a peacefulcrowd of unarmedprotestersto seizethe Vilnius televisiontower. The military easily grabbedcontrol of the tower and the republic's main broadcastingstudios, but in the wake of the attacks,more protestersthan everpouredinto the streets.Lithuaniawas not vanquished.The Januaryviolencein Vilnius had struckmany as a dressrehearsalfor a granderscheme.No more dressrehearsalsnow. This wasthe real thing. I ran down the hall to tell my National Public Radio colleague,Ben Roe, and we set to work, beggingfor new planetickets back to Moscow, cancelingour interviews and phoning friends in Vilnius, where the newswasjust beginningto spread.Our friend Gintaspickedus up right away,andwe spedoff towardthe Lithuanianparliamentbuilding, strongholdof the republic's democraticallyelectedgovernment.The routeto parliamentwas alreadylittered with metal beamsandconcrete blocks designedto thwart tanks; after January,the Lithuanians had becomemasterbuildersof the instantbarricade. Inside the parliament building I felt as though I was wandering through a rerun of January.Local militia loyal to Lithuania's proindependence governmentjammedinto a lobby area,countingout bullets for their rifles. Legislative workers rushedout of the building carrying electronic equipment-nodoubt for storage in safer hideaways.Parliamentarians andjournalistsswappedscrapsof information in the hallways.Rita Dapkus,the indefatigableLithuanian-American who ran the parliamentpressoffice, settledin for the expectedsiege with a wry smile. "At least this time we've got company,"she said, noting that Moscow, and not Vilnius, appearedto be the fIrst targetof theputschists. Later, on the way to the Vilnius airport, Gintasaskedshyly whether, whenthe dustsettleda bit, I could checkthe statusof his applicationto emigrateto the United States.Gintas actually had a good chanceof getting out of the Soviet Union, becausehis wife's family lived in California. The coup gave his applicationa new urgency,and his requestfor help broughtme close totears.How manypeoplelike Gintas hadwe met-peoplewho flourishedwhengiven new freedomto speak andwrite, to travel abroad,to createprivatebusinesses, to form political parties or publish anti-Communistnewspapers.At a minimum, a
310 ANN COOPER return to dictatorship would reversetheir achievementsand destroy their dreams.It was these personalanxieties,rather than the larger threat to internationalorder, that preoccupiedme in the ftrst hours of the coup. What, for example,might becomeof our loyal driver Volodia, who picked me up at the airport when I landed in Moscow early Monday afternoon?As usual,Volodia wasburstingwith news-thelatestradio announcements, how manytanks he had countedon his way out of the city. I wonderedhow the new regimemight rewardVolodia'senthusiastic assistanceto a foreign journalist. Two of the putschists,Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov and KGB chief Vladimir Kriuchkov, had madehystericalanti-Westernstatementsin recentmonths,and a new round of antiforeignerpropagandaseemedcertainif they succeededin bringingthe countryundertheir control. I saw the fIrSt tanks shortly after Volodia turned onto Leningrad Highway. We were still in Moscow's suburbs,and the convoys we passedwere parked along the roadside,apparentlyawaiting further orders.Most of the soldierswho loungedatop the armor appearedto be from CentralAsia, a worrisomesign becausecentralAsiansseemed far more likely than Slavic soldiersto obeyany ordersaimedat subduing Russiancivilians. Later, though,I sawthat mosttroopsdeployedin Moscow-particularly around Manezh Square-wereSlavic. They looked like raw recruits, uncertain what they were doing there and extremely uncomfortablewhen civilians caught their eye and asked point blank: "You wouldn't shootat us,would you?" The putschistshad called a pressconferencefor 5:00 P.M. Monday. When I arrived at the Foreign Ministry's presscenterat 4:00 P.M., it wasbedlam.For somereason,guardsat the door were favoring foreign correspondents,and I managedto ftght my way into the building in time to getthroughthe securitycheckandftnd a seat. As I waited for the beginningof this surrealevent,I wonderedhow one shouldaddressquestionsto the leadersof a coup. Shouldthey be simpleand straightforward?Carroll Bogertof Newsweek apparently thought so. She was recognizedftrst and asked: "Whereis Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev?What is he sick with?" ____Qr should one load the questionwith all the contemptone felt for the menon the stage? "Bearing in mind the wording of your communique,did you askfor advice from GeneralPinochet?"demandedan Italian correspondent.
THE FOREIGN PRESS 311 His impudencewon a round of applausefrom his colleagues,but no satisfactoryresponsefrom the putschists. In the end, it was a journalist from the scrappiestof the new Soviet newspaperswho found what struckme aspreciselythe right balanceof contempt and courage,delivered in a voice with only the thinnest veneerof civility: "Could you pleasesay whether or not you understandthat last night you carriedout a coup d'etat?"askedtwenty-fouryear-oldTatianaMalkina of Nezavisimaiagazeta. Malkina's impertinencedid more than confront the putschistswith the "coup" label. It was a warning of sorts, from an entire generation that cameof age in the perestroikayears,a generationthat had never known the fears and subservienceof its parentsand was not about to meekly surrenderits future to a bunchof old Communistfossils. It was an ominoussign for the putschists. Our apartmentwas completepandemoniumthat night. Irina, our belovedteacherandtranslator,monitoredradio andTV while I juggled the constantjangle of phone calls-from editors in Washingtonand from Russianfriends andacquaintances in Perm,Sverdlovsk,Izhevsk, andotherprovincial cities Bill or I hadvisited. "This is Igor from Izhevsk.Do you rememberme?" "Yes," I lied. "We haveno informationhere.Canyou tell me what'shappeningin Moscow?" Of courseI could, becauseeven though I only later remembered precisely who Igor was, I was certain he had helped me generously when I was in Izhevsk.Provincialhospitalitywas oneof the greatjoys of travel in the Soviet Union; it more than madeup for the nightmare of Aeroflot flights andthe discomfortsof provincial hotels. Irina and I took turns fielding thesecalls, swappingour newsabout Boris Yeltsin's defiant standat the Russianparliamentfor information aboutthe scenein the provinces.It seemedthat outsideof Moscowand Leningrad there were no protestsin Russia, but neither were there tanks. And so far, the putsch'sinformation blackouthad succeededin censoringY eltsin's protests. That was aboutto change,though.At 9:00 P.M., "Vremia," the main televisionnewsprogram,openedwith yet anotherreadingof the statementsand decreesof the GKChP, the country'sostensiblenew rulers. And then, suddenly,amazingly,therewas Boris Yeltsin's burly figure standingon an unfriendlytank outsidehis parliamentbuilding, spitting
312 ANN COOPER out an eloquent denunciationof the coup. Yeltsin's audaciousact would later becomethe most stirring symbol of resistanceto the coup. Now, inexplicably, the putsch-controlledairwaveswere transmitting this symbol to the entire country, along with a daring narration by SergeiMedvedev,a youngreporterfor centraltelevision. Medvedevinfonned his viewers about Yeltsin's call for a nationwide strike. When Yeltsin's image faded, there was Medvedevat the barricadesaround the RussianWhite House, describing the barrierbuilding and interviewing a seriesof calmly determinedMuscovites who hadcometo defendthe bUilding. Medvedev'sreport sentan electrifying messagearoundthe country: althoughthe putschistshad deployedtankson the perimeterof central TV headquarters, they were not in full control of what wentout on the air. Psychologically,that bit of information was as important to the resistanceaswasthe powerful imageof its leader,Boris Yeltsin. After "Vremia," we had fewer callers from the provinces. Now peopleknew; Y eltsin had drawn his line andurgedthe public to stand behindhim. What would the peopledo? On Tuesdaymorning, as we drove around Moscow, it seemedat fIrst that the peoplewould acquiesceratherthan rebel. The city looked dismayingly nonnal. Shopswere open, offices functioned, factories produced.When I stoppedpeople on the streets,most said they opposed the coup, but few were ready to respondto Yeltsin's strike appeal. "We'll seehow thingsdevelopfurther," onewomantold me. I askedwhat developmentsshe was waiting for. She said she and her coworkerssimply hadn't yet gotten aroundto talking about Yeltsin'sappeal. Whenmight they talk aboutit, I asked."After lunch," shesaid,looking like shehopedI would go away. I expressedamazementthat morethan twenty-fourhoursafter it began,shefelt no senseof urgencyabout the coup--eventhough she claimedto sympathizewith Yeltsin. Nothing strangeabout it, said the woman, explaining that the constructionoffIce wheresheworkedwas subordinateto the nationalgovernment. "What difference does that make?" I asked, mystifIed by what seemedto me a non sequitur.Irina guessedthat the womanworked in a secret,defense-related office andwas simply unableto copewith the notion of questioninganyonein authority--evenmen who had illegally seizedpower.
THE FOREIGN PRESS 313 By early Tuesdaymorning all routes to the RussianWhite House were mazesof barricades.Thesemade strong symbolsof resistance, but they were rather pitiful defensesagainsta possibletank assault. The buses,cars,bricks, and metal strewn acrossthe roadwayswould prove no more effective than the barricadesof Vilnius or Tiananmen Square,shouldthe military decideto attack. The closerwe got to the White House,though,the morebuoyantthe mood became.Severalarmoredvehicles had come over to Yeltsin's side during the night. Unlike the troops on guard a couple of miles away, down by the Kremlin, the soldiers on theserebel tanks were smiling and chattingwith demonstrators.They werehappyto talk with a reporter. "The peopleelectedBoris Yeltsin, andthe army is with the people," saidoneparatrooperwhenI askedwhy his unit hadswitchedloyalties. Othersoldiersrespondedwith similar slogans.It was nice rhetoric, but no one was willing to tell me the details of how the group decidedto defectto Yeltsin. Even so, the paratrooper'sexplanationoffered a reminder of the legitimacy Yeltsin had attainedwhen Russianvoters electedhim as their Presidenttwo months earlier. Russianshad never before been given the chanceto choosea leaderdemocratically.Yeltsin's decisive mandatenow put him on the moral high groundas he battleda gangof menwith no legitimateclaim on power. The coup was one of life's rare momentsof absoluteclarity, when many are called upon to choosesides, and there is no gray area for retreat.As I pickedthroughthe campfiresanddebrisaroundthe White House early Tuesdaymorning, it seemedto me that very few had chosenYeltsin's side; in a city of nine million, only a few thousand remainedafter Monday'sall-night vigil. Even later that day, when the few thousandgrew to a rally of tens of thousands,the crowd looked puny comparedwith the unbelievablemassesI had seenat anti-Soviet rallies in the Baltic republics. "It's not enoughpeople,"I thought asI watchedthe hourly expansionsandcontractionsof the White Housecrowd. But what constituted "enough"?A military attacklaunchedwhenthe crowd haddwindledto only a few thousandcould still easily becomea massacre.Perhapsit wasthis nightmarishvision thatkept the tanksaway. NPR'stwo weekdaynewsprogramsare on the air nine hoursa day, and during a fast-breakingeventlike the coup, a correspondenthasto
314 ANN COOPER be reachableby phonethroughoutthat broadcasttime. In Moscowthat meant sitting tight by the telephone,at home. This was enormously frustratingwhen I worked alone,as I usually did. But with Ben Roe in town, one of us could be on the streets,calling in information, while the otherpulled phoneduty. Our broadcastlink was an ordinary phoneline like thoseavailable to Soviet citizens. Internationalcalls had to be bookedin advance-perhapsone or two daysahead,to get throughto America. For several months,though, I had taken advantageof a little-known fluke in the phone systemthat allowed me to bypassSoviet operatorsaltogether. Although I could not direct dial to America from my phone,I could dial a call to Finland. Thus, I could easily reach the AT&T "USA Direct" number in Finland and immediately be connectedwith any telephonein the United States. Now I worried that the putschistsmight shut down our only viable connectionto NPR. Ironically, I should have worried about AT&T instead.Ma Bell apparentlywas not awareof its illicit Moscow-to-Finland traffic until the coup causeda hugejump in its use.By September the Finlandroute wasblocked--apparentlyat AT&T's request,though no AT&T operatorcould evergive me a plausibleexplanationfor this decision. Fortunatelythe phonesneverwent down during the coup itself. In fact, if the putschistsdid have any kind of blueprint for curtailing the they nevercarriedit out. Our reports work of foreign correspondents, were not blocked,and we had considerableaccessto information---at leastaboutthe resistance. The hardpart, of course,was reportingon the putschiststhemselves, who did not appearagain in public after the Monday night press conference.Their whereaboutsand intentionsbecamethe subjectof dozensof rumors over the next two days. But the only authoritative information about them came from TASS, the governmentnews agencywhosebosseshad put up little resistanceto the dictatesof the coupleaders. TASS's main rival was the independentnews service Interfax, which managedto keepfunctioning throughoutthe coup, sendingfact and rumor severaltimes a day to its fax clients. Interfax had a nationwide networkof aggressivereporters;Westernreportersconsideredits reports uneven, but indispensable.During the coup, two of Gorbachev'smore moderateaidesusedInterfax to issue a statementde-
THE FOREIGN PRESS 315 mandingthe withdrawal of tanks and insistingthat the Presidentwas not sick at all. The mostpoignantInterfax reportwas a rambling statement from former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze,who monthsearlierhad stunnedthe world with his resignationand chilling predictionof an impendingcoup. "I am awarethat this may be a cry in the dark," beganShevardnadze,in his Interfax appealfor peacefulresistance."I would like you to interpretmy messagecorrectly. May it not be regardedas a plea of despair.It is first and foremostan expressionof hopeand confidence in this country." Fax machineswere crucial to Yeltsin's strategyfor challengingthe coup leaders.Using his authority as RussianPresident,he issueda seriesof decrees,essentiallytaking control of the RussianRepUblic. Yeltsin aidestransmittedthesedecreesby fax to newspapersall over the country. A couple of weekslater, in the southernRussiancity of Krasnodar,I could seethe impactthis hadhadin the provinces.During the coup, with other information sourcessilenced,Krasnodar'slocal youth newspaperran all of Yeltsin's decreesverbatim; as a result, readersmanyhundredsof miles from Moscowhadthe impressionof a Presidentbusygrabbingcontrol from the coupleaders. Krasnodar'sCommunistPartypaperdid not run Yeltsin's decrees-only the bulletins approvedby the putschistsandput out by TASS; An editor at the Communistpapergaveme this absurdexplanation:while he did receivethe Yeltsin faxes, he did not know whetherthey were authentic,so he ran TASS instead.Little wonderthat the Yeltsin-appointedreformerswho took over in post-coupKrasnodarwere trying to confiscatethe Partypaperandall of its property. The putschistshad betterluck controlling the electronicmedia, although there was an important exceptionin Moscow. Moscow Echo was a tiny independentstationthat hadkept Muscoviteswell informed during the Januarysiege in Lithuania, when most other media were muzzled.Severaltimes during the August coup securitythugs pulled the plug on Moscow Echo, only to have it reappeara few hours later from someother clandestinesite. The cat and mousegamegave the Muscovitesa morale boosteverytime the stationcamebackon the air. The reporting,though,turnedout to be lessthanreliable. On Tuesdaynight, with Ben on the streetsfor us at the White House,Irina andI hadMoscowEchotunedin during the singleviolent clashof the coup. A breathlessreportercameon the air, describinga
316 ANN COOPER line of tanks, lots of shooting and a death toll of aroundten. A few minutes later, Moscow Echo's transmissionswent dead in mid-sentence. And a few minutesafter that I had to be on the air with NPR, giving a live updateof what was going on. Needlessto say, my report was full of gloom. Only a bit later, whenBen managedto call me, did I realizethat therewas no tank assaulton the White House.The clashes that did occurwere a few blocks away. Fortunately,Ben'seyewitness descriptionreplacedmy misleadingreport when the "All Things Considered"broadcastwasrepeatedthat night. By WednesdaymorningVolodia hadbecomean expertnavigatorof the White House barricades,which extendedfor blocks beyond the actual Russianparliamentbuilding. After picking up Irina and me, he maneuveredthroughseeminglyimpassableroutes,depositingus atthe Hotel Ukraina acrossthe river from the White House.Ben and some other reportershad managedto grab an hour or two of sleep at the Hotel Ukraina, and Irina and I brought them cookiesand soft drinks for breakfast.Thesewere the non-nutritional,high-energymainstayof my diet during much of my five frantic years covering the Soviet Union. After yet anothercookie breakfastI wadedthrough the crowds to the emergencysessionof the Russianparliamentcalledby Yeltsin. In the lobby I mingled with parliamentariansand journalists."We have won," saida smiling Lev Timofeev, a gentlewriter who spentyearsin prison for the intellectual honestyof his essayson Soviet economics. Others told me essentially the same thing-that, having made it througha crucial night with no attack,it now appearedthe military was in rebellionandwould not comeafterYeltsin. I remainedunconvincedas I went into the parliamentarychamber. Before the sessiongot under way someonehad a seizure;the man's desperategaspsseemedto me a horrible metaphorfor Russia'sstruggle againstthe putschists. Russia'stop leaderstook the stage-Yeltsin,Prime Minister Ivan Silaev, vice presidentAleksandrRutskoi, andthe parliamentarychairman RuslanKhasbulatov.Thesefour menpresentedan incredibleprofile in couragethroughoutthe coup; it remainsincomprehensibleto me that their alliance collapsedsoon afterward--thatRutskoi and Khasbulatovlater becamethe bitterestofY eltsin's enemies. After the dramaticspeechesin parliamentI rushedhometo file for "Morning Edition." On the GardenRing RoadI noticedthat the tanks
THE FOREIGN PRESS 317 parked outside the Foreign Ministry press center had disappeared. What could it mean?The presscenter was hardly a major strategic target, yet it was one of the few buildings where tanks had beenstationed. I neededto find out what was happeningat Red Square,but traffic in central Moscow made it impossible to go check and still make my Morning Edition deadline. Volodia dropped me at home, thendashedoff with Ben to inspectRed Square. Unlike most of my colleagues,who lived in foreigners'compounds, I renteda tiny Soviet apartment.An elderly neighborgot on the elevator with me, sortingthroughher mail. "Our newspapersare very sadtoday," she told me. "Everything is very sadtoday." "Maybe it will all turn out all right," I said, not stoppingto explain why I felt a suddenburstof optimism. Half an hour or so later my optimism was confirmed.Ben calledto say that he and Volodia arrived in time to witnessthe paradeof tanks leaving Red Square. Soon after that I went on NPR with the first concretenewsindicatingthe coupwasending. The rest of the day was a wild paradeof rumors. Someputschists had committedsuicide.No, they all boardeda planeto seekasylumin CentralAsia. No, they were drunk in the Kremlin. No, they had been arrested.No, they were headeddown to see Gorbachev,to beg his forgiveness.... As the hostsof NPR badgeredus for confirmation of eachstory, I recall finally going on one broadcast,running through every rumor I had heardin the pastcoupleof hours,and endingby advisingthe host to ''takeyour pick." "Who's in control, who's running thecountry?"the hostspersisted, was until about4:00 A.M. on Thursday,when"All Things Considered" headinginto its final hour. Damnedif I knew. All I could say with certaintywasthat the putschistswere gone,Muscoviteshaddeliriously celebratedtheir·departureat the White House,and Mikhail Gorbachev wasbackin Moscow.An NPR hostwantedto know what Gorbachev's return meantfor the future of the Union Treaty, a documentdefining new relationshipsamong Soviet republics. I pointed out that since dawn was just approaching,and democracyseemedout of dangerfor the moment,most of Moscow was getting somewell-deservedsleep; the fate of the Soviet Union could be resolvedlater, after everyone woke up.
