A HISTORY OF
RUSSIAN
RAILWAYS

J. N. WESTWOOD

A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN RAILWAYS

A HISTORY OF

RUSSIAN RAILWAYS

J. N. WESTWOOD

ILLUSTRATED

London

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD

RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET
FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1964 <-

This Book is copyright under the Berne Convention.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of
private study, research, criticism or review, as
permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no
portion may be reproduced by any process without
written permission. Enquiry should be made to
the publisher.

© George Allen id Unwin I Ad, 1964

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
in 11 point Bell type
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LTD
THE GRESHAM PRESS
OLD WOKING, SURREY
INTRODUCTION

‘When the trains stop, that will be the end!’ said Lenin, faced
with a transport crisis. Certainly for the Bolsheviks it would
have been the end, although much of Russia at that time would
hardly have noticed the difference if in fact the trains had
stopped. Lenin’s words would be more true today, for there can
be few nations so dependant on rail transport as the Soviet
Union. But when the Revolution came Russia was only halfway
in its progression towards a modem industrial economy. The
Crimean War had shown the impossibility of being a world
power and at the same time a country politically and economi-
cally under-developed. By 1914 this dilemma had been moder-
ated but not eliminated. It was left to the Soviet governments
to continue the transformation.

As in other countries, industrialization in tsarist Russia was
founded on railway building, but this does not mean that
exactly the same process occurred as in Europe. And the con-
trast with North America was even more striking. Perhaps the
most significant evidence of this is that in Russia the railways
never entered the national consciousness like they did in
America. The Trans-Siberian never meant as much to Russians
as did the first transcontinental to Americans. Golden spikes
were not ceremonially driven in by Russian dignitaries. Folk
singers did not celebrate Russian train wrecks. Sovfilm did not
acquire a stock of antique engines to puff across Russian cinema
screens. Perhaps this was because in Russia it was the rivers
which were the traditional routes of the frontiersmen and the
empire builders. More likely it was because the railways were
not a spontaneous grasping for territory and prosperity as they
were in the United States, but a forced growth sponsored by
the Tsar and built by foreigners.

In America and western Europe the state had little need to
promote railways because commerce, industry, and local
governments were eager enough not only to demand railways
but also to get them built. In Russia it was the Government
which provided the enthusiasm. While the tsars and their
ministers were willing to multiply the national debt, even to
sell Alaska, to find money for railway-building, commercial and
industrial interests did little to help. It is true that merchants
agitated for and occasionally promoted railways to serve their
own trade, but they were rarely willing to risk their own
money in such enterprises. As for the industrialists, they showed
little of the initiative sometimes ascribed to private business. It
was not until the twentieth century that Russia could be con-
sidered self-sufficient in railway equipment production. Whereas
in western Europe early railway-building encouraged the
development of industry as much by providing a market as by
improving communications, Russian industrialists were slow to
exploit their opportunities. They made little effort to supply
the needs of the railways, contenting themselves with cam-
paigning for ever-higher tariffs and ever-wider import restric-
tions, behind whose protection they did eventually condescend
to supply most of the railways’ demands.

Foreign industry and foreign money filled the gap left by the
lack of domestic enterprise. But not always w'ith happy results,
and it is interesting to speculate how much present Soviet
attitudes towards western aid to under-developed countries owe
to the unpleasant experiences of the nineteenth century, when
between the foreigners who were building the railways and the
Russians who wanted them there was such a barrier of incom-
prehension and distrust that the work could only be done badly
and wastefully.

There is an essential continuity in Russian railway develop-
ment over the thirteen decades covered in this book. Perhaps
because railways are affected by technical as much as by
political changes 1917 was a turning point only in a limited
sense. The greatest difference between tsarist and Soviet poli-
cies towards the railways is that before 1917 an expanding rail
network was the foundation of Russian industrialization whereas
in Soviet times railway investment was deliberately kept to a
minimum so that more funds could be allotted to other parts of
industry. The railways were no longer accepted as a source and
inspiration for the economy, but as a regrettable necessity. Yet
in the nineteen-sixties the ussr is one of that diminishing
number of countries where railways are still considered to be
part of the future. This favour towards a nineteenth-century
mode of transport may today seem retrograde. But tomorrow
it may not.
A NOTE ON STATISTICS AND PLACE-NAMES

That some percentages in this book are given to one place of
decimals does not imply that the author has faith in the accuracy
of railway statistics. They are presented thus to make it easier for
a specialist reader to identify their source. Elsewhere figures have
been rounded off, with a loss of precision more apparent than real,
for the railway statistics of any country can never be precise. Even
when the intentions are of the best, by nature transport operations
do not lend themselves to accurate recording. When intentions are
not of the best (as. for example, when stationmasters inflate their
figures of tons originated so as to embellish their productivity
records) the incorporation of local statistics into one country-wide
index may be accompanied by a wide deviation from the truth. If,
as even now still happens, railways make only half-hearted efforts
to gather and analyse statistics of their performance, it is literally
impossible to know with any precision what they are doing or how
they are doing it.

This last deficiency affected Russian railways less than certain
others, for right from the beginning the government collected and
published railway statistics. However, these were concerned mainly
w ith traffic, and moreover it was not always clear what assumptions
and definitions were used. In the early twentieth century, for
example, the Ministry of Ways and Communications published the
figure of 0-4 kopek as the average cost of one passenger/verst. At
the same time a Professor Salov arrived at 0 • 69 kopek for the same
index, and one Engineer Frolov calculated the coot as О - 06 kopek.
They were all correct; the difference was in the definitions and
assumptions. Another difficulty, with nineteenth-century figures, is
that traffic moving over several railways would be recorded by
each carrier, and thus counted more than once in the total tonnage
figures compiled by the Ministry. Yet another complication is that
the Ministry of State Control in compiling profit and loss tables
ignored the value of the considerable services performed by the
railways for government departments, which were not paid for in
cash.

The Soviet Government, with its predilection for production
figures, produced very complete railway statistics and these are not
unreliable, as is sometimes supposed, provided that their definitions
are known and understood. In the early Soviet years, however,
general statistical incompetence led to some inaccuracy.

Changing frontiers are one big problem, Russian railway
statistics are based on a wide variety of permutations, and it is not
always clear which of these is being used. In the pre-revolutionary
years figures inight.be based on European Russia or Russia as a
whole. Poland was usually but not always included while Finland
and the Chinese Eastern Railway were usually, but not always,
excluded. By the end of the Civil War Poland and Finland, together
with the Baltic States and other areas, had been lost but by 1940
and 1945 some of these were won back. Soviet statisticians have
produced synthetic figures for 1913, based on the inter-war fron-
tiers, which are useful for comparing progress made during the
Soviet era (even though 1915 and 1916 were better years for the
railways).

In this book an effort has been made to avoid the presentation
of statistics for their own sake. In general, figures are used only
to give precision to a comparison, and only when they are in fact
comparable. This sometimes entails discrepancies between figures
and sets of figures in different parts of the book. For example,
1913 statistics in one chapter may be based on Imperial frontiers
and in a subsequent chapter on Soviet frontiers. But the reasons
for such discrepancies are usually obvious.

It is not easy to compare Soviet railway indices with those of
other countries. Definitions are often different from those used
elsewhere. In Britain, for example, the definition of railway workers
includes persons employed in locomotive workshops and in railway
construction. In the us sr, because these activities are under
different ministries, their workers are not classed as railwaymen.
Also, because of the large role played in the ussn by non-common-
carrier lines, whose figures are not included in railway statistics,
the common-carrier railways are statistically not comparable with
those of other countries. In particular, they are relieved of much
of the unproductive short-distance and switching work which in
other countries depresses the various productivity indices.

Tons are metric and billions American.

Russian language specialists may be pained by the English ren-
dering of certain names in this book. Unfortunately, many Russian
names cannot be anglicised without sacrificing accuracy, consistency,
or traditional usage. The reader will no doubt realise, for example,
that the Nikolaev Railway of this book is the Russian Nikolaevskaya,
sometimes anglicised as Nicholas or Nicholai, and the Ekaterinin
Railway might also be called the Catherine Railway. For additional
clarification, the Index of this volume has been amply cross-refer-
enced, and thus serves also as a guide to those places which have
been renamed since 1917.
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	f>age 7

A NOTE ON STATISTICS AND PLACE-NAMES	9

I. THE RAILWAY AGE BEGINS	17

Pre-railway transport in Russia—The first railways
—'Fhe Tsarskoye Selo Railway—The Warsaw-
Vienna Railway—Proposals for a St Petersburg-
Moscow Railway—The Russian railway gauge—
CunsU ucliuii uf die 3l Feleisbuig—Михи» Rail-
way—Ilie Nikolaev Railway in operation—Other
railway proposals—The main company—Other
railways—The Moscow-Yaroslavl Railway—The
railways in the mid-sixties—Westerners and
Slavophils—Security on the railways—Locomotives
and equipment—Domestic equipment production—
Train services.

IL THE BOOM YEARS, 1866-99	59

Railway construction—Railway promotion and fin-
ancing—The railway kings—Private railways and
state—Traffic—Profit and loss—The Baranov Com-
mission—Tariffs—Operation—Passenger services—
Railway oqiHprrwnt production—T zicnmotive and
rolling stock policy—The South Western Railway.

III.	RAILWAYS INTO ASIA	Ю7

The need for a Siberian railway—Proposals for a
Trans-Siberian railway—The Ussuri Railway—'fhe
Western Siberian Railway—The Central Siberian
Railway—The Baikal ferry—The Trans-Baikal
Railway—The Chinese Eastern Railway—The
Amur Railway—The Tyumen-Omsk line—Trans-
Siberian Railway traffic—Technical standards and
equipment—Trans-Siberian train sendee—Passen-
ger tariffs—The significance of the Trans-Siberian—
The Trans-Caspian Railway—Other railways in
Central Asia.
IV.	THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 129
Railway operations—Profit and loss—Traffic—
Railway construction—Ownership and control—
Tariff policy—Passenger sendees—The physical
condition of the railways—The cartelization of the
railway supply industry—labour—Corruption.

V.	SEVEN YEARS OF WAR	167

Railway mobilization—The railway battalions—The
railways in the Great War—The Civil War—Rail-
way traffic during the Civil War—Railway organi-
zation after 1917—Railway operations, 1917-21—
The railways' physical coiidiiioii—The Tiaus-
Siberian during the Civil War.

VI.	RESTORATION	199

The New Economic Policy—Restoration—Traffic—
Operations—Passenger services—The fuel crisis—
Wages and productivity—Theft—Organization and
administration—Tariff policy—Planning—New rail-
way construction—Locomotives and rolling stock—
Electric and diesel traction.

VIL	THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS, 1928-59	226

Traffic—Railway operations after 1928—PredeF-
shchiki and novatory—The war—New railway con-
struction— I he technical condition of the railways—
Organization—Planning—Finance and ‘khozras-
chet"—Tariff policy—Passenger services—Labour
—Locomotive manning—Electrification and dieseli-
zation—Railway equipment industry—Locomotive
policy.

VIII.	CO-ORDINATION OF TRANSPORT 281

Competition and co-ordination—Transport co-ordi-
nation in the ussr—Soviet waterway policy—Ocean
shipping—Road transport—Pipelines and the co-
ordination of fuel transport—Co-ordination of pas-
senger services—Transport co-ordination in the
Ukraine.
CONTENTS

APPENDICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

page 302

318

321

The research leading towards this book was partly financed
by the Canada Council. In acknowledging this, with
appreciation, the author wishes to emphasize that the
Council bears no responsibility for the statements and views
expressed.

ILLUSTRATIONS

1.	One of the original engines imported for the Tsar-
skoye Selo railway, 1836

Russian railway station in the mid-nineteenth
century	facing page 32

2.	Tank shunting locomotive, built in 1861
The Moscow Terminus of the St Petersburg-
Moscow Railway	S3

3.	One of the original passenger engines of the Kursk-
Kharkov Sevastopol Railway, about 1870
Locomotives of the Kursk-Kharkov-Sevastopol
Railway	64

4.	Tsvetkovo, a station of the South-Western Railway
A class V six-wheeler built in 1875	65

5.	A Russian passenger car of the late nineteenth
century

A bath car	96

6.	Kursk Station at about the end of the nineteenth
century

A Russian-built Fairlie locomotive	97

7.	Standard О class freight design	128

8.	1'he class V, the last type of eight-wheeled freight
engine built for the Russian railways

One of the type К locomotives

One of the ‘half-tank’ engines built for the Ryazan-
Uralsk Railway	129

9.	A Fairlie locomotive in use at Baku

A bridge on the Trans-Siberian Railway	160

10.	A Trans-Siberian train at Kharbin

An eight-wheeled passenger car on the Trans-
Siberian Railway during the Civil War

Fuel being loaded on a passenger train on the
Trans-Siberian Railway, 1919

A wood-burning eight-wheeled freight engine	161
11.	The station at Polyanyi Krug in 1919	
	British and Russian officers at a station on the  Archangel line, 1919  Soldiers of the White Army and their transport	192
12.	A British officer supervising Russian fitters at	
	Murmansk, 1919  American troops with improvised armoured train in North Russia, 1919  One of the Civil War locomotive cemeteries	193
13.	A diesel-mechanical locomotive on builder’s trials	
	In Germany, 1926  A class E engine, with a transfer freight at Kiev, 1961  A class Su engine with a suburban train at Kiev in 1961	224
14.	A ‘Iosif Stalin’ type engine in the Moscow suburbs,	
	1959  A ‘Iosif Stalin’ type engine with experimental streamlining	225
15.	A class E locomotive in German hands during the	
	war  An R class 2-8-0 captured by the Germans during the Second World War  The standard post-war freight locomotive	256
16.	A PS6 class engine at Kalinin, 1959	
	A twin-section 2,000 h.p. diesel electric engine type TE-2  A Czechoslovak prototype passenger electric engine at Kalinin, 1959	257
	MAPS  Russian railways in 1870	60
	Russian railways in 1890	10O
	Russian railways in 1914	168
	Principal Russian railways in 1959	283
CHAPTER I

THE RAILWAY AGE BEGINS

PRE-RAILWAY TRANSPORT IN RUSSIA

Russia contains more water within its frontiers than any other
country and its early history and development were determined
more than anything else by the course of its rivers. It was the
rivers, too, which in later days provided not only trade routes
between Asia and Europe but also became the principal means
of transport between the different parts of a growing empire.
St Petersburg and Moscow could not have flourished without
the river-borne grain from the fertile south.

The golden age of river transport in Russia was the eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries. It was in this period
that most of the canals were built joining different rivers into
a waterway system which was becoming more and more unified.
The Upper Volga waterway system, linking the Volga with the
Baltic, was built as early as 1709 and in the nineteenth century
was passing up to 5,000 boats each year. By the Wurtemburg
and Mariinsk canals the Upper Volga was connected with a
network of northern rivers and with Lake Ladoga.

Technically, the traditional method of propulsion is sym-
bolized by the Volga boatmen. These boatmen would form an
artel, elect a leader, and offer a barge operator their services
in hauling his craft up the river by tow ropes. A few barges
were hauled by horses but on the Volga at least the price of
manpower was lower than that of horsepower.1 Neither the
men nor the horses were to be envied: the work was hardly
endurable, the food scanty and poor and the rewards meagre.
Grain, moved from the south by these methods, reached the
northern cities only in the year following the harvest, as the

1 MPS. Statistichesku obzor xhelexnykh dorog i vnutrtnnikh rodnykh putei. St
Petersburg, 1893. Second Section.
barges were overtaken by winter ice before they could reach
their destination. Another method of traction was equally slow:
this involved the warping of the boat up-river to an anchor
which would be taken ahead by rowing boat. A huge capstan
on the vessel's deck, turned by horses or by eighty or more
men, would haul in the anchor rope. Using horses and towing
a train of seven or eight barges these vessels could take 4,000
tons of wheat up the Volga from Samara to Rybinsk, where it
would be stored until the spring and then shipped to
St Petersburg.

Steamships came early to Russia; two steamships were plying
the Kama around Kazan as early as 1817; in 1823 the first
steamship was operating on the Dnieper. But because capital was
scarce man and horse continued to be the predominating source
of power, although some of the capstan ships began to be
equipped with steam engines. A few steam tugs appeared, and
many of these carried passengers. But it was only at the end of
the century that steam power was widely used.

When the railways came, the water carriers were not ruined,
as happened in England and other countries. Although in some
years the tonnage of freight shipped by river declined because
of rail competition, in most years it actually increased, thanks
to an economy which was both developing commercially and
enlarging territorially. In 1861 the rivers carried six million
tons of freight and in 1913 nearly 40 million. Timber and
firewood represented rather more than half the total traffic, and
grain about an eighth. In 1913 oil shipments, mainly up the
Volga from the Caspian Sea, amounted in ton/kilometres to a
tenth of river traffic.1 It often happened that the activities of
rail and river were co-ordinated, so that one would serve as a
feeder to the other.2 This was particularly true in Siberia at the
end of the century. The Russian Government at that time
established several new shipping lines on Siberian rivers, as
well as building a canal to join the rivers Ob’ and Yenesci.

Packhorses were also used for freight traffic, especially for
high value commodities; manufactured rather than primary
products. Their unreliability and high cost wrere a disadvantage.

1	Nikol’skii, 1. Geografiya transporta SSR. Moscow, I960, pp. 192-3. Lebed,
A., and Yakovlev, B. Soviet Waterways. Munich, 1956, p. 22.

3	According to a member of the Duma in 1908, about 10 per cent of Russian
freight was carried by a rail-river combination. See Gosuiiarstvennaya Duma.
Slenograjuheshye otchety. April 1908 (2075-76).
Horse-drawn carts were used over shorter distances. In the
mid-nineteenth century most of Moscow’s food and fuel
requirements were carried in carts.

The fastest form of passenger transport in Russia was by
overland tract with horse motive power. Travellers in the
nineteenth century would change horses every two hours or so
at the government-organized post stations. These were super-
vised by a stationmaster, who was bound to give preference to
travellers on government service. The ordinary traveller might
therefore have to wait hours or days for horses to become
available, but his trials could be lightened by skilful bribery.
Although in some parts of northern Russia there were plank
or corduroy roads (Peter the Great began his St Petersburg-
Moscow road as a corduroy highway), most tracts consisted
simply of a beaten track. In the steppes there was not even this,
only a succession of tall posts to mark the way.

The dilligence was the largest passenger vehicle. It was
usually drawn by four horses harnessed abreast and carried
four passengers inside and three outside, plus a conductor and
driver. The government dilligence was faster and more com-
fortable than the public dilligence—but also more expensive.
Family dilligences might carry as many as twelve inside
passengers. Unlike the more austere telegas and kibitkas, the
dilligence had springs. Not very good ones, however:

'. . . one traveller . . . describes the vehicle as having
imaginary springs, strong cushions, green baize lining, and
inhabited by a thriving colony of bugs, and himself as having
arrived at Novgorod with his teeth loose, and his limbs half
dislocated’.1

In the mid-nineteenth century Nizhnii Novgorod could be
reached from Moscow in two days and two nights by a 450-km.
chaussee, one of the few Russian roads with an elementary
macadamized surface. During the rainy and thaw seasons road
travel came to a halt, but in winter high speeds could be
maintained on the ice, wheels being replaced by sledge runners
during this period. In the cities droshkies could be hired. These
consisted of a wooden bench running on four wheels or a sledge.
The client sat astride the bench immediately behind the driver.
Foreigners disliked these, for apart from the difficulty of

1 Sears, R. Illustrated Description of the Russian Empire. N.Y., 1855, p. 593.
remaining seated on these springless vehicles, on congested
streets the passenger often found himself cheek-to-cheek with
the horse of a following' droshky.

Other non-rail forms of transport included ocean shipping.
This was not highly developed, although in the last decade of
the nineteenth century foreign ships were using the northern
sea route to serve Siberia. This, like the Voluntary Fleet’s
service to Vladivostok, and the Odessa-Caucasus service, was
of importance in developing new areas but had little general
economic significance. Most of Russia’s foreign trade was
carried in foreign vessels.

THF. FIRST RAILWAYS

As in Britain, the first railways in Russia were a means of con-
veying materials inside mining enterprises. Russia’s first rail-
way was probably a primitive system with wooden rails at the
Pyskorsk copper mines on the upper Kama, where in the
seventeenth century waggonettes were used to transport the
ore from mine to smelter.1 In 1788, at the state cannon factory
at Alexandrovsk, iron rails were laid for the first time in Russia.

In the seventeen-sixties the elder Frolov introduced, at the
Zmeinogorsk mines in the Altai, a system of internal railways
with waggonettes drawn by cables powered by a waterwheel.
His son, Pyotr Frolov, completed in 1809 a two-kilometre line
conveying silver ore from the mines to the Zmeinogorsk works.
This line was notable for being the first in Russia to use horse
traction (one horse could haul three wagons, each carrying
eight tons of ore), for the many cuttings and tunnels built to
ease gradients, and for the replacement of angle rails, as used
elsewhere, by cast-iron convex rails matching corresponding
grooves in the wheels of the wagons. But despite the technical
significance of this railway, and despite the fact that it belonged
to a state enterprise, its existence was hardly known outside
the Altai region. In fact, when in 1816 the Tsar was shown a
German model of an iron road (on which a little dog with a
silken cord pulled a heavy load for a hundred yards), he
regarded it as an absolute novelty; he did not know that he
possessed a real railway of his own. But in fact at the end of
the Napoleonic wars railway development was no more back-
ward in Russia than elsewhere, apart from Wales and England.

* Gumilevskii, L. Z/ielexnaja doroga. Moscow, 1950, p. 41.
In South Wales steam traction was tried out in 1804, and
there was a public passenger-carrying railway from 1807; in
north-east England steam locomotives were in regular service
from 1812. The first Russian steam engine appeared in 1834,
thirty years after Trevithick’s locomotive at Merthyr Tydfil.

fig. 1

The first locomotive in
Russia: a drawing of a
model of the Cherepanovs'
engine.

It was the work of the Cherepanovs, father and son, who were
mechanics at an iron works at Nizhnii Tagil in the Urals. Their
first effort was not very effective due to poor steam-raising
abilities and wras rebuilt with a new boiler in which this defect
was remedied so successfully that it exploded while being
tested. Another attempt at improvement, this time by increasing
the number of tubes, ended similarly. However, a third try
produced a usable boiler and the locomotive was able to move
faster than a horse, even if it could pull only a smaller load.1
A second locomotive appeared in 1835; this was similar in
design but twice as powerful and could haul a sixty-ton load.

THE TSARSKOYE SELO RAILWAY

By 1835 there were about 200 km. of common-carrier railway
in Britain, a similar mileage in the Austrian Empire and about
1,300 km. in North America. In Russia there were no common-

1	Tlie drawings of this engine are preserved in the Nizhnii Tagil Museum.
carrier lines, but from about 1825 there was ever-increasing
pressure to introduce the iron road. A number Of proposals for
horse railways were made but none adopted, partly due to
opposition by supporters of inland waterways and by tradi-
tionalists. Even a proposal like that by State Councillor
Bestuzhev in 1834, that railways should be built simply as
feeder branches for the rivers, was pigeon-holed.

But in 1834 the Viennese professor Von Gerstner, who had
built the first public railway on the European continent (the
Danube-Moldavia line) was invited to visit the Urals mining
industry. As a by-product of his visit he submitted a memoran-
dum to the Tsar criticizing the poor communications inside
Russia and suggesting that he be allowed to build railways
between Moscow and St Petersburg and Moscow, Nizhnii
Novgorod and Kazan.

The essence of Von Gerstner’s proposal was that he should
be conceded a twenty-year monopoly of railway-building in
Russia. In exchange, the Empire would benefit from his
experience and reputation. Also, he would guarantee that his
railways would always be ready at twenty-four hour notice to
transport 5,000 infantrymen and 5oo cavalrymen, together with
artillery and horses, between provincial capitals at a speed of
two hundred versts (212 km.) per day.

In January 1835 the Directorate of Ways and Communica-
tions and Public Buildings organized a commission to examine
the possibilities of railway construction. The commission
favoured the idea and recommended that horses be used for
freight services with locomotives for passenger trains only.
This recommendation was not so ridiculous as it might seem.
The commission was dealing with two innovations: the iron
wheel running on iron tracks, and the steam locomotive. The
world’s first public railway to be operated solely with steam
traction (the Liverpool and Manchester Railway) had been
opened only in 1830, and the St Etienne to Lyons Railway
which was completed in 1832 had adopted mixed horse and
steam propulsion. The main issue facing the commission was
whether the iron road was suited to Russian conditions. The
question of animal and mechanical traction seemed a secondary
one. As steam engines had never operated in conditions match-
ing the Russian winter, as their weight certainly caused many
track failures, and as it did not then seem impossible to
segregate passenger lines from freight lines, the caution of the
commissioners is understandable.

A second, more distinguished, commission examined Von
Gerstner’s proposals in February 1835. Under the chairman-
ship of the Tsar, it included the ministers of War, Internal
Affairs, and Finance as well as the Director of Ways and
Communications. Its findings were favourable, but doubted
whether Von Gerstner’s company would be able to raise the
capital. Inside the committee Kankrin, the Minister of Finance,
and Tol’, the Director of Ways and Communications, who had
both originally supported the railway, began to oppose railway-
building. Kankrin was an economist who considered that the
welfare of the people would not benefit from the diveroion into
railway-building of capital which could be used to improve
agriculture. He also feared the effect on the carters, and
lamented that the Russian forests would be devoured for loco-
motive fuel. Tol's opposition is less explicable, but he was an
ex-army officer with little knowledge of the subject and was
probably influenced by his subordinate Destrein, who was one
of the loudest proponents of inland waterway transport. On the
other hand, the Tsar seemed very much in favour of Von
Gerstner’s scheme for a railway which would link the two
capitals with the Volga. Probably this enthusiasm was because
he realized that with a fast steamer service the Caspian Sea
would be brought to two weeks’ journey from St Petersburg,
thus giving Russia better access than Britain to the Persian
Gulf area. The Tsar’s attention had also been drawn by the
British Government’s swift transfer by rail of troops from
Manchester to Liverpool during an Irish emergency: there was
a certain parallel between England’s Ireland and Russia’s
Poland.

The outcome was that Von Gerstner was permitted to build
only a short experimental line, in order to prove the feasibility
of railways in Russia and in particular the possibility of operat-
ing locomotives in winter. The railway was to run from the
capital to the Tsar’s summer residence at Tsarskoye Selo (23
km.) and then continue to Pavlovsk (25 km.). A number of
privileges were granted in order to speed the completion of
this line; there was freedom from levies and taxes, and it was
to enjoy the same privileges as a state enterprise. More
remarkably, it had full control over its tariffs (a concession not
allowed to subsequent lines, and probably unique outside
America). Nor did any of the relevant decrees mention any
time limit after which' the Company’s rights would revert to
the State. The obligation to buy only Russian materials (so
long as they were not more than 15 per cent dearer than the
St Petersburg price of imports) was later relaxed due to the
long delivery time of Urals iron products.

The single track, 6 ft. gauge,1 line was started in 1885 and
in 1836 trains began to run provisionally. On October SO, 1837,
the line was officially opened by an 8-car train which reached
Tsarskoye Selo in 28 minutes. The extension to Pavlovsk was
opened the following summer. At first there were four loco-
motives, three from England and one from Belgium, and these
handled the traffic on holidays, with horses used on other days.
Two more engines were later acquired and from 1838 steam
traction was used exclusively. The stations were built in a
supposedly western style. At Pavlovsk, which w'as to become
a popular day-trip resort for the capital’s inhabitants, buffets
and a ballroom wrere built. It was this that prompted Kankrin’s
bitter remark that whereas in other countries railways were
built to industrial centres, in Russia the first railway led to a
tavern.

The line was an immediate success. Von Gerstner had fore-
cast that 800,000 passengers would use the line annually, and
the first year of complete operation (1839) almost achieved
this; 725,626 passenger journeys wrere made, of which 521,882
were for the whole length of the railway. Gross income was
265,077 roubles and expenses 182,494, and 40,000 roubles
were distributed as dividends (equal to 4 per cent on the
capital invested). By 1856 total passenger journeys had risen
to 855,345 per annum and the 4 per cent had risen to 7 per
cent.2 Freight traffic, in which the railway had little interest,
was very slight.

The railway’s expenses included an annual sum for public
entertainment, the greater part of which was allocated to music
at Pavlovsk, as described in Dostoevsky’s ‘Idiot’. In the early
eighteen-sixties the railway used to engage Herr Johann Strauss
to give summer concerts there. Admission to those concerts
was free, but the railway fares from the capital were high.

1 The gauge was changed to 5 ft. only in 1902.

’ Zhurnal glavnaiv ufrravlmiya putti i soobschchemi. Vol. 25 (1857), pp. 325-6.
By 1857 only one of the original engines, the 1836’ ‘Rossiya’,
was still on the books, but the line possessed seven locomotives
of which the newest, the 80 h.p. ‘Maximilian’, was Russian-
built. There were thirty-nine passenger cars (carrying first-
second, and fourth-class passengers; third class had been
abolished in 1848). The electric telegraph had been installed
in 1856, and the railway's workshops were capable of building
freight cars and reconstructing locomotives.1

THE WARSAW-VIENNA RAILWAY

The Warsaw-Vienna Railway was the second line to receive
the Tsar’s approval, on the recommendation of the local
guveinniciit. It ran from Warsaw to the Austro Hungarian
frontier, and as it was intended to link with another line from
the frontier to Vienna, it was constructed to the 4 ft. 8j in.
gauge. As this railway was approved in 1839 (a year before the
Paris-Orleans Railway) it was the first in Europe to have
shares offering a dividend guaranteed by the government
(although, earlier, the Amsterdam-Arnhem Railway shares
had been personally guaranteed by the Dutch king). The
interest guaranteed was 4 per cent, matching the government’s
bank rate.

The company had intended to use horse traction, but the
Government insisted on steain. Work started in 1839 but
ceased in 1842 when die company, unable to raise sufficient
capital, refused to continue. The Tsar ordered the Treasury to
take over the line, and it was opened in 1848. One of its first
tasks was the carriage of Russian troops to help crush the 1848
Hungarian Rising. In 1857, due to unsatisfactory management
by the Treasury, and to the Tsar’s preference for private
enterprise, it was transferred to a Warsaw company, which
received the operating rights for seventy-five years in return
for annual rent.

PROPOSALS FOR A ST PETERSBURG-MOSCOW

RAILWAY

The Tsarskoye Selo Railway, often referred to contemptuously
as ‘Gerstner’s toy’ did nothing to satisfy the demands of
merchants for a more efficient transport system. From about
1825 Russia’s move towards capitalism had accelerated; industry

1 ZJiurnal glavnow upravlrniya putei i soobuhdunii. Vol. 25 (1857), p. 329.
was growing and the market, notably the grain market, was
expanding. The number of boats passing along the inland
waterways more than doubled between 1825 and 1844, and so
did the toll receipts from highway traffic between 1839 and
1844. But even though these traditional modes of freight
transport had increased their capacity, the service they provided
was not suited to a fast-moving economy.

River costs were high; in the eighteen-thirties a pood of rye
which cost 98 kopeks in Saratov would be sold in the Baltic
provinces for 4-23 roubles, the increase being almost entirely
attributable to transport costs.1 The developing metal industry
of the Urals suffered particularly: the price of iron products
increased by several times between the factory and the pur
chaser in Moscow and St Petersburg. Because die smaller or
less wealthy enterprises could not afford to pay such an inflated
price the market for iron goods was limited. Moreover,
external markets were lost, especially after English iron began
to fall in price. Road transport was even more expensive.

Nor was the direct cost of carriage the only penalty paid by
the shipper, the speed of transit was so low that the turnover
of capital could rarely be faster than once a year. From the
Lower Volga grain took seven months to reach St Petersburg
(two navigation seasons) and the introduction of steam pro-
pulsion could do little to reduce this. From the national point
of view, a consequence of this slow rate of movement was that
a bad harvest in one province could rarely be compensated by
grain shipments from a more fortunate region; hence the
frequency in Russia of localized but deadly famines. Even though
theoretically land transport (by pack animal or horse-drawn
cart) could function in the winter, in fact it was no better than
waterway transport because of the poor roads. It was a rule
rather than an exception for carters to abandon their cargoes
when the latter became stuck. The unfortunate shipper then
would have to wait for good weather and set out to find his
goods, which, with luck, he would find stacked neatly at the
wayside.

The best route for a first, commercially useful, railway was
obviously from St Petersburg to Moscow', which would not
only serve the two largest cities but would also, at Tver, make
a connection with the Volga system. A St Petersburg-Moscow

* Krasnyi arkhtv. Vol. 76 (1936), p. 87.
railway had been among Von Gerstner’s suggestions, but had
been postponed until the Tsarskoye Selo line could prove the
feasibility of railways in Russia. In 1838 state councillor Abaza
made a new proposal for this inter-city line, in which he
emphasized the all-the-year-round availability of railway trans-
port. However, the committee which examined his proposal
was generally unfavourable; its members included ТоГ and
Kankrin, who were opposed to railways. The former claimed
that the proposal exaggerated the possible traffic and minimized
expenses, while Kankrin (presumably forced to shift his ground
after the success of the Tsarskoye Selo Railway) claimed that
long-distance railways w’ere a doubtful proposition. He also
emphasized the problem of raising capital and pointed out dial
it would be difficult to give the proposed company the right to
possess serfs.

Another railway enthusiast was the privy councillor Mura-
viev, who wrote no less than five memoranda on the subject to
the Tsar, all of which were pigeon-holed after scrutiny by ТоГ.
The latter said that Muraviev’s proposals ignored the advan-
tages of waterways, and he claimed that a faster turnover of
capital was meaningless to Russia, which was an agricultural
country and therefore moved according to Nature’s own cycle.

But despite the hostility of his Director of Ways and Com-
munications and of his Minister of Finance, Nicholas I in
March 1841 ordered the establishment of a commission to study
the possibility of a St Petersburg-Moscow railway.1

Tho r«?pr>rt nf rhe Tear’s commission appeared in September
1841.8 Although the experience of the Tsarskoye Selo line and
of a few foreign railways was the only basis for its work, its
findings were very complete and sound. They became the plan
by which the railway was finally built and in certain respects
set the pattern for other future railways. The commission
decided that steam rather than horse traction should be used,
being both cheaper and faster. Because of the heavy traffic

* This was Tol's second imperial snub, for in 1839 when tie liad urged the
rejection of one of Muraviev’s schemes the Tsar wrote on the official journal of
the Committee of Ministers that it might be a good idea if ТоГ examined the
Petersburg-Rybinsk railway proposal, for this was one whose advantages were
indisputable. (ТоГ, undaunted, reported that this proposed railway would be
mainly for passengers, who were already well served by steamboats.)

’ ‘Report to Nicholas I of the Commission on the construction of a railway
between St Petersburg and Moscow.’ September 15, 1841. Reprinted in Krasnyi
arkhiv. Vol. 76, pp. 127-44.
expected, and for safety reasons, the line would be double-track
throughout, and at 8 km. intervals there would be 200 metre
loops. The route was to be direct, leaving out Novgorod and
Torchok. It would cross the Valdai Hills at a more favourable
place than did the highway. The ruling grade over these hills
could thus be reduced to 1 in 100, and 1 in 400 would be the
rule elsewhere. Bridges were to be wooden with stone piers.
Culverts were to be of stone. 862 locomotives were to be used;
this included a reserve of about 100 units and the extra engines
needed for the Valdai sections. These engines would be
depreciated at 10 per cent per annum. To handle peak traffic
the stock of passenger cars would be double the normal require-
ment, and of freight cars four times. It was expected that there
would be 270,000 passengers per annum, together with 25
million roubles-worth of freight (of which four-fifths would be
northbound). 8,904 trains a year would be run. The maximum
train load would be limited to 92 tons although the engines
would be capable of handling 160 tons. Passenger trains would
move at 37 km. per hour (23 m.p.h.) and goods trains at 16
km. per hour (10 m.p.h.). Locomotive fuel would be mainly
wood, supplemented by English coal which, because of the
imbalance of freight traffic, could be carried southwards from
St Petersburg in wagons which would otherwise be empty. A
two-man crew for each locomotive was assumed, and the wages
of these 724 men were calculated on the basis of one and a half
times the rates then being paid to the foreign enginemen of the
Tsarskoye Selo line, with a note that these wages could he
reduced after Russians had been trained to drive engines. In
addition to the enginemen, each train would carry four con-
ductors, which in number would total 696 men. There would be
three classes of passenger and two of freight (fast and slow).
It was expected that freight would be the main source of
income.

This report met the habitual opposition of ТоГ and Kankrin.
Tol’s Directorate claimed that the income and expenditure
calculated by the commission were too optimistic. As for
Kankrin, he expressed himself thus:1

*. . . All thinking people abroad consider that it will realize
no profit, will ruin morality and liquidate unproductively

1 Krasnyi arkhiv. Vol. 76, p. 150.
capital which could be put to better use. On being asked why
then do foreign governments build such railways, they reply
that necessity forces them to make a concession to this modem
sickness, and to imitate their neighbours so that the latter will
not gain an advantage from the industrial point of view. . .

Nevertheless, the Government went ahead with the project. In
1841 an agreement was reached w'ith a consortium of Leipzig
bankers which, although it was never consummated, had great
significance for future relations between the Russian Govern-
ment and railway-building capitalists. The consortium agreed
to raise the capital for building a St Petersburg-Moscow rail-
way on condition that the Government would guarantee a 1 per
cent dividend on this sum in those years when the railway’s net
income was not large enough to provide such a dividend. The
agreement was notable because it set a definite term to the
existence of the private company; after thirty-seven years the
railway would be transferred gratuitously to the State and its
share capital would be amortized by putting aside 2 per cent
of its net revenue in each of those thirty-seven years. The State
also had the right to purchase the railway earlier, if it so
wished. The agreement indicates that the Government by this
time had realized that railways were of such national importance
that state participation and control could not be avoided.
Russian officials had visited France between 1838 and 1840,
and tliis agreement appears to be based on that of 1838 between
the French Government and the Paris-Orleans Railway.

In 1842, after hearing the report of two engineers, Melnikov
and Kraft, whom he had sent to study railways in the us a, the
Tsar formally announced his intention to build a St Petersburg-
Moscow railway. He set up a Special Committee for the
Construction of the St Petersburg-Moscow Railway, with his
heir (the future Alexander II) as chairman. This appointment
emphasized the Tsar’s interest in the matter and was a pre-
cedent followed on later occasions. Other members of the
Committee were Tol’ and Kankrin, but as the former died in
April 1842, being succeeded by Kleinmikhel, and the latter
retired in the same year, ministerial opposition to railways
almost disappeared.

The Committee, like the Commission which it succeeded,
recommended the shortest possible route, but some members,
and also the technical commission of the Railway Department
(which had been established in August 1842 to examine the
constructional and enginering problems) thought that the
traditional trading centre of Novgorod should also be served,
even though this would entail a longer route. They claimed
that the railway was intended to benefit the whole country, not
just the terminal cities. Asked to make the final decision the
Tsar declared himself for the shortest route, saying that by not
serving Novgorod the railway would not deprive the city of the
advantages it was currently enjoying. In actual fact the building
of the railway ended Novgorod’s prosperity.1

THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY GAUGE

One of tlie most important decisions of the Committee con-
cerned the railway gauge to be used, for it was this decision
which caused the present three-and-a-half-inch difference be-
tween the Russian railways and those of most of the rest of
Europe. European railways (and American and many other)
use tiie 'standard gauge’ of 4 ft. 8j in. between the rails.
Russia (and hence Finland) use a 5 ft. gauge.

It is customary to explain this as evidence of traditional
Russian suspicion of the outside world, as a strategic measure
to hinder an invasion of Russia. Thus The Times correspondent
wrote in 1866:

. The Russian Government, I am told, with я view to
prevent an enemy advancing into the country by rail, have
adopted a slightly narrower track than the one used on the rest
of the Continent. . .

Apart from his mistake in ascribing to Russian railways a
narrow rather than a broad gauge, this correspondent was
propagating the view common among foreigners that the
Russians did not adopt the 'standard gauge’ for strategic
reasons. In fact, as the reports of the Committee’s meetings
show, the choice was not between 4 ft. 81 in. and 5 ft., but

1 The story that the Tsar decided the route of the railway by taking a ruler
and pen does of course explain why the line is so straight (the kinks at Malaya
Vishera, V. Volochek and Tver being the places where his fingers projected over
the edge of the ruler) but seems to be more of a legend than a fact.

• The Timet. November 13, 1866.
between the latter and the 6 ft. gauge. Also, it was an American
who made the final recommendation. Moreover, at the time
the decision was made it was not at all certain that 4 ft. 8| in.
would in fact become the standard gauge. (In the British Isles,
for example, there existed a 6 ft. gauge, and the line destined
to become Britain’s greatest railway had chosen seven foot.)

At the time the decision was made Russia had experience of
building two railways: the 6 ft. gauge Tsarskoye Selo line and
the 4 ft. 8| in. gauge Warsaw-Vienna Railway. Most members
of the Committee expected that the 6 ft. gauge would be adopted
for the St Petersburg-Moscow line; it would permit more
capacious cars and ensure stability at high speeds. However,
Whistler, the American railway engineer who had been invited
to Russia as a technical adviser to the Committee, declared that
a 5 ft. gauge would meet the requirements equally well, and
his advice was accepted.1

Thus Russia had three railway gauges, and this number
increased when narrow gauge local lines became popular. But
the 5 ft. gauge was adopted as the standard for main lines
(except in Poland). The strategic significance of this has been
negative, it is much easier for an invader to re-lay one rail on
Russia’s broad gauge track than it is for the Russians to widen
the gauge in occupied territory. This was particularly evident
in the Civil War, when the Soviet attack on Warsaw was
hampered by the difference in gauges, but wrhen the Poles
advanced on Kiev they quickly had through trains running from
Poland into occupied territory.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE ST PETERSBURG-
MOSCOW’ RAILWAY

The construction of the new railway began in 1843. It was to
be a state enterprise with a capital of 34 million roubles.
Neither the German bankers nor Von Gerstner obtained the
concessions they had asked for. (Von Gerstner had left Russia
earlier for America, where he died shortly afterw’ards.) The
Tsar wished the railway to be a specifically Russian enterprise;
not only was the capital to be Russian but also the engineering
skill. Although an American was appointed as adviser, and
, * This Whistler, incidentally, was the father of the celebrated artist. His wife,
Whistler’s Mother’, accompanied him to St Petersburg.
Americans staffed the locomotive works, the railway itself was
entrusted to Russians, Melnikov was entrusted with the build-
ing of the northern section (St Petersburg-Bologoye) and Kraft
with the southern section. Under them were the district engi-
neers (ten versts (10| km.) of line comprised a ‘district’).
Engineers were scarce in Russia and to supply the demand
almost the entire graduating class of the Imperial School of
Engineering was drafted to the railway in 1843. Bridges were
the work of Zhuravskii whose erections, made of timber with
stone piers, lasted three or four decades before requiring
renewal.1

It was also the Tsar’s wish that the materials used should be,
as far as possible, of Russian origin. He ordered that the Urals
ironmasters should be invited to supply the rails. But domestic
industry declared that it could not manage the whole order, so
five million poods (815,000 tons) were ordered from the Urals
and 1,860,000 poods were ordered from England (the English
rails cost 85 kopeks per pood, the Russian 1-43 roubles). In
actual fact the Russian industry, despite the generous price
offered, could only supply 50,000 poods and the remaining rails
were made in England. Chairs and fishplates, however, were
produced in Russia from American-made machines.

To ensure the domestic production of locomotives, and to
establish a Russian locomotive industry, the Alexandrovsk
State Factory (near St Petersburg) wras renovated and at
Whistler's suggestion two well-known American locomotive-
builders. Winan of Baltimore and Eastwick and Harrison of
Philadelphia, were invited to furnish it with appropriate
machinery, staff it with American craftsmen, and produce the
162 twenty-five ton engines, 2,500 American style (eight-wheel)
freight cars, and 70 passenger cars which the railway would
require.2 In return for this profitable concession the Americans
were to train Russian craftsmen and engine drivers.

Earthwork was entrusted to a vast army of serfs who in
certain years exceeded 50,000 in number. These labourers
were assembled by contractors by agreement with the serf-
owners. The individual serf usually made a contract, but his pay

1 Zhuravskii was one of Russia's greatest engineers. Little of his bridge work
remains, but a more lasting example of his work is the spire of the Peter and
Paul fortress in Leningrad.

* It will be noted that the extravagant rolling-stock requirements of the 1841
plan had been scaled down.
1. One of tile original engines imported for the Tsarskoye Selo Railway in 1836.
Photo. Im Vie clu Hail.

A Russian railway station in the mid-Nineteenth Century.
Photo. Hadio Timex Hulton Picture Library.
2. Tank shunting locomotive used by the St Petersburg Warsaw and Moscow-Nizhnii
Novgorod railways. This type was built from 1B«1 at workshops in Paris. Uegc and
St Petersburg. Plioto. Zxt I’ie du Hail.

11м? Moscow terminus of the Sr Petersburg-Moscow Railway» substantially unchanged
after more man a Hundred years use. Ttx.* 3i retersbuig leniiinus was uf siuilku design.

Photo. Official.
was negligible and mostly absorbed by compulsory payments,
and his hours of work were long. The contracts stipulated a
working day from sunrise to sunset and the labourers were
usually required to work on Sundays and holidays; only heavy
rain could be relied on to give them a rest. Much of the line
traversed marshes, and serfs might spend a whole working day
waist deep in mud and water. They were badly fed and badly
housed and they were liable to be flogged if they complained.
Apart from the usual ills like scurvy and diarrhoea there were
epidemics of typhoid. Several thousand are believed to have
died during the construction. But little leisure and a generous
supply of liquor prevented any serious mutiny. Those who tried
to escape were usually captured by the railway gendarmerie
which had been specially established to prevent worker dis-
turbances (or, as it was officially put, to protect the interests
of the workers). Government officials, as their correspondence
reveals, were concerned about the welfare of the workers, but
Kleinmikhel’s anxiety to please the Tsar by a prompt comple-
tion of the work foiled efforts to improve the workers’ lot.1
The public knew little of the circumstances at the time, but
some years later the poet Nekrasov published an indignant
thirty-seven-verse poem on the subject:2

The way is straight, the embankment narrow,
Telegraph poles, rails, bridges.

And everywhere on both sides are Russian bones—
Vanechka, do you know how many?

Brothers! You remember our reward!

Fated to be strewn in the earth—
Do you still remember kindly us poor ones,
Or have you long forgotten?

The completion of the railway was delayed several years by
government difficulties occasioned by military expenditure and
it was not until the autumn of 1851 that the line was opened
throughout, although it had been opened to Kolpino as early
as 1847. It had cost considerably more than had been estimated:

1 This official correspondence is printed in Krasnyi arkhrv. Vol. 83 (1937), p. 48.
*'Zbeleznaya doroga’ (1864), Nekrasov, N. Sochintniya. Tom 2. Moscow,
1969, pp. 7-9.

В
76 million roubles, or 125,000 roubles per verst. But it was a
fine piece of engineering; two tracks of 29-6 kg. per metre
(60 lb. per yd.) rail, laid in an almost straight line (as the
crow flies, Moscow was 598 versts from St Petersburg, the
railway was only 6 versts longer than this). It had substantial
bridges and earthworks, and the ruling grade had been kept
low, even the section over the Valdai Hills was no steeper than
1 in 125.1 Every 75 versts (80 krn.) there was a substantially-
built station with buffet and locomotive shops, where engines
could be changed while the passengers took refreshment.
Russian engine-men and craftsmen had been trained, and the
Alexandrovsk works could handle major repairs as well as new
construction.

The first passenger train to Moscow left St Petersburg at
11.15 a.m. on the first of November 1851, and arrived the next
day at 9 a.m. Shortly after the opening the Tsar travelled to
Moscow by special train. Although he arrived several hours
late (due partly to his meticulous inspection of the line and
partly to the enthusiasm of a local official who greased the rails
to celebrate the occasion) he declared himself satisfied. After
his death in 1855 his son renamed the railway the Nikolaev
Railway. It was always the most distinguished of Russian
railways and, under its present title of October Railway, is still
very much a pace-setter for other lines.

THE NIKOLAEV RAILWAY IN OPERATION

The volume of traffic carried by the railway exceeded the
expectations of even its champions. In 1852, the first full year
of operation, 632,522 passengers were carried (excluding
60,656 military), 168,000 tons of freight and 8,479 head of
livestock.® By 1856 these figures had risen to 962,198 pas-
sengers plus 247,055 military, 380,000 tons, and 33,298 head
of livestock. Total income for the year including mail and court
traffic not included in the above figures, was 7,503,258 roubles.®

The peak month for passengers was May (104,462) with a
trough in February (48,437). With freight traffic the peak
month was June (45,000 tons) and trough April (12,200 tons).

1 In 1881 an avoiding line reduced this grade to 1 in 165.

* Zhumal glavnovo upravleniya putei i soobuhheniya. 1857, Vo). 25, p. 318.

» Ibid., 1856, p. 474.
There was a definite imbalance of traffic but not as great as
expected. In 1856, 282,339 passengers originated at St Peters-
burg, but only 197,572 at Moscow. Of the intermediate stations,
Tver (76,221 passengers), and Vyshnii Volochek (49,030)
were the most important for passengers. The difference
between northbound and southbound loadings was even more
marked with freight traffic. In November 1854, for example,
while non-agricultural traffic of 155,744 poods arriving at St
Petersburg was balanced by 164,962 poods arriving at Moscow,
the 577,334 poods of food and agricultural produce (plus 1,725
cattle) shipped to St Petersburg was matched by only 36,945
poods arriving at Moscow.1 Most of the agricultural traffic was
grain and flour, Transferred to the railway fioni die rivers at
Tver and Vyshnii Volochek, for shipment to St Petersburg and
the Baltic.

Another reason why buoyant traffic figures did not neces-
sarily lead to profitable operation was the rather low level of
tariffs, which were adopted to encourage the growth of traffic
and to be of benefit to the country generally. The price of
shipping a pood of freight from Moscow to St Petersburg by
horse-cart before the railway was built was from 1-2 to 2-4
roubles; the rail rate was from 15 to 40 kopeks only. Even more
striking was the cheap passenger fare for travellers who w'ere
prepared to brave the discomfort of travelling third class in a
slow ordinary’ train; only 4 roubles (about 12s. 6d. sterling)
from Moscow to St Petersburg, probably the cheapest per
kilometre rate in the world at that time. This tariff must have
been below cost, and when it is considered that of the 883,330
civil passengers carried in 1854 no less titan 618,752 travelled
in third-class ordinary the unprofitability of the railway becomes
credible.®

Later, when traffic had increased, costs reduced, and other
railways had made connections with the line at Moscow', the
Nikolaev Railway became profitable. In the early years, apart
from the high capital cost and the implicit requirement of
paying for it, a major expense was for maintenance. This item
was high, partly because of the inefficiency of allocating work

1 Zhurnal glavnovo upravleniya putei i soobschheniya. 1855, vol. 1, pp. 62-77.

’ Ibid., 1856, p. 454. The remaining passengers were distributed as follows: in
family compartments 2,148; first class 14,716; second 73,229; third 153,491;
second-class ordinary train 20,994.
to private contractors instead of keeping a regular force of
maintenance workers attached to the railways. The American
engineer Winans took advantage of his contract to enrich
himself as much as possible at Russia's expense. It was not
until he was dearly bought out that the maintenance cost of
rolling stock fell from 30 per cent of gross income to a more
normal 15 per cent.1

By 1866 there were three passenger trains daily each way
between the two terminals. One train carried first class as well
as second and third, and called at only nine of the intermediate
stations. Southbound, it left the capital at 2.30 p.m. and
arrived in Moscow at 10 a.m., an overall average speed of 33
km. per hour (21 m.p.h.). 'Ilie other two trains were second
and third class only, and made stops at each station.2 In contrast
to the third class, the first class and de luxe compartments
were exceptionally comfortable. The Times reported in 1865:

'... that for the trifling addition of two roubles ... travellers
are received in brilliantly lighted saloons . . . luxurious sofas
and armchairs invite the weary to repose. ... When the hour of
retiring arrives the valet de chambre conducts the gentlemen
passengers . . . smart femmes de chambre point out to the lady
travellers their bedrooms and boudoirs. . .

The first-class fare on the fast trains was 19 roubles, second
class 13 roubles, third class 10 roubles.

The impressions of another foreign traveller, who made the
journey in 1852, are worth quoting at length, for the scenes
described, novel at the time, were subsequently to become
typical of Russian railway travel:

*. . . Only one train starts daily; and the hour at which this
most important event takes place is, or ought to be, eleven
a.m. Travellers are commanded by the government to be at the
station at ten precisely; and even then they are liable to be told
that the train is full—as it is quite an unheard of thing to put
on an extra carriage for any number of passengers. Having
arrived . . . we rushed ... to show our passport for Moscow,
to procure which we had been to three different offices the day
before. Here the description of our persons and our reasons for

1 Del’vig, A. Moi vosfiominaniya. Moscow, 1912, Vol. Ill, p. 62.

* Rradshaw's Continental Railway Guide. December 1866.

’ The Times. October 10, 1865.
travelling . . . being copied at full length, we were hurried to
another counter, where we got it stamped; whence ... we
sped on to the ticket office, and then, returning to our port-
manteaux, went through a few formalities, wrhich ended in
receiving a ticket to add to the number of those with which our
pockets were now pretty well filled. . . . We now betook our-
selves to the waiting room, which we should have thought
handsome had we not been detained in it so long that we got
tired of admiring it.

'For an hour did the destined occupants of the train sit
patiently on the benches ... At a quarter before eleven, how-
ever, . . . we are hurried through a barrier, the doors of which
close behind us. Soon die whole Lauiei becomea thronged with
people, waving their adieux as ardently as if we were booked
for Australia. A bell, a whistle, and a sort of dull attempt at a
scream, are, as in more civilized parts of the world, the signals
for starting; we leave . . . and in the course of minutes, find, to
our satisfaction, that we have increased our speed to fifteen
miles an hour. We have hardly done so ere we arrive at a
station. . . . We are to stop here ten minutes, and the people
during that time walk up and down the platform and smoke;
then we huddle into our old places. . . . The carriages are large.
Nobody seems to go in the first class. A second-class carriage
accommodates about fifty people. They are built as in Austria
and America, with a passage in the centre, perambulated by a
man in uniform, who occasionally asks people for their tickets.
He seems to make the enquiry the first time to satisfy himself
that you have got one, and afterwards merely as an amuse-
ment. . . . The men are bearded and dirty, and relate stories in
a loud tone of voice, for the benefit of the whole company, most
of whom have evidently never been in a railway before. At
every station the same scene ensues. The unsmoked ends of the
last station’s cigars, having been carefully preserved, are
lighted afresh, and vehemently smoked on the platform during
five or ten minutes, as the case may be.

'The stations are all very spacious and uniformly constructed,
with an immense domed building for engines, attached to each.
Though there is only one passenger train daily, there are three
goods trains. . . .'x

1 Oliphant, L. The Russian Shores of the Black Sea in the Autumn of 1852. N.Y.,
1&54, pp. 5-8.
OTHER RAILWAY PROPOSALS

The Committee for the St Petersburg-Moscow Railway
gradually came to participate in the examination of proposals
for other lines, and on completion of its original task was
renamed Committee for the Examination of Proposed Railway
Construction. In the period from 1844 to 1855 many projects
were put forward and some were approved, but none actually
reached the construction stage. Nevertheless, the work of the
Committee at this time was significant, for it laid the founda-
tions for future, and more fruitful, railway policy.

The Main Directorate of Ways and Communications also
had much to learn. Hitherto concerned with roads, waterways
and public buildings, it had to adapt itself rapidly to the railway
age. One of its first achievements under Kleinmikhel’ was the
accumulation of up-to-date statistical information from all parts
of Russia. Previously the Government had no statistical
information about the economic situation and needs of the
various provinces and towns. (The first serious economic study
of Russia was probably Tengoborskii’s, Essai sur les forces
productive! de la Russie, which was published only in 1848, and
in Paris.) Thus when the Committee examined proposals for
new railways it had to rely on economic information supplied
by the promoters themselves, who sometimes did (but often
did not) carry out their own rather elementary surveys. What
Kleinmikhel' did was to obtain information from gubemiya
(provincial) officials and from this he drew up his own plan of
requirements for water, road and railway transport. So during
the eighteen-fifties the Directorate was able to advise the
rejection of certain proposals on the basis of its own information.
Kleinmikhel’ believed that railways should be built only
between industrial and trading centres; Moscow was the
obvious centre and the first priority should be a line from
Moscow to Kharkov.

All except one of the proposals made before the Crimean
War involved some form of government guarantee. There was
a lack of confidence in the profitability, even feasibility of
railways in Russia and this misgiving was particularly strong
on the international money market. The high cost of the St
Petersburg-Moscow Railway had taught the Russian Govern-
ment that private capital w-ould be needed to provide Russia
with a railway network, and the lesson was emphasized by the
Treasury’s difficulties occasioned by campaigns in the Caucasus
and Hungary, and the Krakow rebellion.

The usual procedure was for promoters to submit their plans
to the Committee, together with a copy of the proposed
charter, train timetables and tariffs. At this stage a fee was
charged, one-twentieth of the proposed basic capital. If the line
was approved (by the Committee, then by the Council of
Ministers, finally by the Tsar) the Government would guaran-
tee 4 per cent interest on the capital actually spent on construc-
tion (that is, the expenses of raising the capital would be
deducted), payable from the opening of the line. Lines con-
sidered to be of national significance would be granted the
right of free possession of necessary state land, just as were
state enterprises. In order to secure orders for Russian industry,
invitations to tender for metal products had to be advertised
in Moscow and St Petersburg eighteen months before they
were needed. Only if no offers were received within six months
could orders be placed abroad. In theory this meant that cars,
rails, fishplates and chairs would be produced in Russia, while
locomotives could be imported duty-free. The private com-
panies would have the right to exploit the railways for periods
varying from forty-four to sixty-six years, after which they
would automatically become state property, and in any case
the State had the right to purchase after twenty years of
operation.

These arrangements, which were closely modelled on those
of die French railways, were gradually relaxed when it was
found that many proposals, approved by the Government,
failed because sufficient capital w'as not forthcoming. An extra
i per cent was added to the state-guaranteed interest, which
w'as sometimes paid on the entire capital. Restrictions on the
import of materials were relaxed, and the term after which the
State took over the private railways was extended. Neverthe-
less, none of the lines approved made any progress before the
outbreak of the Crimean War interrupted railway-building.

In 1856 the Committee w'as renamed once again. Its new
title was Main Railway Committee. In that year it rejected
several foreign proposals, usually because the terms demanded
Wfere too high. But in August 1856 the Charter of the Peterhof
Railway (a St Petersburg suburban line which had been
approved by the Committee before the war) was approved by
the Tsar. The promoter, Schtiglitz, had asked for privileges
similar to those enjoyed by the Tsarskoye Selo Railway, but
this request was ignored and a paragraph was inserted giving
the State the right to purchase after fifteen years at the current
value of die shares.

THE MAIN COMPANY

The difference which a railway would have made to the defence
of Sevastopol was an additional spur to the Russian Govern-
ment in its search for promoters of a Russian railway network.
Immediately after die end of die war two European groups,
headed by Fere ire, of the Credit Mobilier, and Oppenheim,
were bargaining for the concession. Pereire’s consortium was
chosen and in October 1856 the Council of Ministers approved
the draft agreement submitted by the Main Directorate of Ways
and Communications. The new company, which was to be
called the Main Company of Russian Railways, was to build
within ten years a main line from Moscow through Tula, Orel,
Kursk and Kharkov to Feodosia in the Crimea; a line (mainly
for grain exports) from either Orel or Kursk to the Baltic port
of Libau, via Vitebsk and Dunaburg ; a line from Moscow to
Nizhnii Novgorod; and to complete the St Petersburg-Warsaw
line, together with a branch from Vilnius to the Russian
frontier, which had been begun by the Government but which
would be transferred to the new company.1 The cost of con-
sliucliuu was lu be 09,000 ivubles verst (cuiupaicd tu die
100-125,000 roubles of the Nikolaev Railway) and the State
guaranteed interest at die rate of 5 per cent payable from die
time of opening of each line. An eighty-five year period was
fixed for private exploitation, after which the railways would
lapse to the State. The latter also had the right to purchase, at a
price depending on the previous seven years’ income, any time
after the twenty years following the ten-year construction period.
For twenty years the Main Company would be given preference
for concessions to build railways paralleling or joining its own
lines.

The Government also specified the maximum tariffs; there

1 The St Petersburg-Warsaw line had been personally approved by the Tsar
in 1851 and was not scrutinized by the Committee of Ministers or by the Com-
mittee. It was primarily a strategic railway.
were to be three classes of freight which would pay 1/12, 1/18,
1/24 kopeks per pood/verst (compared to between 1/40 and
1/15 kopeks on the St Petersburg-Moscow Railway), and there
were to be three passenger classes, paying respectively 8, 2|
and 1| kopeks per verst. Military traffic was to travel at
quarter rate, and mail was to be carried free. These were
maximum tariffs and lower rates could be adopted by the
Company if it wished. An interesting feature of the tariffs was
the reduction of the rate according to distance, with a 10 per
cent reduction after 200 versts, 15 per cent after 500, and 20
per cent after 2,000. This followed French and Austrian
practice but w’as not imitated by other Russian railways for
eevorsl decades, prnhahly hecaiise their lines were shorter than
those of the Main Company.1

The formation of the Main Company proved to be very
damaging to the future not only of the Russian railways but of
the Government itself. At first the shares of the Company were
retained by the promoters, who delayed paying for them. Then,
after a cut in bank rate had made the guaranteed 5 per cent
yield much more attractive, they sold the shares at a profit.
Since most of the buyers w’ere Russian the expected and much-
needed inflow of‘hard’ currency from abroad did not materialize.
The Company introduced French technicians of doubtful com-
petence to construct the lines, and within a year the capital had
wasted away, with work progressing only on the St Petersburg-
Warsaw line.2 Not only were the engineers French, but also
the board of management, which sat in Paris and was not sub-
ject to government control. The Charter had specified the
appointment of Russian Government inspectors, but the pro-
moting banks would not accept close supervision of their
operations. This, and the Paris location of the management,
enabled the Company to ignore with impunity many of its
obligations. Many stories were told of the extravagance of the
Company; how the chairman, Colignon, wishing to spend a
few days in Orel during an inspection of the southern route,
bought at Company expense a large house and redecorated it,
and then cancelled his visit and sold the house at a loss; or how

1 Details of railway negotiations, charters and financing in this chapter are
from: Kislinskii, N. Nasha zhekxnodoroxhnaya fnlitika. Vol. I, St Petersburg, 1902.

* In fairness, it should be added that the Company was caused much embarrass-
ment by the instability of the rouble.

B*
French technicians gave wildly extravagant tips and lived a
life of luxury.1

In view of the exhaustion of the initial capital, a government
loan was requested, and granted, to start the Nizhnii Novgorod
line. But the Government remained powerless to interfere with
the management. By 1860 funds were again exhausted, work
was progressing slowly only on the Warsaw and Nizhnii
Novgorod lines, and the share prices were falling. To bolster
its fortunes, the Company requested other loans and favours
and also permission to purchase the St Petersburg-Moscow
Railway. The latter purchase would, it claimed, provide a
regular income for the Company and restore public confidence.
The Treasury would also benefit, for foreign rnrrenry would
be imported to pay for the railway, and confidence in the
Government’s credit would be strengthened.

These requests, which took the form almost of a demand,
provoked a conflict inside the Government, especially between
the Main Directorate of Ways and Communications and the
Ministry of Finance. The fact that some members of the
Government and of the royal family had substantial sharehold-
ings in the Main Company did not ease the situation. Finally
the Council of Ministers agreed to let negotiations proceed,
but stressed the necessity for prompt completion of the lines.
The Company's position did not improve and in 1861 it was
forced to request an increase in the guaranteed capital, together
with construction subsidies. This time the Government was
able to take advantage of its weakness and imposed new
conditions in exchange for financial help. While a subsidy was
promised on completion of the Warsaw line and its branch to
the Prussian frontier, and the Company’s obligation to construct
the southern line and its Libau offshoot was set aside; the
Government insisted that the Paris managing committee
(which in fact held no shares and could be controlled neither
by the shareholders nor the Government) be abolished and the
management transferred to St Petersburg. Of the fourteen
members of the new management four were to be government
nominees and five more Russian citizens. The accounts were
to be subject to government scrutiny. By 1863 the Company
had completed the St Petersburg-Warsaw Railway and branch,
and the Moscow-Nizhnii Novgorod line.

* Del'vig, A. Op. cit., pp. 121-2.
OTHER RAILWAYS

At the same time as the Main Company was formed, the
Government approved proposals of two other private com-
panies to build railways from Moscow' to Saratov and from
Riga to Dunaburg. The former, planned via Kolomna and
Ryazan, had Belgian support and a 4j per cent government
guarantee. But the bad example of the Main Company (and
the fact that the latter’s shares had a 5 per cent guarantee),
together with the general lack of confidence in Russian railways,
prevented the railway from raising enough capital; the price of
its shares fell by 50 per cent before the issue was completed.
It therefore abandoned its intention to reach the Volga at
Saratov, and renamed itself the Moscow-Ryazan Railway. Its
affairs were placed in the hands of the crafty von Derviz, who
in 1865 succeeded in persuading the Government to support a
Ryazan-Kozlov extension. A guarantee of 5 per cent (plus
1/20 per cent for the amortization of capital), an 81-year term
for private exploitation, and a rather high cost per verst (76,000
'hard' roubles, or 91,000 credit roubles) were accepted by the
Government with the proviso that the capital should be raised
before final approval was granted. This latter reflected the
Government’s disappointment at the failures of so many com-
panies to raise the required funds. Von Derviz, aware of
foreign reluctance to buy Russian railway shares, persuaded the
Government to allow him to sell debentures in Germany.1 This
he did so successfully that he did not need to sell the shares,
which he appropriated for himself. The Kozlov line wras com-
pleted in only eighteen months. The Moscow-Ryazan Railway
prospered and was the only bright spot in the generally grim
railway situation of the mid-sixties.

The Riga-Dunaburg Railway was undertaken by the Riga
Chamber of Commerce, w'hich sought to divert Libau’s grain
exports through its own port. The Government was pleased
to assist the agricultural interests which w'ould be served by
the line and granted a 4| per cent guarantee with a 75-year
term. Alone among the railways approved at this time, the

1 Henceforth, the proportion of share capital to total was to remain low in
Russian railway companies, being as little as one-thirtieth (in one case one-
sixtieth). Railways started after 1908 increased it to about one-tenth, but this was
still low compared to other countries.
Riga-Dunaburg line succeeded in raising its capital without
difficulty. In 1863 an English company was granted the con-
cession to build a connecting Dunaburg-Vitebsk line, with a
5 per cent guarantee ( plus 1/12 per cent for amortization) and an
85-year term. Two years later the Englishman, Sir Morton
Peto,1 was granted the concession to build an Orel-Vitebsk
line. The conditions of this concession were very generous, and
only granted because the line was desperately needed to gain
'hard' currency through grain exports, and to reduce the
unprofitability of the government-guaranteed Riga-Vitebsk
route. Sir Morton was given a 5 per cent guarantee on his
estimated cost of 68,000 credit roubles per verst, even though
government engineers calculated the cost as 57,500 roubles per
verst at most. But this line was never completed as planned.

The most obvious gap in the developing railway map was
the missing line from Moscow to the Black Sea, which the
Main Company had at first undertaken to build. The Govern-
ment granted a very generous concession to an English com-
pany in 1863, by which a Moscow-Sevastopol line would be
built with interest guaranteed at 5 per cent ( -f-1 /24 per cent
amortization) from the beginning of construction. The term of
the concession was for 99 years with government option of
purchase after 36 years. In addition to these inducements, a
free port would be established at Sevastopol and mining land
in the Donetz Basin would be given to the company as a source
of locomotive fuel. The same year a Russian company secured
the concession to build a line from Odessa to Kiev. But neither
company succeeded in raising the basic capital.

In view of the failure of private enterprise, the Government
readily agreed to let the local authorities proceed with the first
stage of the Odessa-Kiev line, from Odessa to Balta. By using
four working companies of 550 men each this line was built
quickly (and cheaply, for free labour would have cost more).
Soon after (1866) the Kiev to Balta line was entrusted to a
foreign contractor who would build the line for the Govern-
ment using Russian troops, and would accept government
bonds in payment. A branch to the Austrian frontier was also
rSir Morton Peto was one of those English railway financiers alternating
between riches and tbc bankruptcy court. His baronetcy was largely a reward for
building the first steam railway in the Crimea; a line at Balaclava to supply the
British army during the Crimean War. This is described in The Journal of Trans-
port History. January 1954 and January 1955.
approved, to forestall a line which Austria wras planning to
build into Galicia and which would have diverted export traffic
from Odessa to Hamburg. As for the Black Sea line, in view of
its urgency tile Government decided to begin building this as a
state railway, starting from Moscow.

The Government was not opposed to lines of more local
significance provided there was a demand for them, but was
not usually willing to give financial guarantees. The local lines
built in this period were: the Grushevskaya Railway which ran
from the Grushevskiye mines to the river Don; it was built by
soldiers at a cost of 44,000 roubles per verst after being
approved in 1861 on the recommendation of the Ministry of
War, and wao extended to Rostov in 100(7, die Poli—Tiflis
line, approved in 1864 on the recommendation of the Caucasus
Committee and built by soldiers under British engineers; two
private lines in Poland, the Warsaw-Terespol and Lodz
Factory lines; suburban lines in St Petersburg; and the Volga-
Don Railway, which resembled more a tramway and was
intended to convey cargoes and small boats between the two
rivers during the navigation season. Another local line was the
Moscow-Sergiev Posad line, which in return for government
assistance soon became a railway of national significance called
the Moscow-Yaroslavl Railway.

THE MOSCOW-YAROSLAVL RAILWAY

One of the directors of this railway, the celebrated engineer von
Del’vig. wrote four volumes of memoirs, published many years
after his death.1 The third volume of this work throws a good
deal of light on the problems of early railway construction in
Russia.

The line was intended originally to run only as far as Sergiev
Posad (now Zagorsk), where was situated the Troitsk
Monastery, one of the most sacred shrines of Russia and hence
a generator of profitable pilgrim traffic. The promoters of the
line therefore thought it politic to secure the blessing of the
Metropolitan of Moscow. The latter received them amiably but
expressed a definite hostility towards railways, which he
thought were all right for other countries but not for Russia.
As for die proposed line from Moscow to Sergiev Posad:

. Pilgrims would come to the monastery in railway cars,
1 Del’vig, A Op. cit.
in which all sorts of tales can be heard, and often dirty stories,
whereas now they come on foot and each step is a feat pleasing
to God.’1

Despite this setback, the promoters remained optimistic,
especially when they were approached by individuals wishing
to buy shares before the day appointed for the opening of
subscriptions. Anticipating a struggling crowd of clients on the
first day, they requested a squad of gendarmes to keep order.
But only about twenty people appeared, and these purchased
few shares, so the gendarmes went home. The following days
showed no improvement and eventually most of the shares were
bought by tlie promoters themselves, and their families and
friends. The disadvantage of the shares was that they carried a
government guarantee of only 4 per cent, a rate decided when
bank rate was only 2 per cent, not 5 per cent, and before the
Main Company had been guaranteed 5 per cent interest on its
shares. The fact that this line was intended to be built and
managed by Russians may also have reduced confidence in its
prospects.

At the first general meeting, the Company’s plans were
exhibited before being submitted to the Directorate of Ways
and Communications for approval. The main influence in
securing approval was the head of the civil engineering section
in the Railway Department. He was a poor man, and the
Company had previously had the sagacity to appoint him as its
St Petersburg representative at a salary of 1,500 roubles per
annum. In these circumstances the approval of the Directorate
was soon obtained.

Chevkin (who had earlier succeeded Kleinmikhel' as Director
of Ways and Communications) occasioned the company extra
expense by not approving the proposed site for the Moscow
terminal. Anxious to secure a physical link between the three
railways which would serve Moscow, he at first insisted that
the Moscow-Yaroslavl and Moscow-Saratov Railways should
use the terminal of the Nikolaev Railway, paying an annual
rent. When the two former railways, unwilling to be at the
mercy of another railway's operating staff, objected, Chevkin
compromised by accepting the location of the three terminals
on the same city square. (This arrangement still exists with

* Dcl’vig, A. Op. dt., p. 29.
the Yaroslavl Station flanking the October Railway terminus,
and the Kazan Station on the opposite side of the square.)

