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STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY XXVII
NATURALISM AND DEONTOLOGY An Essay on the Problems of Ethics by D. A. R O H A T Y N Roosevelt University Chicago, Illinois 1975 MOUTON THF. H A G U E • P A R I S
©Copyright 1975 in The Netherlands Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 73-92240 ISBN: 90 279 3233 6
Rohatyn: Naturalism and Deontology: ERRATA p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p. 32, 51, 86, 98, 98, 99, 102, 102, 103, 119, 1. 19, delete extreme left-hand bracket from the logical formula fn. 120, read 'prepositions' as 'prop.ositions' 1. 14, change last word on line from 'to' to 'now' fn. 81, 5th line, read'Searly'as'Searle' fn. 81,1. 10, read 'Promising' as 'promising' 1. 5, delete the word 'a' fn. 94, 3rd line, read 'dagmatists' as 'dogmatists' fn. 94,4th line, delete second occurrence of '1' in 'Evil' 1. 26, change 'of to 'on' entry under Baker, change '229' to '299' in pagination
For Stevie, who knows all about meta-meta stuff
PREFACE The critics will have no trouble dissecting this work. They will find hyperbole, vagueness, lack of sound argument and sometimes of argument itself, sloppiness, discontinuity, and even misinterpretation. Since enemies are always more numerous than friends, one must suspect, indeed expect, the worst. Dire prognostications about the nonfuture of this book are probably correct, but at the same time they are of very little interest. The main, and perhaps the only redeeming feature of the present volume is that it raises issues which philosophy has, to its own embarrassment, neglected. As long as the neglect does not continue, there will be no reason for further shame. If some of the ideas (for which no originality is claimed, by the way) presented here receive a more thorough trial, the effort made will be rewarded. If not, then it will be up to future generations to see to it that the effort was not wasted, if they dare. Without John Donnelly, not one page here would have been written. His patience in reading, and painstakingly criticizing, every draft and early version of each chapter made it possible for it to be done, let alone possess any conceivable merit. The responsibility for mistakes and defects is of course entirely our own; but without his help, they would have been far more numerous, and infinitely graver in consequence. Only his assistance enabled numerous personal obstacles and limitations to be overcome. Without the patient support, encouragement and above all, deep and continued friendship of the person to w h o m this little treatise is dedicated, life would not be worthwhile. D.A.R. Chicago January, 1973
CONTENTS Preface I II VII Introductory 1 Protreptic Logic 9 III How to Prove the Principle of Utility 22 IV The Searlian Challenge 66 V Postlogue 107 Bibliography 116 Index 126
I INTRODUCTORY Is there a permanent, logical gulf separating statements of fact ('is') from propositions expressing value ('ought')? A corresponding question has explicitly concerned philosophers ever since Hume's famous remark proposing the very distinction. 1 Today this is considered in some quarters the fundamental problem of ethics, in that the construction of a valid theory of obligation within a cognitivist framework seems dependent upon supplying a successful counter-instance to the 'is-ought' disjunction, before it can be begun or certified as rational. One may wonder why the concept of obligation should be boosted so prominently. Undoubtedly, the work of Kant and Kant's effect on ethics are reasons why obligation looms so greatly in contemporary ethical discussion. From one angle, moreover, moral philosophy 'reduces' to a theory of obligation. Suppose that the ethical standard to which one subscribes is the Good. Is it then not incumbent to pursue the Good? Therefore, would it not be odd for a person (let alone a philosopher) to say "x is good, but do not pursue (bring about, realize, obtain, enjoy) x"? Would this not contradict the plausible maxim that bonum faciendum ('the good is to be done')? Regardless whether one identifies the good with pleasure, or happiness, or something else, it would be startling simultaneously to admit that an JC is worth having, in some sense, and yet not go on to recommend that x, to oneself as well as to (many or all) other moral agents. It would be exceedingly strange to make such a judgment, regardless of any other logical concerns external to the issue under consideration. This point is not i D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 8 8 8 ) , 4 6 9 - 4 7 0 . We shall briefly discuss Hume's own contribution to the 'is-ought' dispute in Chapter III, 36-37, 4 3 .
2 INTRODUCTORY affected in case good is wrongly identified with something else; indeed G. E. Moore plus a number of recent philosophers hold that 'good' is in principle mistakenly identified with anything else. From such a perspective it is easy to see why ethics seems (ordinarily) t o imply a theory of obligation, at bottom. However, this 'reduction' is mistaken, for the following reasons: (1) It would be equally odd to hold that it is someone's duty to pursue his own pleasure or happiness, even within the context of a "self-realization" ethic. Since Kant and Mill, attention has been paid to the idea of "self-regarding duties", 2 but whether any such obligations do exist, or it is fruitful to think so, 3 remains largely a muddle. Moreover, making the attainment of one's own satisfaction a matter of obligation is redundant, inasmuch as it will be pursued wholeheartedly and by virtually every individual, and at nearly all times, with no exhortation necessary, 4 provided there is an opportunity to do so. The truth to the doctrine of psychological hedonism is that people will usually seek out that which they conceive to be their own good, or in their own interest, regardless whether this happens to enjoy the benefit of a moral stamp of approval, or not. The problem is often to convince people to be willing to make what are eventually, if ever, perceived as worthwhile sacrifices (subordinations of one's own welfare), generally in the name of the rights and interests of others, of mankind, or one's community. (2) It is likewise odd to contend that it is everyone's duty to promote the well-being of others, although this is maintained by utilitarians. 5 Odd, because it tries to link together two incompatible positions: hedonism and altruism. Perhaps there is an explanation for this, 2 The terminology (self-regarding duties) occurs initially in Kant, but is used for a special purpose, and with an idiosyncratic meaning. See the "third example" in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. 3 For discussion, see Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., reissue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 7, 327-331; and Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 311-318. 4 Compare Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section I, paragraph 11. s See R . T a y l o r , Good and Evil (London: Macmillan, 1970), 8 9 - 9 0 , 9 2 , for critique.
INTRODUCTORY 3 but in the first blush it is as peculiar to opt f o r a combination of hedonism and altruism, as it is to a f f i r m that x is g o o d , but that x should not be f o l l o w e d or realized, at one and the same time. 6 (3) Consider the statement S: " x is worthy o f approval, but d o not go after x". S seems implausible, even self-contradictory; but is it? Only if w e accept a version o f the so-called "universalizability ( o r generalization) detectable. If thesis". Here again Kant's philosophic w e simply deny outright that the impact is universalizability- criterion ( o r , e.g. Hare's "prescriptivism") is the proper foundation f o r ethics, then there is nothing to carp about, f o r there are then no general rules, applying t o all men in similar situations; no paribus ceteris clauses, in other words. This undermines utilitarianism, t o o , even in its most primitive formulation, f o r there is always at least one principle o f distributive justice at w o r k , namely, 'the greatest happiness o f the greatest number'. This objection cuts deeper generalization-argument applies, f o r almost any than merely denying, e.g. that the always and without conflict or exception proponent of universalizability would be willing to concede that much; to be defended, all S requires is that w e be open to possible alternative 'systems' o f ethics — o f which there are examples, which neither make explicit use o f generalization-principles, nor implicitly rest on them (e.g. Nietzsche). Sometimes these theories are so distinctive as to resist classification, altogether. (4) " x deserves approval, but shun it as a g o a l " may even make per- fectly g o o d sense within, e.g. the framework o f a Stoic position, according to which it would not be worth the e f f o r t and/or pain that must be endured in order to reach x. Or take a moral " s k e p t i c " , w h o is reluctant to advise either himself or others what to do, owing to his conviction that both speculative and practical certainty as to whether any x is indeed meritorious, is unattainable. (5) Unsimilarly, an "existentialist" is usually convinced that he has n o right to tell other people what t o do, because that w o u l d be " b a d f a i t h " , made worse b y actually f o l l o w i n g his counsel; he may there- 6 We presuppose that no clash of e.g. duties operates at the time when such an edict might or would take effect.
4 INTRODUCTORY fore refuse to issue any guide entertaining a well worked out notion of e.g. the good, without necessarily arresting or looking askance at such edicts in general. (6) Finally, recalling Aristotle, one might remonstrate that there is a marked difference between 'the Good' and what is good for us as individuals; perhaps it is only the latter that we can ascertain with any degree of reliability. Therefore we have no universal basis f r o m which to tell people in absolute and imperative terms what they should be at, morally speaking. For all these reasons, we do not see that ethics can be glibly "reduced" to a theory of obligation, making anything left over derivative therefrom. Viewing ethics as wholly contained by deontology demands much further argument. Therefore, while the fact-value "split" in value-theory is a matter of extreme urgency and significance, the 'is-ought' question, which is logically subordinate thereto, is not nearly so crucial to ethics as is frequently suggested. For this very reason, repeated inability to resolve the riddle posed by the 'is-ought' dilemma becomes more frustrating. Such failure is all the more embarrassing in that an adequate deontology is not the sole or overwhelming criterion for a workable ethic, as we have just seen. Let us then surmount, if possible, the 'is-ought' obstacle, by focusing upon three successive attempts to deal with specific deontological questions. These are, respectively: the exhortation to philosophy known as the "protreptic argument", stemming f r o m Aristotle; the " p r o o f ' of the principle of utility in the writings of J. S. Mill; and the very recent, celebrated attempt by Searle to "derive" an 'ought' f r o m an 'is' via the example of promising, which concept is created as a "speech act". We shall expound, partly defend, and at the same time undertake extensive revision of each thesis to be examined; evaluate their intrinsic acceptability; and lastly, in the Postlogue, take up fresh challenges, and ferret out implications of the results achieved. One interesting common feature is that all three arguments selected do generate a multitude of "large questions" about philosophy, ones that demand responses, in their own right: should we study or " d o " philosophy, and if so, why? What does the denial that the first premise of an ethical theory can be put on a sound logical footing tell us about the "meaning" of life, the trust to be placed in philosophical
INTRODUCTORY 5 approaches thereto? What limitations govern moral philosophy as an inquiry, and how do these condition reflective attitudes toward "everyday" language? What are the advantages, and the drawbacks, of currently favored methods in each of these areas? And so on. All these items are of intrinsic importance, and all will receive their due. The three major topics are therefore all gratifying in their range and depth. The chapters which follow are each self-contained explorations. Yet we should be remiss not to prepare for the onslaught, with a few needed preliminary remarks. The 'is-ought' controversy is treated most sophisticatedly, as well as directly, by Searle. Searle's "derivation" at its climactic moment, amounts to a logical transition from a neutral description of agreeing to do something, to the morally decisive assessment that it ought to be done. The example chosen by Searle is a straightforward and familiar one: one's obligation to pay a debt, as contracted and expressed by a verbal promise or "speech act". This requires essentially no further explanation beyond the complete commentary provided in Chapter IV, and in the Postlogue. We consider next an assumption whose dramatic and initial "intuitive" plausibility is great: namely, the "necessity" to philosophize (a thesis originally propounded, from all available evidence, by Aristotle). If it can be demonstrated that philosophizing is a necessary occupation, pursuit, activity, life-dimension or undertaking, then it is possible to conclude that we "must" philosophize, i.e. that all men are under a sort of Socratic obligation (e.g. to themselves). This result would surely function as both a normative and a descriptive doctrine, simultaneously. Moreover, it would act as a kind of theorem, thereby enjoying all of the logical force connected with more usual apodictic pronouncements. Such a feat, if but once accomplished, would in addition successfully bridge the 'is-ought' chasm. After a detailed examination of the scope and merits of this famous but neglected argument, we show that (regrettably) it is fallacious. One can already see that the attempt to narrow the "gap" between 'is' and 'ought' is much older than the classic, initial explicit formulation in Hume. What Hume pioneered was the denial of a legitimate passage between 'is' and 'ought', which makes the effort to carry out that deduction by invoking the 'special case' of philosophy all the more intriguing. The "protreptic argument" as attributed to Aristotle might also be summarized in the following dictum: "we have no choice whether or
6 INTRODUCTORY not to philosophize; the only choice is whether we shall do it well or badly". 7 Presumably, one always prefers to do something well rather than badly, //one prefers to do it at all; here, there is no decision as to whether one shall be a philospher or not; so the choice, if there is one, never rests with us, anyway; what then remains is the injunction to become as good a philosopher as one can, which men may obey by some kind of natural or inborn impulse, rather than (say) under duress. While this formulation accords with much of Aristotle's thought, it does not do the protreptic argument justice, when independently formulated. For one thing, do we philosophize willy-nilly, as this version of the argument contends? There is certainly room for doubt. Secondly, the thrust of protreptic thinking is to get men to philosophize; this kind of moral exhortation would be pointless and out of place, if men already did engage in reflection. Thirdly, if men do philosophize, perhaps they ought not to; this is at once an application both of Moore's 'open-question' argument (the companion to the 'naturalistic fallacy') and numerous other statements of the supposed 'is-ought' cleavage, whose general validity is under examination here. So the J. otreptic argument invites early refutation, if not demolition. Moreover, it is not clear that men would always do something well rather than poorly. The duffer who shoots eighteen holes on the weekend has no desire to golf like a champion, although he may admire those who do, even go so far as to study their techniques. Philosophy matters more than golf; or does it? That contention is also at stake in the protreptic argument, and therefore has no business being an implicit assumption of it. It is also not necessarily a matter of choice whether we philosophize well or ill; it could be largely a matter of talent, and therefore either a 'gift' or native aptitude. Are philosophers made or born? Are athletes? We can in time make ourselves somewhat better golfers by practicing diligently out on the links, and likewise better philosophers by much hard work, but even after all that, the duffer will as likely rival Nicklaus, as we match Plato. This analogy may not hold up eternally, but it lasts long enough to indicate that philosophy is not (except for logic) a skill, any more than poetry 1 The writer is indebted to Fr. Vincent G. Potter, SJ, for extended and very fruitful discussion of this feature (among many) of the protreptic argument. (Fr. Potter is of course not responsible for any conclusions reached here, nor even for endorsement of the method of treatment we have adopted.)
INTRODUCTORY 7 (as opposed to mere versification) is. So philosophy is not something acquired by mere repetition, mastery of a technique, or the inculcation of a fixed testing-procedure. There is about as much "method in the madness" of philosophy as there is to writing sonnets. This in turn casts aspersions upon the idea that philosophy is performed, so to speak, by us, whether we will it or not. This just looks empirically false, no matter how generously we define 'philosophy', or make allowances for its sporadic appearance. We can see from even an inadequate presentation of the protreptic argument that it yields much material for close and pertinacious study. For example, it might be thought that if philosophy is somehow compulsory, then this rules out or precludes its being obligatory. But this depends upon (a) conflating logical with physical compulsion, and (b) failing to see the connection between logical and moral norms. 8 Once these concepts are elucidated (below, Chapter II, and Postlogue), and corresponding confusions dissipated, the protreptic argument is only reinforced, not quenched. For this reason alone, although we do determine it to be invalid, the protreptic argument is hard to extinguish. 9 Mill's relationship to the 'is-ought' quandary is more indirect, yet compellingly discernible. For, if the moral code known as utilitarianism can be logically grounded, then the obligation, not only to maximize utility in the world (what J. J. C. Smart calls "acting optimifically"), 1 0 but also to uphold the standard of utility (or the true morality) against all rivals or contenders in ethics, is enjoined. For Mill it would be intellectually binding upon all those whose pro8 That there is such a connection is fiercely maintained by Kant, and prominently exploited by Peirce, to give but two examples. 9 Fr. Potter has suggested (in conversation) that in this respect the protreptic argument resembles the ontological argument, or is equally precious; "you can't kill it". We agree. This expression is a way of preserving its integrity and reputation, indeed elevating them, without thereby having to subscribe to it. For an argument can be false, yet edifying; noble, yet incorrcct. The protreptic argument in our judgment, is both. Yet in our evaluation it remains nevertheless a "classic", albeit one with few champions - and no previous antagonists! 10 J. J. C. Smart, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism", Philosophical Quarterly, 6(1956), 354; repr. in M. D. Bayles, Contemporary Utilitarianism (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1968), 115. Compare J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in J. M. Robson, ed., Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1969), 226.
8 INTRODUCTORY fessional responsibility it is to reason meticulously a b o u t n o r m s , e.g. philosophers. If any or all of these concerted attacks achieve the desired result, then the 'is-ought' cleavage will be shown t o be an 'untenable dualism', t o b o r r o w Dewey's expression. That is the main thrust of the present w o r k , and an indication of the drift of its besetting themes: the reconciliation of ethical naturalism with d e o n t o l o g y . Searle writes at one point of desiring t o p r o d u c e an indefinite n u m b e r of counter-examples t o the thesis that one c a n n o t correctly extract an ' o u g h t ' f r o m an 'is'. 1 1 The p r o t r e p t i c argument and the ' p r o o f of utility are unique a t t e m p t s t o furnish such significant materials, although our interpretations d o not uniformly cast these in a favorable light. In the end, neither Aristotle's nor Mill's " o b l i q u e " derivations w o r k o u t ; Searle's does. These all would remain challenging enterprises, even in abject failure. In this respect t h e y resemble the standard set of proofs for G o d ' s existence. Every generation of thinkers, as Kant very perceptively observed, takes u p the task of " r e f u t a t i o n " of " t r a d i t i o n a l " or "classical" arguments a n e w . 1 2 This certainly applies t o a sympathetic reading of the arguments presented b y Aristotle and Mill; and if Searle's e f f o r t goes appropriately rewarded, it t o o will soon deserve a p e r m a n e n t place in the hierarchy, owing t o its soundness. 11 See below, page 100. 12 KcirV A639, 640, 641/B667, 668, 669. See also A135/B174; A850-851 /B878-879; A462-464/B490-492; and esp. A341/B399; A797/B825.
II PROTREPTIC LOGIC Is philosophy indispensable? Is philosophy inescapable? Is it a " m u s t " ? Is it a necessity? These are all equally ambiguous questions. Indispensable? To whom? When? And what for? Inescapable? By whom? And for how long? A " m u s t " ? In the same sense as "you must go to see XYZ playing Hamlet"? Not quite. A "necessity"? Of what? Of life? Of individual existence? For the survival of the species? For the flourishing of a culture? For the aspirations of a civilization? If the answer to any or all of these questions is negative, that does not mean that we should cease being interested in philosophy. But if any or all can be defended, that is, given a positive reply, then it may be asserted that we have an obligation to do, or to continue doing, philosophy. A simple yes or no answer is premature, for the questions each admit of a variety of interpretations. Moreover, it is unclear to whom they each address themselves. Just who are " w e " who have an obligation to philosophize? Moreover, a positive answer to any member of the original set of questions posed above in no way sheds any light on what kind of philosopher anyone is supposed to be or to become, or remain. Nothing is implied about what one is to hold; only that philosophy is worthwhile as an activity, and presumably, is so in itself, or for its own sake. This means that any conclusions regarding the imperative to do philosophy will be contentless, or adirectional, with regard to specific positions. The overall question, namely whether philosophy is a justifiable undertaking, is metaphilosophical, i.e. it is logically prior to "doing" philosophy itself. If the original group of questions is collectively ambiguous, the overriding issue as just formulated suffers from similar defects, as well. Justifiable? To whom? When? For what purpose? And so on. If an
10 PROTREPT1C LOGIC answer is forthcoming to these successive challenges, to be both fulfilling and thorough it must deal effectively with the vexed concept of justifiability. For present purposes this issue will be restricted to whether there is any compelling reason for all individuals to pursue philosophy. One ambiguity we shall dispose of immediately. We distinguish 'reason' from 'urge' or 'need'. A man's personal reason for practicing philosophic inquiry may stem from some biological or psychological drive; this may well be what Aristotle meant when he declared that "all men by nature desire to know". 1 But that does not prove by itself that they should. If knowledge is desirable, then it is so on 'independent' grounds. 2 On the other hand, if one cannot prove the 'value' of philosophy to any given individual, this does not automatically license the inference that philosophy is intellectually dispensable. There are no logical implications whatsoever in the failure to demonstrate that philosophy ought to have some place in the lives of individual persons, although there may be numerous (and grave) cultural ramifications thereof. To show whether philosophy is indeed a necessity, let us center on one strong piece of reasoning in particular, that known as the "protreptic argument". The invention of this argument is credited to Aristotle, on the strength of a lost dialogue of which only fragments have been left behind. 3 We are not concerned with whether Aristotle enunciated the protreptic argument, nor with whether he was the first 1 Metaphysics I, L, 9 8 0 a 2 1 . 2 Mill's ' p r o o f attempts to counter-example just this restatement of the 'is-ought' dichotomy (see below, Ch. III). 3 For details, see I. Duering, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction (Goeteborg (-Studia Graeca et Latina 12, 1961), and W. G. Rabinowitz, Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of its Reconstruction (Berkeley and Los Angeles) (= Univ. of California Publications in Classical Philology 16, 1957). The "protreptic argument" appears to have occurred for the first time in one of the Alexandrian commentators on Aristotle (who was, to be sure, attempting a meticulous textual reconstruction). But modern scholarship concludes that the closest that Aristotle himself came to recommending such a hortatory approach was in a fragment which in pertinent part reads: "for, we ought not to avoid (or shun) philosophy". See A. H. Chroust, Aristotle-. Protrepticus, A Reconstruction (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1964), 23, 38.
PR0TRF.PT1C LOGIC 11 to do so; we are interested in the argument itself, not in the murky historical details, however fascinating. 4 We shall now examine the protreptic argument in its myriad versions and reformulations. According to the protreptic argument: either it is necessary to philosophize or it is not ; if it is, then it is; if it is not, then it is; therefore, it is necessary to philosophize. 5 Here the protreptic argument (hereafter PA) analyzes into three distinct parts: premise, pattern of sentential reasoning, and conclusion. The pattern followed, along natural deduction lines, is one of setting up for disjunction elimination (dis elim) and then carrying through. (Alternately know as a variant of the "constructive dilemma".) In order to see the various possibilities more perspicuously, we shall resort to logical notation to assist us with the entire exercise. First, let us list the four alternative construals as presented by the premise: namely, ( l ) i t is necessary to philosophize; (2) it is not necessary to philosophize (which does not mean that one should not philosophize, either); (3) it is necessary not to philosophize (this is much stronger than (2), and not entailed by it); (4) it is not necessary not to philosophize (which does not mean that one should philosophize, either). What is contested is whether anyone has an obligation to philosophize; yet the PA is usually stated, not in deontic, but in strictly modal terms. The gambit is no doubt to produce an even more cogent PA than circumstance requires. This strategy of "overproof" is also in keeping with the purely logical character of the PA; for whether there is an obligation to " d o " philosophy belongs to the domain of moral philosophy; whereas, the PA attempts to circumvent the problems that would be generated in designating the issue as an explicitly ethical one. The latter-day Nietzschean critique of the "will to truth" as a mere "philosopher's prejuduce" shows that the PA, if it is to be successful, must avoid direct encounters with such problematic areas. By retreating to logic, the PA can hope to win converts to philosophy through the force of its apodictic pronouncements, using methods and 4 See W. Jaeger, Aristotle, 2nd ed., tr. R. Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), and J. D. Monan, S. J., Moral Knowledge and its Methodology in Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). 5 See A. H. Chroust, Aristotle: Protrepticus, A Reconstruction 3, 48-49. For a Stoic version of the protreptic argument as applied to the alleged indispensability of logic. See Epictetus, Discourses, Bk II, Ch XXV.
12 PROTREPTIC LOGIC techniques with which everyone will agree. This strategy appears more promising than a head-on approach to such a delicate subject as "why study philosophy?" (which we interpret as equivalent, at the initial or introductory stage only, to philosophizing itself). Returning t o our four alternatives, we may represent each by letting N stand for logical necessity, and the two-place predicate, pxy (unbound), for 'x philosophizes^'; the rest is self-explanatory: 6 (1) (2) (3) (4) N -N N -.V (x) (*) (*) (x) (Ey) (Ey) (y) (y) (pxy (pxy -(pxy -(pxy We conceive philosophy, minimally speaking, to involve an intentional relationship, one between a given person and what (for lack of a better word) may be termed a subject-matter. 7 There is nothing prejudicial t o schools, systems or doctrines in construing philosophy in the manner we suggest; furthermore, the PA is grounded without making any favorable or unfavorable reference, either to philosophers or major distinguishing ideas and tenets within the field. The PA requires none of this extra-logical baggage in order to get started. Aristotle's main premise, is that "either it is necessary to philosophize or it is n o t " ; i.e. either (1) or (2). Verbally there is some lingering doubt as to whether "not necessary" might mean "superfluous", but if so, then the premise would be: either (1) or (3); which is plainly false. On the other hand, the premise as we accept it, namely, either (1) or (2), is tautologous. From this it is already clear wherefrom the PA's surface plausibility is derived! As a new approximation to the PA's main premise, we might write: (the wedge V stands for inclusive disjunction) (5) N(x) (Ey) (pxy v -N (x) (Ey) (pxy. While this is a logically valid formula, to represent the " e i t h e r . . . o r " component of the premise, something else must serve as the indicator 6 We omit the use of corners to highlight use-and-mention, hybrid expressions. For, philosophy is not a 'property' of anything. One does not "philosophize" in thin air; the activity always takes an object; including, sometimes, itself (denoted by i ^ z , the reflexive relation). And it is always deliberate, even when orginally acted upon inadvertently. 7
PROTREPTIC LOGIC 13 of exclusive disjunction or alternation. Since "either p or q" (but not both) is equivalent to saying that " p if and only if the negation of q", or "p = -q", (5) can be scrapped in favor of (6) N (x) (Ey) 0xy = -- N (x) (Ey)0xy, which in turn reduces to (7) N(x) (Ey) <pxy=N(x) (Ey) Qxy, or the simple extensional equivalence of (1) with itself. Once again, a bare tautology, which eliminates the need to go through the "argument"; for there is none to speak of, here. As (1) puts it, it is necessary to philosophize, and that is that. Small wonder that the PA is so recurrently popular! Since (7) demands no further reasoning, it follows either that (5) is about as close to the PA as we can get, or else that some other combination of elements from (1) through (4) is required, to accurately portray the drift of the argument. So let us follow through on (5), for it is instructive on just this transition from premise to protreptic conclusion. The set-up which the PA uses is that of dis elim. Since (1) follows trivially from (1), the first half of the disjunction, the remaining question is, how to logically squeeze out (1) from (2), its negation? How to pass from the second disjunct in (5), -N(x) (Ey) (pxy to the desired conclusion, N(x) (Ey) (pxy, as the PA demands? Ancient rhetoricians who practiced this venerable art, and perfected it to a high degree, labeled the procedure "miraculous consequence"; it can be schematized as: (-A -+ A) -*• A; in words, if the negation of a formula (or variable) entails that formula, then that formula is entailed by the conditional which has the negation of the formula as antecedent and the formula as consequent. This is a variant of reductio ad absurdum, which is just what the PA needs at this decisive juncture.
14 PROTRI-PTIC LOGIC Can a "miraculous consequence" be elicited from (2), to produce (1)? Aristotle, strangely enough, thought that not, quite independently of the controversial PA, and gave a number of arguments designed to discredit the notion of "miraculous consequence" altogether; these may be found in the Prior Analytics,8 But even a "miraculous consequence" would be of no avail, for ultimately the PA depends, when its logical form is sufficiently expanded, on reasoning which cannot be formalized; it is at this point that the hope of sheerly logical demonstration leaves off, and another kind of debate begins. For, what does it mean to say that "if it is not necessary to philosophize, it (still or yet) is necessary?" Only this: that in order to arrive at the conclusion that philosophy is not a 'necessary' undertaking, we must engage in philosophical inquiry, if only to determine that much. It would be lame to assert that such argumentation is somehow 'prephilosophical'; its character is roughly philosophical, i.e. self-questioning, reflective, and so on. If the issue cannot be settled without actually engaging in philosophical projects of some sort, then the PA will commit us to the tacit realization that philosophy is logically "inescapable", 9 and so succeed. Is, then, the PA valid? Or does it beg its own question? It cannot be proved by formal logical means alone, which dashes its proud methodological hopes. It can only make its appeal on (quasi-) philosophical terms, but not on terms which are alleged to be logically antecedent to philosophical reasoning and scrutiny. The PA therefore represents a philosophically entrenched position, which cannot dispel dissent by the power of deductive inference alone. Yet it does seem curiously compelling. Why? Because the grip which the PA enjoys is due to overlooking the factor of time. Suppose for the sake of argument that philosophy is indeed a 'necessity', or the intellectual equivalent of bread and water. For how long does it remain such? Are we bound to pursue philosophy "forever", that is, for as long as we live; or is there some shorter period of our mortal existence during which time philosophy is manda- 8 See W. Kneale, "Aristotle and the Consequents Mirabilis", Journal of Hellenic Studies 77, Part 1 (1957), 62-66. Kneale's formalization of the "miraculous consequence" is neither modal nor deontic, however. ' See W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 97.