INTERVIEW WITH TATIANA MALKINA 4 The August 19 PressConference Themass-circulationmagazineOgonek(October5-12, 1991) publishedthis interviewwith TatianaMalkina, a twenty-four-year-old journalistfor the newspaperNezavisimaiagazeta.TatianaMalkina roseto fameat the August19pressconferenceofthe Emergency Committeewhenshealonedaredto posethe unequivocalquestion: "Couldyoupleasesaywhetheror notyou understand that last night you carried out a coupd'etat?" ThefolloWing accountweaves interviewmaterialwith commentaryby thejournalist Asya Kolodizhner. Malkina: The 19th of August is my birthday. Mom got up at six in orderto preparea lot of food for me to take to the office for a birthday celebration.All departmentsof Nezavisimaiagazeta are in a single large stable,a sectionof the former "Voskhod" factory. At work we're all crazy aboutone anotherand so I decidedat onceto treat everyone. Suddenly my mother woke me up: "Get up, Tania, they're saying something on the radio. . . ." Half asleep, I respondedgrumpily: "Comeon, Mom, can'tyou let me sleeponcea year." My motherthen turnedup the radio all the way. And imagine,there I was, the angelic birthday girl, lying in bed and swearinghorribly. Mom's usedto that. Now I hadto wakeup my colleaguesandargueover who wasgoing to wakeup the chief.... But of courseno one canceledthe refreshments.Tania'sexcited coworkersgreetedthe victuals with a thunderousovation. At the office, Taniafirst of all setaboutcalling Yanaev'ssecretary. Malkina: During the previous two months at Nezavisimaiagazeta we frequently discusseda similar version of the coup. We imagined 318
THE AUGUST 19 PRESSCONFERENCE 319 andtried to figure out who would do what to whom. I am a big fan of odiousfigures. And thoseof us in our departmentagreedearly on that [in caseofa coup] GennadiiIvanovichYanaevwas mine.... For mostof the summerTaniaaggressivelysoughtmeetingswith the Vice President,whose secretary,Vladimir Nikolaevich, was politenesspersonified,andwho promisedthat if GennadiiIvanovich wasgoing to grantan interviewto anybody,thenof courseit would be to Nezavisimaiagazeta. ... Then he confidentially informed her that Yanaevjust couldn'tseeher right now. You see, the Vice Presidenthad someambassadors to see... from Mauritania, Tanzania.... The list of GennadiiIvanovich'sstateduties was endless(maybe hewas getting ready for the coup?). Tania punctuallyrang Vladimir Nikolaevichtwice a week, andhe soon got to know her. Malkina: Every now and then I got angry and said,"Listen, it's not that the presstakessucha lively interestin GennadiiIvanovich. Could it be really difficult to find time for a thirty-minuteinterview?" "Now Tania," respondedthe secretary,"a half hour is not nearly enough for your newspaper.We need to find time for a serious discussion." Eventually, my boss told me: "Just forget about him. Who cares about this Gennadii anyway?" And then the EmergencyCommittee camealong. On the 19th I placedmy call. "Vladimir Nikolaevich, you owe me one. Everythinghaschangedcompletely,everythinghasbecomes-o-o-o interesting.GennadiiIvanovichis our Presidentnow,justabout...." Vladimir Nikolaevich respondedgently, playing along as it were, that Yanaevwas terribly busy and had pressingbusinessaffairs. He askedme to call back in an hour. When I did so, he was very severe with me. He saidthat therewould be no interview today, but that there was going to be a pressconferenceat five o'clock. But he saidnothing aboutthe specialone-timepassfor the pressconferenceor about the fact that it would be hopelesstrying to attendit. Tania went to the pressconferencewith a colleague.At the entranceto the building therewas a hugecrowd, someguards,and admissionfor "pool" reportersonly. Journalistsare usedto sur-
320 TAT/ANA MALKlNA prises,and after a long altercationwith the guards,Tania'scolleaguegot inside and handedsomesort of passto her behindthe backof oneof the guards. Malkina: There was a secondcheckpointright in front of the entranceto the auditorium, where you again had to show a pass.Once more we had to dodge and enter together as a single ''pool.'' The officer who frisked us almostgot hold of my macecartridge,which I coveredwith a handkerchief.Luckily, however,he didn't realizewhat it was. Oh, you know, I said to him, those are my personalitems, feminine things, and I nervouslybeganto enumerateall kinds of cosmetic items.In short,we slippedthrough. During the pressconferenceI wantedto standup, pull a stupidface, and pronouncein a serious tone: "Gennadii Ivanovich! You know today'smy birthday.Now in 1968at this time you weresendingtroops into Czechoslovakia,but I was only a year old, and now today you've offered me this present.A classypresent!Thank you!" Then I would sheda few tears.... We were almost late, and we enteredsimultaneouslywith the ... leaders.Suddenly,my mood turnedugly. Oh, what asses!It was not just that they were scoundrelsand criminals, no, it was simply a panopticon.. . . "Good heavens,"I thought, they are far outside the boundsof reason,they are irrational and the irrationality can set in for good." You know, they mademe experiencesucha feeling of ragethat I simply wantedto stranglethem.... And yet the journalistswere still asking such flabby questions.When it comesto poor Ignatenko[Gorbachev'spresssecretary],they hack at him as hard as they can, but now thesesamehandsomethings can'tevenopentheir mouths... not a word. . . . All the foreigners were sleeping or something.. . . The only seriousquestioncame from the journalist from La Stampa.But questionslike this arenot for theserulersmanques. After the pressconferencepeoplebeganto recognizeTania on the streetand in the subway. The reactionswere diverse. A female TV viewer calledthe editorial offices, insistedon speaking to the editor-in-chief,and ventedher angeraboutTania'sbehavior at the pressconference.For somereason,she above all did not like Tania'sdress.Then a young man sentin someverses... which alsocontaineda few words abouther dress.
THE AUGUST 19 PRESSCONFERENCE 321 Tania'smotherwore this dressin her youth. It was considered to be a holiday outfit, andTaniawould wearit if on a given night she said to herself, ''Tomorrow I'll be a lady." And on the 19th she was wearing it; it was her birthday, after all .... Her usual form of dressis a pair of jeansanda sweater. Malkina: I do not want to be rememberedby my fellow citizensas a heroinebecauseof that one question.Any journalist from the Nezavisimaia gazetawould haveaskeda similar question.The pressconferencewas a purely emotionalmoment,andindeedwe realizedeventhat morning that the whole thing was a soap opera and that the strings werebeingpulled from backstage .... There were many young journalists among those who did not allow the news blackoutto develop.The majority of workers at the newspaperRossiia are under thirty. They all stayedat the White House during the coup and releasedover forty leaflets. Tania Voloshina, who is twenty-sevenand the mother of fouryear-old Sasha,and Lena Moskaleva,who is twenty-two with two children,led the editorial teamof Rossiiaon the fifth floor of the White House for three days and three nights. . . . Moscow Echodid not stopits work for an hour, evenafter it wastakenoff the air. Democraticpublicationsput out the "Obshchaiagazeta."· Any of the young peoplewho are accustomedto using Aesopian languageor to concealingtheir gesturesof defiancecould haveaskeda questionlike Tania's.They do not find it necessaryto struggleagainst self-censorship,like their older colleagues.They are also unaware,it would seem,of Glavlit [the USSRcensor].Thesejournalistswere not educatedby Prague1968,but by the Baltics.... A truly independentpressis on its way. *This was the nameof the joint newspaperput out during the coup by eleven newspapers bannedby the EmergencyCommittee.
INTERVIEW WITH VALERII KUCHER 5 A Russian Reporter Remembers the Coup Valerii Kucheris ajournalistfromMagnitogorsk.In 1983he became the editor ofMagnitogorskiirabochii,a local newspaperhe helped transforminto a radical mouthpieceofglasnostduring the Gorbachev years.Kucher'soutspokenjournalism won him a seatin the USSR CongressofPeople'sDeputiesin March 1989.He was electedto the newSovietparliamentas a representativeoftheJournalists'Union. At the time ofthe coup he was the editor ofRossiiskievesti, the weekly newspaperofthe governmentoftheRussianFederation.He was interviewedin Moscowin March 1992by Irina Mikhaleva, who works for the MoscowBureauofNationalPublic Radio. We were awakenedby a call from Magnitogorsk.It was a little after 6:00 A.M. in Moscow. It was my daughter.The time differenceis two hours."Do you havea coupd'etatthere?"We did not understandwhat shewas talking about."Turn on your radio--youhavea coup d'etat." So we turned on the radio at six in the morning and we heard the announcement. I drove to the White Houseat once. On my way there,I passedby severaltanks. The first person1 saw at the White Housewas General Kobets.We actuallyran into eachotheraswe were enteringthe White House.He wasvery agitatedandkeptrepeating:"Damn it, damn it, we must organizesomething,we must do something,we must organize something." "But what happened?What are we to do?" 1 askedhim and followed him to his office. 1tried to find out what washappening. "I havejust come back from Yeltsin's dacha,"he said. "We have 322
A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 323 decidedwe must organizethe defenseof the White House.The situation is dangerou!r-it'sa putsch.Anything couldhappennow." It was hard to understandwhat was really going on at that point, becausetherewasnobodyfrom the top leadershiparound. Milcha/eva: What wasyour emotionalstateat that moment? Kucher: I felt agitatedand disoriented.I should tell you, though, that I was not vacillating, was not trying to make up my mind what side I was on. No, it was completely clear to me. I was not even consciousof any decision.Justas you aren'tconsciousof your heartbeat,so I was not consciousof the decision.It camenaturally, it went without saying.... But I did feel anxious,agitated,becausetherewas no informationaboutanything.I calledthe editorial office of the newspaper[Rossiiskievestl1,told themwhereI was, and askedthemto stay put and wait for me. That's how I reactedat the beginning.I tried to stayin closetouchwith the peoplein the leadership. Milchaleva: What wasthe sceneat the White House? Kucher: I went to the InformationCenter.Phoneswereringing nonstop. After a little while, newspeoplebeganto gather.The first newsI heardwhen I got therewasthat arrestshadcommenced.It was closeto 9:00 A.M. I was told that arrestshad begun,that someindividuals had been already arrested,that the EmergencyCommittee had already launchedthe policy of repression.Soon afterward,the leadership,including SilaevandYeltsin, had a meetingwith the deputiesin orderto makethe first announcement.I waspresentat that meeting,and it was right there and then that Yeltsin spokeaboutthe eventsas a ''putsch.'' He did not equivocate,and this decisivenessand clarity in the use of words struck me then and etcheditself deeply in my memory. These were preciseterms. "It is a putsch,"he said, "it is a conspiracy."The impressionhe conveyedwas that of great possible,probable danger, andalsothat the situationwas graspedwith all the precisionandclarity of which our languageis capable.This sharpdecisivenessandabsence of any equivocationon the part ofYeltsin andhis closeaidessomehow gavea more manageableshapeto my personalanxiety, straightenedit out, so to speak.The situationbecameclearin my own mind, too. I decidedto conveythis senseof clarity, this analysisof the events to my colleagues,the news staff of Magnitogorskiirabochii. I did not think that I was courtingpossibledanger,that peoplewould be divided
324 VALERII KUCHER into those who supportedor did not support the putsch. What was important for me was to sharemy senseof the eventswith the people of Magnitogorsk,to makesurethat they heardmy voice. So I arranged to be interviewedover the phone.The interview cameout on August 20. In a way, I was infectedby Yeltsin's clarity and decisiveness,and in the interview I, too, called a spadea spade:"It is a conspiracy,a putsch, an attempt at a revanche."The guys at the newspaper--you haveto understandthis is a provincial newspaper--were very worried. They took the whole night to put the issuetogetherand print it. The workers who had a democraticorientationguardedthe paperthroughout the night. I have beentold also that not a single personleft the editorial office until they finished printing the issue. In the morning, evenbeforethe trams begangoing, they had hand-deliveredstacksof the paperat the factory gates.So in part, thanksto my interview, which was publishedin the issue,peoplewere informed about what kind of an eventwas taking placein Moscow. While I was dictating the interview, I was looking out of the window of the White House. I was trying to conveymy stateof mind, my feelings. of resistancewere formed I had the sensethen that the headquarters very quickly, that self-defenseteamswere organizedalmostat once,as peoplebeganto gatheraroundthe White House. Milcha/eva: Did you havea senseon that first day that peopleat the White Housewerebeingorganizedaccordingto someplan? Kucher: I understandwhat you are asking. The answeris no. The senseI had then was that I was witnessingsomesort of a spontaneous organization,that it was self-generated,that peoplewere forming into groups and undertakingactions as they went along. Things were organizedon the fly. I had the feeling then that I was completely,but completely alone. You were on your own completely, with no one standing over you, and you could do practically anything. If you wanted,you could stay at home,or you could participate.It was up to you. Those were the days of real choice, political, civic, individual choice.As the eventswereunfolding, I almosthadthe senseof a cloud cover lifting, of fog dissipating,of things becomingclear and lucid. It was only thenthat I understoodwhat a horrifying country we hadbeen living in, what dangerhad beenstalking us, what kind of organization the CPSUreally was,what a monsterthat systemofpartocracywas! It was only then that I fully understoodthoseideasthat I had beenvoic-
A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 325 ing before the putsch--whetherin my conversationswith friends, newspaperreports,or speakingat public rallies. Thosethreedaysgave me the opportunityto gain a real understandingof the political choices. I usedto teachRussiangrammarto little kids. In thosedays I was not quite sureaboutthe rules myself, and I rememberthat I would finally understandthis or that rule only in the courseof my explaining it to them. Only then would I be able to find my own words to explain to them why there should or should not be a comma here. Likewise, during thosethreedaysI acquireda systemof my own convictionsand my own argumentsin support.I hadheld the sameconvictionsbefore, but only during the putsch did they permeatemy whole being and becometruly my own. Mikhaleva:What werethe mostmemorableeventsfor you? Kucher: I rememberwell, first, how we were growing more and more agitated; two, how fear inside the White House was growing towardthe eveningof the 21st; three,how we experiencedthe senseof growing clarity aboutour position: on the one hand,you felt growing fear, on the other, growing resolve. There you were, with fear and resolveseesawinginsideyou andoutsideyou. All of a suddenyou felt terribly frightenedand then, out of nowhere,you would begin to feel greatresolve. I saw the centerof danger,which was inside the White House.But then, I would leave the White House and practically a few hundred yards away, life was as normal as ever, and peoplewere going about their businessas though nothing had happened.I saw peopleleaving the White House.Thosewere governmentofficials, eachcanying his briefcase,hasteningto leave the area after the announcementof an impendingattack had beenmade. A little later, when the dangerhad passed,someof themwould comeback. Among themwere evengovernmentministerswho would come in and askfor firearms. After the dangerwas over, they liked the ideaof paradingaboutthe placewith a pistol. What I am saying is that somepeoplewere enjoying the playacting, some were practically posing, reminding me of Grushnitskii, the poseurcharacterfrom Lermontov'sHero ofOur Time. That first day, I wastrying to be close toYeltsin. That is why I was able to see how he would come out to share his decision with the people.I was not therewhen thosedecisionswerebeing discussedand formulated, but I saw him come out with his new decision and an-
326 VALERII KUCHER nounceit to us. I wastherewith him on the White Housebalconyashe spoke to the people, protectedby those large shields that his bodyguardsheld on both sidesof him. He was always very swift when he was in public, almostdashing.Therewas that senseof certitudeabout him. He first demonstratedit whenhe climbedthat tank with his megaphone.That happenedafter Yeltsin'smeetingwith the deputies.Silaev spoke first, then Yeltsin appeared,followed by Burbulis and other leaders.Yeltsin made his speechthen and left. He was followed by GeneralKobets, and peoplelistenedto him no less attentivelythan to Yeltsin. I recordedKobets's speech.He, too, wasvery clear,but unlike Yeltsin, he did not offer any analysisof the events.He did saythat the army would nevershootat its people,but he nevercalledthe GKChP conspiratorsor putschists.He was very measured.There were also questionsfrom the deputies.I rememberone repeatingthe questionof some woman in the crowd when Yeltsin said to the soldiers: "You won't shoot at your President,will you?" And that woman said: "It's all very well that they won't shootat the President,but what aboutme, will they shoot at me?" So one of the deputiesaskedthe samequestions. ThenI arrivedat our editorial office, gatheredeverybodyandsaidto them: "Folks, we've got to take a position. Our position should be firm, We are for democracy,we are againstthe putschists.We must do something."We hada small groupof peoplewith computers.This had beena very recentdevelopmentwith us, we had just then gotten the computerequipment.So, we put togetherleafletsandprintedthem. By the eveningwe had a lot, and all of us, including the womenworking in the accountingoffice, weredistributingthemby hand. Mikhaleva:Hadn'tyour newspaperbeenshutdown by then? Kucher: Yes, of course.We had actually talked to the printers,but without much success.Our paper,from the very beginning,was conceivedas an alternativeto the Party'scentralpress.We werea Russian paper.But our printer was the printing houseof Moskovskaiapravda. They gaveus the runaroundat first, andtowardthe endof the day they simply saidthat they could not print our paper.I hadhopedthey would print us. So, we decided to go it alone. By ten that night, we had alreadyproduceda large stackof leaflets with Y eltsin's first decrees. And that's what we did every day. In the three-dayperiod, we issued six leaflets,ifI remembercorrectly.