It was difficult to find contractors and engineers to build the
line. Because the St Petersburg-Moscow Railway had taken
ten years to build, there were available very few engineers who
were both young and experienced in railway-building. Even-
tually the construction was divided into three sections, each
under an engineer; two of the three engineers had only just
graduated. A cheap contractor for the earthworks was found.
His price was low because he had recently hired 7,000 peasants
for work on the Moscow-Saratov Railway, where work had
temporarily ceased. Unfortunately, when the work on the latter
restarted, he immediately transferred 4,000 of his workers back
to it. Stone for tlie bridge piers had to be brought expensively
from Moscow' while the spans for the bridges were ordered
from a director of the company, who owned an ironworks. But
he was not enthusiastic and eventually ordered the spans from
England. He still made a profit, however, for the English prices
were lower than his own.

A feast and a church service at the Troitsk Monastery
celebrated the start of work on the line (August 1860). Although
the Metropolitan did not attend, many church dignitaries did,
and the promoters felt confident that there would be no opposi-
tion, and perhaps some support, from the religious authorities.
But there were other difficulties. Landowners demanded exces-
sive compensation for the use of their property, and there was
difficulty in raising additional funds. The shares were only
partly paid up and when in 1861 a further call of 25 roubles per
share was made two of the directors of the company, who
between them held a fifth of the shares, refused to meet this
obligation. In theory, this refusal should have led to the con-
fiscation of their shares, which would have been resold. But it
wras evident that nobody would purchase the shares in these
circumstances, so a government loan was secured to replace
them.

But the line was eventually finished, and its cost was not
excessive. This was largely due to the unusually honest
administrators whom the directors appointed. The promoters
had promised a IS-5 rouble dividend on the 150 rouble shares
and although in the first year of operations (1863) only 6-10
roubles were paid, by 1868 the promise was fulfilled. The
extension to Yaroslavl was favoured by the directors because
the line depended on timber and firewood traffic, and the on-line
forests were being depleted rapidly. The later narrow gauge
extension to Vologda, however, was not a success.

THE RAILWAYS IN THE MID-SIXTIES

When Alexander II became Tsar and Chevkin Director of Ways
and Communications the climate changed in favour of private
railways. Alexander was a greater believer in free enterprise
than his father, and to the influence on him of liberal ideas was
added his distrust of the government departments, which the
Crimean War had illuminated in all their chaos. Resides this,
the building of the St Petersburg-Moscow Railway had not
only strained the Treasury, but its continued operation at a loss
seemed likely to prove a lasting financial embarrassment.
Neither the Tsar nor Chevkin could envisage the State financing
any further railways. At the same time, both realized that some
measure of government control was needed and it is largely
due to the precedent they set in this regard that Russian railway-
building was not bedevilled by the unco-ordinated action of
separate companies which occurred in Britain and the us a. It
is they who are responsible for the absence in Russia of parallel
railways serving identical centres such as exist in those two
countries. In following the European example in regard to
railway promotion, and American practice technically, Russia
took the best of both worlds.

But despite the care taken by the Government, and the
encouragement offered to foreign capitalists, die railway situa-
tion in the mid-sixties was not bright. Only the Moscow-
Ryazan Railway could tell an unqualified success story. Private
capital had failed to justify the hopes placed in it. The Main
Company had been forced to default on the obligation to build
its two southern lines, and many other projects relying on
foreign capital had been liquidated because the international
money market lacked confidence in Russian railway-building.

There were certain good reasons for this reluctance. The
financial condition of the Government was not encouraging.
Foreign wars, Polish risings, a huge standing army, the serf
reform; all demanded funds, and this demand was often satisfied
by issues of paper money unbacked by real resources. Also,
Russia was a supplier of primary products and it was considered
at that time that low-value bulk railway freight could never be
very remunerative. There were also emotional factors, particu-
larly after the Crimean War. When the Russian Government
was seeking railway funds in 1856 the British press advised its
readers not to invest, and the Emperor Napoleon vetoed a
scheme by the Credit Mobilier. It was alleged that the new
railways were intended to increase the war potential of the
recent enemy, that railway funds raised in the West before the
war had not been used to build lines, but to buy munitions, and
that the recently formed Black Sea Steamship Company was
building ships which were designed to carry guns in wartime.

Despite this, foreign capitalists did participate in Russian
railways, but many of them, like the Main Company, did so
with the aim of extracting as much wealth as possible from the
country, and showed little enthusiasm in meeting their obliga-
tions. Thus by 1866 the Russian Government was more or less
resigned to building its own railways, hoping that their success
would encourage private capital to come forward on reasonable
terms. In fact, when it was decided that the Government should
build the Moscow-Black Sea line, Melnikov suggested that a
short line of inevitable profitability should be conceded to a
private company, to encourage others. However, the Govern-
ment had learned several important lessons. It did not repeat
the mistakes it had made with the Main Company. Subsequent
railway charters provided for fuller government inspection and
participation in private railway administration. Furthermore,
by building its own railways the Government became better
informed about the economics of railway construction, and less
likely to accept excessively high cost estimates. The state-built
Moscow-Kursk line cost 62,000 credit roubles per verst,
whereas the Main Company cost 90,000, the Dunaburg-
Vitebsk 80,200, while the proposed Moscow-Sevastopol Rail-
way had been costed at 121,ooo roubles per verst.1 However,
it should be remembered that the Government used soldier-
workers.

In 1865 a special commission reviewed the past experience
of railway building and made its own recommendations. Not
surprisingly, it emphasized the need for more railways, men-
tioning their importance for trade and industry. Citing the value

* Kislinskii, N. Op. cit„ p. 165.
of the St Petersburg-Warsaw Railway in moving troops to
crush the 1863 Polish rebellion, it suggested that rapid rail
communications would permit a reduction in the standing army
which was mainly immobilized in frontier garrisons. It asserted
that Russia was behind the rest of Europe and must attract
private capital if it was to catch up.

At the beginning of 1866, Melnikov presented to the Railway
Committee a map showing the railways already built, or whose
completion was assured. They totalled 5,147 km. (Nikolaev
Railway640 km.; Tsarskoye-Selo, Peterhof,Oranienbaum and
Krasnoselskaya suburban lines at St Petersburg 82 km.; St
Petersburg-Warsaw Railway and branch 1,280 km.; Riga-
Orel line 1,000 km.; Nizhnii Novgorod Railway 4 40 km.;
Moscow-Sergiev Posad 70 km.; Moscow-Ryazan-Kozlov
420 km.; Volga-Don and Grushevskaya lines 147 km.;
Odessa-Balta line and Tiraspol branch 250 km.; Polish lines
710 km.; and in the Duchy of Finland the Helsinki-Tavastgus
line 108 km.). Also under construction or approved were the
state-built Moscow-Orel-Kursk line, and the Kursk-Kiev,
Balta-Elizavetgrad-Kharkov, and Poti-Tiflis lines.

WESTERNERS AND SLAVOPHILS

It is difficult to decide whose fault it was that this period of
Russian railway-building had more failures than successes. One
reason for this is that contemporary accounts were flavoured
with their authors’ view’s in the West versus Slav arguments.
Both those who felt that Russia must learn from the West,
and their opponents who claimed that the Russian way of doing
things was far superior to anything the West could offer, used
the railways as proof of their arguments. Thus much of the
savage criticism apparently directed against the Main Company
was intended to damage the reputation of the French rather
than that of the railway. Some of the promoters of the Moscow-
Yaroslavl Railway considered that a main object of their
company was to prove that Russians could build successful
railways without outside help. They insisted that Russian
engineers be used, and successfully resisted the liquidation of
the company in its early days by warning that such a failure
would encourage the Westerners. Other lines took the opposing
view and made a point of employing foreign engineers, claiming
that they were far superior to Russians. The following describes
a typical skirmish in this battle:

. The Moscow Gazette complains that the railway between
Odessa and Balta is not only exclusively owned by a German
proprietary, but that all the officials employed on the line are
Germans, most of whom are unacquainted with the Russian
language, and not able to make themselves understood by the
natives, and further, that tile timetables and even the passengers’
tickets are printed in German, and with German characters.
That being the case it is but natural that the books and accounts
should be kept, and the correspondence of the company be
carried on in German. On the other hand, the German St
Petersburg Zeitung is highly indignant at this ebullition of petty
national jealousy, and assures its Russian contemporary that it
is a most fortunate thing for Russia that Germans are induced
to carry to that country, their talents, intelligence, and capital,
without which there would be no railroads at all.’1

SECURITY ON THE RAILWAYS

The St Petersburg-Moscow Railway was exceptional in that it
was solidly and expensively built. Other railways were often
quite inadequately built, with bridges which cracked even before
the trains ran. Foreign engineers at first under-estimated the
magnitude of the flood problem, and bridges which they built
with small apertures were sometimes washed away in the
spring To speed construction, masonry was sometimes laid in
sub-zero temperatures writh consequent settlement, sagging and
cracking at the thaw. Not only inexperience, but also unwise
economies in capital expenditure, led to unsound engineering.
The opening of the Nizhnii Novgorod line was postponed for
two weeks because the government inspector found it in-
adequately built; the ballast was laid too thinly (in places the
sleepers were laid directly on the ground), the rails were
uneven, embankments and cuttings were unstable because they
had an inadequate cross-section, and in parts there were only
four sleepers per rail instead of eight. And when the ceremonial
train from Nizhnii Novgorod to Moscow» did at last set out,
loaded with dignitaries, it was derailed during the night, killing
a railway official.

1 Railway News. June 17, 1865.
Railway accidents were common in this period, but because
of the low speeds casualties were few. In 1856 even the Tsar
was involved in a derailment on the Nikolaev Railway, but
nobody wfas injured.1 The Tsarskoye Selo Railway also had an
accident in its early days and it was this which caused the
Government to appoint a railway inspector.

The duties of this inspector were many. He had to ensure
that the conditions of the railway’s charter were observed,
inspect the condition and cleanliness of buildings and rolling
stock, check the reliability of railway staff, examine the com-
position and punctuality of trains, remove passengers when
they misbehaved, make certain that goods were loaded safely,
confirm that the correct fares were being charged. He was
overworked even while the Tsarskoye Selo Railway was his
only territory; when other lines were opened his job was
impossible, even though assistants were appointed to help him.
For this reason a regular railway police force was established
to take over the non-technical part of his work.

The first raikvay police had been on the St Petersburg-
Moscow Railway, where they supervised the labour force and
after the line was opened protected railway property. It had
been intended that ordinary (civil) policemen be used, but
Kleinmikhel’ had raised objections to this. Not only were the
civil police held in contempt by the rest of the population, but
Kleinmikhel’ wanted a force which would be under the control
of the Directorate of Ways and Communications. His opinion
prevailed, and in 1861 the existence of independent railway
police was reasserted, with the appointment of a colonel of
gendarmes, eight officers and eighty-six other ranks to police
the St Petersburg-Warsaw Railway.

LOCOMOTIVES AND EgUIPMENT

The first engines produced at the Alexandrovsk Works were
of the 0-6-0 wheel arrangement and were intended for freight
service. The 0-6-0 two-cylinder formula was to become the
favourite for all the early railways. The 1845 examples for the

* Five years later the Tsar was to suffer another mishap. When inspecting the
St Petersburg-Warsaw Railway the door of his car became stuck at Dunaburg.
and he and the Tsarina were obliged to jump down on to the track from anotiter
door.
St Petersburg-Moscow Railway weighed 30 tons and were
generally rather primitive. Despite the passionate arguments
as to whether railways were really suited to a country with
such a winter, the designers of these locomotives did not see
fit to provide a cab or even a windshield for the enginemen,

fig. 2.	One of the original 0-6-0 freight engines of the St Petersburg-
Moscow Railway, built at the /llexandrovsk Works. (The extra axle was
added soon after construction.)

and this luxury did not appear in Russia for another ten years
or so. The iron wheels of these engines were cast in one piece
and had neither counter-weights nor tyres. The valves to
release from the cylinders water which condensed while the
engine was standing could not be operated from the driving
position on starting, so the unfortunate assistant driver had to
run alongside the engine until the cylinders became dry. Most
of these early engines were reconstructed between 1863 and
1867. Some were converted into tank engines for yard work.
The remaining, unreconstructed, engines were allocated to
what was to become the traditional refuge of unsatisfactory
designs: snow clearance work.

The passenger engines of the St Petersburg-Moscow Rail-
way owed much to American practice. They were of the 4—4-0
wheel arrangement, cabless, and the boiler (and other parts)
was identical with that of the freight engines. After their
reconstruction in 1863-67, when they were fitted with cabs and
enormous spark-arresting chimneys, they would not have
seemed out of place on North American railways.
Some of the 0-6-0 engines were fitted with a leading truck
in order to reduce axle loadings and were probably therefore
the world’s first locomotives of the 2-6-0 wheel arrangement.
The St Petersburg-Moscow Railway was also one of the first
to introduce 0-8-0 engines; sixteen of these were built by the
Alexandrovsk works in 1858-59 to eliminate double-heading
over the Valdai Hills. But the most unusual locomotives used
by this railway were the two units built especially to haul the
Tsar's train (one engine worked between St Petersburg and

fig. 3.	One of two locomotives built in \858for hauling the Tsar’s train
between St Petersburg and Moscow. They were originally of the 4—4-0
type, a third carrying truck being later added to reduce the axle-load.

Bologoye, the other from Bologoye to Moscow). These engines
had a unique wheel arrangement: 6-4-0. In general, however,
the Nikolaev Railway relied on successive improvements of its
basic 0-6-0 and 4 4 0 engines.

The first engines of the St Petersburg-Warsaw Railway,
whose first section was opened shortly after the St Petersburg-
Moscow Railway, were greatly superior to those produced by
the Americans of the Alexandrovsk Works. The railway ordered
103 two-cylinder 0-6-0 engines of a standard design from
Sharp Stewart in England, Gouin of France, the Austrian Rail-
ways locomotive works, and from St Pierre in Belgium. The
engines weighed 31 tons, had steel plate frames, used bronze
in the axle boxes, and had an improved lubrication system.
They were very successful and formed the basis for further
designs, and many remained in service for sixty years. They
were also notable as being the first engines to provide protec-
tion for their crew; they had a primitive cab in the form of a
windshield which at the top bent over backwards to provide an
elementary roof. For passenger work this railway ordered
abroad ninety-three 2-4-0 mixed traffic engines together with
small numbers of faster engines, including four of the Crampton
type from France.

The Moscow-Nizhnii Novgorod Railway being, like the St
Petersburg-Warsaw, under the management of the Main
Company, used the same types of locomotive. For about
twenty-five years this line relied on two basic types of engine:
the 0-6-0 and 2-4-0 designs as used on the Warsaw line.

fig. 4.	A 2-4-0 passenger design built from 1858 by several European
firms for the Moscow-Nizhnii Novgorod and St Petersburg-Warsaw
Railways.

Being for the most part laid in the valley of the River Klyazma,
gradients were no steeper titan 1 in 165, enabling comparatively
small engines to handle traffic for many years. As the two basic
types, moreover, were fitted with common parts, locomotive
maintenance on the Nizhnii Novgorod Railway was efficient
and inexpensive. At the same time it is interesting to note that
these two types of engine were supplied by no fewer than eight
different suppliers, all foreign. This contrasted with the
Moscow'-Yaroslavl Railway, all of whose engines were sup-
plied by Borzig. Usually Russian railways found it difficult to
obtain their engines from a single supplier, for locomotive
builders at this time had full order books and would not accept
big orders. The Moscow-Yaroslavl Railway was fortunate,
because Borzig at that time was planning to enter the Russian
market and not only welcomed a large order but took special
care with its execution and quoted low prices to attract other
Russian companies.

Except for the Nikolaev Railway, Russian rolling stock was
not especially different from that of continental Europe. The
St Petersburg-Moscow line, however, was notable for its four-
axle freight cars, its centre-corridor passenger stock, and the
luxury of its first-class accommodation. Its rolling stock was
also interesting in that it was fitted with a single centre buffer,
which incorporated the coupling. However, from 1863, on the
instruction of the Directorate of Ways and Communications,
this was changed to twin buffers and central screw couplings in
order to make possible the interchange of cars with other
railways.

DOMESTIC EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION

Despite government encouragement, usually expressed in 'buy
Russian’ conditions incorporated in railway charters, home
industry showed no great anxiety to sell its products to the
railways. Partly this was due to the distance separating the
Urals metal-working region from the new railways, and partly
to the technical inferiority of Russian industry. But the over-
riding reason was the lack of enterprise shown by domestic
manufacturers; private ownership of industry did not signify
private enterprise in its operation. In rail production, for
example, few Russian works were equipped with the necessary
rolling machinery, but the others made no effort to acquire this
equipment. In the period from 1836 to 1865 seven-eighths of
the rails used in Russian railways were imported.1 The same
situation existed writh ironwork for bridges; Russian suppliers
were reluctant to try their hand at any structure which was
bigger or more complicated than their usual production. During
this period the only positive step forward was the introduction
of a re-rolling process for worn-out rails, which enabled the
growing stocks of old rails to be reused.

The situation was slightly better with rolling stock. Thanks
to government initiative many Russian craftsmen were trained
at the Alexandrovsk works, and that factory produced 210
locomotives from 1845 to 1868, after which it devoted itself to

1 Kislinskii, N. Op. cit, Vol. IV, p. 211 et seq.
repair and reconstruction work.1 It was the original hope that
the railways would buy all their engines from Russian factories,
but with the formation of the Main Company and the temporary
eclipse of state railways, this hope foundered. The Duke
Leichtenburg factory built two engines for the Tsarskoye Selo
Railway and received a government order for one hundred
units to work on the St Petersburg-Warsaw line. However,
when fifteen engines had been delivered the Main Company
took over the railway and, wishing to buy its engines abroad
and finding the contract with the Leichtenburg works an
obstacle, bought the factory, converted it into the railway’s
main workshop and cancelled the production of the troublesome
eiglity-fivc locomotives.

Taking the railways as a w hole, about two-fifths of the loco-
motive requirements were satisfied by domestic industry
between 1836 and 1865. By the end of 1865 there were about
660 engines in service. About one-third of the 9,000 freight
cars were home-produced, mostly by the Alexandrovsk w'orks
for the Nikolaev Railway. All the freight cars of the Moscow-
Kursk Railway, which the Government was building, had also
been ordered from home suppliers.

TRAIN SERVICES

The St Petersburg-Moscow Railway with its three daily trains
in each direction, of which one ran at speeds of 32 km. per hour
(«о m ph.) provided the best train service in the sixties. The
other long-distance railway, the St Petersburg-Warsaw,
operated two trains each u'ay over the whole distance, plus a
daily service to and from Gatchina.® The fastest of these left St
Petersburg at 11 a.m. and arrived at 5.20 p.in. the next day,
.averaging 37 km. per hour (23 m.p.h.). As the schedule
included ten buffet stops of from twenty to thirty minutes each,
the speeds between stops were quite brisk by Russian standards;
the 72-6 km. between Pskov and Ostrov, for example, wrere
covered at 60 km. per hour (37 m.p.h.). Ilie Warsaw-Vienna
and the Riga-Vitebsk lines each had a daily train in each direc-
tion, while the Moscow-Ryazan and Moscow-Yaroslavl each

1 Rakov, V. Lokomotivy zMeznykh dorog Sovietskavo Soyuxa. Moscow, 1955,
p. 10.

* Bradshaw's Continental Railway Guide. December 1866.
had two. The Tsarskoye Selo line had six trains each way: the
first left at 7 a.m. and the last at 9 p.m. The Oranienbaum line
had four trains in each' direction.

The fares differed according to the railway. First-, second-
and third-class fares over the 197 km. Moscow-Ryazan line
and also over the 1,120 km. St Petersburg-Warsaw route were
2-8, 2-1 and 1-17 kopeks per kilometre whereas on the 209
km. Odessa-Balta railway they were 3-7, 2-8 and 1 • 4 kopeks
respectively. The Moscow-Yaroslavl Railway was interesting
in that its first-class Moscow-Sergiev ticket cost 2'0 roubles,
but the Sergiev-Moscow fare was 2-50 roubles. On the Niko-
laev Railway, apart from the previously mentioned bargain of
0 • 6 kopek per kilometre rate on third-class ordinary trains, the
fare level was unexceptional, first class being almost 3 kopeks
per kilometre.
THE BOOM YEARS, 1866-99

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

The outstanding period for Russian railway-building was the
last thirty-five years of the nineteenth century. From 1866 to
1900 the length of the common carrier rail network increased
from 5,000 km. to 58,200 km.1 The tempo of construction was
not steady, and in fact this period consisted of the boom years
of 1866-79, then a slow-down followed from about 1891 by
another burst of construction, even more powerful. Expressed
in mileage of new railways opened, in the years 1868 to 1877
19,000 km. were built (compared to 4,050 km. in the previous
decade 1858 to 1867). This average of 1,900 km. per year
declined in the next fifteen years to 710 km.; then, in the five-
year period 1898 to 1897, no less than 18,300 km. of new
railway were opened, equivalent to 2,600 km. per annum.
Total railway mileage was trebled between 1867 and 1877,
and doubled again between 1877 and 1897.

Railway construction continued to be subject to government
planning. Successive railway-building plans were drawn up in
the Ministry of Ways and Communications and after approval
were the basis on which concessions were granted. Promoters
of lines which were described in the plan as of first importance
were treated more sympathetically than others. As the Govern-
ment could not effectively impose its will and force promoters
to build the railways it most needed, the successive plans were
usually only partially fulfilled. The Government’s railway plan
of 1866 was therefore notable in being fulfilled completely, and
ahead of schedule.

Although two of the first Russian main lines, the Warsaw-
Vienna and St Petersburg-Warsaw Railways, had been largely

1 These mileages include Poland, but not the Duchy of Finland.
MAP 1

Russian railways in 1870. The frontiers are those of the present day,
territory not belonging to Russia in 1870 being shown as a dotted
area.
strategic, in general the early railways had been built to meet
definite economic needs. These needs were the needs of Moscow
as a developing industrial city and the requirements of the
grain-producing areas. Thus the early railways either radiated
from Moscow (St Petersburg-Moscow 1851, Moscow-Nizhnii
Novgorod, 1862, Moscow-Voronezh 1869, Moscow-Yaro-
slavl-Vologda 1872, Moscow-Kharkov 1869 and to Kiev 1870,
Moscow-Brest-Warsaw 1871), or they ran from the grain
areas north-w'estwards to the Baltic (Tsaritsyn-Riga 1871,
Kiev-Koenigsberg 1873 and to Danzig 1877, Romny-Libau
1874; the Samara-Vyazma line, finished 1877, also belongs to
this category), or they connected the same Black Earth grain
region with the Black Sea ports (Odessa Railway 1870 with
branches into Bessarabia, Kharkov-Nikolaev 1873, Kharkov-
Taganrog 1869, Voronezh-Rostov-on-Don 1876, Kharkov-
Sevastopol 1875). After these lines were built, forming the
basis of the Russian railway system, other towns began to
receive railway connections in accordance with their economic
strength, or, sometimes, their political influence. The tradi-
tional grain-trading centres were among the first to be served
(Rybinsk-Bologoye line 1870, the Orenburg Railway serving
Samara 1877). Then there were railways built to serve develop-
ing industries (Ivanovo-Voznesensk in 1871, the Fastov
branch to serve the sugar industry around Kiev 1876, the
Donetz Railway for the coal-mining industry’ 1872-82, the
Baskunchak Railway for salt 1882, the Urals Railway 1878).
Finally there were the strategic lines (Poti—Tiflis 1872, the
Trans-Caspian Railway from 1882, and the Vladikavkaz Railway
from Rostov into the Caucasus 1875). In the eighties and early
nineties this pattern of development continued, the Tiflis-
Baku, Ekaterinin, Ivangorod-Dombrova, and Ekaterinburg-
Tyumen lines were all primarily devoted to developing
industries while the Polessian Railway was purely a strategic
venture. At the same time the Trans-Siberian Railway and the
Novorossiisk line were examples of special government pro-
jects.

However, in the nineties efforts to intensify the network led
to a certain duplication of facilities. New lines began to appear
which competed with existing railways. Although this could
not be said of the Penza-Kharkov and Tsaritsyn-Tikhoretskaya
lines which were finished in the late nineties, it w’as certainly
true of other new railways, such as the Moscow-Bryansk,
Pskov-Bologoye and Elets-Valuiki lines, although these did
shorten the rail journey between important centres. Govern-
ment control exercised through the Ministry of Finance seemed
sometimes to be weakening possibly for internal political
reasons. Thus when the Vladikavkaz Railway, one of whose
sponsors was a Grand Duke, wished to build a branch to the
Caspian port of Derbent the Ministry of Finance gave permis-
sion, with the warning that the railway would not be allowed
later to extend from Derbent to Baku. Yet the very next year
the railway applied for this extension, and was granted per-
mission.

During the last decades of the century there was much
interest shown in the laying of feeder lines and narrow-gauge
railways. The main attraction of the latter w'as the lower capital
cost as compared to the normal size lines. A Russian mission
visited narrow'-gauge railways in Britain in 1870 and on its
return recommended their adoption in Russia. This wras fol-
lowed by the building of one state and two private narrow-
gauge railways. The government line, between Livny and
Verkhovye (a station on the Orel-Gryaz line) was built mainly
to gain experience. The private lines were the Yaroslavl-
Vologda Railway, promoted by the existing Moscow-Yaroslavl
Railway and intended mainly as a timber-carrier, and a line from
Chudovo on the Nikolaev Railway to the old trading centre of
Novgorod. Thus all these narrow-gauge lines relied on tranship-
ment with the normal railways, and the Yaroslavl-Vologda line
was additionally handicapped by the unbridged Volga crossing
at Yaroslavl. Transhipment costs entailed tariffs higher than
expected, and the narrow-gauge lines were therefore not
entirely satisfactory. If they had been built in areas remote from
other railways they would have been more successful.

Five-foot gauge feeder lines were usually promoted by local
interests, often by individual industrial enterprises. The
Government imposed strict conditions before granting permis-
sion for these lines. When the Putilov works at St Petersburg
decided to build a feeder line connecting its factories with the
main railways it had to pay a preliminary levy of 60,000
roubles, the line was subject to government inspection, and
compulsory purchase was possible after twenty years. Its charter
also contained the interesting provision that all metal articles
needed by the line would be made by the Putilov works itself.
In view of the fact that the company specialized in this kind of
product, the provision reflects the Government’s awareness of
the reluctance with which Russian industrialists accepted railway
orders.

The First Company of Feeder lines was formed in 1892,
having as its object the promotion and construction of secondary
branch lines. As it was unable to place all its shares, one-third
of the capital was subscribed by the Government, which took
the opportunity to appoint two government directors and to
introduce into the charter provisions for supervision. By the end
of the century this company owned about 750 km. of branch lines.

The quality of the construction work carried out by contrac-
tors improved slowly as the Government grew wiser through
bitter experience. The experience of the state Moscow-Kursk
Railway was not repeated, at least not so glaringly. The
Minister of Ways and Communications for reasons of his own
had not appointed any official to supervise construction on the
spot, and the line was built badly. It took three and a half years
to build the Moscow-Serpukhov section (opened November
1867), and within three years a third of the rails were dis-
carded, and the meagre ballast supplemented. The stations
were built far from the towns they served,1 heavy gradients
were permitted out of the Oka valley, and the walls of the Tula
workshops began to crack. Many of the stone bridges had to
have their piers rebuilt, and their iron girders were badly
placed; at least one engine fell through.

The coming of the railways caused an upheaval in the
countryside, even though few understood its real significance.
When the new Kiev-Zhmerinka Railway wished to build a
station half a kilometre from the Bogdanov estate, the land-
owner objected violently, saying that he did not want to have
his sleep disturbed. He had no understanding of die advantages
which a railway station so closely situated would bring to his
own economy. The Railway built the station ten kilometres
away (but still named it Bogdanovtsy).

1 Avoidance of towns by tlte main lines became a characteristic of railway
building for which no really adequate reason has been advanced. The strategic
preoccupation with speed of long distance transit may have been one reason, the
example of the us a another (but their railways ran in straight lines only through
the virgin country). Another reason may be that Russian towns were built at
easily defended points: on hills or behind natural water barriers.
The influx of railway labourers into the countryside was
immediately followed by an increase in local grain prices,
sometimes by as much as ten times. The price of land rose
similarly. Contractors were annoyed by these price rises, but
the local folk, who became greedy and mercenary as they made
hay while the sun was shining, claimed it was the contractors’
own fault for spending their money too freely. Little provision
was made by the main lines for serving local interests. Country
stations often lacked covered space to store grain awaiting
shipment and it was left in sacks in the open, where it might
be stolen or used as pig-food by the local railwaymen.1 When
a line w as completed and the first train was due all the villagers
would turn out to welcome it. In the south, the younger
peasants on horseback would gallop oft' to meet the train as
soon as it appeared over the steppe’s horizon. A crowd of
people curious to see their first steam locomotive would stand
at the lineside agitatedly, as though conscious that the old way
of life had come to an end. When the train clanked past they
would cheer. Others crossed themselves.

RAILWAY PROMOTION AND FINANCING

The later sixties were characterized by increasing confidence on
the part of domestic and foreign investors in the profitability
of Russian railway-building. It became much easier to finance
railway construction; promoters began to compete with each
other for a given concession. However, this thirst for new
railw ay concessions was occasioned more by hopes of big short
term gains at the expense of the Government than by expecta-
tion of steady profits from year-to-year railway operation.
Attempts by the Government to limit its own generosity were
only partially successful; investors, particularly foreign inves-
tors, still did not consider the financial situation of Russia
sufficiently stable to remove the extra risk which they believed
was entailed by investment in Russian companies. The un-
favourable balance of trade which continued until the nineties,
the constant manipulation by the Treasury to preserve a more
or less stable currency despite inadequate reserves, and frequent
involvement in wars and rebellions made the investor wary of
Russian securities unless they offered very generous terms. On

1 Sec: Petrunkevich, I. Iz zapisok obshcheitvennavo deyatelya. Berlin, 1984.
:t. One of the original passenger engines of the Kursk KIutrkov Sevastopol Hallway,
built around 1870. Photo. iM-omolive Publishing Cwnfsany.

Locomotives of the Kursk Kharkov Sevastopol Railway (later the Southern Railway),
lite nearer engine is one of a series built by Schneider in ISO!) 70

I’itoto. Ijuomotive Publishing Comlntny.
4. Tsvetkovo, a station of the South Western Railway. The R class six-wheeler was
built in 1Я7К by the Nevskii works. Photo. /.<» 1'ie du Rail.

A class V six-wheeler built in 1875 by the Maltsev works for the Vladikavkaz Railway.
1‘boto. 1м Fie du Rail.
the other hand, the Russian Government was still anxious, for
economic and strategic reasons, to build a railway network
comparable with that of Western Europe. Few Russians would
have disagreed with what the War Minister expressed to
Alexander III:

. railways are now the strongest and most decisive element
of war. Therefore regardless even of financial difficulties, it is
exceedingly desirable to make our railway network equal that
of our enemies.’1

In short, the Government’s desire for new railways was still
rather stronger than the investors’ desire to finance them. But
because of the large profits to be made from the construction
of railways under the terms of the usual government guarantee
of interest on the capital, there was no lack of promoters. For
this reason, in the late sixties the Government decided to cease
guaranteeing interest on the capital of those companies under-
taking railways which were not of first priority in the railway-
building plan. Apart from saving money and thus helping the
Government’s credit, this measure put an end to a situation in
which too many guaranteed issues were spoiling the market;
shares and debentures were being sold far below par, and
earlier companies were experiencing difficulty in completing
their issue. However, this was too drastic a step. The Baltic
Railway, which in accordance with the new policy had to be
financed solely by non-guaranteed shares, was unable to raise
the necessary funds and the Government did finally guarantee
its capital. The Kiev-Brest Railway could not sell its shares
and eventually the Government bought six and a half million
roubles' worth at 75 roubles per 100-rouble share. The Libau
Railway succeeded in placing its non-guaranteed shares, but the
purchasers proved unwilling to pay succeeding instalments of
their purchase price. To end this situation without returning to
the situation which it was trying to avoid, the Government
introduced the temporary guarantee: interest on capital would
be guaranteed for fifteen years only.

By 1870 the Government was able to lay down a stricter
procedure for granting concessions, and the Ministries of

1 Quoted in: Istmchrsiiye zapiski. 47/1954, p. 171.

C
Finance and of Ways and Communications studied projects
more critically on the basis of their own scale of priorities and
statistical information. When it was decided to have a par-
ticular line built, the Ministry of Ways and Communications
would draw up the terms of concession; no longer were the
terms suggested by the promoters themselves. These terms
would be approved by the Ministry of Finance and finally by
the Tsar. The next stage was the invitation to bid for the
concession, each promoter being obliged to deposit his offer in
a sealed envelope, which would be opened, together with those
of competing promoters, on a previously fixed day. The
Ministry of Ways and Communications would then discuss the
bids with the promoters whose offers were considered worthy
of further study, the main consideration being the per-verst
cost of construction. A promoter would be chosen and the Tsar
on the advice of the two ministries would decide the date the
concession would be awarded, while the Ministry of Finance
would make recommendations on the form and conditions of
issue of the capital. Finally the Ministry of Ways and Com-
munications, with the approval of the Ministry of Finance,
would take the final agreement through the Committee of
Ministers for the Tsar's assent.

The reluctance of the Government to grant financial aid for
railway-building outside its own scheme of priority lines led to
the participation of the Zemstvos in railway promotion.1 A
decree of 1864 had established Zemstvos in thirty-three
guberniyas and included the following sentences:

'Matters subject to management by the Zemstvo institutions
. . . are . . . construction and maintenance of buildings, other
construction works and routes belonging to the Zemstvo. . . .'2

The Zemstvos held that this gave them the right to promote
railways of local benefit, and although this view was later,
inconclusively, challenged, a number of important lines were in
fact sponsored by these local assemblies. By building their own
railway they could develop local industries and raise the value

1 Zemstvos were a step towards limited local self-government. They were
elected, and entrusted with economic and social affairs of purely local significance.

’ Kislinskii, N. Op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 171, 231.
of their land. No doubt they also hoped to benefit from the
enormous profits which could be made from railway construc-
tion; the retention by Derviz of the shares of the Ryazan-
Kozlov line, with face value of three-quarters of a million
pounds sterling, had caused many mouths to water. But in fact
it was the professional railway-builders, who persuaded the
Zemstvos to transfer the concessions to them, that harvested
these construction profits.

The first Zemstvo-sponsored lines were connected with
Derviz's Ryazan-Kozlov line. The very first was the Kozlov-
Voronezh Railway, finished in 1869, which enjoyed the normal
5 per cent guarantee and 81-year lease granted by the Govern-
ment. But it was the Tambov—Kozlov Railway which set a new
fashion. The Government having decided to restrict its guaran-
tees, the Zemstvo itself guaranteed a dividend of 2| per cent
on the face value of the capital (3 per cent on the real capital).
The Government helped by buying many of the shares, expect-
ing the dividend to increase and welcoming the line because it
would gain traffic for the government-guaranteed lines from
Kozlov to Riga and Moscow. The concession was approved by
the Government in March 1868 and the line opened in December
1869. It was later extended to Saratov on the Volga and became
part of the Ryazan-Uralsk Railway’s main line.

In the early seventies, following the stronger government
line in the granting of concessions, interest in Russian railway
securities again declined. Shares and debentures had to be sold
at a crippling discount. The ‘temporary’ guarantee was not
sufficient to attract funds. Also, the small investor still took no
part in railway construction. It was the railway ‘kings’ like
Polyakov, Varshavskii, Gubonin and Derviz, and the banks,
who built and financed the new railways, for the sake of
immediate profits. To remedy this situation the Ministry of
Finance proposed changes in the conditions relating to the
raising of capital, and despite the opposition of the Ministry of
Ways and Communications, these changes were adopted for the
next series of capital issues. The latter, due to open in the
spring of 1874, were the shares of the new Orenburg, Fastov,
Urals and Vistula Railways. The terms on which the issues were
sold included an ‘absolute’ guarantee (that is, the guaranteed
interest was paid by the Government from the time the shares
were issued and therefore did not depend on the line actually
being completed).1 It was hoped that this would attract the
small investor, and the offer was felt to be generous enough for
a reserve price of 9S'roubles per 100-rouble share to be fixed.
To discourage big speculators receiving the shares without
actually paying for them, in the expectation of selling them
later at a profit, it was ruled that 10 per cent of the purchase
price must be paid at the time of issue.

The results of the issue justified all the warnings of the
Ministry of Ways and Communications. With such good terms
the demand was so great that only the powerful and experienced
railway ‘kings’ were able to obtain the shares. They were
assisted by the use of nominees, and by the State Bank, which
offered to provide credit for the necessary 10 per cent of the
purchase price against the deposit of any security quoted on the
Stock Exchange. The shares were to be sold only in Moscow
and St Petersburg and in the days preceding the opening of
subscriptions the speculators gathered together their securities
and deposited them in the State Bank, which established special
credit accounts for the sole use of persons needing to raise the
10 per cent deposit. As a result the shares were acquired by a
select group of men and the small investor squeezed out.
General meetings of the companies were held soon afterwards
to elect directors. At the meeting of the Orenburg Railway
Company the shareholders elected Varshavskii, Gubonin, and
Polyakov. The Urals Railway Company elected Polyakov and
Gubonin. The Fastov Railway Company elected Varshavskii,
Gubonin and Polyakov. It was only internal dissension which
prevented this trio from securing complete control of the
Vistula Railway Company also.

In 1867 the Railway Fund was established. Hitherto state
railways had been financed mainly by internal and external
loans. Private railways were also supported by foreign capital
and the Government welcomed the resulting contribution to
national reserves of foreign currency. But as railway construc-
tion intensified, the Treasury accounts with the various railways
became more numerous and more complicated, and the flood of
capital issues depressed the market. To remedy this, and to

1 The first ‘absolute’ guarantee was made when the Kursk-Kiev Railway,
originally a state enterprise, was conceded to Derviz. The 5 per cent (+• 1/12
per cent amortization) on the 3 million sterling debentures was paid from the
date of issue, not date of line completion.
camouflage the Government’s enormous financial commitment
to the railways and thus protect Russia’s credit abroad, was the
aim of the Railway Fund. The first step in establishing this was
the issue on the London market of the Nikolaev Railway Loan.
This 4 per cent debenture stock had a face value of 100 million
•hard' roubles but could only be placed at 66| per cent, and
after the commission and other expenses were deducted the
Treasury received 44| million roubles. As it had already been
decided to sell the Nikolaev Railway to the Main Company,
and the 44| million would be taken into account when this was
done, it could be claimed that this money-raising transaction
did not increase the national debt. To this 44| million w’ere
added the proceeds of the sale of Alaska to the us л, and of the
sale of government-held stock in the Kiev-Kursk and other
railways.

Despite the virtual sacrifice of the Nikolaev Railway, the
immediate results of the Railway Fund were beneficial. Con-
fidence in the financial stability of the Russian Empire returned
to the foreign money markets, and the substitution of a few big
foreign loans by this official body for the previous numerous
private raihvay loans enabled better terms of issue to be
obtained. The first of these consolidated loans (in 1870) was
placed at 76 per cent, in contrast to the 60-70 per cent of loans
raised a few years earlier. Unfortunately, howrever, the Fund’s
expenditure began to outpace the proceeds of new loans and it
was abolished in 1883. To some extent the Fund camouflaged
the heavy and increasing financial drain which the railways
represented to the Treasury. According to the Baranov Com-
mission, even as early as the beginning of 1878 the private
companies owned lines which had cost 1,619,000 roubles of
nominal capital, but only 436,000 roubles of shares and deben-
tures were in private hands; the Government had bought the
greater part. Moreover, the private companies had an accumu-
lated debt to the Government of 260 million roubles on
account of the payments w hich had been made on the guaranteed
capital.1

In the nineties the economic and financial situation of Russia
improved and railway construction was helped by a favourable
balance of trade, the development of commerce and industry,
and a healthy budget. The Government was affluent enough to

* Ittorichesliiye xapisH. 47/1954.
build the lines it considered to be of first importance, and there
was abundant private capital to finance secondary lines. Existing
railways competed for new concessions and would offer the
Treasury a share of the expected profits (sometimes as high as
four-fifths) in exchange for the privilege of building the lines.
Not only this, but they would also undertake to build less
profitable lines in exchange for concessions to construct the
lines they wanted. When the Ryazan-Uralsk Railway secured
the concession for the Moscow-Pavelets line against the rival
offers from the Moscow-Kazan and South-Eastern railways, it
offered to build the Smolensk-Dankov line required by the
Government—although this apparently generous gesture may
have been made with the intention of using the Smolensk-
Dankov line for its through traffic, which was at that time
routed over two state railways!

THE RAILWAY KINGS

The last four decades of the nineteenth century were prosperous
years for that new type of speculator, the railway promoter.
These railway kings could be divided into three groups: the
older men who had entered the railway field after making their
fortunes in other businesses, men like Benardaki who became
one of the promoters of the Moscow-Yaroslavl Railway after
enriching himself in the Siberian liquor trade; then there were
the professional bankers like Bliokh and Utin who became
chairmen of several railways which they were financing; and
finally there was a new generation which had made its fortunes
solely from railway promotion. Of these, Polyakov, von Mekk
and von Derviz became the best known.

Derviz, apparently, was a former schoolmate of the Minister
of Finance, Reitem, who was responsible for granting him the
concessions to build the Moscow-Ryazan and Ryazan-Kozlov
railways.1 He was a clever man, not over-scrupulous but never-
theless building his lines to a better technical standard than
most of his competitors. As previously related, he succeeded in
selling the debentures of the Kozlov line at a time when other
companies were expiring from lack of capital, and at the same
time was able to keep shares worth three-quarters of a million
pounds sterling for himself. It may well have been his example
which spurred other speculators to try their luck with the

* See Vine, S. Paipominaniya. St Petersburg, 1924, Vol. HI.
railways, with the result that the demand for railway conces-
sions recovered from the lack of confidence of the mid-sixties.
Derviz, together with Mekk, later built the Kursk-Kiev Railway
and having made his fortune had the good sense to retire to
Italy. When Mekk later invited him to participate in the Libau
Railway he replied that he was already rich enough and saw no
reason to risk his fortune (von Mekk did in fact subsequently
lose money on this line). It was Derviz who in Italy built a
theatre and hired an opera company to give performances to
him as sole audience. He exhibited many other eccentricities
and it wras generally held that his riches had turned his head.

Polyakov w'as a former plasterer in Kiev. In 1861 he pre-
sented himself, in full Jewish regalia, to the management of the
Moscow-Yaroslavl Railway requesting a contract for the
transport of rails. He was refused, but in the following year he
became the contractor for supplying coal to pumping stations
in Moscow. He then obtained a few minor contracts for high-
way building in the Moscow area and it was thus that he met
Count Tolstoi, who was the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.
The latter entrusted him with the management of post stations
on the Tolstoi estates. He now had sufficient resources to
engage in railway work and was soon supplying men and
materials for the construction of the Ryazan-Kozlov Railway.
It was here that he met the engineer-speculator von Mekk. He
then tried to join the group w'hich Derviz and Mekk had formed
to build the Kozlov-Voronezh line, but Derviz refused to
associate with him Rut the tables were neatly turned when
Melnikov, who disliked Derviz, satisfied the request of Polya-
kov’s patron Count Tolstoi and granted the concession to the
Voronezh zemstvo. Polyakov promptly persuaded the latter to
transfer the concession to him in order to get the line built.
Von Mekk joined him and both found the line very profitable,
ffie Government having guaranteed 5 per cent (4-1/10 per
cent) interest on a capital generously calculated at 78,500
roubles per verst. As construction costs w'ere considerably less
than this Polyakov was able to keep most of the shares for
himself, and lodged them with German bankers until their price
should rise. Or at least most of them, for when Count Tolstoi
died among his assets were found hall'a million roubles' worth
of Kozlov-Voronezh Railway shares.1

1 Del’vig, A. Op. cit., Vol. HI. p. 398.
Many other important civil servants and even members of
the royal family (including apparently the Tsar’s brother, the
Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich) received bribes in the form
of shares from railway promoters.1 The Governor of the State
Bank, Lamanskii, held shares in many companies and it was
generally accepted that he had received these as gifts:

*. . . Lamanskii has no money, certainly not the millions
required by a railway. Why then do they invite him into all
the companies. Obviously because of his position as manager of
the State Bank. In this connection a strange thing happened
recently in the Committee of Ministers: the charter of a com-
pany had been presented and I waa reporting on it. Prince
Gagarin, with the permission of the Tsar raised the question:
should not this company be rejected because in it participated
five high officials of the Ministry of Finance, including Laman-
skii? But in the Committee one hand washes another and all
were against this opinion.’2

The financial benefits of railway construction were not measured
in terms of annual operating profit (in fact it was often advan-
tageous to make an operating loss), but in short-term gains.
The most common device was to quote a capital cost per verst
considerably higher than the real cost. The capital of the
company would be fixed at this inflated figure, the real con-
struction costs could be met solely through the sale of the
government-guaranteed debentures, and the promoters (who
in fact invested none of their own money in the project) kept
the shares for themselves.

When the Government, realizing what was happening, began
to examine more critically the terms suggested by promoters,
there were still many other profitable avenues to explore. When
the capital of a line was fixed at a reasonable figure, the low
per-verst price could be undercut by opening the line before it
was completed; the track might be laid but the bridges could
be cheap temporary structures, and buildings non-existent. The
remaining work was carried out after operations had begun and
charged as operating costs. The fact that this might mean an
operating loss was of no account, for the Government guaran-

1 See: Krainyi arkhiv. 56/1933.

* From Kulomzin’s diary—quoted in: htorichesMye zapiski. 47/1954, p. 156.
teed the interest on most of the capital. This fact, that interest
would be received from the Government in unprofitable years,
could be exploited in many other ways. The capital value of the
line (and hence of its shares and debentures) could be enhanced
by furnishing it with the very best rolling stock and the cost
entered as renewal and amortization (it was also the practice,
when replacing equipment, to enter the value on capital account
without deducting the value of the material which had been
replaced. This inflated the book value of the railway).

With the Government guaranteeing interest and in addition
often making loans for the purchase of materials and equipment,
railway-owners soon found yet another way of transferring
government funds into their own pockets. They would agree
with factory-owners to purchase equipment at inflated prices,
in return for a generous commission. Instances of this were
rarely discovered; but when a railway changed hands it might
happen that the new owners would decide to publicize the mal-
practices of their predecessors. This happened when the Libau
Railway was purchased from von Nfekk by a group of bankers.
The new owners revealed that the railway (which had been
making increasing losses—nearly a million roubles in 1880
alone) had bought sleepers, lubricants and tyres at 30-40 per
cent above current figures. In 1881 von Mekk had ordered one
and a half million poods of rail at 2-14 roubles per pood, about
60 kopeks more than the current price.1

There were, of course, other devices, but some of these
entailed a risk of prosecution. But no doubt the common
phenomenon of increasing traffic being accompanied by increas-
ing losses covered a multitude of undiscovered sins. In the case
of the Moscow-Yaroslavl-Archangel Railway an increasing net
income w’as achieved from growing traffic, but dividends fell.
From 1892 to 1898 the net income of the railway doubled, but
the dividend fell from 30 to 18 roubles. This led to enquiries
and it was discovered that the funds of the Railway had found
their way into the coffers of enterprises like the Nevskii Works
and the East Siberia Factor}' Company, and that members of
the management had received large sums to which they were
not entitled. A total of about 12 million roubles was missing
and the Government had to provide financial support for the
company. One of those held responsible, the millionaire

1 Istoricheskiye zapiski. 47/1954.

C*
Mamontov, was later prosecuted on a charge of embezzlement
—but was acquitted.

PRIVATE RAILWAYS AND STATE

In the early sixties government favour towards private railways
had reluctantly been exchanged for increasing state initiative in
railway-building. So many private promoters failed to build the
railways which the country needed that the Government was
obliged to build them on its own account. But the financing of
state railways proved too much of a burden for the Treasury
and it was decided to sell them to private interests, using the
money thus raised to finance further railway projects through
the Railway Fund. The first line to be sold was the Nikolaev
Railway, which the Main Company had long coveted and at
last acquired in 1868. The conditions of the sale were very
generous. While the Government was given the right to receive
each year all the profits of the company up to a maximum of
7-2 million credit roubles, any deficiency resulting from the
failure of the line to produce a net income of that amount in
any one year was not carried over into the next. Thus the
company had ever}' incentive to reduce its net operating income.
By devoting excessive amounts to maintenance and replacement
it could enhance the value of its property using funds which
otherwise would pass to the Government. In any case, even if
the full amount of 7-2 million roubles was paid, it would be a
poor return on the enormous (and in fact incalculable) capital
investment which had been devoted to the line. In addition to
all these advantages, the Government agreed to spend an
additional 15 million roubles on improving the railway before
it was transferred.

Other railways sold to private interests were the Odessa
Railway, sold to a steamship company, the FJizavetgrad-
Kremenchug line, sold to the Kharkov-Kremenchug Railway,
the Moscow-Kursk Railway, and the Kiev-Zhmerinka line. The
latter was sold to the Kiev-Brest Railway at its true capital
value, the Government receiving two-thirds of the payment in
the company’s guaranteed debentures (guaranteed, that is, by
the Government itself) and one-third in unguaranteed shares.
The subsequent adjustments and subsidies meant that in effect
the Government was actually paying the private company to
take over the line. As for the Moscow-Kursk Railway, this was
obviously destined to become a key and highly profitable line,
serving as it did a mining and industrial area and soon to be
connected with the developing South Ukraine. Hence there were
several rival bids for the line. The chosen purchaser was a
consortium of Moscow financiers who in fact had offered a price
lower than some of the competing bids. Their offer was
accepted probably because one of the consortium, Chizhov, was
a friend of Del’vig, who at that time was performing the duties
of Minister of Ways and Communications. The price was 52
million roubles, but since the Government retained the deben-
tures the only cash transaction was the sale of 15 million
roubles’ worth of shares.

The disposal of the state railways was hardly a good bargain
for the Government. Most of the lines concerned began to show
a profit soon after their transfer. Although this may well have
been partly due to stricter management (and in particular to
local in place of departmental management from St Petersburg),
it is also true that the natural growth of traffic volume was the
main reason. How the Government could bring itself to carry
out so disadvantageous a transaction is only explicable in the
light of its financial difficulties and the activities of various
interested parties inside the government apparatus and at
Court. By 1880 only about 60 km. of railway remained under
state management. On the other hand the Government held the
majority, sometimes all, of the private railways’ debentures and
enjoyed a certain part of die profits, even though the companies
found various ways to reduce this share.

But since under the terms of their agreements the private
owners found it more advantageous to make a loss than a profit,
the financial drain on the Treasury continued. At die same time,
the railways were becoming less and less capable of meeting the
country’s transport requirements. Their inefficiency and lack of
capacity were highlighted during the Turkish War in the late
seventies. For this reason the Government reversed its policy;
it began to purchase the private railways, both the ex-state
lines and companies which had always been private. Since the
Government already held most of die debentures only the shares
had to be bought to effect this change. According to one
calculation, in 1883 of the total capital invested in private
railways no less than four-fifths was provided by the Govern-
ment, which nevertheless had little control over the manage-
ment. The first railways to be purchased tended to be the less
profitable ones (which had long invoked their annual right to
the government-guaranteed dividend) and with the greatest
debt to the Government. This is the main reason why the state
railways in later years tended to be less profitable than the
private companies; it was not simply a case of state ownership
leading to inefficiency, as many champions of private enterprise
alleged.

Among the companies purchased in the eighties were the
Ryazhsk-Morshansk, Kharkov-Nikolaev, Baltic, Tambov-
Saratov, and Urals railways. The debts of the companies to the
State uwpcanrpllod (ahnnt 1,1CW> millinn rnnhlne), and in snnw
cases the State also paid off the private creditors of the pur-
chased railways. In many cases lines were taken over before the
expiry of tlie twenty-year period of unassailable ownership
which their charters had stipulated, but this was with the
agreement (and usually to the great satisfaction) of the com-
panies. Later, some of the profitable lines were taken over,
their owners receiving very favourable terms. Since the charters
usually stipulated that in such cases the compensation paid
would be based on the most profitable of the preceding five
years the shares might well be valued considerably higher than
their current stock exchange quotation. Sometimes the Govern-
ment would resist the more extravagant demands. For example,
negotiations for the purchase of the Tambov-Kozlov Railway
lasted five years, during which the price asked for the 100-
rouble shares was reduced from 112 • 5 roubles to par. But as
the shares had been quoted on the Stock Exchange at 85
roubles, the shareholders could hardly complain.

By 1890 about a quarter of the railway mileage belonged to
tlie state railways, and the process of government acquisition
continued during the following decade so that by 1898, 55 per
cent of the mileage wras state-owned. Because during this
period private companies with government encouragement
were building secondary lines, what was happening was that
new key railways wrere being built by the State, while less
important lines were entrusted to private enterprise.

Tlie Government intended to take over all the big companies,
but as some of these were profitable and still had several years
remaining of their statutory period of private operation the
Government felt unable to purchase them by mutual agreement.
It did, however, reach new agreements with them by which it
created a few big, strong, companies out of the previous smaller
lines. The Ryazan-Uralsk Railway, for example, was formed in
1892 by allowing the private (and profitable) Ryazan-Kozlov
Railway to operate the state-owned Kozlov-Saratov line. The
new company thus formed granted the Government a share in
its profits as well as a rental for the use of the government line.
At the same time the Government allowed it to build some
new branches and extensions.

Other new railways formed in the same way were the South-
Eastern, the Moscow-Vindava-Rybinsk, Moscow-Kiev-Voro-
nezh, Moscow—Kazan, and Moscow-Archangel companies. But
the change was probably not as beneficial to the Government as
might appear. The companies by various devices were able to
reduce the participation of the Government in the profits of
these railways. For example the Ryazan-Uralsk Railway in
1895 paid its shareholders a 17-7 per cent dividend (in the
same year the Kazan and Archangel railways were paying SO
per cent) but the Government received only 1,600,000 roubles
as rent for its share of the mileage, whereas the interest pay-
ments it paid on the capital of this section of the line amounted
to 2,900,000 roubles. In subsequent years even the rent was
not paid and the Railway's debt to the Government increased
year by year. The Government decided to purchase it as soon
as the term of its private ownership should expire, and in
preparation for this appointed its own directors to the manage-
ment in order to gain experience in readiness for the takeover.

The South-Eastern Railway (formed from the Gryaz-
Tsaritsyn, Kozlov-Voronezh-Rostov, Orel-Gryaz, and Livny
railways) did somewhat better than the Ryazan-Uralsk Rail-
way. It became prosperous immediately, and in 1895 holders of
the 125-rouble unamortized shares received a ten-rouble divi-
dend, while the Government’s four-fifths share of the remaining
profit amounted to nearly a million roubles.

By 1898 there were seventeen private railway companies (as
compared to forty-four in 1886). Of the total mileage of about
20,000 kin., 17,700 km. belonged to seven big companies.
(Ryazan-Uralsk 8,800 km., South-Eastern 3,700 km., Vladi-
kavkaz 2,300 km., Moscow-Kiev-Voronezh 2,100 km.,
Moscow-Archangel 2,000 km., Moscow-Vindava-Rybinsk
2,000 km., Moscow-Kazan 1,700 km.). Another three com-
panies accounted for 1,500 km. of the remainder (the First
Company of Feeder Lines, the Warsaw-Vienna and Ivangorod-
Dombrova railways).

TRAFFIC

Between 1865 and 1880 freight traffic increased by about four
times, between 1880 and 1890 it more than doubled, and
between 1890 and 1900 it almost doubled again. Passenger
movements experienced a similar growth. Apart from this rapid
development of traffic the period from 1865 to 1900 was
characterized by an increase in the average lengths of freight
and passenger journey as more and more of the country partici-
pated in a national economy based on rail-bome commerce,
and a change in the composition of traffic. The latter was
characterized first by an increase, then a decline, in the relative
importance of grain traffic.

While it is not true that the railways caused the increase in
grain movements (which in fact doubled during the forties,
before the railways were built) there is no doubt that they
accelerated the changeover from subsistence farming to the
cultivation of grain for sale. Several railways were built solely
to aid grain exports, as a contribution towards reducing
Russia's unfavourable balance of trade. It was in the seventies
that grain attained its highest relative importance in rail-freight
traffic; in 1870 it represented 27 per cent of all freight ship-
ments, and in 1875 42 per cent. Soon after this, although grain
shipments continued to increase, they were outpaced by other
types of freight so that in 1882 they represented only a quarter,
and by 1897 only a fifth, of total freight traffic.1 Among the
freight which was increasing at a faster-than-average rate was
coal, which in the years 1895-97 averaged 15 per cent of total
freight shipments, oil products (7 per cent), iron and steel
products (4 per cent). Timber remained stable at 2 per cent of
the total. While the tonnage of all the main categories was
rising, so was their average length of haul. Oil products in
1876-80 moved, on average, 154 km., but in 1896-98 this rose
to 520 km. Coal changed from 302 to 380 km., timber from 172

1 LyaslxJienko, P. History of the National Economy of Russia. N.Y., 1949, pp. 512,
515, and Trudy vol'novo eionomicheskovo obshchestva. Series 2, St Petersburg, 1898.
to 826 km., and the six principal grains from 507 to 685
km1

By 1890 the South-Western Railway had become by far the
largest carrier of freight (5-4 million tons), followed by tlie
Nikolaev (2-9 million), Warsaw-Vienna (2-9 million), Mos-
cow-Kursk and Orel-Vitebsk (2 million each). The two coal-
carrying lines (the Donetz and Ekaterinin railways) were,
however, challenging the older-established routes with 1 • 7
million tons each. Most railways were heavily dependent on
either grain or coal traffic or both; wheat represented a quarter
of the South-Western’s traffic, 27 per cent of the Nikolaev’s,
and a quarter of the Moscow-Kursk’s. This preponderance was
even more evident on some of the smaller lines, 46 per cent of
the Moscow-Ryazan’s and 55 per cent of the Vladikavkaz
Railway’s freight was wheat, and other grains were also
carried. Railways dependent on the coal trade included the
Warsaw-Vienna (55 per cent), Donetz (70 per cent) and
Ekaterinin (45 per cent). Among the smaller lines, often built
for one particular traffic, dependence on a single category of
freight was even more marked. The Baskunchak Railway,4 for
example, carried 188,000 tons of freight in 1890 and of this
187,000 tons was salt.3

Passenger journeys increased from 34 «4 million in 1881 to
44'3 million in 1890 and during the nineties more than doubled.
Whereas in the seventies passenger travel rose from the end
of the winter, through the spring to the end of the summer,
and then fell, in later decades the peak period shifted from
August to May and June and traffic began to decline in July
rather than September. This was probably due to a fall in the
importance of farm labour traffic and a rise in the so-called
dacha traffic of townsfolk commuting to their country cottages.
Certainly, the proportion of short distance journeys to the
total was rising as commuter services developed. In 1894, 58
per cent of passenger journeys were for less than 50 versts
(53 km.).

In 1893 die South-Western Railway, with its big mileage

*	Lyashchenko. P. Op. cit, pp. 515-16.

•Tlie Baskunchak Railway, built from the Baskunchak salt deposits to tlie
Volga, was one of four lines isolated from the main network and not interchanging
freight with other lines. The others were the Tsarskoye Selo, Trans-Caucasus,
and Urals railways.

*	Statitiicheiiu obzor. Op. cit., p. SO.
and two urban areas at Kiev and Odessa, carried more pas-
sengers than any other railway, the Warsaw-Vienna was in
second place, and the-Baltic Railway third. But in 18.96 and
1897 the Baltic Railway was in first place with an annual
average of 3,898,000 passengers (of which four-fifths were com-
muters), the South-Western Railway was second (3,811,000),
the Warsaw-Vienna third (2,441,000) and the Nikolaev Rail-
way fourth (2,379,000).1

PROFIT AND LOSS

In general, the railways were unprofitable during almost the
whole of the Iasi three decades of the nineteenth century. While
their operating expenses were usually lower than their operat-
ing income, the resulting net revenue was seldom large enough
to cover interest on capital. One reason for this was the exces-
sive capital involved: railway promoters had taken care to see
that the nominal capital of their lines (i.e. the face value of
shares and debentures) was much in excess of the real capital
actually used. Nor was there any stimulus to profitable opera-
tion, for the Government guaranteed interest on most of the
capital. The guaranteed interest was usually 5 per cent and as
the capital was issued at a sizeable discount the resulting real
rate of interest compared well with corresponding West
European stocks. Repayment to the Government of its guaran-
teed-interest payments was avoided by making sure that net
rpvpniu» rw>wr rnsA ton high It was hoped, and the hope was
justified, that w-hen eventually the State acquired the private
railways, their debts to the Government would be written off.
In fact some charters provided for this. Unless a railway was
likely to be enormously profitable a constantly increasing debt
to the Government could be considered a sign of smart manage-
ment. According to the Baranov Commission, at the beginning
of the eighties, of thirty-seven private companies only five were
neither in debt nor calling for the guaranteed-interest payments.
As a whole, the private railways then owed 1,100 million
roubles to the Government.

In these circumstances the tendency for railway unprofita-
bility to worsen w hile traffic was increasing is not so surprising.
This happened to many railways in the seventies. Between 1870

1 Trudy. Op. cit., p. 139.
and 1879, for example, traffic on the Kursk-Kharkov-Azov
Railway rose by three and a half times and its gross income
doubled, yet its debt to the Government rose by six and a half
times. Similarly with the Dunaburg-Vitebsk Railway; traffic
rose by tw'o and a half times, gross income almost doubled, and
indebtedness to the Treasury increased by two and a half times.
And these two lines were not exceptional.1

In 1881 the operating income of Russian railways totalled
201 million roubles, and operating expenses 151 million. By
1890 income had risen to 285 million, and expenses to 172
million. Eighteen per cent of the operating income was from
passenger operations, and 78 per cent from freight. The
average leccipts per pood/verst of freight decreased from
0-0280 kopeks to 0*0243 during this decade.

The 113 million roubles operating profit of 1890 was dis-
tributed as follows: 74 per cent as payments on debentures,
6 per cent on repayment of debts to the Government, 5 per
cent on extraordinary expenses such as workers' compensation.
The remaining 15 per cent represented dividends on the un-
guaranteed shares of private railways together with the net
profit of certain state railways. But the 74 per cent accounted
for by interest paid on debentures was equal to 85 million
roubles only, and 119 million roubles was due. Hence there
was a 34 million deficit to be financed by the Treasury.

By 1884 the Ministry of Finance was able to say that the
railways’ debt was equal to ten times the Government's annual
budget deficit At the end of 1891 the indebtedness of the
railways to the Government totalled 310 million hard roubles
plus 597 million credit roubles.2 This was an enormous sum,
and was still growing. However, during the nineties the state
railways improved their position, and in some years returned a
modest profit.

THE BARANOV COMMISSION

The growing inability of the railways to handle their traffic
effectively, culminating in the transport chaos during the war
against Turkey, prompted the establishment of the Baranov

1 Kislinskii. Op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 65.

* Statistichrskii obxor zhelmtykk dorog i i-nutrtnnM vodnykh putei. St Petersburg,
1893, pp. 4, 8, 10.
Commission, charged with making recommendations for the
improvement of the railways. Set up in 1878, its work dragged
on for years. Baranov himself had died before its principal
creation, the General Charter for Russian Railways, was
approved in 1885. Nevertheless the findings of its investiga-
tions w ere enlightening and some of the recommendations made
during the course of its work (for example, government loans
for increasing line capacity) were significant.

The main recommendations of the Commission were con-
tained in its proposed General Charter. The first article of this
would have established an autonomous Council for Railway
Affairs, uniting all interested parties, and parallel local councils.
This was designed to end the predominance of the Ministry of
Ways and Communications in the governmental supervision of
railways and the consequent over-emphasis of tlie technical
point of view. However, in the final charter, accepted by the
Government, the Council for Railway Affairs was a compara-
tively unimportant body. The remaining sections of the charter
were mainly concerned with establishing unified rules and
obligations. Hitherto each railway acknowledged different
obligations to its clients, nor did the railways admit any liability
for loss of goods in transit or spoilage resulting from unreason-
able delays. The main effect of die General Charter was to
impose these responsibilities on the railways by means of a
single set of regulations applicable to every7 company.

The first recommendation of the Commission for a Supreme
Railway Council having been rejected, railway administration
at the end of the century- was in the hands of three separate
ministries. The Ministry of State Control inspected the
accounts of the individual railways. The Ministry of Ways and
Communications was a technical and executive body. A re-
organization in 1899 had provided it with two special direc-
torates (one for operating and the other for building railways)
each of which had their own functional committees. Finally
there was the Ministry of Finance, with its Tariff Council,
Tariff Committee, Railway Department and its Commission on
New Railways. It was responsible for tariffs, financial matters,
including state purchase of private railways, and general plans
of railway development.

The state railways had a manager, assisted by representatives
of the three ministries. Below this council were the functional
departments; traffic, commercial, track and buildings, rolling
stock and traction, workshops, stores, telegraphs, and receipts.
New lines, if small, were entrusted to the management of the
adjacent railway. Big new lines had a special construction
management, which was dissolved when the work was finished.

TARIFFS

Until the mid-eighties there was no tariff system in the real
sense. Each railway had its own rates, its own concessions,
exclusions, commodity groups, mileage computations and all
the other factors which are mixed together to produce a rate
for a given shipment to a given yuiiit uiidei given conditions.
Tlie resulting chaos, especially when a shipment was routed
over more than one railway, was such that not even specialist
tariff clerks could be relied on to work out the correct rates.
For the shipper it was impossible, and he tended, therefore, to
suspect overcharging.

From the earliest days of railways in Russia the Government
had not seen fit to impose any strict control on railway tariffs.
The Tsarskoye Selo Railway had complete freedom, and even
the Main Company was only limited as regards maximum
tariffs. Alexander II and his ministers had favoured the liberal
concept of the free play of economic forces preventing excessive
abuses of this tariff freedom. 1Ъе charters of later railways
simply stipulated that the maximum tariffs should not exceed
those which had been agreed for the Main Company

It soon became evident that what was required were not
maximum rates, but government-controlled minimum tariffs.
The existence of government guarantees of interest on capital
and the consequent indifference to unprofitable operation,
enabled the railways to lower their tariffs to what in normal
circumstances would have been a ruinous level. They did this
for competitive reasons, to strengthen their own and their
region’s economic standing. 'Ibis tariff competition in turn led
to the routing of traffic by roundabout routes and to a distortion
of the natural location of industry.

In the charters of new railways the Government began to
repair the damage caused by its previous laissez-faire attitude.
The charter of the Donetz Railway was the first to give the
Government the right to inspect tariffs (ever)’ five years), but
the general situation remained unsatisfactory. The confusion
was intensified by frequent tariff changes, often unpublished.
In subsequent charters (for instance of the Moscow-Brest and
Vladikavkaz railways) provisions were included for the state
supervision of minimum tariffs, but already existing railways
were not affected by this.

The first really decisive measure was taken in 1886. This
concerned freight rates from the Baltic ports. The various rail-
ways had previously applied very low rates on goods moving
eastwards from the Baltic in order to secure better utilization
of cars returning from the grain export outlets. This had led
to an outbreak of fresh competition between railways and
between tlie ports they served and the situation finally stabilized
itself with very low, and equal, rates from these ports to the
centre. Thus, although Koenigsberg was 530 km., and Libau
370 km. further from Moscow than Revel, the cost of shipping
freight to Moscow from all these points was the same. In effect
this meant that tariffs for import traffic were less than local
tariffs and Russian manufacturers were soon complaining that
this enabled foreign goods, despite duties, to undercut home-
made products. Equal charges also fostered artificial competi-
tion between ports and distorted their natural hinterlands. The
Government decided to end this situation and, claiming that
railway charters made no mention of the companies’ rights
concerning foreign traffic, imposed government supervision of
tariff's for through traffic to and from foreign points.

In 1887 the State Council acknowledged the principle that
where the interests of the State and of the general good were
involved, the Government had a duty to intervene in tariff
matters. Tlie Ministries of Finance, Ways and Communications,
Crown Lands and State Control were requested to work out a
tariff' law. This request, taken with the earlier law requiring
railways to submit their accounts to the Ministry of State
Control, marks the end of the Government’s laissez-faire
attitude towards railway management.

In 1888 it was decided that the Ministry of Finance should
have exclusive right of supervision of tariff's, and in 1889 the
Temporary Statute on Tariff' Matters was adopted, destined to
remain in force for three decades. This statute established three
permanent bodies: the Council for Tariff Affairs in the Ministry
of Finance (similar to the Council for Railway Affairs in the
Ministry of Ways and Communications) which would contain
representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Ways and Com-
munications, Interior, Crown Lands and State Control, together
with delegates from trade, industry, agriculture and the private
railways; the Tariff Committee, which would be composed of
representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Ways and Com-
munications, and State Control; and the Department for Rail-
way Affairs. The Council for Tariff Aff airs was to be concerned
with the establishment and review of general principles, the
Tariff Committee was to resolve tariff questions considered to
affect the general good or the state’s interest, while the
Department for Railway Affairs was entrusted with the detailed
working out of tariffs. Provision was also made in the statute
for a special conference of railway representatives called by the
Ministry of Finance to discuss tariff problems.1 This conference,
or individual railways, could originate proposals for tariff
changes but their proposals had to be confirmed by the new
tariff bodies, and the Ministry of Finance was free to modify
or reject them.

Vitte, a former official of the South-Western Railway whose
book Principles of Railway Tariffs had been the first on this
subject in Russian and had created for the author the reputation
of an outstanding tariff' expert, was appointed head of the
Department for Railway Affairs.2 Acknowledging the danger of
making changes too rapidly and too widely, the formulation of
unified tariff’s for the whole railway system was achieved
category by category over a period of years. First were
evolved new tariffs for grain, then for other vital bulk freights
and finally for the less important commodity groups. The
underlying basis of these reforms was a gradual discrimination
in favour of long-distance traffic; the per-verst charge diminished
as the distance increased. The principle was intended not so
much to reflect the fact that long-distance traffic had lower costs
per verst, but to encourage the development of distant areas.
The Urals ironmasters had long complained of their disadvan-
tage in the Russian market, and Siberia was being opened up
by railway penetration. It was for the benefit of regions such

1 There was also a conference on conventions, to discuss inter-line agreements in
relation to through traffic, etc.

’ Vitte was later to become one of the few Russian Prime Ministers who were
not mere puppets. His memoirs contain much information and comment of railway
interest.
as these that the favourable long-distance tariff's were intro-
duced.

By 1893 the genera} unified tariff was in full operation. There
remained to be done only passenger tariff’s (again with a
reducing long-distance rate) and to make certain adjustments.
Apart from a few special rates, the latter consisted of the
Chelyabinsk 'break*, which was introduced to protect land-
owners in European Russia from the competition of Siberian
grain. This rate break divided the haul into two sections: from
Siberia to Chelyabinsk and from Chelyabinsk to destination.
By calculating each section separately, so that instead of one
long-distance haul there were two of medium distance, the
reduction in the rates due to length of haul was partially
avoided. In 1901 relief was given to railways originating grain
traffic. Some of these, particularly the Ryazan-Uralsk and South-
Eastern railways, suffered from the low rates on long-distance
grain. They themselves had the expense of originating this
traffic but only carried it for short distances, while the 'bridge*
lines to the ports, with their greater mileage, claimed the bulk
of the receipts. The 1901 adjustment, which was intended to
be only temporary, allowed a higher tariff for the first 126
versts of the haul.

OPERATION

In the seventies the railways began to show signs of a lack of
capacity. In 1873, for instance, export grain piled up at the
stations of the Odessa Railway and nearly a fifth of it was
spoiled. Some years later the Donetz Railway was forced to
hire cars from other railways to meet the demands of its coal
traffic. This was a period of rapid traffic growth as agriculture
was commercialized, heavy industry developed in the South
Ukraine and elsewhere, and secondary industries began to
appear. Railway traffic doubled between 1874 and 1884 and the
railway crisis came to a head in 1877 and 1878. The military
traffic occasioned by the Turkish War, the blockade of the
Black Sea ports which necessitated the diversion of southern
export freight to the Baltic, the growth of heavy traffic origi-
nating from the Donetz and Ekaterinin Railways, all contributed
to a chaotic situation on the railways in the south of Russia.
The resulting failure of the southern railways to adequately
supply the Russian army led to government intervention and
the Baranov Commission.

Even before the war the Government had made loans from
the Railway Fund to lines requiring capital to increase line
capacity by installing double track, building warehouses, and
buying extra freight cars, and this practice was continued. At
the same time measures were taken to impose a higher degree of
standardization in the design of locomotives and rolling stock.
But tlie main need was to improve operating efficiency by a
co-ordination of activities between the separate companies.

A step in this direction had been taken earlier with the
formation of the Kharkov Coal Committee, which brought
railway officials and mineowners together, to reduce the backlog
of coal awaiting shipment by means of planned distribution,
both of rolling stock and of coal supplies. The idea had later
been adopted by tlie metal industry. But the main cause of
railway inefficiency was tlie restriction on through-car workings
between railways. The practice of unloading freight from one
car into another at the boundaries separating different railways
was not universal, for in 1869 a few railways had made inter-
change agreements, and the Government in granting improve-
ment loans had stipulated that recipient railways must institute
through-car workings (and in the case of double-track lines,
allow the passage of complete trains from other railways). But
the practice was sufficiently widespread to cause the Govern-
ment to make interchange obligatory for all railways from 1879.