P R O T R E P T I C LOGIC 15 tory? And if so, what period might that be, and how long does it last? Or is any answer both individual and indefinite? Could it be a one-time occurrence for one man, and on similar principles, another man's career? The PAis unable to say. Moreover, what if it turns out that an impartial investigation upholds (2), i.e. the non-necessity of philosophy, what then? Grant that for the length of time that it takes to discover the "answer", one is a philosopher; but is there any compelling reason why one should stay in that condition, especially now that one knows how "unnecessary" philosophy really is? Can the PA survive such a paradoxical result, if forthcoming? Or would the PA be forced to affirm tacitly that "once a philosopher, always a philosopher" regardless what changes the philosopher makes in the way he orients his life — such as dropping philosophy, or taking up another avocation? Here too, the PA is silent. Furthermore, if one does conclude (2), must it be on 'philosophic' grounds? Are these the only legitimate reasons possible why philosophy should not be, or continue to be, a part of a man's life? If so, then it is obvious why philosophy should be thought indispensable: for the ground-rules forbid a non-philosophic rejection, or else claim in advance that any and every refutation of philosophy will be philosophic in tenor. A hypothesized counter-example becomes pertinent: Jones may decide against entering into philosophy because he feels that in a world filled with suffering it is wrong for him to sit by doing "nothing" while people are dying of starvation, disease, in war, and so forth - people he could be helping, instead of e.g. sitting by the fireplace reading books. Even Aristotle points out that the existence of philosophy implies the universal attainment of leisure, as distinct from e.g. mankind having to cope with the necessities of sheer physical survival. 10 Is Jones' decision a "philosophical" deliberation? Hardly. It is about philosophy, but since Jones is virtually ignorant of philosophy itself, his choice cannot be said to have been made on a philosophic basis — Jones has at best only a vague, superficial idea of what he would be getting into if he studied philosophy. Jones' decision is based on reasons, and it may well be considered "moral", or in conformity with certain familiar precepts, but it cannot be said to io See Metaphysics, I, 1, 9 8 1 b 2 0 f f .
16 PROTREPTIC LOGIC be the outcome of philosophic training, 11 unless this very episode be taken as a rude baptism. Oddly, Jones' deliberation upon his own scale of values and priorities makes him feel obligated to resist and refuse the opportunity to philosophize, for the time being, at any rate. The Jones case seems to undercut the PA. So does the PA'S deep conceptual association with the phenomenenon of intellectual conversion. Philosophers quite naturally have a refined, yet heavily vested interest in philosophy and, therefore, are most anxious to display the PA. Take St. Augustine, who in his Confessions recounts twice (Bk. Ill, Ch. iv; Bk. VIII, Ch. vii) that he was led to philosophy through reading a (now lost) dialogue of Cicero's called the Hortensius — one which, from all available evidence, was inspired by, and directly modelled upon, Aristotle's Protreptikos. But, as St. Augustine recalls the story of his introduction into the earnest philosophic life, he is already long since — and irrevocably so — a philosopher. As we become aware of his attachment, we grow skeptical concerning his impartiality, although not his sincerity. St. Augustine's experience may well have been indelibly shaped by Ciceronian thought and style. When one's acquaintance with philosophy is in retrospect destined to be a lasting relationship, however, one's permanent outlook appears hopelessly subjective, even to the most sympathetic observer. Nothing so far implies that there is not a wealth of good reasons for pursuing the philosophic and/or contemplative ideal. The question is rather whether there is something — anything — which would permit one to soundly infer that philosophy is a "must", i.e. a (selfregarding) duty. The only recourse is to review the presentation insisted on at the outset, and to renew the endeavor to make sense out of the drift of the PA in formal logical terms. Accordingly, we abandon (5) and select a fresh pair of alternatives. Now (1) is fixed as one of the disjuncts; this leaves only (3) as a likely co-disjunct, even though such a combination appears to yield a patent logical falsehood. Rather than giving up on the PA prematurely, let us attempt to come up with a formulation which will triumph, but less cheaply and less dearly than i' This "training" or education need not be formal, of course. We hypothesize that Jones is seriously entertaining this proposal for the very first (and perhaps last) time.
PROTREPTIC LOGIC 17 the version which culminated in (6) and (7) did. As a first approximation: (8) N(x) (Ey) (pxy v N (x) (y) -(pxy Second approximation: apply to (8) and explicate, i.e. replace it with an expression which captures the " e i t h e r . . . o r " aspect: (9) N(x) (Ey) <pxy=-N(x) (y)- (pxy (9) reads: either it is necessary to philosophize or it is necessary not to philosophize; 1 2 as remarked before, this is simply invalid; (9) would produce a contradiction if it were allowed into any (otherwise consistent) system of (modal) logic. It is an "all or nothing" proposition, which is false simply upon verbal inspection, preliminary to any logical reconstruction. (9) is simply too strong an equivalence, to be held. So we fall back upon the logically weaker ( 8 ) , 1 3 which states that: it is necessary to philosophize, or it is necessary not to philosophize. Logically odd, this, but not as futile as (9). (8) is worth looking into, if only because its allure is derived from the way in which it capitalizes or trades upon the ambiguity in the word "necessity", as indeed suggesting the opposite of "superfluity". There is, therefore, something of the flavor of an 'either-or' left to (8), in that it insinuates that philosophy is worthwhile — or it is worthless! [see above, page 12]. Can logic take the hint? At least (8) enables us to finally carry out the actual reasoning followed by the PA, in logical terms. As such, however, (8) turns out to be a distinct disappointment. From it follows: (10) (x) (Ey) (pxy v (x) (y) .(pxy, and thence, employing free variables, >2 Equivalently, it is necessary to philospphize if and only if it is not necessary not to philosophize "(1) if and only if (4).' 13 In conditional form, it may be seen that (8) is the right half of the biconditional (9). For, (8) is equivalent to the implication (8') -N (x) (Ey) 0xy DN (x) -0xy, which in turn is equivalent to its transposition, (8") -N (x) (y) -<pxy DN (*) (Ey) <i>xy. But (.9) is equivalent to (9') N (x) (Ey) 0xy D-N (x) (y) -0xy & -N (*) O ) - 0xy DN (x) (Ey) 0xy. So, (9) is stronger than (8).
18 (11) PROTREPTIC LOGIC (Ey) (pxyv{y) -0xy" The nub of the problem has now been exposed. Once again, a set-up for dis elim is used. One half of the desired result falls readily into place, with the cooperation of the first disjunct. But '(y)-(pxy' is in direct contradiction to \Ey) 0xy\ by definition. So to derive any kind of conclusion from (11) is out of the question. If it were possible to insert an additional premise, such as (12) 0) -0xyD(Ey) 0xy, it would then be possible to grind out the first half of (11), (13) (Ey) 0xy15 by modus ponens from the second part of the disjunct; but the nearest we can approach to this is (14) -0) -(pxy 3 (Ey) (pxy, which follows from (11) by successive steps of implication and transposition, respectively. But alas, (13) is not to be, and so the PA goes awry and remains simply unsupportable, logically speaking. (13) cannot be derived for some arbitrary variable (and therefore a universal) x. 1 5 The trouble with (8) is not that it is invalid; quite the contrary. (11) shows that (8), too, is a tautology; it is a cleverly concealed or veiled analytic proposition, but no less analytic for that. The fundamental defect of the PA is that its premise is empty, and thus compatible with whatever other conclusions we may reach. In fact, nothing follows from the premise at all; and this explains the PA'S unique attraction. For its considerable charm and impressiveness 14 The steps to be used in the derivation involve the rules of necessity elimination and universal quantifier elimination, respectively. Note too that (8) amounts to asserting, and in the inclusive sense, '(1) or (3)', which becomes tautologous, much as '(1) or (2)' shows itself to be. 15 The meaning of (13) would be that there is a philosophy to which something else is related (in this instance, a person; for example, [(£Vz)] (Ey) Qay, using constants). The necessity of this relation would not automatically be a consequence, however, 'p' does not entail 'Np'.
PROTREPTIC LOGIC 19 in luring (new) philosophers over to its side lie more in its vacuousness than in its pretensions to precision; and it is just this quality which insures unhesitating adoption of its main premise at the initial stage of the dispute. But how could anyone ever be duped into accepting the PA? The reason is that the PA, although a standard item of the philosophic repertoire, especially at the so-called 'introductory' level, was heretofore taken for granted, and consequently left entirely unexamined. The p a ' s non-cogent persuasiveness is heightened by its being expressly addressed to philosophers, adepts, would-be philosophers, and unintensely non-philosophical critics of philosophy. But the last-named are not in any position (owing to lack of training) to effectively challenge the PA; while philosophers and aspiring philosophers alike fail to take the initiative needed to "see through" the PA, inasmuch as it does provide a convenient "paralogism" to help justify their occupation or defend the status of their profession, to themselves as well as to others. Strikingly, the history of philosophy does not mention any opposition (on any grounds) to the PA. Silence is after all a tacit form of assent. The presumption is, then, that no philosopher has ever wanted to mount a serious challenge to the PA, since this would either be logically self-defeating, or else tend to undermine one's own discipline. No universally binding norm exists for cultivating philosophic endeavors; one can be exacted only at the considerable expense of total loss of extra-logical significance. To have a future, or to improve itself, the PA must (even if imprudently) eschew logic, in favor of an intrinsically philosophical 'position' which it can manage to work out on its own; say, a final commitment to emulating the "rational ideal". To look after its own welfare, the PA inevitably has to risk dealing in philosophy 'proper', even though this means including values unlikely to meet with total favor or approval. The PA inadvertently teaches itself that "directionality" or bias in philosophy is inescapable. How to discriminate between and among biases, or to evaluate respective acceptability, then becomes the first (and perhaps last) lesson of philosophy proper. Whether one judges it to be worth one's time depends on the quality of the biases to which one is exposed. Total neutrality in philosophy is a fiction; it is neither possible nor desirable. 1 6 A given philosophic approach is philosophy's 16 Cf. Kant, KdrV, A xi n.\ A 7 5 1 / / B 7 7 9 ; A 7 5 6 / B 784; A 8 5 6 / B 884.
20 PROTREPTIC LOGIC own best and in the end its only available form of advertisement. This is a conviction, one rendered unshakable by the PA'S own notable failure. Hence the idea of a "presuppositionless" philosophy is at once misguided and misconceived. The PA attempts to triumph by generating an insoluble paradox of self-reference. Instead, the PA is caught in its own trap. Our own strategy in attacking the PA amounts to this: either it is a logical truth, or it is not. Since it is not, (a) the PA is not what it is intended to be; (b) even if the PA were defensible on some non-logical ground, its support should itself have to derive or emanate from an already entrenched philosophical outlook. Whereas, refutation or rejection of philosophy need not be philosophically based or inspired — consider, e.g. the "Jones case". If a successful challenge to the PA must come from "within" some specific line of philosophy, this still does not succeed in demonstrating the "necessity" of philosophy, nor in establishing a straightforward deontic consequence which would tumble out therefrom, as an application of an elementary modal principle. Why? Because the acceptance (or dismissal) of the "philosophic life" [as e.g. virtuous] requires its own embryonic moral theory, which inevitably will be partial to certain kinds of activity, and thereby exclude or disapprove of certain others. But the PA seeks to impose a universal injunction which will cut across the boundaries separating contrasting or competing (philosophical) positions, by imparting a putative logical necessity (from which an obligation could be logically manufactured; which purportedly bids all men to inquire, although it does not stipulate the form or content of such investigation, and indeed does not wish to prejudice the issue). What destroys the high-minded goal, if not the universal appeal, of the PA, is its naive sense of the non-controversial, in seeking to reach and thereby justify an unimpeachable, because extra-philosophic, tenet which (consequently) no one is permitted to disregard, one which allegedly both stands above and somehow precedes the rest of philosophy, encouraging logical as well as moral devotion. The PA is simply unequal to this task, whereas philosophy itself may not be; but only philosophy. That is what makes the "defense" of philosophy so aggravatingly circular, yet so perennially fascinating. Summing up: (5) is provable, but neither one of its disjuncts is a theorem. So, the deductive scheme which the PA seeks to foster, instead founders. Either the PA is invalid, like (9), or harmlessly tau-
PROTRI:PTIC LOGIC 2J tologous, like (8). In any case, the PA may not be used to impose philosophy upon the untutored. Its logical impact is nil. Its rhetorical success is incommensurate with its lack of cogency. 1 7 A defense of the philosophic life, if to be sought at all, must lie elsewhere; namely, within some philosophic approach, perhaps one not as yet devised; perhaps one never to be f o u n d ! The door remains open, for either defense or r e f u t a t i o n . 1 8 One warning: the idea of establishing a "presuppositionless" philosophy looks to be at once misguided and in principle radically misconceived. For once, looks may not be deceptive. 17 See Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 23, I 3 9 9 b 3 3 . 18 One possible line of indirect proof of the PA might be to rebuff our entire account by showing that it is an instance of what the PA terms humanly ineluctable, namely, philosophizing. But this could at most serve to corroborate, not confirm, the inescapability of philosophy, since it would only dispose of our presentation and its objections.
Ill HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY John Stuart Mill writes that "a doctrine is not judged at all until it is judged in its best fo.m". 1 We should remember this advice in examining the highly controversial subject of Mill's own alleged " p r o o f ' of the principle of utility, as offered in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism. We shall see that it is not easy to answer with a straightforward "yes or no" the question as to whether Mill has succeeded in establishing his ethical theory on a sound logical footing; how we evaluate Mill depends (1) upon what standards of proof we are willing to adopt, and consequently (2) upon how we judge the standards which Mill employs. In this respect we should agree with Hall2 that Mill's own investigation is centered around an exploration of the term 'proof in the context of ethical first principles. Therefore the first part of our own inquiry will be devoted to cataloguing the various senses of ' p r o o f , and inspecting each to see whether or not the form of proof specified under each heading is actually used by Mill, or is applicable to Mill's own undertaking. 3 But even if the meaning of 'proof were fixed and invariable for the purposes of evaluating Mill's proof, the problem of Mill's success or failure in this project would yet leave open the question of "absolute" success or failure. Mill's supposed inability to carry the proof out to a legitimate conclusion does not determine once and for all 1 J. S. Mill, "Sedgwick's Discourse", in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 52. Henceforth we shall refer to this collection of Mill's writings as EERS and include the item and page reference. 2 E. W. Hall, "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bcntham and Mill", reprinted in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 157. 3 For full quotation of Mill's Proof see page 45, below.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 23 that there is no logically supportable "foundation" for ethics; nor does the narrower conclusion, that in any case "proofs" of utility as an ethical norm are impossible, follow. After one reading of Mill it is easy to become discouraged, and so to generalize from a negative conclusion about Mill's proof, to ethical proofs generally. However, even if Mill's proof does not satisfy certain stringent, logical requirements, it is very far indeed from being an exasperating disappointment. It may not be the "best form" of proof possible, but it does come exceedingly close. This is what we intend to show. Mill himself makes clear that logically deductive proofs in ethics are out of the question. Speaking of the principle of utility, he flatly states his plan to furnish . . . such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that this cannot proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Questions ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means something admitted to be good without proof. 4 be of be to Mill goes on to provide illustrations: can health, or pleasure, be proved to be good? No; for these ends do not lend themselves to further rational argument. If two or more parties to an ethical dispute agree concerning "ultimate ends", then certain progress can be made in reaching accord on "intermediate propositions" contained in the network of an ethical theory. But what if there is no such agreement? Then it becomes impossible to produce "what is commonly understood by p r o o f ' , 5 according to Mill. The natural temptation is to conclude from this that (1) one first principle is as justifiable as any other; (2) that such agreement as may be enjoyed depends upon the ability of one party to persuade the other of the "truth" of some position; (3) that to "admit" something to be good and yet not demand a proof of same, amounts to an espousal of the self-evidence of key ethical doctrines, or in effect their "intuitional" basis. But Mill explicitly resists all three of these temptations! While strict proofs may not be feasible, he argues that it would be incorrect to infer of every ethical theory 4 s J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", (1861), in EERS, J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 208. 207-208.
24 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY . . . that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word ' p r o o f , in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof. 6 What this "larger" sense of 'proof is, and how far Mill fulfills his pledge to formulate the philosophy of utilitarianism with an acceptable alternative to "proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term", we shall attempt to discover. Let us begin with the word itself. Unfortunately, Mill takes his reader's understanding of 'proof for granted, and therefore fails to explain himself precisely. One possible meaning of 'proof is: (a) evidence sufficient (or contributing) to establish a fact, or to establish the truth of a statement; the action of such assimilated evidence in convincing the mind, demonstrating or producing belief in the certainty of something. Mill relies on this sense of 'proof in discussing the empirical grounds (e.g. the design argument) for arguing to the existence of a Supreme Being or Creator. 7 Meaning (a) demands publicly shared standards of testimony, but it also enforces the role of individual conviction, and so is compatible with another, more "personal" sense of ' p r o o f , according to which the term signifies: (b) the action or fact of passing through or having experience of something; also, knowledge derived from this; individual observation and confirmation of an antecedently formulated hypothesis. 8 Consulting the dictionary is only a first step. For we want to distinguish a cogent argument from one which is merely convincing. A cogent argument need not be persuasive, while a convincing one may 6 EERS 208. For commentary, see J. M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind: The Social and Political Thought of J. S. Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 155-156; Alan Ryan, John Stuart Mill (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 188. 7 See "Theism", in EERS, 462, 469, 470. For discussion, see H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study (London: Macmillan, 1971), 165. 8 Definitions (a) and (b), respectively, condensed and arranged from the OED. This abbreviated listing is anything but exhaustive.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 25 be false. Nonetheless, (a) already implicitly guards against construals which would permit "demonstrations" from counting as 'proofs' without either evidential support or other forms of reliable empirical testing and confirmation. 9 Mill opts for something closer to (b), despite pronounced antipathy for anything which reeks of "partiality", or a policy which advocates personal expediency over t r u t h . 1 0 Mill's own endeavor, as the previous quotation (page 24, above) makes clear, then becomes that of putting sense (b) of 'proof on a sound footing. The principle of utility is not meant to be deductively inferred, for this is well-nigh impossible. The proof of utility will seek its own special validity in the broader but equally challenging sense of appealing to one's observation, reflection and introspection; the raw material for this operation is supplied by the " f u n d " of human experience. 1 1 The " t e s t " is empirical, and is intended to transcend "personal" knowledge, and to be (potentially) universally applicable. The result becomes an inductive generalization from the lessons taught by Erfahrung. Allegiance to (b) shows that Mill wishes to avoid having to 'prove' an abstraction; he wants to be able to appeal to utilitarianism in operation, as an effective principle which has been activated and which is "in the world", rather than merely on the drawing b o a r d . 1 2 So, while the theoretical underpinning of utility as an ethical standard is at stake, Mill prudently disdains the possibility of producing a strictly logical proof. He would find himself compelled to forgo ' p r o o f in the currently accepted sense of metamathematics, 1 3 were he propounding his views today. Mill expressly repudiates any such 9 That Mill does have such a sense of ' p r o o f vividly before him is attested by, e.g. his opening remarks in "Utility of Religion", EERS, 403. 10 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 243, 257n. 11 EERS, 224-225, 237-238. We may observe that if Mill's appropriation of (b) is successful, the outcome will be a psychologically true proposition, or an insight into the workings of human nature. See below, p. 57. 12 For the genesis and overall character of this "empirical" strain in Mill's philosophy, see "Autobiography", in Autobiography and Other Writings (henceforth ' A O W ' ) , ed. J. Stillinger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 13, 20, 134-135, 162. 13 Where ' p r o o f means: a deduction, or array of steps, each one of which is either an (agreed-upon) axiom of logic, or else follows from a previous step by means of an accepted rule of logical inference. The last such step is usually known as a 'theorem'.
26 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY attempt to "prove" the first principle of utility; and wisely so, since it is more than plausible to maintain that such efforts are always doomed to failure in ethics, and must therefore be rejected wholesale, as indeed, Mill does at the very o u t s e t . 1 4 For the ideal of mathematical proof is simply inappropriate, or an unrealistically high expectation, in ethics. 1 5 Moreover, the variety of axioms and the necessary rules of correct deduction to be employed must be deliberated upon and chosen; this is why logic is itself considered a "normative science", and tells why Mill's remark concerning agreement on ultimate ends applies even to such august areas as metalogical proof-theory. The definitions supplied by the dictionary indicate that an empirical or evidential test is more in keeping with common parlance concerning the meaning of ' p r o o f than is the technical, abstract climate of logic and mathematics. This is not to disparage either logic or c o m m o n sense; but as Mill points out, there is an "equivalent" to providing strict proof, which the case of the principle of utility may fit. Since Mill firmly believes that " . . . right and wrong, as well as t r u t h and falsehood, are questions of observation and e x p e r i e n c e " , 1 6 it is fair to assume that Mill's own attempt to prove the principle of utility will be empirical in character, in line with his very qualified acceptance of " p o p u l a r " thought on this matter. Just what this empirical character is, and what it dictates, we shall determine later. Now that we have covered a motley of meanings of the term ' p r o o f , let us examine the various strategies of proof, in order to pinpoint the sort of proof with which Mill is experimenting in Utilitarianism. We shall proceed to furnish all the methods which may come into play, and to ascertain whether (and if so, to what e x t e n t ) Mill chose to avail himself of each kind. This will be followed by a direct examination of the " p r o o f ' of utility itself. 14 See M. Mandelbaum, "Two Moot Issues in Mill's Utilitarianism", in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, 232h48. is For further remarks on the limitations imposed upon proofs in ethics and in philosophy, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1,3, 1094b 24ff, and I, 7, 1098a 25ff; and Kant, KdrV, A734-A736/B762-764. 16 J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 206. See also ibid., 220 on the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong' respectively; and ibid., 205 on the problem of finding a criterion for right and wrong actions. Compare Kant, KdrV A476/B504.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 27 T Y P E S OF P H I L O S O P H I C P R O O F 1. Strictly Psychological Bentham claims that a proof of one's first principle is "impossible", because he fears the danger of an infinite logical regress; but he simultaneously claims that it is "needless". 17 This is because Bentham sees the conditions of human life, and in particular the biological make-up and psychological nature of human beings, as unalterable, and so, morally inescapable. Pleasure and pain are the "two sovereign masters" of nature, under whose thumb we exist. There is no alternative but to follow their dictates, and satisfy one's cravings. Bentham makes the transition, sometimes thought to be logically illicit, between psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism, by affirming that only pleasure and pain can " . . . point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do". 1 8 Is there a mistake here? There would appear to be. For Bentham exaggerates the hold that pleasure and pain do in fact exert upon us. Mill points out that men are able to defer their pleasure, 19 even to sacrifice it on particular occasions, although he does not conceive of their being prepared to forgo their own general happiness or wellbeing; 20 nor is he particularly sensitive to the ethics of aversion or "renunciation" which, as a nineteenth-century moralist, he was bound to encounter in literature. 21 Mill also has quick praise for "readiness to encounter pain and especially labour" 2 2 and encourages what he takes to be the virtue of applying oneself to "disagreeable" and "irksome" chores, such as school work. 2 3 17 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. L. J. Lafleur (New York: Hafner, 1948), 4. 18 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1. 19 J. S. Mill, "Nature", in EERS, 395. 20 J. S. Mill, On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, ed. H. M. Magid, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 147-148. (A System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter xii, paragraph 7). 21 J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 214. 22 J. S. Mill, "Autobiography", in AOW, 30. 23 AOW, 34. Compare the essay on "Civilisation" (1836), any edition, paragraph # 2 7 , on the conditions for heroism. On the incomparability of the phenomena of pleasure and pain, see "Utilitarianism" in EERS, 237 (compare Plato, Phaedo 60B).
28 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY And yet, despite the preponderance of such statements, Mill is equally quick to defend Bentham's position by asserting that "to desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant is a physical and metaphysical impossibility". 24 This unmodified thesis cannot logically survive such counterinstantial phenomena as sadomasochism, or the self-directed death wish. 2 5 Therefore, insofar as both Bentham and Mill are making a factual claim, it is too strong, hence false. But there is a second error committed by Bentham here, in conflating the human conditions for morality, or what Hall calls the requirement of "psychological realism", 26 with what Mill terms the "criteria" of morality and conduct. 2 7 The conditions for morality logically precede any reasoned attempt to formulate criteria; but moral criteria, on Bentham's view, merely collapse into a description of the raw materials of morality: namely, human "passions". In emphasizing the importance of human wants and needs as factors for the moral philosopher to consider, Bentham establishes himself as what today would be called a "descriptivist". But Bentham's easy-going transference between psychological and ethical hedonism 2 8 is as straightforward as it is invalid. What is demanded here, in order to shore up Bentham's weak logic on this point, is a bridge notion, such as that of "prima facie" desirability. 29 The introduction of this concept permits one to say that human desires, motivated as they (in large measure) are by pleasant and painful associations, may supply a hoped-for clue as to what is normatively desirable, or even intrinsically valuable. Desire "points" to desirability, but not infallibly so: for, as in law, a "prima 24 "Utilitarianism" in EERS, 238. For discussion, see H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, ed. Sir W. D. Ross, new int. J. O. Urmson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 49, 53; and H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study (London: Macmillan, 1971), 69. 25 R . T a y l o r , in Good and Evil (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 206, 242, would add "self-hatred" to these examples. 2« E. W. Hall, "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bentham and Mill", in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A collection of Critical Essays, 161. See below, pp. 4 7 , 52. 27 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234, 237, 240. 28 For the origin of this distinction, see H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., reissued (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 40, 412. 29 See R. J. Fogelin, Evidence and Meaning (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), 179-180 and p. 179n2. Compare R . T a y l o r , Good and Evil (London: Macmillan, 1970), 136.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 29 facie" case is "defeasible", or can be overturned (e.g. by submitting fresh evidence). Bentham's approach is also suspect because it trades upon converse Kantianism: instead of the surface plausibility of "ought implies can", Bentham operates on the strange assumption that "can implies ought". What can this mean? As Aristotle says of the life of uninterrupted contemplation that it would be "too high for m a n " , 3 0 so Bentham avers that it is foolish to goad or exhort people to reach "impossible" goals. But in what sense are they impossible? Not in the logical sense, since only contradictions are ruled out thereby. Not in the technological sense, either, since in this domain, progress steadily obliterates previously held notions as to what could or could not be done, almost routinely. This leaves Bentham with impossibility in the sense of a violation of the laws of nature (insofar as they are known). 3 1 But it is difficult to imagine any transgression of such laws which might have any ethical i/npact. If a man were to jump from a high place and go up instead of coming down, this would be astonishing, and indeed a violation (or suspension) of the law of universal gravitation, but what could its moral content be? 32 Besides, just like technological improvements, the supposed boundaries of what is thought humanly possible are ever-receding (take the case of the fourminute mile barrier). Moreover, there is a justifiable sense in which we expect a man's "reach to exceed his grasp", 3 3 and lay down moral legislation accordingly. We likewise know that people do not usually live up to the ideal that may be set for them by a religious leader, prophet or reformer, yet we hope that they may be inspired to do better than if their own sense of limitation, feebleness, and lack of selfmastery had been pandered to outright. 3 4 This consideration is 30 Nicomachean Ethics, x, 7, 1177 b 26. 31 But, "man necessarily obeys the laws of nature", having no other choice, as Mill writes in "Nature", in EERS, 379. 32 Spinoza's theory of conatus would, no doubt, provide at least one ready answer. 33 See A. Edel, Method in Ethical Theory (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 344, on "distancing". Also see R. Taylor, Good and Evil (London: Macmillan, 1970), 138. 34 See R. B. Brandt, "Towards a Credible Form of Utilitarianism", reprinted in M. D. Bayles, ed., Contemporary Utilitarianism (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1968), 172n7.
30 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY beyond Bentham's purview. Hence the psychological " p r o o f ' hedonism is decisively flawed. 2. of Reductionism This is another Benthamite tactic. Like Mill, Bentham concedes that the basis for action is frequently deferred pleasure; but when this is conceived under an ostensibly nonutilitarian code of conduct, Bentham calls it "utility misapplied". 3 5 The illustration Bentham selects is that of the religious ascetic, who hopes to enter heaven and enjoy eternal bliss. What Mill in another context calls the "living b e l i e f ' 3 6 which regulates a person's conduct (as opposed to that to which he gives his purely verbal assent), is considered by Bentham to be just the principle of utility (together with any rules subordinate thereto) in all cases, and no other. So utilitarianism is not merely the best ethic, but the only ethic! It is not necessary for Bentham to accuse selfproclaimed practitioners of rival moral codes of some form of hypocrisy; it is sufficient, and less risky, for him to point out that the underlying structure of their supposedly distinct systems is in reality nothing if not utilitarian. Mill continues the Benthamite policy, in declaiming that "utilitarian arguments are indispensable" to all "a priori moralists", especially Kantians. 3 7 Mill's own specific comparison may or may not be far-fetched, but it is primarily an attempt to undermine an opponent's position by arguing that it coincides with one's own, and so is not really opposed to anything at all. The impression that Mill is following this line of attack is confirmed by his hostile remarks elsewhere concerning asceticism, in particular. 3 8 It is therefore not surprising that somewhere along the line, Mill should be rebuked for daring to deny the presence of legitimate alternatives to utilitarianism. One recent writer is exceedingly stern with Mill, contending that he 35 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 9, 12,13. 36 J. S. Mill, "On Liberty", mAOW, 389. 37 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 207; also see 249; and "Coleridge", in EERS 159 (in AOW, p. 304). For comment, see A. Ryan, John Stuart Mill, 209-210, and H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study, 59, 84. 38 J. S. Mill, Inaugural Address (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1867), 78. See below, page 38 ff.; 39n71;also 55nl37, 64.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY 31 labored for page after page to convince his readers of what plainly is not so: that hedonism is what all men believe anyway, that it is the very basis of Judeo-Christian morality, the basis of law, and that it incorporates perfectly the traditional concepts of duty derived from these sources. 39 These charges relate to Mill's sustained effort to clear the name of utilitarianism, in Chapter II of Utilitarianism, and to shield it from abusive interpretations. Writing six years after the first publication of that work, Mill recommended, in an address on higher education, the edification to be gained by a thorough grounding in classical philosophical works (and especially ethics) Pupils, Mill reflects, . . . should be made acquainted with the principal systems of moral philosophy which have existed and been practically operative among mankind, and should hear what there is to be said for each: the Aristotelian, the Epicurean, the Stoic, the Judaic, the Christian in the various modes of its interpretation . . . (the student) should be made familiar with the different standards of right and wrong which have been taken as the basis of ethics; general utility, natural justice, a moral sense, principles of practical reason. . . . there is not one of these systems which has not its good side; not one from which there is not something to be learned . . . . 4 0 While this represents a platitudinously "safe" educational philosophy, it certainly is not the thing we should expect to find, if Mill is bent on minimizing the differences between utilitarianism and competing ethical schools of thought. Mill sounds more like Hegel here than like Bentham. "One-sideness" and "half-truths" were a life-long concern of Mill's; 41 and it is characteristic of Mill to point out that one way to overcome the then-incipient "two cultures" curricular mentality would be to instruct in the arts, including the ancient languages, and to impart the natural sciences in depth. (This should offset any impression that the quote above might be discounted as a mere isolated occurrence.) Furthermore, while Mill is at times only too happy to 39 R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 92. t o J. S. Mill, Inaugural Address, 12. See also "Autobiography", in AOW, 98, 119, 130-131. On the value of studying logic and mathematics, see ibid., 13, 20; and Inaugural Address, esp. 43, 46-49, 52-55, 57-58. For comments, see J. M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, 169-171. 41 J. S. Mill, "Bentham", in AOW, 222-223; in EERS, 85-86; also, "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", in EERS, 177-178.