A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 327 Milchaleva: How manycopiesdid you produce? Kucher: Not that many-all that our equipmentcould produce.I remembertaking a stack with me to Kalinin Prospect,and people simply tore themout of my hands.I believethe reasonfew peoplegot hold of theseleafletsis that they would quite literally tearthem apart, trying to yank themout of one another'shands.This was an explosion of glasnost:peoplebelievedevery word they readin them. We would postthemwherewe could--in the subways,on lampposts,andso on. Milchaleva: Whendid you get the sensethat the putschwasfailing? Kucher: I was afraid that the White Housewould be attacked,I had a strong feeling that would happen.As to the ultimate failure of the putsch, I had no doubts about that almost from the very beginning, before everybodyelse understoodit. The reasonis that I receiveda phone call from the United Statesfrom my friend ProfessorSteve Kotkin, an AmericanSovietologist.He calledme on the eveningof the 19th and askedme how I was doing, what was happening.I tried to inform him the bestI could. He said,"Listen, Valerii, my predictionis that it will all end very soon, two to three days at the most, and then it'll be all over. So, don't worry." That'sthe kind of conversationI had with my friend StephenKotkin. I knewthat he understoodthe situation herepretty well, I was surethat his predictionwould cometrue. Jokes aside, I did not think the putschistswould succeed,but I was pretty surethey would try to attackthe White House. On the 19th, we had printed our leaflets,distributedthem, and then in the early hours of the morning, I left the White House and went home. A few hours later, I was back there. I saw it as my function to collect thedecreesand all other information there and passthem on as soon as possible to the editorial offices, so that they could quickly print them. Nobodygaveme this assignment-itall happened spontaneously. Speakingof interestingmoments,I rememberthat ftrst evening,I cameout of the White Houseto seewhat was going on aroundit, and there on the barricades,I saw the Japaneseambassador.It was the 20th. He drove up to the barricadesin his embassycar. I was very intrigued by his presencethere. I walked up to him, greetedhim, and asked for an interview. He agreed.After this interview, we became friends. It was clearthat he wantedto makea statement.The Japanese leadershiphad a ratherstrange,reservedreactionto the putsch,but he
328 VALERII KUCHER wantedto showwherehe stood,and it was very importantfor him that an editor saw him there and even interviewedhim right on the barricades.For me it was importantto clarify for my readersthe Japanese government'sattitude to the events.He was very judicious in his remarks,asyou canunderstand. I had frequent meetingswith General Kobets during those days, talked to him, interviewed him, saw how the security regime in the White House was growing tighter and tighter. At a certain point, a security detail took a position on the roof, and at a certainpoint, they begandistributing bullet-proofvests. By the eveningof the 20th, the internal White Houseradio stationbeganits broadcasts.I have a tape of Sergei Stankevich'sreport about Gorbachevin Foros. All these reportswere eagerlyawaitedand were quickly snatchedup by reporters and passedon to editorial offices. I always tried to passon this informationto myoid colleaguesin Magnitogorskas well as my Moscow paper. On the eveningof the 20th, the situationwas very grave. We were expectingthe attack at any moment, and there were constantrumors aboutthe "appointedhour" of the attack.Around ten in the evening,I went home to pick up my wife. I wantedher to seethe White House andwhat was happening around there.Despiteall the barriers,etc., we managedto get right into the thick of it, almost right up to the very White House.We took a walk aroundthe barricades.I wantedto show her what was going on, becauseshewasjust holedup in our apartment on the Rublev Highway, frightened to death that something might happento me. Peopleweresitting aroundbonfiresunderthe drizzle.... A few days later, I found out that the head of the Moscow Weather Bureausentan official letter to Ivan Silaevdenyingthe rumorsthat he was in cahootswith the junta andthat it was he who usedsomemeans to bring about the rain over the White House on the 20th. It was an official letter, really, in which he deniedhis complicity in andability to produce localized rainfall and asked Silaevto dispel all such suspicions. That kind of absurdity also took place then. Suddenly,many governmentofficials beganto fear that they might be suspectedof cooperatingwith thejunta. Milchaleva: Wastherea PressOffice at the White House? Kucher: Yes. It was Sergei Stankevich, for the most part, who playedthe role of the PressSecretary.The importantinformation was
A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 329 the decreesand official decisions,and as soon as I receivedthem, I would passthemon to the editorial office. On the eveningof the 20th (it could havebeenearly the next momin~I can't can't recall now), I ran into Poltoranin, the Press Minister [Chairman of Russia'sState Committee on the Press], in Yeltsin's waiting room. I saidto him: "Mikhail Nikiforovich, look, we've started publishinga newspaper,we print it ourselvesand then post it all over the city. You know, the junta bannedus, but we couldn'tjust sit still, so we found a way to print the mostimportantthings." He said that they were discussingthe idea of an oppositionpress and publishing a joint newspaperto tell peoplewhat happened."Get on the phoneto Yegor Yakovlev," he said. ''Use the governmentline and call him-he'swaiting to hearfrom people.Sendhim your representative." This idea of publishinga joint newspaperwas floating aroundthen. I rememberdiscussingit quite spontaneouslywith our correspondent, Nikolai Vishnevskii. It was he who said to me during our planning meetingat the editorial office that it would be a good ideato publisha joint newspaperwith all the other bannedpapers.By the time we had gottenhold of the telephonenumbersof the editors-in-chief,the idea, as it turnedout, hadalreadysurfacedelsewhere. After my conversationwith Poltoranin, I called Yegor Yakovlev and askedhim what my newspaper'scontributionshouldbe, what we should be writing now. He said: "Call Kommersant,send your own reporterthere, and then you'll decidewhat you shouldcover. But for the time being, we'll just publish a joint newspapercontainingall the official decreesof the Russiangovernment,and if you don't mind, we'll put your namedown,too, asa cofounderof the issue." Of course,I agreed.But we did not have the time to bring out a secondissueof thejoint paper-theputschwas over. The idea,though, was to haveone liaison personfrom everypaper,somehowto coordinatethe coverage,and to publish it undera single roof, so to speak.I liked this idea so much that I decided to set up a Club of Eleven Editors, associatedwith my paper, and later on, sometimeafter the putsch, we producedthe secondissue of this joint newspaper.This thenwasthe opinion of everyoneof theseeditorsaboutthe situationin the country. Actually, we put out two issuesafter the putsch. That's how the idea of the joint newspaperwas realized.Of course,it had no real future: eventhe two issuesthat I put togetherafter the putschwere
330 VALERII KUCHER a ratherartificial creation.My impulse was to preservethat feeling of solidarity we all had then, but undernormal circumstances,therewas neither a need for it nor an inclination. We simply do not have that kind of causetoday,a powerful causeto bring everybodytogether. Mikhaleva: What do think aboutthe radio reportingin thosedays? Kucher: Of course,those days were ideally suited for the radio. MoscowEchowas superb,unique.I tunedin as often as I could. They did an excellentjob. Mikhaleva: My own impressionis that, for the most part, in the country as a whole, peoplereactedrather impassively,with indifference.Only a small numbertook an active part in the events.The rest appearedindifferent. What do you think? What causedthis attitude? Kucher: I explainit by the fact that peoplehadbeenlied to so much and for such a long time that they simply could not understandwhat was going on. Only now, perhaps,are they capableof more or less soberanalysis.Indeed,only now is it begi~ing to sink in what would November have happenedhad the putschistswon. Finally, the eventsdeveloped so fast that peoplesimply did not havethe time to makejudgments,to form an opinion. They could not appreciatethe enormity of what had happened,that the entiresocialsystemhadchanged. Mikhaleva: And you yourself, did you understandthat the putsch meantthe endof communism,that communismwould cometo an end in thesethree days, that the whole systemwould collapse?Did you really think that on, say,Wednesdaythe 21st? Kucher: No, of course not. I'll be frank with Yol.r-I could not foreseethe rapidity with which the eventsactuallyunfolded.And I was very surprisedthat things movedso fast. But I knew, I sensedit with my whole body, that if the junta took the upper hand, democracyin Russia would be doomed. But I did not understandthat this huge machine,this enormousedifice, had suchspindly legs, was so easyto knock down. As we wrote in that first issue of the joint newspaper after the putsch,democracyhad won becausea free peopleand a free presstook their standtogether.It turnedout that people'sinner mood, inner feeling, was so much opposedto the CPSU and its system,so much opposedto all they stood for, that the collapseof communism did not take that much effort. But it is true therewasn'tany exuberant
A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 331 reactionon the part of the people in those three days. They did not respondin one big outburst,with fireworks and so forth, but slowly and in different ways. They havebeenrespondingever since.It takes time to absorb freedom, to becomecomfortable with it-that's my opinion. Mikhaleva: What about now? If a putsch were to happen now, would it succeed? Kucher: I know thereis talk like that andsomeregretthat the putsch failed. But let us look at thosewho cameto defendthe White House. They were younger people, for the most part. The veteransof the CPSU, the Komsomol, the war veteransdid not man the barricades. Young peoplecame,andthereweremanyyoungwomen.It wasa very good-lookingcrowd, good faces.... Perhaps,for the young people,it was an opportunityto put themselvesto a testas a social force. And of course,in defendingthe White House,thesepeopledid not have any specificpolitical or socialprogramin mind, they did not think that, for example,we must take strong measures to stabilizethe ruble, to carry out a radical land reform and so forth. Thosewere not the slogansthat movedthem in thosethreedays.What did they feel? My senseis that peoplesimply could not standthe ideaof having thoseParty martinets remain in power. Nobody wantedall thoseLukianovs,Ryzhkovs,all thosemonsters,thoseParty bosses to continuegoverningthe country. Mikhaleva: What was Gorbachev'srole in all of this, in your opinion? I know it is a complex question, but I would like your own personalopinion. Kucher: In my reporting,I oncecameacrossan interestingdocument -1 have written about it in my newspaper.It was a transcript of Lukianov's talk with a delegationof Russia'sdeputies.It was not intendedfor publication. Among them were Silaev and a few other membersof the government.In this talk, Lukianovusedthreats,saying that if Russiacontinuedto refuse to abide by the Union laws, there would be unpleasantconsequences. He spokewith authority, as one of the key membersof the Union government;he spokeas the masterof the situation. And in that conversation,he said that Gorbachevwas awareof the measuresthat might be undertakenagainstRussia'sgovernment.Lateron, he changedhis tune.But the transcriptpromptedme to write a note to Lukianov. Then, somemilitary peoplehavetold me
332 VALERII KUCHER that they interceptedGorbachev'scommunicationswith the Kremlin on the eve of the coup. I askedthem if I could listen to the tape.They promisedto give it to me, but I never receivedit. When I reminded them of the promisesometimelater, they told me that they had lost it. It is hard to say what actually transpired.However,during the putsch, many in the White Housewere sayingthat Gorbachevknew aboutthe plansto stagea coup. Mikhaleva: Tell me more about what people were thinking about Gorbachevin the White Housein thosedays? Kucher: Peopleassociatedwith the apparatof the Council of Ministers - I emphasize,the apparat--triedhard to raise suspicionsabout Gorbachev; some in the military did too. Again I emphasizethat these were the officials of the apparat,not electedofficials; they were officials who are no longer there. They tried to presentGorbachevas a virtual accompliceof the putschists,if not the actual leader. Those people,I would say,weresimply scoundrels.As to the electedofficials of the SupremeSoviet, the democraticleadership,they had a clear position: "What happenedto the President?If he is sick, give us the opinion of medical experts.Tell us where he is. Give us preciseand clearinformation. Demandto speakto the President."Thosewere two distinct attitudes.It was clearthat one segment,the apparat,wantedto count him with the traitors, to implicate him, to compromisehim. Indeed,how else can one interpret that incident when I was told that they had the tape of an interceptedcommunicationand then was told that the tapehadbeenlost? Why did they approacha reporterwith this sort of information? It's a question,isn't it? PerhapssomedayI will name that person.Moreover, that personsaid to me: "We'll use the tapewhenthe time is right." So, to sumup what I think aboutGorbachev,I believethat he could not have been among those who were preparedto use violence and terror againsttheir own people.That is my personalconviction. As to the rest, I have no idea. When they talked to Gorbachevpreviously aboutthe necessityto introducea stateof emergency,he may havesaid somethingto them that they interpretedas tacit approval. He could havemeantonething andthey understoodit in their own way. Perhaps there is some truth to those who say that his equivocationswere so ambiguousthat one could interpret them any way one wished. And surely he had doubtsabout his course,about his methods;surely, he
A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 333 consideredall sorts of options in trying to find a way out of an impossiblesituation,agonizedoverthem. But I do not believethat he was capableof thosemethods,of that role, of that massivelie. It is unthinkable for me. Of course,there are also somepeoplenow who want to presentthe putschas a kind of comic opera.But the dangerwas real. And it wasn'tjust the tanksthat posedthis danger,not the immediate threatof violence.The questionwasthe coursethe countrywould take: towarddemocracyor towardpartocracy.That wasthe fork in the road. Mikhaleva: But why would peoplewho had alreadybeeninvested with power, why would thosepeoplestagea coup?In order to prove that they actually had power? After all, Kriuchkov and Yazov had plenty of power, they pretty much controlled the situation. So why would the peoplewho hadreal powerdecideto stagea coup? Kucher: You know what?They did not havepowerover the people. It was a strangesituation.For this is a real mystery: what is the relationshipbetweenthe peopleandthe rulers?Eventoday,I do not understandwhat it should be. But I know that in one way or another,the peoplegive the rulers their consent,which allows the governmentto carry out its policy. What the putschistsdid not havewas that consent, they did not have influence amongthe people,they could not gain a sure footing. For that reason,they decidedto destroythose who had and continuedto gain influenceamongthe people.Take our problems today [early 1992]. If it had been Pavlov who decontrolledprices, peoplewould have tom him to shreds.It is a questionof trust, and becausepeopletrust this government,they are not in revolt. That is why they arestill toleratingboth Yeltsin and[Yegor] Gaidar. That is what the putschistsdid not have,that is what they had lost. Even though they had the opportunity to issueorders,to use all the trappingsof this enormousstate, theyunderstoodthat peoplehad an aversionto them. They were outsidethe people.How did this come about?I think that peoplehadbecome sosick of this Party, sick of the corruption aroundthem, sick of this small clique presidingover their lives, their apparentincompetence.Peoplehad grown to hate them so much that it was imperativefor the Party bossesto do something.To throw tanksagainstthe people?That, obviously,could not achievethe desiredeffect. So what they set out to do was to destroya few democrats.They could havebeeneffective had they carriedout large-scale repression,had they managedto destroy physically the people who
334 VALERIl KUCHER were on their list. But they failed. What they did not understandis that they would have had to destroy hundredsof millions in order to reinstill fear in people.Peoplehadlost fear. Milchaleva: Why? Kucher: It was not the kind of anny that could do that. I remember talking to one of the first tankerswho arrived at the White House. I askedhim: "Who areyou?" "We are Soviet,"he said. "What the hell is Soviet?" I replied, "and what the hell did you comeherefor?" Lateron, I realizedthat this was not the right approachfor talking to those people. They were frightened or something,they looked confused.For a soldier,to attackyou hadto be sureof yourself,andthat is what they lost, they were not sureof themselvesany more.This confusion createda vacuum,a split: they were not yet citizensof Russia,but they were no longer thesoldiersof that old system.An anny in sucha psychologicalstateis not capableof violence againstthe people.It is, in this sense,partof the people. Mikhaleva: Returningto thosethree days at the White House,who were thepeoplewho impressedyou most?What was the most memorableevent? Kucher: Governmentofficials fleeing the White House looked to me like cartoonbureaucratswith briefcases.For the first time in my life, I was able to seewhat the apparatwas really all about. They all looked alike, all carried similar-looking briefcases.The apparatwas leaving the White House.In droves.That was the first, most memorable picture. November for the first time--what it Second,I saw and felt~xperienced meantto make a real choice.I saw this in simple people.I saw this in militiamen, armedand wearing flack jackets.They were the first line of defense,and they would have beenmowed down in the first few secondsof the attack. But they would not have turned back. People were facing possibledeath,just simplepeople,andthey were standing firm--unlike the bureaucrats. Istill carry this picture vividly in mind: someare fleeing, andsomearestandingfirm. And here is anotherimpressionthat cuts deepinto my memory. At momentsof great stress,some people think only about themselves,
A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 335 aboutthe opportunityto glorify themselves,to promotethemselves.I saw in those days some individuals placedhigh in the government who, after the main dangerhad alreadypassed,were asking for personal weapons.And they would sling thoseover the shoulder.It was clearthat this was all make-believe.The samecould be saidaboutall thoseoratorswho suddenlyappearedout of nowhereand beganmaking fiery speechesafterthe couphadfailed. Milchaleva: What aboutthe situationinsidethe White House? Kucher: To my surprise,the White Housefor a long time smelledof the people.It becamedemocratic,totally democraticto the point that things were strewn aroundall over the place, cannedfood, heapsof breadloaves,cigarettebuttson the floor, massesof peoplesleepingon the floor, including reporters.It was some kind of a revolutionary flophouse.Everythingwas simple,primitive even-notlike today. Today you needa passto get in, andyou cannotevenget into the cafeteria at StaraiaSquare.* The danger,the mortal dangerpeoplefacedthen, madeyou feel absolutelydemocratic.You felt like the otherguy, it gave you a senseof solidarity, a greatsensationof democracy.Nobody cared aboutrank or otherdistinctions---justpeople.Doors were open: feel free to comeinto any office. Everythingtherewas in motion. But therewasa time when the White House was practically empty, with only a few individuals stayingput. It was whenorderswere issuedfor everybodyto leavethe White Houseby five in the afternoon.The attackwas expected. So therewereten, maybetwenty minutes,the mosttragic twentyminutes, when the entire building was empty while outsidea seaof peoplewas lapping at the White Housewalls. In thosemoments,the White House was quiet and empty--like a bomb shelter,with a few securitypeople armedto the teeth(originally, therewaslittle weaponryaround). Milchaleva: Was it true that merchantscameto the barricadeswith loadsof food andcigarettesto distributefree of chargeto the defenders of the White House? Kucher: Yes, that was true, therewere mountainsof sausageat the White House,mountainsof bread,cigarettes,tea, and so on. Indeed, the White Housereekedof smokedsausageandbakedbreadfor weeks *Now the executiveheadquarters of the Russiangovernment.the buildings on Staraia(Old) Squareformerly belongedto the CentralCommitteeof the CPSU.