The common-user system of car utilization which this
obligation entailed was based on a car-for-car standard. A
railway forwarding a loaded car would receive a similar car
from the receiving railway. Failure to provide a car in exchange
resulted in a fine. No railway was allowed to keep a car for
more than three years (in fact it probably would not wish to,
as the car by then w'ould be due for repair). The Russian system
therefore differed from the American practice, where receiving
railways paid an agreed rate for the use of ‘foreign’ cars.
Probably the Russian method was better, because of the diffi-
culty of putting an accurate money value on the use of cars; a
price too low would cause railways to retain numbers of
‘foreign’ cars rather than provide their own, while too high a
price would encourage receiving railways to return cars im-
mediately, even if this meant long empty journeys. But the
Russian system was probably less efficient than the Prussian,
under which a central clearing house allocated cars according
to day-by-day needs. •

While most operating indices showed a steady improvement
during this period, the accident rate deteriorated rapidly during
the nineties. Whereas in 1880, 455 people were killed and 979
injured on the railways, in 1895 there were 589 deaths and
1,347 injuries.1 Expressed as casualties per million train/kilo-
metres casualties were 14-4 in 1880 and 27*1 in 1895. The
increasing accident rate was presumably due to higher traffic
densities and the increasing speed of trains may have been a
secondary factor.

The railways wore beginning to treat their problems from a
more scientific angle. In the eighties, for example, systematic
records were kept of snowstorms in all parts of the country,
so that it might be possible to forecast them with more accuracy.
On the Morshansk-Syzran line each of the track foremen (who
were stationed every 12 km.) had a wind gauge and direction
indicator. When the wind was of the quality which previous
experience showed to herald a blizzard, the foreman would
inform the nearest stationmaster. The latter would consult his
barometer and if necessary would telegraph the railway
management and the chief of the local depot. Freight trains
would then be cancelled and their engines used to haul the
passenger trains.1 By this means could be avoided situations
such as befell the South-Western Railway in October 1882,
when trains leaving Odessa on the 3rd arrived at Kiev only on
the 6th, or the Nikolaev Railway in March 1883, when 12,000
man-days were spent digging out stranded trains.

By 1890 the railw ay labour force had grown to 252,415, and
was to increase yet further in the following decade, reaching
half a million by the end of the century. Of the 1890 workers,
only 167,464 had the status of permanent workers; 10,447
were temporary and 74,504 daily. The permanent workers,
who naturally included the more senior or qualified grades,

* These figures include all deaths on the railways, both public and railway staff.
Even suicides are included. Accidents to passengers were much fewer: 18 deaths
in 1886, 52 in 1888 (the year of a serious collision on the Moscow-Brest Railway
and of the Borki derailment), 28 in 1890. See Strumilin, S. Statistichesko—
ekonomicheskiye ocherki. Moscow, 1958, p. 644: and Statisticherkii obzor. Op. cit.,
p. 18.

•Sec Zapiski Imp. Akad. Sauk. Vol. 6'2 (1890).
received an average wage of 370 roubles per annum, the
temporary workers only 192. The daily workers averaged 78
kopeks per day, and on a yearly basis (many were in fact
‘permanently’ employed, even though lacking that status) this
was about the same rate as the temporary workers received.
The wagebill in 1890 accounted for 47 per cent of the railways’
expenditure.1

Strikes during the period 1865-1900 tended to become more
industrial in character. In the first years it was labourers
engaged on railway construction who adopted the somewhat
forlorn hope of a strike to improve their lot. In 1865, 200
labourers struck and appealed to a local governor to improve
conditions, but they had little success; many were arrested or
beaten. Ten years later troops were used to suppress a strike
by labourers building the Orenburg Railway when the con-
tractor had reduced wages below the agreed level. In the fol-
lowing years it was workers in railway workshops who took the
lead. There was a three-and-a-half week unsuccessful strike at
the Odessa shops in 1877. In 1879, 2,000 workers at the Kiev
shops struck after Saturday working hours had been increased.
In 1894 the Rostov workshops, and in 1895 the Moscow shops
of the Kazan Railway held strikes, and the latter was partially
successful in gaining its demands. But the Gomel' strike of
1899, which lasted six weeks, was suppressed by troops and
the increased wages which had been demanded were not
granted. In 1900 there were strikes in railway workshops at
Tiflis and Kharkov. In 1902 operating railwaymen were
involved in the Rostov strike.

PASSENGER SERVICES

By 1880 improving technical standards had permitted significant
acceleration of passenger services on some lines, and developing
traffic led to a more frequent service. On the Nikolaev Railway
which fourteen years previously had operated between St
Petersburg and Moscow three trains each way of which the
fastest took I9| hours, the service in the summer of 1880 was
provided by five through trains in each direction. The fastest
of these, limited to first- and second-class travellers, took 15
hours and made eight intermediate stops. Its overall average

1 Statulichttkii obzor. Op. cit., p. 22. Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 635.
speed was 42 km. per hour (26 m.p.h.). The slowest train took
25 hours.1

On the former Moscow-Sergiev Posad Railway, since be-
come the Moscow-Yaroslavl-Vologda Railway, there was one
through train to Yaroslavl leaving Moscow at 8.15 p.m. and
arriving at 7.09 a.m., representing an overall average speed of
26 km. per hour (16 m.p.h.). Having arrived at Yaroslavl any
traveller unfortunate enough to be bound for Vologda would
cross the Volga by ferry, and then take the Company's narrow
gauge train which left at 9.15 a.m. This would trundle into
Vologda eleven hours later, having averaged 19 km. per hour
(12 m.p.h.) from Yaroslavl.

The Moscow-Nizhnii Novgorod Railway provided one of
the country’s fastest services. Of its two daily through trains
in each direction, the fastest needed 13 hours making an overall
average speed of 44 km. per hour (27 m.p.h.). The somewhat
newer lines out of Moscow, to Kursk and Brest, also provided
running w'hich was lively compared to the Moscow-Yaroslavl
service.2 On the Moscow-Kursk Railway there were three daily
trains in each direction and the best of these averaged 36 km.
per hour (23 m.p.h.) over the 536 km. On the Moscow-Brest
Railway the through trains to Warsaw covered the 419 km.
from Moscow to Smolensk at 33 km. per hour (21 m.p.h.).

Most of the older suburban services remained as before
although here and there accelerations had taken place. The
Petersburg-Oranienbaum line still provided only four trains
daily in each direction, just as in tlie sixties. A curious feature
of this particular sendee was that while the three ordinary
trains needed 1 hour 20 minutes for the trip, the other train,
reserved for first- and second-class passengers, needed five
minutes longer.

Fares had been edging upwards over the previous years and
on average were about 25 per cent above tlie level of the mid-
sixties. Different railways had different policies. The Moscow-
Yaroslavl-Vologda Railway, for example, was one of the rail-
ways which reduced the rate as the distance of journey increased.
Between Moscow* and Sergiev Posad it charged 3*6 kopeks
per kilometre for first class, and 2  8 and 1 • 3 kopeks for the

1 Bradshaw's Continental Railway Guide. Summer 1880.

* In fairness it should be added that the Moscow-Yaroslavl’s fastest train was
open to third-class passengers, while the best services of the other railways
mentioned in this section were for first and second class only.
other two classes. But passengers travelling four times as far to
Yaroslavl paid 3-5, 2-0 and 1-2 kopeks respectively. There
were considerable variations also between the different railways,
even between two railways belonging to the Main Company,
for the St Petersburg to Moscow fares were 3-7, 2-5 and 1 -3
kopeks per kilometre, whereas for the somewhat shorter
Moscow-Nizhnii Novgorod journey they were 3*5, 1*9 and
0-9 kopeks.1

RAILWAY EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION

The Government continued to encourage the development of a
railway supply industry in Russia, but domestic producers
evinced little enthusiasm, at least at first. Railways whose
charters had contained, on government insistence, provisions
reserving a certain proportion of the rails and rolling stock to
domestic factories frequently found excuses to import all their
requirements. As foreign equipment was cheaper and usually
better than the Russian production, they could hardly be blamed
for doing so.

In the early seventies the Government adopted two measures
to foster home rail production in the south. It founded a new
state factory at Lisichansk to provide pig-iron for rail-making,
and it granted concessions for rail-rolling plants to three
Russian and two British entrepreneurs. However, Lisichansk
suffered from the poor quality of the local coal, and of the
projects for rail production in south Russia only the Welshman
Hughes's factory at Novorossiisk was successful. (Hughes was
one of the few foreigners who gave the Government good value
for its concessions.) The notorious Polyakov obtained one of
the concessions and received financial support and a grant of
land for his project before requesting (and receiving) permission
to transfer the orders he had received to Hughes. He claimed
that there wras too poor a water supply on his site. To fill the
gap left by these failed concessions a few existing metal works
were adapted for rail production.

In view of the expanding capacity of domestic rail factories,
most charters granted in the late sixties and the seventies
stipulated that from one-quarter to one-third of the rails used

1 The special concessionary and money-losing third-class fare on the Nikolaev
Railway seems to have disappeared when the railway was sold to the Main
Company.
should be of home manufacture. Despite the increasing mileage
of new lines, and of old lines needing new rails, imports of rails
were slightly less in 1874 than in 1869, so the Government’s
policy could be considered successful. Unfortunately, a new
crisis developed when the production of steel rails became a
practical proposition. In 1866, on government initiative, the
Nikolaev Railway had laid an experimental section of steel rails
and these were as outstandingly successful as they had proved
to be in Western Europe; they lasted much longer and were
comparatively immune to dangerous breakages. Soon all the
Russian railways were clamouring for them. The iron industry
had been slow to take advantage of recent developments in the
technique of steel production, and the conversion of rail factories
from iron to steel raw material was not a simple matter. So in
1874 the Government willingly allowed the Putilov factory to
cease producing iron rails, and in addition promised a generous
contract after the conversion of the works for steel rail manu-
facture. (It offered a price of 2-37 roubles per pood, as com-
pared to the selling price of English steel rails of 1*70 roubles,
including shipping and tariffs).1 Ilie Special Commission on
Russian Railway Equipment which had been established in 1875
recommended similar contracts for other factories converting
to steel rails, with the concealed subsidy diminishing in suc-
ceeding years. This was done, and in later years the converted
factories, having formed a cartel, carried on a highly profitable
business behind a growing wall of tariff protection. In these
circumstances, it was not difficult in the nineties to replace the
old converted works by new ones, built specially for the task.
By 1898 there were thirteen steel rail factories with an annual
capacity of half a million tons.

While the comparatively simple freight and passenger cars
presented little technical difficulty to Russian builders, it was a
different matter with locomotives. Most engines were imported
from Britain, France, Belgium, Germany or Austria. With the
engines came mechanics from the foreign factories to assemble
them and watch over their early work on Russian railways.
These ‘chief erectors’, who were predominantly Scottish or
German, were men skilled and resourceful, prepared to work
not only in the ports but in isolated depots. They had many
unpleasant encounters with customs officials and traditional

* Kislimkii. Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 250.
Russian suspicion. In the ports there was sometimes no proper
loading equipment, and even when a hoist was improvised
there was no guarantee that the wharf would not collapse under
the weight of the engine. One enterprising erector, in order
that a line might be built simultaneously from both its termini,
took a locomotive 220 kilometres on a peasant-hauled sledge.
At one point his engine dropped through ice into a lake and
he hired foresters to build a wooden coffer-dam so that his
machine might be retrieved.1

To foster domestic locomotive production the Government
made tariff changes and also agreed to give contracts for state
railway engines to five enterprises which had declared them-
selves willing to adapt themselves for locomotive building.
These were the Nevskii, Kolomna, and Maltsev works, the
workshops of the St Petersburg-Warsaw Railway and the state-
owned Kama-Votkinsk factory. The prices were high, and in
addition the Government promised to pay a subsidy for each
engine these works produced for the private railways. Although
the St Petersburg-Warsaw Railway’s workshops (the old
Leichtenberg works) failed to take advantage of this offer the
remaining four factories produced thirty-nine engines in 1870
and by 1879 this figure had grown to 251, of which half came
from the Nevskii Works and more than a third from Kolomna.8

But the generous support offered by the Government soon
caused over-production. Tlie so-called ‘government reserve' of
engines was swollen with locomotives not needed by the state
railways, which at this time could have been supplied adequately
by a single factor}’. In 1884 the Government announced that
further state orders could no longer be counted on, and until
the new railway boom of the nineties locomotive production
never again exceeded 100 units per annum. But by 1899 produc-
tion had climbed to 875 units and seven factories were now
involved (Kolomna, Votkinsk, Nevskii, Bryansk, Putilov,
Kharkov and Sormovo; the Maltsev works had ceased produc-
tion in 1881).8 Of the 5,196 engines delivered to Russian
railways in the nineties, only 826 were imported.

*	Reminiscences by one of these chief erectors were published in the Railway
Magazine, 1913 and 1914.

*	Rakov, V. Op. cit., pp. 10, 70.

•	The Nikolaev Railway had continued to obtain its locomotives from its own
Alexandrovsk works which produced 131 engines 1869-93. After 1893 the Railway
obtained its engines elsewhere.
LOCOMOTIVE AND ROLLING-STOCK POLICY

During the seventies and eighties the 0-6-0 continued to be
the usual locomotive type for freight work, and the 2-4—0 for
passenger. Many variations of these basic types were built by
different factories for individual railways, but the two-cylinder

fig. 5. A 2-4-0 type built by Borzig in 1866 far the Ryazan-Uralsk
Railway.

arrangement and the simple design were maintained. In the
period 1860-80, 73 per cent of imported engines were of the
0-6-0 freight type, and 17 per cent of the 2—4-0 (and 0-4—2)
passenger type.1 The only railways which had a radically
different locomotive policy were the Trans-Caucasus and the

fig. 6. One of the 0-6-0 designs used by the Ryazan-Uralsk Railway.
This example was built by Dubs in the early seventies.

Urals railways. The former, whose Poti-Tiflis main line
included the formidable Suram Pass with its 1 in 25 gradients,®
started with some 0-4—4 tank units built by the Yorkshire
Engine Company, but in 1880 began to acquire a fleet of Fairlie

1	Rakov, V. Op. cit., p. 10.

* After 1890, when the line was relocated through tunnels, these gradients were
less severe.
engines. The latter, which in essence consisted of two 0-6-0
tank engines, permanently attached back-to-back with one cab
in the middle, provided a high power output, ability to negotiate
sharp curves, and did not require turntables. The railway bought
4.5 of these engines (of which 15 were purchased second-hand
from the Tambov-Saratov Railway). Designed for wood fuel,
they were later converted to oil burners and remained in
operation at least until the mid-thirties.

The Urals Railway, like the Trans-Caucasus, had difficult
gradients and it therefore adopted the 0-8-0 type for its freight
services. Designed and built in Germany, these engines with

fig. 7. One of the 0-8-0 freight locomotives used by the Moscow-
Kursk Railway in its early years.

their ll|-ton axle-weight proved very successful, and in 1879
the Kolomna works began to build them. This design was
chosen by the Main Company for supplementing the locomotive
stock of its Nikolaev and St Petersburg-Warsaw railways. For
its passenger services the Urals Railway introduced in 1878
what were probably the first passenger 2-6-0 engines in the
world. They were also notable in having a primitive form of
rocking grate. The locomotives of this railway were delivered
by river boats, as there was no rail connection with other lines.

One of the results of the Baranov Commission was a realiza-
tion that the Russian locomotive stock consisted of far too
many types, and that these were too small and feeble for
efficient operation. The so-called Temporary Directorate for
the State Railways in the Ministry of Ways and Communications
occupied itself with the problem of introducing standard
types of more powerful engines to be used on all the state
railways and, it was hoped, on the private lines also. Tlie first
positive result of this policy was the standardization of the ch
class of 0-8-0 freight engine. The first of these appeared from
Kolomna works in 1878, and was based on the German-built
engines of tlie Urals Railway. It had an axle weight of 12 tons,
which allowed it to work over lines laid with rails of SO kg./
metre (61 lb. per yd.) or heavier, and had a maximum speed

fig. 8. 'The type ch 0-8-0 locomotive built in large numbers to form
the 'government stock'. The drawing shows one of the compound units
built from 1886 onwards.

of 45 km. per hour (28 m.p.h.). It was thus suited to freight
haulage over most of the Russian main lines. After extensive
trials on various government railways the Ministry’ of Ways
and Communications approved it as a standard type for the
state railways. It was these engines which made up the 'govern-
ment reserve’ of subsidized locomotive production, and at first
they were allocated for strategic reasons to the state railways
in the western borderlands. They were built in large numbers
from 1879 to 1892 by the Kolomna and Maltsev works and
soon spread to other state railways. A few private companies
also ordered them.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century Russian engineers
began to apply scientific methods to locomotive design. A
motive power laboratory’, the world’s first, was established by
the South-Western Railway at Kiev in 1882 and experiments
carried out with compound engines. The work of Borodin of
A Russian passenger car of the late Nineteenth Century. This six-wheeler seems to be
one of the standard first-class vehicles, providing twenty-four sleeping places and
centrally-located toilet and stove. Sleeping cars first appeared in Russia on the Nikolaev
Railway, in 1866, Photo. iM-omotive Publishing Company.

for employees at remote stations the Kursk-Kharkov Sevastopol Railway provided this
hath car, reconstructed from a U.S.-built freight car. Attached to it is an old passenger
vehicle used to provide dressing cubicles. Photo. Iлатolhr Publishing Company.
(i. Kursk Station at about tlte end of the Nineteenth Century. Prominent handrails became
a typical feature of Russian locomotives after 1880, when a new regulation made them
compulsory, with die aim of reducing accidents to enginemen lubricating their machines
while in motion. Photo. Jsicomothv Publishing Company.

Most of the Fairlie locomotives of the Trans-Caucasus Railway were imported, hut this
example was built at Kolomna in I88+. I’lioto Locomotive Publishing Company.

Oil-burning freight locomotive built by Schwartzkopf for the Vladikavkaz Railway in 1875.
Photo. Locomotive Publishing Company.
the South-Western Railway, and of others, led to the populariza-
tion of the two-cylinder compound system for Russian loco-
motives. This system, it was found, could produce significant
fuel economies. Not only did new designs incorporate this idea,
but many existing engines, or types still in production, were
modified. From 1888 tlie ch engines of the 'government
reserve’ were built as compounds.

The next stage of freight locomotive development was the
evolution of the ‘1898 standard engine’. In 1892 Kolomna w orks
delivered to the private Vladikavkaz Railway some new' com-
pound 0-8-0 engines and, as the old ch type was becoming
obsolete, the Ministry of Ways and Communications ordered
spvpral similar engines for trial on two of the state railways.
After a few modifications the design wras adopted as standard
for the state railways and called the ‘1893 standard’. It was
later reclassified as the О class and about 9,000 units were built,
the basic design being modified in various ways over the years.
It was one of the most successful and numerous of Russian
engines and hundreds, probably thousands, were still at work
in the sixties on branch lines and in yard service.

The О class was in itself a great achievement in tlie stan-
dardization policy. Not only the State, but also the private
railways, were keen purchasers. And its significance was even
greater when it was found possible to design a passenger
engine using tlie О class boiler, cylinders and other parts. This
new 2-6-0 passenger design, the class N, was built in thirteen
variations; some units were compound and some simple, there
were two sizes of driving w heel, some were superheated and
others not, some were designed for coal, others for oil, and
many for wood. But the basis remained the same. About a
thousand units were built but they were less widely distributed
than tlie class O, as they were not considered suitable for hilly
lines. On the flat Nikolaev Railway, however, they were in
their element and were allowed a maximum permitted speed
higher than any other engines, 75 km. per hour (47 m.p.h.).
One of them, on trial, hauled a 390-ton train at an average
speed of 48 km. per hour (SO m.p.h.) over the St Petersburg-
Bologoye section, with its 1 in 125 grades. These engines
remained in service until the fifties, their 15-ton axle-load
making them suitable for branch and feeder lines.

These 2-6-o’s replaced the 4 4 О type which had been the
D
favourite for new construction in the eighties. 4-4-0 engines,
however, continued to be built for some railways right up to
the end of the century. Many of the private railways did not
favour the government standard types and bought specially
designed engines from the various engine builders. The
Moscow-Yaroslavl-Archangel Railway introduced its own
2-6-0 simple design in 1896, as it considered that the N class
compounds had poor acceleration. The Vladikavkaz Railway
sponsored the A class 4—6-0 from Kolomna works, which was
later adopted by other private railways. The South-Eastern
introduced in 1896 a class of 4-6-0 Vauclain compounds.

In 1879 tile Russian railways possessed 5,074 locomotives
and at the end of 1090 there were G,93O. In 1097 there were
9,067, of which 6,992 were freight, 1,778 passenger, and 802
switchers.

There was a steady tendency for mineral fuel to replace
firewood. In 1881, 46 per cent of the locomotive/kilometres
were fired by wood fuel, in 1890 86 per cent During the same
period fuel costs diminished from 10 per cent of total operating
expenses to 8| per cent.1

Standardization of freight car designs was initiated earlier
than locomotive standardization. In 1875 the Ministry of Ways
and Communications, having discovered that there were no
fewer than fifty different types of box car and thirty-five different
types of flat car circulating on Russian railways, fixed obligatory
dimensions for the load-carrying parts of the cars. In 1892
standard designs for thn dirthront kinds of freight car were
established. The basic Russian freight car had been designed
by the Kovrov workshops in 1872.2 A four-wheeler with iron
frames, it had a tare weight of 7 tons and a capacity of 10 tons.
Subsequently, without any major design changes it was found
possible to increase the capacity first to 12| tons, and then 16j
tons. Some railways had their own specialized cars. The
Grushevskaya Railway, a coal line, had special open cars for its
mineral traffic; another railway had cars containing tanks for
the transport of live fish; the South-Western Railway had
double-deck cars for sheep and pigs.

1 Kovalevskii, V. La Hustu a la fin du IfX Siecle. St Petersburg, 1900, p. 858.
Istoricheskiye xapiski. 47/1954. Slatuticheskii obxor. Op. cit., pp. 3, 12.

г These shops, in 1895, were al&o responsible for the standard 3-axle passenger
car.
THE SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY

Each of the Russian railways had its own history’, featuring
problems and events both typical and particular. Since it is not
possible to study each company in detail this section will be
devoted to just one railway, the South-Western, which at the
end of the century was the largest in the country.

The origin of this railway was the Imperial assent, granted
in 1868, for a railway from Odessa to the river Dnestr. This
work was entrusted to a former court official, Baron L'ngar-
Schtemberg who, using construction brigades of penal workers,
finished the Odessa-Balta line in 1865. The Governor-General
of Novorossiisk then allowed the Baron to build the next
section, from Balta to Elizavetgrad. It was started in 1866
and finished in 1870, costing only 40,700 roubles per verst.

It had originally been intended to continue this line to form
an Odessa-Kharkov railway but a Kiev-Odessa link soon
received priority over this. The Kiev-Balta line was accordingly
projected, and its construction entrusted to the contractor de
Briere, at 65,216 roubles per verst. The contractor was slow in
making a start so government troops were sent to carry out the
initial works—three divisions of infantry’ being used. De Briere
started work in 1866 but his own contractors failed to provide
satisfactory labour. The peasants who had been hired constantly
ran away, and some complained to the local administration,
which forced the company to raise its wages. However, in view
of the labour difficulties de Briere was allowed to use troops
and penal workers. The daily pay was 45 kopeks, but about 30
kopeks of this was never paid; it was deducted to pay for the
use of the company’s tools.

By 1870 the Odessa-Kiev line was open for traffic. At about
tile same time the port of Odessa had hopes of becoming a rival
to Trieste. The Suez Canal, and the growth of the locally based
Russian Steamship and Trading Company, were the causes of
this optimism. To facilitate this plan, which promised an
agreeable triumph over the Habsburgs, it was decided to
amalgamate the Odessa Railway and the steamship line. The
new company had a capital of 30| million roubles in shares and
47| million in debentures on which the Government guaranteed
the interest. The Government received all the debentures and
half the shares in exchange for handing over its Odessa Railway.
MAP 2

Russian railways in 18.90. The frontiers are those of the of the present
day, Russian territory acquired since 1890 being shown as a dotted
area.
The amalgamation took place in 1870, but when the first
general meeting was held in 1874 the capital of the company,
which had been earmarked for the building of new railway lines,
was largely unspent while the company already owed the
Government 3 million roubles for the non-payment of interest
on the debentures. Holders of shares were unlucky, for only in
1877 was the first dividend paid.

When the Turkish war started in 1877 this railway was
obviously a vital one. Unfortunately, the carefully made
mobilization plan was spoiled in its execution by the late arrival
of locomotives which should have been drafted from less
important railways. There were delays, trains had to be des-
patched one after the other oeparated only by time intervals,
and some cavalry' units had to be de-trained and sent towards
Bessarabia on their own horses. The blockade of the Black Sea
ports made matters worse. Engines were manned on the shift
system in place of one engine-one crew principle, giving better
availability but poorer maintenance. The five luxuriously
appointed ambulance trains, provided by royal and private
charity, were quite insufficient (they carried only about fifty
injured each, and the normal trip between the frontier and the
hospitals took up to two weeks). Wounded began to be
'stacked like logs’ at the Roumanian frontier stations, until
freight cars were introduced for this sendee.

A foretaste of the railway’s troubles in the coming war had
been provided in 1875 by the Telegul disaster. Two hundred
kilometres from Odessa a track gang was replacing a rail, but
had neither arranged warning signals nor informed the nearest
stations. It was December, and a blizzard struck. The line here
crosses the Telegul ravine, and is built on an embankment. In
such an exposed position work could not continue and the men
retired to a hut to drink tea while the storm blew itself out.
They did not, however, replace the rail which they had removed.
A special troop train bound for Odessa entered the section, wras
derailed, hurtled into the ravine, and caught fire. About one
hundred soldiers were killed. A director and an official of the
railway were later sentenced to a short term of imprisonment
for this catastrophe, but as both were needed to arrange urgent
traffic their sentences were never properly served.

This was by no means the only accident on this railway,
although it was certainly the most disastrous. The Tsar was
several times involved in mishaps. As at this time the railway
was the most convenient way of reaching the Crimea (by sea
through Odessa) roykl travellers were frequent, and a constant
source of concern to the railway management. Anything could
happen:

'I remember we once carried Emperor Alexander II to
Odessa. The train stopped several minutes at Birzul. The
Emperor decided to take a stroll and in order not to be seen by
the public got out on the platform not on the left side where
everybody was expecting him, but on the right . . . the train
was despatched and the Emperor remained on the station. .. J1

'. . . we were waiting on Zhmerinka station for the arrival of
the Imperial train. Suddenly, near the Kiev-Brest station at
Zhmerinka, the Imperial train ran off the rails. So the Emperor
came to us at the station on foot. . . asked "what happened?”
... he reacted very generously to this incident . . . the train
was put on the rails and the Emperor continued further.’®

And at a time of defeats in the Turkish war, Alexander II
returning from the front looks moodily out of his carriage
window, then stares fixedly at an officer standing on the station
platform:

'. . . and I see Cavalry Captain Kuzminskii standing there,
wearing his St George Cross . . . the Emperor says to him;
"you . . . are a deserter, you ran away out of my army without
my permission . . .”. The Emperor, turning to Katalei, says
"Arrest him and lock him up” . . . And suddenly I see Kuz-
minskii take out a dagger and calmly plunge it into his heart.
So that the Emperor . . . should not see, we all surrounded
Kuzminskii ... we dragged him into the room where the
throne was standing, and thus it was that we placed the dead
Kuzminskii on the steps of the throne. . . . The Emperor, not
realizing what had happened was constantly demanding,
"What’s going on? What’s happened?”

'To escape from this situation ... I asked the stationmaster to
despatch the train immediately. . . .’3

1 Vine, S. Op. cit., p. 73.	* Ibid., p. 74.

• Ibid., p. 77.
The rather casual way in which the Imperial railway mishaps
were treated changed in the case of the Borki accident, even
though this disaster was indirectly the fault of the Emperor.
He had always appeared to consider it a personal affront if his
train was not driven at the highest possible speed, and the
schedules for his journeys were drawn up in St Petersburg with
this in mind. On this occasion the Imperial train was a heavy
one, containing many members of the Royal Family and
courtiers. It was so heavy, in fact, that two freight engines were
attached to it in an effort to maintain its fast schedule. These
engines with their small wheels were quite unsuitable for high
speeds, and it should have surprised nobody when they broke a
rail. The consequent derailment caused twenty-one fatalities,
but the Royal Family was spared.

Because of its geographical position many Poles and Jews
were employed by the railway, and it therefore suffered con-
siderably from the frequent measures against these two
minority groups. The stationmaster at the railway’s most
important station, Odessa-Port, was dismissed without a pen-
sion because the governor had ordered all Poles to be sacked
and this unfortunate man, although a genuine Russian, had a
Polish-sounding name. When the railway became a state railway
Jews were sacked, although a very talented engineer, the chief
of the Permanent Way and Building department, was treated
generously, merely being transferred to the remote Moscow-
Archangel Railway.

At the end of the Turkish war the railway was separated
from the steamship line. The latter had subordinated railway
operations to the interests of its ships, which were themselves
operating at a loss. Odessa, though important, was far from
achieving its dreams of supremacy over Mediterranean ports.
The shares of the Russian Steamship and Trading and Odessa
Railway Company reached a trough in 1877, being quoted at
37 roubles per 100-rouble share.

It was in these circumstances that the Government en-
couraged the formation of the South-Western Railway. The
former Odessa Railway was amalgamated with two other
unprofitable companies (the Kiev-Brest and Brest-Graevo) in
the hope that the resulting big organization might be more
efficient. There was a government guarantee of 5 per cent on
the capital which by now, through the various additional issues
of debentures, amounted to about 105,000 roubles per verst of
line. This high capitalization made it virtually impossible to
pay the required dividends without invoking the government
guarantee. Several branches were built to improve the profita-
bility of the railway, and usually had the opposite effect. But in
the nineties the railway began to experience some prosperous
years. It became a state railway in 1895. In 1896 gross receipts
totalled 38 million roubles, of which passengers and parcels
traffic accounted for 7 million. Operating expenses were 20
million roubles. This left just enough net revenue to cover
dividends.

With a mileage in 1898 of 3,900 km. (of which 1,370 km.
were double-track) the railway was the biggest in length as
well as by traffic. Its main lines extended from Kiev to Odessa
and Kishinev, with an extension from Balta to Elizavetgrad
(the former Odessa Railway), from Kiev to Brest (the Kiev-
Brest Railway) and thence to Graevo (Brest-Graevo Railway).
From the latter terminal there were connections to Danzig and
Koenigsberg. There were many branch lines, most of them
strategic, running westwards to the Austro-Hungarian frontier.
One branch, to Lutsk (12 km.), was built by the Ministry of
War in 1890 to serve the summer manoeuvres of that year.
However, it had a certain long-term value. As the railway’s
guide book delicately expressed it:

. has no serious economic significance, but one can regard
it as the beginning of a new rail route which in the future will
progress further to the west, towards the Austrian frontier and
become a new link connecting Russia with the Slavic lands
possessed by Austria-Hungary’.1

On its 3,900 km. of track, the railway operated 245 passenger
stations; 6 telegraph offices; 17,572 freight cars; 631 freight,
147 mixed traffic and 7 passenger locomotives. The latter,
built at the Odessa workshops but having a very French
appearance, were the pride of the line. They were 4 4 О
tandem compounds and were designed for the fastest trains.
Having a maximum permitted speed of 85 km. per hour (53
m.p.h.) they could haul 15-car trains (250 tons) up 1 in 125

’ Illymtriorovannyi putcvodittl' po yugo-zapadnym kaztnnym zMtznym dor ogam.
Kiev. 1898, p. 9. Much of this section is based on this guide book.
grades at 37 km. per hour (23 m.p.h.) The railway also
possessed 41 tank engines, mainly for use in its docks at Odessa.

Of the 954 passenger cars owned by the railway in 1898, 500
were third class, and 156 second. There were 20 composite
second/thirds and 56 first/seconds. First-class cars totalled 90
and saloons 49. The remaining passenger stock consisted of 50
mail cars and 49 vehicles with barred windows for the arrestee
traffic.

The saloon cars were used in the day train from Kiev to
Odessa and Kishinev. They were modelled on American parlour
cars, with eighteen revolving armchairs, large mirrors and
windows, electric lighting, separate toilets for ladies and
gentlemen, a smoking room, carpets and wall paper. They had
been built at the Company’s Kiev workshops in 1894. The
railway took even greater pride in its ‘Pul’manovskii’ sleeping
cars, with their two-berth compartments, side corridor, hot
water in the toilets, and covered gangways between each
vehicle.

The fastest trains were the night trains Nos. I and 2 between
Kiev and Odessa, carrying first- and second-class passengers
only. Over the distance of 654 km. the Kiev-Odessa ‘Courier’
took 12 hours 9 minutes, an overall average of 53 km. per hour
(S3 m.p.h.). This, moreover, included eleven intermediate
stops, of which three were of 10 minutes and one of 15 minutes.
Average speeds between stations were therefore rather higher.
Between Fastov and Kazatin, for example, the start-to-stop
average was 65 km. per hour (40 m.p.h.). There were also two
‘fast’ trains in each direction with an overall average speed of
35 km. per hour (22 m.p.h.); one mail train which stopped at
all stations (including a 1 hour 24 minutes halt at Kazatin) and
took 23 hours 27 minutes for the trip. Finally, the daily mixed
train, third class only, took 26 hours 43 minutes. The fastest
time for the journey from Moscow to Odessa was 43 hours 16
minutes.1 Even taking into account the lighter trains of those
days, the ‘courier’ schedules demanded smart work from loco-
motives and railway staff. Sixty-three years later, in 1961, the
Kiev-Odessa trains were slower than the night trains of the old
South-Western. Although the number of fast trains was greater
in 1961, the best of them needed 12 hours 13 minutes to cover
the distance, and it made only seven intermediate stops.

1 Rotpisaniyi dvizhtniya passaxhirskikh potzdov na lelnii uzon. Kiev, 1898.
The railway in 1898 employed 30,044 people. All permanent
workers had to belong to the pension scheme which, introduced
in 1873, was one of the first such schemes in Russia to be based
on actuarial principles.1 The worker paid 6 per cent of his
income and the Company (after nationalization, the Treasury)
paid 3 per cent. Into the pension fund also went proceeds from
the sale of unclaimed goods. The pension depended on age and
length of service. Fifteen years’ sendee was the minimum and
workers who left voluntarily before achieving this received
only the value of their own payments. The railway maintained
two technical schools, at Odessa and Kiev, and these produced
fifty graduates each year for employment by the Company.
Nine elementary schools were also maintained for the education
of about 2,700 children of railwaymen in the railway towns.
Subsidies were paid to public elementary schools which taught
the children of railway workers.

The railway’s medical service employed thirty-six doctors,
and operated a 32-bed hospital in Kiev, 50 treatment centres
and 29 first-aid and medical stations. A sanatorium owned by
the railway was reserved for its workers (and their families)
whose income was less than 1,000 roubles per annum. The
railway also provided laundries, bathhouses, reading-rooms,
and a 25-place orphanage in Kiev.

1 Pension funds were established for Russian railways in general by an order
which received Imperial approval May SO, 1888.
RAILWAYS INTO ASIA

THE NEED FOR A SIBERIAN RAILWAY

The world’s first transcontinental railway, the Union Pacific
and Central Pacific line in the us a, was opened in 1869, but the
1885 opening of the Canadian Pacific Railway attracted more
attention in Russia, for political and strategic reasons. The
binding of British Columbia to Eastern Canada seemed to some
an example to be followed: the Russian Far East was also a
recently-acquired and remote colony subject to threats from the
south, and accessible only by a roundabout sea voyage or a
lengthy and inconvenient overland journey.

Apart from the benefit of a railway to the Far East from the
point of view of colonization, defence, and the spread of Russian
influence into Korea, Manchuria and China, the development
of the territory through which it would pass was a point in its
favour. Not only did this aspect appeal to the business world,
which felt that Siberia could develop into a useful new market
and source of raw materials, but it also attracted the Govern-
ment. One of the main social problems of Russia at this time
was the rural overpopulation of European Russia. Not only
frequent famines resulted, but also peasant discontent and dis-
order. The deadly famine of 1891 gave extra point to encourag-
ing more peasant families to emigrate to the virgin but culti-
vable lands of Siberia. Hitherto w'ould-be emigrants had been
deterred by the journey, which was forbidding even after the
construction of the Perm-Tyumen railway. Migrants would
reach Perm by barge on the Volga/Kama system, go by rail to
Tyumen and then by a combination of boats and carts to their
destination. 'The river ferries became inadequate and the result-
ing congestion at river crossing points helped the spread of
disease. It is believed that 10 per cent of adult and SO per cent
of child emigrants died en route.1 Most emigrants settled in
Western Siberia; for the few who went to the Far East there
was a choice of an uncomfortable sea trip from Odessa or a
two-year overland journey.

Emigrants to Western Siberia had already shown that the
area could produce cheap grain and dairy products either for
European Russia or for export, so there was an economic as
well as a social justification for a railway into Siberia. East of
Omsk, however, this justification disappeared. Pacific fishing
was about the only industry whose products could bear the cost
of transport to the markets of European Russia, although the
shipbuilding and ship repair yards of Vladivostok and Blago-
veshchenck would benefit from a rail supply route. The eastern
part of the Trans-Siberian Railway had very little economic
justification. It was built for mainly strategic and political
reasons.

PROPOSALS FOR A TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

Like many other great enterprises, the railway through Siberia
to the Pacific took longer to start than to finish. The first
proposals were made in the fifties but work was not begun
until the nineties, and by 1905 the through rail link between
Moscow and Vladivostok was complete.

There was a spate of proposals during the eighteen-fifties.
The Governor of the Far Eastern Province, Count Muraviev
Amurskii, suggested a line linking the valley of the Amur with
the sea. But there was little support from St Petersburg either
for this project or for the various proposals, some from abroad,
of a line from Nizhnii Novgorod to the Pacific. In the two
subsequent decades more modest suggestions were made;
Western Siberia was the target and it was hoped that a line
connecting this province with the European railway network
would also serve the Urals, where the mining and metalworking
industries were limited by transport difficulties. A Urals rail-
way was on the point of government acceptance when financial
troubles due to the war with Turkey caused its postponement.
But finally, in 1883, Siberia’s first railway was started. It was
from Ekaterinburg to Tyumen and by connecting with the
Perm-Ekaterinburg line (completed in 1878) provided an east-

’Treadgold, D. The Great Siberian Migration. Princeton, 1957, p. 96.
west link between the rivers Kama and Ob’. This railway was
completed in 1885 and was unconnected with the main railway
network until the Ekaterinburg-Chelyabinsk line was com-
pleted in 1896.

In the eighteen-eighties the Government began to think
seriously of a Trans-Siberian railway through to the Pacific.
Posiet, the Minister of Ways and Communications, was not a
warm supporter of this idea but was in favour of a railway as
far as Western Siberia. Tlie Committee of Ministers accepted
his proposal for a second railway into Siberia which would
pass, via Ufa and Zlatoust, through Chelyabinsk and terminate
at Omsk, with the possibility of a future extension eastwards.
In 1886 this line was started from Samara, which already had a
railway connection with Moscow.

With most ministers, including the Minister of Ways and
Communications, considering a Trans-Siberian railway prema-
ture, it was mainly the enthusiasm of Tsar Alexander III which
caused the completion of the Samara-Chelyabinsk line, the
decision to start a line from Vladivostok and tlie scheme for a
line eastwards from Chelyabinsk to join it. To show the
importance which the Tsar attached to this railway, his heir
was chosen to lay the first stone at Vladivostok in May 1891.
The following year work started at the Chelyabinsk end.

In 1892 Vitte, who had recently been appointed Minister of
Finance, presented his plan for the Trans-Siberian Railway.
The main theme of his programme was that since the new
railway was so enormous an undertaking, its construction
should be co-ordinated with other new projects. Thus Vitte
proposed the building of the Ekaterinburg to Chelyabinsk line,
so that metal products from the Urals could be easily brought
to the construction sites. Tlie re-equipment of waterways
crossing the Trans-Siberian route was also recommended to
facilitate the supply of building materials, especially timber and
stone. Since migration of peasants from European Russia was a
principal object of the railway, Vitte proposed that this migra-
tion should be planned and that land distribution schemes, and
medical, veterinary, religious and other services be established
to aid the immigrant. Finally, he recommended the formation
of a special committee of high-ranking persons to study
questions pertaining to the railway.

Vitte proposed that construction should be phased according
to predetermined priorities. '1Ъе first lines to be built would be
the Chelyabinsk-Irkutsk section (with a ferry crossing of the
Ob’ until a bridge was completed), together with the Ekaterin-
burg-Chelyabinsk supply line and a first section of the Ussuri
Railway from Vladivostok to Grafskaya. The second phase
would be from Mysovaya on the south-eastern shore of Lake
Baikal to Sretensk on the Amur, and the remaining section of
the Ussuri Railway to Khabarovsk. The final stage would be
the difficult line from Irkutsk round the southern shore of Lake
Baikal to Mysovaya, and the Amur Railway from Sretensk to
Khabarovsk.

Vitte’s plan received royal approval at the end of 1892. The
establishment of the Siberian Railway Committee marked a
turning point. Consisting as it did of the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, the Ministers of Finance, Ways and
Communications, Inlemal Affairs, the Crown Lands, War, and
State Control and managed by State Secretary Kulomzin, it
plainly implied that henceforth the railway was to be con-
sidered of first importance and that progress so far (consisting
mainly of a few earthworks for the Western Siberian and
Ussuri railways) was too slow. To emphasize this priority, the
Tsar appointed his heir Nicholas Chairman of the Siberian
Railway Committee:1

‘Your Imperial Highness.

‘Returning from a long journey to the far comers of the
Russian land You, by My command, in Vladivostok on the 19th
day of May 1891 laid the foundation stone of the through
Siberian railway line planned by Me.

‘Now, appointing You Chairman of the Siberian Railway
Committee, I entrust to You the carrying out to the end of this
Russian project of peace and enlightenment in the East.

‘May the Almighty help You to achieve this enterprise so
close to my heart, together with the proposals to facilitate the
peopling and industrial development of Siberia. I firmly believe
that You will justify the hopes of Me and of beloved Russia.

‘Sincerely, loving You with all my soul,

Alexander.’

The railway was the chief, but not the only, preoccupation of
* Axiatdiaya Rossiya. St Petersburg, 1Э14, p. 517.
the Committee; emigration and the development of Siberia
were also within its competence.

Tlie more important decisions of the Committee in this
period were the advancement of the Trans-Baikal line to the
first phase of the plan; the establishment of a special manage-
ment for the construction of tlie Siberian Railway, to relieve
the Directorate of State Railways; the re-equipment of certain
Siberian rivers to help the delivery of construction materials;
and the decision to use the labour of convicts, exiles, and
detainees (whose sentences would be reduced), to overcome
the shortage of workers.

THE USSURI RAILWAY

Lines west of Chelyabinsk not being considered part of the
Trans-Siberian, the first section to be started (although not the
first to be finished) was the Ussuri Railway between the port
of Vladivostok and the provincial capital of Khabarovsk. The
400-km. South Ussuri section was opened provisionally in 1894,
permanently in 1896, while tlie 360-kin. North Ussuri section
was finished in 1899. Most of tlie line is through forest, tlie
rest through taiga, and before the construction could begin
400,000 roubles were spent building supply roads. As there
was hardly any local population and because Chinese labour
was unwelcome, convicts were imported from the island of
Sakhalin and worked under tlie supervision of the prison
authorities. These were supplemented by soldiers from local
garrisons under their own officers.

THE WESTERN SIBERIAN RAILWAY

Mikhailovskii, the builder of the Samara-Zlatoust line and
designer of tlie Alexander Bridge across the Volga, was chosen
as chief construction engineer of this line, which was started
in 1892 and provisionally opened in 1895. As the bridge over
the Irtysh was opened only in 1896 and that over the Ob' (790
metres long with seven spans) in 1897, ferries were used at
first. Although the territory over which this line was built was
fairly flat and dry there were other physical difficulties. Raw
materials were not readily available so there was much pre-
liminary work on building roads, establishing horse and water
transport, setting up sawmills and limeworks. Shortage of local
labour entailed the building of workers’ quarters, and this did
not in itself lead to ah influx of workers. To solve the shortage
of labourers mechanical excavators were necessary. They were
horse-powered, American-built, and were probably the first to
be used in Russia.1 There was also a water problem; water
was available in local lakes but was hard and rather salty.
Eight artesian wells were bored but the water they produced
had to be chemically softened.

THE CENTRAL SIBERIAN RAILWAY

The line from Ob’ to Irkutsk was a separate section called the
Central Siberian Railway. Construction began in 1893 and
completion was planned for 1898. The Ob’-Krasnoyarsk section
was opened provisionally in February 1897 and the Kras-
noyarsk-Irkutsk section in 1898. The branch from Taiga to the
university and trading city of Tomsk was built at the same
time. In 1900 the Central Siberian and Western Siberian rail-
ways were amalgamated into the Siberian Railway.

The main difficulties encountered in the construction of this
line were due to the hilly nature of the territory. Excavations,
cuttings, and embankments were needed over almost the entire
mileage. In the valley of the Berezovka and Sytik 75 km. of
track contained 85 bridges and culverts. Also, in the taiga the
ground was covered by a marshy layer two or three feet deep
and in places this was frozen until July. Thus in order to lay
the track it was first necessary to build rough corduroy roads,
then dig drainage ditches, before removing the layer of old
vegetation. As construction of this line wras concurrent with
that of the Western Siberian Railway, there was no rail link
and the supply situation was therefore difficult. Although the
Crown Lands supplied timber gratuitously, its transport was a
problem. Stocks of construction material such as rails and nails
were set up where rivers crossed the route. Extensive use of
horse transport was complicated because fodder also had to be
brought great distances. Ilie labour situation was even worse
than in Western Siberia; there were no craftsmen available
locally and whole artels had to be brought from European

1 Excavators had in fact been imported for building the St Petersburg-Moscow
Railway, but they do not appear to have been used.
Russia. At the peak of activity 29,800 workers were employed,
including some convicts.

THE BAIKAL FERRY

Because of the extreme climate and the high mountains stretch-
ing almost to the water’s edge the construction of the railway
around the southern shore of Lake Baikal was expected to be a
long and difficult job. For this reason it was decided to provide
a water link and two ice-breaking ferries were ordered from
England. This ferry sendee began to operate in 1900; being
replaced by a host of horsedrawn sledges each winter when the
ice thickened. Meanwhile an extension (finished 1898) was
built from the railhead at Irkutsk to the lakeshore and a mole
and other harbour installations built.

THE TRANS-BAIKAL RAILWAY

The Trans-Baikal Railway, from the eastern shore of the lake
to Sretensk was begun in 1895 but the unprecedented floods of
1897 delayed its completion until 1900. Because permafrost
extended to a depth of from one to six feet dynamite was used
in place of the usual excavating methods. The maintenance of
water supplies presented another problem and the waterpipes
at stations were enclosed in wooden tunnels heated by warm
air. As the railway to the west was not complete, materials
were brought from European Russia by sea to Vladivostok, by
rail to Khabarovsk and then by the rivers Amur and Shilka to
the construction sites (but some locomotives for the railway
were dismantled and hauled on sledges across Lake Baikal).
Craftsmen were brought from European Russia while labour
for earthworks was provided mainly by detainees.

The line around the southern tip of I-ake Baikal, which had
been started in 1899, was opened in 1904. This was one of the
most difficult pieces of railway engineering ever attempted. It
was built in an inaccessible region on the cliffs overhanging
I-ake Baikal, and included no less than thirty-three tunnels. The
highest point on the Siberian Railway is here, over the Yablo-
novoi mountains (3,412 ft.). On its completion, the two train
ferries were not scrapped, but used for local services on the
lake.
THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

Second thoughts in 1894 and 1895 showed that the proposed
Amur Railway, which was intended to bridge the gap betw'een
the Trans-Baikal and Ussuri railways, would be difficult and
expensive to build and would pass through territory of little
economic potential. An alternative route through Manchuria to
Vladivostok was also attractive because it would be about 600
km. shorter and would strengthen and extend the Russian
sphere of influence in the Far East. It was therefore decided
to build the Chinese Eastern Railway from Chita, a station
718 km. to the east of Mysovaya, through Kharbin to Vladi-
vostok. The Chinese Government, still smarting from the
recent war with Japan, made a friendly response to the Russian
request for railway pow-ers through Manchuria and in 1896 an
agreement was reached. The cer would be a private under-
taking, the Russo-China Bank being awarded the concession for
its construction. The cer would operate the line for eighty
years although after thirty-six years the Chinese Government
had the right to purchase the line (but the price fixed for this
was so high that it was hoped and expected that China would
not be able to raise the money).

Construction was begun in 1897 but not finished until 1904
ow'ing to the Boxer Rebellion. During this rebellion, the
Chinese Government troops, who were bitended to protect the
railway, from time to time joined tlie rebels and bombarded
the line with their field guns. When the turmoil ended two-
thirds of tlie railway completed by 1900 was destroyed or
damaged. Apart from these disturbances, the territory was
mountainous and difficult for railway-building. Eight tunnels
had to be bored, and two bridges, one of them over one kilo-
metre long, were built over the River Sungari. Later, after
Russia had leased the ice-free ports of Port Arthur and Dairen
the cer was extended to these places from Kharbin. But by
the Treaty of Portsmouth which terminated the war against
Japan the southern part of this line (south of Changchun) was
acquired by Japan, converted to 4 ft. 81 in. gauge, and renamed
South Manchuria Railway.

Although the cer was built and operated by a private com-
pany, strict government supervision was exercised through the
Ministry of Finance. Subsequently, the cer took over the
operation of the Ussuri Railway, which it joined near Vladi-
vostok.

THE AMUR RAILWAY

After the unhappy ending of the Russo-Japanese War, the
Government decided that the c e r was too vulnerable to attack
from the south and that the Amur Railway should, after all, be
built. Although there was much opposition to this in the Duma,
largely on account of the expensive construction entailed and
the unpopulated and mainly uncultivable land through which it
would run, surveys made in 1906 and 1907 wrere followed by
construction work in 1908. The Ministry of Ways and Com-
munications supervised construction on the spot and the Prime
Minister, Stolypin, took a great interest in the line, which he
supported for strategic reasons.

The railway was to come no closer to the Manchuria-Russian
frontier than 16 km. and no further away than 128 km. The
line crossed many watersheds and extra engineering work was
necessary because although the line followed, where possible,
the valleys, river floods prevented the floor of the valleys being
used. The biggest town of the area, Blagoveshchensk, was
reached only by means of a 109-km. branch line and a 1,200-
metre bridge. At Khabarovsk the Amur was bridged again,
this time by a 2,300-metre 22-span bridge. As a matter of
policy, only Russian labour was used, even though cheap
Chinese labour was available. To ensure the good behaviour
of the labourers fourteen companies of troops were attached to
the project to reinforce the usual railway gendarmerie, and to
keep the workers happy state liquor stores were opened at
strategic points. Much publicity was given to the building of
churches for the railwaymen;1 the new’ gaols were probably a
better investment although less advertised. But the establish-
ment of schools for the children of the permanent railwaymen,
the building of supply roads, and an improvement in postal
services were genuine benefits resulting from the new railway.

The western part of the Amur Railway was a principal
problem, due to the freezing of the rivers. After a good deal
of investigation it was found possible at most places to tap
underground reservoirs lying beneath the river beds.

Tile Amur Railway was opened provisionally in 1914, and

1 There was also an ornate and mobile church made from a passenger car.
permanently in 1916. Its cost per kilometre was more than
twice as high as the other sections of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way. The Amur Railway cost at least 264 million roubles,
while the Western and Central Siberian, Trans-Baikal and
Ussuri railways cost 385 million.1

THE TYUMEN-OMSK LINE

After the war against Japan, in which the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way was overloaded with traffic, it was decided to double-track
the railway. West of Omsk, however, it was decided not to
double the line to Chelyabinsk but to lay a second single-track
railway to Tyumen, whence a railway to Ekaterinburg and St
Petersburg already existed. Apart from providing a somewhat
shorter route from Siberia to the capital and the Baltic ports,
this line ran through a thriving agricultural area. It was started
in 1909 and finished in 1913. In the nineteen-sixties it was still
used by Moscow-Far East passenger trains in preference to
the shorter route through Kazan.

TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY TRAFFIC

Although traffic never developed enough to make the railway
a paying proposition, it was sufficient to show that in Western
Siberia at least the line had achieved its objects. Immigration
increased to such an extent that the population of the area
served by the railway grew from 5,846.000 to 8.683.000
between 1900 and 1909. Although a greater proportion of
immigrants were tempted by the railway to travel further
eastwards (by 1907 a fifth of them went to the Far East) in
absolute numbers Western and Central Siberia benefited most.
The population of Tomsk Province increased by nine times
during this period. Many big towns appeared, such as Slav-
gorod, which had simply not existed before the railway came.
In 1902 over one million passengers w'ere carried (first class
8,000, second class 140,000, third class 370,000, fourth class
420,000, Emigrant class 140,000, Soldiers 55,000). 1907 was
the best year for immigration but in most years after the end
of the Russo-Japanese War immigrants exceeded a quarter of

1 Axiattiaya Rossiya. Op. cit., pp. 528-9. The cost quoted for the Amur Railway
was calculated in 1914, before completion.
a million, compared to the average of 40,000 per year between
1887 and 1892. Thanks to the railway, and to its associated
medical, feeding, and reception centres, mortality among
immigrants fell to 1 per cent.1

Although Eastern Siberia and the Far East had a grain deficit,
Western and Central Siberia developed a large surplus and
despite tlie Chelyabinsk tariff break (which had been introduced
to protect landowners in European Russia from an influx of
low-cost wheat) much of the crop was sent westwards over the
railway. Stolypin unsuccessfully advocated the abolition of the
Chelyabinsk break, and also proposed the export of Siberian
grain to Europe via the rivers Ob’ and Yenesei, where free
ports were established to attract foreign shipping. Export of
Siberian grain to the Trans-Baikal and Far East area was
hampered by another tariff break at Irkutsk. Tlie abolition of
this in 1900 increased eastbound grain traffic but also reduced
the grain traffic of the c e h.

Siberia had more success with the export of higher-valued
farm products. By 1911 half of the meat consumed in St
Petersburg and Moscow came by rail from Siberia. Butter
traffic developed equally rapidly. As with passenger traffic,
there was an imbalance between westbound export and east-
bound import traffic. In 1902 the main freight imported (in
descending order by weight) were cereals, metal and metal
goods, coal, sugar, machinery, manufactures. Export traffic
was confined to cereals, butter and tea (from China); meat
became important later, as did traffic in agricultural machinery
from Vladivostok to the distribution points of the International
Harvester Corporation.

Industry did not develop significantly and was mainly a
product of the railway, like the on-line coal mines at Suchan
in the Far East and at Sudzhenskii and Cheremkhovo in Siberia,
and the railway shops at Nikolsk-Ussurisk and elsewhere.

TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND EQUIPMENT

The Trans-Siberian Railway was deliberately built to low
technical standards; by Treating it as a ‘pioneer’ line construction
could proceed rapidly without outdistancing the funds available.

1 Kulomzin, A. Le Tranuiberien. Paris, 1£K4. Appendix.
Thus of the total mileage of bridges only a quarter was
represented by metal construction, most being of wood. The few
bridges which were properly built were the big ones, over the
wide rivers of Siberia, where engineering works were so difficult
that it would have been senseless to repeat them ten years
later, when the time came to replace timber constructions.
Unfortunately, the bridges were frequently still unfinished
when the remainder of the railway was open, so ferries had to
be used in the early years.

But apart from bridges, other economies were made which
were later to prove unwise. There were insufficient crossing
loops and watering points, the permanent way was under-
ballasted so that the track tended to creep sideways, line
capacity over some sections was limited because steep gradients
had not been eased, and the 24 kg. (48 lb.) rails were not only
too light, but also were rolled from low’ grade steel. And the
wooden bridges themselves, on which so much reliance had
been placed, developed twists and gaps due to the movement
of clay subsoils during the thaw period.

As early as the winter of 1897-98, before the line was pro-
perly completed, a backlog of unshipped freight accumulated,
and in 1898 the Minister of Ways and Communications,
Khilkov, had to travel to Irkutsk to find ways of increasing line
capacity. The Tsar then appointed a special committee to study
the problem, w'hich recommended a decrease in the average
distance between crossing loops to 26-7 km. (24-5 km. in
mountainous areas), more watering points, increased staff,
replacement of wooden bridges, an increase in the thickness of
ballast (to 0-47 metres), use of heavier rails and enforcement
of stricter regulations over the standards of Russian rail pro-
ducers. In 1899 an extra 94 million roubles were made available
to carry out these proposals which, it was hoped, would permit
an increase in train speeds and hence line capacity.

But line capacity did not increase as fast as traffic, and in 1903
the Petrov Report proposed the smoothing of the worst gradi-
ents in order to unify train weights over the railway. (For
example, over one 750-km. section a few grades of up to 1 in
68 limited the maximum freight train load to 16 cars compared
to 36 elsewhere. Petrov proposed that the ruling grade should
be fixed at 1 in 100).1 It was said that by 1904 it would be

1 See Kulomzin, A. Lt Transtibtritn. Paris, 1904.
possible to run eleven pairs of trains daily, but in fact this was
not achieved, three pairs being the norm.

After the difficulties experienced during the war against
Japan, it was decided to double-track the railway, and by 1918
this had been largely achieved. West of Omsk an additional
single-track line had been laid to Tyumen connecting with St
Petersburg. Between Omsk and Kitaiskii (.8,640 km.) the line
was doubled. (The Russian claim that this was the longest
double-track railway in the world is, strictly speaking, in-
accurate, for a number of bridges were still single-track.) From

fig. .9. A 2-4—4—О Mallet design, of which 100 units were built at
Kolomna from 1903 for passenger work on the Central Siberian Railway.

Kitaiskii there were two single-track routes to Vladivostok, the
Amur Railway and the ceh. In addition, no kin. of die Uasuii
Railway out of Vladivostok had also been doubled. Ruling
grades of 1 in 125 had been adopted (1 in 165 in the Ob’
valley). However, lightweight rails were still used in 1918.1

Due to axle-weight restrictions, the Mallet type of articulated
locomotive was extensively employed on the Trans-Siberian
Railway. A particularly interesting version of this type was the
class I, which was built for passenger work, with the unusual
2-4—4—О wheel arrangement. As elsewhere, these Mallets had
very high maintenance and repair costs and could only be justi-
fied by their high power-to-axle-weight ratio. Other loco-
motives used were standard government designs like the
00-8-0. For some reason the S type passenger engine wras

1 See Railway Review, August 3, 1918.
not used on tlie Trans-Siberian although it would seem to have
been an ideal design for this line.

The Lake Baikal ferries were notable in several respects.
The first, the 'Baikal’, was completed by Armstrong-Whitworth
in only six months. It was then dismantled for the movement
from the Tyne to Siberia, a journey which took two and a
quarter years and was accomplished by rail, water, and sledge
(it was alleged that many parts were stolen en route). It was
290 ft. long, with a breadth of 57 ft. Displacing 4,200 tons it
could accommodate, in addition to passengers and miscellaneous

fig. 10. O-6-6-O Mallet design built from 1903 by the Putilov
Warks for the Trans-Siberian line.

freight, twenty-five freight cars. It had screws fore and aft to
facilitate ice breaking. A second ship, the ‘Angara’, was subse-
quently ordered, but was somewhat smaller than the ‘Baikal’
(1,250 h.p. as against 3,750 h.p.).

TRANS-SIBERIAN TRAIN SERVICE

When Lenin was exiled to Siberia in 1897 he wrote home that
on the Trans-Siberian Railway tlie further one went the slower
it became. But despite the fact that he was obliged to change
trains and make a boat trip at the big rivers he was luckier than
many travellers. In 1896 Kulomzin visited Chelyabinsk and
found thousands of travellers encamped there awaiting rolling
stock; passenger cars for 15,000 people were lacking. He also
found many families waiting there for their baggage, which
often needed two or three weeks to travel over the Samara-
Zlatoust line. The shortage of rolling stock for immigrants
persisted for years, but in 1908 funds were granted to build
fourth-class vehicles for Siberian emigrants.

The first-class trains, on the other hand, soon gained a
deserved reputation for luxury. At first the 'Trans-Siberian
Express’1 ran twice weekly, the state railways and the Inter-
national Sleeping Car Company providing the rolling stock for
alternate trains. But when in 1903 it was decided to run the
train every day (with a de-luxe train once a week) the Inter-
national Company contracted to provide sleepers and diners in
each train (the introduction of daily trains was, however,
repeatedly postponed).

According to the 1900 schedules,2 fast train no. 2 left
Chelyabinsk at 5.10 p.m. on Tuesdays, arriving at Irkutsk the
following Monday at 7.25 a.m. Despite its title, this train
stopped at each of the 113 intermediate stations, usually staying
from five to fifteen minutes at each (but twenty-nine minutes at
one, and only a minute at some). There were twenty-nine
stations with a buffet service. The return working as fast train
no. 1 left Irkutsk on Fridays. The consequent layover of the
trains at Irkutsk from Monday to Friday, and at Chelyabinsk
from Thursday to Tuesday, meant that three train sets were
needed instead of the two which would have sufficed if there
had been only a 24-hour layover at each end. Presumably this
extravagance was intended as a protection against the long-
term disruption which would occur if a train was delayed for
more than a day en route.

Apart from trains no 1 and no 9, which made an overall
average speed of 24 km. per hour (15 m.p.h.) and about 30
km. per hour (19 m.p.h.) between stations, there were two
other trains running in 1900. There was a daily mixed train
which took two days longer than no. 1 and no. 2, and also a
daily mail train which ran as far as Ob’, where its postal cars
were attached to the mixed train. A temporary timetable was
in operation on the Irkutsk-Baikal line, with a thrice-weekly
train leaving at 1 a.m. to connect with the ferry.

Of the many westerners wrho made a trip on the Siberian
Railway and returned home to write their impressions,
1 At first the train never appears to have borne officially this title, which
was probably invented by English travellers. It was, however, sometimes referred
to as the ‘International’ train.

’ Dmitriev-Manionov, A. Guide to the Grtal Siberian Railway. St Petersburg,
1900, Appendix.
Shoemaker gives the fullest description of the trains.1 He made
his journey in the winter of 1901-2, when Irkutsk trains were
starting from Moscow. Although he tried hard he failed to
travel in the much sought-after ‘International’ train, for railway
officials could not, or would not, say which days it operated.
So he travelled in the standard train provided by the state
railway administration. This consisted of four cars, electrically
lit; two second class, one first and a unique vehicle which
contained a dining-room, kitchen, bathroom, and luggage sec-
tion. Shoemaker noted that the piano in the dining-room w'as
used only as a shelf for dirty dishes. On the ‘International’ train
each of the first-class compartments had a toilet, writing table,
and armchair; the whole train was carpeted; and the bathroom;:
were marble-tiled with porcelain baths.

On the ordinary trains, Shoemaker noted that the third class
w’as well-filled but firsi and second empty. Emigrants were
travelling in ‘teplushki’ (freight cars fitted with bunks).
Special cars with barred windows were provided for the prison
traffic.

Sledge traffic on I-ake Baikal lasted three months. Tins
traveller moved halfway across the lake on the ‘Angara’, which
was following a channel broken by the ‘Baikal’. When the ice
became too thick the passengers transferred to a hundred or so
horse-drawn sledges which were waiting on the ice. The train
from the lakeshore to Manchuria was a mixed train drawn by a
wood-burning freight locomotive, and included two four-wheel
first-class cars. Shoemaker remarks that this line was more
solidly built, with rails heavier than those west of Baikal.

By 1905 schedules had been accelerated. Trains 1 and 2 now
ran three times each week and took 109 hours to reach Irkutsk
(30 km. per hour or 19 m.p.h.). Passengers from Moscow by
fast no. 17 to Chelyabinsk could reach Irkutsk in 172 hours
compared with 203 hours in 1900.2

By 1914 there were further accelerations. Just before the
Great War a weekly service from Moscow to Vladivostok was
introduced which covered the distance in nine days, and with a
fast steamer connection allowed a traveller to reach Tokyo in
eleven days.

So far as freight was concerned, the only outstanding services

1 Shoemaker, M. The Great Siberian Railway. N.Y., 1903.

* Ofittiafnyi uhazatel'. St Petersburg, Summer 1905,
were provided by the butter trains. Tlie rapid, government-
encouraged, increase in butter production in Western Siberia
necessitated special transport arrangements. Refrigerator cars
were built and within a few years special butter trains were
operating, made up entirely of these white-painted cars. The
trains ran direct to the export ports where the butter was
transhipped, usually for London, Hull, or Hamburg. In the
early summer peak period about a dozen trains, each of twenty-
five cars, w'ere despatched each week. At some stations cold
storage was provided.

One of these trains was involved in an unusual mishap:

‘Orders have been issued to the Siberian Railway Staff' that
all practising students are to be kept from engine driving.
About 100 learners are thus debarred from further activity on
the railway referred to. This order was due to the derailment
of a butter train near Chelyabinsk, when the engine was being
driven by a student of the Tomsk Technological Institute.’1

PASSENGER TARIFFS

Despite the primitive accommodation provided, the railway did
not profit from the heavy immigration traffic. This was because
it was government policy to provide special incentive fares for
immigrants. In 1898 a special railway immigrant fare was
introduced, replacing an earlier subsidy arrangement. By it an
immigrants’ fare was reduced to half the third-class price. A
‘scout’ looking for land on behalf of his village paid one-eighth
fare. By 1910 passenger receipts on the Trans-Siberian averaged
О • 3 kopeks per passenger verst, about one-third of the average
in European Russia.2 In first and second class, efforts were
made to attract foreign passengers, to compete with the shipping
companies between Europe and Japan and China. From 1908
special return tickets on the Trans-Siberian Railway were issued
to permit a passenger to travel one way by sea. Another
arrangement, made in 1912, was with tlie Canadian Pacific
Railway for round-the-world bookings via Vladivostok, Japan,
Canada and Liverpool.

1 Railway Timts. Vol. 85, p. 44 (1904).

’ Petrov, N. Ubylochna li set' russkikh zMeznykh dorogt St Petersburg, 1911.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN

So much attention has been directed to the grandiose projects
and achievements of Soviet governments that the significance
of the Siberian Railway has been neglected. It was and probably
remains the world’s greatest railway project. Moreover, the
Siberian Committee, two decades before the Revolution,
showed what large-scale state planning could achieve.

For the Siberian Railway was only the most important part
of a complete scheme for the development of Siberia as a planned
economy. Planned transport, planned emigration, planned sur-
veying were all part of the scheme. And to a large extent the
plan was carried out, even though ninny unfinished parts such
as the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, the Yakutsk Highway, and
the exploitation of newly-discovered minerals were completed
by the Soviet Government.

But a plan is only a means to an end. And while it is possible
to praise the Imperial Government for the former, acceptance
of the latter is not so easy. Criticism of the Siberian Railway
project rests on two questions: was the railway necessary? and
was the speed of its construction justified?

Taking the latter point first, it is worth noting that in terms
of miles per year the Siberian Railway was built about one and
a half times faster than the Canadian Pacific. This speedy
construction w'as made possible by starting the work on dif-
ferent sections simultaneously, which meant that only at the
western end could materials be brought up over newly-laid
railway. It is difficult to calculate how much extra money this
cost, but it was certainly no small sum. And the reason for this
haste w'as simply the wish to send more troops to the Far East.
Whether or not the military strengthening of the Russian
position in the east was desirable the fact remains that the hasty
building of the line could have been avoided by an earlier start.
As for the justification of the Siberian Railway, its economic
and social purpose evaporated the further east it went. Western
and Central Siberia developed very satisfactorily as a result of
the railway, but east of Lake Baikal there was little of value to
develop. The heavy operating losses borne by the Chinese
Eastern Railway and the enormous cost of the Amur Railway
represented money which could have been better spent in
raising the standards of existing railways.
Nor can the alleged military advantages of the railway be
accepted without question. In the event, the existence of the
railway encouraged Nicholas II to embark on a war which was
disastrous not only to the country but for the regime. The fact
that defeated generals like Kuropatkin blamed their defeat on
the unpreparedness of the railway does not mean that if the
railway had been finished the Russians would have won.
Furthermore, much of the least justifiable expenditure occurred
after the war; the Amur Railway was almost certainly pushed
through in the expectation of ‘having another go' at the
Japanese.

Vitte remarked that in the later nineteenth century Russian
railway-building was dominated by the possibility of war in
Europe, but that when war did come it was against Japan. If
he had lived longer he might have added that in the reign of
Nicholas railway-building was dominated by the probability of
war in the east, but when war did come it was against Germany.

THE TRANS-CASPIAN RAILWAY

During the second half of the nineteenth century the Russian
Empire was expanding in central Asia against opposition from
the natives of the area and from Britain. It is not therefore
surprising that the first railway in Asiatic Russia was a purely
military line into central Asia. In 1874, only seven years after
the establishment of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship, a
line was proposed from Orenburg to Tashkent, along the
caravan route. This line no doubt would have been the first to
be built had not a native revolt in the area between the Aral
and the Caspian seas prompted the construction of the Trans-
Caspian Railway. This line was built by engineering troops
eastwards from the shore of the Caspian, and was intended
to transport and supply the Russian army in its pacifying
mission.

Imperial permission for the line was granted in 1880, and
work proceeded rapidly, with Smolensk navvies and Baku
Persians supplementing the military labour. Wages were rela-
tively high but there was a rapid turnover of the labour force
due to the hard conditions; malaria, bandit attacks, and a water
shortage not completely eliminated by a special water-purifying
plant. Unfriendly local inhabitants and the need to transfer
materials from ocean-going ships to shallow-draught boats for
landing in the Mikhailov Gulf were other obstacles. Neverthe-
less, the line was opened as far as Kizyl-Arbat in only ten
months. But the military campaign had finished unexpectedly
early, so the line was hardly used for its original purpose.
However, by making possible a quick transfer of troops from
the Caucasus to Central Asia it strengthened the Russian
position in the area.

When ten years later further Russian annexations aroused
British suspicion, it was decided to prolong the Trans-Caspian
Railway as far as the Amu-Darya River, so as to establish a
convenient military route to tlie Afghanistan frontier.

The route passed over the Kara Kum Desert, and included a
150-km. stretch over shifting sands. No other railway had been
built in these conditions and after the tracks had been buried,
swept away, or left hanging in the air each time it was laid,
doubts grew about the railway’s feasibility. At one stage it was
even suggested that the entire section should be built in a
tunnel. However, General Annenkov, who was in charge of the
construction, persisted with various remedies, such as strewing
the track with thorny bushes, planting windshields, spreading a
layer of clay over the road-bed, and stationing permanent
track-sweepers at the most vulnerable points. But these measures
alone were not enough, and only tlie laborious process of
elevating the railway on a continuous embankment finally
solved the problem. Henceforth the chief menace to the railway
came from herds of camels which from time to time caused
derailments; and the chief worry was the water shortage, which
necessitated (and still does) the running of regular water
supply trains.

Despite these difficulties construction was rapid. This was
partly due to the large number of workers employed (over
20,000 at times) and the high-pressure construction methods.
A construction train of about thirty double-deck cars which
accommodated materials, workshops, officers’ quarters and field
kitchens, and carried two companies of troops and several
hundred labourers, was the spearhead of the railway’s advance,
supported by pack horses and pack camels. The extension from
Kizyl-Arbat was started in May 1885 and the line reached the
Amu Darya (800 kin.) in November 1886. Annenkov then
appropriated the funds authorized for a ferry, and built a
timber bridge instead. This ‘temporary’ bridge was finished in
January' 1888 and lasted fourteen years (by which time it was
cracked and twisted, and trains passed over it at a walking
pace). The line later continued to Samarkand and then to
Tashkent with a branch to Andizhan. The last section was over
the Sanzar Pass (Tamerlane’s Gate) and here a plaque was
erected at the railside:

‘Nicholas II in 1895 commanded: Let there be a railway.
1898. And it was done.’

The line was now called the Central Asian Railway. From its
western terminus (which was twice moved and was finally
established at Krasnovodsk) to Tashkent it was 1,850 km.
long; with the branch lines the total mileage was 2,510 km.
The management was at Ashkhabad. Its economic significance
was not great, although in the Tashkent region it did much to
encourage rice, cotton and wine production.