32 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY quote Bentham's typical derision of certain ethical standpoints, 42 it is a deprecation which Mill accomplishes without making the slightest hint that the supposed source of the alleged weakness of contrasting ethical viewpoints is that they do not really contrast with utilitarian principles, but only pretend to be logically independent therefrom. While reductionism certainly has its shortcomings, we conclude that both Bentham and Mill pursue it so half-heartedly (or so inconstantly) that it may be ruled out as a means of characterizing Mill's proof-strategy. There is sufficient evidence from Mill's writings to conclude that he would not subscribe to such an approach, were it offered to him. 3. Principle of the Absolute This idea derives from the mathematician E. W. Beth. The principle of the absolute, or PAB for short, stands for a classic (but fallacious) pattern of reasoning, which Beth found to be tacitly invoked at various crucial stages of the history of philosophical speculation, and with widespread applications in metaphysics, economics, physics, and ethics. The PAB maintains that: (Ex) (Ey) Rxy -*• (Ea) (z) ((z J=a — (Rza DRaz))', where a is any constant, Rxy (unbound) stands for any relation (two-termed predicate), and the arrow symbolizes entailment. 4 3 In words, the PAB amounts to the metaphysical thesis (or paralogism) that certain relationships are not transitive. An example would be Aristotle's highest (or supreme) good, 4 4 which resurfaces in many later writers, including Mill. 4S The concept of the summum bonum can be mapped onto Beth's PAB by letting a equal it, while Rxy 42 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation, 17-1 8M 1. 43 E. W. Beth, "The Prehistory of Research into Foundations", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 3 (1952-1953), 66; The Foundations of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1965), 9. Beth's notation is slightly revised here. 44 Nicomachean Ethics I, 2, 1094 a 23. 45 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 205.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 33 represents "x is desired for the sake of y". The conclusion which the PAB then reaches is that there exist things which are desirable for their own sakes, or at least one such item. The PAB is therefore used to "justify" the concept of an end-in-itself, or more generally that of intrinsic value. (Mill prefers the misleading expression "intrinsic usefulness".) 4 6 Is it then possible to contend that Mill might be resting his case on the P A B ? Initially one would think not, since the P A B is presented formally, and we have seen that Mill eschews logical proof. However, the logical form of the PAB is there only for the sake of elegance and perspicuity; its couching throughout various phases of philosophic thought has been predominantly discursive. Nothing prevents Mill from arguing, albeit without the assistance of logical apparatus, that some relations, notably those involving the Good, are intransitive. But did Mill in fact do so? No; on the contrary, Mill has puzzled many a commentator by insisting that virtue, and not utility, is what is desirable for its own sake. 4 7 To be sure, Mill considers utility to be "the foundation of virtue", 4 8 and also holds that "the object of virtue" is to bring about "the multiplication of happiness", on a utilitarian reading of d u t y . 4 9 Strangely, he still insists on upholding the independent merits of virtue, as against deriving it from or making it fully consonant with the standard enjoined by utilitarian consideration. The oddity becomes all the more striking when we encounter Mill maintaining that " . . . pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends" although he quickly amends this by adding that "desirable things . . . are as numerous in the utilitarian as any other scheme". This passage makes sense only if one takes Mill to be drawing a very fine distinction between desirable things and things desirable as ends; for he goes on to tell us that things may possess two kinds of desirability; "inherent", or as "means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain". 5 0 Since only the latter have any direct relation to 46 "Autobiography", in AOW, 3 0 , 1 1 3 . 47 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 235. Compare ibid., 2 1 3 , 2 1 4 , 2 1 8 , 2 5 7 « on the "impartial" and "disinterested" qualities of any properly utilitarian assessment; also ibid., 2 2 3 , 225. For discussion, see A. Ryan, John Stuart Mill, 2 1 0 . "8 "Obituary of Bentham", Appendix B, in EERS, 491. "9 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 220. so EERS, 2 1 0 , which is the source of all of the immediately preceding quotes.
34 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY the utilitarian norm, what Mill is granting here is that certain nonutilitarian things are desirable in themselves (but not as ends; at least, not as utilitarian ends!) This interpretation is supported by Mill's comment that "the ingredients of happiness are very various", although Mill immediately undercuts his own precise distinction by suggesting that desirable things may serve not only as means but as "part of the end", i.e. happiness, or that which the principle of utility seeks the widest possible dissemination of among mankind! 51 If this seems vexed, it but reflects the abundant confusions in Mill's text, which for once seem ineradicable. 52 Suffice it to remark that the PAB, while perhaps functioning behind the scenes in Mill's elevation of virtue to a place of theoretical supremacy in ethics, is not used to argue on behalf of utility as an ethical ultimate, for that very reason. This is a fortunate piece of restraint on Mill's part, since, as Beth shows, the PAB turns out to be logically invalid, 53 despite an appearance of formal correctness. 4. Indirect Proof To be considered next is the method of challenge proposed by Hume, who opined that " 'tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger". Hume meant that it is not the function of reason to decide these things; that this is the heart's, and not the mind's, department. Reason concerns itself only with relations of ideas or matters of fact, while ethics does not occupy itself with matters involving knowledge at all. This is what Hume was driving at, we feel. 54 So, while 'proof of an ethical doctrine is logically ruled out, so too is disproof; or as Bentham put it, proof is "needless". There is no reason why we should not adopt whatever si EERS, 235, which is the source of the last two quotes. For an excellent explanation of the Greatest Happiness Principle, as stated ibid., 214-216, and recapitulated ibid., 257-258, see A. Edel, Method in Ethical Theory, 353. 52 Another case in point would be Mill on the threefold relationship between and among happiness, utility, and human desires ("Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234-235, 237), which we shall explore later. See below, p. 56. 53 For counter-examples see E. W. Beth, The Foundations of Mathematics, 11. 54 See D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 416. For discussion, see R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 150.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY 35 ethical platform may suit our fancy. Mill however warned us that we should not fall prey to the natural temptation to consider all candidates for the title of ethical first principles as being on the same level, because then to favor or choose any one over all the others would have to involve a sheerly "arbitrary" selection. But suppose we follow out Hume here. Must we subsequently sacrifice all moral principles? How can we evaluate moral systems? There may still be three criteria: (1) internal consistency; 55 (2) whether the ethic meets with our (e.g. temperamental) approval or not; 5 5 (3) the collective interests of mankind, which serve to check wayward or idiosyncratic formulations of precepts governing moral action. 5 6 All of these would accord with a Humean outlook; but both (1) and (3) render Hume's appeal to the supposed ineffectiveness of reason as a moral arbitrator transparently false. For only reason can deal with logical coherence. And "reasonable" is a just name for any ethics that pays heed to the conflicts between individual and social aims, while attempting to work out and resolve clashes which arise whenever divergent goals are simultaneously and thus incompatibly pursued by individual members of society. That reason is not always up to this task, we freely grant. But no other aspect of human consciousness is capable of dealing with such problems, or even of grasping their very intricacy, in the first place. These considerations vindicate Mill in his strenuous search for a non-intuitional grounding of the principle of utility. They also serve to dispose of the method of indirect proof, as employed by Hume. Mill simply never adhered to such a technique, in spite of its interesting ramifications. But perhaps Hume's more famously definitive rejection of proof in ethics might provide a hint as to Mill's actual tactics. Let us examine that next. 55 See B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 182, 773. See also W . D . H u d s o n , Modern Moral Philosophy (NewYork: Doubleday, 1970), 129-131, on emotivism. 56 See R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 89, 92; J. Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, ed. A. Isenberg (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 95. "Collective interest" is opposed to the development of crude theories of egoism, or maximum self-aggrandizement. See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 243, 257n.
36 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 5. 'Is'vs. 'Ought' Is Mill deliberately attempting to cross Hume's line between 'is'-statements, or propositions of fact, and 'ought'-assertions, expressing obligations?57 In short, is Mill defying the "ban" on deriving an 'ought' from an is'? 58 Or is it that Mill unwittingly stumbles upon the ground of Hume's injunction, and in so doing commits a supposed fallacy? There are many issues to be untangled here. First, we postpone the 'is-ought' question itself to the ensuing chapter where we shall look at it in the framework of the Searlian derivation. Second, Mill was unacquainted with Hume's own version of the 'is-ought' distinction, for a number of reasons, the most decisive of which is that Mill never read Hume's Treatise.59 But Mill did read, and admire, Hume's first Inquiry , 6 0 as well as a number of Hume's lesser but (at that time) better-known works.61 His general estimate of Hume was quite low, however: Mill thought of him as a sophistical genius, clever without being shallow, but devoid of honesty or any sense of philosophic integrity and responsibility for the conclusions which he, Hume, adopted. 62 Hume, unlike the succession of nineteenth century figures 57 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 469-470. 58 For more recent clarifications of the 'is-ought' cleavage, see R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 29, 44; and Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 186. For discussion, refer to W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 249-265, and for papers on Hume, to W. D. Hudson, ed., The Is-Ought Question (London: Macmillan, 1969), 35-80. 59 After its original publication (1739-1740), Hume's Treatise was not reedited again until the centennial commemoration anticipated by the Green and Grose edition (1874-1875) of Hume's works, which appeared one year after Mill's death. Not only was Hume's philosophic reputation (as opposed to his fame as an historian) at a low ebb throughout the century after his death, but his works were not widely disseminated until Green's commentary helped to revive and stimulate interest in them, during the period of the Idealist movement in Great Britain. So it is hardly surprising that Mill should not have been familiar with Hume's Treatise although it had been republished and was available. 60 See remarks in "Theism", in EERS, 470. For Mill's comments on the value of 'negative logic', see "Autobiography", in AOW, 14-15, and "On Liberty", in AOW, 393. 61 See "Autobiography", in AOW, 6, 7, 44. 62 See the scathing attack on Hume in " B e n t h a m " , in AOW, 216-217; in EERS, 80 and 80«.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 37 whom Mill had occasion to bludgeon for having "trespassed" 6 3 into philosophy, had ability, but lacked discipline and character, according to Mill. Against such a background, it is astonishing to find that Mill "repeats" in his own way the 'is-ought' distinction. It is fair to say that Mill arrived at this independently of Hume, although Mill cannot be credited here with any originality. 64 The passages in which Mill elaborates an 'is-ought' split of one or another kind are as follows: (i) Referring to the systematic ambiguity inherent in the term 'nature' and its cognates, Mill distinguishes several meanings, including one " . . . in which Nature does not stand for what is, but for what ought to be; or for the rule or standard of what ought to b e " . 6 5 Because the term 'nature' is used so unthinkingly by many, or without an appreciation of qualitative differences, which are simply ridden over, Mill deems it necessary to protest against the derivation of unwarranted conclusions concerning the standard of human action. By harnessing the 'is-ought' separation, Mill goes on to argue that "conformity to nature, has no connection whatever with right and wrong". 6 6 (ii) In his Logic, Mill states emphatically that: propositions of science assert a matter of fact: an existence, a coexistence, a succession, or a resemblance. The propositions . . . (of the "art of life") do not assert that anything is, but enjoin or recommend that something should be. They are a class by themselves. A proposition of which the predicate is expressed by the words ought or should be, is generically different from one which is expressed by is or will be. It is true that, in the largest sense of the words, even these propositions assert something as a matter of fact. The fact affirmed in them is, that the conduct recommended excites the feeling of approbation (in the 63 See "Autobiography", in AOW, 120, where this observation is made of Sedgwick. 64 On the Continent, Ritschl and his disciples and followers were busy inventing the 'fact-value' distinction, as a new consequence of Kant's dichotomy between noumena and phenomena, at about this time. See below, p. 70. 65 "Nature", in EERS, 377. This passage has been heretofore neglected in the vast Mill-literature, even though it is easily accessible. 66 EERS, 400.
38 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY speaker). This, however, does not go to the bottom of the matter, f o r . . . (this) is no sufficient reason why other people should approve. 67 This passage is self-explanatory. In it we find Mill dividing propositions into two classes, normative and scientific, and insisting that there is a "generic difference" between the two. This is in effect to note that to "derive" an 'ought' from an 'is' involves an unjustifiable inference. (iii) In an early essay, Mill attacks a writer for confusing . . . two distinct, though nearly connected, questions; the standard or test of moral obligation, and the origin of our moral sentiments. It is one question what rule we ought to obey, and why; another question how our feelings of approbation and disapprobation actually originate. The former is the fundamental question of practical morals; the latter is a problem in mental philosophy. 68 (iv) In Utilitarianism, Mill picks up each of these themes. With regard to the concept of justice, he asserts that " . . . there is no necessary connection between the question of its origin, and that of its binding force". 6 9 On the question of asceticism, especially that with an ulterior or selfish motive in view, Mill has harsher words in store: ascetics " . . . may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do, but 67 J. S. Mill, On the Logicof the Moral Sciences, 144-145. (A System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter xii, paragraph 6.) All italics in original [see R. H. Popkin, "A Note on the 'Proof of Utility in J. S. Mill", Ethics, vol. 61 (1950-1951), 66-68], Mill reaffirms the 'is-ought' distinction shortly thereafter, as part of a deliberate contrast between the offices of natural science and social psychology, respectively (On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, 146; A System of Logic, VI, xii, 6). 68 J. S. Mill, "Blakey's History of Moral 'Science", in EERS, 26. Italics in original. 69 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 240. Mill continues: "That a feeling is bestowed upon us by Nature does not necessarily legitimate all its promptings" (ibidem). But see ibid.; 230, on the naturalness of moral feelings. [For discussion, see J. M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, 133«43, 149]. For Mill's additional usage of "binding force" (or "binding efficacy") of a norm, see ibid., 227, 229, 233, 251.
HOW TO PROVK THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY assuredly not an example of what they should",70 tions are self-regarding. 71 39 i.e. if their inten- (v) Mill also reminds the reader of the force of moral inertia by pointing out that " . . . we may will from habit what we no longer desire for itself, or desire only because we will it". 7 2 Habits, reinforced by long associations, make us "persevere", as Mill says, long after the course of action we follow has "ceased to be pleasurable". 7 3 This tendency is in itself neither good or bad, but takes its moral valence from the activity itself, or the end toward which it is directed. So it is important that we discern for ourselves some proper guidelines for action, even if only as a retroactive validation of patterns of behavior already made stable and fixed by previous training. It is also clear from Mill's policy on 'is-ought' that he regards human beings as capable of discarding the principles on which they may have previously acted. Consequently, men have the ability to revise their conceptions of righteous conduct and incorporate them in their lives. This means that Mill cannot afford to take very seriously Bentham's psychologicalcwm-ethical hedonism, in the end. (vi) Mill distinguishes between laws which ought to exist and those which do exist, pointing out that the two classes are not identical, nor do their respective members coincide completely. 7 4 70 EERS, 217. Italics in original. 71 "The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tent1 to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted". ("Utilitariar n", in EERS, 218). See above, page 30. 72 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 238. But compare "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", in EERS, 184«: " . . . the good of others becomes our pleasure because we have learned to find pleasure in it". 73 On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, 16-17. (A System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter xii, paragraph 4.) For discussion, see G. W. Spence, "The Psychology Behind J. S. Mill's 'Proof ", Philosophy, 43 (1968), 25. 74 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 245. Another overlooked passage in the critical literature on Mill.
40 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY (vii) Mill draws a distinction between a "rule of action" and its "motive", 75 which enables him to respond to those critics of utilitarianism who assail it for its very "exacting" standard of high-minded, disinterested behavior. 76 It is not easy to see the 'is-ought' at work here without detailed explanation. What Mill is getting at is that people do not need to follow consciously the doctrine of utility ('ought') in order to promote it ('is') in the course of going about their ordinary affairs. Mill concludes that attaining the utilitarian standard is not superhuman, unrealistic, or a back-breaking goal. Conformity to antecedently established regulations will perceptibly further its achievement, while action based upon deliberate acceptance of the utilitarian position is unnecessary in no fewer than 99 percent of the cases, Mill confidently avers. This is one reason why Mill brands as absurd the antiutilitarian complaint that most situations leave too little time to perform "calculations" of the probable effects of doing A, as opposed to B.77 Calculation is usually not needed; trust your "instincts", i.e. the accumulated wisdom garnered from past experience, and you will be doing all right, even from a utilitarian point of view, nearly all of the time. These ideas would be noteworthy, even in the absence of a tacit appeal to the is-ought gap. For one thing, Mill is again minimizing the differences between contrasting ethical standpoints, 7 8 but this time, at the expense of his own (utilitarian) ethics! For another, Mill is convinced that the "raw materials" of morality — human agents — are the most significant moral factors, while moral philosophers occupy a decidedly subsidiary role. People can be moral without philosophy; but philosophy depends on people. 7 9 Moral philosophers do little or 75 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 219. 76 For a pessimistic account of human motivation, see Mill, "Utility of Religion", in EERS, 4 1 0 . For an appreciative response to Mill's dilemma, see H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 87. 77 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 224-225, 229. See A. Ryan, John Stuart Mill, 220-221, for comment. And, for discussion of Mill's ridicule of the "Nautical Almanack" approach to morality, see V. J. McGill, The Idea of Happiness (Washington, D.C.: Frederick Praeger, 1967), 125; H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study, 76-77, and J. J. C. Smart, " E x t r e m e and Restricted Utilitarianism", Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1956), 346, 349, 350 (repr. in M. D. Bayles, ed., Contemporary Utilitarianism, 103, 108, 109). 78 79 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, esp. 207, 230, 249. This point is entirely overlooked by many writers, such as Bernard
HOW TO PROVli THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 41 nothing "with" or " f o r " them, unless their moral proclivities have already been developed to some degree - and by then, the most demanding moral philosopher may find little or nothing in their proceedings to correct. 80 This is an odd thing for Mill to hold, not only considering his lifelong preoccupation with social reform, but also his stress on becoming aware of the animating impulses and springs of action, in order either to justify or else replace them. That the philosopher (as opposed to the parent or preacher) steps into the picture at a comparatively late date, whether historically or in the span of an individual's own "moral career", is incontestable. But the claim that the philosopher need not, as it happens, exert much pressure for change, or improvement, is debatable. In Chapter III of Utilitarianism Mill extols the virtue of "conscience", 81 comprising the agent's selfpolicing moral habits, which are strong but slow to take root. But Mill feels as though the activity of philosophy, as the articulator of moral obligation, the spokesman for conscience, and the guide to right conduct, 8 2 were downright superfluous! 'People will do all right for themselves, if you leave them alone' seems to be his m o t t o . 8 3 The concealed allusion to the 'is-ought' distinction only makes matters worse, however. In the " p r o o f ' itself Mill is often accused of committing the "fallacy of composition", by arguing from the alleged goodness of individual desires to the overall good of everyone, as if pleasure or happiness could simply be combined additively, and then Williams, in Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), esp. 93,100-101, 104-107, who are mistakenly convinced that in order to act in conformity with utilitarian precepts, one must be a utilitarian or at any rate think like one. This is a very common error. Of course, Mill's position is perplexing, since (if correct) it does away with the distinctiveness of, hence the need for, a codification of utilitarian (as opposed to e.g. Christian) morality. This Williams does notice (ibid., 91, 102). 80 The strongest support for this view (and the 'self-undermining' interpretation of Mill's conception of the role of philosophy) is afforded by Mill's insightful remarks on immorality, for which see "Utilitarianism", in EERS, esp. 225, 229. 81 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, esp. 225, 229-231, 246. For discussion, see A . R y a n , John Stuart Mill, 113; J. M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, 149. 82 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 259; also, "Nature", in EERS, 379. 83 And yet, Mill recognizes a need to train people to desire virtue: see "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 239. For further oscillations, see below, page 47.
42 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY s u m m e d . 8 4 O n e recent writer 85 has e v e n c o u n t e d u p as m a n y as three possible (and d i s t i n c t ) fallacies s u p p o s e d l y occurring in the p r o o f ! 86 Mill might have called u p o n his favorite a n a l o g y , that o f c h e m i c a l c o m b i n a t i o n ( c f . Moore's principle o f 'organic unities'), and n o t i c e d that w h e n separate "units" are b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r , t h e y "transform" o n e a n o t h e r , s o that the result is n o t a l w a y s t h e same in either q u a l i t y or q u a n t i t y as the original, u n u n i t e d c o m p o n e n t s ( t h e m i x t u r e o f equal parts o f a l c o h o l and w a t e r is a ready paradigm). B u t s o m e h o w , Mill felt that the "ingredients" o f s o c i e t y , n a m e l y individuals, underw e n t n o such change in being " m i x e d " t o g e t h e r as a tribe, c o m m u n i t y , state or n a t i o n , or else he s h o u l d have spared h i m s e l f a c o s t l y m i s t a k e . What m i s t a k e ? T o find o u t , w e s h o u l d q u o t e Mill: . . . n o s y s t e m o f ethics requires that the sole m o t i v e of all w e d o shall be a feeling o f d u t y ; o n t h e contrary, n i n e t y - n i n e h u n d r e d t h s of all 84 For discussion, see the following: C. Wellman, "A Reinterpretation of Mill's Proof", Ethics, 69 (1958-1959), 273-274; A. W. Levi, "A Study in the Social Philosophy of John Stuart Mill" (Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1940), 34-35; C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, reissue (Paterson, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1959), 184; F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd ed., new int. R. Wollheim (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 113-114nl; «3; J. P. Day, "On Proving Utilitarianism", repr. in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill. A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 204-206; D. P. Dryer, "Mill's Utilitarianism", in EERS, lxxxii-lxxxiii; E. W. Hall, "The 'Proof of Utility in Bentham and Mill", in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, 146, 162; P. Haezrahi, " T h e Desired and the Desirable", Analysis, vol. 10 (1949-1950), 40-48; D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of Value", Theoria 36 (1970), 112-113; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 104-105; J. Seth, " T h e Alleged Fallacies in Mill's 'Utilitarianism' ", Philosophical Review 17 (1908), 471, who quotes Dewey as attributing to Mill the corresponding "fallacy of division"; W. H. Long, "The Legend of Mill's 'Proofs' ", Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (1967), 36, 40; and S. K. Wertz, "Composition and Mill's Utilitarian Principle", The Personalist 52 (1971), 417-431. (Wertz, applying the ' p r o o f to Mill's theory of society, concludes that it makes 'general welfare' a precondition for 'personal welfare*. This is compatible with, although not deducible from, cither of the readings of the ' p r o o f presented below, pages 57ff, 60ff.). 85 See H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study, 61-64, esp 62. The fallacies "enumerated" are those of composition, equivocation and irrelevant proof, respectively. 86 The 'false (or imperfect) analogy' critique of Mill's proof is held by numerous critics, including, among recent authors, V. J. McGill in The Idea of Happiness, 129.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 43 our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty (i.e. utility) does not condemn them. 87 Message: if you do not tamper or interfere with private actions done for purely private benefit, then public benefit will (indirectly) be served. No wonder that Mill does not consider utility to be "exacting" too much from us! But the error here is parallel to one made by the classical laissez-faire economists. It rests on the conveniently sanguine assumption that conflicts between individual and general "will" do not (as a matter of contingent fact) arise, leaving the "atoms" of society free to pursue enlightened self-interest: enlightened only because they realize that in helping themselves, they are somehow also helping others. 88 Even if this assumption were borne out in practice, the theory for that very reason would be left all the more unprotected from hypothetical exceptions. But this Mill fails to perceive; or perhaps he considers it a mere technicality; as a result, he simply slurs over it. This area of vulnerability aggravates Mill's failure to see that his arguments in effect make utilitarianism (if not ethics in general) well-nigh dispensable: a most curious argument for a philosopher committed to a ratiocinative ideal to be making about his own discipline! Whatever the consequences brought on by Mill's appropriation of the 'is-ought' distinction, a violation of that distinction is not one of them. 8 9 Hume, it may be noted, fashioned an 'is-ought' division just once, and in such a manner as to leave his intentions open to vast speculation. Whereas, Mill iterates the 'is-ought' at least half a dozen times, and leaves little room for doubt or unclarity in interpretation. Inasmuch as Mill devotes an entire book of his Logic to the stock topic 87 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 219; compare ibid., 246, re duty. [In all of the passages quoted in this section (5.), italics are in the original; the parenthetical remarks are supplied.] Mill repeats this idea stating that "the great majority of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up" {ibid., in EERS, 220). See our remarks above (page 41) on the fallacy of composition, and (page 43) on the economic theory which underlies Mill's smug complacency. 88 For this idea, see esp. "Whewell on Mo.ral Philosophy", in EERS, 184 and 184«; "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 218, 259. 89 For further discussion of some of the passages treated above in (iii) - (vii), see M. Mandelbaum, "Two Moot Issues in Mill's Utilitarianism", in J. B. Schneewind, ed„ Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays 226-227, «39 and «40.
44 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY of fallacies, including (a) false analogies, 90 (b) the place of metaphors in reasoning, 91 (c) ambiguous terms and other confusions, 9 2 it stands to reason that Mill is a thinker of pronounced sensitivity on the subject of "fallacies" in general. This susceptibility shows through even in the way in which Mill composed his books; his manner of writing them is a testimony to painstaking carefulness. 9 3 However, there is no guarantee against fallibility, as the author of On Liberty realized only too well. Or should have. 6. Inconsequentialism Before coming to the " p r o o f ' itself, we should dispose of another strange but intriguing argument, one a bit like that of Hume (4. above). We shall call this the argument from inconsequentialism. The inconsequentialist argument takes as its foundation Mill's admission that 95 percent of mankind are forced to do without happiness, 9 4 and even seem to get along or be contented without it. 9 5 If so, then proving the principle of utility, as the coping stone of an ethical theory, is so moot, so academic, that one would have to be a boor or a pedant to object! This is reminiscent of Aristotle's attempt to dismiss the problem of the external world by remarking that to prove the existence of "nature" Would be a waste of time, since everybody knows that it exists, unless "blind" or unable to t h i n k . 9 6 Proving the principle of utility is then a trivial matter, since the goal it sets up (happiness, whose content can be variously defined) is both agreeable and ««available to nearly all. No one would object to the pursuit of happiness, since it actively concerns hardly anyone! 90 A System of Logic, Book V, Chapter v, paragraph 7. Mill divides false analogies into two categories: those which claim a non-existent resemblance, and those which exaggerate it, thereby "overrating its probative force" even though the resemblance drawn may, in respect of some limited number of similar properties, be just. 91 A System of Logic, V, v, 7. 92 A System of Logic, V, vii, 1. These passages are rarely if ever mentioned, let alone discussed, in the vast secondary literature on Mill. 93 See "Autobiography", inAOW, 74, 114, 132-133, 147-150, 158. 94 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 217. See also ibid., 214. 95 EERS, 215. For comment, see McGill, The Idea of Happiness, 127. 96 Physics, II, 1, 193 a 2-7.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 45 This strategy, far from rescuing Mill's proof, would only consign it to oblivion. What Mill could say by way of rebuttal is that: (a) his ethical works are addressed, for the time being at least, to the remaining 5 percent of mankind who happen to be favorably disposed with regard to "external good fortune", that necessary preliminary to the happy life; 9 7 (b) it is not the claim of utilitarians that their morality is followed universally, but only, that the world would be a better place to live in if such precepts were more widely heeded than they are. 9 8 This is a reaffirmation of the is-ought distinction, in its "real vs. ideal" variation. On behalf of Mill, then, it could be said that the proof occupies a position of considerable importance. We have dealt with aspects of Mill's ethical theory in order to provide necessary backdrop; we have scoured possible proof-strategies, some of which Mill dabbles with, others which we eliminated altogether. Now to turn to the full statement of Mill's proof, and accompanying reconstruction: The "Proof" The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good, that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct and, consequently, one of the criteria of morality. 99 97 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics, 1099 a 31 - 1099^9. 98 See B. Russell, "John Stuart Mill", reprinted in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 21. 99 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234. Italics in original.