336 VALERII KUCHER afterward.Businessmenwere not the only oneswho were responsible for this cornucopia;the White Housesupply staffhaddonea lot also.I recall whenGeneralKobets was only beginningto think aboutorganizing the defenseof the White House, practically the first thing he thought about was finding portable toilets. And he did find some. There was also a lot of intelligence gathering, tracking of the putschists'moves: for example,the headquartersat the White House wereawareof everyairplanetakeoffand landingon the territory of the Soviet Union; they knew aboutevery movementof troops.They were receiving confidential information from the GeneralStaff, of course. Then, deputieswere sentto meetwith the troops on the GardenRing Road.... But let me tell you that somepeoplewere making moneyon it, too. Oneguy approachedme andofferedme somethingfor money.He was speculating.I meanthat evenamid thesetragic events,somemembers of the intelligentsiaelite were seekingto promotethemselves,someof the commonfolk were looking for opportunityto makea profit. That, too, was part of the picture, as it always happenswhen really big eventstake place---thegood was side by side with the bad,the tragic, sideby sidewith the ridiculous.
Chronology of Eventsof August 19, 20, 21,1991 In compilingthis ChronologyofEvents,the editorsrelied on several publishedchronologies;documentssuchas the decreesissuedby the EmergencyCommitteeandby thegovernmentofRussia;their own memoriesofevents;and-because thereare manyinconsistencies amongall the above--agooddealofcommonsense.*Accordingly, the chronologyshouldbe usedwith caution.Notealso that timesgiven for someofthe eventsrefer to the momentoftheir beingreportedby a newsserviceandnot necessarilythe momentwhentheytookplace. The world found out about the conspiracyon Monday, August 19, 1991,but the coupd'etatassuchhadcommencedon the previousday. On Sunday,August 18, in the Presidentialvacationhome in Foros, in the Crimea,Mikhail S. Gorbachevwas at work on his speechfor the signingof the Union Treaty(the signingwasscheduledfor August20). At 4:00 P.M., he discussedhis speechon the telephonewith his aide, Georgii Sbakbnazarov,who was stayingat a nearbyresort.At 4:50 P.M., Gorbachevwas informed that a delegation,headedby his chief of *The following sourceshave been used: Khronika putcha: chas za chasom. Sobytiia19-22avgusta1991 v svodkakhRossiiskogoInformatsionnogoAgenstva (Leningrad, 1991); Putsch: The Diary (Oakville-New York-London: Mosaic Press,1992); Current Digest of the SovietPress,vol. 43, nos. 33 and 34 (1991); Komsomolskaiapravda, August 22, 1991; . . . Deviatnadtsatoe,dvadtsatoe. dvadtsatpervoe... (Moscow, 1991); Valentin Stepankovand Yevgenii Lisov's Kremlevskiizagovor: versiia sledstviia,(Moscow, 1992); and GeneralAleksandr Lebed'smemoirSpektak/nazyvalsiaputch,publishedin Tiraspol in 1993,the first installmentof which wasreprintedin LiteraturnaiaRossiia,September24, 1993. 337
338 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 19,1991 staff, Valerii Boldin, and including the Chief of the SecurityDirectorate of the KGB, Yurii Plekhanov,had arrived--uninvited--andwas requestinga meetingwith him. Reachingfor the telephoneto find out the reasonfor this surprisevisit, Gorbachevdiscoveredthat all of his lines of communicationwith the outsideworld had beencut. After a brief family council, Gorbachevmet the visitors, who, speakingin the name of the EmergencyCommittee,offered him an ultimatum: sign the declarationof the stateof emergencyandtransferpresidentialpowers to Vice PresidentYanaev,or resign. Gorbachevrefusedto do either. The delegation returned to Moscow empty-handed,and the machineryof the coup d'etat, much of it slappedtogetherat the last moment,went intomotion. August19, 1991 1:00 A.M. GennadiiShishkin, First Deputy Director of TASS, is awakenedby a phonecall from Leonid Kravchenko,the Director of Gosteleradio,and asked to cometo the CentralCommitteeheadquarters. 4:00 A.M. The SevastopolRegimentof the KGB surroundsGorbachev'sdachaat Foros in the Crimea. The runway at the airstrip where the presidentialplane and helicoptersit is blocked on the order of Commanderof the Air Defense Forces,Colonel GeneralMaltsev. 4:30 A.M. A codedcable, signedby the Minister of Defense,Dmitrii Yazov, is sentto the Commanderof the FarEastForces;the Commanderof the Airborne ParatrooperForces;commandersof army groups,military districts and fleets; and headsof the chief and central directoratesof the Ministry of Defense, ordering them to upgradethe readinessstatusof the forces undertheir commandto battle-ready. 6:00 A.M. Centraltelevision and radio are takenover by the StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency,consistingof eight governmentofficials: Vice President Gennadii Yanaev; KGB headVladimir Kriuchkov; DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov; Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo; Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov; First Deputy Chairmanof the National DefenseCouncil and leaderof the military industrial complex Oleg Baklanov; chairmanof Peasants'Union Vasilii Starodubtsev;andthe Presidentof the Associationof StateEnterprises and Industrial Groupsin Production,Construction,Transportation,and Communications,AleksandrTiziakov. Only one nationwide channelis broadcasting. Eachhour, the following items areread:Decreeof Vice PresidentYanaev; Declarationof the Soviet Leadership;Appeal to the Soviet People;Appeal to [Foreign] Statesand Governmentsand the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations; ResolutionNo. 1 of the EmergencyCommittee; and a declaration
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 19,1991 339 criticizing the Union Treaty by Anatolii Lukianov, Chairman of the USSR SupremeSoviet. All of these statements,exceptfor Lukianov's declaration, pronounceGorbachevto be "no longercapableof performinghis dutiesdueto the stateof his health." Lukianov's declarationis datedAugust 16, 1991; the others,August 18, 1991. Minister of DefenseDmitrii Yazov, a memberof the EmergencyCommittee, convenesa meeting of the commandersof the country'smilitary districts. His instructions: maintain order and increasesecurity at military installations. 7:40 A.M. KGB personnelenter the offices of the Moscow Echo radio station, shutit down, and sealthe premises. 8:25--9:00A.M. In Lithuania, the Radio and Television Centeris taken over by Soviet Army troops.Broadcastsare interrupted,but radio transmissioncontinuesin the capital,Vilnius. Oneof the first stepsby the conspiratorsis to limit the pressto nine central and Moscownewspapers. 8:30 A.M. Viktor Urazhtsev,People'sDeputy of the RSFSRandthe chairmanof Shield, a veterans'association,is arrestedoutsidethe RSFSRSupremeSoviet Building (hereafter,the White House). 9:00 A.M. Telrnan Gdlian, a USSR People'sDeputy famous for his struggle againstofficial corruption,is arrestedin his apartmentby agentsof the KGB. He is held under guardwith two other RSFSRdeputies,Mikhail Kamchatov andNikolai Proselkov,at a military baseoutsideMoscow. The "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia"is signedby the Presidentof Russia, Boris Yeltsin; Ivan Silaev, PrimeMinister of Russia;andRuslanKhasbulatov, Acting Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet of Russia.The appeal declaresthe StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergencyalong with its decreesand orders to be illegal and unconstitutional;orders local authoritiesto observestrictly constitutionallaws and presidentialdecrees;demandsthat Gorbachevbe allowed to addressthe country; convenesan ExtraordinarySessionof the Congress of People'sDeputies of the USSR; and calls for a general strike in supportof thesedemands. The Moscow City Soviet setsup headquartersto deal with the emergencysituation. 9:20 A.M. Yeltsin signs DecreeNo. 59, declaringthat (1) the EmergencyCommittee is unconstitutionaland its actions a coup d'etat; (2) decisionsof the EmergencyCommitteehave no legal force on RSFSRterritory; and (3) officials following the ordersof the EmergencyCommitteeare in violation of the RSFSRCriminal Codeandsubjectto prosecution.
340 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 19,1991 9:30 A.M. In Moscow, movementsof military columns begin, including army trucks, tanks, and armoredpersonnelcarriers (APCs). Broadcastingover the Russiantelevisionchannelof RussianFederationbroadcastingis interrupted. 10:00 A.M. The PressServiceof the Foreign Ministry of the RussianFederation announcesthat foreign correspondents are invited to a pressconferenceto be held at 11:00A.M. in the Houseof Sovietsof the RussianFederation(hereafter the White House).Yeltsin is expectedto conductthe pressconference. The Leningrad Military District Commander,GeneralViktor Samsonov,announceson local radio andtelevisionthe formation of the StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergencyand the introductionof emergencymeasuresaffecting the workplace,public transport,the media, and communications.Strikes and public meetingsareprohibited. The Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet of the RSFSRdecidesto convenean emergencysessionof the SupremeSovieton August21, 1991. APCs surroundKomsomolskaiapravda'seditorial offices. 10:30A.M. PrimeMinister Pavlov,a coupleader,suffersan attackof hypertension. 11 :00 A.M. A large tank column advancesinto Moscow along the Minsk Highway. 11:30A.M. Membersof the USSRCommitteeon ConstitutionalOversightsign a statementdeclaringthe formation of the EmergencyCommitteeto be without legal foundation. The statement,heavily distortedby the headof the official newsagencyTASS, Lev Spiridonov,is publishedin the Tuesdaypapers. 11:45 A.M. Demonstratorsbegin arriving at Manezh Squarebearingbannersof protest.No measuresare taken to dispersethe crowd. Vladimir Zhirinovskii, leaderof the Liberal-DemocraticParty, is chasedfrom the squareby protesters. 11:54 A.M. An army captaininterviewedoutsidethe building of the news agency TASS assertsthat his unit would use its weaponsagainstthe civilian population if so ordered 12:19 P.M. A spontaneousgatheringtakes place on Manezh Squareand across from the Moscow City Soviet. Ten armoredvehiclesarrive from Maiakovskii Squarebut are blockedby the crowd on TverskaiaStreet.The White Houseis reportedlysurroundedby tanks. 12:30 P.M. Armoredtransportvehiclesmoving towardthe centerof Moscow are stoppedby the crowd in front of the Moscow City Soviet. Demonstrators mount the vehicles and the vehicles tum back. The Russiantricolor flag appearsin the window of the city soviet. Yeltsin is expectedto speak.
CHRONOWGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 19. 1991 341 The spontaneous gatheringon ManezhSquarenow numbersseveralthousand peopleand continuesto grow. Yeltsin's address"To the Citizensof Russia"is read and word about Yeltsin's call for a generalstrike spreadson Manezh Square.Demonstratorsblock TverskaiaStreetnear the Hotel National with two trolley cars. Tanks have beenpositionedat all bridgesin Moscow. According to Moscow Echo, the Commanderof the Moscow Military District, Colonel GeneralNikolai Kalinin, newly appointedby Yanaev, announcesthat a state of emergencyhasbeenintroducedin Moscow. Chairmanof the USSRSupremeSoviet Anatolii Lukianov hasannouncedhis intention to convenean emergencysessionof the USSR SupremeSoviet on August 26 and suggeststhat committeesof the SupremeSoviet begin to considerthe decreesof the EmergencyCommittee. 1:00 P.M. Yeltsin hasemergedfrom the White HouseandmountedTank No. 110 of the Taman Division, from which he appealsto Muscovites and all the citizens of Russiato give a worthy responseto thoseinvolved in the putsch and to demandthe return of the nation to normal constitutionaldevelopment. Standingnext to Yeltsin, Nikolai Vorontsov and GeneralKonstantinKobets also addressthe small crowd. 1:30 P.M. Military vehiclescontinueto massaroundManezhandTheaterSquares.A motorizedrifle unit is posted at the Bolshoi Theater.Buseswith special assault troopsare parkednearthe Historical Museum.Demonstratorsagainstoparmored carriers betweenManezh Squareand Alexander Garden. Army Major Viktor Gogolev publicly announcesthat there are no ordersto shoot A Moscow City SovietDeputy announcesto the crowd that two factoriesare out on strike [unconfirmed] andPeople'sDeputyTelmanGdlianhasbeenarrested. A groupof demonstratorsleavesfor the White House.A largeconcentrationof military personnelis observedin the vicinity of the White House. RuslanKhasbulatovhas announcedthat the Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet has resolvedto convenean emergencysessionof the SupremeSoviet of the RussianFederationto be held on August21. One issuewill be on the agenda: "The political situationin the republic owing to the coupd'etat." 1:35 P.M. Major GeneralAleksandr Lebed arrives at the White House on the ordersof the Commanderof the Airborne ParatrooperForces(APF), Colonel GeneralPavel Grachev,to take commandof the defenseof the White House with the SecondBattalion of the RiazanRegimentof the APF. The missionis accomplishedthatnight. 2:00 P.M. The CentralTelegraphin Moscow, now controlledby a troop of military personnelfrom the TamanDivision, hasterminatedintercity and international communications.
342 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST19,1991 People'sDeputiesof the RussianFederationhavecalled on the Muscovitesto cometo the White Houseto defendit from possibleattack. 2:37 P.M. In Leningrad,Nina Andreeva,an outspokenconservative,expressesfull supportfor the coup and the expectationthat a majority of the Soviet population will supportit, with the exceptionof MoscowandLeningrad. 2:43 P.M. In Leningrad,an emergencysessionof the LeningradSoviet is to be convenedat 4:00 P.M. A crowd of about 1,000 people gathersoutside the building. 3:10 P.M. The Commanderof the Air DefenseForces,Colonel GeneralMaltsev, has issuedthe following order over the telephone:"There havebeenattempts on the part of people close to Gorbachevto break through to Gorbachev.If such attemptsare repeated,I order you to arrestall involved and hand them over to the KGB." This information is publicized by Sergei Stankevichon August20 overthe White Houseintercomsystem. 3:28 P.M. According to the RussianInformation Agency, Gorbachevis under housearrestat his dachain the Crimea. The Memorial Societyissuesa statementcondemningthe coup. 3:30 P.M. At the White House,barricadesare erectedout of stonesand bricks to preventthe stormingof the building which, as rumor hasit, will begin at 4:00 P.M. In the White House,a staff for the defenseof the building is organized under Colonel GeneralKonstantin Kobets, designatedChairmanof the State Committeeof the RussianFederationfor Defense.[The decreeconfirming the appointmentis signedon August20.] 4:00 P.M. The air spaceover and the sea and approachesto Gorbachev'sresidencein Foroshavebeendeclaredoff limits by the EmergencyCommittee. 4:47 P.M. Yeltsin has issuedDecreeNo. 61 transferring all executiveorgans, including the KGB, the MVD, and the DefenseMinistry at the All-Union level, to his authoritywithin the RussianFederation. 4:57 P.M. The Council of Ministers of the RussianFederationissuesthe resolution "On the Illegal Introduction of the State of Emergency" supporting Yeltsin's "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia" and DecreeNo. 61. The LeningradCity Sovietissuesa similar statement. 5:00 P.M. In Moscow, RussianPrime Minister Ivan Silaev holds a meetingnearthe White Houseand readsthe two presidentialdecreesand the resolutionof the Council of Ministers of the RussianFederation.He calls upon Muscovitesand Russiansto opposethe unconstitutionalcoup d'etat. He statesthat the whereaboutsof Gorbachevareunknownto the Russianleadership.