OTHER RAILWAYS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Although a direct line to Tashkent was approved in 1892, after
the Ministry of War had recommended it for strategic reasons,
it was not started until 1900. This was due to the delay in
choosing whether to lay the line to the east or west of the Aral
Sea, from Aleksandrov Gai to Chardzhou, or from Orenburg
to Tashkent. Eventually the latter route was chosen. Com-
pleted in 1906 and running through flat steppe, the line did
much to encourage the development of the Fergana area. By
permitting the import of grain from European Russia, local
land was freed for growing cotton, which was sent in its raw
state to the textile industries of Moscow, now only twenty days
distant by freight train.

On the eve of the Great War several other railway projects
in Central Asia were under way. The Novonikolaevsk-Semi-
palatinsk section of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway was being
built, and a private company had been granted a concession for
the South Siberian Railway, which was to run parallel to the
Trans-Siberian (but about 400 km. to the south of it) to open
up new land for agriculture. This line had been approved by the
Tsar in 1911 as a state railway but while the 'Ministry of Ways
and Communications‘was surveying the route one of the many
entrepreneurs clamouring for railway concessions succeeded in
winning back the concession for private interests.
7. Main- units of the standard О class freight design survived into the sixties. This example
was photographed in Iflofl working on an electrified section in Moscow. Photo. Author.
8. The last type of eight-wheeled freight engine built for the Russian railways was the
class V. 'litis photograph shows one of the first batch, built from 1908 at Kolomna for
the Moscow-Kazan Railway. Photo. La Kie du Rail.

One of the type К locomotives built for tlte Moscow-Kazan Railway from 1907. 'litis very
successful design was later adopted by many other Russian railways. Photo. La I'ie du flail.

One of the "half-tank” engines lisiilt for tlte suburban services of tlte Rvazan-Cralsk Railwav.
Photo. La Pit du Rail.
CHAPTER IV

THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

RAILWAY OPERATIONS

The troubles of 1905 and 1906 so weakened the autocratic
regime that for a short spell there existed a State Duma with a
limited degree of independence. Two documents, the report of
the Duma's Budget Committee on the Government's railway
estimates, and the debate on this report in the Duma, throw a
good deal of light on the railway situation in the difficult years
after the Russo-Japanese War. The Ministry of Ways and
Communications was, among other tilings, trying to enlist the
Duma’s support for a 938-million rouble credit, to improve the
railways over a five-year period.

The 1908 debate continued much longer than expected and
this was not just because of the disturbance caused by the
Minister of Finance’s remark that ‘Thank God we don’t have
a Parliament.’ Members were genuinely anxious about the
state of the railways ; many of them were also well informed
on the subject.

The main cause of this anxiety were the losses which the
railways were making, necessitating ever-larger disbursements
from the Treasury to cover government-guaranteed debentures
and shares. Apart from this, of the total national debt in 1906
of 7,841 million roubles, no less than 3,513 million were
unliquidated railway debts.1 If the state was willing to pledge
credit to this extent in aid of railway-building and improvement
it was felt that there should be something worthwhile to show
for it, not a loss-making system incapable of carrying the traffic
offered. Criticism was sharpened by the knowledge that in the
nineties the railways had shown signs of profitability.

1 Gosudarstvennava Duma. Doklady byudxJutnoi komwii. St Petersburg, 1907,
p. 153.

E
The Budget Committee described the railway situation as
chaotic. There was some discussion as to whether the trouble
was 'internal' (i.e. dtie to bad management) or 'external' (due
to geographic, political, and historical circumstances). External
causes were certainly relevant in the case of the Trans-Siberian
whose expenses had increased by two and a half times over five
years. Thousands of cars had gone east and disappeared for a
time before being returned in bad condition. Strikes and
revolution had had a bad effect on all railways. In support of
the first thesis, that the trouble was internal, the case of the
Nikolaev Railway was cited. The losses of this railway were
not due to tariff' reductions, the critics claimed, but to bad
management as exemplified in deteriorating labour productivity.
This railway then, as now, had perhaps the highest reputation
of any Russian line and its management was supposed to be
one of the best. Yet from 1896 to 1904 while freight traffic on
this railway increased by 14 per cent, the number of workers
employed rose by 50 per cent.1 At the same time, the average
train weight was falling. On the railway system as a whole
labour productivity fell from 92 million ton/kms. per worker
in 1898 to 87 million in 1908.2 And this was at a time of
increasing traffic. The deterioration was due entirely to an
inflation of the labour force. In 1906 the load factor of freight
cars was lower than it had been in 1899.

At the same time the railways were not capable of dealing
with the traffic which was offered to them. Especially in the
autumn, enormous backlogs of freight piled up at stations
awaiting shipment. There was a continuous backlog which rose
from the average of 50,000 carloads during 1900 to 1904, to
170,000 carloads in 1905 and to 210,000 in February of 1906.
The railways could not cope because they could not compensate
for an insufficient freight car stock by attaining high car utiliza-
tion rates. There were many complaints. One Duma member
complained that his firm had despatched 100 carloads of grain
in September but because of rolling-stock shortages they did
not arrive at their destination until March, when the spring
thaw delayed their delivery a further month. Such delays not
only caused loss of quality in the products being conveyed, they

* Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Sltnografichtskiyt otchely. April 1908.

’ Stnunilin, S. Op. cit., pp. 635-6.
also inflicted losses on the owner of the freight; capital was tied
up, and good prices depended on timely delivery.

The defence offered by the Ministry of Ways and Com-
munications was not a strong one. In answer to unfavourable
comparisons with other European railways he claimed that if
Russian tariff's were at the German level, the railways would
be profitable. As for the freight accumulations, he stated that
European railways benefited from the Berne Freight Convention,
which stipulated that shippers should store freight which the
railways could not carry. The General Regulations of Russian
railways obliged Russian railways to accept all freight offered,
and to store that which could not be shipped immediately. He
also stressed the preponderance of agricultural freight, which
was responsible for enormous seasonal variations in traffic (he
did not mention that the proportion of agricultural freight had
been declining for several years. However, it is true that car
shortages and freight backlogs were at their worst in autumn).

In reality the reason for the railways’ inability to cope with
rising demands stemmed from two factors; lack of technical
capacity through under- and mis-investment, and unsatisfactory
management, especially as regards planning and co-ordination.
In time this was realized and attempts were made to improve
the situation.

These attempts were not always well conceived. Govern-
ment credits were granted to increase line capacity, but the
lines which received them were often those which were least
eflRripntly managed, whose operating departments were long
the last refuge of poor-quality staff Nor were credits granted
according to any overall plan; increased capacity on one line
could merely create a bottleneck on neighbouring routes. Also,
it was not unknown for a credit to a state railway to be followed
by the Government granting a concession with the usual
guarantees to a new private railway, which would to some
extent compete with that self-same state railway. Lack of
planning also led to expensive measures to overcome short-
term difficulties. A typical example of this occurred in 1906
when a fuel crisis developed. Big credits were granted to the
Moscow-Kursk and South-Eastern railways enabling them to
increase their capacity to move Donetz coal to the Moscow area.

Probably the most useful measure introduced to bring order
out of chaos was the institution of so-called Central and Raion
Committees for the planning and co-ordination of shipments.
These were similar to the Kharkov Coal Committee which in
the 187O’s had been formed to regulate coal movements. In
these new committees were representatives of the Ministries of
Ways and Communications, of Finance, of Trade, of Industry
and of Agriculture, together with delegates from local industry
and trade, and from local Zemstvos. Their function was to
forecast and establish the demand for transport, to distribute
the available freight cars among shippers, to establish priorities
between different categories of freight, and to regulate traffic
over key routes. They sanctioned routing by roundabout routes
to avoid congested lines (from 1906 roundabout-routed traffic
was charged according to tariffldistanco, this latter being the
shortest rail distance between origin and destination). Although
it may be true that the composition of these committees was
such that the more powerful industrial and mercantile interests
could influence decisions, thus hurting the small man, there is
no doubt that they did much to effect that improvement in
railway operations which occurred immediately before the
Great War.

It is difficult to find reliable quantitative data on operating
efficiency for these years, although 1913 figures are available
for most operating indices. These, however, relate to the inter-
war frontiers and will be quoted in the chapters treating tlie
inter-war period. Some revealing data for the 1900-14 period
does exist for two aspects of railway operation: train weight
and accident rates.

It would seem that the average weight of freight trains in
1907 was no higher than it had been ten years earlier, despite
the introduction of bigger locomotives. In 1897 Russian trains
averaged 195 tons (net), rather more than other European
railways and about the same as in the us a. But ten years later,
the average American freight train weighed 290 tons while the
Russian had not improved since 1897. But by 1913 there was
an improvement ; 302 tons was the average weight of trains in
1913 (inter-war frontiers) and Russian trains were still the
heaviest in Europe.

Accident rates on Russian railways during the eighties and
early nineties had not been unduly high, and were only a fraction
of the American rates. But from the mid-nineties accidents
occurred more and more frequently. The events of 1905-6
resulted in a further deterioration; military trains and military
control were responsible for many casualties, fatal accidents
were so frequent that several could occur the same day.1 Yet
even in the following years when the railways were beginning
to recover, accident rates continued to deteriorate. The term
'kostolomka’ (‘bone-breaker’) which had been used for particular
railways with especially bad records, was pluralized into
‘kostolomki’ and began to refer to railways in general.

In 1900 nearly 1,500 accidental deaths were recorded on the
railways, of which one-third were railwaymen. Killed and
injured averaged 31 casualties per one million train/km., or
181 casualties per thousand kilometres of track. In 1905 there
were nearly 2,200 deaths, and casualties per million ГгашДип.
had risen to 36, or 222 per 1,000 km. of track. This deteriora-
tion continued at an ever-increasing rate so that in 1913 there
occurred 3,531 accidental deaths, 54 casualties per million
train/km., and 367 casualties per one thousand kilometres of
track.1 These figures do much to justify those critics who were
scandalized by the irresponsibility of the railway staff.

Not all deaths on the railways were accidental. Apart from
the revolutionary disturbances of 1905-6, when trains and
stations were besieged, shelled, rifled and sabotaged, train
robberies were perhaps as frequent in Russia as they were in
America. The robbers were sometimes professionals, like those
who terrorized the Tashkent Railway until troops were sent to
dislodge them, or amateurs like those peasants in Tula Pro-
vince who in 1913 had the idea of bettering their lot by loosening
the rails of a local main line, causing a train to derail and roll
down an embankment, where its injured passengers could be
robbed at leisure.*

Compensation payments by the railways for loss and damage
quadrupled between 1898 and 1908.

PROFIT AND LOSS

The recovery’ from the bad year of 1893, when the Treasury
had paid out twenty-one million roubles to cover railway
deficits, lasted only until the end of the century. From 1900

1 See The Times. January 2, 1906.

’ Strumilin, S. Op. cit., pp. 635-6.

•See Hailway Gazette. March 7, 1913.
increasing losses were experienced, aggravated by the troubles
of 1904-6. In 1906 the Treasury paid out 103 million roubles
to cover railway losses and the government-guaranteed divi-
dends on debentures. The 1900 disbursement had been only 3-6
million. From this figure of 103 million should be deducted
about 15-20 million, being the value of various benefits which
the government derived from the private railways (participa-
tion in dividends of profitable lines, taxes, reduced military
tariffs, carriage of mail). But in the last pre-war years there
was a recovery, partly because tlie political and economic
situation in Russia improved and partly because the Govern-
ment was sufficiently aroused to take a few elementary measures
to secure good railway management. By 1910 most railways
were able to cover their capital charges. The Moscow-Vindava-
Rybinsk Railway, whose 100-rouble shares earned a dividend
of only 1*25 roubles in 1904 and nothing at all in 1908, was
paying 11 per cent in 1911. Tlie Moscow-Kazan Railway's
recovery was even more impressive for it too paid no dividend
in 1908, but produced 27*5 per cent in 1911.1 These were both
private railways; as for tlie state railways, they also became
quite profitable, except in Asiatic Russia. In 1913 the state
railways had a gross income of 825,882,000 roubles. Expenses
were 518,458,000, leaving a net income of 307,424,000. To this
could be added 21,292,000 roubles of taxes which the Govern-
ment levied on the state railways' transactions. As at the end
of 1913 the capital value of the state railways was 5,639,000,000
roubles, the net income for that year wras equal to 5 • 8 per cent
of the capital invested.2

The increasing unprofitability of the railways in the first
decade of the century was not due to falling traffic. On the
contrary, traffic was increasing all the time. But income was
not increasing as fast as operating expenses. In 1898 over a
mid-year mileage of 38,555 km. the railways received a total
income of 466 million gold roubles, operating expenses includ-
ing depreciation amounted to 317 million roubles, leaving a
net revenue of 148 million roubles to cover charges on capital
(which was of the value of 3,200 million roubles, plus about 15
per cent for tlie cost of raising it). By 1903 income was 679

1 Pogrebinskii, A. Gosudarstvenno—monopolisticheskii kapitalixm v Hossii. Mos-
cow, 1959, p. 89.

’ Mikhailov, I. Evolyutsiya russkovo transporta 1913-25. M-L 1925, p. 14.
million roubles, expenses 528 million, leaving 151 million to
service the capital which had meantime grown to 4,764 million
roubles. By 1908, at the bottom of the trough, there was a net
revenue of only 89 million to cover charges on a capital value
of 5,665 million. In the ten years from 1898 railway receipts
had risen by 78 per cent, operating expenses by 128 per
cent, mileage by 66 per cent and invested capital by 77 per
cent.1

The excuse offered by apologists for the railways, that the
losses were due to increasing mileage, was not a substantial
one. With the exception of the Warsaw-Vienna and Nikolaev
railways,2 income per verst of track was increasing over this
period. On the other hand, there wao no doubt much truth in
the assertion that the losses of many railways were more than
balanced by the economic and social benefits which they con-
ferred. This had particular reference to the Asiatic lines, whose
losses were enormous, due partly to low tariffs.

The biggest factor in the increase of working expenses was
the wagebill, which accounted for more than half of the total
operating costs. Increased wages were due mainly to the 95
per cent increase in the number of workers over the decade,
but partly also to an increase, in 1906, of the wages earned by
the lower-paid workers. These two factors together account for
the 128 per cent increase in the wagebill over the decade.

An even sharper increase was shown in the cost of fuel and
lubricants, which between 1898 and 1908 trebled, while the
railway traffic increased by only 84 per cent. Fuel thus ac-
counted for 11 per cent of operating costs in 1898 but 15 per
cent ten years later. Fluctuations in the price relationship
between coal, oil and wood were also responsible for much
expenditure on converting locomotives to bunt the currently
cheaper kind of fuel; between 1895 and 1904 coal prices
increased by a half while oil prices doubled. Apart from
depreciation, the two next most important items of expenditure
were repair costs (which included some renewals), and
material costs; both of these doubled over the ten years. Two
smaller but very significant items were the compensation pay-
ments made for loss or damage, and internal expenses. Both

1 Derived from Strumilin, S. Op. cit., pp. 635-6.

4 The length of the Nikolaev Railway had been almost doubled by the addition
of the strategic Bologoye-Grodno line.
of these quadrupled, which would seem to support complaints
expressed on the Duma concerning on the one hand inflated
administrative staffs and, on the other, irresponsibility of the
operating personnel.

The composition of the railways’ income hardly changed
during this period. Thus income from freight rose from 344
million to 608 million while that from passenger services
increased from 75 million to 143 million. ‘Miscellaneous’
income (mainly from handling and storage) did not increase
quite so fast, from 46 million to 77 million roubles.

Two considerations should be borne in mind when comparing
income and expenditure during this period. Firstly, this was a
period of rising price levels and no railway thrives under
inflationary conditions because a railway, due to its size and to
government regulation, is always slow in adjusting its tariffs to
meet increasing cost levels.

Secondly, the figures quoted refer to the railways as a whole,
but there were big variations between individual companies.
For example, even in the revolutionary year of 1905 the
South-Eastern Railway ( serving the Donetz mining area) made
a satisfying profit. Its receipts rose to 381 million roubles and
expenses to 24| million, permitting its dividend to be raised
from S| per cent to 6| per cent. This was in spite of an esti-
mated 800,000-rouble loss occasioned by the disturbances. It
felt sufficiently confident to raise 3 million roubles of new
capital in 1906.1 The same railway the following year had a
net revenue of 13| million roubles and was the most profitable
of the private railways. At the other end of the scale was the
Chinese Eastern Railway, which had to meet an operating loss
of 17$ million roubles as well as its capital charges.2 The
profitability of state and private railways in European Russia
was very similar. On freight operations in 1905 the operating
ratio (operating expenses as percentage of gross income) was
69 per cent for state and 67  7 per cent for private companies.
State railways’ expenses had increased by 11 per cent, and
private by 6 per cent since 1900. Ilie Central Asia and Tashkent
railways had a ratio of 91 • 8 per cent, while the Trans-Siberian
line’s rates had deteriorated from 121-8 per cent in 1900 to
155-7 per cent in 1905, partly due to the stresses of the Far

1 Railway Timet. August 4, 1906.

* 1908 Estimates of the Railways Dept., Ministry of Finance.
Eastern war.1 The losses per train kilometre of the Trans-
Siberian, whose operating expenses had increased by 240 per
cent from 1900 to 1905, were about equal to the net revenue
per train kilometre of the European lines.

From 1908 to 1913 the financial condition of the railways
improved steadily. After 1907 the railways, especially the state
lines, began to watch their expenses more carefully. In 1909
the state railways managed to reduce their freight train miles
by 18 per cent compared with 1907.2 Operating expenses
increased from 740 million roubles in 1908 to 778 million in
1913 while gross income grew from 828 million to 1,176
million.8 Passenger revenue, which had suffered at the turn of
the century from tariff reductions, was now growing somewhat
faster than freight (by 57 per cent from 1908 to 1913, com-
pared with 40 per cent for freight). However, in 1913 passenger
services were still operated at a loss, being cross-subsidized by
the profitable freight services. The operating ratios of all rail-
ways, for all services, improved from the 89-5 per cent of 1908
to 73 per cent in 1909, 63'5 per cent in 1911, and 66 per cent
in 19IS.4 The relationship between net revenue and capital
invested which in 1906 had been 2 per cent, rose to 5*5 per
cent in 1910, 1-3 per cent in 1911, 1-6 per cent in 1912, and
8-3 per cent in 1913.5

The main factor in this improvement, apart from the increase
of traffic, was a reduction in the number of railway workers.
These had numbered 844,200 in 1908 but by 1913 they were
reduced to 815,500. So despite wage increases the wage bill
increased by only О per cent.* The fuel bill, which had doubled
between 1903 and 1908, increased by only a fifth in the next
five years. Compared to a traffic growth of 34 per cent these
were small increases indeed. Although on capital account the
period from 1908 to 1913 is marked by insufficient expenditure
on rolling stock, there is no evidence that the technical state of
the railways deteriorated on maintenance and renewal account.

1 Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Doklady byudzhetnoi komissii. St Petersburg, 1907,
p. 186.

‘Petrov, N. Ubytochna li uf russkikh zMeznykh dorog? St Petersburg, 1911,
pp. 19-21.

‘ Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 623.

* Strumilin, S. Op. cit., pp. 635-6, and Railway Gazelle, May 31, 1912.

‘ Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 630.

• Ibid., pp. 635-6.

E*
Although in these five years there was a slight drop in expendi-
ture on materials, the repair and renewal item increased li-
nearly a third—which corresponds closely with the increase in
traffic.

TRAFFIC

Railway traffic in the period from 1900 to 1,914 grew, if not
steadily, at least continuously. Compared with 1898, the 1913
traffic (in ton/km.) was two and a half times greater, reaching
98-6 billion in the latter year.1 Traffic increased by almost the
same ratio in terms of weight, from 63 million tons in 1899 to
1.58 million in 1913. A significant part of this increase was due
to coal traffic; hard coal continued to be the most important
railway traffic; being 22 per cent of the total (by weight) in
1913, as against 17 per cent in 1899.® In 1913, 35 million tons
of coal w ere shipped by rail, mainly from the Donetz Basin to
tlie ports and to cities, even to cities in other coal-bearing areas.
This 35 million tons represented a tripling of the 1899 figure.
Tlie next most important freight was grain and flour, which in
1913 accounted for 13 per cent of railway freight shipments
(against 14| per cent in 1899); 20 million tons were carried
in 1913. The third most important item was timber of which
15 million tons were carried in 1913 as against 5 million in
1899, increasing its share in the total from 7| per cent to 9j
per cent. Thus these three products, coal, cereals, and timber
accounted for almost half of the Russian railways' freight
traffic.

The next most important traffic by weight was firewood,
which accounted for 10 million tons and 6 per cent of total
shipments in 1913 (in terms of ton/km. its share would be
lower). Oil products, w-here the railways had more competition
from the rivers than with coal, amounted to 6 million tons or
3| per cent of the whole; although oil shipments had been
smaller in 1899 they then represented 6| per cent of total
freight traffic. Finally, ferrous metals amounted to million
tons, or 3 per cent of the whole. Thus six bulk commodities
accounted for 57 per cent of the railways’ shipments, and the
fastest growing freights were coal and timber, reflecting
increased exports of both and the increasing demands of

1 Stnunilin, S. Op. cit., pp. 635-6.

* Danilov, S. Ekonomika transfwrta. Moscow, 1956, p. 71.
industry for fuel and building materials. Industrial goods in
1913 accounted for 75 per cent of traffic and agricultural
products 25 per cent. This difference had been widening over
several decades.

The above analysis is reflected in the geographical distribu-
tion of freight traffic. In 1913 the southern region, which
included the Donetz mining and metalworking area, originated
and received 38 per cent of total railway freight traffic. The
centre, which includes the Moscow region, handled 17 j per
cent, the west and north-western region 12| per cent, the Urals
5 per cent, Siberia and the Far East 2| per cent, Kazakhstan
and central Asia 2 per cent. The poor showing of the Urals area
contrasts with its potential, and supports Soviet allegations of
industrial maldistribution (although it is interesting to note
that in 1958 the southern and central regions still held first and
second place in the distribution of rail traffic).1

In terms of traffic density, on average in Russia it was higher
at this time than in France or England (but less than in Germany
and the us a when Asiatic lines are included). The densest
traffic was between Krivoi Rog and the Donetz Basin, where
there were 6| million ton/km. registered in 1913 per one
kilometre of track. Other heavy densities were to be found on
the lines from the Donetz Basin to the centre, reaching 2j
million ton/km. per km. On the Trans-Siberian line, despite an
increase in grain shipments from 80 thousand tons in 1901 to
740 thousand in 1913, traffic density was uneconomically low;
only about ЛОО thousand ton/km. per km.2 The average freight
density of the whole system in 1913 was 1 • 1 million ton/km.
per km., compared to 0-9 million in 1904. To this 1-1 million
ton/km. per km. can be added 0’42 million pass./km. per km.
(against 0'36 million in 1904).*

Passenger traffic continued to increase. In 1913, 244 million
passengers were carried, of whom about 6 per cent were com-
muters (a rather low percentage in view of the good suburban
services offered in the large cities). The average passenger
journey (including commuters) was 120 km.4 In 1900 there
were 104 million passengers, and in 1904, 128 million. The
most popular class of travel was third, which accounted for 83

* Nikol'skii, I. Op. cit., p. 144.	• Danilov, S. Op. cit., p. 75.

• Ibid., p. 74, and Dohlady byudzhetnoi komiiii. Op. cit., p. 208.

* Danilov, S. Op. cit., p. 74.
million journeys in 1904, while second class was chosen by 11
million, fourth class by 8 million, and first by 1 million. Over
the six years 1899-1904 the average passenger journey was 240
km. in first class, 170 km. in second, 100 km. in third, and in
fourth 115 km.1 The railway managements did not, apparently,
succeed in matching their passenger services to demand. The
load factors of passenger trains were on average low, while at
the same time on some services it was very difficult to obtain
reservations.

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

The rate of railway construction after the turn of the century
did not match that of the nineties. There was only a 25 per cent
increase in mileage between 1900 and 1910, compared to 75
per cent between 1890 and 1900. By the end of 1913 the railway
network measured 71,000 kilometres.2

Apart from the Tashkent Railway and the Trans-Siberian
line east of Irkutsk, the most important new lines built during
this period were: the line from Krasnyi Liman to Lgov, through
Kharkov, which was completed in 1912 and provided an extra
route for Donetz coal moving north and north-west; the
Dolgintsevo-Zaporozhe-Volnovakha line, built in 1908 to pro-
vide a second link between Krivoi Rog iron ore and Donetz
coal, and destined to become one of the world’s busiest railway
lines; in the Urals the Perm-Kungur-Ekaterinburg line was
opened in 1909 and the Tyumen-Omsk line in 1913; the St
Petersburg-Vologda-Vyatka line at last made it economic to
ship Siberian grain through north-western ports. Many less
important lines were built, especially in the Caucasus. Russian
engineers and capital also built lines in Turkey and Persia
connecting with the Russian railways. The Moscow Belt Rail-
way was completed during this period—its double-track line
for the most part laid on a high embankment, and its bridges
over the Moscow River testify to the skill of Russian railway
engineers in the last pre-revolutionary years. Two railway
projects rejected by the Railway Department of the Ministry of

1 Doklady byudzhrtnoi komissii. Op. dt., p. 188. These figures exclude military
traffic.

•Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 623. The 1913 figure includes all common-carrier
railways except in Finland.
Finance were a proposal for a Russo-Indian railway through
Afghanistan, and a French project to connect Irkutsk with the
Klondyke via a tunnel under tlie Bering Sea. The Railway
Department termed the latter . politically harmful and
economically useless.’1

Constructon work cannot be judged solely by new mileage
opened for traffic. In 1907, for example, 370 km. were opened,
but 1,790 km. were under construction and a further 2,120 km.
had been authorized in that year. In addition, 985 km. of line
were doubled.* By 1913 the tempo of new construction was
accelerating; in that year, 1,070 km. of line were opened for
full operation, and 1,720 km. of new government railways and
1,670 km. of new private railway were opened for limited
traffic. At the end of the year no less than 12,900 km. were in
course of construction (3,870 km. state and 8,790 km. private,
plus 240 km. in Finland); this included important lines like the
Turkestan-Siberian Railway, designed to connect Alma Ata
with the Trans-Siberian Railway.8

Military considerations remained a principal factor in plan-
ning new railways. Approval by the Ministry of War or by the
General Staff was usually sufficient to overcome opposition on
economic grounds. The Ivashchenko Railway Committee of
1903-4 had reported that continued construction of strategic
railways was the prime cause of the railways’ financial diffi-
culties, and had stated that six-sevenths of recent new railways
were built primarily for military reasons, yet the process con-
tinued. In fact, in the Caucasus much of the mileage was under
the control of the War Ministry rather than of the Ministry of
Ways and Communications. At the same time there was a
serious and largely unsatisfied need for light railways of local
importance. Motor transport was two decades in the future;
there were only horses to transport grain, say, 400 km. to the
nearest station in the short interval between the harvest and
the rainy season. Failure to move his crop meant a heavy loss
for the farmer. Apart from the inadequacy of horses for bulk
transport, a railway was easier to build than a surfaced road in
most parts of Russia, where stone was hard to find. But little
was done to promote local railways. In 1913 there were only

* Railway Times. August 5, 1905.

'•Railway Gazette. September 25, 1908.

•Railway News. July 18, 1914.
about 3,000 km. of narrow gauge line in Russia, while the
normal gauge feeder lines served industry rather than agri-
culture.

The policy of building railways to low technical standards
until growing traffic demanded improvements was, in theory,
justifiable and no doubt permitted lines to be built which
otherwise would have given impossibly low returns on capital.
But the practice was sometimes carried too far, and the so-
called improvements to increase line capacity often involved
complete and expensive reconstruction. About 600 km. of the
Trans-Siberian line were rebuilt, to ease the gradients, only ten
years after opening. The narrow gauge Yaroslavl-Archangel
line, only six years after completion, was being converted to a
broad gauge by laying an extra pair of rails outside the original
ones. This aroused much adverse comment; apart from the
difficulties of clearing snow and ice from a four-rail line,
unwillingness to write off almost-new locomotives resulted in
broad gauge trains being hauled by narrow' gauge engines.

OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

According to one calculation, the capital invested in Russian
common-carrier railways (excluding Finland) at the end of
1900 totalled 4,825 million gold roubles. Of this 70 per cent
was invested in the state railways, and corresponds to their
share in total mileage. Of this capital about four-fifths was in
the form of debentures and a further one-fifth was supple-
mentary investment, leaving only 120 million roubles worth of
shares. By 1913 shares still only totalled 130 million roubles
whereas total capital had increased to 7,683 million roubles (of
which the state railways accounted for 73 per cent). In the
decade preceding the Great War investment in the railways
was almost equal to investment in Russian industry (2,002
million roubles against 2,230 million).1

The Government was the biggest source of capital, although
it in turn borrowed heavily abroad to float its railway loans.
The Government not only possessed the state railways but also
had a sizeable interest in the private lines. If construction
subsidies be taken into account the total capital invested by the
Government in the private railways was still 24 per cent of the

1 Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 623.
total (as against 80 per cent twenty years earlier).1 This was
mainly the result of the Government’s purchase of unsold
shares and debentures. Hie private railways were largely
owned by the banks, which again drew heavily on foreign
(especially French) funds. The Russo-Asia Bank had large
holdings in the South-Eastern, Moscow-Kazan, and Moscow-
Kiev-Voronezh railways while the Mezhdunarodny Bank held
much of the stock of the Vladikavkaz and Moscow-Vindava-
Rybinsk railways.

The large-scale nationalization of private railways in the
nineties was followed by the amalgamations, encouraged by the
Ministry of Finance, of the surviving private lines. In January
1900 apart from minor lines there were nine private railways
and twenty-two state companies, owning respectively SO per
cent and 70 per cent of the total mileage. (Of the nine private
companies one was the Chinese Eastern Railway, and two
others were in Poland. The remaining six were the Moscow-
Kazan, Moscow-Kiev-Voronezh, Moscow-Vindava-Rybinsk,
Ryazan-Uralsk, South-Eastern, and Vladikavkaz railways.) Tile
Government encouraged these six private companies to build
new lines and prevented (until 1905) the formation of compet-
ing private companies by refusing to guarantee their deben-
tures. The six also increased their mileage through further
acquisitions. Russia’s oldest line, the Tsarskoye Selo Railway,
was acquired by the Moscow-Vindava-Rybinsk Railway in
1900, giving the latter access to St Petersburg; the recently-
completed government-owned Baskunchak Railway was trans-
ferred to the Ryazan—Uralsk Railway in 1906, while another
state line, the Ussuri Railway, was also handed over, to the
Chinese Eastern Railway.

Thus until 1905 the Government was not receptive to pro-
posals for new private companies. Two lines in the Caucasus
suggested in 1900 are good examples of the terms which
promoters demanded and which the Government was now
refusing: one company wished to connect Novorossiisk with
the Trans-Caucasus Railway (a distance of about 450 km.)
and suggested a capital of 24 million roubles of which only one
quarter would be raised by shares, the remaining three-quarters
being secured by 4 per cent state-guaranteed debentures; the
promoters of the second line did not ask for a state guarantee of

* Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 624.
their debentures, but demanded an annual advance of 650,000
roubles for ten years and the free transport of construction
materials for their 18O-km. line.1

After 1905 new companies were allowed to build railways,
but an effort was made to limit these to undeveloped areas,
and many of the new lines were absorbed by larger railways
after completion. In January 1909 there were eleven private
railways with state-guaranteed debentures, two years later
there were sixteen, and in 1913 twenty-two.4 The Government’s
policy of granting to private promoters concessions only for
short lines, which were unlikely to be profitable, discouraged
investment. To remedy this, short railways were allowed to
charge higher rates. In 1917 a further privilege was granted
in the case of the new and short Achinsk-Minusinsk Railway;
as this line would act as a feeder, providing long-haul traffic
for the Trans-Siberian line, the latter was to contribute to its
dividends.

After 1910 there was a renewed pressure for the nationaliza-
tion of the private railways but by the outbreak of war only one
of the big companies had been bought by the state: the Warsaw-
Vienna. Occasional foreign offers to buy Russian railways were
refused, strategic factors being the reason given. In 1900
American interests tried to buy the government-owned
Moscow-Yaroslavl-Archangel Railway and in 1911 an
English group made an unsuccessful offer for the bankrupt
St Petersburg-Lysterbank Railway.

The state railways were also reorganized. By amalgamations
the number of state railways was reduced from twenty-two to
fifteen. In 1906 the Baltic-Pskov-Riga Railway was joined to
the St Petersburg-Warsaw line, to form the new North-Western
Railway. Soon afterwards the Kursk-Kharkov-Sevastopol and
Kharkov-Nikolaev railways were combined into the new
Southern Railway, and the Moscow-Yaroslavl-Archangel and
St Petersburg-Vyatka railways were joined to make the
Northern Railway. These, and similar amalgamations, gave
birth to the following railway managements: South-Western
Railway (4,300km.), Moscow-Kursk Railway (3,800 km.), Bal-
tic Railway (3,600 km.), Central Asia Railway (3,500 km.),
Siberian Railway (8,300 kin.), Ekaterinin Railway (3,200 km.),

1 Railway Timet. Vol. LXXVIII, p. 361.

’See Ministry of Finance. Russian Bondholder's Manual. London. 1909-13.
Southern Railway (2,800 km.), Northern Railway (2,800 km.),
Western Railway (2,700 km.), North-Western Railway (2,500
km.), Samara Railway (2,400 km.), Smolensk Railway (2,300
km.), Nikolaev Railway (2,100 km.), Trans-Baikal Railway
(1,800 km.), Trans-Caucasus Railway (1,600 km.).1

Both state and private railways remained under close govern-
ment supervision. The Ministry of Ways and Communications
was concerned with the operation of the railways while the
Ministry of Finance had a Department of Railway Affairs with
a financial section and tariff section. In the same ministry there
was a tariff committee to examine proposals and also a Council
for Tariff Affairs over which presided the Minister himself.
The Ministry of Finance was also concerned with new railway
projects. The Ministry of War was also influential, and State
Control supervised expenditure. For a time in 1905 a new
Ministry of Commerce and Industry was established with
jurisdiction in railway equipment and operation, but these
functions were soon returned to the Ministry of Finance.
Co-ordination between ministries appears to have been lacking.

. . the commission cannot refrain from pointing out some-
thing which the separate departments do not say, but which has
been observed for many years; the commission must point out
the complete anarchy in the activity of separate ministries,
pursuing in railway matters each its own goal and often in a
state of mutual enmity where there should be agreement and
mutual aid.

'It is a secret to nobody that the Ministry of Finance, pro-
tecting, it is true, the lawful interests of the Treasury, is always
the severest critic of the requests of the Ministry of Ways and
Communications, for the means to maintain the technical capa-
city of the railways, and as a result of this permanent struggle
there has occurred a serious lowering of the technical structure
of the system’4

TARIFF POLICY

The average length of haul for freight traffic in 1904 was only
240 kilometres.® But it increased rapidly in the following years,
1 Railway Tima. April 7, 1906.

* Doklady byudzhetnoi komitrii. Op. cit., p. 158.

’ This figure refers to Euroepan Russia only. Doklady byudzhetnoi komiiiii. Op.
dt., p. 208.
reaching 485 km. in 1913.1 Such a doubling of the average
distance travelled by freight cannot be explained simply by the
growth of traffic over' the long-distance lines like the Trans-
Siberian and the Tashkent Railway. It owes much to the artifi-
cial distribution of production in the country at that time, which
was abetted by a tariff system which only incidentally reflected
the real costs of transport.

The two strongest influences in the rate-making bodies
which had been set up towards the end of the nineteenth
century were the industrialists of the south, and the landowners
of the European grain belt. The landowners had won their
victory in the nineties, when the ‘Chelyabinsk Break’ was
established to prevent Siberian grain spoiling the market in
European Russia. The industrialists were late-starters in the
rate game, but the cartelization of industry in the early twen-
tieth century gave them their opportunity. The cartels, whose
shipments were of dominating importance in the railways’ profit
and loss accounts, could apply significant pressure to obtain
the rates they wanted. More important, the shippers’ repre-
sentatives on the tariff committees were usually from the large-
scale enterprises; the small firms and the merchants had little
influence. For example, rates per carload were cheaper than
less-than-carload, which is reasonable. But carload rates did not
apply to small shipments pooled to form a carload. This was a
serious disadvantage for the small shipper; according to the
1905 tariffs, for example, it cost 18-8 kopeks per pood to send
a carload of meat 500 versts, while the less-than-carload rate
was 22’55 kopeks. Similarly with sugar, where the corre-
sponding rates were 24-18 and 40-0 kopeks.2

The situation in the coal industry was not untypical. The
cartel ‘Produgol’ controlled three-quarters of hard coal output
and was by far the railways’ most important customer. Centred
in the Donetz Basin, the aim of the cartel was to drive other
coal-producing enterprises out of business through price-cutting.
For Donetz coal to be sold in Moscow or the Urals for less
than the price of locally produced coal low transport costs were
clearly necessary and in fact at one stage some railway coal
tariffs descended to 0-114 kopeks per ton/km., about a tenth

1 This includes Asia. If it did not, the figure would be in the region of 400 km.
Danilov, S. Op. cit., p. 74.

* Doklady byudzhetnoi komissii. Op. cit., p. 194.
of the average cost of railway freight movement, and a tenth
of the average freight tariff. Many coal producers were forced
out of business; while the consumption of coal in Moscow
increased, the production of local soft coal fell. The same pro-
cess happened in the Urals and the fate of the Donbas anthracite
mines, not members of the ‘Produgol’, shows that Donetz coal
did not simply triumph because of its quality. In the long run
the railways may have expected to benefit from this enforced
distortion of natural flows; carrying coals to Newcastle can be
profitable for the carrier. A similar situation existed in other
industries. The activities of the metal syndicate 'Prodamet’ had
the same kind of result.

Quveiiuiicnt policy with its corollary of concessionary tariffs
also took its effect. Because cotton rates were high over the
short distances and artificially low for long hauls, raw cotton
was not processed in Central Asia, where it was grown, but
taken to factories in European Russia. Mercantilist policies in
the field of foreign trade led to the institution of concessionary
rates on exports; Russian butter was considerably cheaper in
London than in St Petersburg, Ukrainian sugar was cheaper in
Hull than in Kiev (the 1905 tariff' for granulated sugar over
one thousand versts was 49-39 kopeks per pood if for the
domestic market, but only 23-7 kopeks if destined for export).1

According to one calculation,2 in 1904 while freight traffic
was producing an infinitesimal profit (1/469 kopeks per pood/
verst) after operating and capital charges had been deducted
from rpvpnup, passenger traffic was carried at a loss. Although
passenger receipts covered operating costs, when interest
charges were taken into account there was a loss of almost {
kopek per passenger/verst (comparable losses in Germany and
the usa were | and I kopeks respectively). The Russian rail-
ways ascribed this loss to the continuing effect of the 1894
tariff adjustment, the main features of which were preserved
despite criticism.

The basic feature of the 1894 reform had been the drastic
reduction of rates for the longer journeys. Unfortunately, the
reduced rates did not attract enough extra passengers to offset
tlie loss of revenue per passenger which they occasioned. Most
railways had accepted the 1894 changes reluctantly for this
reason. In fact the Government had to threaten the Kursk-Kiev

* DMady byudxhetnoi komusii. Op. cit., p. 194.	’ Ibid., p. 208.
and Moscow-Yaroslavl railways with drastic rate reductions on
competing lines before these companies would comply.

Passenger fares in 1905 were calculated as follows. In the
third class the rate was I  4875 kopeks per verst for the first
160 versts.1 From 160 versts to 800 this was reduced to 0-9
kopeks. After SOO versts there were tariff zones. For some
reason the first zone, from SO 1 to S25 versts, was priced at 24
kopeks, which represented, even for the traveller going to the
last station of the zone, a slight increase in the per verst rate
after 300 versts. After 325 versts each succeeding zone added
20 kopeks to the price, and as the total distance increased, so
did the width of the zones. From 301 to 500 versts each zone
was of 25 versts, for the succeeding 210 versts the zones were
30 versts, then from 711 to 990 versts there were 35-verst
zones, 40-verst zones between 991 and 1,510 versts, and 50-
verst zones from 1,511 to 3,010 versts. Above 3,010 versts the
rate rose again, the zones were each of 70 versts, and cost 40
kopeks. The first-class fares were 2f times third class, second
class 1J times, while the rigours of fourth-class travel (which
existed only on a few lines, mainly in the east) were compen-
sated by tariff's at only half the third-class level. Children (5-10
years) paid quarter fare. There was clearly something wrong
with these proportions; the two superior classes were over-
priced and could not attract sufficient business to make them
profitable; it was first and second class which were responsible
for the losses on passenger operations; the overcrowded third
and fourth classes were profitable. Thus, in the period 1894—1904
the first class on average was in deficit to the tune of 12-29
kopeks per car/verst or 4-59 kopeks per passenger/verst (thus
first-class passengers were averaging less than three per car).
Second class lost 5*37 kopeks per car/verst or 0-5 kopeks per
passenger/verst. Third class, on the other hand, showed a very
tiny profit while fourth class produced 2-86 kopeks per car/
verst profit. During the same period the load factor of first class
in ‘fast’ trains was 8 • 6 per cent and in ‘passenger’ trains 4 • 0
per cent. Third class registered 35-2 per cent and 28-2 per
cent respectively.* The claim that the poorer travellers were
subsidizing the rich was therefore not unfounded. But Russia’s
rulers were not third-class travellers.

1	These rates are taken from the official 1905 timetable.

* Doklady byudzhetnoi komiuii. Op. cit., p. 193.
There were other, concessionary, tariff's. The Government
benefited from reduced rates for soldiers; in third class or
'Teplushki’ their tariff was 5/16 kopek per verst up to 1,000
versts, then decreasing to | kopek after 1,415 versts. Officers
travelled in the second class at third-class tariff's. Then there
were the expected concessions for students and, on certain rail-
ways, for workers on holiday, workers travelling in freight cars,
worshippers on feast days. Special trains could be hired at 1 - 5
roubles per train/verst, but their composition was limited to
one first, one third and one baggage car (but fire brigades
travelling by special train to extinguish a fire were given a
wider choice!).

There were some differences in concessionary rates for the
commuter tickets of the various railways. These were usually
monthly, 4-monthly (summer only), and yearly tickets, also
sometimes S-monthly and 2-monthly seasons. There also
existed 10-ride tickets. On the state railways the 10-ride ticket
cost ten times the price of an ordinary one-ride ticket, it being
claimed that the passenger’s gain was freedom from the daily
struggle at the ticket window. But the private railways usually
offered a pecuniary incentive with these tickets. Four-month
and yearly tickets could usually be bought on an instalment
plan. Typical commuter fares were (in 1905): St Petersburg-
Oranienbaum (37 versts), third class single 37 kopeks, monthly
9-25 roubles, yearly 74 roubles. Thus the yearly ticket cost
only 2 roubles for each verst, and the monthly 0-25 roubles.
This was the state Rallic-Pskov-Riga Railway. On the private
Ryazan-Uralsk Railway the third-class monthly season from
Moscow to Domadedovo (34 versts) cost rather more: 18-95
roubles. In general, the state railways provided cheaper com-
muter services than did the private railways.

In addition to the standard railway passenger fares various
supplements were paid. Then, as now, an extra charge was
levied for travel in the fastest trains. There was also a 15 per
cent tax on tickets, and from 1900 a compulsory Red Cross
levy (io kopeks on every first- and second-class ticket above 2
roubles, and on every third-class ticket over 8 roubles. It was
also levied on non-paying passengers). In addition city stations
charged a commission of 10 to 20 kopeks per document issued,
'document’ including not only the transportation ticket but also
those for reservations and extra charges.
PASSENGER SERVICES -4

By 1905 the speed and frequency of the passenger timetable
had attained a level which in general was not surpassed for
fifty years, although the punctuality with which trains followed
the schedules left plenty of room for improvement. However,
the fact that trains in 1905 were as fast as they were in 1955
is not to the credit of 1905 for Russian trains were then, as in
1955, among the slowest in Europe.1

The St Petersburg-Moscow route of the Nikolaev Railway
has always been a standard-setter for tlie other Russian railways,
and in the summer of 1905 the trains on this route were tlie
beat in Russia. There were nine through trains in each direction,
together with a few stopping trains going only part of the way.
Train no. 1 was the 'courier’ service, and this was supple-
mented for most of the summer by no. ic, which conveyed
through cars to the Crimea. No. 1 was a night train and left
St Petersburg at 10.30 p.m. and with eight intermediate stops
arrived at Moscow at 10 a.m. This first class only train
averaged up to 56 km. per hour (35 m.p.h.) between stations.
No. 1c ran at similar station-to-station speeds but as it made
two additional conditional stops, and ran into the Kursk
Station in Moscow’, it took a few minutes longer. It carried
second-class as well as first-class passengers, and it was the sole
train over this route to include a restaurant car, being the only
day sendee between the two capitals, leaving at 9.45 a.m. and
arriving- at 9.20 p.m.

The next beat train was fast no. 5, which left at 8 p.m. and
arrived in Moscow at 8.45 a.m. the next morning. It carried
first- and second-class passengers, made nine regular and three
conditional stops, and averaged up to 48 km. per hour (30
m.p.h.) between stations. Like nos. 1 and 1c, it was a supple-
mentary fare train, all places were reserved, and sleeping cars
of the International Sleeping Car Company w’ere included.

The third category was the ‘passenger’ train, which was
considerably slower than the ‘courier’ and ‘fast’ trains. Five
‘passenger’ trains ran from St Petersburg to Moscow: no. 7

1 This section is based on the official timetables of 1905 and 1915. (The 1915
timetable repeated, more or less, the 1914 schedules, with a note that because of
tlte war many of the advertised trains were not in fact running. Tlie fastest train
between Moscow and tlie capital was shown as a 9|-hour schedule.)
(second and third class, sleeping cars, departure at noon,
arrival 6.SO a.m. stopping at most stations), no. 15 (second
and third class, sleepers, departure 3.30 p.m., arrival 10.30
a.m.), no. 11 (first, second and third class, second- and third-
class sleepers, departure 11.30 p.m., arrival з p.m.) and no. 13
(first, second and third class, with second- and third-class
sleepers, departure 12.30 a.m., arrival 8 a.m.). Lastly, there
was mail no. 3, carrying second- and third-class seats and first-
and second-class sleepers. This left at 3 p.m. and arrived at
7 a.m.

On the Moscow-Brest line, another of the better passenger
routes, there were four daily through trains. No. 1, the 'courier’
train, was the Moscow—Warsaw service. It was for first- and
second-class passengers only, contained a restaurant car, and
also sleeping cars of the International Sleeping Car Company;
a supplementary fare was payable. With fifteen intermediate
stops, it took twenty-five hours to cover the 955 km. to Brest,
an overall average speed of only 39 km. per hour (24 m.p.h.).
However, it dashed over the first fifty-six kilometres at an
exhilarating 45 km. per hour (28 m.p.h.). The next best train
was fast no. 5. This left at 8.30 p.m. and arrived 30 hours 35
minutes later, an average speed of 26 km. per hour (16 m.p.h.).
It carried first-, second- and third-class passengers. Then there
was mail no. 3, another three-class train, stopping at all stations
(but local passengers were only picked up if places were
available). Finally there was mixed train no. 7, carrying first-,
second-, and third-class passengers, together with freight, and
needing 47 hours to cover the distance.

Both the St Petersburg-Moscow and Moscow-Brest lines
were reputed to have excellent passenger trains, so the sendees
provided on most of the other routes are not difficult to
.visualize. The pride of many a main line was a train making
25 kin. per hour (15 m.p.h.) between stations and requiring
from its passengers a supplement for the privilege of travelling
at so great a velocity. Thus by 1905 the traditional Russian
passenger train was well entrenched; slow and with long waits
at stations. There were very good operating reasons for the
tardy schedules. In particular, the less divergence there is
between the speeds of passenger trains and freight, the greater
the line capacity (because fewer freight trains are overtaken
and therefore less sidetracking is necessary). Also, Russian
passenger engines were usually rather small and inadequate
because of weight limitations, and slow schedules permitted
them to haul heavier .loads, thus increasing revenue per train/
kilometre and decreasing costs per passenger/kilometre.

Commuter services were usually good, and up to the stan-
dard of other countries. For example, on the St Petersburg-
Oranienbaum service there were 26 trains in each direction,
carrying first-, second- and third-class passengers. The first
train left at 7 a.m., and the last at 12.40 a.m. With five inter-
mediate stops the 35 km. were covered in 65 minutes (32 km.
per hour, or 20 m.p.h.). At Oranienbaum a connecting steam
railcar trundled to Peterhof at 19 km. per hour (12 m.p.h.).
The Moscow Klin service of the Nikolaev Railway was pro-
vided by sixteen daily trains. The first left at 7.30 a.m. and the
last at 12.35 a.m. Most trains were second and third class, some
were three-class and a few which did not stop at all stations
were first and second class only. The stopping trains took 2
hours 25 minutes for the 89-km. journey, making twelve
intermediate stops.

In subsequent years there was a steady improvement in
services. In summer 1.914 the fastest train between St Peters-
burg and Moscow took only 10 hours, leaving at 10 a.m. and
arriving at 8.0 p.m. This implied an overall average speed of
65 km. per hour (40 m.p.h.). On the Moscow-Klin suburban
service the first train had been advanced to 6 a.m., and the
fastest trains took only 1 hour 50 minutes for the 89 km.

THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE RAILWAYS

Soviet commentators stress that from a technical point of view
the railways on the eve of the Great War were in a very bad
state. The decline in the number of new locomotives delivered
(from an annual average 1900-6 of 1,125 units to 559 units
per annum 1907-13 )x is often cited in this connection, together
with the fact that the average age of locomotives in 1913 was
16-3 years.2 These criticisms would seem to be unjustified; in
view of tire economy drive which was in progress for eight
years before 1913 the locomotive stock of the Russian railways

* Derived from Rakov, V. Op. cit., p. 70.

’ Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 656.
was in a surprisingly good state.1 After all, 16*3 years is not
an excessive average age for steam locomotives, the Soviet
locomotive stock in the nineteen-fifties was older than this. Nor
is there any substantial evidence of a locomotive shortage
before the Great War. On the other hand, it must be admitted
that Russian locomotives of that time were too small for the
work offered, which resulted in uneconomically small trains and
poor schedules and punctuality.

The two trends in locomotive design in the early twentieth
century' were the application of superheating (and consequent
abandonment of the two-cylinder compound idea) and the

fig. 11. The type Z passenger 4-6-0 used by the Moscow-Kazan and
South-Eastern railways. The design, introduced in 1902, was the first
in Russia to include a superheater.

introduction of bigger engines. Small engines of previous
designs, such as the О 0-8-0 and N 2-6-0 continued to be
built (sometimes with superheating) but designers were in-
creasingly occupied with the problem of building really adequate
locomotives.

For freight work, twelve-wheeled articulated engines con-
tinued to be built until 1916. 350 units were built for the
Moscow-Kmn, Trans-Siberian, and Trans-Caucasus railways,
but their high maintenance costs discouraged other railways
from using them. To replace eight-wheeled engines on the main
lines of the state railways the Minister of Ways and Com-
munications in 1905 ordered his motive power assistant, one

* According to Mikhailov, I. Op. cit., p. 18, there were 3,828 passenger and
16,234 freight engines at the beginning of 1914. Of these, 75 per cent burned coal,
20 per cent oil, and 5 per cent wood. 8 j per cent were over 40 years old, but 75
per cent were less than 20 years.
Professor Shchukin, to prepare a design for a 2-8-0 engine.
The resulting engine (which in fact was based On a design built
a few years earlier for tw'o private railways, the Vladikavkaz
and Chinese Eastern) was built from 1907 to 1911 by six
factories, a total of 1,850 units being delivered. But only three
private railways bought this engine, and they only in small
quantities, for except at the higher speeds it used an excessive
amount of steam per horsepower. But due to the influence of
its patron, Professor Shchukin, this class ‘shch’ design was on
several occasions modified in an attempt to improve its per-
formance.

The existence of this 2-8-0 design delayed the appearance
of 0-10-0 type engines on Russian rails; as early as 1906 the
Engineering Council in the Ministry of Ways and Communica-
tions had rejected a 0-10-0 design submitted by the South-
Eastern Railway. Several other attempts were made to intro-
duce this type of engine, but it was not until 1911 that the
Vladikavkaz Railway overcame the opposition of Professor
Shchukin and gained Ministry approval for its 0-10-0 design.
These engines began to appear in 1912 and were ordered also
by the Ryazan-Uralsk and the North Donetz railways. Thus
was bom the E class, which was destined to be built almost
continuously for thirty-five years and to become the world’s
most numerous locomotive type.

For passenger work the N type 2-6-0 was built up to 1911,
about 1,000 units being produced by that year. Although it was
the most numerous passenger class of pre-revolutionary Russia
it was far from being adequate for the heavier and faster trains
which were becoming necessary. Tins was especially true after
rising oil prices had caused many of these engines to be con-
verted to coal-burners; with coal firing their steam-raising
ability was badly affected. Although a number of quite successful
4—6-0 types were built in these years it was not until 1910 that
a really capable engine was built. This was the S class, designed
by the Sormovo Works for the state railways at the request of
the Ministry of Ways and Communications. Based on an
Italian design, it was of the 2-6-2 wheel arrangement and had
an extra-large grate to cope with poor-quality coal (in fact, the
first five engines, which worked on the St Petersburg-Warsaw
line, burned wood). But a change in fuel prices caused many
railways to convert them to oil-burners. These engines, which
in all respects were very successful, were produced by three
works, and when production ceased in 19is about 900 units
had been built. They were used by many of the state railways,
but only one of the private lines. However, in a modified form
they were to become the standard passenger engine of the

fig. 12. The type Sv passenger locomotive built from 1913 for the
Warsaw-Vienna Railway. This was an adaptation of the S type, and
was for the 4 ft. 8| in. gauge. It was from this design that the standard
Soviet passenger engine {type Su) was later derived.

Soviet railways, and the original engines were still on passenger
work until the nineteen-sixties.

However, not all Russian design work was as successful as
this. The case of the ‘half tank’ engine is evidence of this. In
1906 the Ryazan-Uralsk Railway ordered from the Kharkov
works a suburban tank locomotive of a 4-6-2 4-cylinder com-
pound type. The designed weight of this engine, as approved
by the Engineering Council of the Ministry, was 73 tons in
working order. But when the first of the eight engines was
weighed, the scales showed 108 tons. So the tanks were
removed and a special water tender was attached to the loco-
motive, but the weight of the engine itself was still 90 tons.
It was not until 1910 that the Ministry allowed the railway to
use these engines; the factor}’ sold them at a considerable loss,
and the chitf designer was sacked.

One reason why big engines were slow to appear on Russian
railways was the lightweight rail commonly used, and the
continued existence of ‘temporary’ wooden bridges. In 1913
about 90 per cent of the total mileage w as laid with rails of less
than 34 kg. per metre (68 lb. per yd.).1 The Trans-Siberian
still used 23 kg. (46 lb.) rails. Not only did these light rails

* Danilov, S. Op. cit., p. 73.
limit locomotive size, but they wore out quickly, and their use
later proved to be the Achilles heel of the Russian railways.

While the locomotive stock of the pre-war Russian railways
was adequate, and the track rather poor, the situation of tlie
rolling stock w as plainly bad. There was a chronic shortage of
freight cars and no real attempt to remedy it. Requests by the
Ministry of Ways and Communications for funds to purchase
rolling stock for the state railways were usually unsatisfied; in
its 1914 estimates the Ministry asked for 16,700 new cars, but
the State Duma granted funds for only 8,350. The car shortage
was one of the main causes of the backlog of freight shipments,
and the position did not improve. While the freight car stock
increased by 1О per cent from 4S£2,000 units in 1£Ю4> to about
475,000 in 1913, traffic increased by 30 per cent. The dominant
freight car remained the 4-wheel box car of 16 j to 18-ton
capacity, although in 1914 was introduced a 20-ton model.
There was a shortage of open freight cars, only 2| per cent of
the total stock being of this type. This meant that many bulk
industrial goods, like coal, were carried in box cars, which
composed two-thirds of the stock. Only 5 per cent of the car
stock was 4-axle.1

The screw couplings of freight cars were too w eak, and were
a main cause of accidents. To prevent trains breaking, the
pow erful articulated locomotives of the Moscow-Kazan Railway
were fitted with a pair of cables which hooked on to the twelfth
or fifteenth car behind the engine to relieve the strain on the
normal couplings. A weird device containing a compressed air-
operated cylinder, and a w’inch, were on the tender to keep tlie
cables tensioned and to make adjustments when passing over
curves. Most enginemen ignored this apparatus, which after a
few years was abandoned.

The railways owned about 31,000 passenger cars in 1913.
Almost all were of standard design, although at least one
railway designed its own passenger cars. The best first-class
cars had 18 berths in 2-berth compartments, were 20 metres
long, ran on 4-wheel bogies, and had central heating. Second-
class cars were usually similar but carried 28 passengers in
4-berth compartments. Fourth-class vehicles had four wheels
with elementary springing, were 15 metres long, uncompart-
mented and carried 35 passengers, illumination was by candle,

1	Danilov, S. Op. cit., p. 77.
there was no central heating but there was a stove at each end
of the car, there were two lavatories but no water. Third class
was somewhat better, but smelt the same.1

THE CARTELIZATION OF THE RAILWAY

SUPPLY INDUSTRY

The beginning of the twentieth century saw the flowering in
Russia of cartels in industries supplying the railways. The real
start of this process was the founding by the Government in
1902 of the Committee for the Distribution of Orders for
Railway Rolling Stock and Rails. The Committee was in the
jurisdicliun uf the Ministry of Ways and Communications and
its membership included representatives from the Ministries
of Finance, Trade, Industry, and State Control. It was origi-
nally established to support industry during a period of depres-
sion. It did this by maintaining high prices so that in effect the
railways subsidized industry by paying excessive prices.

This temporary committee became a permanent feature of
the Russian railway scene. Despite many attempts by the rail-
ways to bring its activity to an end, its term was always
renewed and it lasted until the Great War gratified industry
with as much profitable business as it could handle. During its
life it contributed to the railway technical deficiencies which the
war would reveal and maintained prices only through the under-
utilization of productive capacity.

This cartpliyation reached its peak just before the Great War.
In 1913 the railway companies complained that price rings
existed among 'heir suppliers of locomotives, cars, metals,
wire, coal and coke, cement, and oil. In other words, they were
forced to pay excessive prices for nine-tenths of their material
needs. They were not allowed to deal with companies outside
the cartels which meant, in most cases, that they could not
import thehj supplies without special government sanction. It
was calculated that Russian suppliers overcharged by 3,000
roubles on each new locomotive, and by 300 roubles on each
freight car. Thus it often happened that the Russian product
was priced higher than the cost of a similar foreign product
even after shipping costs and import duties had been added.

1	For a description of rail travel from the passengers’ point of view see Troyat,
H. Daily Life in Russia under the Last Tsar. London, 1961, Ch. 1.
But only in a few cases was government permission granted to
railways enabling them to buy abroad. Conditions before the
growth of cartels had been difficult enough, although in 1901
the railways had been allowed to import rails, due to the
unwillingness of Russian industry to supply them (a previous
edict had permitted this only when Russian firms asked prices
over 10 per cent higher than import prices). Again, about the
same time, import duties on coal were lifted for a few months
to ease the railways' fuel difficulties. But these concessions
became rarer as the cartels became more firmly entrenched.
And the railways suffered not only from the high prices; they
had no recourse against frequent delays in delivery. No punitive
clauses were allowed in the contracts. Quality was often poor;
one railway received a batch of twenty-four locomotives from
the Kharkov works, which were unsafe at less than half of their
designed speed. Industry was reluctant to adopt railway sug-
gestions for improvements in its products.

Cartelization had its usual, intended, effect on the general
economy; productive resources which should have been diverted
to other work were kept in being and under-utilized. In the
locomotive building industry, for example, of the nine factories
active at this period eight belonged to the Council of Repre-
sentatives of tlie locomotive-building factories, a cartelizing
organization acting with, and through, the Committee for
Distribution of Orders for Railway Rolling Stock and Rails.
Tlie one producer which did not belong to the cartel was the
Votkinsk Works, which was owned by the State. It is perhaps
significant that from 1909 to 1913 this factory fulfilled orders
at an average rate of six locomotives per year. But the other
works were also grossly under-utilized. In 1906 the eight
factories in the Russian locomotive industry produced 1,266
engines, and even then were not working at absolutely full
capacity. By 1912 production had fallen to 313 units,1 and an
additional factory had entered the locomotive industry.

In tlie car-building industry fourteen out of the sixteen firms
belonged to the cartel. The cartel distributed orders among its
members in the following agreed proportions: 13-87 per cent
of production to the Russo-Baltic Company; 8-45 per cent to
Sormovo, 6-98 per cent each to the Dvigatel’, Kolomna,
Putilov, Tver, Phoenix and St Petersburg factories, 6-68 per

1 Rakov, V. Op. cit., p. 70.
cent to the Mytishchi Works, 6-6 per cent each to the Bryansk
and Maltsev factories, 5-6 per cent each to the Lilpop, Rav,
Levenstein and Southern Ural works, and the remaining 4-72
per cent to the Nikolaev factory.1 The effect of this combination
was to aggravate the long-standing railway car shortage.
Freight cars had been insufficient for peak demands even in
1900, and the growth of traffic had not been matched by
increased car production, in fact the state railways were in-
creasing their car stock at an annual average rate of only о • 8
per cent. Yet the Russian car factories were only utilizing about
one-third of their productive capacity at this time.

At the end of 1913 yet another committee of enquiry into
Russian railways received a petition from the railway com-
panies that they be allowed to order equipment from anywhere,
including abroad, and that they be permitted to construct their
own rolling stock (as some had done in the past) and acquire
their own coal mines and oil wells. But it was only the war, or
more probably, the Revolution, which put a definite end to the
cartels. In 1913 the agreements had been extended for another
five years.

LABOUR

In the ten years up to 1908 the number of railway workers
increased faster than either mileage or traffic. In 1898 there
were, on average, 432,000 railwaymen at work, and in 1908
844,000; a 95 per cent increase. Railway mileage increased by
66 per cent in the same period, and ton/km. by 84 per cent.
Tile fall in labour productivity was from 92,000 ton/km. per
worker in 1898 to 87,000 in 1908. But in the following five
years, despite increases in traffic and mileage, it was found
possible to reduce the number of workers to 815,000, a 3 per
cent reduction. With a 26 per cent increase in traffic, labour
productivity thus rose to 121,000 ton/km. per worker in 1913.2
In the us^ at this time railway labour productivity was about
700,000 ton/km. per worker. Another source8 states that on
the eve of the war there were in Russia 15 workers per kilo-
metre of track compared to about 8 in France.

The railways’ payroll was still characterized by a high pro-
portion of more or less casual labour. In 1904 the staff'of both

1 Railway Times. February 1, 1918.	• Strumilin, S. Op. cit., pp. 635-6.

• Vasiliev, N. Transport Rossis v voine 1914-18. gg. .Moscow, 1939, p. 15.
state and private railways in European Russia included daily
workers to the extent of 40 per cent of the total (in Asiatic
Russia half the workers were employed on a day-to-day basis).1
To these must be added another 5 per cent of the workers,
classified as ‘temporary’. While it is true that most daily
workers were in fact employed continuously, merely being paid
on a day or piece basis, the situation was not good for labour
discipline; these men had no sense of belonging to the railway-
service and enjoyed even less security of employment than the
established railway worker. Staff cuts after 1908 reduced the
proportion of non-permancnt labour to about 22 per cent by
1918, and in that year a Bill was introduced which had the aim,
apart from introducing better diccipline and improved wages,
of creating a regular railway labour force on a permanent basis.

Official regulations concerning working hours distinguished
between different categories of railwaymen. In 1906, enginemen
were intended to enjoy over each ten-day period a number of
rest hours not less than the number of w-orking hours, and no
working spell was to be longer than twelve hours (or sixteen
in exceptional circumstances). Switchmen (point operators) at
busy locations were prescribed an eight-hour day, and at points
of average traffic twelve hours. Track-walkers (permanent way
lengthmen) were not expected to cover more than 17 km. each
day. At the busier stations the staff usually worked on a shift
system on a four-day cycle; a man would work a full twenty-
four hours the first day, sixteen the next, and eight hours on
thp third day while the fourth day would be free.4 In 1913 on
average workers in the traffic, telegraph and traction services
w-orked a ten-hour day, permanent way and signalling employees
ten and a half, workshop personnel nine hours, and managerial
six hours.3 Lower workers were officially entitled (according
to the 1906 regulations) to two weeks holiday a year, and
senior grades four weeks, ‘when conditions permitted’. In
Siberia a one-month paid holiday was given for each year of
work, with a maximum of four months.4

Wage rates rose over this period, at least nominally. The

1	Doklady byudzhetnoi komissii. Op. cit., p. 158.

* Zhumal ministerstva putei soobshchenii. St Petersburg, 1906, Book 1.

• Mikhailov, 1. Op. cit., p. 26.

‘ The 1906 details of holidays and hours of work were figures supplied by the
Ministry for an international railway conference, and may be somewhat rose-
tinted.
>>. Over the heavily-graded line between the refineries and main freight yards at Baku the
I’rans-Caucasus Kailway used Fairlie locomotives. These were oil-burners and carried their
fuel in tanks above the toiler. Photo. Ijicomothr Publishing Company.

The Trans-Siberian Kailway; a photograph taken in 1911 to mark the opening of a
permanent bridge. Photo. Hadio Times Hulton Picture Library.
fl

10. A Trans-Siberian train at Kharbin (Manchuria). Tile locomotive is
ot the G type, built for the Vladikavkaz and Chinese Eastern railways
in 1901-02. Photo. La Lie du Hail.

The Trans-Siberian Railway in 1919. Fuel for heating is taken aboard the
passenger vehicle of a mixed train. Plioto. Lu Lie du Hail,
On the Trans-Siberian Railway during the Civil Warr the eight-wheel
passenger cars are of tlte type built for the pre-war Moscow Vladivostok
service. Photo. /.a F/r it к Hail.

A wood-burning eight-wheel freight engine on a passenger train at
Murmansk in 1919. Photo, Imperial M'ar Museum.
lower-paid workers benefited from an increase approved in
1906. Using a crude average derived by dividing number of
workers into total wagebill (including lodging allowances),
the average income of a railway worker was 325 roubles in
1898, 380 in 1908, and 416 in 1913.1 But because of fluctuations
in the price level, it is doubtful whether real wages ever
exceeded the 1895 level, and in 1908 real wages were almost
as low as in the bad year of 1892.

Excluding higher management, the ratio between the highest
and lowest salary rates was about 25:1. On the Nikolaev
Railway in Moscow in 1905, the stationmaster of the passenger
terminal received 2,400 roubles per annum, the stationmaster
of the freight terminal 2,700 roubles, together with free accom-
modation. Tiie lowest paid established workers at tile passenger
station, labourers, received 120 roubles, rising to 180. Signal-
men received from 240 to 300 roubles, office workers from SOO
to 480, plus a housing allowance of about 100 roubles.2

The existing rules safeguarding the interests of the railway
worker seem often to have been honoured in the breach rather
than in the observance. In the railway debates in the 1908
Duma the Ministry of Ways and Communications claimed that
the nine-hour day was firmly established, with extra pay for
overtime, and that scales of pensions and accident compensation
were being observed. But members refuted this, often citing
concrete examples known to them of men regularly working
sixteen hours a day, of engine drivers who did not leave their
locomotives for twenty-four hours or more, of old or injured
railwaymen being dismissed without a pension. The ingrained
Russian habit of tyrannizing subordinates and cringing before
superiors led to the concealment of faults and to oppression of
the lower ranks. Л stationmaster would force a switchman to
hoe his cucumber patch in his few off-duty hours, a chief clerk
might force his juniors to overcharge shippers so that he could
pocket the excess; a worker unloading grain on the North-
Western^Railway ripped the sole from his shoe, put on his bast
shoes, and was then sacked by his stationmaster, accused of
damaging railway property with his feet.

Minorities also suffered. The tendency for the government
establishment to direct popular discontent into the safe channel

• Derived from Strumilin, S. Op. cit., pp. 635-6.

* Gordcenko, Ya. Kurt z/teleznykJi dorag. St Petersburg, 1906, Appendix.
of murderous anti-semitism deprived the railways, especially
the state railways, of managerial talent. Riissian chauvinism
was also vented against Poles, many of whom had entered
railway service in Russia and were accused of taking the bread
from the mouths of Russian workers. But the latter found their
revenge when the nationalization of the Warsaw-Vienna Rail-
way led to the dismissal of many Polish workers (and especially
administrators) and their replacement by Russians.1 On the
other hand the position of women was no worse than the
situation in other countries; in fact from 1913 women were
allowed to hold responsible railway posts, provided they held
the Railway Engineers’ Certificate of the St Petersburg
Women’s Polytechnic.

Nevertheless, compared to other industries, tlte Russian rail-
wayman's life was not the worst. This is probably one reason
why in 1905 the railways were late in joining the strike move-
ment. ‘Bloody Sunday’, which triggered the 1905 Revolution,
and was followed by strikes in St Petersburg, Moscow and
Warsaw, and in other big cities, occurred in January 1905, but
it was not until October that an effective railway strike was
called. Meanwhile, in April 1905 the All-Russian Railway
Union was formed at a conference in Moscow in which worker
representatives of ten state railways participated. At first a
moderate programme was favoured but on some railways (e.g.
"Vladikavkaz) rival and more extreme organizations were
formed.

But it was not long before Bolshevik influence was felt in the
Railway Union. At the second conference, in July of the same
year, twenty railways were represented, and resolutions were
carried in favour of agitation for a national railway strike for
political ends. Another conference at the end of September was
held in St Petersburg and demanded an eight-hour working
day; election, instead of appointment, of railway administrators;
the release of arrested workers; the abolition of martial law
and of the strengthened railway gendarmerie which had been
imposed on the railways. In a wider context the railwaymen
demanded political freedom and amnesty for all; freedom for

1 The compulsory replacement of Polish by tlte Russian language on this railway
give rise to many bitter sallies; porters delighted in ordering ‘Publiku zaperet’
fortochku’ which in Russian means "keep the window closed’ but in Polish some-
thing much less respectable.
nationalities like the Poles and Finns to leave the Russian
Empire, and the immediate calling of a constituent Assembly.

These demands were variously described as impudent, ridi-
culous, and sublime. But the fact that railwaymen were willing
to face dismissal, imprisonment, and in the case of the leaders
execution, cannot be considered as merely the hypnotic effect
of Bolshevik agitation; railwaymen, like other Russians were
at the end of their patience after years of subjection and neglect
by rulers who believed they had a divine right to autocratic
mismanagement. The general railway strike commenced on the
eighth of October and completely paralyzed the Moscow area.
Four days later St Petersburg traffic came to a standstill and by
the seventeenlli neaily the whole system was stopped. But the
strikers lacked the strength to withstand a prolonged stoppage
with its attendant hunger and violence. On the twenty-first the
strike was called off. It was not an entire failure, for the railway
strike was probably the last straw which broke the Tsar's
resistance: on the seventeenth of October he issued a manifesto
which conceded a few of the strikers’ political demands.

However, this apparent concession was only intended to be
temporary, to split the opposition and gain time. Gangs of
thugs appeared, supported by Church and State, who attacked
and often murdered, apart from the usual Jews, any person
thought to be hostile to the regime. In December 1905 worker-
representatives of twenty-nine railways joined in supporting a
new general strike which it was hoped to convert to an armed
uprising

This new’ strike did not succeed in affecting the whole
country. St Petersburg remained calm, as did many other big
cities. In Moscow, however, the strike did develop into an
armed uprising with workers of the Moscow-Kazan Railway
taking a leading part and running trains to supply the rebels.
The Government completely lost control of the Trans-Siberian
lin<^ where mutinous soldiers returning from their dispiriting
campaign against the Japanese revolted en route. On the 2nd
January (20th of December by the old calendar) The Times
contained this account from its Russian correspondent:

‘The newspapers give a terrible picture of the position of
affairs on the Siberian Railway. It is stated that as far as
Cheliabinsk there are no railway authorities, and that all the
stations have been pillaged. The soldiers and sailors act just as
they please. Complete anarchy reigns at Irkutsk, and the offi-
cials themselves recognize that they are unable to restore order.
Military trains follow one another indiscriminately, and a
disaster may be expected at any moment, as the locomotives
are not in charge of qualified drivers.’

In fact, many disasters did occur, fatal collisions happening
almost every day.

An Imperial Decree was hurriedly issued to place the railway
service under a special emergency commission, the manager of
the Tsarskoye Selo Railway was arrested for complicity, in
railway districts where martial law was in force court martials
tried and punished the rebels, hundreds of railwaymen were
dismissed and deprived of the right to re-enter government
service. But it was military violence which won the day for the
Government. The Kazan Railway in Moscow was recovered
only with troops supported by artillery; 800 railwaymen were
killed and a further seventy summarily shot. General Orlov,
who was ‘pacifying’ the Baltic provinces, hung a stationmaster
who could not, or would not, provide him with a train.