46 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY COMMENTARY We see here Mill attempting an "empirical" rather than a logical proof, a proof based on the "sources of our experience". 1 0 0 Nonetheless the proof has certain logical features, which shall be elucidated. That Mill intends to carry out an appeal to factual observation is borne out by a later remark in the same chapter (IV) of Utilitarianism, to the effect that what humans desire, is a question to be decided "upon evidence". 101 There is nothing initially startling about this, except that Mill, in finally claiming that what humans desire is pleasure, does not try to ascertain this by "fact and experience" so much as by manipulation and dialectic. This is because of Mill's philosophical equation between pleasure and happiness, 102 about which more will be said later. Our procedure here shall be four-fold: (i) interpretation; (ii) clarification of (i); (iii) defense of (i), and consequently of Mill, against various lines of criticism; (iv) new criticisms of our own, coupled with formalization of (i). Interpretation On the whole, Mill is saying that desire is a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for desirability. In referring to 'desire' Mill means only the presence or existence of desire, but this is to jump ahead of the story. 103 Later, we shall clarify this interpretation of the proof by exhibiting its logical structure. The point made by Mill's proof resembles, e.g. Aristotle's dictum that "thought by itself moves 100 p o r a clear-cut occurrence of the term ' p r o o f having exactly this meaning, see "On Liberty", in AOW, 426, where the context surrounds the controversial notion of "self-regarding" duties i.e. to oneself. For clarification on that topic, see "Autobiography", in AOW, 113. 101 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237. 102 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237. See below, pp. 55-57. 103 See N. Kretzmann, "Desire as Proof of Desirability". Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1958), 255; defended against Moore's strictures, ibid., 257. More recently, see D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of Value", 103-105. For critique, see J. Margolis, "Mill's Utilitarianism Again", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1967), 179, repr. in Values and Conduct (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 153.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 47 nothing", 1 0 4 or Locke's statement that " . . . if we never desired something we should never do anything". 1 0 5 For Mill, in short, 'ought (sometimes) implies do, in actual fact'. This recalls Hall and the related tenet of "psychological realism", 1 0 6 although a number of other writers reaffirm the same point in their own w a y . 1 0 7 The question here is not primarily one of judgment as to what is desirable, but concerns its subsequent wholesale pursuit. 1 0 8 As Aristotle might say, one's life-goal is primarily to be or become good, and not merely to know the good, or apprehend it intellectually, even though the latter activity is perhaps an indispensable, logical prerequisite for being good. Mill concurs most emphatically. So our initial task is to shed some light on this vexed pair, desire and desirability. This brings us to the sphere of clarification proper. Clarification What does 'desirable' mean? Here are two principal significations: (a) Worthy to be desired; to be wished for; often standing for the qualities which cause a thing to be desired; pleasant, delectable, choice, excellent, goodly. (b) Characterized by or full of desire. 1 0 9 Mill is often charged with illegitimate use of the term 'desirable', employing it as though it meant 'capable of being desired' rather than lot Nicomachean Ethics VI, 2, 1139 a 36. 105 Quoted in H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, 194. 106 E. W. Hall, "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bentham and Mill", in J. B. Schneewind,ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, esp. 161. See above, p. 28; below, p. 52. 107 J. Narveson,Morality and Utility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 284; H.W.Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy and Argument (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959), 78; M. G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 266; V. C. Punzo, Reflective Naturalism (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 83; R. J. Fogelin, Evidence and Meaning (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), 179-180; A. R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), 67; A. I. Melden, Free Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 19, 52; and R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 136. 108 See B. Lang and G. Stahl, "Mill's 'Howlers' and the Logic of Naturalism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (1968-1969), 563-564. 109 Condensed and arranged from the OED.
48 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY 'normatively desirable'. 110 To lodge this objection, however, is to legislate the meaning of the term, or to express an opinion as to what its philosophical currency should be. The normative sense of 'desirable' is covered by the first sentence, perhaps even the first clause only, of (a): "worthy (or fit) to be desired; to be wished for". The second part of (a) stands apart; so does (b). So now there are at least three major significations of 'desirable'. We shall see momentarily that there is yet another possible meaning to be added to the list. But the first question which confronts us is: did Mill use the word 'desirable' in an unsupportable sense? When this question is asked, it is usually begged, by restricting the permissible range of 'desirable' to the first clause of (a). There are many occasions when Mill employs the term in just this sense; and listing a sampling of these serves to dispel the facile notion that Mill's English was hopelessly confused. As examples take Mill's (1) explanation as to why it is "desirable" that he should set down his memoirs; 111 (2) description of actions taken on behalf of candidates for political office whom he thought it "desirable" for the populace to elect; 1 1 2 (3) recognition of the vain hope of ever being able to make a complete and accurate estimate of the consequences of following any given line of conduct, as yet being a "desirable" thing to attempt to enumerate exhaustively; 113 (4) reasons offered as to why it is "desirable" to promote a scientific approach to the problems of morals; 1 1 4 (5) discussion of the "desirable" ends aimed at by the framers of no See G . E . M o o r e , Principia Ethica,Th\ also 123. For discussion, see D. P. Dryer, "Mill's Utilitarianism", in EERS, lxxiv; and F„ Sosa, "Mill's Utilitarianism", in J. M. Smith and E. Sosa, eds., Mill's Utilitarianism: Text and Criticism (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1969), 155-157. Hi "Autobiography", in AOW, 3. H2 AOW, 184. 113 "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", in EERS, 180. For further clarification of the consequentialist position, see "Sedgwick's Discourse", in EERS, 69; for commentary, see H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study, 47, 75; and M. Stocker, "Consequentialism and its Complexities", American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969), 276-289. lit On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, 6;A System of Logic, VI, i, 1.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 49 moral rules, the craftsmen of the Art of Life, who in addition possess the ability to formulate an hierarchical order of "desirable" things, and who, when they are not specifically dealing with the most general principles governing conduct, are permitted to take "desirableness" of certain agreed-upon goals for granted. 1 1 5 The weight of evidence makes it improbable that Mill should simply have erred in one instance, while using the word 'desirable' "correctly" or in a manner more pleasing to fastidious tastes, at nearly all other times. However, we already noticed certain muddles in Mill's employment of 'desirability' in relation to the question of ends and means. 1 1 6 So it remains possible, perhaps even plausible, to contend that in the " p r o o f ' Mill is not (necessarily) using 'desirable' in a strictly normative sense. 1 1 7 However, it is false to persist in arguing that just because Mill's use of 'desirable' in the context of the proof may not have been parallel to that of clause one of definition (a), above, that it therefore was improper. Mill is not inventing for himself a new meaning which will enable him to smuggle into the proof some extra, otherwise concealed premises. The apparent flexibility in Mill's usage happens to be real; but it is sanctioned by the elasticity inherent in the word itself. Moreover, the kind of usage to which Mill appealed was so common or "ordinary" that, as in the case of the term ' p r o o f , Mill did not feel called upon to produce any special elaboration as to his own meaning. In retrospect, this was regrettable, since it gave rise to numerous 115 On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, 144-146; A System of Logic, VI, xii, 6. See also ibid., 142, on the framing of rules and comparison of ends as 'desirable'. (A System of Logic, VI, xii, 4.) 116 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 210. But on "the ultimate end" of ethics (the principle of utility, or its equivalent), Mill is unequivocal in his employment of "desirable" (ibid., in EERS, 214). The same holds good for Mill's treatment of virtue, as both "desired and desirable", and as "desirable" both for its own sake, and on account of its consequences (ibid., in EERS, 235). i" But Mill does use 'desirable' in an unquestionably normative sense, in at least the following three places: "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 111 ("the more desirable pleasure", and foregoing remarks, ibidem, on kinds of pleasure); ibid., 246, where "desirable" action is contrasted with what is right, and what ought to be done with that which is merely "laudable"; "Coleridge", in EERS, 160 (in AOW, 305), where Mill asks whether or not it is "desirable" to derive theology from philosophy. Also see "On Liberty", in AOW, 371, 372, 396, 407, 409, 414, 424, 449, 456. Cf. "Theism", in EERS, 445, 446.
50 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY serious misunderstandings. The immediate assignment, then, is to develop sharper as well as more sensitive instruments for contextual explications of passages in such classic philosophic writings. And so, to unearth Mill's own meaning in the course of the proof, let us consider the following sentence: Cleopatra was a desirable woman. (S) No one will disagree with the contention that (5) is true. Yet if (S) is true, then (5) can hardly be a normative statement. As a normative statement (S) would be false; 1 1 8 consult Shakespeare, or a Roman historian. Cleopatra was not desirable at all in the normative sense, not only because of certain personal deficiencies, but because Mark Antony's love affair with her proved to be the ruination of both, and did not do very much for Roman civilization. Yet if (S) is true, then in what sense is it true? In precisely the 'outlawed' sense according to which 'desirable' means 'capable of being desired': just ask Mark Antony, who was "full of desire" (sense (b)) for Cleopatra, as well! The second clause of (a), "the qualities which cause a thing to be desired", is likewise an acceptable rendering; it might also happen to be true that Cleopatra was "full of desire". And this leads to an important distinction. In the foregoing account, in claiming that (S) would be false on a normative interpretation of 'desirable', we have performed an evaluation. Some people may disagree with it. But that likewise pertains to 'desirable' in the sense recognized by the second clause of (a). Not everyone might find Cleopatra desirable: for, some people would not desire her! Cleopatra is 'capable of being desired' by some, but not by others. If someone told us that Cleopatra was not his type of woman, he would be justified in inferring that she was, so far as he was concerned, not desirable, or even undesirable. This too is inescapably an evaluation, but one of a different kind than the more 'strictly' moral one. It is what one writer calls an "appreciative judgment"; 1 1 9 whereas, to say, along with (b), that Cleopatra was full of desire, is to make a psychobiographical statement, one theoretically capable of verification. This in companion lis We are assuming here that normative statements can be or are "cognitive" in content, which is just what a "naturalist" such as Mill would do, too. us J. Margolis, Values and Conduct, 21ft., 127. These are person-relative values.
HOW TO PROVK THI: PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 51 terms is a "finding". 120 Only sense (b) of 'desirable' is free from the evaluative labelling that characterizes any assessment made under either clause of (a). This classification effectively avoids prevarication. This explains why 'desirable' is used to cover more ground than just what is 'fit to be desired', and why any such narrowing down of its meaning is bound to be artificial (and probably less helpful) than becoming reconciled to the systematic ambiguity of 'desirable'. Besides, the ordinary perlocutionary effect of calling something desirable is that both the speaker and the utterer will (try to) pursue it. To be desirable must therefore in part signify that any further exhortations would usually be superfluous. This shows that the logical separation between the concepts of desire and desirability, respectively, is the product of a strange sort of dialectical artifice. The upshot of this abbreviated semantic investigation registers thusly: Mill is using, as Moore thought, 'desirable' to mean 'capable of being desired'. But this does not automatically vitiate Mill's result, or make it "unphilosophical" in character, or consign it to low status. Mill is again very careful to remind his readers, in the opening two paragraphs of Chapter IV, of the limitations on the kind of proof possible; 121 and in the proof itself this comes out in the cryptic remark "all the proof which the case admits o f ' or "which it is possible to require"; or which may be salvaged. Before getting into the logical basis of the proof, we must consider the suggestion made by Sidgwick, 122 and picked up by two later authors, 1 2 3 with respect to a possible "third [or fourth] sense" of 'desirable', one midway between 'ought to be desired' and 'capable of being desired'. For Sidgwick, the 'good' is equated with whatever is preferred, 1 2 4 i.e. with 120 J. Margolis, Values and Conduct, 21ff, 127. These are empirical prepositions. 121 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234. For negative comment, see R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 89. 122 H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 111, who is the source of the quotation below, on page 52. See also D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of Value", 106. For Sidgwick's own attempt to prove the principle of utility, see The Methods of Ethics, 418-422. 123 c. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, 174-175; M. Mandelbaum, "Two Moot Issues in Mill's Utilitarianism", in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, 231«47. 124 h . Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 127. Preference and preferability serve to explain Sidgwick's wider-than-the-normative sense of 'desirable'.
52 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY what would be desired, with strength proportioned to the degree of desirability, if it were judged attainable by voluntary action, supposing the desirer to possess a perfect forecast, emotional as well as intellectual, of the state of attainment or fruition. As Broad considers Sidgwick to be making a "very important point", and as Sidgwick is among the legions who have debunked Mill's proof, 1 2 5 let us examine this conception carefully. What is Sidgwick trying to accomplish? At least this much: he would sufficiently dilute the norm of 'what ought to be desired', until it harmonizes with, or is in some kind of proportion to, the amount of human effort required to reach any goal. Sidgwick is in effect trying to satisfy Hall's criterion of "psychological realism". The third sense of 'desirable' is meant to steer between the dual extremes of "high ideals" and "base instincts", respectively. Its designs are unwaveringly practical. In postulating this third sense of 'desirable', Sidgwick cogently anticipates the three-fold structure of the human personality as expounded by Freud. Here 'capable of being desired' (or of arousing desire) corresponds to the role played by the id, 'ought to be desired' parallels the function exercised by the super-ego; and Sidgwick's third sense of 'desirable', which adjusts itself to the conflicts and tensions between these two, delineates well the job performed by the ego (or 'reality principle') in Freud's psychoanalytical theory. This "positively ideal meaning" of desirable, as Broad calls it, is a mediator, whose task it is to determine what, as Sidgwick puts it, is "attainable by voluntary action". However, unlike Freud's three psychic principles, each of which is defined independently, Sidgwick's "third sense" of 'desirable' is derivative from the first two, or is conceptually dependent upon them. Another fruitful comparison might be one between Sidgwick's third sense and the "compromise" involved in making choices or decisions, and then, traditionally, calling the object or outcome of choice 'good'. 1 2 6 This would likewise correspond to the psychology of "rationalization", in modern terms. Analogies aside, when Sidgwick speaks of "strength proportioned 125 H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 387-389. For criticism of Sidgwick, see P. Zinkernagel, "Revaluations of J. S. Mill's Ethical Proof', Theoria 18 (1952), 70-77. 126 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, 2, 1112 a 18; III, 3, 1112 b 16, a 1113 5; III, 4, 1113 a 15, and 1113 b l, the last of which, compare with x, 2, passim.
HOW TO PROVF THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY 53 to the degree of desirability", which sense of desirability does he envision? It cannot be his own (third) sense, or else the definition would be circular; but Sidgwick leaves us entirely hanging as to which of the other two senses it might be. This is another indication that the "positively ideal meaning" of 'desirable' is too weak, in the absence of further elucidation, to stand on its own. In its efforts to be realistic and reasonable, it only succeeds in begging or postponing the major question. Still another hint of the weakness of Sidgwick's problematic attempt to arbitrate between 'ought' and 'can', is that Moore's openquestion argument 1 2 7 can sensibly be applied an indefinite number of times to the judgments yielded by this ethically interesting analogue of the Freudian ego or reality-principle. A Moorean will always be able to intelligently retaliate that what is desirable on any other semantic interpretation is not normatively desirable, and that is that. (Unless, contingently, something desirable in another fashion is also desirable on normative grounds.) In that case, Sidgwick's new meaning turns out to be useless. Instead of steering between two extremes, it makes us unable to disregard the imperative claims to which the deontologist clings. 128 Finally, Sidgwick himself realizes that no one does or can "possess a perfect forecast" of the consequences of his action, making his a most unrealistic definition. Often we must "make d o " with much less than comprehensive information, in trying to adjudicate between alternative courses of action. Hence Sidgwick's "ideal" definition is so ideal as to be, for all practical purposes, simply inapplicable. This is not a trifling objection; it lies at the heart of many a guarded critique 127 G . E . M o o r e , Principia Ethica, 15-17. For its application to Mill, see J. M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, 15 8« 111. 128 Sidgwick would vigorously disagree with this estimate; like Freud, he would consider the imperatives of desire to exact a much stronger dominion, not merely psychologically but also intellectually. He writes: " . . . we too easily think that we ought to do what wc very much wish to do". And this trenchant observation: "Whatever we desire we are apt to pronounce desirable" ( T h e Methods of Ethics, 209, 339, respectively). Sidgwick is rightly alert to the tendency to collapse a norm into the perlocutionary effects wrought by calling something a norm; and the predilection for making something into a norm, merely because it happens to stimulate desires. See above, pp. 27-30, 51.
54 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY of utilitarianism as a standard of conduct, and so there is no reason why it should not be brought to bear against Sidgwick, t o o . 1 2 9 Therefore, we may regard Sidgwick's derivative sense of 'desirable' as having no ultimate impact on Mill's proof. But the overriding issue is not just Mill's proof, but the proof of utility in general, and how it may be improved. This is why Sidgwick's proposition is worthy of scrutiny, although not adoption. From Sidgwick, we turn now to an additional vital criticism raised by Moore, which has heretofore gone unnoticed. Criticisms "Pleasure", writes Moore, "is not what I desire, it is not what I want; it is something which I already have, before I can want anything." 1 3 0 What Moore claims is that it is preposterous to say that one desires pleasure; such a way of looking at things embodies a category mistake. What we may desire are pleasurable experiences, events, objects, 1 3 1 or states-of-affairs; but not pleasure by itself. As a logical analysis, this seems impeccable; but phenomenologically, consider Nietzsche's vigilant counter-testimony, to the effect that "in the end one loves one's desire, and no longer the thing desired", 1 3 2 or the popular song which describes "falling in love with love". The essence of man may well be desire; 1 3 3 but since desire takes an object, and is not usually reflexive, the object it takes will be distinct from itself. This is both grammatically and empirically correct, and helps to shore up Moore's objection. The criticism made by Moore is meant to strike down not only the proof, but also a good deal of the utilitarian program. Sidgwick even anticipates Moore's challenge, by discovering 129 See "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", in EERS, 180, for Mill's low estimation of this objection. Mill asks rhetorically: " . . . because we cannot foresee everything, is there no such thing as foresight? " 130 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 71. For agreement, see McGill, The Idea of Happiness, 168 and L. Freed, "A New Review of Principia Ethica", Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1956), 322. 131 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 212 (and ibid, 211-212, on t h e ' u n desirable'). 132 Beyond Good and Evil, §175. For 'desire', Nietzsche uses Begierde. 133 Plato, Symposium 205D; Spinoza, Ethica, Part III, "The Affects", Def. I, and Part IV, Prop. XVIII.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 55 the "paradox" of hedonism, 134 according to which happiness and pleasure are never secured directly, or by aiming at them, but only by engaging in other activities which bring about happiness and pleasure as by-products or fillips. Mill is hardly unaware of this paradox. For he accepts this view whole-heartedly! "Those only are happy", Mill declares, "who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness . . . ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be s o " . 1 3 5 The secret to happiness is, not to allow the carefully inculcated "habit of analysis" on intellectual questions to "wear away the feelings". 1 3 6 Nothing erodes joy more than self-consciousness; nothing disturbs emotional well-being more than sudden lack of spontaneity. Mill's Hegelianesque observations 137 suffice to mollify Moore's and Sidgwick's antagonism, insofar as Mill actually reinforces their position. There is no real area of disagreement here. But a second, related criticism of Mill is that he allegedly tries to "sneak" the proof across by (erroneously) claiming that happiness (or pleasure) is the only thing that men do desire. (This is perhaps the origin of Nietzsche's cruel jibe that mankind does not desire happiness — only the English do that.) Were this allegation true, Mill would be guilty of a reductive approach, similar to the Benthamite tactic examined earlier, in sect. 2. He would have committed a fallacy which the open-question argument is designed to exploit: that of holding that because men allegedly desire something, therefore we may straightaway conclude that they should do so. Moore asks rhetorically, "are not bad desires also possible?" 138 Mill's " p r o o f ' is the target for demolition there. 134 The Methods of Ethics, 136; discussed by Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, 192. This "paradox" is not meant to be logically damaging to hedonism, nor is it in fact a fatal blow. 135 "Autobiography", in AOW, 85-86. 136 AOW, p. 83. Compare "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 230, on the "dissolving force of analysis". 137 "I will add that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable." ("Utilitarianism", in EERS, 217). 138 Principia Ethica, 67. Italics in original. Compare Plato on "bad pleasures", at Republic, VI, 505C. For comments, see D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of
56 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY Yes, bad desires are possible. But we have already noted that Mill allows for the existence of " . . . desirable things . . . as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme". 1 3 9 While "all action is for the sake of some end", 1 4 0 Mill is prepared to acknowledge the diversity of ends entertained by men. He lists "love of money, or power, or fame" 141 as commonplace desires; insists on the prizeworthy character of virtue, quite apart from personal or other gain which may accrue to the doer of virtuous deeds; 1 4 2 and expresses skeptical doubts as to the possibility of showing happiness to be the "sole criterion" of morality (see especially the last sentence of the "proof'), for which purpose it would be . . . necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness. 1 4 3 There is only one passage in Utilitarianism which can be cited against Mill, and indeed it does display a wealth of tricky dialectic, much more so than the proof! 144 Mill starts out by affirming that Value", 101-102, and L. M. Loring, "Moore's Criticism of Mill", Ratio 9 (1967), 86-87. 139 "Utilitarianism" in EERS, 210. Also: "Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full w o r t h " (ibid., 221). Note the occurrence of the term 'desirable' both in this passage and in the one footnoted immediately above, in the text. Compare pp. 33-34, above. 140 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 206. For remarks, see H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, 42, 112. 141 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237. In "Sedgwick's Discourse", in EERS, 62, Mill also lists "feelings of ambition", power over others, and a number of others, besides. 142 EERS, 235. For discussion, see M. Mandelbaum, "On Interpreting Mill's Utilitarianism", Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968), 35, 42-46. 143 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234-235. (Mill gives the desire to be virtuous as his illustration; see also ibid., 239). This helps to dispose of the "happy slave" type of objection, for which see, e.g., A. Maclntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: MacMillan, 1966) 237-238, who invokes the 'is-ought' distinction and incorporates it in his attack, only to discard it moments later (Maclntyre, 240) in favor of an onslaught on the alleged vagueness of pleasure (or happiness) as a moral criterion! 144 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, esp. 236.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 57 " . . . there is in reality nothing desired except happiness", 1 4 5 but quickly amends this to read: " . . . human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or means of happiness", which appears initially as an empirical hypothesis, its status that of a "psychologically true opinion". Mill then repeats his modest argument that "we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable". 146 By inserting in his formula the clause "a means of happiness", Mill leaves open the door to other 'goods' besides happiness itself, while holding in reserve the privilege of a dialectical reconstruction of what it is that human beings "really" want. In no case is there an abuse of language, although the "facts" are strained to serve Mill's own purpose. But there is another aspect to this argument concerning desire in relation to happiness that will best be understood only after formalization of Mill's " p r o o f ' ; accordingly we now approach that topic directly, in hopes of making several contributions toward an understanding of the " p r o o f ' . Formalization and Final Criticisms As we have observed, Mill finds formal logical proof of ethical standards repugnant; and we are in fundamental agreement with his aversion. However, it is worthwhile to state formally the content of the proof. This is philosophically appropriate, and does not at all violate the spirit in which Mill's own endeavor is promulgated. 1 4 7 An initial version of the proof, couched in formal terms, reads as follows: (jc) 0 0 Dxy [ • (Ez) Az & (z - (z) (Ex) Dxz)] where Dxy (unbound) stands for 'x desires^', Az (unbound) stands for 'z is desirable', and the arrow denotes logical entailment, while the square operator represents logical necessity. Notice that there are no restrictions placed on the subject or object 145 EERS, p. 237. 146 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 2 3 7 , is the source of all three of the preceding quotations. Note 'desirable' occurring at the tag end of the third. 147 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 257/1, 258n, for Mill's o w n general attitude toward ("scientific") "deductive proof". Also see "Sedgwick's Discourse", in EERS, 62, for further corresponding remarks on 'disproof.
58 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY of desire; the proof does not discuss or require them, in order to "go through". While desire is treated here as (minimally) a two-termed relation, desirability is regarded as a property. And by 'desirability' we now do mean "in the normative sense", since otherwise the proposition expressed becomes trivial: for if anyone desires anything, it follows that there is something which is capable of being desired, or has qualities which would excite desire, and so on. In transferring to the normative meaning of 'desirable', it might be thought that we have left Mill behind. The proof as formulated above is definitely stronger than Mill's ipsissima verba, but it is supported by what Mill says elsewhere, as we shall see when we come to offer our own criticisms, below. Moreover, if the present revised version of the proof is justified, then, as a logical consequence thereof, Mill's own version is likewise validated. In words, the formalized proof says that: for all x and y, if x desires y, this entails that (1) there necessarily exists a z such that z is desirable and (2) if z is distinct from y , then this in turn entails that it is not the case that for all z there exists an x such that x desires z. In less stilted language, the proof amounts to the following: if there are desires, then there must be something desirable. Or to put it another way: if anything is desired, then something must be desirable. The qualifications with which this proof is packed, avoid most (if not all) of the pitfalls into which Mill is frequently accused of stumbling. For example, some scholars maintain that Mill simply equates what is desired with what is desirable. 1 4 8 To do so would indeed be fallacious, as Moore insists. 1 4 9 But Mill can be exonerated from the old charge of postulating the desired as (extensionally or intensionally) equivalent to the desirable. 1S0 For, the proof as just stated makes it clear that ( l ) t h e desirable is distinct from the desired and (2) it is false that there must ever be someone who desires what is desirable. The second denial affects, by logical implication, items of contingent status: in other words, the desirable is possibly what is desired in 148 See A. Stroll, "Mill's Fallacy", Dialogue, vol. Ill (1964-1965), 385-389, 400-404, esp. 404. Stroll's mistake is to infer that Mill is fastening exclusively on particular desires, instead of upon desire as such, or generally speaking. 149 Principia Ethica, 73,123. iso E . W . H a l l , "The 'Proof of Utility in Bentham and Mill", in J. B. Schneewind,ed., Mill: A Collection of-Critical Essays 150, 154. For further discussion see our "Hall and Mill's P r o o f ' , Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 2 (1971), 113-118.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 59 specific instances, but is not necessarily so; similarly, it may be that someone desires the desirable, but it does not have to be so. Possibly, yes; necessarily, no. The categories are kept separate. What is necessarily so, is that the very existence of desires means that there is something which is desirable. This is, as we interpret the proof, a logical " m u s t " , and moreover the only one which is present. This explains our preliminary diagnosis of Mill (pp. 46-47 above): namely, desires furnish, by their sheer natural existence, a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for the desirability of a given item. This is a minimal statement of the proof. Although it is stronger than Mill's own formulation, which incidentally drops no hint of entailment or modality of any kind, an even stronger version can be devised, which will j u m p far ahead of Mill. For an explanation of this, we must return now to the substantive question Mill raises (and answers) in Chapter IV of Utilitarianism-. "What is it that all men uniformly desire? Pleasure." 151 But Mill artfully transforms "pleasure" into either happiness itself, or else a means toward the promotion of happiness, as we previously elaborated. So happiness alone is what is universally desired; and quite apart from subordinate desires for other things. These subsidiary desires vary f r o m person t o person, but their idiosyncratic nature is overcome by examining the one end which is held in common by all men, although often quite diversely pursued.152 Happiness, then, is a special case falling under the general heading of desire. And it is but a tautology to equate happiness with the desirable (normatively, as well as in any other sense); happiness is desirable by definition, and to argue against this is to betray gross ignorance (e.g. of semantics). This is the point Mill is making, in a tortured way, near the conclusion of Chapter IV. 1 5 3 It enables us to isi For critique, see R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 89, 154; D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of Value", 107-108. On the (false) identification of pleasure with the good, see Plato, Republic, VI, 505C; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 125, 59; M. Warnock, Ethics Since 1900, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 19. 152 Compare the remarks made by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 4, 1095 a 16-21, and I, 7, 1097 b 23-24. 153 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237, 238. For comment, see D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of Value", 111. For Mill's equation of 'happiness' with 'desirable'
60 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY reinvoke the proof, as follows: in the special case where happiness is what is desired, the statement is shortened, letting the constant a stand for happiness, to: • (Ez) Az & (z= a & (jc) (z) Dxz) Notice that this formulation still permits a range of values (desirable objects) to z, each one of which will be identified with, or at least lead to, happiness. This is Mill's form of multiplicity-within-unity; or moral pluralism within a monistic, eudaimonistic 154 framework. This is a maximal statement of the proof, according to which the desired is extensionally equivalent to the desirable — but only in the special case where 'the desired' is considered predicator for 'happiness'. The original equation (page 57) might then read: (x) O ) Dxy [• (Ez) Az&(zfy -»• (z) (x) Dxz)] We may now see why so many of Mill's opponents have been misled into thinking that Mill altogether collapses 'the desirable' into 'what is desired'. This impression comes about as a result of Mill's focus on the paramount ethical topic of (human) happiness and wellbeing, under the guise of the principle of utility, i.e. the greatest happiness principle. The maximal version of the proof, which is not cautiously formed, is simply false. Mill knew this as well as his philosophical enemies; but he chose not to emphasize the importance of failing to hedge disproof properly. Why? We cannot say with assurance what Mill's reasons may have been; perhaps he thought the subject of happiness would be of such prime concern as to obliterate any rival dimensions. Under whose intense light might the proof be scrutinized if not by someone sharing Mill's eudaimonistic outlook? Those who subject Mill to criticism ordinarily extract and isolate the " p r o o f ' from its utilitarian context, and so consider it on its see "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 257-258n. Mill regards this as purely a linguistic matter, not as a conceptual issue or philosophical problem to be handled. Consequently, it is easy for him to procure universal verbal agreement, for what that may be worth, on the universality of the desire for happiness. 154 For comments, see Margolis, "Mill's Utilitarianism Again", Values and Conduct, 158, and McGill, The Idea of Happiness, 121,142.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 61 "independent" merits. Hence the maximal version becomes plainly unacceptable; yet Mill's own version would be closer to that (see page 60), only shorn of its modal operator. Whereas, the minimal version we presented first (see page 57), which states a necessary but //(sufficient condition for desirability (in contrast to the maximal version, which, left unqualified, simply goes factually overboard), is eminently defensible quite independently of Mill, and so may henceforth be looked upon as that version of the proof which he permanently (albeit most awkwardly) bequeathed to philosophy; not least because it is free from the specific commitments of Mill's own ethical theory or detachable therefrom. One remaining question is whether or not, having been rescued from oblivion, the minimal proof is sound. The answer, on a strictly logical basis, is no; but the counter-examples required to unseat the proof are most revealing in their own right. The aspirations of many an ethical theory are bound up with the fate of the minimal proof, as we shall see shortly. The proof fails to "go through" under two possible conditions. The first is the circumstance in which nobody happens to desire anything. If there are no desires, then what is the point of setting something up as normatively desirable? And, if no desires exist, then nothing can be desired, either; for this would involve a 'degenerate' relational predicate, or one for which there is no instantiation available. While the objects of desire might still possess certain desire-arousing qualities, they would be dormant properties. One might compare this to Aristotle's "pure potency", or to the existential-metaphysical concept of Nothingness — if such allusions to the "unthinkable" are spurs to one's imagination. On 'strict' logical grounds, the minimal proof actually "succeeds" in a desireless-state, since the pioof is couched in the form of a necessary conditional whose antecedent (in this particular substitution instance) would'tum out to be false. This illustrates one minor shortcoming of putting the proof in formal terms: namely, the unresolved dilemma of counterfactual conditionals. 155 No one would even bother 1 ss In this (hypothetical) case, one of the paradoxes of material implication appears, but only because the set of desires (whether only the human, or ranging over "sentient beings" in general, as Mill occasionally prefers) happens to be empty, to form a null class. But then Mill's proof would never be formulated, since the question as to what is desirable (in any sense of the term) would simply
62 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY to formulate the proof, if earnestly convinced that no such thing as was being postulated existed. But this is a pragmatic consideration, not a logical one. The logically possible world of no desires at all makes out an exceedingly damaging prospect for ethics, since it rules out desirability (in the normative sense) in one stroke. 156 Fortunately, it is unreal. As long as there are people, there will be desires; for people just do harbor desires, indeed a multitude of them. 1 5 7 This is why Mill ties his proof, at every step along the way, to the level of fact, observation, experience, and evidence. It is also why Mill claims that the sheer existence of desires entails (or implies) something about what is desirable: namely, that it exists, even if it never happens to coincide with the object of any desire. 1 S 8 This brings us to the second, ultimately more damaging, refutation: suppose that (a) what is correctly judged desirable (one or more items, but at least one) did not exist; or, (b) all (human) desires were for things that are not desirable (that is, for things other than what is desirable, including both the undesirable and the non-desirable). Both (a) and (b) may be the case simultaneously, as well. Since the consequent of the minimal proof is a conjunction, by falsifying any one of its conjuncts one already falsities the entire, putatively necessary conditional. Now, (b) alone cannot really accomplish this, since the minimal proof already provides for the case in which the desirable is in fact not desired. What (b) postulates is an indefinite temporal extension of a dismal and frustrating situation, in which (presumably) the desirable exists and is there for the asking, but somehow is never located or fastened upon. The effect of (b) is never arise. But this is a "pragmatic" or "extra-logical" factor, as we remark below on p. 62. 156 On the assumption that desire is a necessary condition for desirability, which is, after all, what the " p r o o f ' in any version seeks to establish. 157 The " p r o o f " would not work, i.e. would fail to institute a norm, in a possible world governed exclusively by the ideal of, e.g. ascetic withdrawal, or Stoic apatheia. The question is: is such a world a desiderate (on moral, psychological or even religious grounds), or is it but a "second-best", . . . a defeated form of response to the frustration of a multitude of significant, unsatisfied desires previously harbored in this world? 158 Whereas, happiness is the one thing that is both universally desired and normatively desirable. This enables Mill to advance to his clinching step, which completes the attempted demonstration for the advanced or 'special case', i.e. the maximal proof. Both versions of the " p r o o f ' maintain flatly that desires (by
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY 63 not to destroy the proof, but to make meliorism impossible, and so dash all hopes for moral "progress". The real blow is dealt by (a), and by (a) alone. What if it should happen that nothing this-worldly is desirable? This is a direct challenge, not only to the minimal proof, but also to Mill's chief contention, that the presence of desire insures, or makes indubitable, the existence of something desirable (not necessarily ever corresponding to what is in fact desired, by errant mankind). If (a) holds, then the " p r o o f ' is invalidated. Stated in modern terms, what if no "moral values" exist? Then any human desires must be directed to the "wrong" thing; for there is no "right" object for them to be directed toward. Just as Mill, in claiming that desires for what is unpleasant could not occur, 1 S 9 was unable to foresee the insights of later psychology into "deviance", so here it is inconceivable to him that moral "values" might be "dead", or that e.g. "nihilism" could be taken seriously. In neither case does this come about merely because Mill is an intellectual victim of his own historical era; these possibilities Mill also systematically rules out, by means of the premises and underlying assumptions generated in his ethics, which reflectively preclude a plunge into moral "nihilism". To cite one relevant example: Mill would support what is today called "negative utilitarianism", 1 6 0 which seeks as its principal goal the prevention of suffering and misery, rather than concentration upon the increase or promotion of happiness. Mill's remarks on this subject are instructive for present purposes. Initially he explains that . . . Utility . . . holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. . . . By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. 161 So far, Mill upholds both negative and what might be termed "positive" utilitarianism: both the furtherance of the highest good, and the definition) are not devoid of normative significance, or morally 'neutral' (in the generic sense). This residue is valid, whatever.the fate of the " p r o o f " . 159 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237-238. 160 For the origin of this term, see R. N. Smart, "Negative Utilitarianism", Mind 67 (1958), 542-543. The original idea is credited to Sir Karl Popper. 161 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 210. In "Sedgwick's Discourse", in EERS, 59, Mill writes: "As soon as a child has the idea of voluntarily producing pain or pleasure to any one person, he has an accurate notion of utility."