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST19,1991 343 Armored carriersclearall approachesto ManezhSquare.The trolleycarsoverturned by demonstratorsacrossfrom TverskaiaStreet are removed and armored vehicles placed along all streets leading to the square. An officer requeststhat the gathering disperse,but the crowd is now growing again. Copies of the presidentialaddressand decreeshower down onto Tverskaia Streetfrom windows in the MoscowCity Soviet. Meanwhile,Yanaev,Pugo,Baklanov,Starodubtsev,and Tiziakov are holding a press conferenceat the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs PressCenter. Yanaevstatesthat Gorbachev"is restingand undergoingmedicaltreatmentin the Crimea." He explainsthat the stateof emergencyhasbeendeclared"in a very difficult periodfor the countryin orderto avoid excessesof any sort." 5:10 P.M. Yeltsin issueshis Appeal of the Presidentof Russiato Soldiers and Officers of the USSR Armed Forces,the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. Characterizingthe actions of the EmergencyCommittee,he says:"The 'order' promisedus by the self-appointedsaviorsof the Fatherland will end in wholesalesuppressionof dissent,concentrationcamps,and nighttime arrests." In Moscow, tanks and military vehicles attemptingto cross Borodin Bridge toward the city centerwere stoppedby demonstratorswho have blockedthe route with busesandtrolleycars.The military forcestum back, with one officerfiring his automaticrifle into the air. 5:15 P.M. The barricadesaround the White House have been reinforced with concreteblocks and dumpsters,but there has been no attempt to storm the building. SeveralthousandMuscoviteshaveformed a humanchain aroundthe building complexin orderto defendit. 5:30 P.M. Yeltsin has issuedPresidentialDecreeNo. 62 creating"a government in exile," including Vice PremierOleg Lobov; memberof the Presidiumof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet,SergeiKrasavchenko;andmemberof the StateCouncil, Aleksei Yablokov. They leave Moscow for Sverdlovsk(Yekaterinburg) andestablishtemporaryheadquarters in a specialbunker70 kilometersoutside the city. The USSR Central Bank has announcedthat it is terminatingthe saleof hard currencyto citizensgoing abroadon personalbusiness. 5:55 P.M. At the emergencysessionof the LeningradSoviet, the deputiesoppose the introduction of a state of emergencyin the city. Sobchakhas flown to Leningradfrom Moscow. All approachesand entriesto the LeningradSoviet havebeenblockedby trucks. 6:00 P.M. A meetingof the USSRCouncil of Ministers is convenedby Valentin Pavlov to discussthe operationof the economyunderthe stateof emergency. Among the ministerspresentat the meeting,only Minister of Culture Nikolai
344 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 19.1991 Gubenko and Minister of Environmentand Natural ResourcesManagement Nikolai Vorontsov expresstheir loyalty to PresidentGorbachev.Vorontsov offers to serveas an intermediarybetweenthe EmergencyCommitteeand the Russianleadershipin the White House. A scheduledplenary sessionof the CPSU Central Committee is postponed until the USSRSupreme Soviethasbeenconvenedto discussthe introduction ofthe stateof emergency. 6:38 P.M. Yeltsin hasissuedhis Appeal of the Presidentof Russiato the Patriarch of All Russia. 7:00 P.M. The Congressof Compatriotsopensin Moscow. Yeltsin is now not expectedto officially openthe congressas plannedfor 7:00 P.M. Participantsin the congressissueno statementregardingthe unfolding eventsin the country. 7:20 P.M. LeningradMayor Anatolii Sobchakappearson Leningradtelevision's program "Fakt" along with Deputy Mayor ViacheslavShcherbakovand the head of the Leningrad Regional Soviet, Yurii Yarov. Sobchak calls for a political strike and a rally to take place the following day on St. Isaac's Square.Earlier in the day, Sobchakreportedat an emergencysessionof the LeningradCity Soviet that PresidentGorbachevhad beenaskedto resign but had refused and demandedto be allowed to make a televised appearance. Sobchak'sspeechat the sessionof the city soviet was broadcastlive by radio to St. Isaac'sSquarewhere a protest rally was taking place. The work of erectingbarricadeshascontinuedoutsidethe city soviet. 8:08 P.M. The presscenterof the LeningradKGB acknowledgesthat the introduction of the stateof emergencycameas a surpriseto many KGB officers. It appearsthat supportfor the StateEmergencyCommitteewithin the KGB is far from unanimous. 8:52 P.M. The RussianInformation Agency reports that Yeltsin has addressed severalthousandpeoplegatheredoutsidethe White House.He announcedthat the Russiangovernmentwould remainin the White Housearoundthe clock. 9:00 P.M. The USSRtelevisionnewsprogram"Vremia" goeson the air according to its regularschedule.In additionto the readingof the EmergencyCommittee decrees,the programcontainssensationalreportsfrom MoscowandLeningrad showing--ina sympatheticlight-massresistanceto the coup. 9:40 P.M. The "Vremia" studio receivesirate phone calls from, among others, Boris Pugo,CPSU Politburo memberAleksandrDzasokhov,and the headof the MoscowParty organization,Yurii Prokofiev, whoare outragedby the reportfrom Moscow.Finally, Yanaevcalls andsaysthat"it wasa good,balancedreport." is madeon the newly createdRadioof the Supreme 10:00 P.M. An announcement Soviet of the RussianFederation--RadioRussia--broadcasting from the White
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20, /99/ 345 House to clear away the barricadesto make way for a tank unit from the TamanDivision which will guardthe White Houseduring the stormingthat is now expectedto comeduring the night. Shortly thereafterthe tank unit, commandedby Major SergeiYevdokimov,takesup its guardpost. Eight armoredscout vehicles flying the Russiantricolor arrive at the White Houseunderthe commandof Major GeneralAleksandrLebed.Lebedreportedly announcesthat he and airbornetroops from the Tula Division have arrived to protect the legal Russian authorities on orders from the APF commander,ColonelGeneralPavelGrachev. 10:20 P.M. Human rights activist Yelena Bonnercalls upon Muscovitesto "defend freedom." 10:30P.M. Yeltsin signsa decree(No. 63) namingandcondemningthe leadersof the coup for their criminal acts.He appealsto all organsof stateto upholdthe Constitutionandoffers legal protectionto officials disobeyingthe ordersof the EmergencyCommittee.This is the last decreeissuedduring the first day of the coup. According to a pressreleaseof the EmergencyCommittee,the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RussianFederationhas orderedthat cadetsfrom the academiesof the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs be transferred,fully armed,to Moscow no later than August 21. Acting on ordersfrom the EmergencyCommittee,the USSRMinister of InternalAffairs hasvoidedthe orders of Russia'sMinistry ofIntemalAffairs. 11:30P.M. The independentnewsagenciesInterfax andPostfactumas well asthe RussianInformation Agency are still operating.Copies of the underground editionsof NezavisimaiagazetaandKuranty arecirculated. Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov returns to Moscow and addressesthe crowd outsidethe White House. August 20, 1991 12:00 A.M. Five of thirteenmines in Vorkuta go on strike. By noon threemore mineshavejoinedthe protest.It is expectedthat the remainingfive will go on strike aswell. Miners in the Kuzbassalsopreparefor strikes. Personnelof the radio station Moscow Echo have been informed that the Sklifosovskii EmergencyMedicineInstitute,which hasthe largestfacility for emergencytreatment in Moscow,is preparingto receivelargenumbersof wounded. 12:15 A.M. The RussianInformation Agency reportsthat the leadershipof the army, the MVD, andthe KGB aswell asmembersof the EmergencyCommittee itself arevacillating in their supportof the coup.
346 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST10, 1991 In Leningrad,Mayor Sobchakholds a pressconferenceandpredictsthe defeat of the coup. He statesthat all the deputiesfavor conveningan Extraordinary Sessionof the Congressof People'sDeputiesof the USSR.He also saysthat GeneralSamsonovhasgiven his word of honorthat military forceswill not be movedinto the city. Nonetheless,thereare reportsof troopsandtank columns moving toward Leningrad.Meanwhile, the mayoral offices have beenbarricadedand Molotov cocktails readied.A guard for the building is assembled out of officers of the OMON andAfghan war veterans. 1:00 A.M. Half the telephonesin Ivan Silaev'soffice havebeen disconnected,complicatinghis communicationswith governmentofficials in otherparts of Russia. Nearly 10,000peoplehave assembledoutsidethe White House.Self-defense units arebeingformed. 2:00-3:00A.M. Thereis a reportthat Yeltsin tried to contactYanaev,unsuccessfully. Later, Yeltsin reachesYanaev,who tells him that Gorbachevis not yet capableof performinghis dutiesowing to the stateof his health. 3:11 A.M. Thereis an unconfirmedreportthat Gorbachevflew out of Simferopol the eveningof August 19, his destinationwas unknown.Witnessesreportthat he appearedto be in goodhealth. 4:00 A.M. Demonstratorsbelievethat the stormingof the White Houseis imminent. The peoplewho spentthe night defendingthe building appealto Muscovites to relieve them so that they can go home and rest. According to the independentnews agencyInterfax, Ivan Silaev appealedto the defendersof the White Housenot to disperse"until peoplecometo relieveyou." 4:52 A.M. A column of armoredtransport vehicles approachingLeningrad is sighted52 kilometersoutsidethe city. Accordingto official orders,theseunits shouldhavearrivedat midnight. By 5:00 A.M., KGB andArmy divisionshave joinedthe columnnearGatchinaoutsideLeningrad 5:00 A.M. A deputy of the LeningradSoviet reportsthat close to 150 military vehicles,tanks, and APCs are moving toward Leningrad. Self-defenseunits arebeingformed outsidethe building of the LeningradSoviet. 6:07 A.M. In Moscow, Silaevgivesa radio addressat the White House.He thanks the demonstrators. 6:54 A.M. In Moscow,the citywide protestagainstthe introductionof the stateof emergencyin the USSR,plannedfor noon, is movedfrom ManezhSquareto the White Housedue to fearsthat tear-gasmay be usedagainstdemonstrators. ManezhSquareis completelyfilled with armoredvehiclesandtroops. 8:02 A.M. Accordingto the RussianInformation Agency, Colonel GeneralPavel Grachev,hasbeenput underarrest[this reportprovedto be incorrect]. Highly
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20, /99/ 347 placedofficials of the Russiangovernmentreport that the Airborne Assault Division which arrived from Tula to protect the White Housewas acting on Grachev'sorders. 9:00 A.M. The White House Radio announcesYeltsin's decreecalling for a political generalstrike. 9:31 A.M. OutsideLeningrad,the column of armoredvehiclesstopsits advance andretreatsfartherfrom the city. A meetingis in progresson the squareat the Kirov Factoryin Leningrad.The numberof protesterson the squareis estimatedat 10,000. 10:00A.M. In Leningrad,the protestmeetingplannedfor PalaceSquarebegins.It lasts until 1:00 P.M. with an estimated130,000to 300,000participants.The meetingissuesa unanimousdeclarationin supportof the decreesof the Russianparliament,the LeningradSoviet,andLeningrad'smayor. After the meeting, groupsof protestersproceedto the LeningradSovietto guardthebuilding. In Moscow, RussianVice PresidentAleksandr Rutskoi, Silaev, and Khasbulatov havereportedlyleft the Kremlin by car to presentAnatolii Lukianov with an ultimatum. Thousandsof peoplecontinueto arrive in the vicinity of the White House.The building of barricadescontinues. Yanaevhasissueda decree,datedAugust20, overrulingYeltsin's decreesnos. 59,61,62,and63 of August 19 on the groundsthat they are"at variancewith the laws andthe Constitutionof the USSR." The EmergencyCommitteeissuesits ResolutionNo.3, establishingtight controls overthe electronicmedia,closingdown Russia'sTelevisionandRadioas well as Moscow Echo, and orderingthe KGB and MVD "to take additional measuresin orderto ensurethatthe decreeis carriedout." 10:36 A.M. A memorandum,signedby Yeltsin, Rutskoi,Silaev,andKhasbulatov, is presentedto the Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet of the USSR(Lukianov), requesting,amongotherthings,an urgentmeetingwith Gorbachev,the lifting of the stateof emergencyfor the duration of the sessionof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet,the lifting of censorship,and the disbandingof the Emergency Committee. 11:00 A.M.-12:00 noon. Major GeneralLebedwithdrawshis battalionsfrom the vicinity of the White Houseon ordersfrom ColonelGeneralGrachev. 11:00 A.M. The headof the GoverningBoard of the USSRCentral StateBank, Viktor Gerashchenko, sendsa cableto the headsof the CentralBank Branches and the National Banks in the republics demandingthat they carry out their
348 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 20, 1991 duties as outlined in ResolutionNo. 1 of the EmergencyCommitteeor face dismissal. The RSFSRPressand Information Ministry registersObshchaiagazeta(Joint Newspaper),a publication formed by a consortium of eleven independent papersbannedby the EmergencyCommittee. According to the pressservice of the CPSU Central Committee,the Deputy GeneralSecretaryof the CPSU,Vladimir Ivashko,hasbeenhospitalizedfor a minor operation. According to the same source, no plenary sessionof the CentralCommitteeis expectedin the next two days. 11:15 A.M. The leadershipof the USSRCinematographers' Union issuesa statement protestingthe introduction of the stateof emergencyand declaringthe actionsof the EmergencyCommitteeillegitimate. 11 :30 A.M. Rutskoi, Silaev, and Khasbulatovreturn to the White House from their visit to Lukianov. They are greetedby an enthusiasticcrowd when they arrive at the White House. 11:31 A.M. The Presidiumof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet has resolvedthat an emergencysessionof the SupremeSoviet is to be convenedat 11:00 A.M. the following morning (August21). 11 :54 A.M. There is an unconfirmedreportthat Gorbachevarrived outsideMoscow by plane the previousevening.Rumor has it that he is being held under KGB guardat a residenceoutsideMoscow. Thereareunconfirmedreportsthat Air Force General Yevgenii Shaposhnikovhas been placed under arrest on Yazov'sorders.[Thesereportsprovedto be incorrect.] 12:00noon. Outsidethe parliament,a rally beginsunderthe slogan"The Defense of Legality and the Rule of Law." The estimatesof the size of the rally vary from 70,000to over 150,000. There are now four different radio stationsbroadcastingfrom inside the Russianparliamentbuilding. At the rally, RussianVice PresidentRutskoi explainsthat the putschleaders havebeengiven 24 hoursto meetthe Russianauthorities'demands.He reports that Lukianov himself admits the illegality of the State Emergency Committee'sactions.Yeltsin alsoaddresses the rally andreaffirmsthe position ofthe Russianleadership. Meanwhile, outside the Moscow City Soviet, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gavriil Popov, EduardShevardnadze, and Sergei Stankevichaddressa rally of thousands.They call the coup plotters "state criminals." At the conclusionof the rally, the demonstratorsmarch to the White House carrying a giant tricolor flag which is to adornthe balconyofthe White House.
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20,1991 349 A meeting of the headsof the "creative" unions is held at the office of the USSRMinister of Culture,Nikolai Gubenko,to discussa commonresponseto the introductionofthe stateof emergency. The Central Committeeof the USSRKomsomol hasissueda strongcondemnationof the EmergencyCommittee. 12:17 P.M. It is reportedthat the EmergencyCommitteeis preparinga decreeto removeYeltsin from his postasPresidentof Russiaandprosecuteboth Yeltsin andGeneralKobets. Units of the USSRMinistry of Intemal Affairs in Krasnoiarskhold a gathering in supportof Yeltsin. 12:30 P.M. Colonel Ivanov of the staff headquartersof the Leningrad Military District EmergencyCommitteestates,in reply to a reporter'squestion,that the attitude of troops toward the addressesissuedby Yeltsin and the Leningrad Sovietis "positive." An emergencymeetingof the Congressof RussianBusinessCircles issuesa strongcondemnationof the EmergencyCommitteeandappealsto the business communityabroadfor support. 12:34 P.M. The Presidiumof the Moscow Soviet appealsto the military to avoid civil war andnot to openfire on citizens. 1:00 A.M. Mstislav Rostropovichhas arrived in Moscow from Paris and proceededdirectly to the White House. 1:40 P.M. RussianVice PresidentAleksandrRutskoi hasbriefed reportersabout his meeting with the Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet Lukianov (see 10:36 above).Accordingto Rutskoi,Lukianov saidthat he would convenea meeting of the Presidiumto considerthe legal status of the State EmergencyCommittee'sdecreesandwould insistthat Gorbachevbe permittedto attend.Lukianov hopedto contactthe President,who was reportedto be alive andwell. Rutskoi believedthat Gorbachevwas still underguardby a specialunit of KGB troops at a dachain the Crimea,andnot in Moscowas somehavereported. Colonel Qaddafiof Libya hassenta congratulatorytelegramto Yanaev. MoscowEchoradio stationis backon the air. 2:50 P.M. According to the RussianInformation Agency, the EmergencyCommittee has issued arrest warrants for the USSR People'sDeputies Sergei BelozerstevandOleg Kalugin. 3:00 P.M. GeneralKobets sendsthe SupremeCommanderof Russia'sCossack Forces,Mikhail Nesmachnyi,to the Mounted Regimentof the Mosfilm Film
350 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20, 1991 Studiosto take possessionof horsesand weaponsneededby the Cossacksfor the protectionof the legitimategovernmentof Russia. USSR Minister of Environment and Natural ResourcesManagement Vorontsov and USSR Minister of Chemical and Oil Refining Industry Khadzhiev sign orderstransferringtheir respectiveministries to the jurisdiction of the Presidentof the RSFSR''temporarily,until power is restoredto the Presidentof the USSR." 3:09 P.M. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RussianFederationissuesa diplomatic note disclaiming responsibility for any acts by the Emergency Committeeand requestsforeign governmentsto freeze gold and currencyreservesand cargo until an extraordinaryCongressof People'sDeputiesof the USSRconvenes. 3:15 P.M. PresidentBush calls Yeltsin and askshim about the stepstaken by the Russianleadershipto restoreorder. Bush expressesunqualifiedsupportfor GorbachevandYeltsin on the partof G7 nationsandpraisesYeltsin for his courage. 3:26 P.M. Inside the International Section of the CPSU Central Committee, instructionsare circulatedon preparingsecretdocumentsand internal memos for destruction. 4:00 P.M. In Moscow,the rally outsidethe White Houseendsandthe movement of military units intensifies. The Moscow Soviet receivesa report that the storming of its building is scheduledfor 8:00 P.M. The mayor and city soviet call uponMuscovitesto go thereandstandwitnessto any bloodshed. The formation of self-defenseunits outsidethe White Housecontinues. 4:02 P.M. Editors of bannednewspapersjointly preparea sixteen-pageissue of Obshchaiagazeta. 4:11 P.M. It is raining in Moscow. The RussianInformation Agency reports that troops loyal to the EmergencyCommitteewill attempt to storm and seize the White Housethis evening.A part of thesemilitary forces are reportedlynearthe centerof Moscow and are armedwith sniper rifles equippedwith night vision scopes. 4:28 P.M. Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov holds a meetingto warn all Muscovites aboutthe criminal penaltiesfor thosewho attemptto createalternativeorgans of poweron the basisof ordersof the EmergencyCommittee. 4:39 P.M. Former USSR Foreign Minister EduardShevardnadze,speakingat a meetingoutsidethe White House,saysthat ''the dictatorshipwill not succeed." 4:51 P.M. SergeiStankevichannounceson the radio of the RussianparliamentRadioRussia--thatthe stormingof the building may be imminent. He calls for full readinessandrequestsall womento leavethe building.