Elsewhere in the Russian empire the rebels w'on temporary
successes, often using the railways to move their own armed
groups. In Poland, and probably elsewhere, no»-strikers were
attacked by strikers; ‘blackleg’ engine drivers being a favourite
target as trains came within range of rebel rifles. Near Kharkov
government troops scored a spectacular success when their
artillery hit an ammunition train in a rebel-held station. The
Trans-Caucasus Railway, like the Trans-Siberian, was under
rebel control for several weeks but by the end of the year the
Government was in control of all railways except these two,
and the Vladikavkaz Railway. The Trans-Siberian Railway was
restored by an unusual operation, probably unique in nature
and scale: two military trains each commanded by a general
simultaneously entered the railway, one from the west and the
other from the east. With frequent halts to suppress, flog, and
execute rebels and mutineers, the two trains finally met at
Chita, and the Trans-Siberian Railway was declared to be
reopened for business.

After the bloody suppression of the general strike and revolt,
the Bolshevik group lost influence in the Railway Union (which
after 1905 had been obliged to operate clandestinely) and by
1907 its Central Committee demanded the resignation of
revolutionaries. Subsequently the Railway Union became the
largest of the pre-revolutionary workers’ organizations, and
was notable in that it embraced not only manual workers, but
also clerical and administrative.

CORRUPTION

The notoriety which the Russian railw ays gained on account of
dishonesty and corruption can be considered partly as a reflec-
tion of the moral standards of the society they served, and
partly as a result of salary levels which made it difficult for the
railway official to live honestly. Corruption of officials had long
been a normal, even accepted, feature of Russian life. So few
were willing to draw the line between a tip and a bribe, or
between overcharging and fraud, that it is perhaps surprising
that the railways were singled out for so much criticism on this
score. This criticism developed especially around tlie turn of the
century, although there is no evidence that there was any
change in moral standards at that time.

It was the ticket inspector who was the butt of most critics.
Big men who practised fraud or at least sharp-dealing usually
made their fortunes unscathed. Criticism and outcry against
ticket inspectors, who for a consideration wrould let passengers
travel without a ticket or in superior accommodation for which
they had not paid, found expression in the press, in the Duma,
and in fiction. What follows is from Chapter 15 of Kuprin’s
novel The Pit.

‘The inspector is going to pass through now,’ said the con-
ductor, ‘so please stand here writh your wife for a while at the
end of the third-class car.*

'All right!’ agreed Horizon.

»And the money we agreed, please.’

now much do I owe you then?’

‘Just as we agreed; half of what you saved, two roubles
eighty.’

‘What?’ Horizon suddenly exploded, ‘two roubles eighty?
Do you think I’m a fool. Here’s one rouble and be grateful!
. . . What impudence! I’ll tell the inspector that you carry
people without tickets. ..."
Passengers travelling with passes issued by the Ministry of
Ways and Communications were much more numerous than
service needs alone would have warranted. In 1908 Count
Bobrinskoi, representing Kiev in the State Duma, drew cheers
when he complained that passholders left no room on the train
for legitimate paying passengers:

. Gentlemen, I personally happened to be in a car very
tightly packed with passengers; one could hardly find a place,
the journey was a long one. The inspector comes in and asks
for our tickets. All the passengers show passes or similar
documents. Then it is my turn. 1 take out my ticket. The
inspector, astonished, says, “What, you have a ticket?"
(laughter). Gentlemen! We have the right to call this un-
systematic and uneconomic (applause).’1

Complaints such as this led the Minister of Ways and Com-
munications to ask one of the state railways, the Nikolaev, to
investigate passengers travelling between St Petersburg and
Moscow in 1908 without tickets. The results of this enquiry
were as follows: in that year 32,884 persons travelled between
the two capitals without buying a ticket. The majority of these
held passes, but only a few were entitled to them. Of these
transgressors 716 were fined and their passes confiscated.
Seventeen railway officials were dismissed for complicity.2

The small number of those penalized, relative to the thousands
of persons involved, as a result of this special and untypical
investigation would indicate that the chances of success in this
game were high. Widespread venality and graft persisted on
the railway until Soviet times. One of its lesser manifestations
was linguistic; w'hen a ticket inspector asked for the traveller’s
‘biletchik’ and not for his ‘bilet’ it meant that if he didn’t get a
tip there might be some unpleasantness.

1 Gosudarstvennava Duma. Strnograficheskiye otchety. 1906-16. April 1908,
p. 1975.

• Railway Gazette. September 30, 1909.	'»
CHAPTER V

SEVEN YEARS OF WAR

RAILWAY MOBILIZATION

Ever since tlie early days of railways in Russia, the Ministry of
War had ensured that each line knew its role and duties in the
event of hostilities. By 1914 the mobilization plans had become
outstanding examples of anticipator}' planning in detail. They
were drawn up every two or three years by the military
authorities in co-operation with the railway managements.
There were several variations of each plan to cover all likely
enemies and battle zones. Each railway received tlie sections of
the plan relevant to its own work and they were placed in
sealed packets, and then in an iron box secreted at pre-arranged
points. Some relaxations of this secrecy were permitted to key
railway staff, who were allowed to acquaint themselves with
their own particular mobilization duties. The plans covered the
first two weeks following the day announced by the Tsar to be
the start of mobilization. Wisely, no attempt was made to plan
the following weeks, it was intended that schemes would be
drawn up for these after the war had started.1

The basis of the mobilization procedure was the cessation of
almost all passenger trains and most freight. This included not
only the lines handling military traffic, but also the others, to
enable them to transfer locomotives, staff and rolling stock to
the hard-pressed companies. On most railways, only a mail
train would circulate daily in each direction. The only freight
trains to operate would be the few considered necessary for
maintaining activity in industries vital to the war effort. Having
thus cleared the railways of normal traffic, troop and munition
trains could move rapidly, stopping only for engine purposes,

1 Vitte, S. Konspekt lektsii о tuirodnom i gosudarstevnnom khoziaistive. St
Petersburg, 1912, pp. 365-81.
MAP 3
x

Russian railways in 1914. The frontiers are those of the present day,
territory not belonging to Russia in 1914 being shown as a dotted
area.
or for watering the horses, or for hot food. Military trains in
these conditions were scheduled to move 400 km. a day.

Peacetime capital works for war purposes had included not
only the construction of strategic railways, but also the improve-
ment of lines which were expected to bear tlie heaviest military
traffic. This concerned mainly the railways on the western
borderlands, like tlie South-Western and the St Petersburg-
Warsaw. On these, double-tracking had been carried out in
excess of commercial requirements, extra loops and sidings
had been installed, and additional block-posts. Many of these
loops and block-posts were not used in peacetime. The technical
standard of these reconstructed routes was such that they could
pass up tn thirty-sir pairs of trains daily on the double-track
sections.

The plans for the different railways were elaborated down
to the nearest hour. Those of individual stations down to the
last emergency latrine. Tlie first days of the mobilization were
not expected to produce very heavy traffic, they were to be
used to prepare for tlie flood which would build up from about
the fourth or fifth day. In these early days the railways least
affected by the mobilization would transfer their surplus loco-
motives and cars to the needy routes, care being taken to
allocate the engines to an area burning the same fuel, and spare
parts being sent for each unit. Box cars would be prepared for
war use (the etiquette ‘40 men or 8 horses’ was a Russian as
well as a French device to improve car utilization). At the
stations loaded cars would be unloaded, and platforms and
loading areas cleared. Folding ramps would be prepared so dial
flat cars could unload their artillery and wagons anywhere.

The scope of these arrangements can be judged from one
practice mobilization about the turn of the century. This
involved tlie transfer of 1,360 engines, 1,150 passenger and
28,800 freight cars within twelve days from the start of
mobilization. The movement of this equipment was according
to a carefully devised and detailed schedule, and it was accom-
panied by a transfer of 4,600 workers, including 1,720 engine-
men.

On some lines the anticipated increase of traffic was to be met
by a doubling of staff. While a few unskilled grades could be
recruited locally, most would be transferred from other railways,
and junior staff would be used to perform senior duties. Accord-

F*
ing to the statute on railwaymen in wartime, workers who
refused to transfer from one railway to another (and in some
circumstances to railways outside the Empire) were liable to
severe punishment. On the other hand, men liable for reserve
service were allowed to stay in their railway jobs after call-up.

THE RAILWAY BATTALIONS

In time of war, front-line railways were to be operated by the
military authorities, using their railway battalions. These were
an offshoot of the engineering corps, and had originated on the
St Petersburg-Moscow Railway, where soldiers were used not
only as construction workers, but also formed conductor and
telegraph companies. During tile construction of the St Peters-
burg-Warsaw line a railway construction brigade was formed
to help in the work, with the object of gaining experience in
railway-building and repair. This was followed by the establish-
ment of regular military railway detachments, and during the
Russo-Turkish War the first railway battalion was formed,
which built and operated military railways in Roumania and
Bulgaria. By 1880 the railway troops were strong enough to
undertake the Trans-Caspian Railw'ay and during the Russo-
Japanese War they operated the Chinese Eastern Railway and
built narrow’-gauge lines at the front.

At the beginning of the Great War the Russian Army had
only nine railway battalions, of which three were narrow-gauge
units, plus three brigades specializing in narrow-gauge horse-
traction lines. There were 900 km. of narrow-gauge front-line
railway, of which 600 km. was horse railway. During the war
were built a further 2,128 km. of horse railway, 1,746 km. of
steam and 232 km. of internal combustion lines.1 In general the
railway troops acquitted themselves well during the war, except
for a frequent failure to co-ordinate their work with the civilian
railway managers. At some big railway centres, w'here opera-
tions remained in the hands of professional railwaymen w hile
control was vested with the military transport officers, chaos
frequently developed, as happened at Lemberg in October 1915.

Railway troops were employed widely in the Red Army
during the Civil War, and afterwards built certain new railway
lines. Subsequently, a regular railway operating corps was
formed in the Red Army.

1	Vasiliev, N. Op. cit., p. 125.
THE RAILWAYS IN THE GREAT WAR

When general mobilization was declared about one-third of the
network (‘railways of the Western Area’) fell under the control
of the military authorities. The transfer of rolling stock to these
lines from ‘the railways of the Eastern Area’ increased the pro-
portion of locomotives serving in the west from a peacetime
29 per cent to 35 per cent of the national total, while cars on
the western railways rose from 25 per cent to 33 per cent of
the total.1

Mobilization Plan No. 19, variant A, was applied. (‘A’
signified that Austria was the main enemy: Plan 19G was for
use if Germany was the principal foe.) In 1914 a new plan,
No. 20, was being worked out but was not ready in time. Plan
No. 19 was formulated in 1910 and therefore did not utilize
increases in railway capacity achieved during the pre-war years.
Moreover, inspired by the Ministry of Ways and Communica-
tions, it contained hidden reserve capacity even by 1910 stan-
dards. A further disadvantage of Plan No. 19 was that it w'as
composed just after the Ministry of War had decided to
concentrate more in the interior areas, and less at the front, on
mobilization. By 1914 only half-hearted arrangements had been
made to execute this new policy, on which the railway mobiliza-
tion plan had been largely based.

By the plan half of the infantry were to be mobilized by the
fifteenth day, and three-quarters by the twentieth. Polish rail-
way were given five days to prepare for mobilization; others
had up to eleven days. It thus happened that many divisions were
ready for transport a week or more before the railways could
accept them. After the railways reached their mobilization
readiness they were expected to work at full capacity only for
a few days.

Thus, it was soon discovered that only a few railways w’ere
completely filled with war traffic, and commercial goods which
had been hurriedly dumped at the lineside were reloaded.
Further commercial shipments were accepted and on the eastern
lines (except the Trans-Siberian and its approaches) about
one-third of the normal commercial traffic was carried in the
first fourteen days.2 But the resumption of normal traffic was
unplanned and without priorities.

* Mikhailov, I. Op. dt., p. 33.	* Vasiliev, N. Op. cit., p. 66.
From the transport point of view, Russia’s enemies could
hardly have been more threatening. The entire frontier became
a battle line; Turkey blockaded the Black Sea ports and Ger-
many the Baltic. The enemy had thirty-six railway tracks
serving the front, while Russia had only eighteen. This meant
that rapid concentrations of troops against weak points in the
Austro-German defence were impossible. General Brusilov
during his south-western offensive in 1916 in fact asked that
troops should not be sent to him from other areas:

'Knowing the limitation of our railway transport... I knew
that while we were entraining and transporting one Army
Corps, the Germans would ill an age Lu lianspviL du er ui Гош.'1

Apart from the lines serving the front, changing traffic flows
put an increasing strain on railways which had unexpectedly
become key supply routes. Donetz coal needed transport to new
and more distant parts of the empire, following the loss of the
Polish coalfields and the cessation of English coal imports
through St Petersburg. The transformation of self-sufficient
peasants into bread-consuming soldiers entailed increased grain
movements towards the west. The blockade of southern and
Baltic ports meant that imports had to be received through
Vladivostok or Archangel. The Trans-Siberian Railway was
already working at its somewhat limited capacity and goods
began to pile up at Vladivostok, awaiting shipment. This rail-
way was nn the verge of chaos and in 1017 American railway
experts arrived to reorganize it. By then, however, it was too
late. As for the port of Archangel, this depended on the single-
track narrow-gauge Vologda-Archangel line of the Moscow-
Yaroslavl-Archangel Railway, which could pass only one pair
of passenger and three pairs of freight trains daily. In other
words, the port could despatch only about seventy narrow-gauge
carloads of freight each day. By the end of 1914 there had
already accumulated at Archangel 330,000 tons of English coal,
60,000 tons of other freight, and 3,000 military vehicles,
enough to keep the railway busy for eighteen months.2 Although
some of this freight was taken by horse transport to St Peters-

* Brusillov, A. A Soldier’s Notebook. London, 1930, p. 239.

’ Pogrebinskii, A. Gosudarstvenno-monopolisticheskii kapitalism v Rossis. Moscow,
1959, pp. 143-50.
burg, about a thousand kilometres distant, it was decided to
finish rapidly the conversion of the line to the normal gauge,
but due to a shortage of men and materials this was not achieved
until 1916. At the same time, the construction of the Murmansk
Railway was accelerated, to provide a rail connection with this
ice-free port. This line was provisionally opened towards the
end of 1916.

The first railway crisis occurred in the summer of 1915, when
an apparently unforeseen situation arose: the evacuation of
Poland. Not only were Russian troops moved back but also
thousands of refugees and factory equipment. This eastward
flood lasted three months, choking junctions, disorganizing
stations, and exacerbating die car shortage. Coal shipments
from the Donetz Basin wfere almost halved by the end of the
summer due largely to die car shortage, the big cities began to
experience food shortages, and in 1916 even the army could
only receive about half its stated requirements of provisions.

What accentuated the railways’ problems was the decision
to split managerial control between the old professional ad-
ministration (that is, the existing railway managers) and the
military transport officers. The latter were in control of the
lines in the front areas, while the lines in die rear came under
the Ministry of Ways and Communications. Since die division
was on a line radier than a railway basis this could mean that a
given railway company was split in two between the two
authorities. About one-third of the total railway mileage was
under die control of the army. If the two authorities had been
able to respect each odier and co-operate rather than struggle
among themselves, this division might have justified itself. But
what happened was that die professional railway managers were
over-cautious in changing time-hallowed procedures and
methods of operation, while die military mind, with its custo-
mary lightning grasp of die superficial, was unable to appreciate
anything but the shortest of short-term considerations. The
chaos which resulted from this, when resources were scarce and
should have been allocated with care, is not hard to imagine.
The Donetz coal traffic was a typical example: the principal
reason why unshipped coal began to accumulate at the pitheads
was the shortage of cars. Empty cars should have arrived via
railways under military control but they were commandeered
by the latter for their own immediate use. Only in January 1917
were all the railways brought under the centralized control of
the Ministry of Ways and Communications.

Railway planning during this period was regulated by the
Special Conference on Transport, one of the off-shoots of the
Special Defence Conference. It supervised not only the state and
private railways but also river transport. It was headed by the
Minister of Ways and Communications, and contained seven
members of the State Duma, representatives of various minis-
tries, of the cities, and of the Union of Zemstvos. Railway and
industrial representatives also took part. Its wrork consisted of
discussion; discussion about railway construction, railway
traffic capacity, and railway operation. Another special con-
ference was established to discuss the fuel crisis, and its recom-
mendations resulted in the railways being granted priority in
supplies.

The technical state of the railways deteriorated, due to lack
of imagination on the part of the Government Not only were
railway workshops denied their full requirements of metals,
and many works, against the advice of the Minister of Ways
and Communications, converted to munitions production, but
thousands of skilled workshop men were called up for military
service. As equipment failures and breakdowns increased, this
was acknowledged to be a mistake, and these workers were,
theoretically, released. But as by then they had built and w’ere
staffing front-line workshops for military equipment, they could
hardly be spared, and only a proportion did in fact return to the
railway shops. Even before the war started, the Russian railways
had been short of freight cars and of locomotives, and to the
effect of increased traffic and new routings was added a rising
percentage of engines and cars out of service awaiting repair.
Efforts were made to raise the production rate of both loco-
motives and cars (in 1914 the productive capacity of the car
and engine building industries had only been half-utilized).
However, the cartels showed little enthusiasm for new business
at a time when munition production seemed likely to be more
profitable. Appeals to patriotism were not likely to call forth
a bigger output. What the industrialists wanted were higher
prices, and the patent urgency of the railways’ needs encouraged
them to be more, not less, inflexible. In 1915 the Moscow
Society of Factory-owners and Manufacturers set forth the
conditions which would enable the car shortage to be alleviated
by new construction: higher prices, big long-term contracts,
and cash advances.

These demands were unheeded by the buyers, production
continued to drop and in 1916 the Government decided to
weaken the monopoly of domestic suppliers by ordering loco-
motives and freight cars from North America. Delivery, how-
ever, was delayed until 1917, partly because tlie suppliers were
not completely confident of tlie Russian Government's credit-
worthiness and insisted that gold be shipped to London as
security against the contract. 875 engines were supplied, all of
the same basic 2-10-0 design. Built by three companies
(Baldwin, Alco, and Canadian Locomotive Co.) they were
shipped to Russia via Vladivostok. They weie muic powerful
than other Russian engines but their weight limited their
route-availability. They were concentrated on the Trans-
Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern. After the Revolution
some undelivered engines of this series were purchased by
American railways, and during the Second World War a further
2,000 units were supplied to Russia by tlie us a.1 The 31,000
freight cars ordered from the United States were high-capacity
4-axle units, each equal to two conventional 2-axle cars.

During the war years there was a high rate of railway
construction, partly because of war needs but mainly the result
of pre-war projects. In 1914 there were 18,231 km. of line
under construction, falling to 13,330 km. in 1917, but the 5,000
km. drop was less than the length of line completed (2,924 km.
in 4,103 km. in 1016, anrl 077 km in 1017) 2 Among the
new lines built during this period were the Bui-Danilov con-
necting line, which provided a new route to the Urals via the
former Moscow-Yaroslavl Railway; the St Petersburg-Rybinsk
line, and the Murmansk Railway. In view of the shortages which
beset tlie last-named, it seems surprising that work on the
Amur Railway went forward so rapidly. New railway' projects
continued to be approved in conformity with a general plan.
The last railway plan to be approved under tlte Tsarist regime
was, by ironic coincidence, called the 1917 Five-Year Plan. It
was the work of an inter-departmental conference called to

1 Russian railways could later boast, therefore, of possessing not only the
world’s most numerous class of steam locomotive (the E 0-10-0) but also one
of the most numerous American classes.

* Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 647.
decide the proper rate of railway-building in view of the
available resources, and to establish priorities on the basis of
the Ministry of Ways' and Communications’ traffic statistics. A
total of 35,601 km. of new main line and 17,685 km. of secondary
line was adopted as the target for the five years. About a third
of the new mileage was in Asia. Some of the projects were
readopted later by the Soviet Government which, however,
dropped the plans for the duplication of existing main lines,
such as Kiev-Odessa and Moscow-Donbas, in favour of re-
construction of existing lines.1

Apart from the laying of new routes, capital works were
undertaken at key junctions to overcome bottlenecks which had
arisen during the war The routes frntn Siberia to the west, and
out of the Donetz Basin, were especially overloaded. The
Moscow-Kursk section was still so congested that trains had
to be diverted over roundabout routes. But progress in capital
works was held up by the rail shortage. The Prodamet cartel,
which had a near-monopoly, still preferred low production at
high prices.

Up to 1917 railway operating income exceeded operating
expenses. In 1914, 1,270,000,000 roubles were received, against
834,000,000 roubles of expenses. By 1916 the margin had
diminished but at least still existed: 1,350,000,000 against
l,210,000,00Oroubles.Butin 1917 there were only 1,400,000,000
roubles of gross receipts to set against operating expenses of
3,300,000,000 roubles, and this was despite heavy tariff in-
creases on civilian freight. In 1918 the operating deficit quad-
rupled to 8,000,000,000 roubles, while in the following three
years the deficits were even greater, but in the circumstances,
excusable.2

During the war, despite the difficulties, the railways did
succeed in passing greatly-increased traffic with only a small
accretion of new mileage. From 1913 to 1916 average freight
ton/km. per month rose from 5 9 to 7*6 billion and total
passenger journeys rose by 28 per cent.8 These figures suggest
that tile lack of railway capacity so frequently bewailed before

1 See Status of the Private Railway Business in Russia. N.Y., 1918, and The
Russian Government's Plan of Future Railroad Construction. N.Y., 1919.

’ Tekhnika i ekonomika futei soobshchenii. January 1920.

• Vasiliev, N. Op. cit., pp. 76 and 92. Freight figures do not include liquids.
Between 1913 and 1915 the average passenger journey lengthened by 60 per cent.
the war was a product more of managerial than of technical
inadequacy.

The period 1916-17 marked the beginning of the collapse of
rail transport. In the first war years the railways’ incapacity
had been marked by failure to supply either the army or the
population, but by 1917 the statistics not only of traffic but also
of technical sufficiency, began to deteriorate. From July 1916
to July 1917 the average number of serviceable locomotives fell
from 16,400 to 15,700 and the number of freight cars awaiting
repair rose from 24,000 to 46,000.1 But this was only a foretaste
of what the following years would bring.

THE CIVIL WAR

In March 1917 popular dissatisfaction with shortages and
defeats led to the abdication of the Tsar. Government fell into
the hands of a provisional government with Kerensky as Prime
Minister. During the life of this Government the condition of
the railways, as indeed of Russia, did not improve, mainly
because the war continued. In April the German Government
allowed Lenin to pass from exile through Germany to Russia,
which he reached by rail, in a sealed car. In November a revolt
in St Petersburg enabled the Bolshevik group of Marxists to
make a bid for power. The next three years were occupied
with a savage civil war in w'hich the Bolsheviks narrowly
achieved supremacy.

At the same time Russia was obliged to pay a heavy terri-
torial price for the lost war against Germany and Austria. Not
only Poland, but also parts of White Russia and the Ukraine
were sacrificed. The heavy industries of Poland, and its coal
supplies, could no longer augment the Russian economy. A
considerable length of railway mileage, together with its equip-
ment, was also lost (about 11,000 km., or almost exactly the
same mileage as had been built during the war). Total railway
mileage at the end of 1917 was 70,000 km., although at the
time not all of this was actually in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

During the three years of Civil War the railways were in a
sorry state, especially those located on the constantly shifting
periphery of Soviet power. The Bolsheviks had the advantage
of internal lines of communication; their citadel was the centre,

1 Poerebinskii, A. Op. cit.. p. 257.
with the two capitals of Moscow and St Petersburg. As the
railway network to a large degree radiated from the centre, the
Bolsheviks were able tooperate the railway as a single system,
transferring locomotives and rolling stock from one route to
another as the decisive theatre of war changed. The basic
characteristic of the Civil War was that the Bolshevik territory
was attacked from all directions, and to use its troops to the
best advantage the Government exploited the railways to the
full. Having defeated an enemy on one front, the whole army
would be moved by rail to a new decisive front opening up
elsewhere. At times, as much as two-thirds of the Bed Army
was involved in this kind of mass transfer. But the fact that
railways wore the decisive clement meant that they were also a
decisive target.

While the war was in progress the Russian economy decom-
posed amidst famine, fuel shortage, transport chaos, and human
suffering. In 1916 the Russian railways had a traffic density of
19 trains per day per verst (one more than in 1911). Two
years later each verst of track produced 10 train/versts, and in
1921 but 5.1 The cancellation by the new Government of its
predecessor’s accumulated railway debts was only a theoretical
compensation for the physical damage suffered during the first
Bolshevik years.

RAILWAY TRAFFIC DURING THE CIVIL WAR

The Soviet railways carried 37 million tons of freight in 1918,
30 in 1919, and 32 in 1920 (according to the not very reliable
statistics of this period).2 The 1913 figure had been 132
million. While these figures are affected by the amount of
railway actually operated by the Soviet Government each year,
any adjustment would show that the real situation was even
worse than the figures indicate, for while in 1918 the average
mileage of railway in Soviet-occupied territory was only
27,000 km. it grew to 32,000 km. in 1919, and 57,000 km. in
1920.® Thus by 1920 the railways were carrying less traffic
than in 1918 over a mileage twice as long. Some idea of how

1 Statisticluskii allot pulti toobshchenii RSFSR. Moscow, 1922, p. 18.

* Naporko, A. Ochtrki razvitiya zMrznodorozhnovv transporta SSSR. Moscow.
1954, p. 96.

’ Strumilin, S. Op. dt., p. 667.
the population suffered during these years can be derived from
the following figures. Rail shipments of grain: 1913, 18 million
tons; 1918, 1 million; 1919, 2 million; 1920, 3 million: and of
coal: 1913, 26 million tons; 1918, 4 million; 1919, 2 million;
1920, 4 million.

Tlie composition of railway traffic was very different from
the pre-war situation, mainly because of the predominance of
military traffic. The type of freight was also liable to sudden
short-term changes as different priorities and new slogans were
adopted to remedy succeeding crises, hi January 1920, for
example, of the 9,150 car loadings planned (but not achieved)
for the month, 2,000 were for military traffic, 1,000 for food,
and 4,000 for fuel. In the spring of the previous year famine in
tlie cities and full granaries in die grain belt had necessitated
not only priority, but also special ‘shock’ measures in favour of
foodstuffs traffic. The period from March 18th to April 10th in
1919 was declared to be 'freight month', a month in which
stocks of grain would be moved from the producing regions to
tlie consuming centres. During this month passenger traffic
ceased completely to provide engines and line capacity for tlie
food trains. Some success was achieved; by the end of March
food traffic arriving in Moscow had almost doubled, from 118
cars a day to 200, of which a quarter were grain cars.1 After
the month was finished Lenin continued to receive daily reports
of the formation and progress of food trains, and at the end of
April military traffic on eastern lines was reduced to ease tlie
flow of provisions.

The evacuation and reinstatement of refugees, food, plant
and materials from areas invaded or threatened by the White
forces was a continuous process in such a mobile war with
ever-changing fronts. In September 1919, 12,000 freight cars
were occupied in this sendee. Another demanding, but quite
immobile, traffic were the troops who were permanently
housed in railway box cars assembled on railway sidings. These
vast colonies at one stage occupied over 5,000 cars between
Chelyabinsk and Krasnoyarsk alone.2 The wastefulness of this
type of barracks was accentuated by the troops’ destructive
treatment of their railway-provided homes; when they had

’Gladkov, I. V'oprosy planirvvaniya saviettkovo khoxyaiflva v 1918-22. gg-
Moscow, 1951, pp. 220-1.

* Sverdlov, V. Doklad о polozhenii russkM xheleznykh dorog . . . Moscow, 1920.
damaged one car so that it could no longer be used as a
residence, they commandeered another.

It is estimated that about 25 million troops were carried
during the Civil War. In the spring of 1919 troops and supplies
were rushed to the Far East to defeat Kolchak’s army. Then in
the summer they were taken back to relieve St Petersburg from
the threat of Yudenich, and to Tula and Orel to meet Denikin’s
thrust from the south. In 1920 troops were carried west against
the Poles and south against Wrangel.

Passenger services in the normal sense ceased to exist. The
passenger rolling stock had been ruined by demobilized and
riotous soldiers returning to their villages after the Revolution
and in l£>10 passenger class distinctions were abolished, the
former third-class type of accommodation being established as
the standard degree of comfort to be provided. (But less than
two years later the Council of People’s Commissars was
obliged to issue a decree specifying which categories of citizen
had a right to the free supplementary tickets allowing 'soft’
class travel.)1

In 1919 an instruction was issued forbidding the carriage of
non-suburban trains of passengers other than those with a
special pass. This pass could only be obtained by producing
another document proving either real necessity or state busi-
ness. This instruction ended with a note that the People’s
Commissariat of Internal Affairs was to strengthen its forces
at the stations in order to ensure that the order was carried out.
'Tbo rniKnns fnr thp inctriirtinn wprp rnntainpd in thp preamble 2

‘The currently increasing flow of passengers on the railway
lines, accompanied by the licentious and disorderly riding of
passengers on car roofs and steps, destroys the rolling stock
and, crowding the territory of the station, through the spreading
of disease creates intolerable conditions on the railway system.'

The horrible conditions of travel are conveyed in Chapter 5
of Pil’nyak’s novel A Bare Year-.

‘Mixed train no. 58 crawls over the darkened steppe.

1 Zheleznodorozhny! transport SSSR v dokumentakh .. . Moscow, 1957, pp. 47,
106.

• Ibid., p. 68.
‘People. Human legs, arms, heads, bellies, backs. Human
manure. People infesting the box car like lice. People crowded
in this place and maintaining their right to travel with their
fists, because here in the famine areas at each station crowds of
starving people throw themselves at the car and struggle to
get inside over the heads and necks and backs and feet of the
others. They fight, and the others fight back. They tear off and
throw down those already on the train. They fight until the
train starts and carries away those who happen to be attached
to it, and these get ready to fight again at the next station.
People travel for days between filth and cleanliness, learn to
sleep sitting, standing, or dangling. Along and across the car
are several tiers of board bunks. On these boards, under them,
on the floor, on shelves, in every cranny people are sitting,
standing, and lying quietly, saving their strength for the
struggle at the next station. The air in the car is poisoned by
human bowels and cheap tobacco. At night it is dark; the doors
and windows are closed. It’s cold and the wind blows through
the cracks. Someone croaks, another scratches himself, while
the car groans like an old cart. One can't move about in the car,
for one man's feet are on another’s chest and a third is sleeping
on top of both of them with his feet on the first man's neck. But
all the same people do move. One man, whose lungs have
doubtless half rotted aw'ay already, instinctively huddles by the
door while beside him men and women come to open the door
and satisfy the demands of nature as they hang or squat over
the passing ballast. This man learns in detail how they manage
this, everyone in their own different way.’

That the author was not exaggerating the discomforts can
be verified by reference to the contemporary announcements
and directives issued to passengers and railwaymen, w’hose
impersonal language covers a multitude of horrors. The
following is typical:1

‘The People’s Commissariat of Ways and Communications
announces the cancellation of fast trains nos. 19/20 Moscow-
Syzran, in order to save fuel and avoid the spread of infectious
diseases. . . . For the carriage of mail, Soviet workers with
visaed passes and Red Army men travelling alone, mixed trains
nos. 97/98 will operate daily Moscow-Syzran. ... A heated

1 Kratnyi put' zMexnodorozhnilui. No. 47/1919.
freight car will be coupled to these trains for the quarantine of
passengers becoming ill en route. . . . The trains will run
according to the current timetable. . . . Moscow-Syzran 61
hours 14 minutes. . .

RAILWAY ORGANIZATION AFTER 1917

The Tsarist Government had nationalized most of the Russian
railways and would no doubt have completed the process if the
Great War had not intervened.1 The nationalization of the
remaining private railways was therefore not a radical move,
but merely the final achievement of a long-standing policy.
Nevertheless, the new Bolshevik Government was in no hurry
to end private railway management. The reason for this hesi-
tancy was that the Central Government was in a better position
than its supporters to see that a transport catastrophe was
threatening the life of the country. It had already had great
difficulty in digesting the state railways and finding suitable
persons to replace those members of the former managements
who had fled or disappeared. Skilled administrators were rare
in the Bolshevik ranks, the continued use of the old staff was
vital and the latter might leave the private railways in disgust
should they be nationalized. Worse, they might stay, and use
their skill to disorganize transport work. Previous nationaliza-
tions of private railways had involved extra expense and gave
little immediate improvement of efficiency. Finally, the Govern-
ment considered that time was needed to prepare for nationali-
zation so that the process would be a smooth one: to nationalize
just when the railways were facing a crucial shortage of fuel
and materials would be folly.

However, local Bolsheviks did not share this view, and the
railway workers’ committees which had been established on
different railways were frequently in conflict with the Govern-
ment on this question. In February 1918, for example, the
committee set up by the workers building the Semirechensk
Railway decided on their own initiative to expel the manage-
ment and nationalize the line because, they claimed, the railway
had great economic significance and the management was
deliberately delaying construction work. But although the
Soviet of People’s Commissars of Turkestan approved this
action the management did not leave, and continued to fulfil

* In 1917 two-thirds of the mileage was state-owned.
the normal functions both of direction and of ownership. It even
negotiated with the Central Government and received a 14-
million credit to permit construction to go ahead. Faced with
this evidence of their own ineffectiveness, die workers eventually
made a formal request to the Government to nationalize the
line, but by then it had already been decided to nationalize all
the railways.

This was not an isolated example of attempts at de facto
nationalization by die local railwaymen. In spring 1918 die
People’s Commissar of Ways and Communications was ob-.
liged to issue an order, instructing the railway committees to
preserve the old administrations, but requesting the appoint-
ment of commissars to watch over them. The collegia also
caused trouble. These represented a kind of workers' control;
they were officially subordinated to the People's Commissariat
of Ways and Communications with the duty of supervising the
work of the railway managements. In May 1918 the ‘Collegium
of Five for the Management of the South-Eastern Railway’
demanded die immediate liquidation of the management of this
private company. But the People’s Commissariat refused, saying
that the collegium was only a supervisory body, not a directing
organ.

But despite ministerial orders and decrees, most of the private
railways were in fact under worker control by spring 1918, their
former managements being either expelled or arrested and
operations being organized by specially appointed commissions.
The first line to be legally nationalized was the Kulunda Rail-
way, in June 1918, which was taken over when it ran out of
funds. At the end of the same month the Government surren-
dered to die pressure of its supporters and abandoned its
original hope of postponing die liquidation of capitalist enter-
prises. A decree was issued nationalizing all large-scale industry,
which included the railways. All their property was transferred
to the State and there was no compensation for the former
owners. Early in July another decree, on the liquidation of the
private railways, set forth die nationalization procedure. The
managements were to be expelled, and liquidating commissions
established. The tasks of the latter were the execution of the
transfer of ownership, determination of the various railways’
financial condition, and ensuring that the departing manage-
ments handed over proper accounts to tlie new owners.
In the first weeks after the Bolshevik assumption of power
the loyalty of railway workers to the new r£girrie was doubtful.
At this time the Bolsheviks could not command a favourable
majority in the country as a whole, so it is not surprising that
wholehearted support was not forthcoming from the railway-
men. The executive committee of the railway trade union
(‘Vikzhel’) was composed mainly of Mensheviks and Social
Revolutionaries, men hostile to the Bolsheviks. While there
may be some truth in the Bolshevik assertion that at the out-
break of war so-called bourgeois elements had entered railway
service to avoid conscription, and had infiltrated the union
organization, it seems far more likely that the hostility of the
railwaymen’s representatives was due not to nefarious plotting
but to the fact that the railwaymen simply did not like the
Bolsheviks. Although the railwayman’s lot was not a particu-
larly happy one, he did belong to an elite and privileged pro-
fession, and would be unlikely to show much enthusiasm for a
government brought to power by force of arms w ielded by able
seamen and demobilized peasants.

The situation threatened the existence of Lenin's Govern-
ment. The power of the railway union had been shown before
in 1917. When General Komilov attempted to seize pow'er,
the union decided not to let his troop trains pass to the capital,
thus ensuring his failure. Again, shortly after the Bolsheviks
had ousted Kerensky from St Petersburg the latter advanced
back towards the capital with loyal troops and demanded troop
trains from Tsarskoye Selo to the city. Vikzhel, wishing at this
stage neither to openly oppose the Bolsheviks nor to commit
itself to their support, effectively caused the failure of Kerensky’s
counter-attack by ordering its members to refuse to handle
troop trains of either side. Immediately after the Bolsheviks
gained power, Vikzhel announced that it did not approve of
one-party government and that it was going to run the railways
for the benefit of its members, and that government instructions
regarding the railways would only be obeyed if endorsed by
itself. By threatening to hold a railway strike it also succeeded
in obtaining the post of Minister of Ways and Communications
for one of its own executive members.1

1 See Carr, E. A History of Soviet Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23.
London, 1950, Vol. II, pp. 394-7.
The first move to shake Vikzhel was Bolshevik advice (in
December 1917) to their supporters among the railwaymen to
follow the example of the workers’ executive committee of the
Nikolaev Railway, which had just taken over the direction of
the line. Then, in the same month, an Extraordinary All-
Russian Conference of Railwaymen was assembled in which a
majority of the delegates supported the Bolsheviks. The con-
ference split into two factions and the pro-Bolshevik group set
up their own union executive (‘Vikzhedor’). As this was able
to co-operate with the Government it soon strengthened its
position and Vikzhel lost influence.

The first year of Bolshevik rule was marked by a conflict
between two schools of thought about railway organization;
centralized control against decentralization. It was originally
the intention to make use of the experience gained by the
wartime Special Traffic Conference, introducing some modifica-
tions so that there could also be some form of mass participation
in decisions. But this was made difficult when not only the
higher managerial staff’ of the old railways refused to continue
under the new regime, but also the rank and file administrators,
and technicians. (When the representatives of the newly-
constituted Commissariat of Ways and Communications
appeared to take over the old Ministry they found the offices
stripped and only a dozen or so of the old employees still
working.) Since it was thus impossible to establish a strong
central body to operate the railways, and in response to the
demands of a section of the Party, workers’ control was
resorted to. Many of the state railway managements were
ejected and replaced by executive committees elected by the
railwaymen, sometimes assisted by a collegium containing
rank-and-file rail workers. Sometimes the former managers
agreed, or were obliged, to participate in or to advise the new
organs. In January 1918 the Extraordinary All-Russian Con-
ference of Railwaymen defined the work and status of the new
organizations. The basic principle was that direction was
entrusted to the soviets of railwaymen’s deputies and their
executive committees. Each railway elected its own soviet, and
the railway soviet then elected an executive committee respon-
sible for operations and management, which was assisted by
those former administrators who were still available, and con-
sidered to be trustworthy. Under the railway soviets were the
local raion (district) soviets of railwaymen’s deputies with
corresponding executive committees, while inter-railway co-
ordination was to be effected by parallel soviets at the okrug
(regional) level. (In 1918 the Russian Republic was divided
into nine okrugs.) In the okrug soviets were representatives
of the local soviets of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies,
and of other interested organizations. As a supreme co-ordinat-
ing body there was the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of
Railwaymen’s Deputies and its executive. The latter was
supposed to work in co-operation with its managing collegium,
a form of workers’ control whose members were not appointed,
but elected by the railway soviets. (Similar collegia existed at
the railway level.)

But this system of self-management was already becoming
discredited. In Russia as a whole the proletariat had ideas about
its rights and responsibilities more far-reaching than the
Government’s. Because of the esprit de corps found among
railwaymen, and their self-consciousness as a kind of proletarian
elite, these divergent tendencies were more marked on the
railways titan in other industries. Syndicalist slogans like 'the
railways for the railwaymen’ found wide support. Parochialism
found expression not only in constant assertions of indepen-
dence by the separate railways, but also by the sections of those
railways.1 A given section might uncouple for its own use
through cars carrying fuel or provisions. Railways would
ignore the representatives of the Commissariat of State Con-
trol. and refuse to hand over their receipts, preferring to use
them for their own needs. Labour discipline deteriorated, and
workers’ morale was sapped by the differing wages and work
norms between railways and between sections. Tlie collegia
were usually ineffective, being split into two factions; the newly
victorious but inexperienced proletarian element and the resent-
ful but capable ‘bourgeois’ specialists. Not only this, but
decentralization offered no resistance to outside interference,
and there were constant clashes between the railways and other
organizations. For example, in January 1918 the local soviet
of workers’ and soldiers' deputies ejected the Urals railway
raion executive committee from the management of the Perm
Railway, replacing it with tlie oblast (area) supply department
in the hope of getting better service. But the latter proved

1 A ’section’ corresponds to the ’divisions’ of most western railways.
incompetent. However, weeks passed before the Commissariat
of Ways and Communications could bring back the former
management of railwaymen. Outside interference of a less
dramatic but equally harmful nature took the form of a constant
stream of representatives, commissars, emissaries and delegates
from different government offices, all armed with extraordinary
and superextraordinary powers to make the railways give
priority to the needs of their own departments.

To restore a strong centralized administration a decree in
February 1918 asserted the primacy of the People’s Commis-
sariat of Ways and Communications (nkps). No other
establishments or individuals were to have any power or
influence, and anybody attempting to violate this piinciplc
would be treated as a 'wrecker’. A second decree in March gave
more details of the new forms of organization. The raion and
oblast railway organizations were to select a manager who was
both a capable railwayman and loyal to the Bolsheviks. His
appointment had to be approved by the nkps. The same decree
expelled commissars and representatives of other government
departments from railway management. Railways were acknow-
ledged to be extra-territorial and not subject to control by the
local governments through whose areas they passed.

But while a few railways accepted the new ruling, others did
not. Many of tlie Bolshevik supporters had taken literally the
earlier slogans about all power to the workers, and could not
accept that their newly-won position in railway management be
sacrificed to я new central body little different from the Tsarist
Ministry of Ways and Communications. Nor did they approve
the envisaged improved treatment of the ‘bourgeois’ specialists
in an effort to gain their co-operation. The All-Russian Execu-
tive Committee of Railwaymen (Vikzhedor) which had been
established to support the Bolshevik Government, turned sour
and opposed the new line. Many railwaymen preferred to obey
the orders of Vikzhedor rather than the nkps. On some railways
the Government was obliged to expel the railway soviets and
replace them with so-called war-revolutionary committees,
which handed over operations to the old professionals. An
apparent compromise w'as reached in May; a workers’ colle-
gium, of nine members approved by Vikzhedor, would be
established in the nkps. This lasted until February 1919, when
the status of railway management was re-defined.
In October 1918 the management of a railway was defined
as a commissar, who was personally responsible to the Govern-
ment, aided by a collegium and technical department. With the
establishment of these commissars the principle of one-man
responsibility was asserted above the previously popular but
often ineffective concept of collective leadership.

By mid-1918 famine and civil war faced the country and the
policy of ‘War Communism’ was adopted, which meant a siege
economy and a siege policy. About the same time the Cheka
was formed, for the unmasking and liquidation of hostile ele-
ments. With a wide interpretation of ‘hostile elements’ the
Government was able to eliminate internal opponents of its
decisions and concentrate less on securing consent for its poli-
cies, and more on their execution. In November 1918 martial
law was declared on the railways; their main task was to be the
fulfilment of military requirements and Extraordinary War
Commissars were appointed to the railways of each front (army
group) with overriding powers. All railwaymen were con-
sidered as having been called up for military service were
liable to court martial for failure to perform their duties
properly.

When the railway situation deteriorated even further,
Trotsky was appointed Commissar of Ways and Communica-
tions (March 1920). He diagnosed the cause of demoralization
as being the departure of the best workers to the front, and the
bad effect of workers’ control exerised through the collegia—
which he termed the supervision of experts by ignoramuses.
He effected a virtual militarization of the railways, appointing
military men to key administrative posts. This policy was the
main issue in the controversy which raged in 1920 on how far
the trade unions should be subordinated to the State. At first
it seemed that the trade unions might win this stuggle, for in
1921 the Central Committee of Transport W’orkers and the
railways’ chief political department, both of which had wished
to continue the militarized regime on the railways, were
abolished. But in later years the railway union, like other
unions, no longer represented the workers against the Govern-
ment but rather served as a link, transmitting and interpreting
official policy to its members, and in case of dispute supporting
the former against the latter.
RAILWAY OPERATION, 1917-21

The mass demobilization of soldiers after the Bolshevik seizure
of power caused many lines to work themselves to a standstill.
Delays to these trains would be enlivened by the soldiers
robbing trains passing in the other direction or by destroying
the upholstery and woodwork of their own cars. At the same
time peasants were finding train robbery a profitable occupa-
tion, and continued to do so even after the Government had
arranged shoot-on-sight railway protection forces. During the
1917-18 winter the fuel shortage caused in the Moscow area
the closure for three days of the Ryazan-Uralsk and Moscow-
Kicv-Voronczh railways. On all lines many trains had to be
abandoned en route. On the Northern Railway alone on
December 20th there were fifty-two loaded trains abandoned
by their crews due to fuel shortage. At the same time, some
sections of the Trans-Siberian Railway closed because no funds
were available to pay the workers. In the railway centres the
yards were congested with accumulated cars. Another source
of difficulty was the German advance into the Ukraine before
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed, cutting oft' supplies of
Donetz coal and creating an evacuation problem. So much
rolling stock was evacuated from the invaded areas that it had
to be stored on the second track of double-track lines, or on
city street-car lines. Meanwhile, hungry railwaymen abandoned
work to look for food in the countryside and anti-Bolshevik
feeling grew. However, the railway executive committees pre-
vented serious stoppages by arresting actual and potential strike
leaders. The worst month was December; in early 1918 fuel
stocks were replenished, although they remained at a dan-
gerously low level. In some ways the subsequent loss of railway
mileage as tlie anti-Bolshevik armies closed in was of consider-
able help to railway operations. It decreased the average length
of haul and concentrated rolling stock into a smaller area.

On the other hand, war conditions entailed frequent opposing
and irrational movements, often because military supply bases
were far from the front. For example, horse fodder sent from
Syzran to the Eastern Front at Samara, 186 km. away, had
first to be sent westwards 550 km. to the base at Arzamas, and
back through Syzran to the destination. Another problem was
the shortage of locomotives, and mass transfers were arranged
as the traffic pattern changed. This did not prevent situations
arising such as occurred on the Kharkov-Moscow line in 1920,
when because of an engine shortage only five daily pairs of
trains were operated, instead of forty-five. For most of the
period locomotive allocations were centrally controlled by the
Supreme Traffic Council. Only in the short-lived peace in early
1920 were engines returned to the jurisdiction of the nkps in
the interests of fuel economy and better utilization. To over-
come the fuel crisis local inhabitants were frequently conscripted
to cut firewood and many engines were converted to bum this
fuel. But even firewood was scarce; green wood was sometimes
supplied and in one area peat was used. Railways sometimes
commandeered coal trains passing over their lines.

More effort was demanded from staff, and unco-operative
workers were dealt with more and more firmly. A decree on
‘labour deserters’ in 1920 ordered workers to boycott their
fellows who had stayed away from work because, it said, even
if they did have a medical certificate this no doubt was fraudu-
lent. Other sinners were the workers who would appear on duty
in tlie workshops and then spend their time making articles for
their own private use or sale. Railwaymen were made personally
responsible for failures of equipment in their charge and prizes
of extra rations were instituted for train crew’s who covered
above-norm distances. (Lenin also suggested that bad workers
receive reduced rations but this does not seem to have been put
into practice. Presumably a bad worker was better than a dead
one.) At the same time, to provide more qualified administrators,
renewed efforts were made to attract the pre-revolutionary staff',
railway specialists who had been earlier transferred to other gov-
eminen t departments were recalled to the nkps, and several thou-
sand seasoned Party organizers were also posted to the railways.

Despite frequent prohibitions other departments, particularly
the military authorities, interfered with railway work. The
military, not content with their formal right to watch the
execution of their requirements, would use their armed force
to alter schedules and commandeer engines and cars. An
account of this kind of situation is given in the following des-
cription of preparations for the assault on Simferopol, the last
battle of the Civil War.1

* Malyshkin, A. Padtniye Daira. In Sochineniya v dvukh tomakk. Moscow, 1956,
pp. 152-4.
‘Trains ran only to the south, no locomotives were released
for the north. Northbound travellers lived at the station for
weeks. They became shabby, worn-out, lousy and disease-
ridden from so much lying about on the platforms and in the
fields. But there were still no hopes of leaving. It was in vain
that the little, dark, eager, man in a pince-nez—the war
transport representative—ran up and down the station, made
’phone-calls, hovered over the telegraph . . . there was a
bottleneck at the junction, a catastrophic situation and sabotage,
the commandeering of locomotives, armed threats (“request
those responsible be tried by Revolutionary Tribunal, firing
squad the only remedy”). . . .

‘Wheezing painfully, an engine rolled out from the depot . . .
the northbound travellers crowded on to the platform with
their sacks and bags, grew savage and knocked each other with
shoulder and elbow', pushing themselves towards the track so
as not to be too late, so as not to die. The men with rifles, who
had been waiting, took the engine to the turntable . . . and
turned its iron front to the south. The commander of the troop
train took a pistol from his belt and told the driver: “Take her
to the troop train on track eleven." The driver w'as going to
protest, changed his mind . . . the engine backed on to the troop
train. The people on the platform, deceived, let out a roar,
became wild, shook their fists, ran on to the tracks, rattled on
die station windows. . . .

‘The little dark man wras running along the train. He was
losing his pince-nez and was shouting furiously: “This is
banditry! . . . You'll hear more of this! ... I have a telephone
line to the Special Section!”

' “Go to hell!" said the commander, pushing him aside—“I’ve
got orders to report for action at midnight ... I’d like to spit
on your schedules. . . .” ’

Planning during this difficult period could only be primitive.
Up to October 1919 state plans for the railway had been formu-
lated by die Central Traffic Committee under the nkps. Then
a new' body, the Supreme Traffic Council (under the Council of
People’s Commissars) was made responsible, but the Central
Traffic Committee remained the executive planning organ. The
latter planned movements on a national scale, trying to co-
ordinate demand with resources. On die local level there w'ere
plans worked out by the okrug traffic committees. The Supreme
Traffic Council established priorities, attempted to make
longer-term forecasts, and checked the execution of the plans.
The plans were monthly, and the three main factors taken into
account were expected traffic, railway capacity, and fuel sup-
plies. In April 1920, a 'permanent' commission was set up
under the Council of Labour and Defence to plan the restoration
and development of transport, and to check the fulfilment of
the plans.

The collection of accurate statistics at this time seemed a
hopeless endeavour. Local officials distorted their figures to
their own advantage and statistical methods varied between
railways. One eminent Soviet economist has stated that when
statistics were collected of the progress of rail replacement, the
figures of some railways represented kilometres, others the
weight of the new rails, and yet others the cost of the work.
The central statistics clerks added all these figures together to
arrive at the national total!1 Money had lost its significance as
a unit of account. The railways had a huge working deficit but
this was due to the fact that most of the traffic was carried free,
and because tariff increases on the lemainder could not keep
pace with inflation.

the railways’ physical condition

According to an expert American witness,2 in the spring of
1917 the Russian railways possessed about 17,600 engines, and
590,000 freight cars (of which 13,000 were American eight-
wheelers). About 15 per cent of the engines were wood-
bumers. There was a car shortage estimated to be of 88,000
units, and about 3,000 new engines were expected to be
required each year to meet demand. The main line track was in
fair condition, gravel ballast predominating. 43-6 kg. (88 lb.)
rails were laid on the Nikolaev Railway, and 33-5 kg. (68 lb.)
rails on other main lines.8 Repair shops were old-fashioned,

* Strumilin. S. Op. cit., p. 658.

•The railway engineer J. Greiner, in Railway Review. August 3, 1918. The
number of cars given is not reliable.

’ According to another, Soviet, source (Naporko, A. Op. cit., p. 166) the state
of track in the beginning of 1917 was as follows: Type la rail (43-6 kg./metre)
2 per cent of mileage, Ila (38-4 kg.) 10 per cent, Illa (33-5 kg.) 39 per cent,
IVa (80-9 kg.) 12 per cent, lighter than IVa 37 per cent. The lengths of standard
rails varied from 4-6 to 15 metres.
11.	Where the
Murmansk Railway
wtts the Arctic Circle;
the station at I’olyanyi
Krug in 1919.
photo. Imptrial If'ar
pfu.teum.

British anti Russian
officers at a station on
tin- Archangel line in
1919.

Photo. Imperial War
Museum.

Soldiers of the White
Anny and their
transport.

Photo. Imperial War
Museum.
12.	A British officer
supervising Russian
fitters in the Murmansk
repair shops in 1919.
Photo. Imperia! И ar
Museum.

American troops with
an improvised
armoured train in
North Russia during
1919.

Photo. Imperia! H'er
Mu ream.

One of the many Civil
War locomotive
cemeteries.

Photo. Imperial H'“r
Museum.
bridges were of good design and in good repair, but many were
too old and too weak. An engine run, from the main depot to
the turning point and back again, was from 50 to 80 miles.
The average monthly locomotive mileage was 1,500 miles.

Apart from the fuel crisis the first main problem was the
locomotive shortage. The number of engines out of service
awaiting repair rose steadily as workshop productivity declined
(because of fuel and metal shortages, and unenthusiastic
workers). Locomotive works continued to be devoted to
munitions production, as well as to the construction of armoured
trains, which had a vital role in a war fought along the railway
routes. The number of new engines produced fell from 420 in
1917, and 214 in 1918, to 100 in 1919. At the time of the
Revolution a quarter of the locomotive stock was awaiting
repair. By September 1920 of the 17,577 engines in existence
only 7,296 were available for service.1 Efforts to alleviate this
situation included the cannibalizing of engines older than the
О class, and attempts to increase daily engine hours by attaching
a special car to locomotives, containing bunks, a stove, and
repair equipment. Two crews would live in this vehicle, taking
turns at driving the engine. This idea was not widely adopted.

Labour problems in the workshops were the main obstacles
to a speedier repair of locomotives. Workers still clung to their
own concept of the new freedom for the proletariat. There was
strong opposition to piece rates because they were against the
democratic idea. At the beginning of 1918 both piece rates and
bonuses were abolished by popular demand. This was immedi-
ately followed by a further fall in productivity. But in 1919 and
1920 a different type of incentive was more successful. Prizes
of food and cloth were given to workshops showing satisfactory
productivity. During fuel shortages if a factory repaired an
engine additional to the plan, and this engine hauled an extra-
plan fuel train, then the factory would receive an extra-plan
fuel allocation. Other measures taken in 1920 were the lifting
of the ban on imports of locomotives and parts, and 24-hour
working of the best factories. But in the summer of 1920 the
workshops were still only receiving a third of their require-
ments for firebox parts, and 15 per cent of their sheet metal
needs.

1 Ochtrki po istorii narodnavo khozyaistva SSSR. Moscow, 1959, p. 291. Gladkov,
I. Voprosy planirovaniya sozietskavo khozyaistva v 191S-20gg.

G
An important, but sometimes exaggerated, role in the
improvement of labour productivity was played by the ‘Com-
munist Saturdays’. The first of these occurred at ihe Moscow
depot of tlie Moscow-Kazan Railway in April 1919, when
communist workers did an extra, voluntary and unpaid, shift
from 8 p.m. on Saturday to 6 a.m. on Sunday. Three weeks
later communists and sympathizers worked another six hours
on Saturday, repairing four engines and sixteen cars. The idea
spread and soon extra shifts were being worked not only in
workshops but at stations and fuel collection points. In general,
labour productivity was about two and a half times the normal
level, which indicates that the normal must have been abysmally
low, for the working conditions remained unchanged; the
difference was between the mass of the workers and the
enthusiasts. The idea soon spread to other industries, and more
and more workers were persuaded to join in. High-flown
appeals to class solidarity and patriotism were made through
tlie press and by activists. However, the ‘Communist Saturdays’
remained essentially a minority movement.1

The typical flavour of this publicity is exhibited in the
following example of worker-journalism:2

'105 Communists ... 60 non-party workers ... 15 women
left at 2 a.m. . . . arrived 9 a.m.

‘Despite tlie fact that nearly all the wood was in S-arshin
lengths and very wet, and hence very heavy, the comrades set
to w'ork with a will and freight cars soon filled up with this
commodity, so precious to us at the present time. The incon-
venience of loading the wood was intensified because most of
it was lying in snow and it had to be dug out and handled with
bare hands, because not every body had gloves .. . the wood had
to be carried along a slippery slope.

. . unfamiliarity with such heavy work ... at times affected
the morale of the workers but duty towards tlie revolution,
discipline and self-sacrifice . . . triumphed over weakness.

‘Without a break the communist artel worked 6 hours. . . .
'. . . with more than twenty thousand poods of precious cargo
‘For example, in die Moscow Province in die best month (February 1920),
41,587 workers took part. This figure includes all industries, and those enthusiasts
who appeared more than once are included more than once. (Zh. transport SSSIi
v dokummtakh. p. 64.)

1 Krasnyiput' zMeznvdorozhnika. 47/1919.
the train trundled towards Tula amid a chorus of revolutionary
songs . .

As the area of Soviet-held territory increased, the repair and
replacement of wrecked bridges became urgent. To restore the
Orenburg-Tashkent line in 1919 more than 100 bridges were
replaced. Big and vital structures, such as the Kama bridge at
Perm, were repaired by soldiers and workers on a round-the-
clock basis. But only the most important lines were dealt with
at first; in 1920 10 per cent of the country's railway bridges
were out of use.1 Many repair trains were organized and army
units were drafted to the damaged railways: the Second Army
restored the South-Eastern Railway, which had been wrecked
by the retreating White forces between Voronezh and Rostov.
Earlier, the Moscow-Kazan line had been repaired by the
Reserve Army. The use of troops in preparing sleepers (two-
thirds of sleepers were over-age by 1920) was less successful,
for the men had a regrettable tendency to use them as personal
firewood.

In 1917 there were 13,245 km. of railway under construction
and w’ork was continued, at least formally, on much of this.
Some of the new lines became less urgent during the Civil War
and original intentions were abandoned. A construction com-
mittee in September 1918 allocated funds for the St Petersburg-
Novgorod, Novgorod-Luga and Novgorod-Valdai lines, as
well as the Vyazma-Orel line. But the 1919 programme gave
emphasis tn different lines, especially branch and narrnw-gange
railways. The programme for that year envisaged the construc-
tion of about 320 km. of normal and 150 km. of narrow-gauge
lines. Part of the normal-gauge mileage was represented by the
new Kazan-Ekaterinburg line, urgently needed in the struggle
against Kolchak’s White army. As rail stocks had been ex-
hausted at the end of 1918, track wras taken up from the newly-
built but less urgent Rybinsk-St Petersburg line. At the height
of the Civil War in mid-1919 about 45,000 workers were
engaged on the construction of six urgently-needed railways.1

In January 1920 there was a drastic revision of construction

1 Statistichesiii atlas fmtei soobsAchenu RSFSR. Moscow, 1922. p. 4. The same
source indicates that in 1920 half the railway bridges were of iron, 20 per cent of
wood, 9 per cent of concrete, and 8 per cent stone.

* Gladkov, I. Op. cit., p. 247.
plans. It was decided that in the ensuing year work should cease
on about 13,000 km. of new line (much of which had never
actually been started,1 only planned) and to complete about
2,500 km. of short lines. These were mainly to serve coal
mines, but some were to other raw material sources, such as
metal mines, and quarries. However, this ambitious target was
not fulfilled. Mileage completed fell from 1,069 km. in 1918
to 71 km. in 1919 and rose only to 197 km. in 1920.1

THE TRANS-SIBERIAN DURING THE CIVIL WAR

The Trans-Siberian Railway was one of the lines most affected
by the Civil War. The Americans and the Japanese landed at
Vladivostok, the White Army under Kolchak advanced along
the railway as far as the Urals, while for a time the railway was
under the control of the Czech Army.

Even before the Bolshevik revolution Americans had begun
to participate in the affairs of the Trans-Siberian. In 1917, at
the request of the Russian Government, two American railway
missions had arrived, in the hope that they would rescue the
railways from the impending collapse. There was the United
States Railway Advisory Commission to Russia, headed by
Colonel Stevens and one of whose members became an assistant
to the Deputy Minister of Ways and Communications in the
Provisional Government. This mission landed at Vladivostok
in June 1917 and inspected the Trans-Siberian and certain of the
lines in European Russia. It concluded that the Trans-Siberian
was the only reliable Russian link with the Allies. Then there
was also the Russian Railway Service Corps, under Colonel
Emerson, a former general manager of the Great Northern
Railway. This was divided into about twenty 14-man units,
each comprising a balanced team of the various operating grades,
which were allocated to specific railway centres »o introduce
American techniques. Due to political circumstances they all
took up their posts only in spring 1918, and they were con-
centrated on the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way although for one short period in 1918 Trotsky was
negotiating for extensive American assistance in reorganizing
the whole network.

The Americans found the Trans-Siberian to be congested
1 Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 647.
w ith freight trains, due mainly to the bottleneck of the Tomsk
Railway. This bottleneck was a consequence of a strike at the
coal mines situated at the western end of this railway; produc-
tion had been increased at a mine still open but towards the
eastern extremity of the line, which meant that about fifteen
extra coal trains were being passed each day over 950 miles,
leaving little capacity to receive trains from eastern lines.
Trains were not despatched in the American fashion, but handled
by stationmasters, locomotives were fueled by hand, usually
from the ground, because there were no mechanical coaling
installations. Engines needed twenty minutes to take water
liecause of the small diameters of the pipes. Many bridges were
too w'eak to accept the new American engines. Russian railway
staff, long accustomed to money-losing operations, did not
favour attempts to increase efficiency or to change their methods.

Although in May 1918 the Bolsheviks were in command of
all cities on the line between Irkutsk and Vladivostok this
situation did not last. At this time the Czech Army, the only
disciplined armed force in Russia, was being moved from its
old camps around Kiev back to Europe, via Vladivostok. A
scries of special trains w ere operated for this purpose, but hardly
had the first arrived at the Pacific when the movement was
halted, leaving the Czechs distributed on railway sidings all
along the Trans-Siberian Railway. This halt was at the orders
of the Bolsheviks, who first wished to take the Czechs* arms,
and later began to fear that they might join forces with the
Whites, who were beginning to operate in the Far East.

There was little love lost between the Czechs and the occu-
piers of their country, the Austro-Hungarians, and when west-
bound trains of released Hungarian prisoners began to pass
along the Trans-Siberian, with its train-loads of delayed and
disgruntled Czechs, trouble was bound to arise sooner or later.
At Chelyabinsk a missile flung from a Hungarian train killed a
Czech, whose comrades promptly lynched the thrower. The
Czechs were arrested by the local Bolsheviks and then liberated
by their own countrymen. In this way began the Czech revolt.
News of it spread along the line and soon the Czech Army was
in charge of the railway, using it to move eastwards and
routing any Bolshevik garrisons which tried to stop them.
About the same time a terrorist chief, Semconov, established
himself in the Chita area, Kolchak’s Whites prepared to march
west, and American troops landed at Vladivostok to prevent
the Russian Far East falling into Japanese hands.

After the Czechs had departed the Trans-Siberian was fought
over by the Reds and the Whites, and by Semeonov terrorists.
Tlie latter controlled the junction with the cer and would
appropriate any freight they required. They also operated
armoured trains in which they w'ould attack unsuspecting town-
ships, murdering local populations for the fun of it. Armoured
trains were also used by the Reds and Whites; they were of
great value in a war fought along the railway.1 Meanwhile
American men and money helped to keep the cer and the
eastern part of the Trans-Siberian in working order, and
American troops remained in order to prevent a Japanese take-
over. At one stage the Japanese, expecting to appropriate the
Ussuri Railway (which ran through an area under their occu-
pation) were training Japanese railway staff to speak Russian,
and some of the stations of this line were given new, Japanese,
names. Only diplomatic pressure saved this railway for the
Russians, and in 1920 tlie American military intervention
ended. The Japanese left shortly afterwards.

On the cer the Russian military guards were replaced by
Chinese in 1918. The same year Red detachments halted trains
on this line, conscripting all men of military age to fight the
Czechs. Tlie Inter-Allied Railway Committee (which had been
formed with jurisdiction between the Pacific and the Urals)
carefully avoided allocating Japanese troops to any section of
the cer but the Japanese circumvented this by laying a tele-
phone cable alongside the line and posting troops to guard it.
However, they were never strong enough to take over the line
and soon departed. In 1920 the Chinese were able to strengthen
their representation on the railway; although the manager
would still be a Russian, he would have a Chinese assistant,
and the Railway Zone, formerly virtually a strip of Russian
territory inside Manchuria, came under Chinese administration.
Later, the railway fell into Japanese hands after the 1981 attack
on Manchuria. After the war it was again under mixed control
for a time but after a Communist Government came to power
in China the Russians relinquished their interest, in 1952.

* Ivanov's novel, Armoured Train 14-69, describes life on one of these trains.
RESTORATION

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

At the end of the Civil War the Russian economy was at a
standstill, due partly to war damage, partly to the over-rapid
liquidation of private enterprise. So in 1921 the New Economic
Policy was adopted, which aimed to restore a measure of private
initiative. The State would continue to own and operate key
enterprises such as mines and banks, but private persons would
be able to participate in less vital industries and trades. The
railways were, of course, considered to be key enterprises and
there was never any question of their being handed back to
private ownership. However, their work could not fail to be
affected by the new policy. A first step was the ending of
limitations on the carriage of private goods and private passen-
gers, which was followed by a rapid expansion of this type of
traffic (it was O-S per cent of the freight in November 1921
and 8*8 per cent eight months later).1 Later, the priority which
government departments enjoyed at freight terminals was
abolished. By the mid-twenties the Government decided that
private business had developed far enough, and should be
squeezed out to make way again for public ownership, and the
railways were required to accelerate this process by tariff
discrimination. The new economic policy had run its course by
1928, when the five-year plans began.

For the railways, this period marks the beginning of peace-
time operation under a socialist regime, and the problems
encountered at this time were a foretaste of what was to follow
in later years. Namely, chronic difficulties occasioned by in-
creasing traffic in the face of insufficient transport resources.
Effectiveness rather than efficiency was to become the dominant

* Savittskoyt narodnoyt khozyaistvo v 1921-25 gg. Moscow, 1960, p. 370.
theme; the securing at any cost of the highest utilization of
material resources. Despite the introductiofi of ‘economic
accounting', traffic indices were to be more important than
profit and loss accounts.

RESTORATION

The poor maintenance of railway property during the Great
War, and the damage caused by the Civil War, which had
raged over all Russia except the centre, and was fought along
the railway routes, combined to put the railways in a grim
physical condition by 1921. During the Civil War about 12 per
cent of the total number of railway bridges wrere destroyed,
and this included many of the major structures spanning wide
rivers like the Irtysh, Kama, Volga and Dnepr. Many kilo-
metres of line (official figures claimed 1,885 km.) had been
wrecked, and thousands of locomotives and cars put out of
action.1 And apart from physical damage deliberately inflicted,
there was a six-year backlog of maintenance work, which
meant that thousands of kilometres of rail were worn out, often
dangerously so. About thirty million sleepers were in need of
replacement. Hundreds of bridges left undamaged by the wars
had been weakened by improper maintenance.

At the beginning of the new economic policy more than half
the locomotives in Russia were concentrated in grass-grown
storage tracks outside the locomotive depots. These so-called
‘cemeteries’ contained about 12,ooo rusting engines in the
winter of 1921-22, all awaiting the heavy repairs needed to
get them back into service. (The number of engines destroyed
beyond hope of repair was comparatively small.) Official figures2
indicate that of the 19,067 engines on the books in 1921-22,
64 per cent were unserviceable, and that during the year 8,896
capital or intermediate repairs were carried out. In the follow-
ing tw’o years 18,690 capital and intermediate repairs wrere
achieved, yet in the next year (1924^25) the average number
of locomotives in service was 20,800, and 52 per cent of these
were still unusable. From these figures it can be concluded
either that repair work was of a uniquely low quality or that
workshops embellished their records of output by classifying

1 Swietskoye narodnoye khozyaistvo v 1921-25 gg. Moscow, 1960, p. 357.

* Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 658.
minor repairs as 'intermediate' or ‘capital’. It was not until
1926 that the backlog of repairs began to diminish noticeably.
In 1925-26, 45 per cent of the locomotive stock was unservice-
able, in 1926-27, 39 per cent, and by 1927-28 the 1913 level
was reached at 18 per cent. The number of capital and inter-
mediate repairs remained fairly high in relation to the total
stock; statistically, in 1927-28 each locomotive on the books
underwent 1 -06 capital or intermediate repairs per annum, and
this at a time when the average freight locomotive was running
only about 130 kilometres each day.

The situation of the freight car stock was similar, but not so
pronounced. The number of cars unserviceable never exceeded
я third of the total stock. But whereas 1921-22 was the worst
year for the locomotives, it was in 1922-23 that the number of
unserviceable cars reached its peak of 32 per cent, of a total
stock of 405,000. This was in spite of an instruction by the
Council of Labour and Defence in January 1921,1 that car and
locomotive repairs were to be classed as ‘shock’ work, with
guaranteed supplies of materials and extra rations in the form
of prizes for high output. 1923-24 was another bad year which
showed no improvement, but in 1925-26 the proportion of
unservicable cars fell to a quarter of the total and by 1927-28
to 7-2 per cent of a total stock of 468,000 units (the 1913
figure had been 8-0 per cent).

Because of statistical inadequacies, the progress of rail re-
placement cannot be recounted accurately. The situation in 1921
was so acute that it was decided to divide railways into three
categories. The first category, which was about two-fifths of
the total mileage, comprised the key lines, which were to
receive tlie best materials and most qualified labour. The
second category were less important lines, which were to be
deprived of their through traffic and would serve simply as feeder
lines to routes of the first category. Only half their requirements
in men and materials were to be supplied. The third category
were the lines kept open solely for local needs. They comprised
about one-third of the total network and were to receive only
30 per cent of their requirements.

Shortage of rails prevented any large-scale relaying. Only
where threadbare track threatened to close important lines
could repairs be made. Poor but serviceable track remained in

1 Zheleznodorozhny! transport SSSH v dokumentakh. Moscow, 1957, p. 159.

G*
202

place, limiting train speeds and the use of the heavier loco-
motives. Lightweight rails from secondary lines were often
transferred to the main lines. Whereas in pre-war years about
3 per cent of the total mileage was relaid each year, in 1923-24-
less than 1 per cent was achieved. Towards the end of the new
economic policy 3^4 per cent of the mileage was being relaid
annually, but this did little to reduce the backlog. Lightweight
track remained the crucial weakness of Soviet railways for
another three decades.

The sleeper situation was equally bad, but now of secondary
importance, being overshadowed by the rail shortage. In 1925
about two-fifths of the sleepers were over-age and many of the
new ones were of untreated wood and were unlikely to last
many years. Nor was the bridge problem completely solved.
In 1921 and 1922 the emphasis was on temporary restoration
of bridges, with the aim of getting the traffic moving again.
Then a start was made on capital repairs and in 1922-23 most
of the bigger bridges had been rebuilt. Nevertheless, by the
end of 1925 a tenth of Russian bridges still required renewal
or replacement.

Thus by the end of the new economic policy, the condition
of the railway infrastructure was still inferior to the 1913
standards, even though towards the end of the period much
additional trackage, warehousing and station facilities had been
installed at certain key junctions which w'ere feeling the strain
of growing traffic.1 On the other hand locomotives and rolling
stock had regained, at least statistically, the 1913 level, although
it should be remembered that most restoration work had been
carried out at pre-w'ar technical standards: the 1913 level was
somewhat out of date by 1928.

TRAFFIC

During the first years of the new economic policy there was
only a moderate demand for transport, due to the destruction
and disruption which two successive wars had wrought in town
and country. For this reason, although railway traffic only
slowly rose from its low' level of 1920, transport difficulties
were localized in time and place and never became a threat to

* Notably: Kharkov, Krasnyi Liman, Yasinovataya, Rostov, Novorossiisk,
Odessa, Sverdlovsk, Ivanovo, Lozovaya, Ryazan, Leningrad.
the economy as a whole. Towards the end of the period,
however, agricultural and industrial recovery outpaced railway
development and in April 1926 the Plenum of the Party’s
Central Committee passed a resolution that. transport . . .
has already started to become a link in the Soviet economic
system without a serious strengthening of which a further
growth of trade in the country is impossible.’1

Railway work in 1921 was crippled by the fuel shortage, and
disorganized by the famine. In March and April of that year
absolute priority had to be given to the carriage of seed. In the
summer and autumn famine, emergency measures again were
applied to carry food to the affected areas, principally the
Volga region. After unloading, the grain trains were uacd to
evacuate the local population, but as it was plainly impossible
to save the lives of all inhabitants, children were given priority.
Towards the end of the year the railways were still busy
carrying urgent grain supplies, this time from Siberia and the
Ukraine. With all these difficulties to overcome the railways
in 1921 registered only a small increase in traffic over 1920;
14 billion ton/km. against 11-4 billion.