64 HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY prevention of what Urmson has dubbed summum malum. restates as much when he specifies the good life by way of 162 Mill . . . the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable . . . an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments . . . 163 Here again, positive and negative utility thrive together, even complement one another. But Mill soon becomes compelled to take a glance at the circumstances in which men's existence is unfortunately not as "rich . . . in enjoyments" as either they or Mill would like. Often happiness is to be simply forsworn, either out of necessity (see remarks above, on inconsequentialism, under Sect. 6.), or as a matter of deliberate policy — here enters the ethics of duty, or renunciation. Mill now argues, consistently with both his utilitarianism and his disapproval of asceticism, that . . . if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, the attainment of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational conduct. 164 A similar remark could be made concerning that strange state of affairs in which men, as it happened, would not desire anything, not because their desires had already been fulfilled or satisfied, but out of permanent torpor, so to speak. Mill pleads on behalf of the utilitarian cause, by pointing out that utilitarian theory is prepared for the worst; for inertia or renunciation of life, . . . since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness; and if the former aim be chimerical, there will be all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide . . . 165 "...so long...as mankind think to live". That is the touchstone. As an optimist, Mill believes there is something to live for, even if it has 162 J. O. Urmson, "Saints and Heroes", in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), 209. 163 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 214. Note the occurrence of 'desirable'. 164 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 214. Cf. above, pages 30, 38, 39n 71, 55n, 137. 165 EERS, 214. This should not be confused with stoicism; Mill does take the pains to distinguish and differentiate his own stand from that of the Stoics, at various turns. See, e.g. "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 218, 221.
HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY 65 yet to be discovered (or created). 166 And that is why, short of a totally desperate situation, he is willing to defend the goals outlined in his "proof'. This is also additional textual support for all versions of the "proof'. Aside from the suggestions posed by "nihilism" and by the "death" of all moral values in contemporary thought, the (minimal) "proof' does indeed work. Where and how it may break down is a testimony to its own philosophic character, and the lengths to which one must go in order to try to defeat the proof, splitting open its deepest presuppositions in the process. 167 That is why, although the "proof' is by no means an unqualified success, and does not in the end stand up to all of the most rigorous tests, it does repay close, detailed reappraisal. Mill's "proof', in spite of exasperating evasiveness, does come remarkably close. For the "proof' limns precisely those most fundamental and pervasive clashes of outlook as well as temperament in ethics, showing therein the sources of the divisions between different types of moral mentality. These irreconcilable antagonisms go beyond the coping powers of logic, reason or the tools of discursive philosophy. They can only be adumbrated. 166 it should be borne in mind that Mill himself was an agnostic, so this statement is not intended to prejudice opinion in favor of the alleged need for, e.g. a "religious" understanding of life's meaning or significance. 167 St. Thomas' ethics is remarkably similar to Mill's, in at least one highly instructive respect: for St. Thomas, " . . . even if we grant the existence of a natural desire for a complete and all-satisfying good, it does not necessarily follow that the desire is capable of fulfillment. B u t . . . Aquinas presupposes. . . that human nature has been created by a personal God who would not have created it with an unavoidable impulse towards a non-existent good, or a good incapable of being attained". (F. C. Copleston, Aquinas [Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955], 202.) Inasmuch as Mill's resolution of the Problem of Evil (see Three Essays on Religion, esp. Theism) involves placing a severe limit on God's power, therein denying His omnipotence, it is clear that here Mill and St. Thomas would part theological company. This raises the interesting issue as to whether Mill, as a self-styled agnostic humanist, can ultimately defend his entrenched moral optimism; more generally, whether meliorism, once divested of divine guarantees, can justify its continued presence. Incidentally, Mill would not hold, as Aquinas does, " . . . that we would desire nothing at all, were there not an ultimate or supreme good for Man" (Copleston, ibidem), b u t it is striking to find possible counter-examples to the " p r o o f ' recurring elsewhere. The continuity in outlook is no doubt partly due to the remolded Aristotelian naturalism which Aquinas inherits and adopts. It is also reminiscent of the PAB (above, pp. 32-34).
IV THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE I The most exciting recent development in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy has been the growth of 'philosophy of language', and with it the rise of "speech acts", whose application to moral controversies is largely the work of Searle. 1 Searle's own interest in the 'is-ought' fork is not significantly concerned with either historical illumination or textual criticism, whereas our own involvement with both is more intimate. This preoccupation (esp. in Ch. Ill) has been both methodological and philosophical, and marks one extensive difference between our own approach and that of Searle. Nevertheless, from his own perspective, Searle's viewpoint is amply justified; for this reason, Searle does not hesitate when confronted by questions such as: what did e.g. Hume accomplish in formulating the 'is-ought' distinction? 2 Did he intend adherence to a new canon of logic? Do his own procedures in ethics belie strict fidelity to the 'isought' principle? Since Hare and others have restated the 'is-ought' distinction and made it independent from Hume, Searle finds it quite unnecessary to delve into such problems of exegetical scholarship. On Searle's own terms, this exclusion is understandable; for the 'is-ought' distinction is so pervasive in contemporary thought that a battery of nearly synonymous appellations has by now made its way into common parlance: Factual vs. Normative, Descriptive vs. Evaluative, 1 J. R. Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 43-58; and Speech Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) Ch. 8, 175-198. For critique, see esp. R. M. Hare, "Descriptivism", Proceedings of the British Academy 49 (1963), 115-134; and "The Promising Game", Revue Internationale de Philosophic 18 (1964), 398-412. 2 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 43«2; Speech Acts 1 7 5 n l , 1 7 6 n l .
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 67 Fact-Value "gap", all suggest themselves. Another source (besides Hume) for the philosophical institutionalization of large-scale versions of the 'is-ought' "barrier" is undoubtedly Moore, and in particular the "open-question argument", together with the "naturalistic fallacy", as Moore presented them. 3 We shall return to the open-question argument later, and point out its bearing on Searle's attempted derivation, and what the strengths and weaknesses of invoking it against Searle are. (Like Searle, we shall confine ourselves to critical points, and not discuss here the meaning and status of these ideas as they occur in Moore's own writings.) Two logical priorities: First, the precise meaning and import of the 'is-ought' distinction itself. Second, the tasks and the self-imposed restrictions of the "engaged" moral philosopher. Both command initial discussion; both will be incorporated into the substantive treatment of Searle, as well as in our final reflections. II The 'is-ought' "law" amounts to the following: ( l ) i t is fallacious to infer that something ought to be the case4 from the claim that it is the case; (2) the converse inference likewise does not go through. Thus a radical separation between these two categories is effected. At first sight this looks so simple that one must wonder: (i) how anybody could ever be accused of transgressing against it; (ii) how one could take umbrage at the 'is-ought' cleavage in the first place. But let us unpack the formulation above, examining (2) first. The reason why (2) is considered fallacious is that the logical conditional formed by 'if x ought to be, then x is' may have a true antecedent but a false consequent, thereby falsifying the whole implication. For there are many things or states-of-affairs which ought to be, yet are not: peace in the world, a cure for cancer, a chicken in every pot. These desirables do not exist, at least not yet, or not constantly. The deontic categories simply give no logical assurance as to the (contingent) and uninterrupted reality of the objects or conditions which they so designate. 3 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 15-17. 4 In Hare's version, descriptive premises cannot logically yield a normative conclusion; or, wherever there is a normative conclusion, there must be at least one normative premise. We shall rely on our own formulations, however.
68 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE One might try to argue that 'ought to be' is sometimes equivalent to 'should be', and then contend that since 'should be' means 'probably will be' (as in "it should rain today"), the 'ought-is' chasm has been bridged. But this is nothing more than illicit capitalization on the ambiguity of 'ought to be'. For it is clear that 'ought' does not ever mean 'what shall most likely occur', but expresses e.g. the worthiness of some object or event to be, or have the opportunity to be, realized. Hare (among others) has stressed the close connection between ethical statements and imperatives. If we say that 'Mr. X ought to be the next president' this is legitimately construed as equivalent to "Let Mr. X be the next president". It likewise does register a wish on the part of the speaker, or the person who subscribes to the idea that Mr. X should become the next president: namely, 'would that Mr. X were the next president'. So 'ought' statements can (sometimes) be translated into expressions of desire or preference. This precludes confusion, in that it shows that there is no logically necessary connection between what somebody wants and what (alas) may happen to be the case. Wanting Mr. X to be president will not suffice to boost him into office. It may well influence or motivate future conduct, however; but "wishing alone won't make it so". Another reinterpretation of the 'ought-is' putative fallacy would elaborately retool the 'is-' component. This might take one of two forms: (a) making a distinction between potency and act; (b) collapsing the 'ideal' into the 'real', and so closing the gulf between them. According to (a), what ought to be the case, while it does not automatically tell us what actually exists, does tell us what the real possibilities are. So "ought implies can be". This heralds a Leibnizian theology or metaphysics, whose temporalized consequences are plainly unacceptable. For example, we cannot know whether there is a potential cure for a specific disease until such time as a cure is actually produced. Retrospectively endowed with perfect hindsight, the thesis becomes trivial. Similarly, we cannot know whether it is possible for any man to run a 3-minute mile, unless it is ever done. The actual entails the possible, but the non-actual tells little or nothing about what we should like to know, concerning the future. It is customary to distinguish between and among three senses of the term 'possible' and its cognates: the logical, natural (the known laws of nature, as in physics), and technological, respectively. Which of these is meant, when the 'is-' part is subject to redefi-
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 69 nition? If merely the logical, then anything short of contradiction 'is'! Now, for ought to imply is where 'is' refers to sheer logical possibility, is unobjectionable, inasmuch as it is virtually devoid of content. We do not need 'ought' to discover what is logically possible, anyway. But no other candidate for the transition from 'ought' to 'is' can carry itself through with any plausibility. If someone actually ran a 3-minute mile, then and only then would we know that the laws of nature, i.e. human biological nature, do make such a feat possible. But not beforehand. Likewise, if a cure for a certain disease is ever found, it will then be correct to state that a cure is technologically possible. But no sooner. It is impossible (in principle) to make intelligible predictions of the possible, in advance. Of course, as e.g. milers do get closer and closer to breaking the 3-minute barrier, as medical scientists progress in their work, intelligently optimistic prognostications will no doubt be formulated. But by that time, the achievement or solution is either well in hand, or must already be "in the works". There still will be objective doubt and lingering uncertainty until the goal is actually reached, however. According to (b), the is ought distinction never even arises, because the only use of 'is' considered germane is that of 'ideal reality'. 'Man is a rational animal' does not mean that he is so most of the time, nor that most men do develop and fulfill their rational capacities. 'Man is rational' means that man is rational only at his "highest", "best", and most "distinctive". So the 'is-ought' distinction allegedly topples: one might justly speak instead of an 'ought-ought'. Here, whatever ought to be, is; for within the system in which the 'ideal' is promulgated, the 'is' is treated honorifically, or else not at all. There is something to this position. An art critic says (e.g.) Rembrandt's paintings are "representative" of seventeenth century art in Holland. They are not, if one considers the dozens of forgotten Dutch painters who were living at the same time; but the standards set by experts and competent judges in this field are different. The superior, not the "average" is taken as the yardstick of typicality. This procedure, and the policy linguistically expressed by it, are justified aesthetically, if not historically. One does not regret that Rembrandt's paintings hang in the art galleries, or usurp displays of the canvasses of many less gifted artists. The best (or most prominent) men, events and things also serve as
70 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE a proper guide in other areas, e.g. in the discipline of history, with its loosely formulated principles of narrative-selection. Now, the sense of 'is' which (b) asks us to observe is of this kind. But this merely agrees with the proponent of a rigid 'is-ought' distinction, by redefining 'is'; in effect converting it into an 'ought', as if the 'is' had been a concealed norm, all along. Therefore, refining the meaning of 'is' in no way disposes of the 'is-ought' problem, although the technique is both subtle and sensitive. Equating the real with the ideal tacitly admits the validity of the distinction, in that this revised formulation casts the is as a disguised ought. Theoretically, one category drops out altogether. Searle himself might object to both (a) and (b) on the grounds of their being "metaphysical" or depending upon metaphysical outlooks. 5 The charge is accurate, but it is ineffective, inasmuch as the 'is-ought' is itself the belated product of a "metaphysical" stance, or one with such presuppositions (e.g. Kant's noumena-phenomena split, one ancestor of the fact-value gap). Hence it was necessary to examine all aspects of (2) in pertinent detail. The passage from 'ought' to 'is' is not fallacious on all construals. As a general injunction (2) has merit, for its honest exceptions are either uninteresting or else harmless. Now let us pass on to (1). Pre critically, the 'is-ought' ban looks highly plausible. One usually wants to deny (for example) that "might makes right", while admitting that might (unfortunately) does dictate conditions, as frequently we experience them. "Whatever is, is right" is likewise obnoxious, unless it is sheer comedy. The "openquestion argument" of Moore, is meant to forestall certifying such dangerous doctrines, to prevent them from becoming intellectually respectable. The once-controversial precepts of Social Darwinism, with its facile equation of "higher" (meaning "more evolved") with "better", furnish an illustration of the kind of conclusion which the 'is-ought' fork effectively blocks. Moral: one is not permitted to "read o f f ' ethical conclusions from factual data; the facts may well be unalterable, but only a metaphysical and historical optimist, a Leibniz 5 Speech Acts 197. "Whatever ought to be, is" is most characteristically Fichtean, although Searle does not have Fichte in mind. On 'ought' (or 'should') and 'must', see Mill, "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 251. On Fichte, see J. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 2nd ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), 62. On the perils of going from 'ought' to 'is', and on the reverse transference between e.g. 'is' and 'must', see R. J. Fogelin, Evidence and Meaning, 170-171, 176-177. Also see Kant, KdrV A319/B375; A633/B661; A547-548/B575-576.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 71 or a Hegel, would glibly maintain that the "whole" or the general state of affairs which the "facts" describe, is all to the good. There would seem to be something drastically wrong — logically speaking about entertaining any such ideas. Notice that the 'is-ought' ban is meant to halt the inference that x ought to be, from the assertion that x (already) is. The logical validity of passing from 'is' to 'ought' is assailed. If one were to urge, e.g. that all legal regulations currently in force should remain in effect (and be vigorously prosecuted) merely because they exist, or independently of their respective merit, one would be committing a logical mistake. 6 For surely there are everywhere bad as well as obsolete laws, laws which are now in force but which should be amended, modified, repealed or just plain ignored, by the authorities. The Greeks (especially Aristotle) alleged, for metaphysical reasons, that the concept of an 'unjust law' was a contradiction in terms, since laws introduced harmony and limit (which are good) into a situation previously and otherwise incoherent or chaotic. But if the Greeks could not also recognize that there were bad laws, it would have made little sense to praise Socrates for his courage in breaking the Athenian laws against impiety and corruption of the youth. Such praise was not bestowed from outside, by "neutral" observers, or at a much later time; it was conferred by, e.g. Plato, upon his intellectual master. One might hold that even bad laws should not be broken, as Socrates warily advances in the Crito. But this is not just because the laws exist, but is based on what their existence supposedly means to the (Athenian) community. Breaking the laws, even unjust ones, is a serious business, because it tends to weaken the institution(s) on which society is built; to reduce social cohesion, trust, reciprocity, and so forth. The presence of the laws themselves, promotes little in the way of respect; whereas, regard for the overall consequences of breaking laws, which is conceptually quite different from doing obeisance to their very existence, may well foster high respect. Yet this is not germane — ethically conclusive imperatives such as 'Obey the laws' 6 There is an implicit norm operating here, i.e. dedication to fair, honest and impartial inquiry, which begs or precedes the 'is-ought' dichotomy, indirectly. Compare Kant, on the "reprehensibility" of deriving 'ought' (legal impositions) from 'is' (real-politics), at KdrV A319/B375; also see A547/B575, and A633/B661. On commitment of this sort see below, page 106 n. 103.
72 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE or 'Do not break the laws' are not psychologically or socially entailed. An 'is' does not have to entail an 'ought' for it may well be that ought-judgments are somehow functions of the process of accumulation of (pertinent) is-statements. But consider Hume's own famously analogous causal model about inferring (from the constant conjunction of A and B). This does not mean that A did not cause B, or that B occurs uncaused, or that constant conjunction is not one factor relied upon in claiming that A caused B\ indeed, for Hume, it is the only possible criterion. But (perception of) the constant conjunction of A and B is logically insufficient to deduce that A caused B. This condition is a roundabout way of restating the elementary post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy. The 'is-ought' disjunction is similar in form, and for that reason appears prima facie valid. Note that while (as we shall see) the 'is-ought' dichotomy does not hold up universally, it still earns a badge for guarding against fake "derivations" of what ought to be, from what is or is alleged to be. The 'is-ought' cleavage at most enjoys approximately the status of a regulative, as opposed to a constitutive, principle. 7 And it retains heuristic value, in spite of not being a universally valid proscription. Ill Now to our second issue: the domain of ethics and its methods. It is commonplace nowadays to differentiate between first-order moral discourse on the one hand, and metaethics on the other. 8 We must examine certain ramifications of this distinction. It is important in its own right, and has immense bearing on the 'is-ought' debate. The issue is this: ( l ) i s there really such a thing as metaethics? and if so, (2) what does its existence as a discipline imply about "ethics", or the subject to which metaethics ostensibly refers? Our contention is that metaethics, if its place can be justxtiea, portends the "death" of ethics: not just the end of moral philosophy, but even that of moral 7 KdrV A616, 619/B644, see "How to Derive 'Ought' 8 See H. D. Aiken, Reason 6-10, 24 ff.: W.D.Hudson, Reflective Naturalism, 3. 647. For an appeal to the distinction, much-revised, from 'Is' ", 55 and 55n7; Speech Acts, 33. and Conduct (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), Modern Moral Philosophy, 1, 12ff.; V. C. Punzo,
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 73 discourse in general. Moral philosophers have not faced this issue squarely as yet, because they have failed to appreciate the threat which metaethics poses to ethics itself. Let us see why. "Just because philosophy is second-order talk, it implies the existence of the first-order talk which it is about", writes Hudson. 9 The smug confidence behind such a view is logical, yet not entirely reliable. Consider: 'All ethical statements are nothing but propaganda'. Logically this makes no sense, since "propaganda" stands out only by contrast with something which is not propaganda; the above statement cannot itself be propagandistic, at the risk of circularity. The canon of early empiricism, 'All knowledge is derived through senseexperience', is in a similar bind: indeed, it "proves" that there are at least two sources of knowledge, one of which is not sense-experience; or else the canon above leads to a vicious regress. In a similar way the claim that (moral) philosophy logically "presupposes" 10 the existence of a universe of discourse with which it concerns itself, seems correct. In philosophy, the domain of ethical statements is usually identified by the appearance of clusters of terms such as 'right', 'good', 'ought', words expressing praise and blame, and the like. These vocabularyitems are a permanent feature of moral discourse, with a few variations; they are found everywhere. Yet it is entirely probable that all actual ethical statements do contain an inexpungeable element of propaganda. It would then be in order to speak of the null class, formed by 'non-propagandistic ethical statements', a concept which would remain perfectly intelligible. Consider, e.g. Vico's thesis that 'All discourse is metaphorical'. 1 1 How can this be? Does not 'metaphor' depend upon something "concrete", or non-metaphorical, to be applied intelligibly? Perhaps; but there is no logical guarantee that the non-metaphorical exists.12 'Metaphor' implies only that there is a concept of the non-metaphorical, not that 9 W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 13. 10 Hudson, Modem Moral Philosophy, 14. 11 To avoid a self-referential paradox, one might term this sentence the sole exception to its own universal predication, understanding it to mean 'All other discourse is metaphorical'. 12 A theological parallel: Aquinas' Third Way, the argument from 'contingency' to 'necessity', with no corresponding guarantee of instantiations. For both notions, compare the problems with "analogous predication" in medieval semantics.