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20.1991 351 4:55 P.M. Boris Yeltsin meetswith EduardShevardnadze to discussjoint efforts to restorelaw andorderin the country. 5:00 P.M. Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain telephonesYeltsin to inform him that his governmentis not evenconsideringthe questionof recognizing the EmergencyCommittee.In responseto Yeltsin's words about the planned attackon the White House,Major assuresYeltsin that were this to happen,the world communitywould actmostdecisivelyagainstthe putschists. The Japanesegovernmenthas announcedthe suspensionof trade and economic cooperationwith the USSR. A columnof a hundredtanks entersTallinn, thecapitalof Estonia,andproceedsto a neighborhoodwheretheRussian-speaking populationis concentrated. 5:19 P.M. The Presidentof the Republicof Moldova, Mircea Snegur,hasissueda decreedeclaringthe EmergencyCommitteeillegitimate andits actsillegal. 5:25 P.M. According to the RussianInformation Agency, a snappoll of Muscovites hasbeentakenon August20. Out of 1,500polled, 10 percentsupported the introductionof a stateof emergencyand79.4 percentwere opposed.Only 3.9 percentexpressedconfidencein YanaevasActing President;2.3 percentin Prime Minister Pavlov. In addition: 53 percentbelievedthat Gorbachevmust resumehis dutiesasUSSRPresident;82 percentsupportedYeltsin; 72 percent wantedorder in the country restored;64 percentbelievedthis shouldbe done within the constitutionalframework; and59 percentbelievedthe actionsofthe EmergencyCommitteewould exacerbatechaosanddisorder. 5:28 P.M. According to news reports,the defenseof the White House is to be reinforcedwith six battalionsfrom the Leningradregion as soonas air transport canbe arranged. At the meetingof the Presidiumof the SupremeSovietof Russia,the storming of the White Housewasjudgedto be highly likely. 5:44 P.M. Yeltsin hasaddressedthe crowd outsidethe White House.He saysthe junta will stopat nothing to hold on to powerbecausethey haveeverythingto lose. He notesthe stateof emergencyhasonly beenintroducedin thoseplaces wheresupportersof democracyhold power. He calls for calm andaskspeople to refrain from any actsof provocationagainstthe military. 5:48 P.M. Yeltsin assumesthe responsibilitiesof Commander-in-Chiefof all the armedforceson the territory of the RussianRepublicuntil Gorbachevresumes his dutiesas Presidentof the USSR. 12:00-6:00P.M. A meeting is being held at the office of the USSR Deputy Minister of DefenseVladislav Achalov for the purposeof preparingoperational plans for attacking the White House. Among those presentare: Vladislav
352 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20, 1991 Achalov; Pavel Grachev, Commanderof the Airborne ParatrooperForces; Boris Gromov, DeputyMinister ofInternal Affairs; Genii Ageev,First Deputy Chairman of the KGB; General Viktor Karpukhin, the Commanderof the "Alpha" unit; and General Boris Beskov, the Commanderof the KGB unit "B." They are joined later by General Aleksandr Lebed and Dmitrii Yazov. The attackplan, code-named"Thunder,"wasto be carriedout at 3:00 A.M. 6:00 P.M. Speakingover the White House intercom system, Yeltsin adviser Sergei Stankevich reportsthat, accordingto reliable sources,Gorbachevand his family arebeingheld at the presidentialdachain Forosin the Crimea. There are two divisions in Moscow: an armored and a motorized infantry division. Two specialpolice units are also stationedin the city. The troopsare groupedat Kuntsevo,the city center,the Kirov metro station, and on Leningrad Prospect.Oleg Poptsov,the headof the RussianRepublicTelevisionand deputy of the RSFSRSupremeSoviet, calls on the residentsof Moscow and officials of transportenterprisesto block the advanceof thesetroopsby forming a ring aroundthe White House. Volunteersoutside the White Houseare being instructedin self-defense,including the use of gas masksand Molotov cocktails.The defendersare asked to form into units often. Women havebeenaskedto fraternizewith soldiers. Somewomencarry signssaying"Soldiers,do not fire at mothers." Leningrad'sdeputy mayor, Rear Admiral ViacheslavShcherbakov,has been appointedby Yeltsin to be Commanderof the LeningradMilitary District. 6:25 P.M. Lukianov informs Yeltsin's aidesthat he has spokenwith Yazov and Kriuchkov andboth deniedplansto stormthe Russianparliament. Accordingto Yeltsin's PressOffice, YanaevtelephonedYeltsin soonthereafter. Yeltsin: "What are you planning-toseizethe White Houseby force? Do of this action for you both in this country and you realize the consequences abroad?"Yanaev:"I know nothing aboutsuchan order. I will makeinquiries, andif thereis suchan order, I shall rescindit." 7:00 P.M. In Moscow, 40 tanks move from the direction of Kalinin Prospect.In addition to the KGB troops stationedat the Hotel Rossiia,there are reports aboutthe movementsof an armoredtank division and airbornecombattroops. Meanwhile,radio broadcastscontinuefrom the White House. Inside the White House,an order goes out not to tum lights on: snipershave beenspottedon the roof of the Hotel Ukrainaacrossthe river from the building. 7:35 P.M. Yeltsin has appointedColonel General Konstantin Kobets Defense Minister ofthe RussianRepublic. 8:00 P.M. Yeltsin declares:"I don't believethat Anatolii Lukianov did not know aboutthe impendingcoup."
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20, /99/ 353 A meetingof the EmergencyCommitteeis convened.chairedby Yanaevand attendedby a severaltop governmentofficials not membersof the Committee. Yanaevreadshis statementdenouncingthe rumors that the EmergencyCommittee is planning to attack the White House and suggeststhat it be made public. His suggestionis met with silence. Later, after the EmergencyCommitteewent into a closedsession,a decision wasmadeto arrestYeltsin "for a certainperiodof time." The Commanderof the Moscow Military District, Colonel GeneralNikolai Kalinin, announcesa curfew in the city of Moscow from 11:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M. He also indicatesthat a withdrawal of heavy military equipmentfrom the capital will begin at around11:00 P.M. Among the defendersof the White Houseare personnelof the RSFSRMinis- try of Internal Affairs armedwith Kalashnikovrifles. Employeesof the private securityfirm "Aleks," wearingblack stockingson their headsto concealtheir identity, are guardingthe White House. RussianForeignMinister Andrei Kozyrev announcesat a pressconferencein Paris that the possibility of settingup a Russiangovernmentin exile has not beenruled out if the situationfurther deterioratesin the SovietUnion. There are mass rallies taking place in the cities of Saratov and Samarain supportof Yeltsin. 8:10 P.M. The SupremeSoviet of Lithuania condemnsthe actionsof the EmergencyCommitteeas illegal. 8:37 P.M. The Presidentof Tatarstan,Mintimir Shaimiev,supportsthe Emergency Committee.A public rally protestingthe introduction of the stateof emergency, held in Kazanon August20, was dispersedby SpecialForcestroops. 9:20 P.M. The news program"Vremia" announcesnew decisionsby the EmergencyCommittee,including the curfew in Moscow. 9:33 P.M. LeningradMayor SobchakandDeputyMayor ViacheslavShcherbakov appearon LeningradTelevision.The latter appealsto servicemenin the Leningrad region to make a choice in favor of the peopleand fulfill the decreesof the RussianPresident.The emergencysessionsof the Leningrad City and RegionalSovietscontinue. 9:38 P.M. Yeltsin offers legal protectionto thosein the ranks of stateorganswho immediatelyfulfill the decreesand ordersof the President,Council of Ministers,and otheragenciesof the RussianRepublic. 9:43 P.M. The Russianleadershiphas issuedan Appeal of the RSFSRGovernmentto the Organsof Law andOrderandthe People'sMilitia.
354 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 20,1991 9:47 P.M. Rumors[subsequentlyprovedfalse] circulatethat USSRDefenseMinister Yazov has resignedand repudiatedthe army's involvementin the coup. Chief of the GeneralStaff Mikhail Moiseevis said to havereplacedhim. The DefenseMinistry's pressservicedeniesthis report. 9:59 P.M. In Leningrad,artillery officers make severaldemandsfor Gorbachev's releaseandin supportof Yeltsin's call to bring the conspiratorsto justice. 10:00P.M. Tankswith numberspaintedover are seenmoving away from Manezh Squarein the directionofthe White House. All police stationsin Moscowhavebeenshutdown. The military has takenover. 10:37 P.M. RussianDefenseMinister KobetsissuesOrderNo. I commandingall military forces on Russianterritory to disregardall ordersof the Emergency Committee, to prevent the use of force against the civilian population or electedgovernment,andto returnto their normal stations. 10:43 P.M. In anticipationof the expectedstormingof the White House,Russian DefenseMinister Kobets issuesOrder No.2 rescindingthe curfew order. He calls on all involved in defendingthe White Houseto remainat their postson alert. The Moscowmetroannouncesthat trainswili stoprunningat II :00 P.M. 10:50 P.M. Yeltsin has issuedan Appeal to the Troops of the Tamanand Dzerzhinskii Motorized Infantry Divisions and the Kantemir Tank Division. He urgesthem to come over to the side of the electedgovernmentof Russiain defenseof democracy:"My dear sons! I hope that you will make the right choice. I hopethat you will take the side of legitimateauthority, the President of the RSFSR." 11:00 P.M. RussianDefenseMinister Kobets addressesthe People'sDeputiesof the RussianRepublic in front of the White House. Membersof the Russian governmentare issuedweapons.He announcesthat the building will be protectedby nearly 2,000 organizeddefenders,including 300 armedprofessionals. The professionalsinclude militia of the RussianRepublic. Kobets also expectsreinforcementsfrom Minsk. In addition,therearethousandsof people surroundingthe building who are preparedto block the path of military vehicles. There are sixteenbarricadesaroundthe White House. Lights inside the White Houseare extinguished.Gas masks areissuedto everyoneinside the building. The headof securityfor the Russianparliamentreceivesa reportthat the assaulton the building hasbeensetfor 2:00 A.M. Throughoutthe evening,groups of deputiesof the RSFSRParliamentleave the White Houseto meetwith commandersof military detachmentsin Moscow andits vicinity.
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991 355 11 :02 P.M. The Presidentof the GeorgianRepublic,Zviad Gamsakhurdia,appeals to the governmentsof Westernnationsto recognizethe independenceof the USSRconstituentrepublicsin light of the coupd'etatin Moscow. At the same time, he qualifies the eventas "either a backroomdeal or a public spectacle stagedso that certain politicians could collect political dividends that they havebeencountingon." 11 :08 P.M. The SupremeSovietsof Estoniaand Latvia havedeclaredthe actions of the EmergencyCommitteeunconstitutional. 11:11 P.M. Moscow Mayor Popov issueslocal instructions"On the Activity of Public Organizationsandthe Suspensionof the Activity of the MoscowOrganizationsof Veteransof War andLabor" (which haddeclaredtheir supportfor the EmergencyCommittee). August 21, 1991 12:00midnight. The White Housevolunteersform groupsof 100; bulldozersand tractorsarerepositionedto face in the directionof the anticipatedattack. Gennadii Burbulisasksthe volunteersnot to sacrificethemselvesbut to allow the attackingvehiclesto go through:"We mustwin a moral victory." If they are to arrive at the White Housefor the attack,the paratroopersunder the commandof GeneralPavel Grachevmust begin to move at midnight, but Grachevhasrefusedto give the order. 12:06 A.M. Burstsof automaticgunfire are heardfrom the direction of the U.S. Embassy. Shotsring out in the vicinity ofthe White House. 12:1 0A.M. More shotsareheardfrom nearthe White House. 12:20 A.M. People'sDeputiesmeetbriefly in the White Houseto discusswhich routesto taketo meetmilitary formationsmassingin the areaaroundthe building. The Krymskii Val by the river and Kalinin Prospect,a broad avenuethat leads straightto theWhite House,areespeciallydangerousplacesto be atthis time. 12:31 A.M. In the areaof the barricadeserectednear SmolenskSquare,single shotsring out. A detachmentof five armoredvehiclesattemptsto passthrough a tunnel running along Tchaikovsky Streetbetweenthe u.s. Embassyand SmolenskSquare.The headvehicle is trying to ram a trolleybusbut it fails to makean openingin thebarricade. A 23-year-oldAfghan veteran,Dmitrii Komar, jumpsonto APC No. 536 and tries to ''blind'' the vehicle with a tarpaulin. He is thrown off, gets up, and
356 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST2/, /99/ jumps into the openhatchof the APC. The APC lurches,andKomar is thrown out of and draggedalongsidethe APC. Vladimir Usov, who is runningto help Komar, is shot dead.Another defender,Igor Krichevskii, throws a stoneat the APC. As he beginsto move in the direction of the vehicle, he is shot in the head.All threemen aredead The RussianInformation Agency reportersat the sceneare approachedby an army major who doesnot give his namebut identifies himselfas officer of the 27th Brigade. He tells the reportersthat the storming of the White House is scheduledfor this night, that the attackis to be launchedby thirty tanksand up to forty APCs, andthat closeto one thousandsoldiersare to participatein the operation. 12:35 A.M. The transmitterof Moscow Echo, whosereportershavebeenbroadcastinglive from the White House,ceasesfunctioning. 12:37 A.M. According to the RussianInformation Agency, a poll conductedin Voronezh disclosedthat 49 percent of the 724 polled residentsof the city considerthe EmergencyCommitteeillegitimate; 28 percentconsiderit legitimate;23 percentarenot sure. 12:45 A.M. The chairmanof the Control Commissionof the RSFSRCommunist Party telephonesChairman of the USSR SupremeSoviet Lukianov, asking him to do everything possibleto avoid bloodshed.Lukianov replies that he cannotdo anythingand that it was Yeltsin who had provokedthe situation in the first place("Wheredid his weaponscomefrom?" Lukianov wondered). 12:57 A.M. The City of Samarasupportsthe Presidentof Russia. 1:03 A.M. RussianVice PresidentRutskoi warns those gatheredin the White Houseabouta possibleassaultby KGB agentsdressedin civilian clothes.He orders the security force to open fire without warning in caseof such an attack. Defenseorganizersat the White Houseask citizensgatheredoutsideto form a humanchain. 1:30 A.M. There is an unconfirmed report that a military group with tanks is stormingthe building of the MoscowCity Soviet. The Moscow Military District Headquartersreports that the Kantemir and TamanDivisions are being withdrawn asunreliable.Only KGB and specialforcesunits will remainin Moscow. 1:35 A.M. People'sDeputy Urazhtsevreportsthat he was arrestedby the State EmergencyCommitteeearlier in the day and urgedto join the coup. Later he was releasedHe says, "I think they do not believe they can win. They're demoralized."