In 1922 some operations were still curtailed by the fuel
shortage, and there was a minor crisis in February and March,
when emergency measures had again to be taken to speed up
the delivery of grain and other foodstuffs. Towards the end of
the year there was a sharp improvement; carloadings in
December averaged 12,373 daily, almost half the 1913 figure
(07,400). Rut the year as a whole only produced 18-2 billion
ton/km., which was still far behind the 1913 level of traffic
(65 *7 billion). However, the average length of haul continued
to be shorter than in 1913, so the difference in tons carried was
less marked: 44,600,000 tons in 1922 as against 132,400,000
tons in 1913.®

1923 was marked by the disappearance of the fuel crisis, and
traffic rose, 26-2 billion tons/km. being recorded in that year.
In 1924 the improvement continued and would have been even
greater if industrial and agricultural traffic had not suffered
from the effects of the ‘scissors’ crisis (when in 1923 a price
divergence between industrial and agricultural products became

1 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh. Part II, p. 261.

* Transport i svyaz' SSSR. Moscow, 1957, p. S3. Savietskoye narodnoye khoz-
yaistvo v. 1921-25 да. Moscow, 1960, p. 370.
so wide as to stifle trade between town and country). Despite
this, in 1924 railway freight traffic at 36-5 billion ton/km. was
half the 1913 amount, and average daily carloadings in 1923-24
rose to 13,517. In 1925 both industry and agriculture had good
years, and rail traffic increased accordingly. In that year 52-6
billion ton/km. were achieved. However, a proportion of this
increase was due to a lengthening of the average distance of
haul from 500 km. to 568 km. Average carloadings in 1924-25
rose to 17,398 daily. There was also an increase of railway
sendee traffic during these years. In the year 1924-25, while
83,454,000 tons of ordinary freight were carried, sendee trains
carried an additional 21,156,000 tons. While an increase in
railway service traffic was understandable in I9Q1 and 1OQQ
when so much restoration was in hand,1 11 it was less excusable
in 1925. Not only this, but the average length of haul of this
traffic was on the increase. The changing pattern of fuel con-
sumption was presumably the main factor; together with the
measures taken to master the fuel shortage, there was a drive
to replace firewood by coal. For example, Donetz coal was
being sent to locomotive depots in Siberia previously supplied
with local firewood.

In 1926 the 1913 figure for ton/km. was passed, but as the
length of haul had continued to increase it was not until the
following year that the tonnage of freight exceeded the pre-war
level. In 1927 82'6 billion ton/km. were recorded, and
139,600,000 tons of freight were carried. Average daily car-
loadings in 1926-27 rose to 27.868.

Coal and coke traffic increased more rapidly than other
classes of freight; by tonnage it had represented 14 per cent
of total freight traffic in 1923, but by 1927 was back at its 1913
level: 20 per cent of total shipments by weight. At the same
time the average length of haul of this freight, which had
declined to 403 km. in 1923 (1913, 485 km.), rose steeply to
no less than 660 km., mainly as a consequence of the measures
taken to widen the area supplied by the Donetz coalfields. The
three next most important freights in 1927 were timber, grain,
and firewood, each representing 11 per cent of the total. Of
these firewood showed the most fluctuation; from 6-5 per cent

1 In fact, in 1921, 27 per cent of freight traffic was on railway service as against

11 per cent in 1913. See Sovietskoyt narodnaye khozyaistvo v. 1921-25gg. Moscow,
1960, p. 375.
in 1915 it rose to 26 per cent in 1928 before declining as coal
consumption started to rise. Grain had the largest haul of all
freight, on average 987 km. in 1927 as against 615 km. in 1928
and 547 km. in 1913. Of the other basic commodities, petroleum
products were at the 1913 proportion, just under 5 per cent;
ores had risen from 1*4 per cent in 1923 to 4-5 per cent in
1927 but were still below 1913 (7 per cent); iron and steel
was at tlie 1918 level (3-5 per cent) but in ton/km. showed a
big increase because the average length of haul had risen from
469 km. in 1923 to 780 km. in 1927.1

Passenger traffic statistics in the early twenties can only be
approximate because of the high proportion of travellers who
did not buy a ticket and therefore were unrecorded. Official
figures give the number of passenger journeys in 1922 as 91
million, compared to 185 million in 1913. Corresponding
passengcr/km. were 9-4 billion and 25-2 billion. In the three
years 1923-25 passenger/кт. rose to 20*5 billion, then to 22-8
billion in 1927 before falling back to 22-4 billion the next year.

OPERATIONS

The principal feature of the changes in operating practice
during the twenties was tlte effort to reduce the effects of the
rolling stock shortage, particularly the shortage of freight cars.
Some of the measures taken were questionable. It became the
general practice to overload cars and this led to an increased
number of mishaps. Accidents also increased following the
institution of simpler inspection techniques. Under the old
regime the car exchange points between different railways
were also car inspection points. But after the railways became
wholly government-owned these were replaced by inspection
brigades at the larger depots. The simpler techniques em-
ployed by these ill-organized squads resulted in a less thorough
examination.

In 1925-26 experiments were begun to see whether it would
be possible to concentrate goods to a single destination from a
single source into one train which could make the trip without
intermediate halts for exchange of cars.8 The full value of this
method was never realized largely because tlie careful and

1 Hunter, H. Soviet Transportation Policy. Harvard, 1957, p. 345.

• In fact this 'marchrout' technique had been used earlier but unsuccessfully.
The Council of Labour and Defence had criticized fuel ‘marchrouts’ as ‘incorrect
and harmful' in 1922.
accurate planning it required was not forthcoming, particularly
from shippers. The latter were required to give two to four
weeks’ advance notice Of bulk goods becoming ready for dis-
patch to a given destination, in order to permit the accumulation
of rolling stock. In fact, most shippers failed to give more than
a few days notification, and on the occasions when adequate
warning was given, the forecast requirements were often very
different from real needs. An extreme example of this in 1925-
26 was the declaration by Neftsindikat (the oil industry) that
its monthly need was for tank cars of total capacity 5-5 million
poods, but in fact only managed to produce 1 • 25 million poods
per month.1

I Insatisfactory also was rhe turnaround of freight cars by
enterprises which still tended to regard cars as temporary
warehouses even after demurrage charges were introduced.
Loading and unloading twenty-four hours a day was imposed
in some places, but the number of cars dealt with daily remained
insufficient.

Apart from the introduction of the shift system for engine-
men, locomotive economy was also obtained by increasing the
size of trains, but there were obvious limits to this in the power
of existing engines and the permanent way restrictions on the
introduction of more powerful ones. Increasing the average
speed of trains was another way of making the most of loco-
motives, cars, and line capacity, but this wras also largely
dependent on locomotive power. During the new’ economic
policy the average speed of freight trains did rise, but very
slowly. The 1913 average commercial speed of 13’5 km. per
hour was only regained in 1927; in 1923 it had been 12-8 km.
per hour. Apart from the obvious reasons such as poor track
entailing speed restrictions, and old-fashioned signalling
methods (which intensified the difficulties of single-line work-
ing), the increased w’eight of trains had the negative feature
of reducing train speeds.

In 1913 the average length of freight trains was 78-8 axles,
and net weight 302 tons. By 1927-28 the corresponding figures
were 96-2 and 415.2 The increase in train weight was thus
greater than the increase in train length, which suggests a

1See Rudzutak, Ya. Transport v. khoxyaistve SSSR. Moscow, 1927.

* Planavoye khozyaistvo. March 1935. Ekonomicheskoye oboxreniye. December
1926. Hunter, H. Soviet Transportation Policy. Harvard, 1957, p. 399.
better utilization of car capacity. In fact cars were not only
better-utilized, but over-utilized, often being grossly over-
loaded and causing frequent accidents. The overloading of cars
and the running of heavier trains also led to a rising accident
rate from broken couplings.

The increased weight of trains was the main factor enabling
a 33 per cent increase of freight ton/km. to be achieved (in
1927-28 compared to 1913) while during the same period
locomotive kilometres at head of train declined by 14 per cent.
At the beginning of the New Economic Policy (1921-22) this
latter index was at a third of the 1913 level (123 million km.
against 382 million) but increased steadily each year even
though it never reached the pre-war standard during this
period. Nor did line utilization quite reach the 1913 mark;
although freight ton/km. in 1927-28 were higher than before
the war, railway mileage had increased and pass./km. had
declined, so that in 1927-28 combined ton/km. per km. of
track were only 93 per cent of the 1,554,000 million registered
in 1913.1

Freight car utilization improved during this period. The
average daily mileage of freight cars in 1922-23 was only 48
km. but by 1928 this had risen to 85 km. (in 1913 it had been
72 km.). The average turnaround time of cars (the time
between successive loadings) was also reduced below the 1913
level: 10-6 days against 12-3, despite the increased length of
haul.2 It should, however, be noted that statistical improve-
ments do not always represent real gains. Part of the increased
daily mileage of freight cars was no doubt due to less time spent
on inspections; reduced turnaround time was partly obtained
by obliging enterprises to inconvenience and penalize them-
selves by diverting skilled workers to loading and unloading
operations.

The strain under which the railways were working, together
with irresponsibility shown by workers and poor maintenance,
led to an increased number of accidents during this period. In
1928 it was stated that four-fifths of the accidents were partly
or wholly the fault of workers. Examples were included in an
article bewailing labour indiscipline on the railways:2

•	Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 671.

•	Hunter, H. Op. cit., p. 406. Transport i svyaz' SSSR. Moscow, 1957, p. 48.

•	Pravda. March 22, 1928.
. at one station there was a collision because a switchman
left his post without permission. At Gandja Station a drunken
driver took it into his head to refuse the train order, and drove
his train to the wrong destination. At Baladjary Station a train
ready to leave was cancelled because the conductor did not turn
up. At this same station a driver on duty refused to take a train
just as it was on the point of being despatched, and it was
cancelled. . . .

'The same picture can be observed on other railways. For
example on July 2, 1927, on the Bryansk-Tsementnaya section
the mail train was derailed. The cause—the drunken driver
was carrying strangers on the locomotive and was playing
cards with them. The result—S dead, 16 injured, and 6 cars
wrecked.’

Tlie case of the Trans-Caucasus Railway (by no means the
worst technically) was mentioned. In the operating period
1926-27 no less than 795 cars were wrecked and 63 loco-
motives damaged in accidents, which caused over a thousand
casualties. Sixty-one of the accidents were collisions. Signalling
errors on the part both of enginemen and signalmen caused a
large proportion of these mishaps. On the railway system as a
w'hole there were 14,489 registered accidents in 1926-27 (com-
pared to 6,140 in 1913). Of these half were ascribed to the fault
of workers and a third to the poor condition of the rolling stock.

HASSENGER SERVICES

During this period passenger services were making a slow
recovery from the effects of the war years. Speeds and fre-
quencies improved, but the pre-war levels were not attained.
On the St Petersburg-Moscow service there were in 1924 four
daily trains each way. Two of these were restricted to soft
class and conveyed sleeping cars. The fastest of them, stopping
en route only at Bologoye and Tver, took 14| hours to reach
the Kursk station in Moscow. This represented an average
speed of 45 km. per hour (28 m.p.h.). Tlte train carrying hard-
class travellers took 29 hours. By 1927 this service had been
improved slightly. There were then five trains, and in common
with other routes (except the Trans-Siberian) the exclusion of
hard-class passengers from the best trains was no longer
practised. All three of the night trains included sleeping cars
and the fastest of them moved at an average speed of 62 km.
per hour (38 m.p.h.), making two intermediate stops.

The fastest train from Moscow to Smolensk in 1924 averaged
40 km. per hour (25 m.p.h.) and operated only twice a week.
By 1927 there was a daily service at the same speed. From
Moscow to Nizhnii Novgorod there was a sleeping-car train
which in 1924 averaged 45 km. per hour (28 m.p.h.). In 1927
it ran at the same speed, but carried all classes of passenger.
On the Trans-Siberian route in 1924 there were three trains
weekly from Moscow' to Vladivostok. Routed via Perm and the
cer, they took 12 days and 79 minutes to complete the trip.
In 1927, the Тгапэ-Sibcrian provided only two through Mos-
cow-Vladivostok services each week, but there were more
ordinary trains moving over various sectors of the line. One of
the through trains operated over the cer, and the other via
Khabarovsk. By ordinary train it was possible to leave Moscow
for Irkutsk on any day of the week.

Commuter services had been thinned out. In the 1922-23
winter service there were only seven daily trains each way
between Moscow and Klin.1

THE FUEL CRISIS

Lack of locomotive fuel was a situation inherited from previous
years. In early 1921 about 4,500 km. of railway had to be
temporarily closed, and many railways had only a une-day fuel
reserve at this time. In January of that year 12 per cent of the
available locomotives were immobilized for lack of fuel, and by
September this proportion had doubled. And because of the
consequent motive power shortage, the available freight cars
could not be fully utilized: 16 per cent of them were out of use
in September for this reason.2 The situation was so threatening
that in this month Lenin instructed all local authorities to
organize a 21-day ‘firewood week' in order to gather fuel
before the autumn rains made it impossible.2 The gubemiya
chairmen of the executive committees, timber committees and

1 OfitsiaTnyi ukazaiel' pastazhirskikh . . . soobshchenii. Petrograd, 1922-23,
Summer 1924, Summer 1927.

*	Savittskoyt narodnoye khozyaistvo v 1921-25 gg. Moscow, I960, p. 36'7.

*	Zheleznudarozhnyi transport SSSR v dokumentakh. Moscow, 1957, p. 148.
Cheka were made personally responsible for the execution of
this order, which was to be given priority equal with the forced
grain requisitions.

In March 1922 a decree of the Council of Labour and Defence
was issued, beginning with the words: ‘I. Acknowledging the
fuel situation in die country as catastrophic . . Z1 It instructed
the Fuel Department and nkps to carry out various measures
to meet the crisis. The railways were given priority in fuel
supplies, and the most needy railways were given financial
assistance. A fresh effort was to be made to counter the theft
of railway fuel, and wasteful techniques; prizes were established
for railwaymen who economized on fuel and who prevented
losees by theft. At the oamc time, realising that de л pile all
efforts the crisis could not be solved without external help,
funds were granted for the import of coal, and also of firewood
from Finland and Estonia.

Tlie fuel situation improved during 1922, but to prevent a
repetition of the previous winter’s crisis the Council of Labour
and Defence appointed a plenary commission to ensure railway
fuel supplies and the carriage of essential foodstuffs during the
autumn. The commission’s decisions were binding on all
government departments. During 1922 coal stocks increased by
about three and a half, and oil stocks by two and a half times.
Moreover, the share of firewood in the total consumption of
the railways dropped from two-thirds to less than half. There
had also been a two-fifths increase in the tonnage of Donetz
coal used by the railway's. In 1923 a number of Donet? rnal
mines were transferred to the nkps, which wras to operate them
solely for locomotive use.

In general, the fuel shortage was overcome by 1923, and a
similar situation was never allowed to develop in subsequent
years.

WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY

Wages of railway workers continued until 1923-24 to fall
parallel to falling productivity. While in 1913 there had been
691,000 railway workers, there were 793,000 in 1923-24,
handling only half the amount of traffic dealt with in 1913.2 The

1 Zheleznodorozhny! transport SSSR v dokumentakh. Moscow, 1957, p. 167.

* Strumilin, S. Op. dt., pp. 670-1.
position later improved; while traffic was increasing the labour
force was declining. An order of the Council of People’s
Commissars in 1922, when railway labour productivity was
only a quarter of the 1913 level, had instructed the nkps to
reduce the total operating workers in transport from the current
983,045 souls to 850,000, and this had some effect.1 The
average monthly wage in 1923-24 was only equivalent to 16-77
pre-war roubles, whereas in 1913 it had been 37-80.2 From
1924 wages and productivity began to rise, but in 1925 wages
(nominal and real) started to outpace the increase in producti-
vity. This was partly because the railway labour force began to
reinflate, reaching over a million in 1926-27 before settling
back to 993,000 workers in 1927-28. During the New Economic
Policy real average railway wages almost reached the 1913
standard, but productivity' did not. However, part of this failure
would have been due to a longer railway network, which in
1927-28 was 131 per cent of the 1913 mileage (while freight
ton/km. were 133 per cent, passenger/km. 93 per cent, the
number of operating workers was 143 per cent, and labour
productivity 84 per cent of the pre-war standards).

Another cause of inferior labour productivity was the labour
code of 1922, which introduced an 8-hour day for locomotive
crews (12 hours being allowed in exceptional circumstances).
Under the old law a 14-hour shift wras the maximum and as two
hours of this were given to preparation time and the trips
between the locomotive depot and train, about 12 hours of
train movement could be secured from nnp turn of duty. The
new law implied a maximum of 10 hours of train movement
per crew shift. As average speeds and loads w'ere no higher
than before the w'ar, the new code entailed a loss both of labour
productivity and of ton/km. per locomotive. To combat the
latter disadvantage from 1927 the shift system was reintroduced
for locomotive manning; when the crews’ w'orking day was
over, they no longer went with their engine to the depot but
w'ere replaced on the footplate by a fresh crew. This system
continued into the thirties, with an almost catastrophic effect
on locomotive maintenance. In 1927 a 7-hour working day was
announced, but this raised fewer problems than the 1922
labour code.

1 Sovietskii transport 1917-27 gg. Moscow, 1927.

’ Zhelexnodorozhnyi transport SSSR v dokumrntakh. Moscow, 1957, p. 180.
Labour discipline remained unsatisfactory during this period.
Many accidents were caused by irresponsibility, and tlie theft
of goods in transit could be partly ascribed to railway workers.
Nevertheless, in 1923 the special military tribunals for transport
offences were abolished.

THEFT

The Russian railways had not been noted for incorruptibility
before the war, and the emergency conditions after 1917, when
little attempt was made to collect fares or freight charges,
encouraged Russians to consider transport as a free social
service, which could be robbed and defrauded at will, preferably
with the assistance of railway staff. The end of the Civil War
and the introduction of ‘economic accounting’ was not therefore
an unmixed blessing for many Russians.

The first shot in the Government’s offensive to rstore regu-
larity and legality in the use of transport was an order of the
Council of Labour and Defence in April 1921, which stated:1

'. . . In view of the extremely serious position . . . and the
ever-increasing flood of ticketless passengers and the carriage
of an unlawful quantity of luggage not only in railway cars, but
also on the brake platforms and even locomotives, particularly
severe measures of repression are to be applied. . . . People
travelling on brake platforms and on locomotives are liable to
immediate arrest and despatch to the nearest Cheka ... up to
five years in a concentration camp.’

The order went on to state that railway personnel, who by
their inactivity allowed passengers to travel illegally, would
receive the same punishment. Tlie 'unlawful quantity of lug-
gage’ was presumably directed at citizens who travelled to the
countryside, where they would fill their sacks with flour or
potatoes or other foods, for sale later at high prices in the
hungry city.

In 1922 the nkps was given the responsibility for checking
illegal use of transport: riding on engines, buffers, roofs and
engines; excessive luggage; and fictitious government passes.
Gradually the phenomenon of as many people travelling outside

1 Zhettxnodorozhyi transport SSSR v document akh. Moscow, 1957, p. 133.
as inside the train became rarer. But the practice was never
entirely eradicated.1

Another kind of illegality suffered by the railways wras the
continuing theft of goods in transit both by the public and by
railway staff. A decree in 1921 established the death penalty for
this offence.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The end of the Civil War and the need to organize transport
so that it could do its work systematically, rather than as a
succession of emergency measures, led to continuing changes
and experimentation in the administrative apparatus. In July
1921 the new status of the people’s commissariat of Ways and
Communications (nkps) was published. The new commissariat
was to concern itself not only with railways, but also with sea,
inland waterway and local (road) transport. A central direc-
torate for each of these four types of transport was included in
its composition. There were also directorates, sections, and
commissions with specialized technical functions. At the local
level it was the transport regions (okrugs) which translated
the directives of the commissariat into action. These regions,
like the nkps, included all forms of land and water transport,
and their sections and departments matched and worked with
those of the superior body. Provision was made at the same
time for the work of local transport directorates for areas not
included in the regiono. However, the operations of these local
managements were to be supervised by the regional operating
departments. To keep the traffic moving, by co-ordinating
transport resources with transport demand (through the allo-
cation of rolling stock, selection of proposals for new lines, etc.)
a central transport committee was set up within the nkps, and
corresponding regional transport committees w ere subordinated
to* it.

These changes did not fully overcome one main difficulty in
transport administration. Because transport, and especially
railways, was both a nation-w'ide system and an organization
of national importance its administration had to be centrally

1 As late as 1961 the author observed passengers of a long-distance train
travelling on the butlers, and heard a station announcer make an apparently
regular appeal to passengers not to do this.
directed. Local bodies could have little voice in general railway
policy. So naturally the gubemiya (provincial)'executive com-
mittees in their tum paid little attention to the needs of the
railways in the area under their jurisdiction. This made it
difficult for the railways to assure themselves of supplies, such
as fuel, and to obtain the co-operation of local party bodies in
organizing work and mobilizing labour. In 1921, therefore, it
was decided that the railway commissars should be entrusted
with another task: liaison between the railways and the
gubemiya party and executive organs. When a few months
later the commissars were disbanded, their 'heroic work’ no
longer being necessary in view’ of the . growth of red
specialist cadres, able to stand at the helm of management . .
their local co-ordinating functions were transferred to a new set
of administrative bodies, the railway administrations.2

These administrations, introduced in the spring of 1922,3
were intended to decentralize management by re-establishing
what were, in form, the managements of the former railway
companies. Each of these railway administrations, while remain-
ing under the co-ordinating supervision of the nkps, was a
separate legal entity, charged with the task of operating at a
profit while carrying out the traffic plans which it drew up in
conjunction with the nkps. Each railway administration had its
own credit to draw upon in the local bank, it could fix its own
(local) tariffs, and within limits make its own collective agree-
ments with its workers. It had to be organized on strict
accounting principles, and its accounts had to be presented for
scrutiny by the nkps. It was also supposed to establish liaison
with the industrial, commercial, and political organizations in
the area it served. It was staffed by transport economists,
together with representatives of local industry and of the local
soviet. From time to time an economic conference was held, at
which could be discussed the problems of co-ordinating railway
service with the transport demands of the area. The practical
day-to-day operation of each railway administration was en-
trusted to its directorate. Later, this separation of the policy-
making and managerial functions was ended, and at the same

1 Zheleznodorozhnyi transport SSSR v dohimmtakh. Moscow, 1957, pp. 187-91.

* The structure of the individual railway is shown diagrammatically in the
Appendix.

• Ibid., p. 172.
time the chairman of each railway administration became a
representative of the nkps. This was presumably to limit a
tendency for the separate railways to regard decentralization
as an invitation to independence, and to promote their own
interests in preference to the national good. The functions of
these new nkps representatives was akin to those of the railway
inspectors of tsarist times, but apart from the traditional
duty of ensuring the observance of regulations the new men
had to make sure that the railway’s policy and operation
conformed to the State’s interest, and to direct political work
on rhe railway.1

The New Economic Policy was accompanied by the reintro-
duction of strict accounting procedures, and a recognition of
profitability as an index of performance. During the Civil War
money tended to lose its importance as a measure of account,
but its use as a measure of input and output was re-established
under the new economic policy. The transition of the railways
to ‘khozraschet’ (literally, economic accounting) took place
rather later than in the rest of the economy, for several reasons.
There was a delay in introducing monetary relationships between
state enterprises, priority in this changeover was gven to the
more urgent sector of agriculture and town/country exchange,
and the 1921 famine meant that emergency methods (which
involved non-payment for services rendered) continued longer
than expected on the railways and rivers. Apart from these
reasons, the nkps was overworked at this time, and unprepared
for a reform of this magnitude.

The first step was the decree in June 1921s which re-estab-
lished payment for all freight shipments and passenger travel,
including government and departmental traffic. For government
and other ‘plan’ shipments, payment was made through the
accounts of the shipper held in state credit institutions. Thus
little cash entered the coffers either of the separate railway
administrations or of the nkps, and they could not therefore
use their income for their own purposes. In January 1922 a
decree introduced ‘khozraschet’ to the railways. Operating costs
were henceforth to be covered by income; costs and tariff's were
re-established as important factors in railway management;
economy in the use of resources became essential if a favourable

1 7-htltznodorozhnyi traniport SSSR v dokumentcM. Moscow, 1957, p. 134.

* Ibid., p. 194.
balance was to be achieved. Services hitherto free were now
charged for: demurrage, warehousing, and the loan of freight
cars. As an incentive, •government traffic carried in excess of
the planned level would be paid for direct to the railway, and
in cash, while the nkps was henceforth allowed to spend on
its own initiative money received from all freight carried in
excess of the plan. The following year it received the right to
use its entire income to cover its expenses.1 In August 1922 a
new railway charter, incorporating 'khozraschet’, was adopted.

Tlie subsequent profitability of the railways,2 and the
national currency reform of 1924, prompted a further decree in
1926, which ordered that all income from railway operations
should be entrusted to the nkps. This meant that individual
railway administration could not keep income they received; it
had to be lodged to the credit of the Ministry at the State Bank.
The Ministry would use the resulting accumulation for the
centralized financing of the railway system as a whole.

TARIFF POLICY

The end of the Civil War and tlie impending introduction of
’khozraschet' into transport undertakings made it more easy
and more important to reintroduce a normal tariff policy. In
November 1921 a decree was published establishing the appar-
atus for tariff control and tariff fixing.2 According to this,
tariff policy was to be tlie exclusive domain of the nkps, whose
tariff organs would be the Tariff Committee, the conference of
railway and waterway representatives, and the financial and
economic directorate of the nkps. Of these three, it was the
first which was responsible for the detailed work involved in
tariff-fixing and it contained members from the People’s Com-
missariats not only of Ways and Communications and of
Finance, but also of Internal Affairs, Supply, External Trade
and others. The chairman was from the Finance Commissariat.

Tariffs during the New Economic Policy had three purposes,

1 Ivlieva, 1. Finansirovaniyt na zhekznodorozhnom transporta. Moscow, 1962,
p. 88.

*	Railway operating income covered operating costs for the first time in 1922-
23; a net profit (allowing for amortization and capital charges) was attained in
1924—25. Since ‘profitability’ depends on the value assigned to inputs the Soviet
and western concepts of the term are not identical.

*	Ibid., pp. 153 and 176.
often conflicting. They were intended to restore the profitability
of the railways, to encourage the general economic restoration
of the country, especially in the heavy and engineering indus-
tries, and they were to be weighted in favour of the state
enterprises and against private industry. Ilie decree of June
1921 which had re-established the principle of payment for
transport services also fixed the tariffs chargeable.1 Freight was
to be carried at tariff's identical to those operating before 1921,
while passenger fares were to be scaled as before July 1917,
but with a substantial increase.2 These tariffs, however, proved
to be a poor weapon for influencing economic development.
There were only seven classifications: the first three varied
according to the size of the shipment (No. 1 class was for ship-
ments up to 250 poods and was at the rate of 0-14 kopeks per
pood verst. No. 3 was for freight over 500 poods, carried at
0-10 kopeks per pood verst) while the remaining four were
special lowr carload rates for twenty-six bulk commodities con-
sidered essential for the economy (fuel, provisions, fertilizers,
etc.) which were charged from 0  022 to О • 066 kopeks per pood
verst. There were also special tariffs for small shipments.3 The
disadvantage of these tariffs was the small margin of dis-
crimination they permitted, too small to be effective in in-
fluencing economic trends. Also, apart from the twenty-six
favoured commodities, no distinction could be made between
the nature or value of different freights, However, they did
encourage to a limited extent the grouping of shipments into
large-sized consignments and above all they were easy to apply
and administer.

In order to provide an effective financial influence on the
economy, this tariff system was replaced at the end of 1922 by
a new one, with twelve general and nine special classifications.
The margin of discrimination almost trebled: Class 1 goods
paid 0-20 kopeks per pood verst, and class 12, 0-0125 kopeks.
The new tariffs also included substantial concessions on long-

*	Free railway carriage had been officially accepted as normal on January 1,
1921.

*	In the inflationary year of 1922, passenger fares reached astronomical levels.
In May 1922 they were established as the pre-July 1917 rates increased by one
million times. A month later they were doubled. In mid-October they were again
increased, by 50 per cent, and this was repeated on the first of November. Tlie
1922-23 official timetable (from which these details are taken) was priced at
1,500 roubles.

’	Kuchurin, S. Tarify zhelexnykh dorog SSSR. Moscow, 1957, p. 22.
distance traffic, which helped remote areas but did nothing to
promote a rational distribution of economic activity. This sys-
tem remained in force,-though with increased rates, until 1926.
In that year a new system was introduced, for the current one
had become too complicated owing to an increased number of
modifications, concessions, and privileges. The 1926 tariff"con-
tained twenty-eight general classifications.

The first significant change in the 1922 tariff'levels occurred
in 1924, when the ‘scissors’ crisis1 caused the Government to
order rate reductions on commodities consumed in the country-
side. For example, sugar rates were cut by a third and salt by
a quarter. At about the same time many more exclusive or
concessive tariffs were adopted (already at the December railway
trade union conference some delegates had complained that low
concessive tariffs were the cause of the railway deficit) and in
the spring of 1924 the nkps admitted that about one-third of
freight traffic was moving at less than cost.2

Among the favoured commodities, coal was outstanding. In
order to stimulate the demand for coal in line with the policy
of replacing wood by mineral fuels, Donbas coal was carried at
a SO per cent reduction and over distances greater than 1,100
km. an even bigger concession was allowed, making a rate of
0-01 kopeks per pood verst. In general, coal was conveyed at
about half the real cost of transport. Some other commodities
were similarly favoured, as well as particular areas, or even
particular enterprises.

When, after 1925, it was found expedient to check the
flourishing private section of the economy railway tariffs was
one of the weapons used; from 1926 freight belonging to
private enterprise was subject to a 50-100 per cent surcharge.

One of the consequences of treating tariffs more as a means
of regulating the economy than of guaranteeing railway pros-
perity was that tariffs rose more slowly than prices. Even by
1924 the transport component of the price of a range of agri-
cultural goods was only 12-3 per cent compared to 15-4 per
cent before the war, and industrial products showed an even
greater change (5-9 per cent against 12-2 per cent).2 For this

1 Hie ‘scissors’ crisis was so called because it was due to prices of manufactured
goods rising out of all proportion to agricultural products.

8 Sovietikoe narodnoyr khozyaistvo v 1921-25 gg. Moscow, 1960, p. 351.

8 Ibid., p. 349.
reason there were percentage tariff increases in 1925 and 1926,
but even then the rates for basic bulk commodities remained
unchanged.

PLANNING

During the Civil War there had been little scope for planning,
apart from a single centralized and rather primitive forecast
which was confirmed by the Supreme Transport Council. In
1920 there was the Basic Transport Commission, which drew
up a plan for the restoration of railway rolling stock. But since
this latter had little resemblance to a unified transport plan,
lacking an element as important as financial assumptions, and
was in any case made unrealistic by the subsequent fuel shortage,
tlie establishment of Transplan in 1922 may be taken as the
start of genuine transport planning.

Transplan (Transport Planning Committee) was established
in the nkps and comprised four sections; organizational,
technical, financial, and economic. Its tasks, which involved all
forms of transport, were as follows: preparation of yearly and
other traffic forecasts and the correlation of the forecast of
transport demand w’ith the envisaged transport resources;
examination and promulgation of the operating plans of the
different forms of transport and the division of their routes into
main (priority) and secondary lines; examination and promul-
gation of yearly plans for repair work and of perspective plans
for the restoration and development of all types of transport;
supervision and alteration of the plans after promulgation:
establishment of the financial and material needs occasioned by
the plans; examination of legislation concerning transport;
participation in the work of the State Planning Commission
(Gosplan) and of other high bodies, concerning transport
questions; examination of proposals touching the organization
of the nkps and its central and local organs, and acceptance of
the work programmes of the different directorates (rail, sea,
river and road) of the nkps; search for ways of increasing
financial and material income and of reducing expenditure,
examination of welfare proposals such as medical and educa-
tional services for transport workers, supervision of the execu-
tion of plans by each section or directorate of the nkps.1

Thus Transplan had not only the function of prognostication,

* Zheleznodorozhnyi transport SSSR v dokumentakh . . . Moscow, 1957, p. 234.
it also had some power to see whether its plans were actually
put into practice. The first plan was for the year 1922-23, but
this suffered from the lack at that time of any homogeneous
accounting system and of any basic plan for the separate
branches of the economy. Soon after, Transplan produced its
first five-year perspective plan. This was drawn up in circum-
stances similar to those which had affected the 1922-23 yearly
plan. It was derived from the extrapolation of pre-war figures
with modifications based on incompatible post-1917 data about
different sections of the economy. Its conclusions were con-
servative; it did not expect the 1913 level of transport activity
to be reached until 1932. Because the plan was drawn up under
the supervision of a bourgeois transport specialist (Ncopildia
nov) the fact that it failed to predict the more rapid improve-
ment which was actually achieved in the twenties was ascribed
to the political complexion of Transplan which, it wras later
claimed, did not have sufficient faith in the socialist system.
However, it is easy to be wise after the event; Transplan's
perspective plan was worked out to provide a guide in circum-
stances which were quite unprecedented, while the statistical
tools and material at its disposal were plainly inadequate for its
task. In subsequent years new techniques were evolved and the
data used became more plentiful and more accurate. Three
years after its establishment Transplan was producing yearly
control figures accurate enough to be useful.

«tw RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

In 1921 there were still about 12,000 km. of railway officially
described as under construction, and the length of new lines
completed in that year was only 200 km. Few resources could
be spared for new construction, except for short or urgently-
needed lines. In 1922 only 118 km. were completed and in 1923
246 km.1 Total mileage of common-carrier railways increased
by only 5,000 km. in the six years 1922-27. In 1927 there were
76,900 km. in service, of which 1,000 km. were naf row-gauge.2

A high proportion of the lines completed during the nep
period were in Asia, or w'ere lines connecting Asiatic with
European Russia. In Central Asia a line was built from Djambul

1 Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 647.

1 Transport i siyat’ SSSR. Moscow, 1957, p. 28.
to Frunze, the capital of Kirgizia, and the line from Samsonovo
to Termez was built (later continued to Stalinabad). Further
north, in Central Siberia the line of the future Karaganda
Railway began to extend southwards from its starting point on
the Trans-Siberian Railway, Petropavlovsk. The line from the
Trans-Siberian Railway at Achinsk to the Siberian coalfield at
Minusinsk received priority at this time and was completed
during the period. In the Urals area, the Kazan-Sverdlovsk line
was finished and, together with the Arzamas-Kanash line com-
pleted earlier, provided a new route between Siberia and the
centre. The beginnings of another trans-Ural route were
emerging in the Kotelnich-Gorkii line, part of which was
finished during the nep period and which, when completed,
would shorten the distance between Kirov, Perm, and the
Centre. In the Ukraine all except the middle section (to be
completed in 1929) of the Kharkov-Kherson line was finished,
linking a fertile agricultural hinterland with the Black Sea port.

LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK

Almost half the freight locomotives of Soviet railways were of
the 1893 'normal eight-axle type’ (class O). These engines
were invaluable because of their low axle-weight; they could
negotiate lightweight wom-out rails with less danger of break-
ing them than could the newer, more powerful, but heavier
engines. However, they were obviously too weak for use in the
future, and new construction was of more modem types.

The class E ten-wheeled freight engine which had proved so
successful over the previous decade, but still represented less
than 5 per cent of the total locomotive stock, was chosen as the
basic type and in 1920 it was decided to order 1,200 of these
from abroad (500 from Sweden, 700 from Germany). The
design of these was slightly modified under the supervision of
the Russian Railway Mission. The German order was spread
among the members of the locomotive-building cartel, so that
in all twenty works built these engines. To test the accuracy
with which the various factories followed the blueprints, the
Russian Railway Mission carried out an interesting experiment:
engine no. E 5616 was successfully assembled from parts con-
tributed by one Swedish and nineteen German companies.

With the influx of engines from abroad, the production of E
type freight locomotives in Russian works could cease, and
attention be paid to passenger units. Passenger locomotives had
not been built since 1918, except for some Vladikavkaz ‘Pacifies’
built by the Putilov factory in 1923 (which proved unsuccessful,
owing to their unsuitability for coal-burning). As there was no
time to work out a new design the successful S 2-6-2 of 1910
was chosen. But because the w'ork of this type had sadly
deteriorated when high quality' fuel was not available, it was
decided that the new engines should have larger fireboxes. The
new design (class Su) was quickly drawn and in 1925 the first
of the class was rolled out. Five locomotive works built them.
Due probably to the disappearance of the pre-w'ar design staffs,
there was a certain amateurishness in the early engines of this
class. This became evident when the first-built was weighed:
the weight on the rear supporting axle was too high because
the design had placed tlie boiler too far back. Some engines
registered a load on the rear axle as high as 20 tons, instead
of the planned 17 tons, and these units had to be reclassified
and restricted to track laid with heavy rails. But despite this
setback the type was highly successful, and improved versions
of the original design w ere still being built in the early fifties.
It became, in fact, the basic passenger locomotive of Soviet
railways.

In 1927 tlie Putilov works produced the first engine of an
entirely new design. This wras the M class 3-cylinder 4^8-0
designed for heavy passenger service. It was not very successful,
and all the engines of the class were soon rebuilt.

During this period seven w'orks produced locomotives,1 but
they were not solely occupied with railway work. Russian
locomotive production reached its lowest ebb in 1921 and 1922,
when only 74 and 71 units were produced. But by 1927 produc-
tion had risen to 473.2

In tlie later twenties, when traffic was approaching the pre-
war level, the most serious difficulty limiting railway work was
no longer the permanent way, but a car shortage. In 1913 there
were about 400,000 freight cars in service and more were built
during the war, but after the Revolution this figure fell every
year until 1922; in the year 1922-23 the freight-car stock stood

1 These were: Bryansk, Voroshilovgrad, Kolomna, Putilov, Sormovo, Kharkov
and Nevskii.

1 Rakov, V. Op. cit., p. 175.
at 405,000 (of which a third were awaiting repair).1 Both car-
building and car-repair suffered from the labour difficulties of
the early twenties. The lack of skilled workers and high
absenteeism was due to malnutrition and constant food-seeking
excursions into the countryside. Incentive ration allocations
helped to solve this problem, but output was then restricted
because of fuel and, later, metal shortages. In 1925-26 only
230 freight and 808 passenger cars were built in Russian
factories, 7 per cent of the order for that year (which itself did
not cover the full requirement).2 By 1927-28 construction had
recovered, reaching 9,550 units in that year. In 1928 there were
472,000 freight cars, together with 23,000 passenger cars. In
general, the designs of the new cars were no different from
those of 1914; 14-metre, 2-axIe passenger cars were still being
built in 1927. But by 1928 a start had been made in the produc-
tion of l-axle box cars, and a little progress had been made
towards automatic brakes ; of the 1927-28 car production about
a quarter was represented by 4-axle units (but more than a half
was accounted for by the traditional 2-axle box cars). About
3 per cent of the freight cars in 1928 were equipped either with
the full automatic brake or at least with air pipes. The average
capacity of cars had also increased: 17-6 tons in 1928 against
15-2 tons in 1913.’

ELECTRIC AND DIESEL TRACTION

Electric traction had interested the Russian railways before the
war, but apart from conferences and projects little was achieved
apart from the appearance on the St Petersburg-Tsarskoye
Selo service of a strange-looking contrivance produced by the
Bryansk works in 1910. This was a 104-passenger twin-unit
battery rail car which could reach a speed of 60 km. per hour
and whose storage cells needed to be recharged every 100 km.
Although this was not a real success, the battery principle was
carried a step further by a Soviet engineer in 1920, who
managed to obtain funds for a complete battery train. This
comprised three passenger cars powered with electric motors
pulling three ‘tenders’ carrying the accumulators.4 As the

*	Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 658.

*	Ekonomicheskoye oboxrtniyt. December 1926.

’	Yakoby, A. ZMtznyie dorogi SSSR v Uifrakh. Moscow, 1935.

4	These ’Tudor’ accumulators had been taken from a submarine.
tenders weighed 63 tons and the cars only 51, the power/weight
ratio of this creation was not high. During the winter of 1920-21
it trundled along the October Railway between Leningrad and
Moscow, recharging its batteries at each end from nearby
tramway wires. After a few months the Supreme Technical
Committee of the nkps decided that its consumption of energy
per horsepower was much higher than that of a steam engine,
and it was taken out of service. Its designer had claimed that
it used one-twelfth the energy of a steam engine performing a
similar service.

The Goelro commission for national electrification had been
formed in 1920 and the plan it drew up included detailed pro-
prxjale fnr railway fdprtrificatinn, first priority hping given tn
the lines in Southern Russia linking Donbas coal with Krivoi
Rog and Kerch ores. In second and third place came electrifica-
tion of lines in the centre and in the Urals. Although it was not
until the thirties that any main-line electrification did take
place, the building of power stations in the twenties brought
railway electrification nearer.

However, there was one successful railway electrification
during the New Economic Policy. The city soviet at Baku pro-
posed the electrification of the short line to Sabunchi, an oil-
processing centre using workers who commuted from Baku.
The nkps presumably not wishing to have one more problem
added to its burden, the line in question was transferred from
the Trans-Caucasus Railway to the city soviet. The latter
electrified it (at 1,200 volts with overhead transmission) and
ordered fourteen powered cars from the Mytishchi works
(which used Austrian and German equipment in their construc-
tion). Each of these cars pulled a single trailer. The line was
opened for full operation in July 1926. During the thirties the
electrification was extended to Buzovna, and in 1940 the line
was transferred back to the Trans-Caucasus Railway.

The practical application of the internal combustion engine
to railway traction had been limited before the Great War to
a gas-electric rail car which worked on the Moscow-Kazan
Railway for a short time. Russian engineers had been pioneers
in the use of diesel-electric power in ships and many projects
had been developed for railway diesel locomotives, but the war
prevented their realization.

Research continued after the Revolution. In the early
IS. A diesel-mecl;-
jnical locomotive.

ordered by Soviet
railways, on
builder’s trials in
Germany in 1996.
photo. Iji Vie du
flail.

The world's
most numerous
steam locomotive
design; a class E
engine, built during
the Soviet period,
with a transfer
freight at Kiev in
1981.

'«oto. Author.

[he standard
Soviet passenger
locomotive; a class
Su engine with a
tuburban train at
Kiev in 1961.
Photo. Author.
14. A "Iosif Stalin" type engine in the Moscow suburbs in 1.959, hauling a train from Odessa.
Photo. Author.

A "Iosif Stalin" type engine with experimental streamlining, built at Voroshilovgrad in 1.9.17.
Photo. Savfoto.
twenties, when lack of fuel and powerful locomotives threatened
a complete transport breakdown, the advantages of diesel pro-
pulsion must have seemed particularly inviting. Lenin was
greatly attracted to the idea, and in 1922 it was announced
that in 1924 a competition would take place to select the best
diesel locomotive. The conditions of this competition (which
had a certain similarity to the Rainhill Trials in England in
1829) included a stipulation that the axle weight of the entries
should not exceed 16 tons, that certain tractive efforts should
be attained, and that the extremes of the Russian climate
should be provided for. The tests would be carried out on lines
in the Leningrad area.

There was only one entrant for the trials. This was a loco-
motive designed by Professor Gakkel. The Professor interested
the chairman of Gosplan in his project, and he in turn recom-
mended it to Lenin, who ordered that funds be allocated to
build it. It was a diesel-electric with the strange wheel arrange-
ment of IC-D-CI, it weighed 180 tons and was equipped with
a 1,000 h.p. diesel engine. The latter was of Vickers manu-
facture, and taken from a submarine. The Volta generators
were also designed for submarines, and the aquatic history of
this locomotive was further extended when, under construction
in a shipyard, it was caught in the Leningrad floods of September
1924. This first main-line diesel was not entirely successful due
to frequent breakdowns, but it showed that diesel traction was
at least feasible. It worked in freight service for about two
years and later was used as a mobile generating station.

During the period two experimental diesels were also
ordered from Germany. The first was finished in 1924 and was
a diesel-electric machine with a 900 h.p. plant. It weighed 125
tons. It worked in European Russia for some years and was
later sent to the Ashkhabad Railway. The second engine was a
diesel-mechanical of 1,200 h.p. It worked successfully for a time
but after transfer to Ashkhabad was withdrawn.

и
THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS, 1928-59

TRAFFIC

During the first five-year plans the overfulfilment of expecta-
tions by heavy industry was, from the traffic point of view,
more important than the failure of light industry, and this was
one of the causes of the transport crises which occurred in the
early thirties. Nevertheless, despite their limited resources, the
railways did a good job; freight ton/km. rose from 93-4 billion
in 1928 to 169-3 billion in 1932 and 415 billion in 1940. The
war interrupted this process and it was not until 1948 that the
pre-war level of traffic was regained. In 1957 the 1,210 billion
ton/km. produced by Soviet railways for the first time exceeded
the traffic carried by the us railways. In 1961, 1,564 billion
ton/km. were carried1

In the late fifties the Russian railways were still handling
primarily the basic, bulk, commodities. In 1958, 98 per cent of
freight traffic was sent at carload rates. The Soviet economy
had not yet progressed from one of basic industry to one where
light industry- and consumption play a more important role,
with a corresponding change in the freight structure. There
was still little of the high-value package type of freight for
which speed and frequency of service is more important than
low costs. Thus coal traffic increased from 22 per cent of the
total ton/km. to 28 per cent between 1928 and 1956, ores
remained at 4 per cent, mineral building materials rose from
7 per cent to 8 per cent, ferrous metals from 6 per cent to 7 per
cent, forestry products declined from 13 per cent to 12 per cent,
oil rose from 9 per cent to 10 per cent, and grain fell from 10

1 Statistical data in this section is derived from Transport i svyaz' SSSR.
Moscow, 1957, pp.34!-4S. Zheleznodorozhnyi transport. March 1958, March I960,
March 1962. See also Soviet Studies. July 1959.
per cent to 7 per cent of the total. In the late fifties there were
signs that tlie predominance of some of these categories was
weakening. In terms of tonnage loaded, coal shipments declined
from 31 per cent of tlie total in 1956 to 26 per cent in 1959 due
to increasing use of oil and gas energy. Grain also represented
a slightly smaller proportion of total shipments. On tlie other
hand, oil and timber were on the increase.

Several commodities, notably metals, timber, grain and oil,
had, on average, very long distances of haul. Despite the
urgency with which the Government year after year demanded
a reduction of the average length of freight haul, this statistic
increased from 598 km. in 1928 to 819 km. in 1957. From that
year it began to fluctuate, and in 1061 was down to 703 km.
Among the commodities whose length of haul increased at a
faster than average rate were oil products (from 728 km. in
1928 to 1,298 km. in 1956 and 1,378 km. in 1961) and timber
(671 km. to 1,293 km. in 1956 and 1,511 km. in 1961). Other
freight showed more moderate increases; coal and coke from
615 km. in 1928 to 672 km. in 1954 and 677 km. in 1961; ores
from 397 km. (1928) to 538 (1954) and 553 km. (1961);
ferrous metals from 786 km. to 1,078 km. and 1,175 km.; and
grain from 949 km. to 1,187 km. and 1,056 km. If average
distances of haul are compared with the 1913 figures the
difference is even more striking; in that year grain moved an
average of 544 km., coal 485 km. and timber 415 km. Yet the
gloom with which the Government commented on these
lengthening distances wras somewhat misplaced: part of it was
accounted for by the very desirable transfer of short-distance
traffic to the highways. Another part of it was a result of the
involuntary capture by the railways of long-distance river
traffic, and although this was against government policy it was
in most cases economically desirable. In any case, the industrial
development of new regions, particularly in Asiatic Russia, w as
bound to increase the average length of haul especially in the
short-term, before local raw materials could be developed.
Apart from this, government schemes like the Urals-Kuznetsk
Combine seemed to be worked out with a minimum regard to
transport economics. Between tlie two bases of this combine
ores and coal were moved over 2,000 km. of busy railway,
whereas in the old metallurgical centre of the Donbas coal and
ore deposits were practically contiguous. So while there were
no doubt many instances of irrational traffic flows, lengthy
distances of haul were, in the main, only a reflection of govern-
ment policy.

Passenger traffic during the first five-year plan increased
rapidly, but long-distance travel actually dropped during the
second, although remaining at a higher level than in 1928.
Long-distance traffic continued to fluctuate until the late forties,
when it began to rise steadily. In 1928, 291 million passenger
journeys were recorded and this rose to 1,343 million in 1940,
and 1,658 million in 1956. But the bulk of the increase was
accounted for by commuter traffic; increasing demand for com-
muter services as a result of the large-scale urbanization during
the five-year plans was met largely by rail transport. Thus,
despite the development and populating of remote areas,
average length of passenger journey actually decreased from
84 km. in 1928 (which in itself was a sharp reduction of the
1913 figure of 136 km.) to 75 km. in 1952 before rising to 86
km. in 1956. The average commuter journey remained steady
at about 24 km. between 1928 and 1956. The volume of
passenger traffic as expressed in pass./km. rose therefore less
rapidly than did the number of passenger journeys; from 24-5
billion pass./km. in 1928 to 142-4 billion in 1956 and 176-3
billion in 1961. Of this traffic commuters accounted for 16 per
cent in 1928 and 23 per cent in 1956 or, in terms of passenger
journeys, 54 per cent and 85 per cent respectively.

RAILWAY OPERATIONS AFTER 1928

From 1928 to 1934 there were no radical changes in railway
operation; but traffic began to increase at a much faster rate.
In fact it doubled during these six years. Thus the slow rate of
improvement of the twenties in railway capacity was not fast
enough to cope with the demands of the early thirties. Between
1928 and 1934 the density of freight movement increased from
1-2 million ton/km. per kilometre to 2-5,1 but despite this
increase the railways could not keep pace with the demands of
rapid industrialization. Goods began to pile up and in 1930
there reappeared the old familiar station landscapes of piles of
unprotected grain awaiting shipment. Mines and factories began

1 Transport i svyax’ SSSfl. p. 43.
to choke with unshipped products or starve from lack of raw-
materials.

The winter was always the most difficult season, when ice
and snow hampered operation, and when increased traffic
resulted from the closing of rivers and ports. There was an
alarming transport crisis in the winter of 1931-32, another the
following year, and again the next year. By the winter of
1934—35 the w-ord crisis was no longer employed to indicate a
state of affairs which had come to be recognized as normal. The
railways even had difficulty in carrying their own freight,
locomotive depots on the eve of the 1932 winter found
themselves almost at the end of their coal stocks. By 1934
there was some improvement, due mainly to better use and
supply of locomotives and cars, but the situation was still
serious.

During the period the decisive factor was still the freight car
shortage. Hence efforts were intensified to speed unloading and
loading operations, and to accelerate freight trains. The average
daily number of cars loaded in 1929 was 38,601, and this
increased to 55,717 in 1934.1 This improvement was achieved
primarily by the growing number of cars in service, and by the
devotion of more man-hours to loading work, rather than by
big changes in efficiency. So-called ‘stormovik’ methods as
applied to loading/unloading work usually meant nothing more
than a frantic effort in the last week of each month to reach the
target and make up for time lost at the beginning of the month.
Complaints persisted about industrial enterprises deliberately
holding back cars, and of railway officials keeping hundreds of
cars 'in reserve’. Misplaced enthusiasm for planning led to
amateur plans; one railway, for example, decided to give
priority to grain traffic, causing chaos in a metallurgical enter-
prise whose ore shipments had been sidetracked.

Despite some improvements in track and locomotive stock,
the average commercial speed of freight trains showed slight
improvement (from 14-1 km. per hour in 1928 to 14-2 km.
per hour in 1934).2 The slowness was due partly to line con-
gestion. Between 1928 and 1934 the average haul of freight
increased by 50 km. and this contributed to an improvement in
the average daily mileage of freight cars from 85 km. to 118
km. During the same period, and despite the longer haul and

* Hunter, H. Op. cit., p. 331.	’ Problem? ekonomiki. March 1935.
unchanging train speed, a considerable improvement was regis-
tered in the turnaround time of freight cars, from 10-6 to 8-8
days. The daily mileage of freight locomotives continued to
rise, from 137 km. in 1928 to 150 km. in 1934. During the
same period tlie average size of freight trains grew from 97
axles to 106, and its net weight from 420 to 555 tons.1 But the
accident rate deteriorated. No less than 4,500 so-called
‘wreckers’ were removed from tlie railways in 1931, but despite
this in 1934, 7,000 engines were damaged and 4,500 cars
destroyed by accident. About one-third of the accidents were
caused by trains breaking, in turn due to overloading and
careless driving.

By this time the Government and the Party were taking a
critical look at rail transport. There was an admonitory decree
issued in 1933, blaming bureaucratic methods for the railways’
failure, pointing out that two-thirds of the qualified railway-
engineers were working in central offices rather than on the
line, and that too many managers were incompetent. Too many
labour norms and the practice of paying office workers higher
rates than operating staff, the lack of labour discipline, and the
accident rate were also criticized. The decree reaffirmed that
tlie railway was the basic unit of management and should not
be interfered with either from the top (the nkps) or from
below (the sections of the railways’ raion (district) manage-
ments). Tlie same year the Party passed a resolution stressing
three necessities: gaining discipline and co-operation from the
workers, fighting the ‘wreckers’ and ‘saboteurs’, and improving
the technical competence of the workers. The managers of
certain railways were singled out for well-publicized criticism;
the head of the Donetz Railway was warned that if his railway
again failed to fulfil the plan he would lose not only his job but
his Party membership. In March 1985 one of the Government’s
best organizers, Kaganovich, was appointed Minister of Ways
and Communications.

The following month a conference of railway workers was
called, which decided that the three most urgent tasks were: a
reduction of the accident rate, which apart from damaging
precious cars also caused line blockages; a reduction of the car
turnaround time; and an increase in capital construction. This
last was a reversal of previous policy, and was executed half-
* See Yakoby, A. Zheltxnye dorogi SSSR v tnfrakh. Moscow, 1935.
heartedly; increased investment in rail transport tailed off after
1937.

The period from 1935 to 1940 was filled with changes and
innovations introduced by Kaganovich and his advisers: ‘march-
routization’, centralized despatching, stricter norms for un-
loading, loading, and car inspection, emphasis on workers’
individual responsibility for the quality of work, Stakhanovism,
train diagrams on a network rather than divisional basis, and
new procedures in operating work. All these measures were
designed to handle increased traffic with a minimum of new
investment.

The available capital was concentrated on a few key routes,
such as Donbas-Hrivoi Rog, Leningrad—Moscow, Easton
Urals-Centre, Centre-Murmansk, Western Siberia-Central
Asia and the lines from the Southern Ukraine to the centre.
These changes involved the reconstruction of bottlenecks such
as stations, yards, and junctions, laying of heavier rails, instal-
lation of automatic block signalling, lengthening of sidings and
loops, and double-tracking. Such improvements permitted the
operation of faster, heavier, and more numerous trains over the
key lines. At the same time, the technical difference between
these lines and the others widened and this gap between the
best and secondary lines remained a feature of Soviet railways.

The basic fact underlying ‘marchroutization’ wras that three-
quarters of railway freight traffic was found in only eight
categories of goods (coal, oil, ferrous metals, ore, timber,
firewood, grain, and mineral building materials) The carriage
of these eight types of freight was henceforth to be planned
from the centre, and trains were formed entirely of one type of
goods for movement (when possible) over the reconstructed
lines. These trains, to which the best locomotives were assigned,
travelled from origin to destination without halts at sorting
yards, and wasted no time at the boundaries separating the
different railways. This method, and the priority granted to the
*march-rout’ trains, ensured a faster speed of delivery and at the
same time helped to guarantee that even if the railways did fail
to fulfil all demands, the shortfall would not consist of the eight
basic materials required by the economy.

This radical change in method was introduced gradually; by
1938 only a quarter of loads were planned for 'marchroutiza-
tion’ and in fact this target was far from being achieved. The
South Ukraine and the Caucasis, with their dominating oil,
coal, and metal traffic had the highest proportibn. The principal
difficultes were those of planning and co-ordination between the
centre and the local on-line authorities; for example, a march-
rout train might be scheduled by the centre but no locomotives
be made available at the station through which it passed.
Another obstacle was the continuing unsatisfactory return of
empty cars. Railwaymen from habit still gave priority to loaded
cars.

Allied to ‘marchroutization’ was the introduction of central-
ized train control (where a central despatcher controls the
movements of all signals and switches over a long length of
line). The first installation of centralized train control in
Europe was probably that of the Ryazan Railway in 1936. This
system did much to improve line utilization. Also in 1936 a
beginning was made with the unification of train weight norms
by the allocation of powerful locomotives to difficult sections.
It was then no longer necessary to remove cars from trains
passing through hilly areas.

Increased stress was laid on the planning and rational conduct
of movement. In 1939 a monthly car plan was introduced. This
specified for a given junction or depot the number and direction
of cars which were to be passed each month. This devolution to
the local authorities of responsibility for the execution of car
movements allowed the planning department of each railway to
concentrate on more fundamental problems. At the same time
another plan, handled by the nkps, dealt exclusively with car
movements from one railway to another, thus reducing irra-
tional movements and speeding the flow of empties.

The diagramming of freight trains in a wider context made
it easier to arrange for trains from different directions to a
single destination to arrive at a common marshalling yard at
the same time, thus permitting them to be combined into one
train for the final stage of their trip. Train formation was
speeded by other measures, including the concentration of work
on the bigger and better-equipped yards, and the building of
mechanized humps.

Due to some of these measures, and to better organization,
more mechanical freight handling gear, the growing fleet of
cars (including some self-emptying units), and the spread of
Stakhanovisin, average daily carloadings increased from 55,717
in 1934 to 95,150 2-axlc units in 1940. The average daily
mileage of freight locomotives rose sharply from 169 km. in
1934 to 246 km. in 1937. By 1940 the average gross weight of
freight trains had risen to 1,298 tons compared to 966 tons in
1932. By 1937 the average commercial speed of freight trains
had increased to 19 km. per hour, and the turnaround time of
freight cars to 7 days, against 9 days in 1934.1

With some exceptions during the war years, the techniques
established during the thirties set the pattern for following
decades. After the first post-war five-year plan had restored
tlie railway to the pre-war level new operating measures were
designed only to improve, not to radically change, the methods
of work current before the war. The principal aim was to
uncover more of the 'hidden reserves’ of railway capacity. The
various manifestations of Stakhanovism helped to raise the
indices of locomotive utilization; in 1956 Russian steam engines
averaged 282 km. daily compared with 255 km. in 1940 and 213
km. in 1934; electric engines covered 428 km. (367 km. in
1940) and diesels 387 km. Tlie commercial speed of freight
trains was 37-6 km. per hour (23 m.p.h.) in 1956, while their
average gross weight was 1,789 tons (steam), 2,152 tons
(electric) and 1,939 tons (diesel).8 Net weights were, respec-
tively, 1,029, 1,242, and 1,094 tons. On electrified lines 4,500-
ton trains were becoming quite common in the early sixties.

Attention continued to be paid to speeding the handling of
freight cars, but many enterprises seemed reluctant to co-
operate, despite high demurrage charges. The railways were
in a position to dictate to shippers and were thus able to enforce
strict loading plans, such as receiving consignments for a given
destination on one particular day only. The mechanization of
freight handling continued, and found particular scope in
container traffic, which developed very rapidly during the fifties.

Car turnaround time, which was 11 days in 1945, reached its
pre-war level in 1951 and was down to 6-3 days in 1956. The
sixth five-year plan specified a further reduction to 5-3 days
by i960 but this was not achieved. In 1961 the index still stood
at 5-6 days. The biggest factor in achieving a faster turn-
around has been the reduction of time spent at intermediate
stations and inspection points. Average daily car mileage in

1 Hunter, H. Op. cit, pp. 331, 399, 403, 406.

• Transport i siyax’ SSSR. pp. 52, 59 61.

H*
1956 was 191 km., double the 1928 figure of 85 km.1 In 1955
daily carloadings averaged 169,400 2-axle units, compared with
61,950 in 1945 and 9^,150 in 1940.2

predel’shchiki and novatory

As they achieved their centenary, railways the world over
began to suffer from old age. They acquired a built-in resistance
to change expressed through self-perpetuating and conservative
managers. The railway, by its nature, demanded strict and
unified rules and procedures which hardened into dogma as one
generation's experience became the next generation’s practice.
Knowledge of precedent became the key to ‘success’ and pro-
motion. New ideas and their originators could easily be rejected
by arguments so detailed that their essential ‘it’s never been
done before’ nature was camouflaged. Administrators of initia-
tive became rare on the railways. Those who did decide to join
the railway service either conformed or left, voluntarily or
involuntarily.

While as late as the nincteen-sixties this situation still pre-
vailed on railways in the West (particularly those which had
been spared the upheavals of war), making them easy victims
to new forms of transport, it might have been expected that
1917 would have swept out the high priests and staff-room
lawyers of the Russian railways’ managements. In fact it did,
most of the old professionals disappeared, but the men who
replaced them, lacking self-confidence, relied even more
heavily on precedent. At the same time, discipline among opera-
ting workers declined, and they were joined by new recruits
lacking the qualities demanded by railway service. In the early
thirties, when the Government was convinced that the railways
could handle much more traffic with their existing plant, they
were opposed by the railway administrators, who claimed that
lines were already working at the limit of their capacity. In
apparent proof of this they could point to an enormous accident
rate, which was really caused by indiscipline and incompetence
among the workers—and to the unshipped goods accumulating
at congested freight yards, which again proved nothing except
that the railways were failing to reach their targets.

1 Transport i svyax' SSSR. pp. +8-49. Zhelexnodoroxhnyi transport. March 1962.

’ Hunter, H. Op. cit., p. 881.
Constant reference to an item of Russian railway dogma
known as the ‘theoretical limit of railway capacity’ soon earned
these pessimists the title of‘limiteers’ (predel’shchiki). Those
who put their beliefs into practice and dragged their feet rather
than achieve the difficult targets were among those termed
‘saboteurs’, while the operating staff who allowed accidents to
happen were exhibited as one type among the many ‘wreckers’
bent on destroying the socialist economy.

As the national economy seemed at this time to be more
endangered by transport bottlenecks than any other threat, and
as the Government and Party remained unconvinced that the
railways were working anywhere near their real limit, a conflict
wa.i almost inevitable, and the Government did not by any
means hold all the trumps. But in the event the recalcitrant
railway staff w'ere routed, and labour discipline improved, with
hardly a struggle. The two weapons were the purge and the
Stakhanovite movement.

Arbitrary arrests, executions and labour camps had been a
feature of Soviet society almost from the beginning, but in
the thirties the purge technique acquired the characteristics of a
mass movement. Accusations were politically based, prisoners
being alleged to be Trotskyites or other inimical elements. So
far as the railways are concerned, it is difficult to know’ whether
arrests were carried out in order to eliminate conservative and
pessimistic administrators, or in fact as part of a drive to
liquidate possible political opponents. What does seem certain
is that in the purges two groups of people suffered more titan
others; army officers and railway managers. And both the Red
Anny and the railways were at this time organizations with
whose work the Party and Government were dissatisfied.
Furthermore, after the railways were purged, their work did
improve beyond the ‘limit’ of the ‘predel’shchiki’. It is difficult
to resist the impression that political labels were merely a
convenience and that many victims were selected because they
stood obstinately in the way of progress and because their fate
would be an example to others. The possibility of a knock on
the door in the small hours must have been a powerful incentive
encouraging railway managers to achieve what they believed
to be impossible. Unfortunately it was also a drastic remedy
and moreover it was clumsy; some of the ‘predel’shchiki’ were
sometimes right (over dieselization, for example). Their
influence could have prevented subsequent errors if they had
not suffered for the obstinacy of their less perceptive brethren.

The other weapons used against the pessimists were the
innovators (‘novatory’) and Stakhanovites. These were workers
who achieved targets and fulfilled norms well in advance of the
current level and who thus created real evidence that the ‘limits’
could be surpassed. Their achievements were quickly used by
the propagandists to discredit the ‘predcl’shchiki’. Due to their
value in this respect, they were often over-rated, and many of
the most highly praised ‘innovations’ had long been practised
in other countries. Krivonos, an engine driver at Slavyansk, was
the first of the railway innovators, and his achievement was
vastly over praised. All he did was to drive his engine badly,
‘thrashing’ it so that it produced a third more steam per hour.
By doing this he could pull a heavier train at a higher speed.
He must also have raised fuel consumption per horsepower to a
much higher rate, and brought his fireman (who, after all,
bore the brunt of the increased steaming rate) to a state of
collapse. However, since at this time traffic capacity was more
important than low costs, Krivonos’s exploit did have a definite
value. Other drivers were encouraged to follow his example,
and it was not long before ton/km. per engine hour increased
far beyond what had previously been considered possible. The
engine driver Papavin achieved a genuinely novel record. He
‘mothered’ his 2-6-2 passenger engine so diligently that during
twelve years it received one intermediate, and no capital,
repairs, running 800,000 km. during this time. Another
Stakhanovite was Ognev, a driver from Tula, who started the
‘15,000’ movement by running his engine 15,000 km. per
month against a norm of 8,000 km., and limiting boiler wash-
outs to each 40,000 km. in place of 5,000 km. Among other
grades of operating workers, there was Kozhukhar’, who
assembled trains at Yasinovataya in 20 minutes instead of 90,
and Krasnov, whose ‘idea’ was to use hump yards to assemble
as well as break up trains. Stakhanovism, together with
‘socialist competition’ (in which a whole operating unit would
challenge others to surpass various norms) continued after the
war. There was the ‘green light’ movement among train
control staff, with the object of eliminating signal delays, and
the ‘heavyweight’ drivers, who took trains hundreds of tons
heavier than the norm. But tlie Stakhanovite movement eventually
became discredited due to over-exploitation. The achieve-
ment of a Stakhanovite railwayman would be the excuse for
raising norms for all. This would often mean an increased effort
for the same w'ages, or reduced wages for the same work as
previously. The resulting resentment was compounded because
the Stakhanovite heroes, who received glory and cash awards,
often depended on the unsung work of their comrades, and were
given superior equipment and facilities. For example, a driver
who intended to beat the norm for ton/km. per engine would be
dependent on the good work of the engine repair brigade and
the goodwill of despatchers (who would give him preference
over others to avoid delaying him) and of the depot chief, who
would sec dial he ievolved the best engine and the best fuel
and was teamed with the best assistant driver and the best
fireman. For these reasons, Stakhanovism as such died out in
the fifties, but the more collective ‘socialist competition’ was
retained. In this way one of the most useful features of Stakhano-
vism, the quick publicity and consequent wide imitation of new
techniques, was not lost.

THE WAR

The third five-year plan, which had forecast an improvement in
railway efficiency as well as an increase in traffic, was inter-
rupted in 1941 by the German invasion. In some ways the
railways had fewer problems in war than they had in peacetime.
The occupation of the western and southern areas of the
country relieved them of the duty of supplying the populations
involved, while the evacuation of rolling stock provided a
reserve for use on the mileage remaining in Soviet hands. Thus
in conditions of diminishing traffic the number of locomotives
and cars per mile of track actually increased. At the beginning
of 1943, route mileage had decreased by 40 per cent, freight
car numbers by 20 per cent, and locomotives by only 15 per
cent, compared to 1941.1

Nevertheless, it is true to say that the Soviet railways
emerged from the wrar with credit, disappointing the German
expectation, and assumption, that transport difficulties would
cause a Russian collapse soon after the invasion. Although

1 See Voznessenskii, N. The War Economy of the USSR in the Period of the
Patriotic War. Moscow, 1948.
railway traffic decreased during the war, ow ing to the disruption
of the economy and restriction of rail transport to war needs,
because of radical changes in traffic flows the work accomplished
was greater than the statistics w'ould indicate. It has been
estimated1 that in 1942 only 228 billion ton/km. of freight was
produced, compared w'ith 460 million in 1941. After 1942, the
worst year of the w'ar, there was a slow improvement but in
1944 there were still only 314 billion ton/km. of freight traffic.
At the same time, due to military demands, the relocation of
industry in Asiatic and east European Russia, and the loss of
key western and northern areas, there was a marked change in
traffic flows. In 1942 nearly a third of freight tonnage was
handled by railways in the Urals and Siberia, compared to less
than one-seventh in 1940. In Central Asia the share of total
freight tonnage rose from one-twelfth in 1940 to one-seventh
in 1942.2 The loss of the Donetz Basin meant that areas in the
centre formerly using Donbas coal had to be supplied from the
Asian coalfields at Karaganda and in the Kuznetsk Basin,
causing an increase of 161 km. in the average haul of coal.® For
similar reasons, the average length of haul of ores rose from
562 km. in 1940 to 886 km. in 1942. The transfer of the
industrial centre of gravity to the east was not achieved without
straining the railways, but some alleviation was secured by
capital works designed to improve the capacity of lines joining
western Siberia w'ith the Urals, the northern Urals to the
southern, the Urals to the centre, and Central Asia w'ith Euro-
pean Russia. These increases in capacity were obtained by the
usual methods of laying new loops and relief lines, improving
the signalling system, and the building of a few new lines.

The first test of the railways came in 1941, with the evacua-
tion of industry from the threatened areas to the east. This
necessitated hundreds of special trains carrying plant and
workers which moved to the new locations without any inter-
mediate halts except for engine purposes. In the threatened
areas, cars already loaded with goods considered less essential
than factory equipment were emptied on the spot, but in any
case the rolling stock situation was not serious because of the
numerous cars which had brought supplies to the front and

* Hunter, H. Op. cit., p. 381.	1 Naporko, A. Op. cit., p. 191.

• Another consequence was that by 1943, 11 per cent of locomotive fuel was
firewood, compared to less than 1 per cent in 1940.
were waiting to be returned. Line capacity was tlie real bottle-
neck, and enemy bombing made matters worse. Permissive
working, with trains following each other almost nose to tail,
was therefore widely used. The railways in 1941 also acquitted
themselves well during the defence of Moscow'. With all but
four of tlie lines radiating from the capital cut by tlie Germans,
trains of relief troops from the Urals and Asia wrere brought in
as far as the Belt Line, where they were unloaded and cleared
for the return trip. These troop trains were given absolute
priority and moved westwards at a speed of about 750 km.
per day.

The railways also played a key role in the siege of Leningrad.
While it is true that hundreds of thousands of people died from
starvation during the siege, without the railways the city could
not have been defended. At one stage all railway lines were cut
by the invaders and supplies were taken by motor truck across
the ice of Lake Ladoga, where the railways (w'hich were still
operating in Leningrad both over the usual routes and over city
street-car lines) took over. In the 1942-43 winter a railway line
was laid over the lake, but never came into use because a Russian
advance opened a land route. The latter wras the Shlisselburg-
Polyana railway, a normal gauge line hurriedly laid around the
reconquered southern shore of the lake. This line was built in
three weeks, despite German bombardment. It was laid on peat
and contained innumerable sharp curves, but despite this
0-10-0 engines were successfully used. As daylight services
w#»rp impnesiЫр,	thn linp was within artillery rangtf*,

trains went into the city one night and came out the next. No
lights or signals were possible, the trains followed one another
at time intervals with a man riding a trolley between each
train to prevent collisions.

Many acts of heroism, some celebrated and others unsung,
were performed by railwaymen. The most typical instances
were the occasions when burning cars in ammunition trains
were uncoupled by the train crew’ to save the remainder of the
load. The Stakhanovite movement produced Lunin, an engine
driver w'ho did his own repairs en route, thus making engines
less dependent on under-staffed or non-existent repair shops.
However, by no means all railwaymen were so enthusiastic.
When the Germans invaded there were many Russians who
hoped they would win, and railwaymen were among these. It
took long for many Russians to realize that the Nazis could not
in any sense be regarded as liberators. Some railwaymen did a
'go slow’ act and otheYs acted irresponsibly, no longer respect-
ing rules laid down by a regime which seemed on the point of
defeat. As this attitude was beginning to threaten war transport
the railways were put under martial law. Railwaymen were
considered as called-up, and a kind of courts martial, the War
Tribunals, were established to try those workers who had failed
to do their duty.1 The worst offenders were shot and others
sent to the penal companies, those unfortunate groups of con-
victed soldiers who were expended in suicidal military tasks,
like clearing minefields by walking through them. The mortal
risk entailed by making a mistake made life unpleasant even
for the most devoted railwaymen, and military-scale rations
were only a partial compensation. Perhaps it was because of
this that in 1.943 medals were introduced for railwaymen; no
less than eight of them ranging from ‘Distinguished Engine
Driver’ to 'Distinguished Railway Clerk’. They were awarded
by the nkps or railway chiefs but probably did not raise much
enthusiasm, for in 1957 they were abolished, being replaced by
a single award 'The Distinguished Participant in Railway
Socialist Competition Medal’.