74 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE there is anything "out there". It makes perfectly good sense to describe "all" discourse as being permeated with metaphors (not to mention all philosophy!);for the set of non-metaphors may just be empty, like the class of honest politicians in a generous ontology. Unless Hudson can redefine 'existence' in such a way as to mean or include only concepts, his quoted statement on page 73 is theorethically falsified. Moral philosophy in this sense implies only the idea of first-order "talk", not such talk itself. Hudson borrows from Wittgenstein's doctrine that technical philosophic language is always "parasitic" upon natural language, so that (some) philosophic problems can be "dissolved" through the "therapy" of discovering how the impetus towards the technical sphere occurred. Instead of resorting to technical language at all, Wittgenstein seeks to refresh our memories, and bids us recall how we learned concepts which, as philosophers, we aspire or pretend to handle with more sophisticated (but, it is alleged, ultimately fruitless) methods. 13 If a Hudson were to follow this genetic line of advice thoroughly, he would have to give up on metaethics entirely. (This has not yet occurred to any of the proponents of metaethics, of whose theories Hudson is a very able expositor as well as occasional partisan.) It is sometimes alleged that metaethics neither is nor can ever remain "normatively neutral". The thought behind this otherwise puzzling charge is that metaethics happens, in fact, to arise from a definite philosophic tradition, with its own commitments, its own view of the nature and limits of knowledge, and very settled opinions as to the methods which are sanctioned for use in philosophy. Sociologically, true; philosophically perhaps pointless. For a self-proclaimed metaethician may at least try to remain morally "uncommitted", if this is how he restricts the 'proper function' of philosophy in this turbulent area. To argue that one's commitments stand regardless of stated intentions and their most rigorous and thoroughgoing execution, is to lean upon the old Jamesian twist, whereby the logic of agnosticism, or lack of commitment, is itself taken as representing a commitment. 1 4 But perhaps it is the only one necessary (or desir- 13 Philosophical Investigations, Part I,§ 77. 14 c f . "The Will to Believe" (1896).This is not merely a taxonomic dodge, or a self-referential rebuttal, in the way that James employs it, since it refers to "our passional nature" and appeals to crisis-situations. See below, page 97.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 75 able) to make, where 'lack of commitment' is tantamount, if not equivalent, to 'deliberately refraining from commitment'. Moreover, lack of commitment is no more of a commitment than atheism can be said to be a form of religious belief! Lack of commitment is merely generic commitment, not substantive. It is only a form of attacking some problem, of addressing oneself to it. When a philosopher claims normative impartiality, his expression of intent must be honored, just so long as he actually carries out this non-commitment with logical scrupulosity and care. It is hyper-critical to deny that on many occasions, non-commitment is or can be a real philosophical variable, not merely an apparent one. 15 15 Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 14. E. M. Zemach, in an important attack entitled "Ought, Is, and a Game Called 'Promise' ", Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1971), 61-63, contends that Searle's derivation, while valid, is trivial(!) and therefore useless. [This is predicated on a false opposition set up between language and, e.g. society, which Zemach then foists upon Searle's whole theory of "speech acts", thereby emptying it of empirical content, as well as robbing it of potential applications. A similar defect vitiates F. S. McNeilly's "Pre-Moral Appraisals", Philosophical Review 81 (1972), 63-81.] Zemach cleverly argues that the compulsion to engage in moralizing is, if genuine, a social one, and therefore amounts to a physical (external) necessity which, being purely contingent, does nothing except to eliminate one's freedom to commit oneself to certain performances. If we cannot help but be moral, in the generic sense, then being moral involves no special merit on our part. This is because the 'cannot' here is purportedly causal, not logical or moral. And it does not matter whether the cause is social pressure, with its folkways and mores and the relentless process of socialization and conditioning, or stems from some bio-psychological propensity in man (e.g., 'man is by nature a political animal/social being'). Zemach in effect transposes "ought implies c a n " into its contrapositive: "cannot implies do not have to". The answer to this would-be infringement upon human responsibility is that if we cannot 'opt out', this does not mean that all (or any) of our choices are dictated; only their framework or setting. One could as well say that Shakespeare had to write King Lear because he could not abscond from English. In that case, why is no one else able to duplicate such a feat, let alone be thought compelled to do so? Of course, Zemach, Ralls [A. Ralls, "The Game of Life", Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1966), 23-34, esp. 24] and Gewirth [A. Gewirth, "Must One Play the Moral Language-Game?" .4 m m a m Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970), 107-118, esp. I l l ] , are all quite right, that one can on occasion depart from a particular situation, e.g. playing chess or baseball. But: (1) The "game of life" or morality is not a hyperbolic extension of such contexts, but instead constitutes a global conceptual unification of them; (2) Zemach's counter-example of the
76 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE Neutrality is or can be genuine; it need not be spurious. Genuine neutrality in metaethics, however, undermines the very subject which breathes life into it; its effects are anything but beneficial. For to begin with, the age-old question "What ought to be (or be done)?" drops out of sight. The metaethician, whose task is made abruptly coextensive with that of the moral philosopher, busies himself with examining the meaning of moral expressions, and little more. The metaethician does not pass judgment. Nor does he advise, urge, exhort, recommend, prompt, or persuade. He refrains from the employment of these techniques, not necessarily because he thinks they are deceitful, or subordinate to some other approach, but because (1) he considers it no part of his business to do that, and (2) the tools of reasoning which he has available are not equipped for such a job. Nor does the metaethician wish to widen his collection, or change his route. He proceeds only with utmost caution, and along a narrow path. The outcome is philosophical 'schizophrenia'. The metaethician does not unify, but instead fragments his own experience. Putting on his philosophical hat, he is content to sift and analyze. Putting on his street cap, he engages himself in first-order moral discourse, not qua philosopher, but in a strictly "amateur" capacity. His participation in affairs of life remains uninformed, which is another philosophically objectionable phenomenon. If "What ought I to d o ? " is not a physician who interrupts a chess game to attend to a sick patient is answered by Searle's discussion of conflicting duties (Speech Acts, 1 8 0 n l ) ; (3) N o t every contingency is, is meant to be, or needs to be exhaustively covered in advance (even if this is in principle possible). The rules of chess do not include a provision (irrelevant on the face of it) for what to do in case, e.g. an emergency appendectomy intervenes, precisely because that is a non-chess emergency, and because the context (chess is a 'game') makes it virtually transparent what does or does not usually take precedence over the continuation of a given chessmatch; (4) Moreover, Zemach's stipulations amount to an ignoratio elenchus, in that the commitment discussed in Searle's derivation has already been made; therefore (ex hypothesf), any 'detached' or 'anthropological' speculation (see below, pages 78, 82«, 83-88, 92-95, 114-115ff.) is logically out of the question, even for a bystander, commenting upon the scene. In short, Zemach peculiarly misses the significance of the Wittgensteinian 'forms of life' upon which Searle (tacitly) rests; just as overconcentration on technical fine-points (e.g. irrelevant "transinstitutional rule" constructions), makes Zemach fail to appreciate the moral eainesty of promising. It is grotesque and evasive to pretend to criticize institutions in general, when one is not really inclined to attack promising, in particular; probably, because it is so invulnerable.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 77 question for philosophers, then who is left to answer it? The misguided, the incompetent; the demagogue, the quack, the illiterate; and the various spokesmen for class- or special interests; including those who may claim to speak on behalf of, e.g. the scientific community. If sustained philosophical reflection is declared either "off limits", or of negligible worth, for the purpose of facing human contingencies, then we face an implicit admission of the sterility of philosophy. Metaethics drives us to this conclusion. It may indeed be correct — but then it is true of ethics (and value-theory) only insofar as it is under the spell of such haunting metaethical shibboleths, and permanently unable to extricate itself. But the sinister implications of metaethics do not end there. Consider how a metaethician might reply to the points just lodged. He could say, "I am clarifying ethical discourse, but also for the purpose of making our thinking on these matters clearer". This is roughly Hare's position. Now Hare acknowledges that (1) ethics as he conceives of it involves decision-making; (2) it is no part of the business of philosophy to dictate, or even to suggest, what steps should be taken in ethics, but only to limn their logical form, "after the fact". So ethics appears to survive and indeed flourish, and not to suffer encroachment. Now, the objective of "clarity" is admirable, like "simplicity" (parsimony) in science, or "elegance" in logic. But it is also a vague criterion, and sometimes amounts to a matter of aesthetic taste and personal preference. No one is against clarity; but one man's clarity may be another's obscurity. An impressionistic attempt is sometimes made at this point to appropriate great philosophers under the banner of metaethics. (This technique harks back to James' cleverly anachronistic labelling of such figures as Mill and Spinoza as "pragmatists".) No doubt, e.g. Socrates was consistently in favor of clarity, as his apparent quest for definitions or search for essences may attest. But does this exhaust either Socrates' contribution or the extent of his commitment?' No; only the metaethician's. Is the attainment of clarity enough? No; not even for purposes of Hareian analysis. Hare's own telling admission that ethics and metaethics logically part company whenever the issue of 'what shall I do?' is joined, shows almost immediately that, in virtue of self-imposed restrictions, metaethics is morally impotent. However, as Hudson aptly points out, no one — philosophers included — can "opt out of moralizing". Therefore it is imperative that something be done to put "moralizing" on a
78 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE more rational footing, rather than simplv allow the untrained, the representative of vested interests, or the rabble-rouser to toy with something so vital. Then again, perhaps Hudson is incorrect: for maybe, in succinct terms, ethics does not "exist", but is a mere mental monstrosity or accretion. Perhaps it is but an illusion, a mirage, a shabby fraud (yet to be exposed). What could this entail? It may dictate a colossal reform of language, like that which Hudson himself envisions with respect to the free-will problem: 1 6 a progressive shrinkage in the vocabulary of ethics, until finally the entire 'language of morals' simply disappears, because it has become, in Wittgenstein's word, "obsolete". It will not be replaced by any other language-game, but will simply die out, just as whole languages sometimes do, only with no survivor or successor. This would require a massive reform in both word and thought, which in turn would influence many attitudes and institutions, e.g. legal punishment. Like ancient mythic accounts of the origin of the universe, the very terminology of ethics might in time become a relic, a museum piece; or a superstition, properly belonging to the prescientific stage of human intellectual development, and a fit subject for antiquarians only. If this sounds frightening, it should. The spectre is alarming, but it is a consequence of the orientation of metaethics. For metaethics is, as has been observed, a kind of logical anthropology of ethics. 1 7 The ramifications of this have slipped by unnoticed. In particular the detachment of the metaethician, who observes what goes on in moral settings, without ever becoming actively involved as an agent, 18 is striking. He is uniformly a spectator, not a celebrant. He surveys existing customs and institutions with an "unprejudiced" eye. He is a spectator, but never a judge, either. 19 He is an ex16 Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 363-365; see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I, § 23; also I. Berlin, "Historical Inevitability" repr. in Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 41-117. 17 Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 320-329. !8 Whereas, this is not always the case in anthropology: the scientist must sometimes undergo initiation-rites, in order to be admitted to the 'group' and so conduct his research; and there are times when he participates (willingly) in the life of, e.g. the tribe, and not just to further his own understanding of their habits or behavior. is The discussion below of the psychology revealed by the metaethical stance
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 79 ception to Hudson's rule; for he does manage to "opt out", and professionally he is not inclined to opt back in, if it can be avoided. If he does join the fold, he then abjures (by his own standards) philosophy. If he philosophizes, to that extent he does not live; he dwells apart, like Plato's "spectator of time and eternity". This is the pragmatic paradox facing him, and the source of a logical 'neurosis' of sorts brought on by his extravagantly speciaized activity. The horizons of thought permit one to speculate that there is an "all-embracing" viewpoint. Yet each person is "victimized" to some extent by training and conditioning. Only a fool thinks that we can completely escape our own, e.g. cultural and parental inheritance. We cannot; if this were genuinely possible, we should still be bound to or by some set of values, just as the metaethician is in the course of his own work. No man is devoid of an ethic, whether he passively imbibes the received wisdom of his time and place, or restructures it. So while neutrality is logically open, it is psychologically beyond us; the metaethician is only deluding himself if he believes otherwise. Parochiality can be trimmed, but never overcome entirely, as Chapter II already demonstrated in an equally formal context. The metaethician's official proclamation therefore runs to the effect that qua philosopher he is not (or refuses to be) morally of one or another conviction. This means either that when he is of some persuasion, he is not (at that moment) opining as a philosopher: a condition already derided; or else that, instead of at least leaving ethics to non-philosophers, the manifesto makes one suspect that ethics does not exist, i.e. that moral philosophy has no subject matter. So then forget about providing justifications for human actions; dismiss them as necessarily inadequate. At the very best, "moralizing" becomes nothing but a minute (but purposeless) examination of "first-order discourse". So ethics degenerates into the talking point of view: there is your talk, and his talk, and theirs, but no rational arbitration between and among conflicting views. This shows the brutal extent of a(metaethically unimproved) depiction of a "moral reality". The end product is defeat, not insight; surrender to the given, rather than (logically supportable) edification. The situation appears provisionally hopeless yet possible and consistent. is not identified with any one figure, but is meant to illuminate some essential characteristics of metaethics as an enterprise. Also see below, pages 102ff., on the metaethical position re the limiting cases of pure theorizing.
80 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE IV Against this depressing background, let us now attend to the mechanics o f Searle's derivation of 'ought' from 'is'. Searle's aim is to fasten upon cases in which the descriptive and normative elements are so inextricably intertwined that, as Searle points out, separating them in order to preserve the universality of the 'is-ought' distinction at all costs would render that thesis "trivial". 2 0 Promise-making and promise-keeping are chosen as the vehicles for the derivation. 2 1 Searle's hypothetical counter-example concerns payment of a debt. He does not specify whether (or h o w ) the debt had previously been incurred; the sole background for the "derivation" is the (dutyincurring) utterance expressing a promise, in this case involving the intention to (re-)pay the m o n e y . 2 2 Searle then moves to the "tautologous" 2 3 conclusion that, since Jones is (fact) under an obligation (at the time t, when the promise is contracted) to pay Smith $5, that Jones ought (evaluation) to pay Smith $5. Searle is justly credited even by Hare with combining "clarity and elegance" in obtaining the result. 2 4 In his book Speech Acts, Searle revises his derivation by adding or inserting various ceteris paribus clauses to eliminate possi- 20 Speech Acts, 184. 21 See J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Wamock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), esp. 98-99, 242, for background; Speech Acts, 57-62, on sincerity-conditions, and the relationship between promising and intention. We confess misgivings over one of Searle's criteria for promising, which runs to the effect that: "it is not obvious" to both promiser and promisee that the promiser will do the thing (to be) promised "in the normal course of events" (Speech Acts, 59.). What about, e.g., a marriage proposal? (Possibly a poor counter-example!) 22 Speech Acts, 65. 23 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 50,56; Speech Acts, 185: " . . . the tautology that one ought to keep one's promises is only one of a class of similar tautologies concerning institutionalized forms of obligation". Searle remarks (Speech Acts, 179nl) that the transition from 'descriptive' to 'evaluative' already takes place as soon as the term 'obligation' is introduced, in step 3 of the derivation given below (page 81, n. 26). This indicates that promising is not the sole avenue for exposing the exclusivity-claim of the putative is-ought disjunction as untenable. It is instead merely representative of a much wider class or cross section of cases, just as Searle himself hopes. 24 Hare, "The Promising Game", 398.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 81 ble " e x t e n u a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s " , 2 5 while expanding and a m p l i f y i n g his original f o r m u l a t i o n . 2 6 25 Speech Acts, 188-198, defends all of these policies and maneuvers against various criticisms. 26 Following Searle's own numbering, and incorporating his qualifications appropriately hedging the argument, the latest form of the complete derivation (see Speech Acts, 177-182) looks like this: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Jones uttered the words, "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars", la. Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence), "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" promises to pay Smith five dollars. 1 b. Conditions C obtain. Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars. 2a. All promises are acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 3a. All those who place themselves under an obligation are (at the time when they so place themselves) under an obligation. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 4a. If one is under an obligation to do something, then as regards that obligation one ought to do what one is under an obligation to do. Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. Although step 5 completes the derivation, Searle regards the transition from descriptive to evaluative already to have been made at step 3 (see Speech Acts, 179«1). As a further gloss on his own derivation, Searle remarks that he could have begun by inserting "an even more ground-floor premise" than step 1, namely, an alternative form of 16 which reads "Jones uttered the phonetic sequence . . . " followed by the phonetic equivalent (or break-down) of the sentence quoted in 1 (and in la). (See Speech Acts, 182, and "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 49). Finally, Searle considers two alternative formulations of his last step, namely (see Speech Acts, 181): 5' 5" As regards his obligation to pay Smith five dollars, Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. All things considered, Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. The advantage of 5' is that it follows directly from 4; whereas 5 " requires an intermediate step, which 4a supplies. This is meant to dispel any doubt as to the meaning or interpretation of 5; yet it has the infelicitous ring of a mere hypothetical imperative to it. For this reason, 5, which is blunter and more flatfooted, is in the end also preferable. For a presentation and evaluation of Searle's original (1964) derivation, see J. Narveson, Morality and Utility, 190ff. Narveson's critique depends upon making a sharp separation between expressive verbal acts on the one hand, and represented institutions (such as obli-
82 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE We take up below some familiar (and unfamiliar) objections to Searle's entire procedure. ( 1 ) Consider the opposition provoked by Moore's "open-question argument". Should Jones pay Smith $5? To this there is n o immediate reply; for it requires an act o f evaluation which is independent from all the facts. Perhaps Smith might use the $5 for the furtherance of some evil, so that e.g. o n utilitarian grounds, if we knew Smith's intentions in advance, we should not pay him the m o n e y , since it could lead to undesirable consequences. N o t knowing what Smith may want to do with the m o n e y is n o excuse; we should find out just what his plans are, and from sources more reliable than Smith might b e . 2 7 Smith may not trust Jones either, but such considerations are irrelevant. 28 gation) on the other; a dichotomy which is both false and artificial. However, Narveson does (correctly) draw attention to (a) the relational character of, e.g. promising; (b) the "incorporation" of values in institutions and their corresponding facts; (c) the question as to whether promising is an institutional arrangement which is "worth practicing"; yet without ever descending into anything remotely resembling the anthropological argument. But the fact that promise-keeping is worthwhile, and therefore is to be upheld, confers upon Searle's example the qualities of unique charm as well as power. Its penetration stems from its being so highly unexceptionable. What Narveson cannot bring himself to accept is that, under the proper circumstances, the performed utterance does indeed "create" the commitment. Therefore, he fails to comprehend the theory of speech acts; and so its forcefulness is entirely wasted on him. We shall forgo entirely discussion of certain recent nit-picking critiques of Searle's derivation: viz., that promising is to be distinguished, in hair-splitting fashion, from e.g. assurance, reassurance and the like; or that deductions might obtain only between propositions, and not hold among illocutionary forces, even though both may have their appropriate linguistic expression, which in each case is essential to them. 27 Compare the case of the borrowed weapon in Republic, I, 331C. 28 It is likewise of no concern how and why Jones came to promise Smith $5. If Jones borrowed the money, then there is (as opposed to a gift) an explicit contract. If Jones freely decides to commit himself to bestow the money on Smith (e.g. as an act of charity), he is still bound, although perhaps morally rather than legally. These details all belong to Jones' biography, personality, motivation, and so forth. They do not affect the status of his promise, except insofar as Smith's interests (or better still, rights) are directly concerned. A promise can, of course, be mutual: as when countries promise not to start a war with one another. So, if one side unilaterally breaks the reciprocal agreement, the other is no longer bound to uphold it. The Hobbesian predicament (state of nature) is then encountered.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 83 This approach insinuates that the open-question argument applies only when we have not yet gathered all pertinent data. In this respect it is not a plea for an independent value-test, but only a demand for what Stevenson calls "comprehensiveness". 2 9 So its own ground-rules are defeated by the situations which allow it to be intelligently invoked. Also, Searle has really anticipated the open-question argument; for he takes the pains to exclude cases involving conflict of obligations, with one duty taking precedence over another; or where honoring an obligation leads to disaster, for the agent, the person to whom the agent is responsible, or others affected. 3 0 Searle provides a sampling of such empirical data, whose applicability on certain occasions is undeniable. But it is singularly to Searle's advantage that he is challenging a universal thesis, which means that one complex counterexample, loaded with any stipulations one cares to throw in (or likewise exclude), is fair g a m e . 3 1 So we may add the factual supposition that Smith's later intentions are (known to be) benign. The fiats Searle excercises are in no way unreasonable. The same cannot be said on behalf of the open-question argument. For the open-question must eventually draw a closing answer, if not for "theorists", then at least to the satisfaction of agents. There is no "infinite regress" in moral thinking, or else decisions and actions might never occur, for better or worse. This may seem a swift and ungracious exit from metaethics, but the urgent and pressing dilemmas of life do oft make for clumsy responses! 3 2 This should suffice to dispose of the open-question argument, which for some reason had never been raised as a possible rejoinder to Searle, although effective and formidable in its own bailiwick. (2) The anthropological objection: developed by Hare and Flew, respectively. Searle counters it by observing that it had already been refuted in the original (1964) paper; 3 3 and then through iteration of 29 See Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 130. 30 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 46-47 and 4 7 « 5 , esp. clause (4a); Speech Acts, 1 8 0 and nl. Compare H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 3 0 5 and n2. 31 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 43. Refer to page 98, below. 32 Yet, as Searle remarks, in a quite different context: "confronted with a case he has never seen before, the agent knows what to d o " (Speech Acts, 4 2 ) . If this is true in the moral arena, too, then.it likewise scores against the tempting infinite-regress option as a theoretical tendency. 33 Speech Acts, 197« 1; see "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 51-51, 5 7 « 8 .
84 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE an appeal to the distinction between internal and external criticism, in a manner reminiscent of Rawls. 3 4 Searle contends that "of all the arguments used against the original (1964) proof, the argument from anthropology is both the most common and the w e a k e s t " . 3 5 But Searle's rebuttal has its own significant shortcomings, and is in need of repair. Searle believes that the anthropological critique of the institution of promises misses the mark, in that it is an implied criticism o / t h e institution as a whole, which is radically different in character from criticism of promises made within the bounds of that institution. One may approve, disapprove, adopt whatever attitude toward promises generally, without abandoning a willingness to describe or characterize promises as being s u c h . 3 6 One can wish to alter, without thereby mutilating; nor does understanding entail total endorsement. However, it is also possible to criticize an institution from "inside", not only in isolated instances, but all the time. Someone could say that he approves of marriage (the family) as the basic social unit, but that he has never seen a union between two people which he would consider loving, wholesome, emotionally healthy, fulfilling for both partners, and so on. If an institution were thoroughly unsound in practice, it might not last very long, unless accompanied by stern religious or legal enforcements. So it would be odd, but utterly consistent, for someone to swear by the institution, while acknowledging that in practice it never does manage to fulfill certain hopes and expectations, not even partially or peripherally. This amounts to an 'ideal-real' chasm, and can be made conceptually plausible. But Searle feels that one may either criticize the institution, or else just features associated with it. One is crucial, the other not. But a middle road can be taken, as we have just s e e n . 3 7 Therefore 34 Speech Acts, 188-189, 196-197; "How to Derive 'Ought" from 'Is' ", 55nl. 35 Speech Acts, 197. 36 Cf. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 116-119. For a counter-example, see below, pp. 85-86. 37 In some cases, to criticize one rule 'governing a practice' would be, in effect, to challenge the entire practice, if that were the only rule it had, or if that rule were so essential that to change it even slightly would be to destroy or drastically alter the practice (e.g. the scoring rules of a sport or game). This defect deters Rawls, as has been noted by Lyons.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 85 we cannot share Searle's low estimate 38 of the force of the anthropological objection, whose merits also may be illustrated as follows: Consider the so-called "laws of warfare" as set forth in the GenevaConvention and the Hague agreements. These are meant (a) to recognize the (sad) reality of armed hostility, and (b) to prescribe a code of conduct to be followed by participants in any military struggle, with respect both to each other and to civilians and bystanders. Accordingly it is correct to describe e.g. the behavior of combatsoldiers as falling into one of two patterns: compliance with the regulations governing warfare, or nonadherence to one or more of those laws. 39 Moreover, consider the laws dealing with propriety in land, naval or air engagements. This specifies e.g. when fire may be returned: it recognizes only purely defensive warfare, i.e. reacting to overt aggression. Now suppose that we encounter a pacifist, who condemns all wars as unjust undertakings. He feels that there should be international laws against (i.e. prohibiting) warfare, not laws which (to his mind) positively sanction warfare, by in effect stipulating what constitutes "proper" conduct within them, clause (a) above notwithstanding. It is easy for him to conclude that since all war is a crime, any war must be criminal, as well; and so too must specific acts of war, as carried out by whatever party or side. The same applies to so-called "war crimes". Is it logically feasible for such an individual to describe the legal practices of which he disapproves only in morally "neutral" terms? Searle might say yes, because, Somatically speaking, understanding a practice is a logical prerequisite for criticizing it, or its "foundations". But to describe is one thing; to describe without (simultaneously) condemning, is quite another. 4 0 One can report "he (x) thought it was his duty to fire at the 'enemy' and did so", and one can even explain in a neutral idiom how doing that (sometimes) results in the award of a medal. 4 1 But can a pacifist admit that it was x's duty, 38 39 Acts, 40 Speech Acts, Ch. 8, esp. 188-189, 193, 196-197. One can of course obey (or break) a rule without knowing it (see Speech 41-42). This fact does not allow one to violate a rule with impunity. The condemnation may of course be tacit, or indirect. See R. M. Hare, "Descriptivism", Proceedings of the British Academy, 49 (1963), 121; repr. in W. D. Hudson, ed„ The Is-Ought Question, 246; for discussion see ibid., editor's introduction, 29, and W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 295. Hare overlooks the important fact that experts or 'competent judges' (to employ Mill's phrase) are quite likely to agree on an
86 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE according to the pacifist's own value-hierarchy? Hardly. If one is opposed to the institutions of war and warfare, one has no recourse but to describe events, if at all, by /-¿'describing them in indirect discourse: which is just what Searle accuses some of his critics of doing in making their (allegedly irrelevant) reformulations of his derivation. 4 Similarlv. if one does not accept promising, for whatever strange reason, 4 3 as an institutional arrangement, then it follows that one cannot countenance specific promises qua promises (i.e. as being promises). They become null and void. So viewed, although the institution of promising does (unfortunately) exist, it should not. And this time the 'ought' "interferes" with the 'is', rather than remaining logically distant. For ideally (sic) there would be no such thing as promising; therefore it would be inconsistent to in effect morally to acknowledge the presence of an alternative, indeed a contradictory commitment. The only resort is the linguistic expedient of quotation marks: or else to refer carefully to only the psychology of the promiser, never to the (disputed) moral value of the object, relation or interpersonal transaction (this keeps the 'ought' artificially separated from the 'is', however, which again plays right into Searle's hands). We suggest that 'ought' and 'is' do not always remain without some kind of reciprocal or mutual influence. Therefore, we would strongly agree with Searle that "the urge to read the metaphysical distinction between Fact and Value back into language as a thesis about valid entailment relations must inevitably run up against counter-examples. . . " . 4 4 But so must aspects of Searle's urge to combat it, as just shown. In short, we cannot concur with Searle's rigid separation between "internal" and "external" criticism of an institution, which is as mistaken in its way as the universal, negative thesis about correctly deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. For, if one criticizes an institution as a evaluation, in the case of wine-tasting, as well as when it comes to awarding medals for military valor. Only in philosophy is unanimity seemingly impossible to procure, and even then not in principle, we daresay. 42 Speech Acts, esp. 197. 43 Part of the force behind Searle's reasoning stems from the fact that promising does indeed pass moral muster, i.e. is a worthwhile practice, or at least very unexceptionable. 44 Speech Acts, 197. See above, p. 70.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 87 whole, one is then logically inclined not to tolerate those forms of conduct which exhibit the institution in operation. One does not, as Searle thinks, have to "throw all institutions overboard" (as opposed to "standing on the deck") 4 S in order to be against some institutions in their entirety, and therefore be opposed to any and all behavior which perpetuates the institution, or which is in accordance with its oft-suppressed valuational framework. Moreover, there is not even a "paradox" contained in being dead-set against "everything", whether one of a logical or pragmatic kind. Searle states, quite rightly, that if one debunks every institution, and every practice falling under an institutional heading, one is morally compelled to refrain from participating in any activities considered "characteristically human", so that one finds it well-nigh impossible to "live by" any creed, whatsoever. 46 Perhaps suicide remains, as an option. This attack resembles Russell's charge that skepticism is inconsistent, because the skeptic must renounce doubt in order to join the rest of mankind, or else risk condemnation as insincere. Hume's famous anticipatory reply is sufficient to rebut such a charge: "As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point;but as a philosopher who has some share of curiosity . . . I want to learn the foundation . . . ". 47 In Hume's case, his "curiosity, I will not say skepticism" directly concerned the meaning of causality. Adjusting to Searle's context, the same point can be reworked. If an institution turns out not to have a "foundation" of some appropriate kind, then, while people may follow its provisions from custom or habit, the thinker who reaches a destructive conclusion will naturally recommend overthrow, replacement, or disposal. At the very least, he will eschew subscribing to it, and as a matter of principle, will evaluate or judge people (himself included) 45 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 57h8; Speech Acts, 186/)l. Italics supplied. 46 Speech Acts, 186« 1: "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 57/i8. This is a refreshing, quasi-religious apologetic coming from a tough-minded, resolutely analytic thinker. 47 D. Hume, An Inquiry Concrring Human Understanding, ed. C. W. Hendcl (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1955), 52. For the accusation by Russell, see A History of Western Philosophy, 672. There is a latent intellectual 'schizophrenia' in Hume, too. (See above, pages , 76-77.) One might question, of course, whether it is even psychologically possible to be as "diffident of philosophical doubts", as of one's "philosophical conviction". (A Treatise of Human Nature, 273).
88 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE accordingly. Whereas, to fail to draw the implications of one's thought-out position, or else not to incorporate them in one's own moral code, would amount to a compromise of integrity, and so an abrogation of philosophic responsibility. So perhaps we must 'go down with the ship', or come to a bitter end, if there is no good institution to rescue us. The ramifications of our revival of the anthropological argument, and our attempt to put some bite into it, should not now mislead the reader into thinking that Searle's derivation is inadequate, 4 8 or beyond successful restoration. It requires none. Searle's own rejection of "anthropologism" rests on two further points: (1) his appropriation of Austin's notion of a performative utterance, in particular the illocutionary act; 4 9 (2) Miss Anscombe's distinction between "brute" and "institutional" facts. s 0 We shall later apply (1) to Hare's version of the anthropological ploy. 5 1 Temporarily we shall concentrate on some additional arguments, then return to (1), by way of (2). Searle maintains that there is no such thing as a detached usage of the word 'promise'. There are many "unserious" usages, e.g. by actors in a play; or in the context of a practical joke; but purportedly, no disengaged yet "serious" use of 'promise' exists. The import of the 4 8 One of Searle's critics shares our contention concerning the possibility of "internal" (as opposed to "external") criticism of an institution. However, he gives Searle's work far too little shrift, and falsely charges him with separating the linguistic from the moral order. See Margolis, Values and Conduct, 88-90, and esp. 90, 215-216^25. For Searle's own position on language and ethics, sec Speech Acts, 176-177, 193, 197-198. Margolis and Searle arc at least in accord that under the appropriate conditions, linguistic commitments do entail moral commitments, although moral commitments do not (usually) entail corresponding linguistic ones (see Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 490). 49 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 58, 58n9. so "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 55, 55«6; Speech Acts, 50-53, 50«1; see G.E.M.Anscombe, "On Brute Facts", Analysis 18 (1957-1958), 69-72. Searle is only helped, not hindered, by the contention that brute facts do not 'exist' or are of dubious status, i.e., that every fact is somehow an institutional fact, insofar as it can be described. This allegation depends, however, either on a Kantian theory of language in relation to reality, or else upon the kind of oratio obliqua method for handling factual imputations which Searle outlaws. In any case, collapsing the distinction between brute and institutional facts, respectively, inadvertently serves to aid and abet the Searlian cause, we think. 51 Hare, "The Promising Game", 411; see Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 286-287. See below, page 99, esp. n 86.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 89 use-mention distinction does not apply, then, to the case of promising. 52 Searle trenchantly comments that " . . . speaking a language . . . consists of performing speech acts according to rules, and there is no separating those speech acts from the commitments which form essential parts of t h e m " . 5 3 This strikes a blow on behalf of descriptivism, yet oddly enough, Mrs. Foot is as critical of Searle, if not more so, than Hare. 54 Therefore let us briefly examine Mrs. Foot's a t t a c k 5 5 on Searle. V Mrs. Foot states a general philosophical agreement with H a r e , 5 6 then tries to supply a counter-example which would destroy Searle's attempt to negotiate between the 'is' and the 'ought'. Inasmuch as Searle has not answered any of Mrs. Foot's criticisms, we shall work this out entirely on our own. Mrs. Foot's basic misgiving about Searle's attempted derivation is that Searle wants to " . . . deduce an 'ought' statement f r o m premises that are 'internal' to a particular institution, and this is not how 'ought' statements are used". Her (lone) illustration: duelling. 5 7 Suppose someone disapproves of duelling. Then is he honor-bound to engage in a duel, if he promises to do it? Mrs. Foot says no. Why? Oddly, because of what she calls the "evil social consequences of the institu- 52 Speech Acts, 193; see Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy. 286-287. 53 Speech Acts, 198. 54 See P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 9-12. 55 Theories of Ethics, introduction, 11. 56 See Hare's paper, "Meaning and Speech Acts", in Philosophical Review 79 (1970), 3-24, esp. 7-12. This is a direct commentary on Searle's "Meaning and Speech Acts", ibid., 71 (1962), 423-432. For a critique of Hare, see G. J. Warnock, "Hare on Meaning and Speech Acts", ibid.,&\ (1972), 80-84. Also a leading descriptivist, Warnock has never commented extensively on Searle's derivation itself. 57 It seems peculiar, not to say irrelevant, to try to deflate Searle's counter-example with a counter-example; for Searle is only challenging the universality of the is-ought thesis, not its legitimate applicability to a wide range of given cases. Mrs. Foot by-passes this difficulty, however. See below, page 100 n 87.