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991 357 I :40 A.M. KazakhstanPresidentNazarbaevcalls Yeltsin andtells him that he has spokenwith Yanaevwho "promisednot to useforce." I :45 A.M. Some30 deputiesgo out onto the streetto try to preventbloodshed. I :49 A.M. The Patriarchof All Russia,Aleksii II, issuesan appeal for peace, saying that ''who raises anns against unarmedpeople commits a grave sin which excommunicates themfrom the Churchandfrom God." I :00-2:00 A.M. Colonel GeneralVladislav Achalov, USSR Deputy Minister of Defensefor EmergencySituations,reportsto Yazov aboutthe first fatalities and the rapidly growing numbersof defendersaroundthe White House. He warns Yazov that the plannedattackwill result in massivebloodshed.Yazov calls off the attack. A.M. The estimatednumberof peoplesurroundingthe White Housevaries from 10,000to 50,000.Reportedlythousandsmoreblock distantapproaches to the Krasnopresnenskaia Embankmentwherethe White Houseis situated. 2:~2:30 Eduard Shevardnadzearrives and enters the parliament building. It is announced by megaphonethat soldiers from one military unit assuredthe People'sDeputiesthey would not fire on the people. The APC involved in the fatal incidentwas attackedby a Molotov cocktail and is burningnearthe tunnel underKalinin Prospect.The humanchainsdefending the parliament are shiftingin responseto reportsaboutmovementsof the attackingtroops. The OMON troopsthat haveguardedthe Moscow SovietBuilding leavefor an unknowndestination. 2:30 A.M. Membersof a Moscowmotorcyclistclub (rokery) return from Kutuzov Prospectand report that no troops are there. Rumors circulate that additional forces have landed outside Moscow and are moving in. The White House defenseheadquarters is unableto confinnthis. There hasbeenno attemptto stonnthe Moscow Soviet. Columnsof military vehiclesleavein the directionofPushkinSquare. 2:43 A.M. River transportcrews bring their vesselsto the Krasnapresnenskaia Embankmentof the MoscowRiver anddeclaretheir supportfor Yeltsin. 3:04 A.M. Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for EmergencySituations,has given assurancesto a USSR People's Deputy thatthe military commandhasno plansto stonnthe White House. 3:08 A.M. Over the previoustwo hours,the Russianleadershiphasbeenin contact with Yanaev,Moiseev (Chiefof the GeneralStaft), Kalinin (Commander
358 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991 of the MoscowMilitary District), andUSSRSupremeSovietChairmanLukianov. All of them-exceptKriuchkov, who could not be found-sworethat they wouldstopthe troops. Although it is quiet nearthe White House,it is not known whetherthe coup leaderswill keep their word aboutnot attackingthe White House.. 3:15 AM. The troops involved in the assaultoperationare leaving Moscow in a chaotic manner.The StateTraffic Patrol reportsthat tankshavebeencrossing the GardenRing Roadfor severalhours--inthe outgoingdirection. 3:16 AM. MoscowEchois back onthe air. 3:24 AM. Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Colonel GeneralBoris Gromov, representatives of the KGB, as well asthe MoscowMilitary District Headquarters deny that the military vehicle burning near the White House belongsto them. It is supposedthat therewerecasualtiesamongthe crews. 3:30 AM. The TamanTank Division hasalreadywithdrawnfrom the city andthe withdrawal of the KantemirDivision is in progress.The retreatfrom Moscow is proceedingat full speed,thoughin an apparently disorganized manner. 3:40 AM. Rutskoi has spokenwith Lukianov: Gorbachev'shealth is fine. Membersof Gorbachev'sSecurityCouncil, Vadim BakatinandYevgenii Primakov, havealsoconfirmedthis information. 4:15 A.M. An Air Force official says that "zero hour" has already passed,so everyonecan sleepeasily now. He assertsthat there is not even one airborne unit in Moscow. He adds that ''the rumors aboutYazov'sresignationare greatly exaggerated;the Minister of Defenseis in commandandleadingthe army." 4:20 AM. The City of Moscow Military Commandant,Lieutenant General Smirnov, expresses regret for the victims and believesthat no military commandersissuedordersto storm the parliament.He statesthat no troops will attemptto seizethe White Houseeither tomorrow or the following day: the rumors aboutthe arrival of additional paratrooperforces at the Kubinka base nearMoscowareunfounded. 4:30 AM. The StateNovember ~mergency Committeeheadedby Yanaevmeetsat the Hotel Oktiabrskaia. An aide to General Kobets reports that units of the Vitebsk KGB Division havehaltedat the entranceto Moscow. 5:00 AM. The cadetsof the Brianskf'olice AcademyareheadingtowardMoscow to aid in the defenseof the White House.Pugohasorderedthe Moscow police to disarmthe cadets. 5:16 AM. Troops have occupiedthe first two floors of the television centerin Tallinn, Estonia.
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991 359 5:25 A.M. Yeltsin'saide StateSecretary GennadiiBurbulis hascontactedKriuchkov severaltimes during the night aboutpossiblemovementsof KGB troopsandhas warnedthe KGB chiefaboutthe dire consequences of any stonningof the White House.Two KGB brigadesin Moscowhavejust beenturnedbackafter Burbulis calledKriuchkov. In Burbulis'sopinion,"a turningpoint has beenpassed." The top leadershipof the KGB is meetingthroughthe night. Headsof departmentseitherrefuseto follow ordersor maintainneutrality. 5:30 A.M. Kobets'sheadquarterslearnsthat the majority of KGB units from the Vitebsk Division never enteredMoscow. White Houseradio announcesthat the Briansk,Orel, and Vladimir police academieswent over to the side of the RussianSupremeSoviet. 5:50 A.M. The leadershipsof severalrepublics of the USSR are preparingan ultimatum to the EmergencyCommittee.The RussianSupremeSoviet will considerit at 11:00A.M. Thecentraldemand:the coupmustbe endedtoday. Early morning. Yanaevcalls Burbulis andexplains:"I only wantedto improve this would have." the countryeconomically,not knowing what consequences 6:07 A.M. The RussianInformation Agency reportsthat, thanksto the intervention by People'sDeputiesGleb Yakunin, Vladimir Kriuchkov [not the KGB Chairman],SergeiYushenkov,andothers,the six APCs trappedin the underpassand blockedby an irate crowd of protesterswere able to leavein peace. Part of the retreatingKantemir Division, they were mistakenlythoughtto be on their way to attackthe White House. 8:00 A.M. The defensestaff of the Russianparliamentreportsthat the dangerof an attackhasnot passedandcalls uponthe defendersto remain. A meetingof the executivecollegium of the USSRMinistry of Defenseis convened. 9:00 A.M. DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov signsthe orderfor the troopsto begin returningto their permanentbasesimmediately. 9:25 A.M. DefenseMinister Yazov resigns. 10:18 A.M. Moscow Echo goes off the air, again, on the order of a unit of paratroopers.The unit was sent to the studio on the orders of the Moscow Commandant.The explanation:an unknown radio station calling itself Moscow Echo was broadcastingfrom 1:19 A.M. to 3:47 A.M., sharplyexaggerating the numberof victims andspreadingothermisinformation. 10:43 A.M. The MoscowCity andRegionalSovietscall on peopleto cometo the defenseof the White House in the eveningand to report the movementsof military units in the areaby telephone.
360 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991 11 :00 A.M. The emergencysessionof Russia'sSupremeSoviet begins,as planned, a~enda, "On the Political Situationin RSFSRObtaining with a single item on the November as a Result of a Coup d'Etat" The sessionis televisedlive on the USSR TV channel. Rus1anKhasbulatovopensthe sessionof Russia'sSupremeSovietwith praise for thosewho opposedthe coup and defendedthe Russianleadership.He says the responseto the eventsby the leadersof Kazakhstan,Ukraine, Moldova, andthe republicsin the Caucasuswas somewhatlate in coming. He thanksthe leadersof countriesin the West and EasternEuropefor their strong support againstthe coupattempt. The armoredvehiclesthat have beenpostedoutsidethe Novosti Information Agencyfor two daysarebeingwithdrawn. 11:09 A.M. PresidentialDecreeNo. 65 "On Insuring the Functioning of Enterprisesand Organizationsin the RussianRepublic" is circulated.The decreeis datedAugust20. 11 :56 A.M. The Moscow city governmentdeclaresthe curfew introducedthe previous day to be illegal and demandsthe immediatewithdrawal of troops beyond the city limits. Soon after, the Commanderof the Moscow Region Military District, Colonel GeneralNikolai Kalinin, makesthe following statement: "RespectedMuscovites! The pasttwenty-four hours havedemonstrated the unsuitability of continuing the curfew in the capital city. Taking into accountthe sociopoliticalsituationin Moscow, I havedecidedto discontinuethe curfewbeginningAugust21." 11:()(}-12:00 Members of the EmergencyCommittee arrive at the Ministry of Defenseto convinceYazov to rescindhis order to withdraw the troops from Moscow. Yazov refusesand suggeststhat they all go to seeGorbachevin the Crimea. 12:00 noon. Yeltsin's PressSecretary,Pavel Voshchanov,reportsthat an agreement has been reachedwith Kriuchkov that the RussianRepublic leadership will go to Forosto meetwith Gorbachev. Deputy General Secretaryof the CPSU Ivashko tries to contactYanaev to learnthe whereaboutsof the CPSUGeneralSecretaryGorbachev. I 12:30 P.M. RussianDefenseMinister Kobets has confirmed to a reporter that Kriuchkov'sorderto attackthe White Housedoesindeedexist. 12:55 P.M. Yeltsin announcesat the emergencysessionof the RussianSupreme Soviet that KGB chief Kriuchkov shouldbe arriving there at one o'clock. He again calls the coup unconstitutionaland refers to two previousattemptsat a coup from the right. He requeststhat Western leaders attempt to contact Gorbachevwho is still beingheld in the Crimea.
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991 361 1:20 P.M. In his speechto the emergencysessionof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet, Khasbulatovoutlines the reasonsfor the coup, the chief among them, the desireof the "reactionaryforces to torpedothe Union Treaty." He expresses indignationaboutthe coverageof eventsprovidedby the newspapersPravda andSovetskaiaRossiiaandSovietTV. He recommendsthe immediatetransfer ofthesemediaorgansto the authorityof the RSFSRgovernment. 1:31 P.M. The RussianSupremeSovietauthorizesRussianPrimeMinister Silaev and RussianVice PresidentRutskoi to accompanyKGB chief Kriuchkov and medical expertsto reachGorbachevand confirm that he is both alive and in goodhealth. The sessiontakesa recess duringwhich time it is learnedthatKriuchkov who, it is suspected,gavethe ordersto stormthe White House,will not be appearing. 1:53 P.M. Yeltsin hasannouncedthat the membersof the EmergencyCommittee are headedtoward Vnukovo Airport in Moscow. He recommendsthe authorizationof their detentionat the airport. 2:00 P.M. KazakhstanPresidentNursultan Nazarbaevresigns from the CPSU Central CommitteePolitburo, stating as his reasonthe fact that the Central Committee Secretariatsupportedthe coup by attempting to force regional Partyorganizationsto collaboratewith the EmergencyCommittee. 2:12 P.M. RuslanKhasbulatovreportsthat two officials of the KGB cameto the White Houseandrequestedthat the live TV broadcastofthe RussianSupreme Sovietsessionbe terminated.The broadcastcontinuesuninterrupted. 2:18 P.M. The plane carrying several membersof the EmergencyCommittee (Kriuchkov, Baklanov, Tiziakov and Yazov), along with Lukianov, Ivashko and the commanderof the presidentialguard, Plekhanov,takes off for the Crimea from the Vnukovo-2 Airport before a unit of Russia'sMVD forces arrivesthereto arrestthem. 2:20 P.M. Officials of the Moscow city governmentand the military conclude negotiationson the removalof troopsfrom the city. 2:30 P.M. RadioRussiaresumesbroadcastingfrom its regularstudios. 2:55 P.M. Commanderof the Moscow Military District Colonel GeneralNikolai Kalinin announcesthat earlierin the morningthe DefenseMinistry Collegium met, in the absenceof Dmitrii Yazov, and decidedto rescindthe curfew in Moscow and to withdraw the troopsfrom the capital and return them to their permanentbases. 3:12 P.M. Sourcesat the Scientific-IndustrialUnion report that Arkadii Volskii spokewith PresidentGorbachevby phonetodayandthat the Presidentwas in good health. [Gorbachev'scommunicationslines were not restoreduntil after 4:15 P.M.]
362 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991 3:15 P.M. According to the Russian Information Agency, the Chairman of Ukraine's SupremeSoviet, Leonid Kravchuk, informed Lukianov in a telephone conversationthat if the stateof emergencywere to be introducedin Ukraine, massprotestsand disturbanceswould be likely and that he, Kravchuk, would not try to dissuadepeoplefrom taking part in them. 4:00 P.M. The eveningedition of /zvestiiagoeson sale with a bannerheadline, "ReactionHasFailed." 4:08 P.M. The presidentialplanecarryingmembersof the EmergencyCommittee, Lukianov, Ivashko, and others lands at the Belbek Military Airport in the Crimea.Two governmentlimousineswhisk the passengers off to Gorbachev's dachain Foros.As soonas they arrive, Gorbachev'spersonalguardputsthem under arrest. Gorbachevrefusesto see them until his communicationsare restored;after they are restored,he refusesto seethem until the arrival of the RSFSRgovernmentdelegation. Gorbachev'sfirst phonecall is to Yeltsin, followed by calls to the leadersof other republics,Chiefof the GeneralStaffMoiseev,andtheKremlin Commandant. 4:14 P.M. Sevenmembersof the StateEmergencyCommitteeare reportedto be under arrest. Rumors circulate that the USSR DefenseMinister Yazov has committedsuicide[this provesincorrect]. 4:30 P.M. AleksandrDzasokhov,memberof the CPSUPolitburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee,holds a pressconferenceand declaresthat "the use of emergencypowersby whateverpolitical force is inadmissible. 4:52 P.M. A plane carrying Ivan Silaev, Aleksandr Rutskoi, two membersof Gorbachev'sSecurity Council, Vadim Bakatin, Yevgenii Primakov, ten People'sDeputiesof the RSFSR,and 36 militia officers, armedwith submachineguns,takesoff from Vnukovo-2 Airport for Foros. 4:56 P.M. Khasbulatovreportsthatthe planecarryingmembersof the StateEmergency Committeehas landedin the Crimea. The plane carrying Silaev, Rutskoi, andothersis en route. A meetingbetweenYeltsin and the Chief of the GeneralStaff of the USSR Armed ForcesMoiseevhasbeenscheduledfor the evening. A resolutionis adoptedby the Presidiumof the USSRSupremeSovietcalling the coupunconstitutional. 5:05 P.M. The collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defenseindicatesthat all troopshavebeenwithdrawnfrom Moscow. 5:12 P.M. Accordingto the poll conductedon August20 by the All-Union Center for the Studyof Public Opinion, out of the 4,567peoplesurveyedfrom differ-
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991 363 ent regionsof the USSR,20 percentsupportedthe EmergencyCommitteeand 62 percentconsideredits actionsillegal. In Russiaand Kazakhstan,the figures were 23 and 57 percent,respectively;in Ukraine, 14 percentwere for the EmergencyCommitteeand72 percentagainst. 5:30 P.M. An avalancheof pressconferencesbeginswith stateofficials andother representatives hasteningto declaretheir respectfor the electedauthoritiesand to repudiatethe actionsof the coupleaders.At his pressconference,the USSR Minister of ForeignAffairs AleksandrBessmertnykhexplainsthat he was ill until today. 5:36 P.M. An emergencysessionof the Moscow City Soviet is scheduledfor 10:00A.M. Thursdaymorningto discussthe political situationin Moscow. 5:53 P.M. PresidentNazarbaevof Kazakhstanreports that he has just had a telephoneconversationwith Gorbachev.The SovietPresidentis still underthe protectionof his thirty KGB guards.Membersof the EmergencyCommittee are at the dachain Forosseekingan audiencewith the President.Nazarbaev urged Gorbachevnot to negotiatewith the coup leadersand to await the delegationarriving from Moscow. 6:08 P.M. The Presidiumof the MoscowCity Sovietproclaimsthe funeral day of thosekilled to bean official day ofmouming.In additionto the threefatalities, therewerefour otherswoundedby gunfire. 6:22 P.M. A presidentialaide,Georgii Shakhnazarov, reportsthat it is not known whenGorbachevwill returnto Moscowto resumehis duties,but that members of the State EmergencyCommittee will be removed from their posts. He refusesto saywhetherthey will be prosecuted. 6:30 P.M. The landing strip at the Belbek Military Airport near Gorbachev's dachain the Crimeais blockedoff, reportedlyon Kriuchkov'sorder.The plane carryingthe RSFSRdelegationmay haveto land in Simferopol,which is five hours'drive from Gorbachevdachain Foros. 6:36 P.M. Departmentsof the USSRMinistry of Internal Affairs andthe KGB in chargeof Moscow andthe Moscow region havebeentransferredto Russia's jurisdiction. 6:45 P.M. After contactingby telephonethe planecarryingthe RSFSRdelegation, Gorbachevordersthe Chief of the USSRGeneralStaff Moiseevto clear the landingstrip at Belbek.The orderis carriedout at once. 7:02 P.M. Troops leave the radio and television centersoccupiedearlier in the day in Lithuania and the telephonecommunicationscenterseizedin Vilnius two daysearlier. 7:14 P.M. Arkadii Volskii (memberofCPSU Central Committee)has called on the CentralCommitteeto condemnthe coupin orderto free the Partyfrom any suspicionconcerningits involvementin the events.
364 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991 7:16 P.M. The planecarrying the RSFSRgovernmentdelegationlands at Belbek, andthe passengers, including Silaev,Rutskoi, Primakov,andBakatin,are soon greetedby the Gorbachevs.Rutskoi recalled:..It was clear from the looks of Gorbachevand RaisaMaksimovnathat what hadtakenplace wasnot a show, that they had indeed been isolated and psychologicallywere ready for any eventuality." Beforeleaving for Moscow, Gorbachevmeetswith Lukianov and Ivashko. He calls Lukianov ''traitor!'' 8:00 P.M. PresidentGorbachevis expectedto be arriving in Moscow from Simferopollatertonight. 8:11 P.M. Russian Defense Minister Kobets issues an addressto Muscovites praisingtheir efforts and calls for calm to expeditethe removal of troopsfrom Moscow. 8:26 P.M. The Russianparliamentis now in recessuntil the following day. A crowd of people still remainsgatheredoutsidethe White Houseand several thousanddecide to spendthe night there, keeping vigil. The barricadesare being cleared away but one remains as a symbolic reminder of Moscow's determination. Debris has beenclearedfrom SmolenskSquarewherepeoplewere crushedby tanks, but the overturnedtrolleycars still block traffic. The withdrawal of troopscontinues. 9:05 P.M. The evening news program "Vremia" broadcastsa brief statement issuedby SovietPresidentGorbachev.He stressesthat he is fully in command of the situation.He will returnto Moscowin a few hours. 9:30 P.M. Yeltsin issues"Demandsof the Presidentof the RSFSRto the Organizers of the Anti-ConstitutionalPutsch"calling for an end to all anticonstitutional actionsby 10:00P.M. It is addressed to Yanaev,Baklanov,Kriuchkov, Pavlov, Pugo,Starodubtsev,Tiziakov, andYazov. 10:00 P.M. Yeltsin hasissuedPresidentialDecreeNo. 69 "On the MassMedia in the RussianRepublic," affirming press freedomand transferringGosteleradio installationson Russia'sterritory to Russia'sjurisdiction. Yeltsin hasissuedPresidentialDecreeNo. 70 removinga numberof chairmen from their postson the executivecommitteesof Sovietsof People'sDeputies in the RussianRepublic becauseof their collaborationwith the Emergency Committee. 10:39 P.M. Gorbachevis expectedto arrive in Moscow from the Crimeaaround midnight. He may hold a pressconferenceafter his arrival.
CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991 365 10:49 P.M. At a pressconference(held earlier in the day), First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSRVladimir Shcherbakovattemptsto explain the inactivity of the Council of Ministers during the coup. He statesthat the Presidiumofthe Council of Ministers, which met earlier, has discussedthe issue of the Cabinet'sresignation but decided against it. He also reports that Valentin Pavlov's condition is poor and that the Soviet Prime Minister knew nothing aheadof time aboutthe plansfor the coup. 11 :00-12:00In Leningrad,the City Sovietdecidesto work throughthe night and keepsecurityforcespostedaroundthe building. 12:00 Midnight. The presidentialplanecarryingthe Gorbachevs,the membersof the RSFSRgovernmentdelegation,and Kriuchkov (the other membersof the EmergencyCommittee are on a separateplane) takes otT from the Belbek Military Airport for Moscow. At around2 A.M., the TU-134 presidentialplanelandsin Moscow.
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Index of PersonalNames Achalov, Vladislav,351-52,357 Agapov,Vladimir, 141 Ageev,Genii, 352 Akhromeev,Sergei,29n Aksiuchits,Viktor, 297 Alekseev,Sergei,128 Aleksii II, Patriarchof Russia,179, 357 Allende, Salvador,50 Andreeva,Nina, 342 Antoshkin,Nikolai, 208 Arutiunov, Mikhail, 186 Burbulis,Gennadii,129, 183, 185, 216,297,326,355,359 Burlatskii, Fedor,292 Bush,George,3,48,179,298,350 Babitskii, Andrei, 299 Bakatin,Vadim, 7,108,207,358,362, 364 Baker,James,8, 27n Baklanov,oteg, 11,31,42--43,57-58, 198,338,343,361,364 Barannikov,Viktor, 226 Baskin,1M., 125 Beliaev,Aleksandr,222 Belozertsev,Sergei,349 Beskov,Boris, 352 Bessmertnykh,Aleksandr,27n, 59, 363 Bogert,Carroll, 44, 310 Bogoraz,Larissa,300 Boldin, Valerii, 10,57-58,65,162, 198,338 Bonnell,Victoria E., 25, 85 Bonner,Yelena,95-96, 108,294,296, 298,300,345 Borshchev,Valerii, 297 Bragin,Viacheslav,186 Brezhnev,Leonid, 136,237,292,299, 307 Bunich,Pavel,125 Bulgakov,Mikhail, 247 Daniel, Aleksandr,293 Daniel, Yulii, 293 Dapkus,Rita, 309 Davletova,Liudmila 190 de Cuellar,Peres,179 Delacroix,Eugene,252 Dementei,Nikolai, 166 Denisenko,Bella, 278--80 Doguzhiev,Vitalii, 188--89,192-93, 195,199 Dubcek,Alexander,271 Dzasokhov,Aleksandr,304, 344,362 Dzerzhinskii,Feliks, 15,84,290 Carnegie,Dale, 125 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 136 Chegodaev,Dmitrii, 290 Chekhov,Anton, 248 Chemiaev,Anatolii, 164 Chemyshevskii,Nikolai, 136 Cooper,Ann, 26, 308 Elliot, lain, 26, 289 FederovSviatislav,125 Filatov, Sergei,276 Filin, Vladimir, 297 Filippov, Sergei,256 Freidin,Anna,98 Freidin,Gregory,25, 71,181,185, 187,193-94,209,226,267-83 Freidin,MonosGrigorievich,86 Freidina,Gita Samuilovna,86 367
368 INDEX Gabrielants,Grigorii, 187, 192 Gaidar,Yegor, 333 Gamsakhurdia,Zviad, 355 Gavrilov, Igor 185 Gdlian, Telman, 297,339, 341 Gelman,Aleksandr,216 Generalov,Viacheslav,29n Genieva,Yekaterina,293, 295 Gerashchenko, Viktor, 347 Gidaspov,Boris, 220-22 Glier, Reinhold,157 Gogolev,Viktor, 341 Golovachev,V.G., 135-36,139, 141-42,145 Golovatov,Mikhail, 29n Goncharov,Sergei,29n Gorbachev,Mikhail, 3-12,14--17, 19, 21,23,25, 26n, 27n, 31, 33-34,42,44,46-47,50-59, 61-63,65-67,85-86,88,96, 104,108-9,115,117,122,124, 127,131-33,135, 138-39, 142-43,147,150,161,171, 180-82,187,191,194-96,198, 200,202-4,207-8,210-11, 215-16,226,228,231,273,279, 283,295-96,299,308,310,314, 317,320,328,331-32,337-39, 342-44,346-52,354,358, 360-65 Gorbacheva,Irina, 162, 168 Gorbacheva,Raisa,162, 198, 364 Gorodnichev,Yurii, 115 Grachev,Andrei, 216 Grachev,Pavel,13, 18,24,28n, 29n, 204--5,341,345-47,352,355 Gremitskikh,Yurii, 50 Gromov,Boris,8, 352, 358 Gubenko,Nikolai, 192,214--15,217, 343-44,348 Gusev,Vladimir, 190 Gutiontov,Aleksandr,270, 285 Hetzer,Michael, 26, 253 Hofheinz,Paul,304 Ignatenko,Vitalii, 161, 168,320 Ilf, Ilia, 125 Isaev,Boris, 184 Isakov,Vladimir, 184 Ivanov, Viacheslav,293 Ivanova,Tamara,72 Ivashko,Vladimir, 167,215-16,348, 360-62,364 Kabakov,Aleksandr,298-99 Kakuchaia,Olvar, 301-2 Kalinin, Nikolai, 60, 341, 353, 357, 359-61 Kalugin, Oleg, 226, 294, 349 Kamchatov,Mikhail, 339 Karaulov,Andrei, 201 Karimov, Islam, 166 Karimov, Rubit, 211 Karpukhin,Viktor, 18, 29n, 352 Katushev,Konstantin,190 Kedrov (yeltsin'saide),205 Keller, Bill, 301, 305-8,311 Khadzhiev,Salambek,193,217,350 Khasbulatov,Ruslan,24-25,44, 46, 72,109,129,138,141,171,177, 179-80,183-85,208,219,258, 270,272,280,297,316,339, 341,347-48,360-62 Khazanov,Gennadii,168,295 Khrennikov,Tikhon, 214 Khrushchev,Nikita, 49,138,198,236 Khudonazarov,Davlat,25, 2~12, 214 King, Martin Luther, 244 Kiselev, Anatolii, 111, 113, Kobets,Konstantin,175, 179, 187, 205,216,274,322,326,328, 336,341-42,349,352,354, 358-60,364 Kohl, Helmut, 50, 298 Kolodizhner,Asya, 318 Komar, Dmitri, 355-56 Korsak,Aleksandr,29n Korzun, Sergei,290 Kotkin, Stephen,327 Kozhevnikov,Aleksei, 26, 263 Kozyrev, Andrei, 179,353 Kramarev, Arkadii,220-21,223 Krasavchenko,Sergei,185-86,343 Kravchenko,Leonid, 301, 303-5,338 Kravchuk,Leonid,166,362 Krichevskii, Igor, 356
INDEX 369 Kriuchkov, Vladimir, RSFSRdeputy, 359 Kriuchkov, Vladimir A., Chairmanof the KGB, 8, 11,24,31,43, 57-59,66-68,176,180,187, 192,194-95,198,205,231,294, 305,310,333,338,352,358-61, 36~5 Kruchina,Nikolai, 29n Kucher,Valerii, 26, 322, 323-28, 330-35 Kulik, Gennadii,185 Laptev,Ivan D., 229 Latsis,Otto, 216 Latynina,AlIa, 292 Laverov,Nikolai, 193 Lavrov, Kiril Iu., 215 Lazutkin, Valentin V., 303-5 Lebed,Aleksandr,13, 18, 28n, 178, 341,345,347,352 Leighton,LaurenG., 25,100 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 107, 128, 139, 143,297 Leontiev,Yaroslav,295 Lermontov,Mikhail, 124,325 Liapunova,Yelena,182,283-84 Likhachev,Dmitrii S., 224 Lisov, Yevgenii, 22, 27n, 29n Litvinov, Mikhail, 299-300 Litvinov, Pavel,300 Litvinova, Flara,299-300 Liubarskii, Kronid, 300 Liubimov, Aleksandr,298 Lobanov,Viacheslav,143-44 Lobov,01eg,343 Lukianov, Anatolii, 29n, 41, 54, 58, 63, 133, 137, 147, 167,169, 179, 188,197-98,211,279,331,339, 341,347-49,352,356,358, 361-62,364 Lukin, Vladimir, 273 Major, John,298, 351 Makashev,Albert, 207 Makkhamov,Kakham,213 Malkina, Tatiana,26, 49, 311,318-21 Maltsev, Igor,338,342 Mameladze,Irma, 292 Marcuse,Herbert,251 Markov, Sergei,296-97 Martynov,Vladlen,A., 273-74, 279 Masliukov, Yurii, 192 Matlock, Jack,27n, 185 McMichael, Scott,27n Medvedev,Sergei,12-13,26,28n, 301,303,305-7,312 Mikhaleva,Irina, 322-28,330-35 Mirabeau,Comtede, 273 Mironov, Viacheslav,186 Mitterand,Fran~ois, 179 Moiseev,Mikhail, 166-67,206,354, 357,362-63 Moskaleva,Lena,321 Mostovoi, Anatolii A., 240 Murenin, K.D., 136 Nazarbaev,Nursultan,166,357,361, 363 Nazimova,AlIa, 26, 28n, 267,269-73, 276-78,281-85 Nesmachnyi,Mikhail, 349 NicholasII, Tsar,92 Orlov, Vladimir 190 Paniukov,Boris, 167, 190 Pavlov,Valentin, 8-9,11,17,24,27n, 31,43,58,62-66,96,128,176, 178,187-95,197-99,206,253, 310,333,338,340,343,351, 364-65 Petrik, Vladimir, 25, 111-19 Petroff, Serge,25,120 Petrov,Boris, 223 Petrov,Yevgenii (Kataev),125 Pinaev,Valerii B., 259 Pinochet,Augusto,50, 143,310 Platonov,Y urii, 214-15 Plekhanov,Yurii, 10, 29n, 58, 65, 67, 161,198,338,361 Pobedinskaia,Olga, 116 Poliakov,Maksim, 154-55 Politkovskii, Aleksandr,299 Poltoranin,Mikhail N., 293, 329
370 INDEX Popov,Gavriil, 23, 29n, 3On, 108, 182,211,229-30,290,345,348, 350,355 Poptsov,0leg, 352 Primakov,Yevgenii, 358, 362,364 Prokhanov,Aleksandr,26, 249, 251 Prokofiev,Yurii, 304, 306, 344 Proselkov,Nikolai, 339 Pugo,Boris K., 8, 11, 17,31, 42-43, 48,53,59,104,129,136,187, 192,195,231,297,304,338, 343-44,358,364 Pushkin,Aleksandr,123, 294 Shcherbakov,Vladimir, 25, 27n, 62, 191,195-97,199,365 Sheinis,Viktor, 26, 28n, 267-81, 284-85 Shekochikhin,Yurii, 292 Shenin,Oleg, 29n, 57-58, 198 Shevardnadze, Eduard,3, 7-8,14,86, 108,127,131,176,188,226, 229,245,294,297,315,348, 350-51,357 Shishkin,Gennadii,338, Shkabardnia,Mikhail S., 189 Silaev,Ivan, 14,25,44,46,72,138, 141,171,177,183-85,270,272, Qaddafi,Muammaral-, 349 316,323,326,328,331,339, 342,346-48,361-62,364 Slepov,S., 142 Raleigh,DonaldJ., 25,131 Slepov,Yu.G., 138 Razumovskii,Andrei, 209 Smirnov,Andrei, 209 Riabev,Lev,187,192 Smorchevskii-Butterbrod,122,283-84 Riabinnikov,Vladimir, 53 Snegur,Mircea, 351 Rodionov,Igor, 222 Sobchak,Anatolii, 13,25,49,182, Roe,Ben, 309, 314-17 203,215,218,221-22,298, Rostropovich,Mstislav, 109,300,349 343-44,346,353 Rutskoi, Aleksandr,14,24,109,119, Sokolov,Mikhail, 267, 299 128-29,179,183,185,207-8, 257,270,272,316,347-49,356, Solzhenitsyn,Aleksandr,247 Spiridonov,Lev, 340 358,361-62,364 Ryzhkov,Nikolai, 189,331 Stalin, Joseph,97,109,203,230,243 Ryzhov,Yurii, 183-85,188 Stankevich,Sergei,290, 328, 342, 348,350,352 Starodubstev,Vasilii, 11,31,42-43, Sabonis-Chafee, Theresa,26, 235n, 48-49,137,338,343,364 241,246 Stepankov,Valentin, 22, 27n, 29n Safarov,Bozaruli, 213 Sagalaev,Eduard,306 Surkov,Aleksei, 278 Suslov,Mikhail, 120 Sakharov,Andrei, 4-5, 95,108,135, Sychev,Valerii, 190-91 152, 183n,294 Sale,Marina, 155 Tchaikovsky,Peter,236 Samsonov,Viktor, 220-25,340, 346 Timofeev,Lev, 300, 316 Sartre,Jean-Paul,251 Shaimiev,Mintimir, 353 Timofeev,Timur, 270 Tiziakov, Aleksandr,11,21,31, Shakespeare, William, 120 42-44,191,338,343,361,364 Shaknazarov,Georgii, 164,337,363 Tolstoi, Alexei, 122 Shaposhnikov,Matvei, 221 Shaposhnikov,Yevgenii,25,201-7,348 Tolstoi, Leo, 126,294 Tolstoi, Mikhail, 122-23,126, 128, Shatalin,Stanislav,132 182,283 Shchadov,Mikhail, 192 Travkin, Nikolai, 297 Shcherbakov,Viacheslav,222-25, 344,352-53 Tretiakov,Vitalii, 293
INDEX 371 Trotskii, Lev, 128 Tsalko,AleksandrV., 205 Tsenina,AlIa, 256 Tverskoi,Vitalii, 117 Urazhtsev,Viktor, 339,356 Usov, Vladimir, 356 Varennikov,Valentin, 29n, 58,251 Virginskii, Anatolii, 162, 168 Vishnevskii,Nikolai, 329 Vladislavlev,Aleksandr,188 Volkov, Vladimir, 216, 276 Voloshina,Tatiana,321 Volskii, Arkadii, 361, 363 Voronin, Yurii, 184 Vorontsov,Nikolai Nikolaevich,25, 72,181,185,187,191-94,217, 283-84,341,344,350 Voshchanov,Pavel,360 Vysotskii, Vladimir, 241-42 Yablokov, Aleksei, 183-85,214,343 Yakovlev, AleksandrNikolaevich,3, 7-8, 14,25,27n, 108, 132,209, 226-31,348 Yakovlev, Yegor, 306,329 Yakunin, Gleb, 300, 359 Yanaev,GennadiiI.,11-12,17,270,31, 33,42-48,50-54,56,58-61,63, 65-67,86,107,115,118,132, 136-37,143-44,169,178,180, 196-97,205-6,295,308,318-20, 338,341,343-44,346-47,349, 351-53,357-60,364 Yarov, Yurii, 223, 344 Yaroshenko,Viktor, 186 Yazov,Dmitrii,8, 11, 14, 17,24, 29n, 31,43,55-63,91,104,157,167, 176,187,192,195,201-6,229, 244-45,247,253,279,297,333, 338-39,348,352,354,357-62, 364 Y egorov,Vladimir, 216 Yeltsin, Boris, 4-6, 9,12-14,16-19, 21, 23-25,28n, 29n,44,46, 51, 61,67-68,71-72,75-81,87-88, 90-95,98,104,108,113,117, 120-29,133-35,137-39, 141-42,145,149-50,166, 170-76,181-86,188,193-94, 203,205,207-8,211,218-20, 224,226,229,233,236-37, 239-41,243-44,246,257-58, 263,268,270,272,279,282-83, 290,294-97,299,301,303-4, 307,311-13,315-16,322-26, 329,333,339-54,356-57, 359-62,364 Yeltsina,NainaY., 219 Yevdokimov,Sergei,256-57,345 Yevtushenko,Yevgenii, 95, 108,294 Yushenkov,Sergei,257, 278, 281,359 Zavorotnyi,Valerii, 25, 147 Zhavoronskii,V., 141 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 340 Zorin, N.F., 139 Zorkin, Valerii, 274 Zotov, A.P., 134, 139 Zubkov, Yurii, 259 Zvereva,Maria, 209
About the Editors Victoria E. Bonnell, Professorof Sociologyat the University of California at Berkeley, has written about Russian history, society, and politics. Her books include a study of Russia'sprerevolutionarylabor and revolutionarymovements,an edited volume on Russianworkers underthe tsaristregime,anda forthcomingwork on political iconography in Sovietpropagandaart. Shehasvisited Russiamany times over the pasttwenty-threeyearsand has beena close observerof the Russianscene. Ann Cooperworked as a journalist in Moscow from December1986 through September1991. She openedNational Public Radio'sbureau in the Soviet capital in 1987 and servedas NPR bureauchief for the next four and a half years. She also contributedarticles to the New York Times on politics and changein the Soviet Union. Ms. Cooper workedpreviouslyfor National Journal, The Baltimore Sun, Congressional Quarterly, and The Louisville Courier-Journal. Sheis currently NPR'scorrespondentin SouthAfrica. GregoryFreidin, Professorof RussianLiteratureand the Humanities at StanfordUniversity, is a writer and commentatoron Russianculture andpolitics. The authorof a critical biographyof Osip Mandelstam,he is completinga book aboutIsaacBabel andhis receptionin Russiaand the United States.His articles on contemporaryRussianpolitics and cultural life have appearedin manyjournals. He returnsfrequently to Moscow, where he lived before emigrating to the United Statesin 1971.