When the Red Army began to advance the railways faced
new problems. The Germans not only used explosives to
destroy buildings and equipment, they also had a device to rip
up track. This was an immense hook, hauled by a locomotive,
which hit into the ballast between the rails and broke the
sleepers in two. Keeping the Red Army supplied wras difficult
in these circumstances and the nkps allocated most of its railway
troops to restoration work. As little local transport was avail-
able to serve the reconstruction sites, thousands of horses w’ere
imported, and the nkps made barter agreements with suppliers
of materials (for example, in exchange for the entire output of
one production line at the Shurov Cement Works, the nkps
promised to give each month 5,000 tons from its coal stocks).
On double-track routes only one line was usually restored, but
this aggravated the problem of the empty cars returning from
the front. When the Red Army advanced beyond the Russian

1 Even after the war, railwaymen shared with water transport workers and
servicemen the distinction of being tried by special tribunals, supervised by
special sections of the Supreme Court.
frontiers, the railway troops converted to 5-ft. gauge the
main lines running parallel to the line of attack. A Russian
0-10-0 engine hauled Soviet participants to the Potsdam
Conference.

On the whole, the outstanding feature of Soviet railway
operation during the war was the speed with which radical
changes in the direction and amount of traffic were accepted,
arranged and carried out under unfavourable conditions; the
planning and operational mechanisms developed before the war
were by no means so inflexible as might have been supposed.
Extraordinary measures (which included the division of single-
track traffic into half a day of up trains, followed by half a day
of down trains, the widespread practice of double-heading, and
extensive use of permissive working) were willingly taken.
But the elimination of all work not considered to have direct
military significance was beginning to have an effect before
the war ended. When peace returned, the problems of repairing
run-down plant could no longer be postponed.

NEW RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

With its marked distaste for investing money in transport it is
not surprising that the Soviet Government limited the construc-
tion of new railway lines. This was especially noticeable during
the first five-year plan. Not only did the plan favour investment
in heavy industry at the expense of the railways, but even the
funds which were allocated were reduced below the plan level,
and were in any case not fully used because of material shortages.
The intention had been that transport should receive 21 per
cent of all new investment during 1929-32 but in fact the per-
centage was 18 per cent. By 1932 the railways possessed 17
per cent of the basic national capital, compared with 23 per
cent in 1928.1 Of the funds assigned to the railways, only a third
were to be allocated to new construction, the remainder being
devoted to re-equipping existing lines. In fact, in the fifty-one
months of the first plan, only one-fifth of railway investment
was in new lines.2 Rising material prices and a shortage of

1 Postroeniye fundamtnta lotxuiliiticheskoi ekonomiki v SSSR. 1926-32 gg.
Moscow, 1960, pp. 370-94.

* But investment in industry also provided new (but non-common-carrier) lines.
(See Appendix.)
rails (of which only 59 per cent of the planned production were
actually received) made the position worse. Although the
situation improved later, Soviet railway construction has,
deliberately, not proceeded as fast as in the best of the tsarist
years, reliance being placed on increasing the amount of traffic
passed by existing lines.

New railway construction during the five-year plans had
several purposes, of which the most important were the develop-
ment of new areas and new sources of raw material, the shifting
of traffic from overloaded lines, and the speeding of transit by
tlie construction of short-cut and avoiding lines. Even though
the pre-war railway-building targets were not ambitious, con-
struction during the five-year plans never achieved the planned
magnitude, and in the post-war period there was in most years
a failure to complete the construction plan. Of the 17,000 km.
of new track scheduled for construction in the first five-year
plan, only about 5,000 km. were actually achieved. Even less
was done in the second plan, only about 3,300 km. being built
(although at the end of the quinquennium there were several
lines half-finished). The projects of the third five-year plan
were almost all unfinished when tlie war started, only 4,600
km. being built up to 1941. During the course of this plan there
was a change of emphasis from longer, cross-country lines, to
short lines tapping local resources. In the post-w ar years there
was emphasis on lengthy lines in Asiatic Russia; work pro-
ceeded on two main lines parallel to the Trans-Siberian, and
long lines were passed through undeveloped areas of Central
Asia. In the fifties there was also a renewed popularity enjoyed
by narrow-gauge railway construction.

Within the inter-war frontiers, there were nearly 77,000 km.
of common-carrier railway in 1928, of which about 1,000 km.
were narrow-gauge. In 1939 there were 86,400 km. (1,100
km. narrow-gauge) and territorial acquisitions brought the
1940 total to 106,100 km. (of which 4,000 km. were narrow-
gauge, the 2,900 km. addition being a contribution from the
Baltic States). In 1946, after wartime construction and further
frontier changes, there were 114,100 km. (of which 6,200 km.
were narrow-gauge). Ten years later there were 120,700 km.
but the widening of narrow-gauge line brought the latter’s
length down to 4,600 km. By the end of 1961 there were about
126,200 km., and at least 650 km. of the line built since 1956
was narrow-gauge trackage serving the ‘virgin lands’ of
Kazakhstan and western Siberia.1

Thus, while freight traffic almost quadrupled between 1940
and I960, railway mileage only rose by a fifth. Between 1928
and 1940 the railway mileage had increased by less than half
while traffic increased by more than four times.2 In the pre-war
period some benefit was derived from the fact that in tsarist
times, especially in Asia, lines had been built which in length
and location were well in advance of current needs. But in the
post-war period traffic density on most lines could only be
increased by new' techniques. In a sense electrification and
dieselization were a substitute for new’ railway construction.

Railway-building duiing tile fivc-ycai plans was directed
particularly to the Asiatic parts of Russia, where the density of
rail routes was still very low', despite the policy of the last
tsarist governments to limit new state railway construction to
the area east of the Urals. By 1954 the railways of Siberia, the
Urals, and Central Asia were carrying more than a quarter of
the total traffic, compared to one-eighth in 1928, and much of
this was both caused and facilitated by new railway lines. Some
of the Asian republics increased their railway mileages con-
siderably faster than the Union as a whole. Thus Kazakhstan,
which in 1917 had 2,700 km. of railway, had 9,200 km. in 1954.
The Kirghiz Republic in the same period increased its railway
mileage from 100 to 400 km.

The first major line to be completed during the five-year
plane was the Turkestan-Siberia Railway. Started and partly
opened before the Revolution, the Soviet-built section of this
line, opened in 1931, ran 1,014 km. southwards from Semi-
palatinsk to Alma Ata, connecting with another new line to
Tashkent. The economy of this part of Central Asia was sensibly
changed by the construction of this line, which carried south-
wards from Siberia coal, timber, and grain, and exported
northwards cotton, as well as oil from the Caspian Sea port
of Krasnovodsk. The coal provided a fuel base for industrial

1 Transport i svyax' SSSR. p. 28. Also Zhelrznodorozhnyi transport. March
1958, March 195.9, Marell 1960, March 1961, March 1962. '

* But it sliould be noted that since 1917 there has been an impressive increase
in non-commomcarrier railway mileage, which is not included in the MPS figures.
To a certain extent miserly investment in common-carrier lines was compensated
by increased investment (by ministries other than the MPS) in feeder lines. (See
Appendix.)
development, the timber encouraged building, and a convenient
outside grain supply allowed more local land to be devoted to
cotton. Another important Asian railway built before the war
was the continuation of the Petropavlovsk-Borovoye line 458
km. southwards to Karaganda (1931) and then another 487 km.
to Lake Balkhash (1939). This created a new coal area at
Karaganda, and tapped resources of rare metals around Lake
Balkhash. Many other short lines were built in Central Asia,
usually to exploit local raw material sources. In the Far East
similar branches were built; the first of these were to coal
deposits but in 1940 and 1941 some short lines were built in
the Vladivostok area probably with a view to further hostilities
with Japan. In this region there was also built in 1940 a line
from Khabarovsk to the new settlement of Komsomolsk (353
km.).

Elsewhere in pre-war Asiatic Russia were built lines to serve
the Urals-Kuznetsk metallurgical combine. Until 1930, Magni-
togorsk was isolated from the railway, but in that year a 401-
km. line southwards from Troitsk to Kartaly and Orsk was
opened, with a 141-km. high-capacity branch to Magnitogorsk.
By this line Magnitogorsk iron ore was connected to the Trans-
Siberian Railway and could be carried eastwards to the Kuz-
netsk Basin. In the latter area the Novosibirsk-Leninsk line
(295 km.) was completed in 1936, reducing the distance between
the Urals and the Kuzbas by about 100 km.

Increasing emphasis on the development of Siberia led to
traffic congestion on certain of the lines through the Urals,
prompting the construction of a number of cut-off' routes.
Among these was the Sverdlovsk-Kurgan line (241 km.) which
relieved the heavily-laden section of the Trans-Siberian Railway
between Sverdlovsk and Omsk. Then there was the 151-km.
Sinarskaya-Churilovo line, providing a second link between
Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk. Further south the Uralsk-Iletsk
line (264 km.) built in 1939, together with a new Volga bridge
at Saratov, provided a new route between European and
Asiatic Russia. Also in the Urals region were built a series of
lines to reach local mineral deposits. Of these the Dema-
Ishimbaevo line (177 km.) was one of the biggest.

In the Caucasus, the most important pre-war line was the
so-called Black Sea Railway, which followed the eastern shore
of the Black Sea southwards from Tuapse, shortening the distance
between Georgia and Moscow by nearly 700 km. (because
previously trains from Batum and Tbilisi had first to travel
south-east to Baku). This new line, which was not completely
finished until 1945, also helped to develop the tourist traffic to
places such as Sochi and Gagra.

Elsewhere in European Russia much construction was
devoted to improving communications with, and within, the
Donetz Basin. In 1929 the final section of a new 518-km. line
between Kherson and Kharkov was completed. The newly-
reconstructed Moscow-Valuiki line was continued southwards
to Kondrashevskaya (224 km.). Further north, an important
connecting line was that between Bryansk and Vyazma (235
km.), completed in 1934 and providing a new route between
the Donbas and Leningrad. Earlier, in 1931, the last sections
of another new route (started during tlie Great War) between
these centres was finished, and trains began to pass between
Vorozhba and Orsha (253 km.). Other lines, often built to
facilitate east-west movement, were built in western Russia
before the war.

One of the characteristics of Russian railway-building has
been its continuation through difficult periods of the country’s
history. The rate of construction during tlie Great War has
never been surpassed. Even during the Civil War about 1,500
km. of line were built. Similarly during the Second World War
about 7,000 km. of new line were brought into operation. This
was considerably more than had been built in any of the five-
year plans. Apart from a few lines which had been started
before 1941 most of the mileage was directly prompted by war
needs. It was laid either to cope with changes in the traffic flow,
to improve connections between the front and rear, or to tap
new resources of raw materials to replace sources which had
fallen into German hands. One of the longest of the war-built
lines was the railway paralleling the Volga from Kazan through
Saratov to Ilovlya, just north of Stalingrad. This was finished
in 1944 and had a length of 976 km. A 338-km. line opened in
1942 had a crucial significance for the Soviet war effort; this
was the Astrakhan-Kizliar line, which enabled tlie north
Caucasus to be supplied after the Germans had advanced
through Rostov and cut the former Vladikavkaz Railway.

The Pechora Railway, which runs north-eastwards into the
Arctic Circle, was built as far as Kozhva during the war. By
I960 it had reached Vorkuta and was carrying a heavy load of
coal from the latter area, so that the Leningrad region could
dispense with Donbas 'coal. The traffic developed to such an
extent that the line (which from Vorkuta to the junction with
the Archangel line is 1,563 km. long) was double-tracked.
Another northern line was an east-west link around the southern
shore of the White Sea, connecting the Murmansk and Arch-
angel lines. The significance of this was that when the Germans
cut the Murmansk Railway near Leningrad the vital warm-
water port of Murmansk could still send freight by rail.

Other lines opened during the war included the railway from
Orsk via Kandagach to the Caspian Sea at Guriev (781 km.)
and the western part of the Moscow Outer Belt line (the
eastern part had been finished in 1940).

In the post-war years railway construction in Asia was the
main feature of the building programme. The South Siberian
Railway, which was planned before the war and partly built
during hostilities, was completed between Kartaly and the
Kuzbas by 1953. This line, which runs south of the Trans-
Siberian Railway for 1,940 km., relieves the latter, shortens the
distance between the southern Urals and the Kuzbas, and
serves the virgin lands of northern Kazakhstan. To enhance the
agricultural significance of this line, during 1957 and 1958
several narrow-gauge feeder lines were built to connect with it.
In the early sixties work was proceeding on both an eastern
and a western extension of the South Siberian, 'rhe latter was
from Magnitogorsk through the Urals to the Trans-Siberian
Railway, and the former was from Abakan to a junction with
the Trans-Siberian at Taishet. At Taishet another new line, the
Baikal-Amur Railway, was planned to run through the un-
developed country north of the Trans-Siberian to Komsomolsk,
on the river Amur. By 1961 the first section, from Taishet to
the River Lena, was complete.1 A third trans-Siberian line,
between the Trans-Siberian and the Southern Siberian was
emerging with the construction of a number of short east-west
lines which would eventually be linked to form the Central
Siberian Railway from Troitsk to Barnaul, via Kustanai and
Kokchetav. The Bamaul-Karasuk section of this, begun in the

1 One portion was laid twice, because due to lack of co-ordination between
ministries the track was originally built through an area destined to be the bed
of the artificial lake supplying the Bratsk hydro-electric station.
late fifties, was designed from the start as an electrified line
which would handle trains of up to 8,000 tons. The minimum
length of sidings and loops was fixed at 1-5 km. to accom-
modate such trains.

In Central Asia, during the fifties the line to Lake Balkhash
was extended southwards, to join the Alma-Ata to Tashkent
line, and a line was laid westwards from Chardzhu (near
Bokhara) along the Amu-Darya to the Aral Sea. It was intended
to extend this line northwards later.

New railway construction in the ussr was not confined to
entirely new routes, but also included the doubling of existing
single-track railways. Much of the double-tracking carried out
in the pre-war five-year plans was devoted to the development
of the Donetz Basin. The Moscow to Valuiki line was doubled,
making it a principal route between the centre and the Donbas.
The Valuiki-Penza line was also doubled. Another line so
treated was the Vologda-Archangel railway. To relieve bottle-
necks through the Urals the Batraki-Chelyabinsk and parts of
the Sverdlovsk-Kirov line were doubled, and in connection with
the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine the Omsk-Chelyabinsk line was
also doubled, as w as the Novosibirsk-Stalinsk line. By 1939 the
Trans-Siberian Railway was double throughout. In the fifties
double-tracking was continued, often exceeding 500 km. per
annum. As new railway mileage was also being built the pro-
portion of double-track line to the total mileage remained fairly
constant at just over one quarter.

THE TECHNICAL CONDITION OF THE RAILWAYS

The Achilles heel of the Soviet railways during the five-year
plans was the track. In the early thirties even the most important
main lines had long sections of track with worn-out lightweight
rails laid before the Great War. Accidents due to rail breakage
were frequent, and more powerful engines could not be intro-
duced because of axle-weight limitations. The bridges also were
too w'eak. But because of the steel shortage little could be done.
Even a line as important as the Kursk Railway was relaid with
old rails in 1932. The basic rail was the type Ша, capable of
bearing the 0-10-0 engines. There was also a slightly heavier
Ila, while the la, capable of accepting 23-ton as against the
16-ton axle loads of the Illa, was hardly produced at all.
Ballast continued to be another difficulty, owing to the lack of
conveniently located quarries. In 1931, 80 per cerit of the mileage
was laid on fine sand'or dirt, only 250 km. had stone chip
ballasting, with another 5,000 km. on gravel.1

In 1934 rail orders were fulfilled by nearly 100 per cent, but
this success was limited by the fact that deliveries of the nuts
and bolts to join them together were only 50 per cent of the
orders. In 1935 the track was recognized as the most backward
sector of the railways; there were at this time 1,500 speed
restrictions in force and 2,000 sections of line were considered
to be unsound. For this reason, new efforts were made to open
new quarries and to reorganize and mechanize track work. But
tlie improvement was only moderate. By 1940 only 17 per cent
of that proportion of the network classed as main line was laid
with la rails, and these rails were in any case not really
adequate.2 At the end of the war the track was in a very poor
state. The principal task set by the fourth five-year plan was the
rebuilding of damaged lines, and it was not until the fifth plan
that much headway could be made in the laying of heavier type
rails. On the basic main lines, especially those which were
electrified, rails of 50 and 65 kg./metre (101 and 182 lb. per
yard) were laid, while the la was laid on less important lines.
However, so limited was the mileage laid with these heavier
types of rail that the steam locomotives built after the war had
axle weights of less than 20 tons. Although by 1954, 56 per
cent of tlie main lines had rails of la type or heavier, no less
than one-third of tlie whole network was subject to speed
restrictions. Defective rails still in use because shortages pre-
vented their replacement totalled 24 km.3 The tempo of
permanent way work quickened after the decision to accelerate
dieselization and electrification. In 1961, 10,000 km. of new
rail were laid, including heavyweight rails on lines due to
receive the new diesel and electric engines, with their 22- and
23-ton axle loadings.

Increased railway capacity with a minimum of investment
was partly achieved through an improved apparatus of train
control. During the first five-year plan, nearly 600 km. were
equipped with automatic block signalling, and another 6,600 km.

* Planowyt khozayaistvo. June 5, 1931.	* Danilov, S. Op. cit., p. 363.

’ Kaganovich, L. Uluchshit’ rabotu i organizovat’ novyi podem zh.d. transporta.
Moscow, 1954, pp. 32, 58.
with a semi-automatic system. Later, centralized train control
and cab signalling were introduced on some lines By the end
of 1940 about 8,500 km. were equipped with the automatic
block. In the post-war period autoblocking, centralized train
control, and cab signalling were extended. By the end of 1954
cab signalling apparatus covered nearly 10 per cent of the net-
work and by 1955 there were 15,000 km. with automatic block
signalling, but on the single-track lines a rather old-fashioned
electric staff system remained the most usual equipment. Pro-
gress had also been made in reducing the number of switches
(points) operated from the lineside, and in the application of
radio to railway work. To speed the formation and division of
freight trains, key junctions on heavy-traffic lines were provided
with hump yards. In 1938 there were 33 mechanized and 22
non-mechanized yards of this type, and in 1955 83 hump yards
were in operation.1

The number of freight cars increased from 341,400 in 1928
to about 721,000 units (2-axle) in 1940 and 1,055,400 in
1955.2 In the fifties annual production was around 30,000
(almost all 4-axle). The fitting of automatic brakes and auto-
matic couplers, one of the most important aids to efficient
operation, was completed during the fifties. Due to a shift from
2-axle to 4-axle freight cars, and from 3-axle to 4-axle passen-
ger cars, average car capacity increased. By 1954 more than
half the freight cars were 4-axle (1913, 5 per cent). In 1961
some of the best-equipped lines were relegating all 2-axle cars
to local service and main-line passenger trains were composed
entirely of all-steel post-war cars. The older cars, including
some 6- and 4-wheelers, were confined to commuter or secon-
dary line service.

The basic freight cars built during this period were the 40-
and 50-ton 4-axle box car, the 50-ton 4-axle hopper, the 4-axle
steel-body open car of 50 tons (first introduced in 1915) and
the 4-axle 5O-cubic metre tank car. Interesting specialized cars
built since the war were the live fish cars containing water
tanks, and the self-contained refrigerator trains consisting of
electrically refrigerated cars flanking a central generating car.

1 Zhekznodorozhyni transport v tretei pyatiletke. Moscow, 1989. Gudok. No. 9235.
Danilov, S. Op. cit., p. 374.

* Hunter, H. Op. cit., p. 378. The figures quoted are not total cars owned but
the average number in service on any [«articular day.
These latter were a considerable advance on the ice refrigerator
cars, each of which had to be re-iced twenty times with a total
of 50 tons of ice and '15 tons of salt on the journey from
Vladivostok to Moscow. In the sixties high capacity open cars
(100-ton or more) began to appear. Due to the lightweight
track of much of the network it was necessary to fit these with
3-axle instead of 2-axle bogies, so as to reduce the axle loading
to 20 tons. Passenger cars were, after the war, all designed on
a standard 23-6 metre chassis, and had steel bodies.1 In 1960
the traditional Russian sleeping car was joined by a few new
'coach’ type cars, providing seats in place of bunks, for the
high-speed day sendees.

ORGANIZATION

In June 1931 the People’s Commissariat of Ways and Com-
munications (nkps) was reformed so that it could devote itself
entirely to railway matters. A separate Commissariat for Water
Transport was established to relieve the nkps of its sea and
river problems. In July 1933 a further reorganization took place
in which the number of directorates was reduced to a basic
seven: political, operational, traction, rolling stock, permanent
way, signalling, and new construction. The remaining direc-
torates were reduced to sections of the Commissariat. In 1940
there was a further upheaval which established twenty-five
directorates in the nkps.2 Apart from the existing seven, eight
new regional directorates were introduced, each aupervioing the
activities of a group of railways, and additional directorates
covered such matters as railway educational institutions, war
mobilization plans, railway engineering factories, safety, and
passenger work. There were also nineteen sections, covering
such matters as planning, finance, accounting, electrification,
statistics, wages, and international traffic. This remained the
pattern after the war with some minor changes. The latter
included the division of the directorates into 'main direc-
torates’ and ‘directorates’ and the inclusion in the former of a
freight and freight planning organ. The directorates consisted

1 For details of Russian freight and passenger cars see Vagony shirokoi kolei
z/irlrznykh dnrog SSSR. Moscow, 1.955.

* The 1931, 1933, and 1940 orders are included in Zheleznodorozhyni transport
SSSR v dokumentakh . . . Moscow, 1947, pp. 242, 271, 324.
mainly of the former sections. The regional directorates estab-
lished in 1940 disappeared, but the new main directorates had
sections each devoted to a particular group of railways.1

During the thirties the railways became firmly established as
tlie basic unit of management. An order in June 1931 affirmed
that the director of a railway, who was appointed by the nkps,
should work on the principle of one-man leadership as opposed
to collective leadership. However, in the order of July 1933 it
was necessary to restate this principle, that the director (now
renamed Chief) bore full responsibility for the work of the
railway and was answerable only to the nkps. The order
specifically condemned the practice whereby the chief had
become only a figurehead behind which tlie real management
was exercised by various on-line organs, and emphasized that
tlie railway’s various depots, workshops, and other units were
directly subordinate to the chief. The managerial structure of a
railway was to consist of the chief, his deputy, the head of the
political section, an assistant in charge of workers’ supplies,
and five services for operations, traction, rolling stock, perma-
nent way, and signalling, together with fourteen specialized
sections. The services and sections, while responsible to the
chief of the railway, would also be under the supervision of the
corresponding directorates and sections of the nkps. This
pattern was confirmed in June 1951, when the tasks and rights
of the chief of a railway were set out in detail.2 In December
of the same year the status of the railway divisions was also
reaffirmed, but the direct subordination of the divisional chiefs
to the railway chief remained unchanged.

In general the different Soviet railways were identical with
the old railway companies, with adjustments here and there to
eliminate irrational situations (as for example when a long
branch from one railway penetrated deep into the territory of
another). In tlie thirties there was a tendency to split the
largest railways so as to make them more manageable; thus the
Southern Railway in 1934 was split into the Southern and
Donetz railways. In 1940 there were fifty-four separate railways
in the ussr. But despite territorial acquisitions in the forties,

» It should be noted that tlte nkps (and mps) had only a client’s interest in
new railway-building. This was entrusted to a separate ministry, the Ministry of
Transport Construction.

* ziteleznodorozhnyi transport SSSR v dokumentakh. p. 351. See also the Appendix
of this volume.
by 1960 there were only thirty-one. This was because in the
late fifties there was a reversal of pre-war policy, and a number
of railways were amalgamated with a view to more efficient
use of managerial and technical talent. The Moscow-Ryazan
and Moscow Belt railways were amalgamated with the Moscow
divisions of several other railways to form the new Moscow
Railway; the Amur Railway was absorbed into the Trans-
Baikal Railway; the Ufa and Orenburg railways were absorbed
by the Kuibyshev Railway; the North Caucasus Railway swal-
lowed the Ordzhonikidze Railway, the Northern Railway took
over the Pechora Railway, and the Kirov Railway became part
of the October Railway.

In the early oixtico ootnc of the ‘private’ linco were absorbed
by the main-line railways. Just as in Britain the National Coal
Board is the largest railway operator outside British Railways
so in the и s s r a considerable amount of trackage was owned by
industry, particularly the mining, metalworking, chemical and
timber industries. In 1956, while the common-carrier railways
under the Ministry of Ways and Communications owned
121,000 km. of track, the private railways owned 87,000 km.1
Most of this was accounted for by the lengthy feeder lines
joining industry to the main railway lines. There were many
large-scale railway systems, some of which possessed work-
shops which could handle all capital repairs and even reconstruct
locomotives. Other lines were operated by locomotives of the
main-line railways. When local enterprises in the later fifties
fell under the control of the new regional economic councils
(sovnarkhozy) their railways went with them and some small
steps were taken to secure better co-ordination between the
industrial railways by, for example, establishing a central loco-
motive repair works for all the railways of a given economic
region. But from 1961 some of the industrial railways were
taken over by neighbouring main-line railways. An example of
this process was the transfer by the Krasnoarmeisk coal trust
and other enterprises around Yasinovataya of 194 feeder lines,
a total of 1,076 km., to the Donetz Railway. Among the savings
effected by this transfer during the first year of operation
were the closing of ten locomotive depots, the replacement of
most of the existing non-standard locomotives by engines

1 Transftort i nyax’ SSSR. p. 27.
belonging to the railway, and an 8 per cent reduction in the
labour force.1

PLANNING

Russian railways had been planned railways from the very
beginning. In some respects, such as the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way, the mobilization plans, and the 1917 ‘five-year plan', the
tsarist planners showed as much skill and forethought as did
their Soviet successors. But they lacked one essential of the
fully-planned system: the means to enforce tlieir intentions. This
factor was not supplied until the Soviet five-year plans came
into being, accompanied by the political changes associated with
tlieir chief proponent, Stalin.

Plan is an inadequate word, for it has many interpretations.
Compared with the railways of other countries the main benefit
of the Soviet planning system was that it permitted a measure
of co-ordination at the top. That is, railway plans could be
made to fit in with the plans of other sections of the national
economy, and with other forms of transport. In the lower units,
such as stations, sections and even railways, planning was little
more than a formalization of good management. Revolution
and war and class-based policies had robbed the Soviet Union
of its stock of capable managers. Men who could organize work
intelligently were rare, and destined to remain rare for many
decades. Planning, by substituting routine for thought, was one
way to relieve this shortage of managerial talent at the lower
levels.

The five-year plans specified the main indices which were to
be achieved by the railways as a whole; the volume of traffic
uras the basic figure and this, in effect, was not fixed by the
planners of the Ministry of Ways and Communications but was
determined by the plans for the various sectors of the economy
which used railway transport. Whatever traffic was produced
the railways had to carry it and the allocation of resources to
transport was limited strictly to the minimum amount necessary
to enable the increments of traffic to be moved. The nkps and
the railways only planned the distribution and the handling of
the traffic. But with the shorter-term plans, the annual, quar-
terly, and monthly plans, the railway managements and nkps
were more intimately involved.

* Sec Zhtlnnodoroxhyni transport. May 1962.
The basic pattern of railway planning was set by orders of
the Council of Ministers issued in September 1933 and March
1934.1 'ГЪе first abolished the previous short-term planning
body, the Traffic Committee. Quarterly and monthly shipment
plans were to be formulated by the nkps with the assistance of
its inter-departmental traffic conference (which consisted of
representatives of the nkps, and of tlie commissariats of war,
the navy, heavy industry, timber and others, as well as of the
People’s Commissariat of Water Transport). The plans had to
lie confirmed by the Council of Labour and Defence. The 1934
order abolished a host of minor bodies, such as the raion
planning and traffic directorate of the nkps and the local traffic
conferences, which had all participated in planning and inter-
fered with the efforts of the railway officials. The composition
of annual, quarterly, and monthly plans was firmly entrusted to
the nkps, and after these had been confirmed by the Council of
Labour and Defence the chiefs of the railways were to hand
down the relevant sections to the railway divisions, and the
chiefs of the railway divisions would in turn transmit them to
the individual stations and depots. From 1939 the plans ceased
to be based on indices of freight carloadings. Instead, they were
formulated according to traffic: its volume, origin, and destina-
tion. Among other advantages, this change made it easier to
avoid irrational movements.

Thus the planning procedure which had evolved by the mid-
fifties was as follows. The five-year and one-year general eco-
nomic plans for tlie national economy were worked out by the
central planning organs and confirmed by the Supreme Soviet.
Tlie various ministries could give advice in their own fields
during the drawing up of these plans. The railway one-year
plan was worked out in three stages.2 The first was entrusted
to the Economic and Planning Directorate of the Ministry of
Ways and Communications (mps), which based its work on
the forecasts of die five-year plan and tlie latest information on
current levels of production. This first stage forecast the traffic

1 Zheleznodorozhny! tramport SSSH dokumentakh. pp. 283 and 294.

* The one-year plan is taken as an example because it may be considered the
basic railway plan. From it were derived the quarterly and monthly operating
plans. The one-year plan contained seven main sections: operations, workshop
production, capital repair, capital construction, supplies and equipment, labour,
finance. The procedure for compiling the monthly and quarterly operating plans
is shown in the Appendix.
both of the railway system and of the individual railways. These
basic figures were transmitted to the individual railways at
least six months before the start of the plan and the various
component units of the railway were informed of their own
particular share of the activity forecast. These lower units then
made their own plans, specifying what resources they would
need to handle the expected work and these local plans were
submitted to the planning directorate of the railway. Here they
were combined into a single plan for the railway and sent to
the planning directorate of the mps. After review inside the
Ministry this in turn was incorporated in the overall plan for
the whole network, copies of which were sent for approval to
die Council of Ministers, Ministry of Finance, and the state
planning organs. When approved the general railway plan was
included in the plan for the national economy as a whole, and
its financial provisions in the State Budget. Finally, the approved
and probably amended plan was transmitted back to the mps,
which returned its component parts to the railways. Each rail-
way then passed back to the divisions the relevant sections of
the railway plan.1 Thus the railway units which had to carry
out the plan wrere granted some participation and influence in
its formulation. In theory.

In practice, this system meant that the essential part of the
plan originated at the centre, for it was the mps in conjunction
with its clients the other ministries which decided the volume
and the pattern of traffic. Less than 2 per cent of the traffic
was planned at the local railway level. Thus an enterprise
wishing to ship its products by rail would not deal directly w'ith
the local railway. What happened was that the enterprise was
told (by the ministry to which it belonged) how many carloads
it was to ship in the particular planning period. The ministry
would contact the mps and the latter would incorporate it in
the plan for the railway concerned. This remote control from
Moscow, coupled with the fine detail of the plans, led to
frequent divergencies between the plan and the actual local
circumstance. The fact that plans were not formulated until
almost the beginning of the planning period added to the
difficulties. And the system was such that if, say, the shipper
discovered that the railway had been requested to supply fewer
cars than were in fact needed the remedy was not simply to

1 See Danilov, S. Op. cit, pp. 169-70.
pick up die telephone and speak to die railway audiorities. The
shipper would, instead, contact his own ministry, which would
get in touch widi the Ministry of Ways and Communications,
which would give fresh instructions to the railway. This process
might take weeks or months.1

The reorganization of economic administration in 1957, with
die establishment of 104 regional economic councils (sovnar-
khozy) on which devolved much of die planning and organizing
previously done from Moscow, provided an opportunity to
decentralize transport planning. In the last quarter of 1957 the
formulation of monthly and quarterly traffic plans began to be
split more equally between the individual railways and the
Ministry. Over a third of the traffic was planned by the railways
widi the co-operation of the local sovnarkhoz and local planning
organs. By 1961 only eight categories of freight were planned
by the Ministry by monthly or quarterly periods.2 This decen-
tralization appeared to cure earlier faults and also led to more
rational traffic flows. In the Sverdlovsk economic region, for
example, die absence of ministerial dictates permitted a 50-ktn.
reduction in the average length of timber haul.3 It was probably
no accident that the establishment of sovnarkhozy coincided
widi die stabilization of the previously ever-rising average
length of haul. On the other hand, the new system was not
completely satisfactory for long-distance inter-regional ship-
ments.

FINANCE AND ‘KHOZRASCHET’

Stricter costing procedures had been introduced during the New
Economic Policy but on the railways were not at first taken very
seriously. Railwaymen were concerned with coping with the
increasing traffic; die cost of doing so was only of secondary
interest. In May 1932 the Council of People’s Commissars
issued an instruction, whose preamble stated that . the
directive on the introduction of khozraschet to the railways has
not been fulfilled and in fact khozraschet does not yet exist’.*

1 Shafirkin, B. and Naumov, P. Planirovaniyt gruxovkh pertvoxok. Moscow, 1961,
pp. 59-64.

* Oil, grain, sugar, meat, dairy products, fish, all imports, and mixed water/rail
shipments.

* See Zhtleznodoroxhnyi transport. February 1958.

‘ ZMtznodorozlinyi transport SSSR v dokumentakh. p. 262.
A class E
locomotive in German
lUiids during the
лаг. Russian
demolition charges
lave removed the
cylinders,
photo, /tnonymuut.

An К class 2 8-0
captured by the
Germans during tlte
Second World War.
This type of tandem
compound engine was
built between 1899
and 1902 for the
Moscow Vindava
Rybinsk. Moscow
Kiev-Voronezh,
Ryazan-Uralsk, and
South Eastern
railways.

Photo. Anonymous.

The standard
post-war freight
locomotive. Several
thousand units of this
type (class I.) were
built in the late
forties and early fifties
Photo. Author.
1«. Hie last type of steam passenger engine to Ik- built for Russian railways; a 1’36' class
engine at Kalinin, on the Moscow Leningrad line, in 1959. Photo. Author.'

A 1 win-section 2,ООО h.p.
diesel-electric engine (type
TE-4) at work on the "
Moscow Belt line in 1961.
t'lioto. Author.

i

A Czechoslovak prototype
passenger electric engine
(subsequently ordered in
quantity by Soviet railways)
at Kalinin in 1.959, flanked
by Russian-built type VL22in
units. Photo. Author.

___—I
Irresponsible attitudes towards costs, receipts, and working
capital, and a general indifference on the part of the railway
units of administration towards the financial results of their
work were criticized in this document. It went on to introduce
measures to improve die situation. The railway was to become
the basic khozraschet unit. It was to have an independent profit
and loss account and it received die right to dispose of all the
income it earned in accordance with the quarterly and annual
plans. The old system whereby the ton-kilometres produced by
the railway were recompensed according to the planned, rather
than actual, costs, was abolished. Thus, the railway now looked
after its own financial affairs, using its receipts to cover its
expenses, both working and capital. It could check the costs of
its basic units (stations, depots, etc.) and thus find ways of
making better use of the railway's resources. It was also
expected to contribute a share of its profit to the state budget
to help finance railway construction and the railways which
were still making a loss.

In 1986 new measures were taken. While the railway re-
mained die basic economic unit, khozraschet was extended to
lower endties such as locomotive and car depots and workshops
and car repair points. Each railway was to work according to a
yearly and quarterly 'productive-financial' plan, which fixed its
traffic tasks, efficiency indices, labour force, wage fund, labour
productivity, costs and profit. This planned profit went, via the
nkps, to the state budget, but half of any above-plan profit
remained with the railway, and in 1937 railways were allowed
to establish their ‘Director’s Fund', financed from profits and
spent as bonuses or as grants for housing, clubs, or other social
services.

During the war various extraordinary financial measures
were taken to meet changing circumstances but these were only
temporary. In the post-war years the pattern of the thirties wras
followed, with khozraschet becoming more and more sophisti-
cated and widely applied. There were occasional minor adjust-
ments. One of these dealt with a problem which had been
experienced in the nineties, the different costs of railways which
loaded and unloaded traffic as compared to the ‘bridge’ lines
which only carried it. To remedy this, in 1954 and 1960 mea-
sures were approved by which when the income from through
traffic was divided between the participants, a bonus per ton or
per passenger train was received by the originating and
receiving railways.

During the forties,' due largely to fixed freight tariffs at a
time of inflation, tlie railways began to make an operating loss
(nearly 3,000 million roubles in 1947). Among measures taken
in 1949 to reduce state subsidies to various branches of tlie
economy, was a tariff adjustment designed to improve railway
finances. In 1949 the subsidization of the railways as a whole
came to an end, although in 1950 there were still nineteen
railways for which a subsidy was planned, diminishing to one
(the narrow-gauge South Sakhalin Railway) in 1961.1

TARIFF POLICY

The new conditions of rapid industrialization entailed changes
in tlie railw ay tariff system. In 1929, the limits of differentiation
were widened, to give more scope for influencing the economy
through tariff policy. In place of the 28 general classes of the
1926 tariff", there w’cre introduced 38, and the difference
between the lowest and the highest was increased to 1:28.
(0'56 and 15-98 kopeks per ton/km.).2 In 1931 a completely
revised tariff system caine into force. This was worked out on
the basis of a directive from the Council of People’s Commissars,
which specified that in general the new rates should cover both
direct and indirect costs, and on average should be no higher
than the 1926-27 tariff index. On the other hand, these two
principles could be over-ridden in the interest of certain political
and economic goals; that is, key mass goods might be carried
below cost, concessive tariffs could be established for fostering
certain favoured industries, and the new general tariff would be
subject to a 50-400 per cent surcharge in the case of goods not
belonging to the socialist sector of the economy.

Among the freight considered to be of sufficient political
importance to enjoy concessions were agricultural machinery,
fertilizers, and tractor fuel (in connection with the difficult
agricultural situation at that time), and industries in the new
union republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as in

» Ivlieva, I. Op. cit., p. 64. Tlie South Sakhalin Railway, acquired from Japan
in 1945, is exceptional among Soviet railways in being entirely narrow-gauge.
Tlie gauge itself is unusual, being the Japanese 1,067 mm. standard.

* Main sources for this section: Kuchurin, S. Op. cit., p. 26 it uq. Turetskii,
Sh. Ocherlci planmmo tsenoobraxovaniya v SSSR. Moscow, 1959, p. 355 it uq.
Siberia and the Far East. For the benefit of these, sharp rate
reductions over long distances were instituted. In addition to
the general commodity groups (35 of the 1929 tariff'classes
had been retained) there were 58 special tariffs for favoured
traffic such as coal, oil, grain and timber, calculated both on a
ton/km. and car/km. basis.

The sharp decrease in long-distance rates, compared to the
small or non-existent reductions over short hauls, was the most
obvious feature of the new tariff'. It was not, however, universal,
for in calculating many of the new tariff's the principle of cost
was strictly adhered to. In the case of commodities which had
previously enjoyed concessive or exclusive tariff's, the result
was sometimes a sharp reduction in short distance and a slight
increase in long-distance tariff's; a flattening of the previous
distance/rate curve. This was noticeably the case with grain,
which had previously enjoyed more than 50 exclusive tariff's,
including export rates and big concessions on grain going for
storage or for milling. These concessions had encouraged
irrational movements and an increased distance of haul. In
particular, grain was being milled in the consumption rather
than the production areas, which was considered to waste
transport resources. By the new tariff' grain rates were nearly
halved over distances up to 500 km. and increased by a half on
3,500 km. hauls. After the new tariff'came into force the pattern
of grain transport changed in the desired way; the proportion
moving over 3,000 km. declined to a quarter of the previous
percentage, while that covering distances up to 800 km.
increased by a half.

The combination of reduced tariffs for long hauls with con-
cessionary tariff's brought the ton/km. rates for bulk industrial
goods to a level below costs. In connection with the Urals-
Kuznetsk metallurgical combine, for instance, the rate on Kuz-
netsk coal moving to the Urals was reduced by three times,
while the rates for Magnitogorsk ores to the Kuzbas were
halved.1 There were similar reductions elsewhere. As the
first five-year plan envisaged new industries on the basis of
expanded production of raw materials in the old centres, the
rates on Donbas coal to Leningrad and the north were halved
and there were 20-40 per cent reductions in rates on basic raw

’ For a detailed discussion of freight rates for the metallurgical industry see
Clark, M. The Economics of Soviet Steel. Harvard, 1956.
materials to the Far East and Central Asia. As bulk raw
materials were forming an increasing proportion of total traffic
it was not long before freight movements as a whole became
unprofitable, especially as the costs of resources used by the
railways were increasing. From 1934 onwards losses on freight
traffic were covered by the profitable passenger services, whose
tariff's had been increased in 1930. At the same time, the low
freight tariffs for long-distance hauls of basic materials led to
an irrational pattern of development and distribution, with
industrial areas importing over long distances materials which,
with some effort, could have been obtained locally. To remedy
these deficiencies, and to deal with the problem of unbalanced
traffic flows, a new tariff reform was approved in 1939.

The 1939 reform increased the general level of tariffs by
about a half to bring them closer to the price level, which had
risen during the five-year plans. The increase was greatest for
consumption goods, while raw materials and fuels were subject
to increases smaller than the average. The main principle of the
new tariff's, however, was not the general increase but the
radical reconstruction of the system of differentiation according
to distance. Commodities were studied separately and rates up
to what was considered the natural limit of their desirable
length of haul were hardly increased at all, while above the
‘normal’ distance rates increased, even becoming punitive. At
the same time, to discourage very short-distance traffic which
would be better handled by automobile or horse transport, 50
km. was taken as the minimum tariff distance. Thus, to take
the example of cement, which was one of the industrial raw
materials enjoying favourable rates, the price per ton/km. before
1939 had been a maximum of 3-7 kopeks at the shortest
distance, reducing sharply to 2-59 kopeks at 250 km. and then
sloping down to 1-14 kopeks at 3,000 km. By contrast, the
1939 rate started at 5 kopeks on a 50 km. haul, declining to
2’93 kopeks at 250 km. and 2-50 kopeks at 1,500 km., after
which it remained constant. In the case of sand and building
stone, the new rate dropped from 4-20 to 2-15 kopeks between
50 km. and 500 km., but then rose appreciably, reaching 3'52
kopeks at 3,000 km.

The general tariff'of 1939 had seven groups with a 1:6
separation (5-30 kopeks per ton/km.), and twenty-six special
groups for the key raw materials. There were also two rates
for goods moving by fast train (40 kopeks for fast freight and
70 kopeks for goods by passenger or parcels trains). Among
other exceptional rates were a 50 per cent reduction on short-
distance coal from mines opened to make an area less dependent
on distant resources, a 25 per cent surcharge on oil products
from the Caucasus to the east by an all-rail route (to encourage
use of combined rail-water services), and surcharges of 25 per
cent on commodities travelling both ways between two points
(for example, on ferrous metals moving from the south to the
Urals and vice versa). There were also surcharges of from
25 to 100 per cent on shipments of raw materials to an area
which could develop its own local resources (for example, on
manganese ores moving from the Caucasus to the Urals). On
the one hand, some low (and mostly loss-making) rates in
connection with the more gigantic of Soviet projects were
continued; Magnitogorsk ore continued to be carried at half-
price to Novokuznetsk (1 kopek instead of 2-07 per ton/km.),
and Kuznetsk coal to the Urals at 1 kopek in place of 1-74 per
ton/km.

An improvement over the 1931 tariff's were die measures
taken to encourage better utilization of rolling stock. The 1931
tariffs had provided incentive carload rates only for raw
materials; many products, like sugar, tobacco and sunflower
seed were usually shipped by the carload but nevertheless paid
less-than-carload rates. The 1939 tariffs established carload
rates as standard for all commodities (with surcharges if the
car was not fully loaded). Carload rates entailed a small but
continuing reduction in the real rates per ton, because utilization
of car capacity was improving. For goods shipped in small
quantities a less-than-carload rate was devised by adding a
surcharge of about 25 per cent (depending on the commodity)
to the carload rate.

The 1939 tarifflasted ten years, although during the war the
measures taken towards a rationalization of freight flows were
no longer justified and were temporarily abandoned. Also, in
1942, the general level of rates was increased by 39 per cent,
discounts for marchrout traffic were abandoned, and passenger
rates were again raised. Nevertheless, bulk freight rates were
unprofitable during and after the war, necessitating subsidies
from the state budget. After the war, with increased prices for
fuel and materials, higher wages and lower labour productivity,
the average cost of freight movement was 5-169 kopeks (in
1947) against an average tariff'rate of 4-91 kopeks per ton/km.1
The bulk goods were, as always, the most unprofitable; only
a few- consumer products were still carried at rates higher than
cost.

For this reason, and in accordance with the decision to end
as soon as possible widespread subsidization, tariff' changes
were made in 1949, when an average tariff of 5-75 kopeks per
ton/km. was adopted. The general principles of the 1939 tariff
were maintained writh slight modifications. Fuel and raw
material tariffs were kept at a relatively low level. Short-
distance tariff's of 50 km. or so were increased by three or four
times, following investigation which showed that the real costs
of these short hauls were much higher than had been thought.
There were some modifications to encourage better car utiliza-
tion (for example, a 20 per cent reduction for briquettes,
which have a better loadability than coal). There were 31
commodity groups, of which 25 were special categories for
particular bulk goods with complicated differentials to en-
courage rational hauls. The remaining 6 general groups were
for the remaining freight, and were based on diminishing rates
up to 1,500 km., beyond w-hich the tariff remained stable. In
addition there were 55 exclusive tariffs, which grew- to 80 by
1950 and 167 by 1951.

From 1950 onwards there was a succession of percentage
rate cuts, in line with the policy of reducing prices in the
country. Between 1950 and 1955 railway freight rates on
average diminished by a third. Under conditions of increasing
traffic, however, the railways remained profitable. Decreases
were applied selectively; in the first reduction consumer goods
fared better than the bulk freight, while to encourage a desired
shift in the distribution of coal, Moscow region coal production
was shipped at 50 per cent reduction in the hope of limiting
the sphere of Donetz coal. Fish traffic from the Pacific received
a similar concession. By means of such traffic reductions, the
average tariffs of most commodity groups moved closer to their
costs. By 1955, for example, the average coal tariff was 99 per
cent of the average cost of coal transport, while cotton cloth,

1 Costs in the ussr were not absolutely comparable with the western concept
of cost. In particular, interest on capital and certain social services provided for
railway workers were not included.
previously charged 385 per cent of cost, was now a little closer
at 285 per cent. Items besides cloth which were still charged
double, or more, of cost included footwear, sugar and canned
goods. Most raw materials were carried at or close to cost.
There was a reversal of the policy towards grain and flour; it
was now decided that it was more economical for the milling
industry to be located in the consuming areas, so rates for flour
were fixed at a higher level than for grain.

Throughout the Soviet period railway rates rose more slowly
than prices. In 19-Ю Donetz coal was priced eight times higher
than in 1913, while the average tariff for its movement only
quadrupled; the price of flour increased by sixteen times in the
same period while its tariff was still only four times more
expensive, and these are typical examples. Expressed differently,
the transport component became a smaller percentage of prices.
In 1928 tlie average tariff for Donetz coal was 75 per cent of
the total cost, but in 1954 only 14 per cent, similar figures for
margarine were 4 per cent and 1 per cent, for kerosene 35 per
cent and 17 per cent.

In 1956, the average freight tariff was 4-298 kopeks per
ton/km., against an average cost of 3-316 kopeks.

Apart from tlie tariff, the railway levied other charges for
different services. Most of these were closer to a fine than a
charge. Thus, if the destination of a car was changed en route
at the request of the shipper or receiver, a fee was payable (in
1955, 300 roubles per car). Of more importance were the
punitive demurrage charges introduced to compel quick load-
ings and unloadings of cars, thus increasing car utilization
rates. According to the new Charter of Soviet Railways (intro-
duced 1955), receivers had one clear day in which to unload a
car. After this, the consignee paid a fine which for a non-
specialized 4-axle car began at s roubles per car/hour for the
first six hours and increased to the crippling rate of 15 roubles
per car/hour after eighteen hours.1 Tardy shippers were treated
similarly. Against this, the railways themselves were obliged
to pay fines to customers when goods were delayed, except
when this was due to bad weather.

In the Soviet period tlie zone system of passenger tariffs was
retained, but with modifications. From 1929 instead of tlie
approximately 500 tariff zones of the pre-revolutionary system,

* Uitav xheleznykh dorog toyuza SSR. Moscow, 1955, p. 57.
there were 174, of which the shortest was 5 km. (priced at 10
kopeks) and the longest 150 km. (at l-IO roubles). This
remained in force until 1938, though with general percentage
rate increases from time to time. In 1938, and again in sub-
sequent years, the rate increases began to be applied with
discrimination. In that year, for example, there was a fare
increase of 25 per cent on distances up to 500 km., reducing to
10 per cent for journeys longer than 5,000 km. In 1960 the
whole system was reformed, the most notable change being a
reduction in the number of tariff zones from 174 to 110. Zone
No. 1 remained 5 km. long, but the last zone was much longer
than previously: 580-40 roubles would buy a 'normal’ ticket to
я plane anywhere between 1 1.Я71 km and	km distant

The effect of the 1960 change was to increase rates up to
about 3,000 km. (so that the per kilometre tariffs at 100,500
and 1,000 km. were respectively 1-7, 1-22, and 0-91 roubles
against 1-54, 1-17, and 0-88 in 1959) and to slightly reduce
fares over the longer distances, especially the inedium-long
journeys of around 5,000 km. (Thus the 5,000 and 10,000 km.
fares in 1960 were respectively 0-51 and 0-49 roubles per
kilometre, against 0-53 and 0-50 in 1959.) This change did
not accord with the official policy of transferring long-distance
passengers from rail to air transport. Instead it would seem to
be simply a manifestation of the ‘charge what the traffic will
bear’ philosophy: reducing fares to meet airline competition
and raising them where there was less competition.

The above-mentioned fares (taken from the 1959 and 1961
official timetables) are based on ‘normal’ accommodation. That
is, for unreserved seating in (usually) the standard 58-berth
non-compartmented ‘hard’ sleeping car which could accommo-
date 107 sitting passengers. For better accommodation, or for
faster trains, supplements were payable. To secure lying space
in the 58-berth car a supplement varying from 35 per cent of
the normal fare at 300 km. to 89 per cent at 100 km. was
charged. ‘Soft’ accommodation was 75 per cent more than the
normal fare. To travel in a courier train there was a 25 per cent
supplement, and in a fast train 12 per cent. The first of these
was probably economically justified, for courier trains were
usually of limited size in the interest of speed. On the other
hand fast trains, because of their more intensive use of both
labour and equipment, were in fact cheaper to operate than the
ordinary passenger train and the supplement for their use was
unjustified and somewhat archaic in the age of air transport.

Tariff's for commuter services were characterized by the
variety of classifications and the wide price difference between
them. The most expensive ticket wras one issued at the standard
non-commuter rate. Then there were the special commuter
fares calculated either on a per-kilometre basis or (in seven
cities in the late fifties) on special commuter tariff zones. Apart
from these, and in accordance with the policy of reducing
transport expenses for workers, especially cheap season tickets
were issued. According to the 1928 tariff, a monthly ticket wras
priced at twenty-five times the one-wray fare, a four-month
ticket at seventy-five times, and an annual at two hundred times.
By the late thirties this formula had changed to 60 kopeks per
kilometre for monthly, 2 roubles for four-monthly, and 5
roubles for annual tickets. From 1940 season tickets were sold
only to workers and students travelling between home and
work. Later, pensioners were also allowed to buy them.
Another change in 1940 was that all types of commuter tickets
increased their per kilometre price above a distance of SO km.
Previously the rate diminished as the length of journey in-
creased.

In 1958 on a 20-km. commuter journey, against the normal
tariff of 2-95 roubles the commuter rate was 2-00 roubles; a
reduction of almost one-third. But the monthly ticket cost only
13'20 roubles, and the season and annual tickets had an even
more favourable rate.1

Passenger operations were the most profitable part of railway
work during the five-year plans. In 1957 the average receipt
per long-distance passenger/km. was 9-7 kopeks, while the
corresponding cost was only 5  7. With commuters, the average
receipt was 6-23 kopeks, and cost 5 «01. There was, however,
considerable cross-subsidization. An important segment of
passenger work, the carriage of mail, had costs averaging 35 • 9
kopeks per axle/km. and receipts of only 20 kopeks. An annual
commuter ticket, assuming 720 rides in a year over a 20-km.
section, was priced at only 15 per cent of cost, whereas the
special one-trip commuter rate was almost double cost. In the
long-distance services the traveller in 'soft’ accommodation
paid 75 per cent more than the standard fare, but the costs of

1 Ivlieva, I. and Potopova, V. Transportnyu tar if у. Moscow, 1960, pp. 151-5.
1*
such accommodation worked oui at 250 per cent more than
standard.1

*

PASSENGER SERVICES

Despite the fact that passenger trains made a profit, while
freight often did not, passenger services during the 1928-60
period were unsatisfactory both in frequency and speed. Obtain-
ing a reservation on main-line trains for the private person was
at times impossible. The demand for freight sen-ices took
priority over the demand for passenger travel. This was
noticeable both in the hectic days of the early five-year plans,
and after the war, when freight traffic reached its pre-war level
hi 19+8 but passenger traffic only in 1951.

Apart from infrequency, train services were also characterized
by slowness. Although fast passenger trains had never been an
outstanding feature of the Russian railways, railway speed in
the thirties was often below the level of the eighteen-nineties. In
1936 Vladivostok was 2051 hours from Moscow (45 km. per
hour or 28 m.p.h.) and on the new Turk-Sib Railway trains
managed to average only 27 km. per hour (17 m.p.h.). There
were seven Leningrad-Moscow trains of which the fastest left
at 12.30 a.m. and arrived, after four intermediate stops, at
10.40. This was an overall average of 65 km. per hour (40
m.p.h.) while between stations average speeds of 77 km. per
hour (48 m.p.h.) were scheduled. The only trains which
showed a marked improvement were the electrified suburban
linpsz whpw> cp^cd and frequency attained new and much higher
levels. In 1950, after recovery from the war, there were only
three fast (plus three slow) trains each way between Moscow
and Leningrad, and the fastest averaged only 55 km. per hour
(34 m.p.h.). This was the fastest Russian train at that time.
The best Moscow-Kharkov train averaged 42 km. per hour
(26 m.p.h.), and it still took nine days to travel from Moscow
to Vladivostok.*

But in the fifties an increasing electrified mileage permitted
an improvement both in frequency and velocity. Also, in 1960
fast day trains were introduced between Moscow and Leningrad.
These new trains, which represented to some extent an

1 Ivlieva. 1. and Potopova, V. Transportnyie tar if у. Moscow, I960, pp. 196-9.

* Ofitsial’nyi ukazatel' paaazhtrskikh soobschenii. Moscow, Winter 1936-37,
Summer 1950, Summer 1959, Summer 1961.
Americanization of the traditional Russian passenger train, were
hauled by a small batch of passenger diesel locomotives. They
numbered two in each direction, and covered the 650 km. in
6 hours 20 minutes with one intermediate stop at Bologoye.
This represented an overall average speed of 103 km. per hour
(64 m.p.h.).1 Elsewhere on electrified lines the better passenger
trains averaged around 70 km. per hour (44 m.p.h.). The
Moscow-Vladivostok journey took only seven days and two
hours in 1962. On the reconstructed lines still with steam
traction average speeds were around 55 km. per hour (85
m.p.h.) although higher speeds were attained on some sections
(for example, post-war 4^8-4 engines were hauling trains at
70 km. pci" hour (-44 m.p.h.) start-to-stop between Minak and
Orsha (209 km.)). On the steam lines with weak track where
2-6-2 engines were still used speeds were more traditional, about
45 km. per hour (28 m.p.h.). Travel on these secondary cross-
country routes was sometimes enlivened by the unexpected:

. . Train no. 45 was scheduled to cover die 358 miles in
15| hours—a gross average of 23 m.p.h. . . . The power pro-
vided for this cross-country trip over lightweight track was
Su 2-6-2 no. Su 202-06. Its load was twelve cars. . . .

'In actual fact, our gross speed was considerably less than 23
m.p.h., for the following morning the train unexpectedly stopped
in the middle of nowhere. Most of the passengers, inquisitive,
climbed down and made their way to the engine, forming an
interested audience to a fierce argument which w'as raging
between the locomotive engineer and a local permanent way
foreman. Apparently a defective rail had been found ahead and
the foreman, who would be held responsible if a train was
delayed by this, w'as urging the engineer to go forward cau-
tiously. But the latter, who might well be held criminally
responsible should an accident result, refused to move the train
until the rail was replaced. Since nobody else was permitted to
drive the engine, he held all the trumps, and so, tiring of the
argument and feeling that the passengers were against him, he
retired sulkily but triumphantly to a shady spot on the embank-
ment. However, after an hour or tw'o, perhaps because he was

1 In 1963, after completion of the Moscow-Leningrad electrification, the day
trains were accelerated. The fastest of them, no. 5 from Ijeningrad to Moscow, had
an overall average speed of 74 m.p.h.
feeling hungry, he climbed on to the engine, pulled madly at the
whistle cord for a half minute, and then opened the regulator.
As we moved off some of the passengers who had strayed too
far could be seen running frantically after the train.’1

The electrified suburban sendees were fast and frequent. On
the Moscow-Klin line, for example, in daylight hours seven to
nine trains ran each hour. Half of these went as far as Kryukovo
and the remainder all the way to Klin, running semi-fast to
Kryukovo. The 89 km. to Klin were covered in 1 hour 45
minutes. The last train of the day left at 1.27 a.m., the first
train at 3.49 a.m.2 Such a service could not be matched any-
where else in Europe or America.

LABOUR

The tendency for nominal railway wages to increase, but more
rapidly than productivity, was reversed during the thirties and
the outpacing of wages by productivity became a permanent
feature of Soviet railways. In terms of real wrages, observations
suggest that there was a decline during the thirties and that
this decline developed into a definite drop during the war. It
would seem that even allowing for invisible wages in the form
of various social services and collective works, the real wage
level of the Soviet railwaymen did not reach the level of the
late twenties until after 1950.

At the same time, labour productivity (as expressed in ton/
km. and passenger/km. per worker) rose significantly. Taking
1913 as the base year (100 per cent) productivity was 104 per
cent in 1928, 280 per cent in 1940, and 469 per cent in 1956.
These increases in productivity were less than the increases in
traffic, and the gap was filled by recruitment. Traffic between
1913 and 1956 increased by about twelve times, labour produc-
tivity by less than five times, while the number of operating
staff increased from 691,000 in 1913 (post-1945 frontiers) to
1,980,000 in 1956.2 This illustrates the policy, common to the

* Trains. July 1962.

’ Raspisaniye dvizhiniya prigorodnykh potzdov. Ltningradskit vokzal. Summer
1961.

• Transport i svaz' SSSR. pp. 64-5. On p. 22 total railway workers are given as
8,414,000 in 1956.
whole economy but especially marked in transport, of compen-
sating for a shortage of capital equipment by a lavish use of
labour. This was the direct opposite of the tendency on Ameri-
can railways, where capital was generously invested so as to
reduce dependance on expensive man-hours. Tlie two million
operating workers represented only about half the total number
of railway workers, which numbered nearly four million if
workers in railway construction and railway factories be
included. This four million equalled about 8 per cent of the
total Soviet labour force. Expressed in ton/km. per w'orker,
labour productivity on Soviet railways was between one-third
and one-quarter of the American level. Expressed in workers
per mile of track the difference was ten to one.1 In the mid-
fifties, however, the Russian railway labour force began to
stabilize and by the sixties actually began to diminish. This,
being a result of the new forms of motive power, was a reversal
of the previous trend; machines were now replacing men. This
was a necessary change because new workers were becoming
less plentiful. Even before the war, when rural over-population
was a rich source of new industrial labour, tlte demand for
railway workers had exceeded the supply. Just before the war,
as a part of the policy for strengthening ‘labour reserves’,
railway training schools were established for children who came
to them both voluntarily and by conscription. (The original
‘children's railways’ were part of this scheme.) In the field of
railway construction there was the use on the one hand of
Komsomol volunteers, and on tlie other hand of forced labour,
often working in sub-human conditions.

Another source of workers was the absorption of female
labour, especially during the war. About 6| per cent of railway
workers were women in 1928. In 1945, 1 per cent of engine
drivers, 8 per cent of assistant drivers, 43 per cent of conductors
and 81 per cent of car porters were women. Some locomotives
were manned by husband and wife teams. In 1954 one-third of
all railway workers were female.

The need to train new workers was met by new schools and
instruction courses, many of them night classes or correspon-
dence courses involving no interruption of work. In 1928 there
were two railway schools providing higher education and

1 See Soviet Studies. July 1959. These comparisons are crude, especially as they
ignore passenger traffic.
sixty-four railway technical schools. In 1954 there was a
'railway academy’, fourteen institutes providing higher educa-
tion, and over eighty technical schools. During the war, when
there was an influx of fresh labour (61 per cent of railway
workers in 1944 had joined since the outbreak of war), training
facilities worked at high pressure; 3,105 new drivers were
trained in 1944 alone.1

Wage policy and practice were gradually refined, after a
period during which norm-fixing was an absurd process (in the
early thirties on one railway there were no less than eighty-four
different norms for workers in locomotive depots. Norms were
sometimes calculated by summing the time taken by different
jobs and dividing the total by the number of jobs). Excessive
equalization of wages (such as existed in 1931 at the Alexan-
drovsk shops, where unskilled labourers received 92 and skilled
smiths only 99 roubles per month2) was replaced by wide
differentials and an extension of the piece-rate system, even
though the latter is not easy to apply to railway workers. In
1955, 55 per cent of railway operating staff were on piece rates.
In addition, railway workers shared in bonuses awarded to and
surpluses earned by railways or their component units. For
example, the engine crews of a locomotive depot might share
in a bonus earned by the depot for reducing its fuel consumption.
The best workers also received individual cash awards. But
there was a reverse aspect to the prize system since forfeits
were exacted for ‘unsatisfactory’ work. For example, if an
engine crew exceeded the thirty-minute norm for preparation
time, their piece rate dropped by 30 per cent. If the locomotive
broke down en route they lost that day’s pay.8

The wage system left much to be desired. The division of
the pay packet into the regular wage and various bonuses often
meant that men working in different units received widely
differing pay for the same work. Piece rates were instituted for
jobs not suited to them; the most fatuous example of this were
the piece rates for passenger engine drivers, who had no control
over their productivity. Work norms in other jobs w'ere often
badly calculated; perhaps in an effort to attract skilled workers
the real wage rates of many workshops were inflated by the

1 Danilov, S. Op. cit., p. 421. Naporko, Л. Ocherki razvitiya zheleznodorazhnavo
transporta SSSR. Moscow, 1954, p. 212.

* Bolshevik. 16-1931.	• Danilov, S. Op. cit., pp. 428, 435.
adoption of low productivity norms. Unlike other workers,
railwaymen did not receive extra pay for night work. Engine
and train crews travelling to and from their duties were paid
only at half rate or less for this time, which was not counted
towards their total of working hours.1

In the early sixties the wage system began to be simplified
in connection with the transition to a 7-hour working day,8
and some of the anomalies were removed. At the same time an
effort was made to bring the wage rates of the lowest-paid
workers closer to the average.

LOCOMOTIVE MANNING

The traditional system of manning locomotives in Russia was
always the ‘personal’ regime. Under this, a given crew was
attached to a definite locomotive, and was responsible not only
for driving it but also keeping it in good order. The Russian
‘mashinist’ was not only a driver; he was also a mechanic and
carried a spanner as well as an oil-can. Running repairs to his
steam engine were his own responsibility and in Soviet times
locomotive failure en route resulted in loss of pay for the engine
crew. The great advantage of this system was the loving care
which a crew' w’ould lavish on its own engine, and the sensitivity
which they developed for its idiosyncracies. The result of this
was that maintenance was good and the engine worked reliably.
Unfortunately, the system meant that the engine was out of use
whnn the ctpw was nflLdnty, and locomotive utilisation was very
low. One remedy for this was to have two, or three, crews per
engine, which somewhat eroded the personal interest, or the
shift system where an engine was taken by any crew.

As Russian railways during many periods were short of
engines the shift system, which permits an engine to work
continuously, apart from servicing hours, was adopted from
time to time. The South-Western Railway tried it during the
Turkish War but soon abandoned it when locomotives began to
deteriorate. The Ryazan-Uralsk Railway used it between 1904
and 1916 during the five months of the peak grain season,

1 Naporko, A. Sokrashcheniye rabochevo dnya i uporyadochtniye zarabotnoiplaty na
zkeleznodorozhnom tramporte. Moscow, 1961, pp. 11-12.

’ In the fifties locomotive and train workers had a working day of about seven
or eight hours and not more than twelve. Shift workers were generally organized
in a four-brigade system, working eight and twelve-hour shifts.
bringing its locomotives back into condition during the quiet
months. From 1914 to 1917 it found increasing application on
Russian railways, but .was largely responsible for the deteriora-
tion in the locomotive stock experienced at that time.

The Soviet Government, which had reinstituted the 'personal'
system in 1918 was unwise enough to condemn it ten years
later, when increasing traffic was leading to an engine shortage.
From the end of 1927 ‘impersonal’ driving was introduced;
when a crew* arrived on duty they would take the first available
engine. At first this produced some very encouraging utilization
indices; average daily locomotive mileage increased from 128
km. in January 1928 to 162 km. in August 1929 and during the
same period average commercial speed of trains increased from
13 km. per hour (8 m.p.h.) to 14-3 km. per hour (9 m.p.h.).
But there followed a steep decline so that in some months the
figures were inferior to those of 1928. At the same time there
was a sharp increase in locomotive failures, from 3-8 per
million locomotive/km. in 1928 to 13-3 in 1930. In absolute
figures there were 1,744 engine failures en route in 1928, and
7,798 in 1930. Tlie attempt to brand these as the acts of
‘enemies of the people, saboteurs and wreckers’ was followed
at the beginning of 1931 by tlie reinstitution of ‘personal’
driving, with immediate benefits to locomotive reliability. At
first two crews were allocated to each engine but this was later
increased to three or more.

After the war were introduced new’ electric and diesel loco-
motives, which are best maintained by specialists and which
need to be utilized to the maximum, having high capital charges
as well as demanding fewer servicing hours than steam engines.
In these circumstances it might have been expected that a shift
system of engine manning would have been introduced, espe-
cially as in North America diesel engines were successfully
operating without change over distances like the 2,900 miles
(4,700 km.) between Montreal and Vancouver. But there was
considerable resistance to this idea, perhaps because of unhappy
memories of previous shift working with steam engines. A book
on the subject of motive power operation published in 19571
advanced some very specious arguments aganst the so-called
‘American System’. It was not until the sixties that much

1 Akadetniya Nauk. Melody ekspluatatsiya tyagovykh seeds tv na transports.
Moscow, 1957.
relaxation in this attitude became apparent, and shift manning,
longer traction divisions, and through locomotive working past
railway section boundaries became common.

ELECTRIFICATION AND DIESELIZATION

The first electrified railway in the ussr was the Baku suburban
line converted during the twenties, and the advantages of this
form of traction were well known to the Soviet planners, who
constantly were seeking ways to increase railway capacity
without building new lines. The ability of electric locomotives
to haul heavy trains at high speeds and with outstanding relia-
bility guaranteed them a place in Russian railway operation.
However, the first main line to be electrified was not a heavy-
traffic route, but the 6S-km. heavily graded line over the Surain
Pass of the Trans-Caucasus Railway. This was converted to
electric traction in 1933. During the later thirties a heavy-
traffic trans-Urals line, the Kizel-Sverdlovsk section (490 km.)
was converted, as were the Novokuznetsk-Belovo line in the
Kuzbas, and the Krivoi Rog-Zaporozhe line in the Donbas,
both heavy-traffic routes. Parts of the Murmansk Railway,
climatically difficult for steam operation, were also electrified.
But electrification never proceeded as fast as was planned; in
the second five-year plan alone 5,000 km. of route were
scheduled for electrification but by 1938 the total electrified
mileage was only 1,622 km. Of this, Moscow and Leningrad
suburban lines accounted for SOO km., the Trans-Caucasus and
North Caucasus for 350 km., and the Urals for 500 km. By the
outbreak of war in 1941 there were still only 1,870 km. of
electrified line. Progress was a little faster in the post-war
decade, although conversion lagged well behind the plans.
About 3,400 km. were electrified between 1945. and 1955. This
included the Penn-Chusovaya and Chelyabinsk—Zlatoust lines
in the Urals, converted in the forties, suburban lines in Moscow,
Leningrad, Riga, Kiev, Baku and other cities and, in the fifties,
two long stretches of the Trans-Siberian Railway; Omsk-
Novosibirsk (640 km.) and Dema-Chelyabinsk (490 km.).

Pre-war Russian experience with diesel traction was totally
unhappy and seems to support the claim that in highly-planned
economies an error of judgment may become a disaster. The
advantages of diesel traction in Russian conditions were
obvious; the railways would need to carry less coal, and the
problems of steam operation in frozen or arid territory avoided.
The ussr had imported a few diesel locomotives from Germany
during the twenties and felt ready to produce them domestically.
In 1930 the Kolomna works turned out its first diesel loco-
motive, and in 1933 the Kaluga factory was to produce a diesel
shunter. The diesel engines, both German and Russian, operated
at first in European Russia, where they could more easily be
kept under observation, and worked satisfactorily.

At this stage the Party stepped in to support those railway
administrators who had become diesel enthusiasts. The June

fig. 13. The type E-el diesel-electric locomotive, the least unsuccessful of
the pre-war Soviet diesel designs.

1931 plenum of its Central Committee approved the dieseliza-
tion of certain lines in Central Asia, where lack of water
hampered steam operation. As during this period officials of
the nkps were being accused of sabotage and pessimism in
their attitude towards diesel locomotives, it would appear that
many railway experts opposed dieselization at this time. But
despite this opposition diesel shops were established at Ash-
khabad and the Ashkhabad Railway was dieselized as fast as
was possible with the slow delivery of locomotives. But it was
not long before the diesels, far from the locomotive works
where they were built, deprived of the careful and expensive
maintenance to which they were accustomed, and handled in
traffic with no special care, began to fail in service. Some
merely cracked their cylinders but others caught fire, and they
were not popular with their drivers, who could be held respon-
sible for breakdowns. They were ‘temporarily’ withdrawn from
service, and to replace the abandoned dieselization plans a
‘crash’ programme of condenser steam locomotive production
was adopted.

During the war some American-built diesel-electric loco-
motives were acquired and on the basis of these a new, and
successful, Soviet diesel locomotive was produced. By 1950, 2
per cent of railway freight traffic was handled by the diesels,
which in the first instance were allocated to the arid Central
Asian lines and the Trans-Baikal Railway (which, because of
permafrost, also had water problems).

Until the mid-fifties the intention was to carry out electrifica-
tion and dieselization at a steady but increasing rate, while
continuing to develop steam traction. There was no question
of a rapid and complete elimination of tlie steam locomotive,
even though diesel and electric traction would increase line
capacity and reduce operating costs.1 The sixth five-year plan
specified that in 1956-60, 6,000 steam, 2,000 diesel, and 2,000
electric engines would be produced. The general feeling was as
expressed by Kaganovich at a railwaymen’s conference in 1954.
As it was these same words which were later used against
Kaganovich at the time of his disgrace (when, among other
things, he was accused of trying to discourage electrification
and dieselization) the passage is worth quoting in full:*

‘I am for the steam locomotive. I am against those who
imagine that we shall have no steamers. It is a robust machine,
stubborn, and will not give up. However, one should not idealize
the steam engine. I should say straight out that although in
future the steam locomotive will remain, the leading locomotives
will be the electric and the diesel.’

But about 1955 the policy was changed. It was decided to
proceed much more rapidly, with the aim of eliminating steam

* The comparative figures produced by Soviet economists to show the cost
advantages of the new forms of traction are not given, since they do not sensibly
differ from similar calculations of western railways. It is, however, interesting to
note that, as in North America, the assumptions on which these calculations were
based were slanted to favour the newer forms of traction. For example, the F D
steam locomotive was chosen as the steam representative, although the post-war
L V engine was considerably more efficient. It is difficult to avoid the impression
that in tlie ussr, as on certain American railways, the decision to eliminate steam
was first taken by higher powers, and economists then produced cost estimates
to justify tlie decision. In actual fact, steam traction does cost more than diesel or
electric, but the difference is not as great as estimated. On the other hand, the
operational convenience of the new locomotives was probably under-estimated.

• Kaganovich, L. Op. cit., p. 70.
traction by 1970. The cause of this change was probably an
internal political one but it was based on certain real considera-
tions. There was the need not only to increase railway capacity,
but also to reduce railway costs. There was a changing pattern
of fuel consumption; increased oil production had been easier
than expected, new electric power projects guaranteed energy
for large-scale electrification plans, and long-distance haulage
of locomotive coal was undesirable. Soviet industry was in a
better position to design and build the new locomotives.
Finally there was the American example, for by 1955 the us
lines w'ere almost steamless.