90 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE tion" of duelling, rather than because of an intrinsic impropriety. The following queries are in order: (a) If someone disapproves of duelling, for any reason, would it not be logically odd, in Nowell-Smith's revealing terminology, for him to so pledge himself in the first place? (b) If someone disapproved of duelling on other than Mrs. Foot's utilitarian grounds, would he still be committed to following through on his promise to duel an adversary? Or are the negative "consequences" of duelling the sole possible reason for rejecting .y's claim that x should carry out x's promise to take part in a duel? Mrs. Foot leaves no hint as to the possible reservations. (c) Is the manner in which 'ought' statements "are used" so simple to determine? Searle devotes much of Speech Acts to finding out the way in which obligations do function in language; but Mrs. Foot nowhere explains what she thinks they consist in, or how they might operate in discourse. (d) If x commits himself to fighting a duel, and if competent judges besides x (e.g. moral philosophers) agree that duelling is "evil" and should be done away with, made illegal, or simply no longer practiced, is their determination overridingly binding upon xl (e) If jc promises to do what is morally forbidden (e.g. duelling), is* automatically enjoined from carrying out his promise? Searle rightly observes that there is no fixed method for resolving this troubled issue — it is context-relative, i.e. depends on what was promised, and on the effect (on e.g. the institution of promising) of breaking one's promise, or not keeping one's word. 5 8 W. D. Ross, for example, would maintain that we have a prima-facie obligation to carry out our promise, for otherwise our word means nothing and none of us shall (or should) be trusted anymore in the future. (In the case of duelling, however, this consideration has little weight, since there may not be any future to contemplate for the two participants, or at least for one of them!) von Wright 59 at one time held, based on modal-deontic principles, that even a promise to do the forbidden is logically contra- 58 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' 48. For a contrasting viewpoint, see Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section I, 5 th paragraph from conclusion. 59 G. H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1951), Ch. V, 39-40, and n2.
THF SUARLIAN CHALLENG1- 91 dictory. hence itself something forbidden. In a more recent paper, von Wright 60 displays greater sensitivity; like Searle, he has become persuaded that there is no general way to confidently handle such cases in advance. Finally. Sidgwick 61 rightly observes that a decision will largely depend upon the factor of time: e.g. did one learn (or become convinced) that duelling was forbidden before or after making the promise.' Someone who knows this beforehand, or "discovers" it almost concurrently with making the promise, is in a strange fix: for he is hypocritical (or egotistic) if he attemps to withdraw from the duel, but behaves logically oddly if he chooses to follow through. Someone who finds out that he is to do the forbidden only after having made the promise, is in less of a bind. He might well be exonerated from blame, if he refused to duel. Perhaps he was even unwittingly duped. (Hintikka, 62 for example, in an extensive formal presentation of obligation-concepts, fails to notice the importance of the timeelement: proving the shortcoming of the deontic operators, as Margolis for one charges, 63 and also showing the need for the development of an adequate tense-logic for moral categories.) At any rate, Mrs. Foot is very far from having slashed Searle's putative proof. 64 Her jeers are misplaced; for Searle is the best friend the descriptivists ever had. Now let us return to "brute facts". VI Searle naturally claims that promising functions only within the context of (moral) institutions. Now institutions surely exist. But, corre60 G. H. von Wright, "On Promises", Theoria 291-293. 28 (1962), 277-297, esp. 61 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 305«2. Compare Searle, Speech Acts, 1 8 0 n l , which echoes Ross. 62 J. Hintikka, "Deontic Logic and Its Philosophical Morals", in Models for Modalities (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1969), 184-214, esp. 206ft'. 63 Margolis, Values and Conduct, 59-62 (for Margolis' remarks on Searle, see esp. 88-90). 64 See further criticism, in H. Meynell, "The Objectivity of Value Judgments", Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1971), 118-131.
92 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE sponding to them, are there really institutional facts, as Searle, following Miss Anscombe, seeks to enumerate? The anthropological critique (which Searle underestimates) emerges in distinct opposition again. Perhaps Hume was right: truth consists only either in relations of ideas, or in matters of (brute) fact, so that it is neither true nor false that x owes the grocer money for sending x a quantity of edibles. The institutional arrangement or implicit contract is undeniably there, as Hume himself concedes. 65 But how do we interpret its ontological status; or has it any? Let us imagine a redescription of events which would omit reference to any institutions, whatsoever. It would be couched strictly in the language of brute fact. Such a translation would do away with all but the "purely physicalistic" aspect of things. Imagine a terse account of a funeral: 66 several human organisms clustered about a box of wood, gesticulating, emitting a series of cadences; raising the box of wood, spreading earth, lowering the box of wood under the ground, starting a fire, and then moving away from the wooden box in a patterned arrangement, and departing. This account is crude, but can be refined to please more fastidious "physicalists". But it is in principle unsatisfactory as an account, because it is grossly incomplete. It does not explain or motivate the event; it does not enable us to infer or distinguish what is going on, except by subtle jests, which belie the very endeavor to systematically expunge reference to e.g. human purposes and customs. In attempting to retreat behind a facade of brute fact, such a linguistic reform only inadvertently emphasizes its own contrast with an equally valid but complementary dimension of human experience and its expression (description) in language. So, something is definitely lost in translation! By eliminating the descriptions of funerals, descriptions to which we are accustomed, in favor of linguistic pseudo-austerity, the clever polemicist can present a brief directed against (supposed) superstition and sentimentality. But denial of their existence would be self-cancelling. The anthropological critique, then, embodies a curious denial that 'institutions' as a concept represents any "ultimate" state-of-affairs. And postulated rules (allegedly) can always be rewritten or refor65 See Hume, /I Treatise of Human Nature, 490. 66 What follows, caricatures a parodizing literary technique effectively employed by, e.g. Voltaire and Tolstoy. The theme is death; the method, understatement.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 93 mulated in such a way as to wipe out their specifically institutional character. This is a drastic, negative ontological claim, and it invokes a rude principle of parsimony for proposed "explanatory models". The anthropological argument declares that while to speak of institutions as facts may be all right, to discuss institutions/ facts is to commit a serious category mistake. Even institutions are to be redescribed, in order just to count as facts; and this approach underlies even Searle's own relatively "brute" starting point, namely the "phonetic sequence" 67 uttered in making a verbal promise. In defense of Searle, we shall rephrase more acceptably his dogma about the absence (non-existence) of any detached standpoint, with respect to promising. For even if such an impartial vantage point could be discovered, it would have to co-exist along with the evaluative, although one could nonetheless try to distinguish it from the evaluative in principle. 6 8 So, a detached sense of 'promise' can but operate together with a committed one, thereby creating a paradox which manages to reduce the pretensions of the anthropologicallyinspired critique, even while its rationale is rescued from oblivion. Consider one further difficulty: so-called 'value-loaded' words. For example, what does one term the configuration made by one stick nailed to another, shorter stick at a perpendicular angle, and at a small distance below the top of the vertically planted stick? It is called a cross. But to paraphrase the old song, a cross is not just a cross. The symbolic component of the cross is not adequately understood in talking about e.g. erecting or planting two pieces of wood; unless it is slyly being denigrated all the while. In some cultures, the cross might have a different (or no discernible) meaning - but such a caveat is 67 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 49; Speech Acts, 182. Compare Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, esp. 522, 524, 525; and see H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, 172, 176, 177, 178. "Phonetic sequence" drives an unfortunate wedge between linguistic form and moral content, instead of welding them together. But of course Searle does refrain from thence considering 'institutional facts' as an unwholesome accretion to their brute analogues. 68 Hare, "Descriptivism", 117-118, 121-122. Such a move does not have to be accompanied by an anthropologically-styled critique. For example, a medal for military bravery could plausibly be bestowed by the enemy, as a token of their admiration or respect for courage, heroism and valor, although not for (the successful completion of) the military mission. So the 'external' and 'internal' points of view may coincide, rather than conflict.
94 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE pointless, although highly obtrusive. For some cultures (and individuals) are sensitive to its conventional meaning, and that is what counts. The anthropologistic critique succeeds only if we ignore this, or make the bizarre and wholesale claim that moral discourse is somehow an aberration. What is "real" can then only be the physical facts, e.g. a T-shaped piece of wood, planted at a certain longitude and latitude, and established from time t onward. (But if everything else is thought merely the figment of an overworked imagination, 69 then why not that, too?) This line of all-out attack might have a strong appeal, in an "age of science". But it is really an unwarranted extension, as James might say, of a guasi-scientific viewpoint. Anthropologism has gotten unglued, and exceeded its applicable boundaries. A 'Stop' sign would not mean anything to a Martian, but what does that imply? Only that Martians do not have any traffic regulations. 70 This surely cannot indicate to men that automobiles on city streets are but the product of ontological hallucinations. If logic cannot stop both reductionism and relativism in their tracks, then facts should take over and do it. The alleged primacy of e.g. physical science is, by simple parity of reasoning, likewise subject to disengaged close criticism. Nothing can be "privileged" or exempt therefrom, if that strategy is to remain both honest and thoroughgoing, linguistically or otherwise. Why should we consider brute facts fundamental, and institutional ones derivative, instead of vice versa? There may be reasons for it, but at bottom this is nothing more than one epistemological prejudice, or preference. Every description is or involves an interpretation — even the one which is "correct". And yet, in ethics, some philosophers persist in believing that the ineradicable presence of interpretation must vitiate everything else: witness Nietzsche's "there are no moral phenomena, only a moral interpretation of phenomena". 7 1 But there 69 Such a world-view is eloquently elaborated by L. Wittgenstein, in "A Lecture on Ethics", Philosophical Review 74 (1965) 3-12. It is, however, preposterous. And see above, page 78. 70 Cf. Wittgenstein on "forms of life". 71 Beyond Good and Evil, § 108. For 'interpretation', Nietzsche uses Ausdeutung. Compare Hamlet's conventionalist thesis, "nothing is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so". This fosters the idea that moral standards "are all in the mind". So, then, is everything else: 'reality', 'pain' whatever. Then as-
95 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE is still one fresh anthropologically-minded rebuttal of Searle to c o m m a n d our attention. VII Lastly, t h e n , w e s h o u l d scrutinize Hare's vigorous critique o f Searle's bridging o f t h e descriptive-normative gap, Hare's views might be initially labelled 72 prior t o o u r c o n c l u s i o n . as "commending vs. all c o m e r s " . Hare insists that t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a description and an e v a l u a t i o n is o n e o b t a i n i n g b e t w e e n t w o separate orders. Evalua- t i o n s and descriptions m a y g o t o g e t h e r ; as w h e n praising s o m e t h i n g as a 'good' (or as ' g o o d ' o f its k i n d ) in virtue o f its having certain properties. 73 T h e having o f t h o s e properties, h o w e v e r , is s o m e t h i n g logi- cally and n o t m e r e l y o p e r a t i o n a l l y distinct f r o m being called ' g o o d ' ( b y dint o f having t h e m ) . Grinding o u t any 'ought' t h e n requires a separate or i n d e p e n d e n t logical step o f j u d g m e n t , even t h o u g h the respective acts o f describing and evaluating m a y o c c u r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , or go hand-in-hand. Moral w o r d s are t h e r e f o r e " s u p e r v e n i e n t " u p o n descriptions. This is the m o t i v a t i o n f o r Hare's " n o n c o g n i t i v i s t " s t a n c e . 7 4 sertions are either trivially true or else conceptually contrastless, hence impossible or unutterable. 72 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 44n3. 73 Cf. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 126-127, on the Stevensonian "second pattern of analysis". 74 See Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 164, 297, 298; R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 80, 131. The concept of 'supervenience' is hopelessly muddled. If it means that 'values depend upon facts', where 'depend' has a logical emphasis, then it boosts the stock of naturalism. Yet Hare rejects naturalism, by relying on independent tests of value, moral disagreement, open-question arguments, and other tactics. Moreover, Hare's appropriation of Leibniz' law of 'identity of indiscernibles' works on behalf of naturalism, too; for it would be logically odd (to say the least) for the same observer (spectator, judge) to evaluate A as 'good' (or 'beautiful') and B as 'bad' (or 'ugly') if A and B are two objects (say) identical in all respects (e.g. physical properties), except for being different specimens, or coordinated by a different spatiotemporal location. This cannot be explained away by referring to such human variables as the 'occasions of experience' (Aristotle and Aquinas, among others, discuss this), because this only accounts for the occurrence, while doing nothing to substantiate or sanction issued judgments. Identity of indiscernibles is perfectly harmonious with supervenience, but neither is compatible with «on-naturalism. Yet Hare proclaims all three doctrines, and moreover considers them mutually and essentially related.
96 THE SEARL1AN CHALLENGE What can this reveal a b o u t the use o f moral terms? Can it e x p l a i n how t o use t h e m ? Or is this left up t o t h e idiosyncratic j u d g m e n t o f the individual? A p p a r e n t l y , yes. Dewey's dichotomy between "prizing" and "appraising" 7 5 recalls Hare in s o m e r e s p e c t s , 7 6 y e t deliberately retains a strong c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n (a) initial desire and ( b ) that w h i c h is approved u p o n r e f l e c t i o n . Hare w o u l d utterly d e t a c h the t w o . But then what criteria, if a n y , can ever be supplied f o r the correct use o f moral w o r d s ? This is a c o m p r e s s e d , logical-linguisticgenetic reproach against Hare. It c u t s a bit d e e p e r t h a n a mere c o m p l a i n t c o n c e r n i n g f r e e d o m t o f o r m u l a t e u n i q u e , high-level t h e o r i e s that Mrs. F o o t brings up, alluding t o b o t h N i e t z s c h e machus. 78 Mrs. F o o t 77 and Thrasy- is under the i m p r e s s i o n that Hare m u s t d e n y that. e.g. N i e t z s c h e is a moral p h i l o s o p h e r , i n a s m u c h as N i e t z s c h e ' s 'will-to-power' is n o t m e a n t t o b e ( n o r c o u l d it b e ) universalized. Since N i e t z s c h e is recognized as a moralist, s o m e t h i n g p r e s u m a b l y m u s t be w r o n g w i t h Hare's prescriptivist criteria, as applied t o historical figures and theories. N i e t z s c h e d o e s try t o reverse ordinary c o n c e p t i o n s o f right and w r o n g — so d o e s T h r a s y m a c h u s , perhaps also Like Stevenson, and possibly Hume, Hare perceives that values are parasitic upon natural conditions. Like Hare, D. H. Monro, in Empiricism and Ethics (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1967), sees that the relation between our moral rubrics and states-of-affairs is not accidental, but arises in part from uniformity in human personality traits and patterns, as well as from stability in the environmental surroundings in which we live. These twin phenomena (human nature and the outside world) are rich in potential norms for conduct, yet none of these writers considers it justified to move from, e.g. the "second pattern of analysis" to something less modest, or less cautious. The underlying reason for this is the feeling that human perspective too readily and too facilely tends to dictate morality. (Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, prop, viii.) To launch an Austinian rebuttal: 'the human perspective'? Is there any other kind? Even for the naturalist (such as Mill) who includes 'sentient creation' in his purview, every "spokesman" will be unavoidably human, and therefore (?) hopelessly provincial in outlook. But if this is a valid objection to naturalist ethics, then it counts against nearly every constructive venture in human history, and automatically nullifies all future prospects. See also above page 85-86 w41 and page 93 «68. 75 J. Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), 5,32. 76 Cf. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 165, 268. 77 P. Foot, "Moral Arguments", Mind 67 (1958), 513. 78 p. Foot, "Moral Beliefs", repr. in W. D. Hudson (ed.), The Is-Ought Question, 209-212, and in P. Foot (cd.), Theories of Ethics, 96-99.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 97 Machiavelli. 79 But denial is not the same thing as flight; nor is negation to be mistaken for lack of interest. Nietzsche is n o less (and n o more) a moralist, even on Hare's terms, than a positivist is in some sense a metaphysician, or the atheist a religious thinker of sorts. Generically, the same set of problems is grappled with; merely the solutions proposed are novel. (Compare above, page 74ff.). The kind of criticism which really does puncture Hare's attempt to categorially distinguish moral f r o m non-moral words is at once more and less sophisticated. To call 'good' something which is nearly universally condemned as bad or evil is at least understandable; whereas, to call it 'super erogatory' or 'happy' or 'prudential' or 'skilled', would not even be intelligible. To so describe e.g. the My Lai massacre would be to commit a genuine category error, to make no logical sense whatsoever; whereas, to call the My Lai massacre 'good' makes perfect sense, indeed it would have to, for anyone meaningfully to deny that, and denominate the events which took place there as b a d . 8 0 As with truth and falsity, 'good' requires a correlative term in order to be applicable. Value-theory demands (minimally) a twovalued matrix of its own. But if moral words are "supervenient", then we cannot know how to properly apply them, for they have been amputated from the rest of the language, just as Moore cut off 'good' and deemed it a simple, non-natural property or quality. Whether (and why) we want to call My Lai good or bad might be an "open-question". Yet a wide range or cluster of (by common consent) 'moral terms' simply would not apply here at all. Just as filling in the blank in "My Lai incident was " with 'nitrogenous' would make no logical sense. So too would inserting 'teleological' or 'equitable', although these are (by agreement) moral terms. To maintain that My Lai was desirable, virtuous, pleasant or benevolent, is at least logically (if not evaluatively) appropriate. If this were not so, then to judge My Lai as undesirable, unpleasant, vicious, outrageous, unfriendly or horrendous would cease to exert any meaning, logical or moral. Also, one would then be unable to explain the prevalent phenomenon of differences of opinion. No doubt moral terms sometimes are supervenient upon descriptions, for argument's sake. But Searle's quest is 79 See Hare, "The Promising Game", 4 0 9 . 80 We are assuming 'pre-established' meanings for at least a small battery of (so-called) ethical terms as is only reasonable to do.
98 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE for one, just one 'is-ought' counter-example; a debating point to be remembered. (Recall page 83). The vulnerable spot in Hare's ethics has been dented here; for Searle is dealing primarily with philosophy of language. 8 1 So the baselessness of Hare's charges depends upon considerations which go well beyond Searle's own immediate problematic. Here are the wider consequences which flow from a refutation of the typical prescriptivist program: 1. The time has come for a radical reappraisal of non-naturalist, non-cognitivist ethics, which has cast a very large and brooding shadow for over seventy years. If there are rules (which Searle does spell out) for the correct (not necessarily morally irreproachable), i.e. the logically responsible use of key ethical vocabulary, 8 2 then the exaggerated sort of debunking performed first by Moore, then by emotivism, and subsequently by Hare, Nowell-Smith, and others in our time, will be doomed once and for all. 2. Moral terms are not always employed superveniently, and so there is a limit, if not a downright handicap, to invoking Moorean "intuition" and the corresponding "isolation-test" of value. These must on occasion yield to moral conclusions derivable from the facts, including the exceedingly complex facts of human nature: witness the direction taken in Mill's " p r o o f ' . Such a triumph is tempered only by the realization that moral psychology is a vast and soberingly difficult undertaking. 8 3 3. The burden of proof has been shifted: it now rests upon those 81 Speech Acts, 3-4, 176-177. Searle docs alas logically subordinate cthical to linguistic concerns, in that he views the 'is-ought' distinction (as well as its correction) as tumbling out of general semantic viewpoints. (See below, page 100.) Searle's discussion of the relationship between philosophy of language and ethics is arbitrarily distorted by D.H. Ruben, "Searly on Institutional Obligation", The Monist 56 (1972), 600-611, esp. 601-602, 608. This is especially unfortunate in light of Ruben's own recognition that the rules which enable Searle to formulate his derivation are as complex as the situation they describe (ibid., 606). This does not entail that 'promising' is an unilluminating category in which to frame moral rules; for'Promising'also engenders the larger but coterminous concept of responsibility. 82 Speech Acts, 57-62. 83 See G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy 33 (1958), 1-19, repr. in W. D. Hudson, cd., The Is-Ought Question, 175-195; also R. Taylor, Good and Evil.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 99 who unthinkingly repeat the catchwords and slogans of twentiethcentury ethics, offering only a stale rehash of, e.g. the opaque and logically disastrous "naturalistic fallacy", 8 4 an uncritical acceptance of which either fails or just refuses to ponder what is entailed by clinging to that once-stirring Moorean thesis of a modern analysis. Rejection of the doctrine (and criterion) of supervenience is already implicit in Searle's own ridicule of the anthropological or 'detached' reportorial standpoint as non-existent. 85 For to supervene means first to withdraw from, and then to impose, judgment. According to Searle, the first step is impossible. 86 Promising is, moreover, quite commonplace and mundane, as Searle points out: rarely is it the terribly dramatic event that e.g. the social contract portrays it to be. And the punishment for failure to comply with one's own promise usually does fit the crime, as Hobbes and Kant alike observe. A breach of etiquette leads to mild embarrassment; not paying a debt, to a fine or jail; disappointing someone who matters, to regret; an indiscretion, to disapprobation; cruelty, to remorse; disloyalty, to unhappiness. Promises are sometimes quite "important", but they are not "paradigmatic" (as philosophers often suppose) of obligation. 87 Nor does 84 See Speech Acts, 132-136, for an intriguing review of that subject; also R. J. Fogelin, Evidence and Meaning, 122-129, esp. 124; A. Edel, Method in Ethical Theory, Ch. V, 111-138, esp. 123; E. H. Duncan, "Has Anybody Committed the Naturalistic Fallacy?" Southern Journal of Philosophy 8 (1970), 49-55; D. P. Gauthier, "Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy", American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1967), 315-320; B. H. Baumrin, "Is there a Naturalistic Fallacy?", ibid. 5 (1968), 79-89; and the classic article by W.K. Frankena. "The Naturalistic Fallacy", Mind 48 0 9 3 9 ) , 4 6 4 ^ 7 7 . 85 See the provision in Speech Acts, 57-62, 5 7 n l , 193, 18-181, 1 8 0 n l ; "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' " , 44-45. For comments, see Hare, "The Promising Game", 399, and Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 286-287. See also Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 523-524. See above, pages 93ff., as well. 86 Searle wavers between ruling out such a move logically, linguistically, or even psychologically (or on all three grounds). Speech Acts, 197, ultimately makes the criterion a logical one, by stipulating that "non-serious occurrences" of the utterance of a promise, while making reformulation in indirect discourse feasible, do not affect the status of the derivation, since they do not count among the conditions for a genuine speech act of promising, anyway. 87 Speech Acts, 188. See Margolis, Values and Conduct, 95; G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), 96-1 13. D. H. Ruben mis-
100 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE Searle need that. On the contrary, the position of relying on special circumstances, or o n an exeptional moral category, could then be ignored with impunity by the 'is-ought' dichotomy enthusiast, even within the province of deontology, and certainly outside it. It is tempting to maintain that if Searle's derivation actually goes through for something as highly "ordinary" as the illocutionary act of promising, there is doubtless a large group of performative utterances, for which similar empirico-logical derivations can be produced or repeated. Such optimism must be empirically buttressed, for not to comb or pause to survey the evidence in each individual case would be to commit a variant of the fallacy of composition. The experiment must suggest itself as a future project, for Searle himself writes engagingly about generating an indefinite number o f proofs such as the one he does construct. 8 8 Once done, the strongest possible link between Searle's theory of language and directly normative ethical concerns will have been forged, after all. interprets the modesty of this position, and so goes on to argue that: (1) Searle's optimism over the possibility of generating further counter-examples to the is-ought "fork" is unjustified, perhaps unjustifiable (see "Searle on Institutional Obligation", 601, 609nl5, 611); (2) Searle's derivation is based on ignoring a supposed distinction between external and internal "reason-producing" items, items which may account for one's conduct (ibid., 610). Actually, Searle deliberately slides the two categories together when reflecting on the domain of institutional obligation, as his critique of anthropologjzing makes evident. Also, Ruben is misled by excessive concentration on situational conflicts, and erects these into counter-examples to Searle's counter-example (ibid., 606-607, 608-609), a procedure about as successful, i.e. as misplaced, as Mrs. Foot's similarly uninspired technique. Despite this exercise in irrelevancy, Ruben does recognize that "morally speaking" (ibid., 608), an individual does, or is meant to, take "responsibility" in the promising-context which Searle delineates: but, he takes responsibility because he realizes that the specific rules do indeed bind or apply to him; whereas, Ruben makes the notion of responsibility both logically and temporally antecedent to moral rules, whose status in turn is (falsely) thought to be conditioned thereby. This is an interesting reversal of what might be dubbed the 'fallacy of awareness' (or self-consciousness). 88 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 43, 56; and see Speech Acts, 185 (quoted above, page 80m23).
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 101 VIII We proceed with a few necessary, decidedly unfashionable, and "post-Searlian" conclusions. We have gained an understanding from this chapter that either ethics or metaethics must "go". But which to retain, and which to drop? Which claims, which discipline to honor; which field to reject? We now attempt to deliver two original blows against the unjustly dominant tendencies and ambitions of metaethics. First, let us recall the stress which metaethics itself quite properly places on the fact that any "second-order" investigation is logically derivative from, and therefore lost without, a correspondingly flourishing "first-order" level of activity, i.e. moral discourse. 89 This 'theoretical underpinning' of metaethics is all but forgotten when 'theory-construction' takes place, however. A metaethical theory then becomes defective; inevitably, it winds up being hopelessly "out of touch" with the very thing it supposedly studies. ^ T h i s mistake is not human, but deliberate or built-in weakness. For metaethics is characteristically found as a branch of "technical" philosophy which is several removes from ethical language. Consequently, metaethics is by design oblivious to the content of moral discourse, and instead concentrates exclusively on isolating, distinguishing and elucidating the purely formal features of moral "talk". This is subsequently defended as constituting the only legitimate area of "professional" interest for philosophers. Just as logic studies and regulates correct patterns of reasoning, and is not concerned (except incidentally) with concrete deductions, this "reduction" of ethics to metaethics eschews classical as well as concrete problems of moral life, remaining content to outline the typology of moral discourse as its sole enterprise. Small wonder that the dispensation of practical advice or of guidelines for human conduct is rarely caseexamined, and if so only by accident. Ethics (=meteathics) neither creates, discovers, applies, urges or recommends norms; it sits back and examines their formal relations and structure alone; it but yields pronouncements concerning the logical fitness of whatever is pro- 89 Above, pages 72-79. 90 Especially emotivism, which claims to be "closely attuned" to the talking point of view, to moral/linguistic bedrock. See Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 114, 119, 122-123, 132-133, 144, 147, for discussion.
102 THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE posed to it. 9 1 Displaying any deeper moral concern is, professionally speaking, considered "bad form". The outcome of such policy is "gamesmanship". Even the influential G. E. Moore would deplore that, but his healthy respect for "casuistry" in ethics has disappeared today. 92 So the moral temperament has grown sluggish; the intellectual muscles, unaccustomed to exercise, have become torpid and atrophic. Occasionally 9 3 a philosopher (in the Anglo-American "school" of analysis) will address himself to a moral dilemma, but only in a pitiful way, because the spectacle afforded by the contemporary philosophical scene demands that an interest in genuine moral issues be prefaced by an apology, which is tantamount to forswearing even the provisional establishment of a norm and therefore bound to be ineffective from the outset. 9 4 The result: passionate commitment to a welter of technicalities, building up to the grand anti-climax — refusal to cultivate a sound moral 'point of view'. No mandates: for (meta-)ethics cannot, by selfimposed restriction, exhibit or generate any; indeed, its own most cherished interests preclude accomplishing that. If conclusions do crop up, they are faultlessly spontaneous, haphazard, prejudiced or simply adventitious! The rusting and withering away of ethics began more than thirtyfive years ago with a pejorative dictum that the "problems of men" were pseudo-problems, or at least not worthy of philosophic attention. The technique has changed, but the manner is the same as ever. We are still in the fell clutch of positivism, beset by its lingering after- 91 A succinct restriction of t h e f u n c t i o n of ethics t o this (and n o o t h e r ) task may be gleaned f r o m C. D. Broad's synopsis of Kantian ethics, in Five Types of Ethical Theory, 123. 92 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 4-5. For a terse but appreciative observation, see J. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 2nd. ed. (New York: The M o d e m Library, 1930), 222n. 93 The strictures which follow are perfectly general in scope; they do not "indict" anyone in particular. Nor do they covertly attack straw men, however. 94 Richard Taylor is a marked exception; but Taylor is in self-styled rebellion against metaethics and its pretensions. However, Taylor regards 'casuistry' in t h e same disparaging way as, say, Kant treats the dagmatists and the conflict over the antinomies of speculative cosmology. See Good and k'vill, 163-172.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 103 effects. 9S The "one-sided diet" 9 6 which metaethics provides perceptibly leads to a professionally irresponsible burial of "first-order" issues, as well as their "second-order" clarification and possible "third-order" resolution. Metaethics is accountable for its own demise, in continuing to insist (bankruptedly) that its paramount concern resides with first-level "talk". If the livelihood of metaethics does depend on the domain of "talk", then why is there no current source for fruitful metaethical contemplation? Because the initial modesty and unassuming character of metaethics have turned into arrogant disregard for everything save the proliferation of harmless logical minutiae. To identify and discriminate the logical properties of certain kinds of discourse may be endlessly fascinating, 97 but to make it the main business is to select materials poorly; to elevate it into an end-in-itself shows bad judgment, as well as bad taste. 9 8 Metaethicians may protest that it is somehow impossible to ever get back to the first-order setting, once one has advanced to the second-order realm of reflection. But that is precisely the permanent, irreparable effect of pursuing a grossly mistaken methodologyThe second major consideration which mitigates against metaethics is the absurd pomposity of its (self-appointed) analogy with, e.g. metamathematics. 9 9 If this analogy is taken at all seriously, then, since the vocabulary of first-order moral discourse, like that of a standard logical object-language, is sufficiently "powerful" or "rich", we have a right to expect rigorous theorems resembling soundness, compactness and completeness, or of such "limiting" proofs as Goedel's incompleteness theorem, or the Skolem-Loewenheim 95 Not surprisingly, emotivists such as P. Edwards sincerely continue to endeavor to scrap ethics, altogether, absurd as the proposal sounds. 96 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I, § 593. 97 See Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy 188-195, on, e.g. Hare's most recent attempt in this field. 98 These are opinions, of course. But there are opinions and then there are opinions. Moreover, ours are distinctive, unduplicated. Nor are they 'metaphilosophical', except insofar as any reflective discourse about philosophy is considered such. In that sense, 'metaphilosophy' is but the name for an extension of philosophy, but does not designate an autonomous subdiscipline or branch of some kind. It enjoys no separate status. See above, Ch. II. 99 But not with 'metaphysics'. Heaven forbid!
104 THI- S E A R L I A N C H A L L L N G L theorem. Metaethics must then be able to sufficiently "tighten up" the morphology o f ethical discourse; to arrange formation rules, transformation rules, rules for well-formed formulas; or in short, to supply the nucleus of a deductive system. But metaethics can never provide the systematic apparatus of metalogic, although some misguided proponents did attempt to champion just such a lost cause. Furthermore, even if such a literal interpretation were plausible, it would suffer from the undesirable (but intrinsic) consequence that the semantic model for, or interpretation of, the syntax fabricated out of ethical language, is not entirely under the control of would-be manipulators. 100 The reason for the failure is parallel to what non-standard analysis engenders in metamathematics. If metaethics were really like metalogic in its principles and operations, nothing would be ultimately gained from its sham of rigor, because the semantic construal of any elaborate (meta-)ethical theory would turn out to remain potentially as ambiguous as b e f o r e . 1 0 1 Deviations from a fixed ("standard") interpretation or its isomorphs would then run as widely variegated in metaethics as those already encountered in non-standard analysis. The philosopher's dream of total precision therefore overshoots its mark, backfiring completely. As Whitehead once said, "exactness is a fake". Some vision. Moreover, what about finding analogues to all the well-known logical paradoxes? Harnessing type-theory, or any other method specifically designed to alleviate such projected difficulties in logic, would theoretically leave behind a never-ending spiral (or hierarchy) of ethical metalanguages. Metaethics would lose its privileged place, and become just another link in an infinite series of object-languages. Inasmuch as the Leibnizian hope for producing a shared, universal metalanguage was never realized, and is indeed known to be mathematically impossible (Goedel's and Tarski's chief results), it follows that metaethics could only occupy the beginning slot of a vast chain of conceptual metalanguages of morals. Formalization on a massive scale would bring on an unwelcome entourage, a maze in which the 100 T h e reason being, that the data-field is t o o vast and t o o unsystematic to be summarized or recapitulated adequately by a f e w 'air-tight' rules. (NowellSmith is sensitive to this nuance, whereas Castañeda is a n y t h i n g but.) 101 This problem likewise renders exaggerated philosophico-semantic pre- o c c u p a t i o n with metamathematics simply much ado about nothing. 1'or its e f f e c t s on ethical t h e o r y , consult e.g. the w o r k o f Hallden, M c N a u g h t o n , others.
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE 105 supposedly unique status of metaethics would rapidly become lost, and so find its claims dashed by its own pretensions. The usefulness of 'metaethics' as a rubric would likewise dissipate in the face of e.g. metametametametametametametametaethics, which makes no nonlogical sense, and which undoubtedly has no discernible subject matter falling under it (for what is metametametametametametametametaethics, in turn?). Whereas, in mathematical logic, no matter how long the chain gets, its links always have their own distinct conceptual identity attached to them. 1 0 2 Now, the term 'metametaethics' still does make sense; it means, or in unfamiliar prose refers to e.g. history of recent moral philosophy. But once we ascend further than just two "metas", the words come to mean progressively less and less; finally, nothing. So the 'meta' in 'metaethics' is both bizarre and ultimately disadvantageous. Since no one-to-one correspondence between logic and ethics exists, the visions and aspirations of metaethics amount to silly fancies. 'Metaethics' is merely a puff of noise and smoke. Metaethics has, we believe, perpetrated an unthought-out, hasty, logically fraudulent exit from both the "timeless" and the urgent and pressing questions of life and moral reflection. The road back to those issues has been responsibly (if obliquely) paved by examining Searle's challenging demolition of the quintessential metaethical tenet. Improved and amended by some arguments we have adduced on Searle's behalf in this chapter, as presented in overall support of his speech-act derivation, we may express finally some cautious optimism over the prospects for the recovery, indeed the resurrection, of once august topics as 'the good life' as future elements of dispassionate ethical rumination. IX Contemporary preoccupation with metaethics at the expense of normative ethics has led to an intolerable situation in which the parasite is steadily disemboweling its decayed host. Before a remedy can be dispensed for this ill, the arguments of metaethics must be met and overcome on their own ground, so that "traditional" ethico-philo102 This is why mathematicians do not " w o r r y " about such untoward develop- ments; while ethicians have more reason to do so!
106 THl- SFARLIAN CHALLENGE sophic concerns may be safely and legitimately r e s u m e d . 1 0 3 For 'metaethics' is not merely dangerous; it is fruitless, confusing, misleading. and logically untenable in the extreme. For t o o long now, metaethics has falsely traded upon the alleged invulnerability of "Hume's F o r k " , in many different guises. As a preliminary hypothesis, the 'is-ought' disjunction may be heuristic (see page 72). However, t o prematurely confer quasi-axiomatic status upon it and its value-theoretic correlates invites eventual refutation, which is what Searle has, we think, achieved. Prior thereto, philosophy in our time heard largely weak, intellectually half-hearted dissent, 104 which deservedly (albeit regrettably) was quashed. Searle's accomplishment forbids continuation of such cavalier treatment. Wittgenstein, too, observed that philosophy does not form a "super-order" among "super-concepts"; 1 0 5 for there is no "secondorder philosophy" 106 at all. Metaethics' most prized and subtle theses are bogus, and so its most significant lessons are but negative and self-exposing. Philosophy often ends in frustration. But somehow we always renew and redouble our e f f o r t . i°3 This of course incorporates a 'value' in its own right: namely intellectual integrity. But it is hardly an embarrassing one! See above, page 71 n. 6. 104 See e.g. W. K. Frankena, "On Saying the Ethical Thing", in J. H. Gill, ed., Philosophy Today No. I (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 250-278, esp. 251. Frankena accepts the metaethics ethics split, thereby making his proposal for a "normative metaethics" seem contradictory, or just self-defeating. 105 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I,§ 97. 106 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I, § 1 2 1 . This is a part of Wittgenstein's "technique" of "therapy"; but it can be divorced therefrom, and recommended independently. See above, page 103, on levels of inquiry.
V POSTLOGUE This section consists of replies to possible objections, on various topics covered throughout this study. (1) Does the "protreptic argument" conflate logical with ethical categories? If there were any semantic confusion prevalent here, it would be shouldered by the PA, not by us. But there is a connection between modal and moral necessity. This may be seen in strictly logical terms from the following premises: (a) 'it is necessary that p' entails 'p' which is a trivial modal theorem; (b) it is not the case that: 'p is obligatory' entails 'p', which is an equally unexceptionable deontic principle, since an 'ought' does not logically necessitate an 'is'. Moreover, it would be pointless to make an action 1 morally incumbent upon someone if its performance, i.e. the result thereof, were already a reality. Imperatives of duty are future-oriented, in that they demand that something be made the case. Therefore, (b) is as securely a theorem as (a) is. But from (a) and (b) together, the following is deducible: (c): i f ' p is necessary', then 'it is possible that p is obligatory'. This means that the connection between logical and moral necessity is not sheerly fortuitous. Moreover, (c) can be strengthened. For, since 'q' entails 'it is possible that q', and 'it is possible that q' entails 'it is possibly necessary that q\ it follows as a modal rule that: 'É/' entails 'it is possibly necessary that q\ Putting these together, we deduce from (c) the following: (d): it is possible that ' "it is necessary that p " entails l The term 'action' is construed to include 'acts of omission', and also to make room for thoughts, feelings, or very nearly anything that might conceivably form the basis for an imperative of duty, i.e. an obligation-statement.
108 POSTLOGUE "it is possible that p is obligatory" '. In a more succinct, symbolic formulation, (d) comes out as: -N-(Np-*— N- Op), where the arrow represents entailment, and where '-N-f stands for 'it is possible that r\ While both (c) and (d) may appear weak, they at least serve to falsify such assertions as : 'it is necessary that p' entails that 'it is not the case that p is obligatory'. To put it another way, it is not the case that for all x, 'x is necessary' entails 'x is not obligatory', and f r o m the denial of this entailment relation, we are entitled to derive the possibility of some x which is both logically necessary and morally obligatory; quantificationally, expressible as (e): - N - (Ex) (Nx & Ox). Something precise but limited follows: namely that moral obligations constitute a sub-class of all necessary truths, relations or connections. 2 The PA claims, as we have interpreted it, to arrive at a result which embodies both of these simultaneously. Such a claim cannot be immediately ruled out. The PA'S conclusion may just be b o t h necessarily true and morally obligatory (although we have contended that it happens to be neither). (2) Suppose for the sake of argument that the PA did turn out to be logically valid. Would it not be self-destructive, since what we "cannot help doing" relieves one of the burden of "having" to philosophize, and thus of the responsibility for beginning (or maintaining) controlled, disciplined reflection? Since the PA does not reach its desired conclusion, this question is academic. The significant parallel between moral and modal necessity is not one which imposes any physical restraints on an individual's ability to choose a definite course of action for himself, since it does not involve, e.g. causal necessity. Logical truths "constrain" us to recognize their veracity; they " c o m p e l " a certain "propositional atti2 T o express this contention more c x a c t l y , ' n e c e s s i t y ' i s a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for something's being 'obligatory'. Symbolically, -Np entails -Op\ or the contrapositive Op entails Np.
POSTLOGUE 109 t u d e " , i n Quine's apt phrase. We may defy them, but only at our peril. Obligations demand fulfillment, but notoriously they often fail to obtain it. This does not mean that we are " f r e e " not to live up to our obligations. Similarly, while we often deviate in our thinking from accordance with, e.g. the laws of logic, this does not make them any less nomic. 3 The canons of deductive inference compel intellectually; they do not "brainwash" or bind in chains. The relationship between such norms and any corresponding moral obligations does not insure (alas) that we shall perform up to expectations, to begin with; and so, free-will is left unjeopardized. Neither logical nor ethical "compulsion" intrudes upon volition or choice. Otherwise, we should be both infallible intellectually, and (automatically) incapable of ever making missteps, morally! But " t o err is h u m a n " . And to be able to err, whether logically or morally, signalizes that human freedom is not encroached upon. Total rectitude alone would endanger free-will. Returning to the question: what if the PA were not fallacious, but correct? What would follow? Only that we may not shrink f r o m philosophy; that sooner or later, even if only for a very brief duration, we must engage in philosophy, whether we desire to or not. 4 And to extricate ourselves f r o m possible further pursuit of philosophy, or to prevent its taking hold of us permanently, we must likewise come up with a (reasoned) approach which enables us to renounce philosophy 3 We are free to create (or discover) alternative systems of logic, or at least to reformulate known or existing rules. A similar freedom does prevail in ethics, and when it is proposed or taken advantage of, it is called moral (political, social, religious, aesthetic) reform. This occurrence only involves replacement of one standard by another. The possible denial of "all" standards might itself be reprimanded as constituting, paradoxically or inconsistently, a standard of one kind. But it could equally legitimately be regarded as a 'meta-standard', or else as a "degenerate case" of standards, once invoked. The logic of this position is both peculiar and ambiguous, but not perforce inconsistent or incoherent. 4 The gist of the PA's conclusion is then the prediction of an event which (it is alleged) must take place eventually, at some moment or other in the course of any given person's life. So the PA's theorem might be considered a 'synthetic a priori' truth, having the force of logic behind it, and yet simultaneously a description of a state of affairs (to be) realized in the world. 'Synthetic a priori' is, however, a vexed if not dubious category, and the PA is already saddled with enough logical encumbrances.
110 POSTLOGUE "forever" — this calls for and reinforces the PA'S own line. But there is no dilemma here: for if this is all that the PA enjoins, or can "prove", then it is not a very strong or cogent exhortation to philosophy, after all. (3) Are there not many things which we have to do, but which are not good; consequently, is not the probative force of the PA overestimated? Indeed, the PA is not successful, on other grounds. But in fairness, (3), with its tacit appeal to e.g. "necessary evils", is weak. For to call something by that name is a blunder, or virtually a contradiction in terms. People must often make sacrifices, but consider, e.g. Mill's contention that worthwhile sacrifices are to occur within the overall context of promotion of some good, or at the very least be for the sake of preventing an evil — not serving as its accomplice. For otherwise the moral enterprise would make very little sense. Also, (3) ignores that the PA is a logical paean, and so conceives of philosophizing as a virtuous activity. (See above, Ch. II, page 20). If someone wishes to dispute that presumption, he is not even in a position to listen to the PA, much less to appreciate its pseudo-logical drift. Moreover, to affirm that 'X is good, but do not pursue X1 sounds logically odd. It calls for an explanation, in the absence of which it is selfdefeating. We might under certain circumstances say 'X is good, but Y is better, so pursue Y in preference to A". Or else the issue might be whether there is even time to pursue X, given competing moral pressures. Classically, X might also conflict with some (other) duty Z which could demand immediate attention, or which at least would take momentary precedence over X. But unless such qualifications are introduced, 'X is good, but do not pursue A" remains an aberration. So, if philosophy is good or at any rate a good, then (3)'s implicit criticism misses the mark, as our introductory discussion in Ch. I (pages 1-4) might also show. (4) Does not the "derivation" of 'ought' from 'is' founder because 'ought' is used indiscriminately? No. The meaning of 'ought'is fairly straightforward. The PA wishes to impose an obligation to study philosophy ; while Searle presents a hypothetical case in which one is under self-imposed obligation to make good a promise, or one's word. Mill's problem is more complex, because (a) he upholds the 'is-ought' dichotomy, and does not try to limit or circumvent this distinction; (b) nonetheless he attempts to lay down a
POSTLOGUE 111 foundation for ethics, and to establish a "binding" norm; (c) he holds that it is not necessary to (consiously) subscribe to a utilitarian standard, in order to promote the end which utility always prescribes, as in Smart's "acting optimifically". However, what emerges from the study of Mill's writings, as well as from an examination of his " p r o o f ' and its underlying reasoning, is a purported obligation to pledge one's intellectual allegiance to utilitarianism, upon recognizing the truth or validity of that ethical doctrine. In short, the obligation is: to be a proponent or defender of utilitarianism, over and above either following its precepts, or at least always conducting oneself compatibly and conformably therewith. The duty is quite restricted in scope. Note that in each case, the reference range of the moral injunction arrived at (or pretended to) differs. The PA is, or would like to be, imperative for everybody. Searle's promiser is an individual, and only he actually incurs the obligation, relative to the promisee. Mill however realizes that a few men, namely moralists, philosophers, and highly reflective persons, have the ability to understand the theory of utilitarianism. All are capable of obeying or heeding it without much thought or deliberation; indeed, unconsciously. Common people do have duties, but their duties do not include the special additional ones imposed upon the inquirer or thinker. These peculiar intellectualist obligations Mill's proof fastens upon, albeit indirectly. By contrast, the PA does not wish to draw distinctions between philosophers and "simple men" with respect to the dramatic question, 'to philosophize or not to philosophize'. [These remarks serve, too, to clarify the thematic unity of the present work, and to trace a thread running through each of the foregoing chapters.] A few more points: I. Since obligations generally refer to purposes beyond themselves, we are unable to accept the concept of duty taken as an endin-itself, or to confer upon it intrinsic value. Herein lies part of the motivation behind our Ch. I deflation of 'obligation' as a candidate for the title of central ethical category. II. Verbally, an obligation is anything which we "are bound to do or to forbear from doing", whether undertaken contractually, via an oath, or through some other means. This includes duties which have no special legal basis, as well as ones which we naturally enter upon, without profound evaluation and subsequent assent; or which are genetically incurred upon minimal socialization, involving the in-
112 POSTLOGUE culcation and internalization of accepted norms of conduct. III. The open-question "why am I obligated to perform suchand-such?" is a meaningful one; it could not be so, if obligations were really surds or ultimate resting points, i.e. first principles of ethics (as indeed Kant and others have thought). Not only is the "why"question meaningful; it often draws an answer, and one more illuminating than merely "well, you are, and that is all". This means that obligations alone are not sufficient for an ethical theory to be comprehensive, including those exasperatingly unclear versions of intuitionism, which rest on the most tenuous of visual analogies. (5) Granted that in each instance we are dealing with some form of obligation. What then is the place of such substitute terms as 'must' and 'should', alongside of 'ought'? 'Must' and 'should' are allied to 'ought', or even synonymous for some purposes. Consider the following. (A) You ought to clean out the garage today. (B) You should clean out the garage today. (A) and (B) are intensionally equivalent. Now, 'must' may strike one as being stronger in force than 'ought'. If so, then any comparison becomes merely a matter of degree. But even this does not hold up uniformly. For, while (C) You must clean out the garage today appears more urgent than either (A) or (B), by the same token (D) You ought to go to the ball game today strikes us as at least as forceful as, if not more so, than (E) You must go to the ball game today is. The term 'must' in (E) could well mean "you owe it to yourself to see the ball game today", in which case it would properly be construed as expressing a self-regarding duty. But it might also be interpreted "if you want to enjoy yourself, go to the ball game today", i.e. as a hypothetical imperative. This in itself illustrates that there are thoroughly approved ends lying "beyond" the pale of duty proper.
POSTLOGUE 113 Or, (E) might be idiomatically retranslated as "(If you want to) do yourself a favor, go to the ball game today". This shows clearly that (E), despite employing the term 'must', is by no means necessarily a sterner 'command' than (D); probably just the contrary. How we regard the meaning of ancillary expressions such as 'must' and 'should' becomes then largely a matter of taste. 'Ought' is the key word, and any variants encountered are as if purely stylistic. It is open to anyone to specify a technical or precise meaning for each of the auxiliary words that crop up, in relation to some larger theory, logical strategy or special distinction. Our own more limited purposes simply do not require any such maneuver. Besides, discriminating between 'oughts' and obligations seems to us a distinction without a corresponding difference. (6) What is the upshot of this work? Is it sometimes legitimate to draw an 'ought' inference categorically from an 'is', and, if so, what does this result imply for philosophy? If we are correct in supporting and sifting out the pros and cons of Searle's "derivation", then it is correct to conclude to (or infer) an 'ought' from an 'is', in some cases. The universal ban on moving from the level of description to that of evaluation has therefore been negated, even though the is-ought distinction (like the analytic/synthetic split) remains pedagogically useful, as one introduction to key ethical problems. Undoubtedly there do remain many fallacious deductions of 'ought' from 'is', scattered throughout ethics and its history, for which the is-ought "gap" still serves usefully as an effective barrier or blockade: but the underlying theory has severe limitations and to that extent is erroneous. In select cases, e.g. promising, it would be more elegant (as well as accurate) to say that 'is'-statements embody logically inseparable 'ought'-propositions. This is quite faithful to Searle's own endeavor, inasmuch as he claims that the transition from "you are under an obligation to pay Jones $5" (putative description) to the judgment that " y o u ought to pay Jones $5" is a strictly logical one, yet so minimal in scope that we are entitled to say that the two sentences have the same meaning. 5 s A similar view is developed by D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce, in Moral Practices (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), Appendix 2, 119-124, on the subject of "Moral Practices and Miss Anscombe's Grocer".
114 POSTLOGUE What about omens for the future? If we have been even partially successful, then the way has been pointed out at last for resumption of large-scale ethical concerns and systematization, with which classical moral philosophers (such as Mill) previously were occupied. Contemporary analytic thought has unwisely chosen to abandon or leave behind this field, owing to unwarranted self-assurance that normative ethics is no longer possible, or indeed, that it never was possible. This trend has been most unfortunate. We hope this work shall help lead philosophers to a much-needed reversal of form and interest. ( 7 ) Searle denies that "external" criticism of, e.g. an institution is possible. Yet it is acknowledged that "internal" vs. "external" criticism can be logically distinguished, and that both kinds involve genuinely alternate postures. But, (i) can someone remain a purely "internal" critic without gradually leaning in the direction of the "detached anthropological standpoint"? And, (ii) cannot someone be said to be an "external" critic, yet accept an institution as (morally) applicable, or as binding upon himself? (See above, page 84ff.) It is possible to stay "inside"; for example, to approve in general of banking (and with no large or vested interest therein), yet at the same time observe that the bank business is at any time replete with a multitude of swindlers, thieves, dishonest brokers, who corrupt it and thereby soil its reputation. One is not necessarily led therefrom to a wholesale condemnation of banking as an institution. One may remain an internal critic and yet be pro-banking, in spite o f sordid truths. This example answers (i) affirmatively, in effect. The answer to (ii) is also yes; but someone who does do this usually risks being deemed or branded a hypocrite. Take the case of an avowed Marxist who buys a house. This action, as the Marxist should realize, conflicts with his theoretical disdain for the institution of private property. Yet it would be foolish to deny that people can, and often do, act against their own most cherished beliefs. Besides, the Marxist, in turn, could retaliate as follows: ( 1 ) revolution now! (2) as long as the institution of land-ownership continues in existence, one is forced to go along with the unyielding mechanism, or else, withdraw from society altogether, move to a commune or leave civilization, if such escape is personally feasible. 6 (3) Marxism is only part of the 6 I f a Marxist bought his house and t h e n , realizing what he had done, sold it immediately, he could be easily forgiven his " t r a n s g r e s s i o n " . B u t i f he held on
POSTLOGUE 115 valuational framework within which one formulates a code of personal conduct. Marxists also have wives and children to think about, or lingering "bourgeois" commitments and attachments. Even such qualifications do not entirely remove the sting; the Marxist may still seem insincere, especially if "deeds speak louder than words". The protestations above might only (inadvertently) show that the Marxist's theoretical and political professions were outweighed by his private actions, or that he was not "really" a Marxist after all. The accuracy of the description is a very delicate matter, and perceptions are bound to differ; judgments cannot be hard-and-fast. So while (ii) likewise can be answered affirmatively, its route is exceedingly treacherous. to his private domicile for an extended period of time, his doctrinal integrity would become questionable, or severely compromised. "What is done cannot be u n d o n e " is false, provided we allow for mitigation, or atonement for previous deeds. Even so, a Marxist who owns his own home would not be a very thorough-going one, and this would shed negative moral light on his personal demeanor. So (in)consistency does play a considerable and warranted role in the formation of moral judgments, as Kant forcefully maintained.
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126 INDEX OF NAMES A n s c o m b e , G. V. M.. 88. 9 2 , 9 8 n , 113n A n t o n y , Mark. 50 Aquinas. St. T h o m a s , 6 5 n , 73n, 9 5 n Aristotle, 4 - 6 , 8, 10, 12, 1 4 - 1 5 , 2 I n , 2 6 n , 29, 3 1 - 3 2 , 4 4 , 4 5 n , 4 6 - 4 7 , 52n, 5 9 n , 6 1 , 7 1 , 9 5 n Augustine, St., 16 Austin, J. L., 8On, 88, 96n B e n t h a m , J., 2 7 - 3 2 , 39, 55 Berlin, I., 78n Beth. E. W„ 32. 34 Broad, C. D.. 4 2 n , 51n, 52, 1 0 2 n Castañeda, H. N., 104n Cicero, 16 C l e o p a t r a , 50 Copleston, F. C., 6 5 n Darwinism, 70 Dewey, J., 8, 35n, 4 2 n , 7 0 n , 102n Donnelly, J., vii Edwards, P., 103n Epietetus, 1 In Epicurean, 31 Fichte, J. G., 70n Elew, A. G. N „ 83 F o o t , P., 8 9 - 9 1 , 9 6 , lOOn F r a n k e n a , W. K., 9 9 n , 106n F r e u d , S„ 52, 53 Goedel, K., 103, 104 Green, T. H., 3 6 n Grose, T. H., 36n 96, Hall, E. W., 22, 2 8 , 4 2 n , 4 7 , 5 2 , 58n Hallden, S., I 0 4 n Hamlet, 9, 9 4 n Hare, R. M., 6 6 , 6 7 n , 77, 8 0 , 83. 8 5 n , 88, 89, 9 3 n , 9 5 - 9 8 , 1 0 3 n Hegel, G. W. F., 31, 55, 71 Hintikka, K. J. J., 91 Hobbes, T., 8 2 n , 9 9 H u d s o n , W. D., 7 3 - 7 4 , 7 7 - 7 9 H u m e , D„ 1, 5, 3 4 - 3 6 , 4 3 , 6 6 - 6 7 , 72, 87, 8 8 n , 9 2 , 9 3 n , 9 6 n , 106 James, W., 74, 7 7 , 9 4 Kant, I., 1 - 3 , 7n, 8, 19n, 2 6 n n , 2 9 , 30, 7 0 , 7 I n , 7 2 n , 8 8 n , 9 0 n , 9 9 , 1 0 2 n n , 112, 115n Leibniz, G. W„ 70, 9 5 n , 104 Locke, J., 4 7 L o e w e n h e i m , L., 103 Lyons, D., 8 4 n Machiavelli, N., 9 7 Macintyre, A., 56n Margolis, J., 8 8 n , 91 Marxist, 114 115 M c N a u g h t o n , R., 104n Mill, J. S., 2, 4 , 7, 8, lOn, Ch. Ill passim, 77, 8 5 n , 9 6 n , 9 8 , 110, 111, 114 M o n r o , D. H., 9 6 n Moore, G. E „ 2, 6, 4 2 , 4 8 n , 5 3 - 5 5 , 5 8 , 5 9 n , 6 7 , 70, 9 7 - 9 9 , 102 Narveson, J., 8 I n Nicklaus, J., 6 51, 82, Nietzsche, F., 3, 11, 5 4 , 5 5 , 9 4 , 9 6 , 97 Nowell-Smith, P. H., 9 0 , 9 8 , 104n Peirce, C. S., 7n
I N D E X OK N A M E S Plato, 6, 2 7 n , 5 4 n , 5 5 n , 5 9 n , 71, 79, 82n P o p p e r , Sir K., 63n P o t t e r , V. G., SJ, 6 n , 7n Quine, W. V. O., 109 Rawls, J., 84 Rembrandt, 69 Ritschl, A., 3 7 n Ross, Sir W. D., 9 0 , 9 I n R u b e n , D. H., 9 8 n , 9 9 n Russell, B., 35n, 4 5 n , 87 Searle, J. R „ 4 , 5, 8, 36, Ch. IV passim, 110. I l l , 114 Shakespeare, W„ 50, 75n 9 4 n Sidgwick, H„ 2 8 n , 5 1 - 5 5 , 91 Skolem, T.. 103 S m a r t , J. J. C „ 7n, 111 Socrates, 5, 71, 77, 85 127 Spinoza, B., 2 9 n , 5 4 n , 77, 9 6 n Stevenson, C. L „ 8 3 , 9 5 n , 9 6 n Stoics, 3, 31, 6 2 n , 6 4 n Tarski, A., 104 Taylor, R., 2 5 n , 3 1 n , 1 0 2 n Thrasymachus, 96 T o l s t o y , L., 9 2 n l l r m s o n , J. O., 64 Vico, G., 73 Voltaire, 9 2 n Warnock, G. J., 8 9 n , 9 9 n Wertz, S. K . , 4 2 n Whitehead, A. N., 104 Williams, B., 4 0 n Wittgenstein, L., 74, 7 6 n , 78, 9 4 n , 103n. 106 Wright, G. H. v o n . 9 0 , 9 1 Z e m a c h , E. M., 75n
128 INDEX OF SPECIAL TOPICS Absolute, principle of the, 32, 34 Anthropological a r g u m e n t , 76n, 78, 8 2 n , 8 3 - 8 8 , 9 2 - 9 5 , 9 9 , lOOn, 114-115 Commitment, intellectual, 5-7, Ch. II passim, 63 -65, 7 4 - 7 5 , 102, 106, 111 Desirable, m e a n i n g of, 28, 4 7 - 5 1 , 58, 62 Facts, b r u t e i>s. institutional, 9 2 - 9 5 Free-will, 78, 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 H e d o n i s m , p a r a d o x of, 55 Inconsequentialist a r g u m e n t , 4 4 - 4 5 Is-ought derivation, 8 I n , et passim Is-ought distinction, passim H u m e a n d Mill o n , 3 6 - 4 4 Meaning of, 7 0 - 7 2 Metaethics, critique of, 72-79, 101-106 M c t a p h i l o s o p h y , Ch. II; 103« Moral t e r m i n o l o g y , correct use of, 96-98 Naturalistic fallacy, 6 7 , 9 9 Obligation, Ch. II passim; also 1 - 8 ; philosophical, 6 3 - 6 5 , 111 Open-question a r g u m e n t , 53, 6 7 , 8 2 - 8 3 , 9 7 , 110 Ought-is fallacy, 6 7 - 7 0 Oughts, 1 1 0 - 1 1 3 Paradox, of h e d o n i s m , 55 Positivism, 9 7 , 102 Promising, 5, 7 5 - 7 6 n , 8 0 - 8 2 , 8 6 n , 88, 8 9 - 91, 9 8 - 9 9 P r o o f , Mill's, Ch. Ill passim; csp. 4 5 ff. clarification, 4 7 - 5 4 criticisms, 54 - 57 f o r m a l i z a t i o n , 57 ff., 6 0 ff. indirect p r o o f , 3 4 - 3 5 mathematical proof, 2 5 - 2 6 , 32, 57 'proof,' meaning of t e r m , 23-26 psychological, 2 7 - 3 0 Protreptic a r g u m e n t , 5 - 7 , Ch. II, 107-110 Rcductionism, in contemporary cthics, 7 2 ff., 101 f f . in d e o n t o l o g y , 1 - 4 , 110 in Mill's p r o o f , 3 0 - 3 2 Supervenicncc, critique of, 95n, 9 6 - 9 8 , 99