The new policy was responsible for the electrification between
1956 and 1961 of 10,300 km. of line; by the middle of 1962
there were 16,000 km. of electrified railway in the Soviet Union.
Electrification of the Trans-Siberian Railway had been com-
pleted as far as Lake Baikal (5,400 km.; the longest stretch of
electrified railway in the world). Electrified also was the
Moscow-Kursk-Donbas line as far as Rostov, and this con-
nected with the newly-electrified Black Sea line to Batum and
Tbilisi. The Moscow-Leningrad electrification was due for
completion, and all lines into Moscow' were electrified. Some
lines, including the Trans-Siberian Railway east of Mariinsk,
were being electrified on the high voltage system. By 1962
most lines in Central Asia were worked by diesel traction and
diesel locomotives had also been allocated, as a temporary
measure, to heavy-traffic lines through the Urals awaiting
electrification, so as to provide an immediate increase of
capacity. By the middle of 1962 electric and diesel traction each
handled SO per cent of the total freight ton/km. (Although,
because the new engines worked over the dense-traffic sections,
in terms of train/km. the proportion would be less.) On the
Ashkhabad Railway, steam traction had entirely disappeared.

RAILWAY EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY

The poor state of the permanent way during the five-year plans
did not reflect any lack of capacity in the rail-rolling factories,
but rather a shortage of steel. In actual fact, the rail factories
inherited from the tsarist economy would have been sufficient
to meet normal Soviet demands, in view of the slower rate of
railway-building after the Revolution. Where capacity was
short was in the car-building industry. In the early thirties
car-building proceeded faster than in the twenties, but was still
insufficient. It was hampered not only by shortage of capacity
but also by shortages and muddles (in September 1932, for
example, at a time of crucial car shortage there w ere 1,100 new
cars complete except for the wheels, and wheels were not forth-
coming). But by the end of the second five-year plan almost all
car factories had been modernized and the big Dzerzhinskii
works built in the Urals. Specialization of production between
different works was extended, components standardized, and
Stakhanovism encouraged. These measures, together writh
better metal supplies and a temporary cessation of passenger
car construction, permitted a significant increase in freight-car
output after 19S5. In that year 8А,ООО new cars (in Q-axle
equivalents) were built. This figure was the result of a special
effort and in subsequent years output was smaller. The planned
production for I960 was 52,000 4-axle freight and 2,800
passenger cars, but actual production was only 35,300 and 1,645
respectively. In the post-war years much rolling stock, especially
passenger, was imported from Poland and East Germany.

During the thirties there was considerable reorganization of
locomotive-building. In 1930 the Putilov works ceased building
railway engines in favour of tractors. At about the same time
the Lugansk (Voroshilovgrad) w’orks were reconstructed to
permit the building of large 2-10-2 engines. After this recon-
struction Voroshilovgrad was capable of producing 1,000 F D
units annually, although in fact this figure was never quite
reached Other factories concentrated on the smaller designs.
The Nevskii wrorks and a factory at Novocherkassk specialized
in industrial locomotives. In 1935 output reached 1,638 units,
of which 631 w'ere built at Voroshilovgrad, 346 at Kharkov, 257
at Kolomna, 180 at Bryansk, 115 at Sormovo (Gorkii), and
109 at the Nevskii works. In 1938 a new works at Ulan Ude
began to build 80 engines, and during the war (when for all
practical purposes locomotive-building ceased) the Voroshilov-
grad plant wras evacuated to Krasnoyarsk, where for a time
engines were still built after Voroshilovgrad had been rehabili-
tated. In the first post-war years all the works built steam
locomotives, but in the fifties steam wrork was concentrated on
Voroshilovgrad and Kolomna. In the post-war period annual
steam locomotive production increased from 8 main-line units
in 1945 to about 1,000 in the early fifties. In 1956, the last
year of steam engine production, 500 units were built. During
the war about 2,000 steam locomotives were received from the
usa and after the war hundreds of engines built in Germany,
Hungary, and Finland were received as reparations.1

Pre-war diesel and electric locomotives were first imported,
and then built in very small numbers by the combined resources
of Kolomna and the Dynamo works. In 1940 only four main-
line diesels and nine main-line electrics were built. After die
war Kharkov began to specialize in diesel locomotives, traction

no. 14. In the thirties, in an attempt to find a solution to the conflict
between locomotive power and axle-load limitations, a few American
2-10-2 and 2-10-4 engines were imported. Also tried were a
Beyer-Garratt and a Soviet-built 4—14-4. The drawing illustrates
the latter, which was built at Voroshilovgrad in 1934. It was unsuccessful.

motors being supplied by Dynamo. Electric engines were first
built by Kolomna with help from Dynamo, but from 1947 the
Novocherkassk works built all electric engines. When steam
construction ceased, Kolomna and Lugansk (Voroshilovgrad)
turned to main-line diesels, and there was some division of
work between these two factories. Bryansk specialized in the
larger diesel switchers. Tlie former Maltsev works at Lyudi-
novo, and a factory at Murom began to produce small diesel
switchers, the Kaluga factory continued to build industrial and
narrow-gauge diesels, and the latter were also built at die
Votkinsk and Kalinin works. In the early sixties the first
engines were produced at a new main-line electric locomotive
works at Tbilisi. In 1961 domestic industry produced 557
main-line electric engines and 1,455 twin-unit main-line diesel
locomotives. A new Leningrad works was producing prototypes
of main-line diesel-hydraulic engines.

1 The Finnish engines were narrow-gauge.
There was continued reliance on imports, not only small
batches to acquaint home designers with foreign techniques,
but also large numbers of engines of particular categories which
Russian industry lacked the capacity to produce. Diesel switchers
were imported from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the
latter country also supplied passenger electric locomotives,
which had not been built in the Soviet Union apart from a
solitary locomotive in the mid-thirties. Hungary' wras also
responsible for the few diesel multiple-unit trains. Due to
planning muddles home production of these was not expected
to begin until the mid-sixties, at the Riga passenger car works.
The latter factory, however, was building many electric mul-
tiple-unit commuter trains (887 cars in 1961).1

LOCOMOTIVE POLICY

By 1929, 40 per cent of the Soviet freight-engine stock consisted
of the old О class, and about 25 per cent of the relatively new
E 0-10-0. To cope w ith growing traffic in the thirties new'
powerful engines were needed, and there was much discussion
as to what type of motive power should be used. It was, how'-
ever, impracticable at this time to replace steam power.

The vital need, locomotives of high power, was conditioned
by the poor state of the track, and really adequate designs
could not be introduced. So during the first two five-year plans
the E 0-10-0 continued to be built in large numbers. By the
mid-thirties 22-ton axle loads became feasible on a few main
lines and over 3,000 FD type 2-10-2 engines were built before
the war. These were of a new Soviet design, embodying many
American features. Shortly after the FD was approved, its
passenger version appeared. This was the Iosif Stalin (IS)
2-8-4, which had many parts, including boiler and cylinders,
standard with the FD. About 650 of these were built. As these
two designs had a 21-ton axle load and were thus limited in
operation, new 0-10-0 and 2-6-2 locomotives continued to
appear. But the former type was soon replaced by a 2-10-0
(class SO) with a larger boiler but the same wheels and
cylinders. A number of experimental engines were also built
before the war, including some streamlined 4-6-4 prototypes

1 Sources for this section: Westwood, J. Russian Locomotive Types. Bristol, I960.
Zheleznodoroxhnyi transport. March 1961, March 1962. Rakov, V. Op. cit.
in connection with proposed high-speed services between
Moscow’ and Leningrad.

After the war a new 2-10-0, the L type, with an 18-ton axle
loading was mass produced until 1954', w’hen it was replaced
by the LV 2-10-2, w’hich was similar but bigger, and reputed
to be very efficient. When the decision to abandon steam was
taken some Ainerican-size articulated prototypes were on trial.
The post-war passenger engines w’ere at first of the well-tried
standard 2-6-2, succeeded by the very capable P36 4—8-4-,
which had high power with a low (18-ton) axle load. A number
of experiments were carried out to enable novel fuels to be
used; one engine was equipped to bum coal dust, another to
use liquihed gas. There was an increasing use of oil fuel and
it w’as expected that coal-burning engines would disappear-
several years before the end of the steam era.

The basic diesel-electric locomotive of the fifties was the
TEs, which succeeded the TE2. Several thousand of the ТЕЗ
type were built, even in the early sixties after it had become
an obsolescent design. Experimental prototypes of gas turbine
and diesel hydraulic engines were also built.

Soviet electric engines originated from the early units im-
ported from Brown Boveri and General Electric. The VL19
type, w’hich was a purely Soviet design, was not produced in
large numbers, but the VL22, and its post-war successor the
VL23, were. The VL22 was very similar to the imported engines
and about 2,000 units of this type were built. The VI.23 was a
modernized version. For the heavy-traffic lines in the east a
completely new Soviet type, the N8, wras designed in the fifties
and built in series. For the high-voltage lines the N6O was
produced. In terms of the power/weight ratio, Soviet diesel and
electric engines were heavier than those of Western countries.

In general Soviet locomotive policy w’as marked by a willing-
ness to import small batches of the best foreign engines to learn
what features were w’orth embodying in home designs. A few
prototypes of Soviet design would then be built and subjected
to long and careful testing. After this, the selected designs
would be built on a large scale, often in thousands of units.1

1 For a more detailed account of Soviet locomotive policy and design see
Westwood, J. Op. cit. Also, Le Fleming, H., and Price, J. Russian Steam Loco-
motives. London 1960
CO-ORDINATION OF TRANSPORT

COMPETITION AND CO-ORDINATION

A perfectly co-ordinated transport system would be one which
ensured that every shipment moved by that carrier, or com-
bination of carriers, which could do the job most efficiently.
Each of the different modes of transport has characteristics
which should determine what kind of work it performs. Thus
there is little doubt that the railway has an inherent advantage
in the speedy movement of bulk commodities over long dis-
tances. Road transport, for many years, was described as the
least economic form of surface transport and defied the econo-
mists by being the fastest-growing freight carrier. Air transport
has an especial advantage in long-distance and high-speed
passenger movement and, using high-capacity aircraft, costs
little, if at all, more than surface transport. Pipeline transport
is feasible when there is a heavy, permanent, and regular flow
of a single bulk commodity between two fixed points and is
especially suited, though not limited, to the movement of
liquids and gases. Finally, there is water transport, both ocean
and inland. Ocean ships can carry all kinds of freight at very
low cost and reasonable speed. It is less easy to define a sphere
of activity for river and canal transport. In certain circum-
stances (i.e. when the waterway does not demand expensive
maintenance in the form of dredging, buoying and reinforce-
ment) internal shipping may provide a cheaper medium of bulk
transport than the railway, although speed of transit and
reliability leave much to be desired, particularly in cold
climates.

In the twentieth century, increasing attention was paid in
Western countries to the competitive position of the railways
in relation to highway transport. The problem first came to a
head in Western Europe where because of short distances and
dense populations, road transport developed faster than else-
where. In North America competition between rail and road
after the Second World War merely weakened both contenders
and raised their costs. In continental Europe government inter-
vention usually succeeded, at the wrorst, in protecting the rail-
ways from ‘unfair’ competition and, at best, in co-ordinating
the activities of road and rail transport. The Anglo-Saxon
democracies were, by their political nature, less able to impose
rational solutions on growing waste and chaos in transport.
American railways fell into a distressing condition because they
lost so much traffic to the roads that they were unable to exploit
their inherent advantages as high-capacity carriers. In a country
where, in effect, every automobile had a vote, highway transport
benefited enormously from the tax-financed road construction
w'hich few Americans had the will to resist, while a public
which rarely travelled by train was not at all enthusiastic about
measures to relieve the railways of restrictions imposed at a
time when they enjoyed a monopoly. In Britain, the position of
the automobile industry as the sacred cow of the British eco-
nomy, together with a succession of governments more
favourably inclined to the small-man businesses of the motor
transport industry than to a nationalized railway, led to much
the same results as in America: a distortion of the natural
pattern of transport, high transport costs, and under-utilization
of the railways, with all the waste that these imply. In the
fifties various methods of technical co-ordination were tried by
the railways, notably the use of road-rail containers and ‘piggy-
back’, which combine the long-haul advantages of the railway
with the door-to-door advantage of the rubber-tyred vehicle.
In general these techniques were found to be successful, but the
railways in America and Britain still needed government support
to make the most of their opportunities.

In the ussr it might be thought that centralized planning
would have resulted in a close approach to perfect co-ordination
of the different means of transport. In fact it did not. Soviet
co-ordination policy produced a transport pattern no more
rational than that of the unplanned countries. This was not the
fault of the planned economy, but rather of government errors,
and there were signs in the late fifties that early mistakes might
not be repeated.
MAP 4

Principal Russian railways in 1959. The thicker lines show railways
completed since 1918 and the broken lines show railways under
construction.
TRANSPORT CO-ORDINATION IN THE USSR

During the first forty years of Soviet government, the transport
situation was dominated by the problems of passing ever-
increasing traffic over the railway routes while keeping the
construction of new lines to a minimum. This implied maximum
exploitation of the railways’ inherent heavy-duty potential. In
1928 the average traffic density of Soviet common-carrier rail-
ways was 1 -5 million combined ton/km. per kilometre of track ;
in 1961 this had increased almost tenfold, to IS-8 million
ton/km. per kilometre.1 In some respects this is a measure of
Soviet achievement in railway policy, an achievement all the
more remarkable because in 1ОДЯ tbe railways seemed to be at
the limit of their capacity. The average traffic density figure
still disguises wide variations between the best and worst lines.
The Omsk-Novosibirsk double-track electrified section was
producing no less than 69 million (freight) ton/km. per kilo-
metre in 1956, and this figure was still increasing. On the other
hand, lines of secondary importance, particularly in western
Russia, had figures wrell below the average. A quarter of the
railway mileage had a freight traffic density of less than 1
million ton/km. per kilometre, and another fifth passed between
1 and 3 million? But even 1 million tons is quite a sizeable load
for a single-track railway.

However, w'hile up to a point railway transport thrives on
high volume, the traffic density on many Russian lines was so
great as not only to be uneconomic (because of congestion) but
also to cause bottlenecks which even electrification could not
always eliminate. Recourse was commonly made to long diver-
sionary routing, and there was constant anxiety about the
railways’ continuing ability to pass ever-increasing traffic. For
this reason, the Government devoted many resources and much
exhortation to the relief of the over-burdened railways by other
forms of transport, notably by water transport.

It has already been mentioned that the coming of the railways
to Russia did not cause the ruin of the inland waterways, as
happened in other countries. During the nineteenth century
the volume of Russian waterway traffic increased and in 1913

*	Soviet Studies. July 1959. Zheleznodorozhnyi Transport March 1962 and
February 1958.

•	Koldomasov, Yu. Kompleksnoye raxvitiye transports SSSR. Moscow, 1961,
p. 55.
it still represented nearly a quarter of the nation’s freight
turnover, with sea transport accounting for almost another fifth,
while the railways accounted for about three-fifths of the ton/km.
and nine-tenths of the pass./km.1 But by 1917 the rivers were
carrying only one-fifth of the traffic, and this proportion was
tending to drop still further. In view of the railways’ difficulties
the Government’s policy was to develop water transport as a
means of lightening their burden.

SOVIET WATERWAY POLICY

In 1913 the railways produced 57 per cent of Russia’s freight
ton/km., In 1У2», /8 per cent, in 19-ю, 83 pci vent, <md ш is5o,
83 per cent. The share of rivers and canals was 25 per cent in
1913, 13 per cent in 1928, 7 per cent in 1940, and 5 per cent
in 1956.2 The Soviet policy of diverting traffic from the railways
to the rivers could not, therefore, be termed an unqualified
success although it could be argued that without such a policy
the rivers’ share might have fallen by even more than five
times. During the Soviet period river traffic had in fact in-
creased in absolute terms, but only by two and a half times
between 1913 and 1956, while rail traffic rose by about sixteen
times. Apart from exhortation, concrete measures to encourage
river transport included the construction of canals to link the
different river systems and the seas, the building of new boats,
the construction and improvement of ports and the equipping
of all the major waterways with buoys and illumination to
permit night navigation.

River transport had two traditional roles in the nineteenth
century: the role of bulk carrier, and of local access. The latter
was the main function of the so-called ‘small’ rivers; to make
possible the development of riverside areas which did not
warrant a railway or a road. This function of river transport
was still important during the five-year plans but it was over-
shadowed by the Government’s emphasis on the other functions
of the waterways, as carriers of bulk goods.

Yet the demand for water transport never approached the
capacity of the waterways. There were very few goods which
were better carried by water than by rail. In the late nineteenth
century half of the freight tonnage of Russian waterways was

*	Transport i svyaz' SSSR. Moscow, 1957, pp. 8-13.	’ Ibid., p. 8.
accounted for by forest products, and another third by the two
other basic freights, oil products and graiiT. The situation in
1928 was very simitar, and even in 1956 timber and firewood
represented half the tonnage. But by 1956 mineral construction
materials (mainly stone and sand) had become the second most
important cargo; oil had dropped to a tenth and grain to a
twentieth (although in terms of ton/km. these two categories
were more important due to their long average haul).1

Apart from tlte fact that Russian rivers run in a north-south
direction, while the traffic flow’s were assuming more and more
an east-west movement, their major disadvantage was that they
were unusable during the winter and early spring. The naviga-
tion season was limited to nine months in the couth and oix
weeks in the north. As the winter was the most difficult time
for the railways, river could not relieve rail when the need was
greatest. Then there was the slowness of river transport.
Despite the station delays of rail transport, the average speed
of delivery of railway freight in 1956 was nearly 150 km. a day
in the most favourable month, whereas by river the speed was
only 80 kin. a day.2 Since goods in transit were a dormant
investment, only low-value freight (or freight which was stored
for long periods, such as fertilizer and grain) could stand this
extra cost burden. The importance of speedy delivery was even
more crucial in the conditions of scarcity under which the
Soviet economy was working.

Waterw ay transport seems to exercise more fascination over
the minds of geographers and politicians, than over transport
economists. The obvious attraction is the apparently free per-
manent way, which would seem to guarantee low costs of
movement. In fact, the cheapness of river and canal transport
is often a delusion. In the ussr it was a delusion, if exception
is made for some highly efficient operations (particularly the
Volga oil traffic, whose costs, it was claimed, were even lower
than pipeline movement). In 1955 even coal was cheaper to
move by rail than by waterway up to 500 kin., also grain and
scrap metal and all high-value commodities. Salt was cheaper
up to 200 km. On the other hand the Volga Tanker Line was
carrying oil at costs three and a half times lower than railway
costs. Timber on the Volga system was carried at a tenth of
railway costs. Oil products and timber (in rafts) were carried

1 Transport i tvyax' SSSR. Moscow, 1957, p. 121.	* Ibid., pp. 75, 147.
at cheaper than rail costs on most rivers. Because these last two
categories composed about 40 per cent of river traffic, average
river costs were 10 per cent lower than average railway costs.1
But it was evident that any attempt to widen the scope of river
traffic beyond a few basic commodities would be hindered by
high costs.

This 10 per cent difference, being an average, could not
attract extra traffic from the railways. Apart from the fact that
a lower ton/km. rate could often be outweighed by a difference
in route mileage (for example Moscow to Volgograd was
twice as far by river as by railway), this 10 per cent concealed
a high cost advantage on the type of freight the rivers were
already carrying, and a high disadvantage on the dry goods
traffic they were seeking. Therefore, to attract business from a
more efficient to a less efficient carrier the time-honoured
device of discriminating tariffs and cross-subsidization was ex-
ploited. River tariffs were lowered between points with a
competing rail service. Tariffs on dry goods were lowered in
the thirties in order to attract custom, and after the 1949 tariff
review this traffic was still carried at a loss even though timber
and oil rates had been increased. The result was that timber
tariffs were nearly twice, and oil tariffs almost two and a half
times, more than costs. Among the commodities which benefited
from reduced rates were coal, carried at about half the cost, and
ores, at one-fifth.8

As coal increased its share of river traffic from 1 per cent in
1929 to 6 per cent of a bigger total in 1956, and mineral
building materials rose similarly from 6 per cent to 23 per cent,
it may be argued that these tariffs had some effect. On the other
hand in the fifties there were constant complaints of timber and
oil being sent by rail on routes which paralleled river services.
For example, in the 1955 navigation season two and a half
million tons of timber were sent by rail from the Urals to
towns on the Kama and Volga, and this was not exceptional.8
Thus it would seem possible that although low rates gained
some unprofitable traffic for the rivers, the corresponding over-

* Turetskii, Sh. Ocherki planovovo tunoobrazovaniya v SSSR. Moscow, 1959,
pp. 356-7. The river costs do not include maintenance of way, whereas railways
do. The 10 per cent advantage of the river is therefore slightly overstated. Main-
tenance of way cost for the rivers equalled about 15 per cent of total costs.

1 Ibid., pp. 356-67.

• Ibid.
charging on commodities for which river transport was more
suited led to a loss of oil and timber traffic. The net result may
well have been not to reduce total railway freight, but merely to
impose a new and inefficient division of traffic between rail and
river.

A more practical way of shedding part of the railways’ burden
w’as through so-called mixed transport. This term described
technical co-ordination between rail and river so that a given
shipment w'ould move partly by railw ay and partly by waterway;
goods would be transhipped from rail to river when the latter
provided an alternative to an over-burdened railway line. To
stimulate mixed transport certain railway tariffs on lines
parallel to rivers were raised during the navigation season,
while rates on goods shipped by a combination of railway and
river were reduced, sometimes by as much as 50 per cent. As
shippers in general preferred to use rail transport they fre-
quently routed their goods by rail with a very small section of
water movement so as to qualify for the mixed tariff. Others,
who w’ere not able to do this, stored their goods until the end
of the navigation season, and then sent them by railway. But
the fundamental obstacle to mixed transport w’as the cost of
transhipment. While a few goods like oil and grain were easily
moved between railway car and boat, provided the specialized
equipment was available, most commodities suitable for river
transport were neither easily loaded nor suitable for containers.1
There was also the difficulty that many river ports, even those
in big cities, had no rail connection.

Apart from purely economic reasons, Russian shippers prob-
ably had a prejudice against river transport caused by the extra
complication w’hich it entailed, as compared to rail transport.
Its seasonal limitations meant either that special plans had to
be made at the beginning and end of the navigation season, or
that thought be given to the accumulation of reserves by the
receiver, to tide him over the winter. There also seemed to be
lack of confidence in the regularity and reliability of water
transport. In addition there was the complicated tariff system.
Because of the difference in costs between the different rivers,
so that Volga costs were about a quarter of those of the Siberian
rivers, a unified tariff was impracticable. There were, therefore,
in 1957, eight tariff systems in force.

1 In fact, containers were not used for river-rail movement.
Investment in inland waterways had involved not only the
improvement of rivers, the building of port installations, and
construction of new boats. Canal building had also been a
feature of the Soviet policy towards water transport, the White
Sea-Baltic and Volga-Don canals being the most ambitious
undertakings. The avowed aim of these canals w as to link the
different river systems so as to create a unified water transport
system embracing the navigable rivers and tlie seas into w'hich
they fell. But Soviet supporters of canal building were always
very coy in discussing the advantages of these projects in
precise statistical terms. Slogans about the grandiose Stalin
construction w'orks and Moscow being the port of five seas
w₽rp perhaps inspiring, but to a transport economist not
convincing.

The usual claims made on behalf of these canals were that
they would cause an increase in river traffic, reduce water
transport costs, increase the average length of haul of river
freight. As for die capital investment, it was often claimed
that the canals formed only a part of the big w’ater projects
involving the construction of dams and hydro-electric stations,
irrigation systems, and waterways, and that these dams would
facilitate river transport by the transformation of rivers into
big elongated lakes. With such integrated schemes die extra
cost of building a canal suitable for river craft could not, it was
implied, be significant.

Taking the last points first, the big hydraulic schemes under-
taken by the Soviet Government may have represented an
Integration of hydro-electric and irrigation projects, but were
certainly of little benefit to river shipping. Of the many claims
made diat the dams would aid shipping, only one was valid ;
the elimination of shallows by the raising of the water level.
The argument diat the new inland lakes would slow down die
currents of the rivers and thus allow boats to move faster was
obviously facile; boats travel both ways. Moreover, the de-
celeration of currents meant a shorter navigation season unless
icebreakers were employed, for the new inland lakes were
frozen from ten to thirty days longer than their rivers. Not
only this, high winds on the lakes could create serious storms
for low-lying craft. As for the canals, they were not an essential
part of the schemes ; they could have been built without the
dams and die dams in no wray depended on die canals. The

к
argument that the canals would increase the average length of
haul does not seem to have been justified; the length of haul
after the opening of the Volga-Don canal dropped at an even
faster rate than previously. As for the supposed traffic-gathering
potential of these canals both personal observation and the
complaints of Soviet economists suggest that they carried a
pitifully small amount of traffic.

After the death of Stalin there was less emphasis on grandiose
projects, but canal-building continued on a modest scale. In
view of the fact that in terms of ton/km. per rouble waterway
investment during the fifties was half as productive as railway
investment it is difficult to justify Soviet policy towards the
waterways.1 The means seemed to become more important than
the end; at first, river transport was developed to save capital
investment in the railways but what happened in the fifties was
that capital was invested in the river systems in preference to
a more productive investment in the railways.

It seemed very doubtful whether waterway transport could
advantageously increase its importance in industrial Russia.
But it had a useful and natural place in the economy, and should
have concentrated its efforts on providing better and cheaper
sendee for the kinds of traffic which it already had, rather than
continuing with expensive canal projects and tariff-juggling in
the hope of gaining new kinds of traffic.

OCEAN SHIPPING

Ocean shipping continued to develop after the Revolution, but
as it depended largely on overseas trade, its fortunes fluctuated.
As an internal carrier, ocean transport played a dominant role
in oil movements, especially in the Caspian—Volga service.
Services on the Black Sea between the southern Ukraine and
the Caucasus also had some importance. The northern sea route
had a special significance in the development of the Arctic areas,
but had little general economic importance. After the war,
reparations provided the Soviet merchant fleet with some
modem German vessels, including passenger liners, and new
ships were ordered from Poland and East Germany. There was
a tendency to specialize in cargo liners operating on regular
schedules, and also in large tankers. It was claimed that the

1 Koldomasov, Yu. Op. cit., p. 97.
latter, such as the 27,000-ton Pekin, carried oil between the
Black Sea and the Far East more cheaply than the railways,
and almost as fast. The cost of sea transport in 1958 was
calculated as 3-8 kopeks per ton/km. for short-distance, and
1 • 1 kopeks for long-distance international services.1 At 400 km.
per day it was faster than other forms of surface transport.

ROAD TRANSPORT

In contrast to its attitude towards the waterways, the Soviet
Government tended to under-estimate the advantages of road
transport. Possibly this was because its disadvantages were
easily expressed in figures, while its advantages were not. The
fact that in the fifties the railways were producing four-fifths of
the total ton/km. and the roads only one-twentieth, while the
number of truck drivers alone exceeded the whole of the Soviet
railways’ operating staff,2 seemed perhaps a compelling argu-
ment against the economics of road transport. In terms of
kopeks per ton/km. common-carrier road-transport costs (ex-
cluding the small and uneconomic trucking enterprises)
averaged 49 kopeks in the us sr, about fifteen times higher
than railway costs.8 On the other hand, because the cost of
loading and unloading is so great a proportion of total transport
costs and transport time, a vehicle which can move directly
from shipper to receiver without intermediate transhipments
has an immense advantage. But since convenience is difficult to
express in figures, and because Soviet transport planners tended
to ignore loading and unloading expense because it was the
clients and not the transport undertakings which were usually
responsible for terminal handling, this advantage was obscured.
Also, the comparison between average road and rail costs was
not a valid one; costs of an essentially long-distance carrier like
(the railway were naturally lower than those of a short-distance
carrier. A valid comparison would have been not with the
common-carrier railways, but with the industrial feeder lines
whose costs in the fifties varied from 14 kopeks to no less than
50 roubles per ton/km.4

The apparently high cost of road transport, not only in
1 Koldomasov, Yu. Op. cit., p. 76.

’ Ibid., p. 61.

* Transport i svyax' SSSR. Moscow, 1967, p. 174.

‘ Ferapontov, G. Zhelexnodorozhnye pod'ezdnye putin eobshehevo роГxovaniya.
Moscow, 1958, p. 19.
money terms but also in metal and rubber and gasoline, was
probably why its development during the first forty years of
Soviet government was allowed to lag. It was not until the
thirties that the motor truck ousted the horse and cart as the
most important pick-up and delivery vehicle serving railway
stations. In the early sixties the horse was still often used out-
side the big cities. In 1957 the us sr despite its size came only
fifth in the world by length of hard surface road, and of the
214,500 km. classed as hard, nearly a half was merely gravel-
surfaced and only 47,100 km. was of the so-called ‘improved’
type.1 And the few good roads that did exist were under-
utilized; outside the cities the main roads rarely carried more
than abuul ten vehicles per hour. Little progrcoo occmed to
have been made in ensuring all-the-year-round use of roads;
the surcharges on road tariffs imposed by local authorities
during the thaw period were a purely negative expedient, and
the use of snow-ploughs during the winter was limited.

It is true that during the five-year plans truck transport
developed. It would be surprising if it had not. The criticism is
that it was not allowed to develop fast enough. Highways were
built radiating from Moscow to the principal cities of European
Russia, as well as to develop remote areas (for example the
Amur-Yakutsk highway). Automobile works concentrated on
the production of trucks rather than of passenger cars; during
1950-59, 4,129,000 vehicles were produced and 3,213,000 of
these were trucks.2 But despite this it seems possible that
between and 10X0 the percentage of traffic handled over
the highways actually fell. (The official statistics showing that
automobile traffic represented О • 1 per cent of total Soviet
freight turnover in 1928 but 3*7 per cent in 1956* are interest-
ing but irrelevant in this context, since truck transport grew
at the expense of animal transport.)

However, in the late fifties a more favourable attitude towards
highway transport seemed to be emerging. In particular, Soviet
economists began to look somewhat ruefully at the lengthy
mileage of railway feeder lines, mostly under-utilized, which
connected enterprises with the common-carrier railway system.
In the fifteen post-war years more than 50,000 km. of new

1 Transport i svyax' SSSR. Moscow, p. 201.

* Koldomasov, Yu. Op. cit., p. 105.

’ Transport i svyaz' SSSR. Moscow, 1957, p. 8.
feeder railway had been laid, four times as much as new main-
line trackage, but calculations showed that feeder lines shorter
than 50 km. were less economic than truck services (unless,
presumably, the feeder line originated complete trainloads of
long-distance traffic). In 1958 only 1 per cent of the feeder lines
were over 50 km.; nearly GO per cent were less than 1 km.1

Apart from short-distance carriage of bulk freight, another
ideal field for the motor vehicle is the movement of package-type
freight which if sent by rail would entail high transhipment
costs. During the five-year plans package freight was not very
significant, but towards the end of the fifties it showed signs
of the growth which could be expected to take place as light
industry developed. According to one calculation, in Russian
conditions highway transport for high-value package freight
was cheaper than rail up to about 300 km.2

However, theoretical cost comparisons were not reflected in
rates actually charged. Despite discriminatory tariff’s on the
railways for less than 50 km. shipments, it was often cheaper
for the shipper to use rail rather than road for short-distance
traffic. First-class freight by road in the mid-fifties was charged
a rate reducing from 2-4 roubles per ton/km. for a 1-km. haul
to 36 kopeks per ton/km. at 10O km. These rates were in no
sense due to over-charging, but road transport costs were
unreasonably high due to bad organization and a limited choice
of vehicles. Until 1959 only about an eight!) of the total stock
of trucks were used by common-carrier organizations; the
majority were owned by individual organizations which used
tnem solely for their own purposes. Utilization rates of both
common-carrier and private vehicles were therefore abysmally
low. Nearly all trucks produced were in the two- to five-ton
size and lack of vehicles outside these limits also raised costs.
Given equivalent utilization the ton/km. costs of a seven-ton
truck are about half those of a two-tonner. Until 1952 the
tariffs charged by common-carrier trucking enterprises depended
on the type of vehicle available. Since few enterprises disposed
of all types of truck the rate for a given shipment in one
locality could be half that in another.

Among the signs of a more enlightened policy towards road
transport which appeared in the fifties were a diversification of

* Aitomobil'nyi transport. March 1960.

’ Koldomasov, Yu. Op. dt., pp. 106-8, and Ferapontov, G. Op. cit., p. 13.
truck production, the reorganization of trucking enterprises,
and an increasing use of road-rail containers. The most impor-
tant of the organizational measures was taken in 1959, when
it was decided to confine private-owner road transport to
internal movements between sections of the same enterprise and
to entrust all other traffic to new, large-scale, common-carrier
organizations. This was facilitated by the coincident devolution
of economic management to the regional economic councils
(‘Sovnarkhozy’) which frequently organized their own regional
road transport organizations. The diversification of truck pro-
duction included the introduction of American-type tractor-and-
trailer combinations of high capacity. The application of con-
tainers in the USSR differed radically from the process which tnnU
place in America at the same time. While the American railways
favoured high-capacity containers (generally in the form of
‘piggy-back’ road-rail trailers), tended to delay their large-
scale adoption while they decided which size and design was
best, and failed to standardize piggy-back and container systems
on a country-wide scale, the Soviet railways adopted en masse
a limited series of containers of rather low efficiency. The
Russians did not favour piggy-back, and their containers were
unsophisticated 2- and 5-ton boxes, limited in size because most
road trucks were small, and needing a crane to transfer them
between highway truck and railway flat car. But the lack of
efficiency was compensated by the speed with which containers
could be built and used. By 1959 three-quarters of package
freight on Soviet railways moved in road-rail containers, and
‘containerization’ had probably been carried further than in any
other country, with the possible exception of Britain. However,
trials were being carried out in the early sixties with larger
containers which did not need crane handling, and with piggy-
back devices. The Russian railways, w’ith their high loading
gauge, would haveseemed particularly well adapted to piggy-back.

In 1957 no less than a fifth of Soviet rail freight traffic was
carried over distances of loo km. or less.1 As the economic
line accepted in America as dividing the spheres of road and
rail transport was about 800 km., the transfer of this segment
of traffic to road transport would have been economically
justified, especially as short-distance rail traffic demands more
than its fair share of railway work.

1 Zhtlexnodorozhnyi transport. February 1958.
PIPELINES AND THE CO-ORDINATION OF
FUEL TRANSPORT

Fuel has always been one of the most important segments of
Russian railway traffic. Even with the development of the oil
industry railway coal traffic as late as 1959 represented 26 per
cent of tlie total tonnage of freight traffic. Oil movements
represented another 7 per cent. Hence a shift in the pattern of
fuel consumption was of great significance in terms of railway
traffic density, and changes which began to take place after the
war did in fact relieve the railways of much traffic. The main
feature of these changes was a decrease in the proportion of
fuel needa filled by coal, and a reduction in the planned length
of haul for coal traffic by building coal power stations near the
mines. Meanwhile, oil, natural gas, and electricity were ousting
raw coal as the main source of energy.

Pipeline transport was a late starter in the us sr and only
began to develop significantly in the fifties. The 1913 pipeline
mileage of 1,100 km. increased to only 5,400 km. by 1950. By
1958 there were 14,400 km., but this was still small in relation
to the need. In general, the pattern of oil transport in the
ussr was old-fashioned and uneconomic. In 1956, 61 per cent
of oil ton/km. were produced by the railways, and no less than
a third of this moved in the form of crude oil with its inferior
calorific value and hence low transportability. Only about 40
per cent was split almost equally between water and pipeline
transport, despite the fact that both the latter could handle oil
at about half the cost of rail transport.1 Nor was this all;
whereas in Western Europe and America oil moved by water or
pipeline over the long distances and by road for distribution,
so that only about one-tenth of it moved by rail, in Russia the
railways were not only carrying half the oil but were also
responsible for much of the short-distance distribution, picking
up and setting down individual tank cars at local sidings. Thus
while pipelines such as tlie 1,332 km. Bashkir-Omsk line did
much to relieve the railways, the lack of road tanker services
thrust a burden on the railways which they were ill-equipped
to handle. There are few operations more inconvenient and
uneconomic for a long-distance bulk carrier than the peddling
of small shipments for short distances.

1 Koldomasov, Yu. Op. cit, p. 120.
With natural gas the railways were never concerned, as it
moved by pipe right from the start. But by reducing the demand
for coal in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev it no doubt indirectly
eased the railways' problems. As for coal distribution, this was
always a problem in Russia. In its earlier days the Soviet
Government was faced with the disappearance of English coal
imports through Leningrad, and of Polish coal, and it reacted
by developing further the Donetz coalfields. Then, because this
entailed long-distance coal movement, new coalfields were
exploited in various parts of the country; the Kuznetz and
Karaganda fields and the low-grade Moscow coal. The last big
coalfield to be developed led to the construction of the Pechora
Railway into the Arctic Circle, to provide a heavy-duty outlet.
But at the end of the fifties the Pechora Railway and other
similar lines seemed destined to lose traffic as coal movement
diminished. Increasing use of oil and natural gas, underground
gasification, and the transmission of coal energy in the form of
electric current were responsible for this. However, coal trans-
port was not always uneconomic; while low-grade varieties
traditionally moving over long distances were economically
suited to on-the-spot conversion to electricity and transmission
by cable, for a high-calorific product like Donbas coal moving,
say, to Moscow, rail transport was cheapest.1

The first seven-year plan (1959-65) seemed to recognize
the essential problems of fuel transport. In particular it planned
to treble the mileage of pipelines and to continue the laying of
long-distance electric power cables. It did not, however, offer
much immediate hope of shifting short-distance oil traffic from
the railways.

CO-ORDINATION OF PASSENGER SERVICES

Given the expediency of shedding part of the Soviet railways,
traffic load, the transfer of passengers to other forms of transport
seemed eminently desirable, especially because a passenger
train demands more than its fair share of line capacity, due to
the sidetracking of freight trains in its path.2 This was fully
realized in the fifties. The airline, which had been the only form
of transport to emerge from the war in a better state than

* Zheleznodorozhnyi transfxrrt. November 1961.

’ In Russian conditions, on a heavy-traffic line, the removal of two passenger
trains allowed the passage of three extra freight trains.
before, was the obvious answer to the railways’ long-distance
passenger problem. But the low-capacity twin-engined aircraft
which were used until the bigger turbine aircraft appeared in
the mid-fifties could not have much effect on the millions of
passengers travelling by rail. When at last the bigger aircraft
did appear they were first used on the long-distance services.
The only service operated by the high-capacity TU-114 aircraft
was between Moscow and Khabarovsk. Seven or eight of these
aircraft, if utilized fully, could replace on the Trans-Siberian
route passenger trains to the extent of 40 engines and 280 cars.1

Another contender for passenger traffic was the road vehicle.
In the urbanization of the ussr the ’bus played a smaller part
than economics warranted; commuter rail services and tram-
ways were exploited in preference. But in the absence of exten-
sive private automobile ownership, the 'bus was cheaper than
the railway commuter service, and a greater relative share of
’bus commuter traffic was forecast for the sixties. Long-distance
passenger coach services were also developed along the new
highways. These were often faster than the railway, and also
cheaper (road costs were not taken into account when calcu-
lating costs or fixing tariffs). But in the fifties these coach
services had not developed to an extent significantly helpful to
the railways.

Of newer forms of passenger transport, a number of hydro-
foil boats were built during the fifties by the Sormovo works
and used on the Volga between Gorkii and Kazan. The larger
hydrofoils seated 150 passengers and could attain 80 km. per
hour (50 m.p.h.). Although limited in scope, they had an
obvious application on the lakes, both natural and artificial.
Conventional passenger boats also moved along the rivers, but
carried few passengers compared with the railways. In the early
sixties some experimental work was started on hovercraft
vehicles. Passenger helicopter sendees were established be-
tween Simferopol and Yalta, and Adler and Sochi, in 1959,
and a future was forecast for them on short-distance inter-urban
services such as Moscow-Ryazan and Moscow-Yaroslavl.

TRANSPORT CO-ORDINATION IN THE UKRAINE

A description in full detail of the progress and problems of
transport co-ordination in the ussr would need a book to itself,

1 Zheleznodorozhnyi transport. March 1958.

K*
so the following paragraphs have been confined to a few out-
standing features of co-ordination in one of the Union Republics,
the Ukraine.1

The share of the railway in the Ukrainian freight traffic in
the late fifties was even higher than the us sr average; it was
91 per cent in 1958, with sea transport taking 3 per cent, river
only 2 per cent despite the extensive Dnepr system, and motor
trucks 4 per cent. The insignificant share of water traffic was
despite efforts to popularize mixed water-rail carriage. This
method, in fact, accounted in 1958 for only about 5 per cent of
the traffic or 8,735,000 tons, an insignificant amount but more
than four times greater than the 1950 figure. This mixed
transport was almost entirely confined to two freights: coal
moving by rail from the Donbas to the Dnepr river ports
(notably Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe) and thence by boat
to Kiev and Gomel; and ore from Krivoi Rog by rail to
Zaporozhe and thence by the Dnepr and Pripet to Brest.

The coal movement represented three-quarters of all Ukraine
mixed traffic. Even so, in amount it was not large and this wras
hardly surprising because by the mixed route costs were about
5 kopeks per ton/km. against tlie cost of the direct rail route of
S| kopeks. There were several reasons for this. The mixed
routing created two high-cost short-distance rail hauls, an extra
loading and unloading was entailed, and there was little return
traffic for the boats. To remedy the last-mentioned disadvantage,
Ovruch quartzite bound for the Donbas was transferred to the
Pripet after a short rail haul, and die port of Kiev was equipped
to handle the scrap metal traffic to the industrial south. But
southbound quartzite and scrap amounted to less than half a
million tons a year, w hile tlie mixed coal traffic was nearly four
million, so most boats still returned empty. Water-rail tran-
shipment costs were high partly because the freight was not
taken direct from hold to railway car but more often than not
was dumped on the wharf until empty cars were available.
Lack of co-ordination between river and rail managements w'as
blamed for this, but the basic reason was more probably the
simple fact that the high utilization rates of freight cars achieved
by Soviet railways had the negative effect of preventing tlie

1 Sources for this section are: Koldomasov, Yu. Op. cit., Zheleznodorozhnyi
transport. June 1959; Spravochnii kurortnika i turista Kryma. Simferopol, 1961;
together with personal observations in 1961 by the author at Kiev and Simferopol.
accumulation of the reserve of empty cars which are needed for
efficient port operations.

Relief of the railways through mixed routings via rail and
Black Sea was similarly undeveloped. Although sea movement
costs were generally less than railway costs per ton/km., this
tended to be overshadowed by high loading and unloading
expenses. In the Black Sea and Azov ports these expenses
averaged 13 roubles per ton; on a commodity like coal moving
at a cost of 1J kopeks per ton/km. this represented about an
extra 900 km. Moreover, many ports charged double or treble
the costs for cargo handling. Despite this, on some routes
(notably to the Caucasus) a mixed rail-Black Sea itinerary was
co much shorter than the all rail route as to be somewhat
cheaper. Yet little traffic was offered and ships were poorly
utilized. There seemed to be three reasons for this: lack of
co-ordination between the railway and shipping managements
(and between the mps and the Ministry of Sea Transport),
ignorance on the part of shippers, and a dislike of routings
likely to increase transit time.1

By comparison, road transport was developing more satis-
factorily. 'Fhe much-publicized Crimea-Moscow 44-hour high-
way sendee for fruit traffic was not the only innovation of the
fifties. In the big cities pick-up and delivery services at the
railway stations were no longer chaotically arranged by the
various clients, but were centralized and planned, resulting in
better efficiency and the reduction of uneconomic rail movements
from one part of the town to another. The use of railways in
such uneconomic hauls as the carriage of beet from the fields to
nearby sugar factories or of animals to market, was also slowly
being eliminated by the extension of highway services. How-
ever, the progress made was still insignificant when compared
to the need. There were countless examples of lack of co-
ordination. Perhaps the worst offender was the Komintem
factory at Dnepropetrovsk, which sent by railway about 10
carloads of wire and cable each day to an enterprise 4 km.
distant by rail, and 2 km. distant by road, thereby raising its
costs by nearly half a million roubles a year.

As regards passengers, the most interesting traffic from the
point of view of co-ordination was the tourist flow to the seaside

1 There was, however, one example of successful technical co-ordination: the
train ferry across the Kerch Strait, introduced in 1955.
resorts on the southern shore of the Crimea. In this area there
were no less than seven different forms of passenger transport:
train, aeroplane, helicopter, boat, 'bus, inter-urban trolley-bus,
and taxi. The nearest city, airport, and railway station to the
holiday resorts was Simferopol, 80 km. from Yalta, and it was
here that most passengers changed from long-distance to short-
distance vehicles. The traffic between Simferopol and the other
cities of Russia was handled by air, rail and highway. In the
summer of 1961 the Simferopol—Moscow route was served each
way daily by five trains (a total of about 2,500 berths), one
S2-seat bus (plus another from Yalta),1 and five 70-seat jet air
services. These three modes of transport also had direct services
to other places. On the Simferopol Moscow route the highest
railway fare (i.e. a 'soft' berth in a compartment) was 236
roubles while a ‘hard’ berth in an open car was 143 roubles.
The ’bus fare was 155-80 roubles in a ZIL-127 vehicle and
125-9 in the less comfortable ZIL-158. The air fare was 270
roubles. Time taken for the journey was 29| hours by ’bus, 23
hours by train, and 2 hours by air.

Local services from Simferopol included the helicopter to
Yalta (50 roubles), a new trolley-bus line to the same city via
coastal towns (14| roubles), and conventional 'bus services.
Small diesel passenger ships maintained a sendee at twenty-
minute intervals along the coast. Arriving tourists whose holi-
day was sponsored by an organization or enterprise carried a
single travel warrant which included both the air or rail trip to
Simferopol and the ensiling *hns movement tn the resort
Other travellers needed, in the summer, to make local ’bus and
trolley-bus resen-ations well in advance. While at the terminal
points the casual traveller could usually hope to find a place on
the ’bus, this was usually impossible at intermediate stopping
places. But the passenger who had the leisure and the bent to
devise his own personal scheme of transport co-ordination could
usually travel by boat to a town at the end of a ’bus route, and
thus eventually reach his destination by a roundabout itinerary.
The shortage of ’bus capacity during the summer could probably
have been entirely eliminated if standing passengers had been
allowed.

The existence in the ussr of the Institute of Complex Trans-
1 The majority of the ’bus services were to cities in the Ukraine.
port Problems, affiliated to the Academy of Sciences, gave cause
to hope that the interrelation of different forms of transport
would be studied deeply and realistically. During the fifties
books and articles by members of this Institute indicated that a
new and more objective look was being cast on previous assump-
tions. If the recommendations and calculations of the Institute
were to be accepted and seriously applied, and if the Govern-
ment and Party were able to resist intoxication by slogan, as
happened with waterway policy, there seemed every chance that
Russia might escape that wasteful misallocation of transport
resources which other economies were enduring in the mid-
twentieth century.
DATES OF OPENING OF PRINCIPAL
LINES

(The dates refer to the completion of through lines between the
points named. Sections of a given route might be open years earlier.)

1837 Tsarskoye Selo Railway.

1848 Warsaw-Vienna.

1851 St Petersburg-Moscow.

1857 St Petersburg-Peterhof.

1862 St Petersburg-Warsaw.
Moscow-Nizhnii Nov-
gorod.

Riga-Dunaburg.

1864 Moscow-Ryazan.

St Petersburg-Oranien-
baum.

1865 Odessa-Balta.

1866 Dunaburg-Vitebsk.

Ryazan-Kozlov.

1867 Warsaw-Terespol.

Ry azhsk-M orshansk.

1868 Vitebsk-Orel.

Moscow-Kursk.

1869 Kursk-Kharkov.
Kharkov-Rostov.
Kozlov Voronezh.

1870 Moscow-Yaroslavl.
Baltic Railway (to Revel).
Moscow-Smolensk.

Kursk-Kiev.

Kiev-Balta.
Rybinsk-Bologoye.
Kharkov-Balta.

1871 Orel-Tsaritsyn.

Smolensk-Bres t-Terespol.
Kozlov-Saratov.

Li bau-Vilnius.
Voronezh-Rostov.

1872 Poti-Tiflis.

1873 Kiev-Koenigsberg.
Kharkov-Nikolaev.

1874 Morshansk-Syzran.

1875 Rostov-Vladikavkaz.

Kharkov-Sevastopol.

1876 Fastov Railway.

1877 Samara-Vyazma.

1878 Perm-Ekaterinburg.

1879 Donetz Railway.

1880 Syzran-Orenburg.

1883 Baku-Tiflis.

Batum-Samtredia.

1884 Ryazan-Kazan.

1885 Ekaterinburg-Tyumen.

1887 Ekaterinin Railway.
Gomel-Bryansk.

1888 Tikhoretskaya-Novoros-
siisk.

Samara-Ufa.

Romny-Kremenchug.
Rzhev-Vyazma.

1889 Pskov-Riga.

1894 Pokrovskii Uralsk.

1895 Balashovo-Kharkov.

1896 Ekaterinburg-Chelyabinsk.

1897 West Siberian Railway.

1898 Central Siberian Railway.

Trans-Caspian Railway
(to Tashkent).

1899 Yaroslavl-Archangel.
Perm-Vyatka-Kotlas.
Ussuri Railway.

1901 Ekaterinodar-Stavropol.

Tikhoretskaya-Tsaritsyn.

1904 Trans-Baikal Railway.
Chinese Eastern Railway.

1906 Orenburg-Tashkent.

Vyatka-Vologda.
1908 Moscow Belt line.

1913 Tyumen-Omsk.

1915 Armavir-Tuapse.

Novonikolaevsk-Biisk.

Y urga-N о vokuznetsk.
Zhlobin-Podolsk.

1916 Tartarskaya-Slavgorod.

Murmansk Railway.

Troi tsk-Kar taly.

Amur Railway.

Kokand Railway.

1918 Orsk-Orenburg.

Arzamas-Kanasha.

1924 Kazan-Sverdlovsk.

1926 Yachinsk-Abakan.

I .eningrad-N о vgorod.

1927 Kharkov-Kherson.

1930 Chelyabinsk-Orsk.
К artaly-M agni togorsk.

1931 Turkestan-Siberian Railway.

Petropavlovsk-Karaganda.
Voronezh-Orsha.

1933 Gorkii-Kotelnich.

1939 Uralsk-lletsk.

Karaganda-Bertys.

1940 Zharyk-Dzhezkazgan.
Khabarovsk-Komsomolsk.

1942 Kandagach-Guriev.
Konosha-Kozhvi.
Astrakhan-Kizliar.

1943 Kartaly-Akmolinsk.

1944 Kazan-Saratov-Ivlovlya.

1945 Tuapsc-Samtredia.

1947 Chelyabinsk-Polunochnoye.

1950 Kozhvi-Vorkuta.

1952 Chardjou-Urgench.

1953 Akmolinsk-Artyshta.
Mointy-Chu.

1959 Stalinsk-Abakan.
Aktogai-Druzhba-
LENGTH OF'COMMON-CARRIER LINE
IN SERVICE (ALL GAUGES)

	km.	miles
1842	26	16 Imperial frontiers excluding Finland.
1847	364	226
1852	994	620
1857	1,164	720
1860	1,600	1,000
1866	4,800	3,000
1874	18,100	11,300
1883	23,700	14,700
1893	31,200	19,500
1903	58,400	36,400
1913	70,500	43,900 Imperial frontiers excluding Finland and Chinese Eastern Railway.
1913	78,000	48,600 Imperial frontiers including Finland and CER.
1913	58,500	36,400 Inter-war frontiers.
1913	71,700	44,600	1946 frontiers.
1919	31,500	19,500 Approximate average mileage in Soviet hands.
1922	71,900	44,700 Inter-w’ar frontiers.
1926	75,700	47,200
1936	85,100	53,000
1939	86,400	53,600
1940	106,100	66,000 Frontiers as at end of 1940.
1946	114,100	71,000 1946 frontiers.
1956	120,700	74,600
Sources: 1842-57. Trudy imperatorskavo vol'novo ekonomicheskovo		

obshchestva. 34/1898, pp. 132—48.

1860-1913. Khachaturov, T. Op. cit., p. 98.

1919. Strumilin, S. Op. at., p. 647.

1922-56. Transport i sty ax' SSStt. Op. cit., p. 28.
LENGTH OF COMMON-CARRIER
NARROW-GAUGE LINE IN SERVICE

	km.	miles	
1913	2,900	1,800	Inter-war frontiers.
1928	1,000	620	
1939	1,100	680	
1940	4,000	2,480	Frontiers as at end of 1940.
1946	6,200	3,860	1946 frontiers.
1956	4,600	2,860	

Note: By 1956 the narrow gauge was predominantly 750 mm. The
first narrow gauge railways were 3 ft. 6 in. (but the Vologda line
was 3 ft.).

Derived from: Transport i svyax' SSSR. Op. cit., p. 28.

APPENDIX 4

LENGTH OF (NON-COMMON-CARRIER)
FEEDER LINES IN SERVICE

	km.	miles	
1877	138	86	
1900	1,380	860	Excludes Urals, Siberia and Central Asia.
1917	2,760	1,620	Imperial frontiers.
1935	18,390	11,400	Inter-war frontiers.
1941	24,806	15,400	Frontiers as at end of 1940.
1947	30,150	18,900	1946 frontiers.
1957	47,800	29,800	

Note: These figures exclude the other non-common-carrier railways,
the industrial lines. In 1956 there were in total 87,200 km. of
non-common-carrier lines.

Sources: Ferapontov, G. Op. cit., pp. 9-13.

Transport i svyax’ SSSR. Op. cit., p. 27.
COMMON-CARRIER RAILWAY FREIGHT
TRAFFIC

	Tons		
	originated	Ton/km.	
	millions	billions	
1866	3		Imperial frontiers.
1874	14	5-4	Imperial frontiers.
1883	24	9-7	Imperial frontiers.
1893	37	15*9	Imperial frontiers.
1903	76	36-8	Imperial frontiers.
1913	158	76-8	Imperial frontiers.
1913	132	65-7	Inter-war frontiers.
1918	37	14-2	Mileage reduced by war.
1928	156	93-4	Inter-war frontiers.
1938	516	370-5	Inter-war frontiers.
1940	593	415	Inter-war frontiers.
1946	453	835	1946 frontiers.
1956	1,371	1079-1	1946 frontiers.
1962	2,064	1643-0	1946 frontiers.
Sources:	1866-1903. Khachaturov, T. Op. cit., p. 98.		

1913 Strumilin, S. Op. cit., p. 670.

1918-56 Transport i svyax’ SSSR. Op. cit., p. 32.

1962 Zhelexnodoroxhnyi transport, March 1963.
PASSENGER TRAFFIC

	Passenger	Passenger/	
Year	Journeys	Kilometres	
	(million)	(billion)	
1856	2		Excludes Poland.
1874	32		Empire.
1881	34	3-7	Empire.
1890	46	5-0	Empire.
1913	244	29-3	Empire.
1913	185	25-2	Inter-war frontiers.
1328	231	2* a	Intcr-war frontiers.
1940	1,343	98'0	Inter-war frontiers.
1945	844	65*9	Post-war frontiers.
1955	1,641	141-4	Post-war frontiers.
1962	2,033	189-0	Post-war frontiers.

Sources:

1856. Total of Petersburg-Moscow, Tsarskoye Selo, and completed
section of Petersburg-Warsaw railways’ passenger traffic as
recorded in die 1857 issues of Zhurnal glavnoroo upravleniya
putei i soobshchenii.

1874. Statisticheskii sbamik. Op. cit., Table VI (1886).

1881, 1890. Statisticheskii obzor. Op. cit., p. 15.

1913. Danilov, S. Op. cit, p. 74.

1928-55. Transport i svyax' SSSR. Op. cit., p. 41.

1962. Zheleznodorozhnyi transport. March 1963.
LIST OF PASSENGER-CARRYING COMMON-
CARRIER RAILWAYS IN 1905, WITH
INDICATION OF OWNERSHIP

Name

Baltic and Pskov-Riga
Baskunchak

Belgorod-Sumskaya

Warsaw Narrow-Gauge Feeder
Lines

W arsaw-Vienna

Vladikavkaz

Georgia Military
Gerby-Chenstokhov
Trans-Baikal

Trans-Caucasus

Ekaterinin

Irinov-Shlisselburg Narrow
Gauge

Chinese Eastern

Kursk-Kharkov-Sevastopol

Libau-Gazenpot Narrow-Gauge

Feeder lines
Libau-Romny
Li fly and Narrow-Gauge
Lodz Factory

Lodz Electric Narrow-Gauge
Feeder Line

Meleskesskii Feeder
Moscow-Brest
Moscow-Vindavo-Rybinsk
Moscow-Kazan

Moscow-Kiev-Voronezh
Moscow-Kursk

Moscow-Nizhnii Novgorod
Moscow-Y aroslavl-Archangel
Nikolaev

Novozubkov Feeder Line

Location of main offices

St Petersburg
Vladimirovka
Belgorod •
Warsaw*

Warsaw*

Rostov*

Tiflis and Vladikavkaz
Chenstokhov*

Irkutsk

Tiflis

Ekaterinoslav, Mariupol,
Debaltsevo

St Petersburg*

Kharbin*

Kharkov
Libau*

Minsk

Valk*

Lodz*

Lodz*

Chasovenskaya *

Moscow

St Petersburg, Moscow, Rybinsk*
Moscow*

Kursk*

Moscow

Moscow

Moscow

St Petersburg
Novozubkov*
Name

Orekhovskii Feeder Line

First Company of Narrow-Gauge

Feeder Lines

Perm

Petrokov-Suleev Narrow-Gauge

Feeder Line

Polessian

Vistula

Riga-Orel

Ryazan-Vladimir Narrow-Gauge

Ryazan-Uralsk

Samara-Zlatoust

St Petersburg-Warsaw

Sestroretsk

Siberian

Central Asia (the Trans-Caspian)

Starodub Narrow-Gauge Feeder

Line

Syzran-Vyazma

Ussuri

Finland

Kharkov-N ikolae v

South-Eastern

South-Western

Location of main offices

Managed by Moscow-Kazan
Railway *

St Petersburg* (various, scat-
tered, lines)

Perm

Petrokov

Vilnius

Warsaw

Riga

Ryazan*

Saratov*

Samara

St Petersburg

St Petersburg*

Tomsk

Ashkhabad

Starodub*

Kaluga

Vladivostok

Helsinki

Kharkov

Voronezh*

Kiev

* Indicates private company.

Source: 1905 official timetable.
LIST OF PRIVATE PASSENGER-CARRYING
COMMON-CARRIER RAILWAYS IN 1915

Armavir-T uapse
Bogoslovskaya
Belgorod-Sumskaya

Warsaw Narrow-Gauge Feeder
Lines

Vladikavkaz

Volga-Bugulminsk

Gerby-Keltsy

Eisk

Irinov-Shlisselburg Narrow-
Gauge

Chinese Eastern and Ussuri

Kuvshin Feeder Line

Libau-Gazenpot

Liflyand Narrow-Gauge

Lodz Factory

Lodz Electric

Markovskii Feeder

Moscow-Vindava-Rybinsk

Moscow Company of Feeder
Unes

Moscow-Kazan

Moscow-Kiev-Voronezh

Novozubkov Feeder Une

First Company of Feeder

Lines

Petrokov-Suleev Narrow-

Gauge

Ryazan-Uralsk

Sestroretsk

Skvirskii Feeder Line

Starodub Narrow-Gauge

North Donetz

Tokrnan

Troitsk

Fergana

Black Sea-Kuban

South-Eastern

Source: April 1915 official timetable.
APPENDIX 9
LIST OF RAILWAYS IN 1957

Name	Location of Headquarters
Azerbaizhan	Baku
Amur	Svobodnyi
Ashkhabad	Ashkhabad
Byelorussian	Minsk
Eastern Siberia	Irkutsk
Gorkii	Gorkii
Far Eastern	Khabarovsk
Donetz	Stalino
Trans-Baikal	Chita
Trans-Caucasus	Tbilisi
Kazan	Kazan
Kalinin	Smolensk
Karaganda	Akmolinsk
Kirov	Petrozavodsk
Krasnoyarsk	Krasnoyarsk
Kuibyshev	Kuibyshev
Latvian	Riga
Lithuanian	Vilnius
Lvov	Lvov
Moldavian	Kishinev
Moscow-Kiev	Kaluga
Moscow-Kursk-Donbas	Moscow
Moscow Belt	Moscow
Moscow-Ryazan	Moscow
Odessa	Odessa
October	Leningrad
Omsk	Omsk
Ordzhonikidze	Ordzhonikidze
Orenburg	Chkalov
Pechora	Kotlas
Volga	Saratov
Sverdlovsk	Sverdlovsk
Northern	Yaroslavl
North Caucasus	Rostov
Stalinsk	Dnepropetrovsk
Tashkent	Tashkent
Tomsk	Novosibirsk
Turkestan Siberia	Alma Ata
312	A HISTORY	OF RUSSIAN RAILWAYS
Name	Location of Headquarters
Ufa  Estonian  Southern South-Eastern South-Western  South Sakhalin South Urals	Ufa  Tallin  Kharkov  Voronezh  Kiev  Y uzhno-Sakhalinsk  Chelyabinsk

Source: Kalendar’-spravochnikzheleznodorozhnika. Moscow, 1957, p. 31
LIST OF RAILWAYS IN 1962

Name	location of Headquarters
Azerbaizhan	Baku
Ashkhabad	Ashkhabad
Byelorussian	Minsk
Eastern Siberia	Irkutsk
Gorkii	Gorkii
Far Eastern	Khabarovsk
Donetz	Donetsk (formerly Stalino)
Trans-Baikal	Chita
Trans-Caucasus	Tbilisi
Western Siberia	Novosibirsk
Kazakh	Alma Ata
Kuibyshev	Kuibyshev
Latvian	Riga
Lithuanian	Vilnius
Lvov	Lvov
Moldavian	Kishinev
Moscow	Moscow
Odessa	Odessa
October	Leningrad
Volga	Saratov
Dnepr (formerly Stalinsk)	Dnepropetrovsk
Sverdlovsk	Sverdlovsk
Northern	Yaroslavl
North Caucasus	Rostov
Tashkent	Tashkent
Estonian	Tallin
South-Eastern	Voronezh
South-Western	Kiev
Southern	Kharkov
South Sakhalin	Y uzhno-Sakhalinsk
South Urals	Chelyabinsk

Source: Spravochnik passazhira 1962. Moscow, 1962, p. 127.
FASTEST INTER-CITY JOURNEY TIMES
1905 AND 1959

From	To	1905 journey hrs. min.	1959 journey hrs. min.
Leningrad	Archangel	57 SO	36 35
Leningrad	Novgorod	7 51	5 31
Leningrad	Brest	28 50	31 35
Leningrad	Rostov	42 00	42 44
Leningrad	Moscow	11 SO	7 55
Moscow	Warsaw	40 45	21 36
Moscow	Vilnius	28 12	17 08
Moscow	Irkutsk	172 20	100 56
Moscow	Kiev	24 50	16 02
Moscow	Rostov	29 SO	24 37
Moscow	Sevastopol	45 55	37 36
Moscow	Kharkov	19 05	IS 36
Kiev	Brest	13 56	18 36
Kiev	Kishinev	14 25	IS 46
Kiev	Kursk	12 55	12 41
Kiev	Simferopol	36 28	23 42
Source: 1905 and 1959 summer passenger timetables.			
Administrative Structure of 0 State Railway in 1898

COUNCIL

Ministry
of Ways and
Communications
Representative

Ministry
of Finance
Representative

State
Control
Representative

----MANAGER

Traffic
Dept,

Commercial Track and

Dept

Bridges
Dept.

Traction	Telegraph	Receipts

and Car Dept. Dept
Dept.

Siwes	Workshop

Dept. Dept.

Source: Kovalevsky, op. cit.. p. 865 (adapted).

APPENDIX 13

Administrative Structure of a Railway in 1925

MANAGEMENT

(pravleniye)

Chairman of Management

Management (three members)

DIRECTORATE
(upravteniye)

Chief of Railway

Administrative
Dept.

Commercial

Dept

Dept

Statistical
Dept

Economic—
Dept.

Operating
Service

Signalling
and Electric
Service

Traction
Service

Track
Service

Receipts

Dept ‘

Notes.—Not all railways had a management, in which case a representative of
the People’s Commissariat of Ways and Communications beaded the railway.

In December 1925 the Directorate and the Chief of Railway were abolished,
and Managements introduced on all railways. The former railway Services
became Departments of the Management. The latter was the body legally
answerable for the railway.

Source: O’Rurk, ZMeznodoroxAnaya entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1926, p. 40.
Administrative Structure of a Railway in 1955

(Minister)

Administrative Structure of a Railway Section (Division) in 1955

Source: Danilov, op. cit, pp. 165-7 (adapted).
Procedure for Compiling Ouorforly Traffic Rons (of freight subject to centralized planning) in I960

and originating railways. (2) Draft plan of loadings for the quarter divided into
months, type of freight, originating railways and into tons and cars per average
day. (3) Draft plan of loadings for the quarter divided into months, type of
freight, and average daily tonnage and carloads. (4) Plan of loadings for the
quarter divided into months, type of freight, originating railways and average
daily tonnage and carloads. (5) Plan of loadings for the month in average daily
tonnage and carloads (copies sent to the directorates of the railways). (6) Revised
plans divided according to type of freight in tons and carloads, originating and
receiving railways and stations. (7) Monthly plan of loadings divided according
to type of freight in average daily tons and carloadings.

Planning procedure for locally planned freight was similar but simpler, because
the All-Union ministries and departments, and the republic planning commissions,
did not participate.

Source: Shaflrkin, B., and Naumov, P., op. cit., p. 136.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

(This bibliography is limited to those titles which have not previously
been recorded, either in the text or in footnotes.)

avgustinok, a. and ovozdev, m. Pervaya magistral’. Leningrad,
1957.

BAKAEV, a. Transport SSSR. Moscow, 1960.

baykov, a. Development of the Soviet Economic System. Cambridge,
1947.

bernshtein-kogan, s. Ocherki geografii transparta. Moscow-Leningrad,
1930.

blyukh, i. Plyaniye zheleznykh dorog na ekonomicheskoye sostoyaniye
Rossii. SPB, 1878.

dmitriev-mamonov, л. Guide to the Trans-Siberian Railway. SPB,
1900.

dmitriev-mamonov, a. Pulevoditel’ po Turkestanu i zheleznym dorogam
Sredne-Aziatskoi i Tashkentskoi. SPB, 1915.

dobb, m. Soviet Economic Development since 1917. New York, 1948.

fischer, e. Overland via the Trans-Siberian Railway. Tientsin, 1908.

Golovachev, a. Zheleznyie dorogi v Rossii. SPB, 1880.

golovachev, a. Istoriya zheleznodorozhnovo dela v Rossii. SPB, 1881.
oreiner, j. The Russian Railway Situation. Baltimore, 1918.

khanukov, E. Transport i razmeshcheniyeproizvodstva. Moscow, 1956.

Khachaturov, t. Razmeshcheniye transporta v SSSR i kapitalisti-
cheskikh stranakh. Moscow, 1939.

Kudryavtsev, a. Ekonomika sotsialisticheskovo transporta. Moscow,
1957.

mal’kevich, l. Novoye v pravilakh tekhnicheskoi ekspluatatsii zheleznykh
dorog soyura SSSR Moscow, 1959.

migulin, p. Nasha noveishaya zheleznodorozhnaya politika i zhelezno-
dorozhnyie zaimy 1893-1902. Kharkov, 1903.

mps. Sovietskii transport 1917-27 gg. Moscow, 1927.

mps. Statisticheskii sbornik MPS. SPB, 1886-1915.

MrrAisHviLi, a. Pnutrennii vodnyi transport SSSR i puti povysheniya
evo ekonomichnosti. Moscow, 1957.

naporko, a. Sokrashcheniye rabochevo dnya i uporyadocheniye zarabotnoi
platy na zheleznodorozhnom transporte. Moscow, 1961.

neopikhanov, a. Russkii transport i evo planirovaniye. Moscow-
Leningrad, 1924.

ordnance survey. Map of the Railway System of the Russian Empire
Showing Maximum Estimated Traffic Capacity. Southampton,
1918.

o'rurk, a. Zheleznodorozhnaya entsiklopediya. Moscow-Leningrad,
1926.
parry, a. IPhistler's Father. New York, 1939.

pavlovskh, a. Sovremennoye russkoye parovoznoye khozyaistvo. SPB,
1908.

petrov, n. Trudy osoboi vysshei komissii dlya vsestoronnevo rassmotreniya
i issledovaniya zheleznodorozhnovo de la v Rossii. SPB, 1909-10.

petrov, v. Voprosy razvitiya seti zheleznykh dorog. Moscow, 1957.
rachinskii, v. Zheleznodorozhnyi transport v 1913g. Moscow, 1925.
rerberg, i. Istoriya eksplualatsii Moskovsko-'Nizhegorodskoi zheleznoi
dorogi za pervyie 25 let. Moscow, 1887.

ross, f. Die Eisenbahnen Sawjet-Russlands im militarishen и volkswirt-
schaft lichen Transporteinsatz. Danzig, 1944. (Restricted.)

samsonov, a. Zheleznyie dorogi nakanunye 3vogodapyatiletki. Moscow,
1930.

shubin, i. Volga i volzhskoye sudokhodstvo. Moscow, 1927.

shukhman, l. Ekspluatatsiya zheleznykh dorog. SPB, 1888.

sokolsky, g. Story of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Shanghai, 1929.

Spravochnik passazhira. Moscow, 1926 (official publication).

sushinskii, в. Ocherk seti zheleznykh dorog s 1886 po 1892g. SPB, 1890.
sverdlov, в. Doklad о polozhenii russkikh zhelezhykh dorog i о merakh
neobkhodimykh dlya vosstanovleniya transporta. Moscow, 1920.

taafe, r. Rail Transportation and the Economic Development of Soviet
Central Asia. Chicago, 1960.

todres, v. Zeleznodorozhnyi transport v zimnikh usloviyakh. Moscow,
1940.

velikin, v. Peterburg-Moskva; iz istorii Oktyabrskoi zheleznoi dorogi.
Leningrad, 1934.

verkhovskii, v. Istorichesku ocherk razvitaya zheleznykh dorog v Rossii
s ikh osnovaniya po 1897g vklyuchitel’no. Moscow, 1898-1901.

videtskii, a. Rechnoi transport SSSR 1917-57 gg. Moscow, 1957.

Voprosy razvitaya zheleznodorozhnovo transporta. Moscow, 1957.

westwood, j. n. Soviet Railways Today. London, 1963.

white, j. The Siberian Intervention. Princetown, 1950.

williams, e. Freight Transportation in the Soviet Union. Princeton,
1962.

Zheleznaya doroga i zheleznodorozhniki v grazhdanskoi voine. Moscow,
1926 (published by ‘Gudok’)-

Zheleznodorozhniki i revolyutsiya. Moscow-I^ningrad, 1925.

Zheleznyie dorogi Evropeiskoi i Aziatskoi Rossii po liniyam i vetvyam,
po gubernii i po vremeni otkrytiya dlya dvizheniya. SPB, 1910.
(Official publication.)
PERIODICALS

Apart from journals already cited in footnotes, the following are
interesting:

Modern Railways. January and February 1962. Articles on contem-
porary Soviet railway situation.

Railway Age. April 25, 1919. Russian railways in 1919.

Railway Magazine. October 1898. Description. September 1900,
Report on travel over Archangel line.

Railway World. Winter 1957-58. A series of articles by a visitor to
Russia.

Rutskaya starina. 1885-8G. A series of articles on early railway
history.

Savremennik. December 1856 and February 1857. Chernyshevsky's
and others’ discussion of railway prospects in Russia.

Tekhnika i ekonomika putei soobshcheniya. February 1920. Free railway

carriage. March 1920, Labour problems.

Trains. (Milwaukee.) January 1961. Experimental Soviet locomotives.

Vestnik Evropy. March-May 1899. Early Russian railways.

Toprosy ekonomiki. February 1958. Discussion and criticism of trans-
port statistics.

Voprosy geograjii. June 1947. Changing geography of Russian trans-
port.

In addition, most issues of the Soviet newspaper Gudok and the
monthly Zheleznodorozhnyi transport contain items of interest.
INDEX

Accidents 51, 88, 101, 123, 132, 205,
207, 230

Accounting 214, 256

Administration (s« also Government,
Management, Planning) 82, 185,
213, 250, 315

Agriculture (see also Grain traffic)
117, 123, 131

Air transport 296

Alaska, sale of 69

Alexandrovsk (set Zaporozlie)

Alexandrovsk Works (at St. Peters-
burg) 20. 32, 93

Alma Ata (r«v nltn Turkestan-Siberia
Railway) 141

America 31, 32, 36, 54, 112, 175,
196, 275

Amur Railway 110, 114, 115

Annenkov, Gen. 126

Archangel (see Moscow-Yaroslavl-

Archangel Railway)

Armoured trains 193, 198

Ashkhabad Railway (see also Trans-
Caspian Railway) 225, 274, 276

Austria (see also Gerstner) 45, 54,92,
104, 224

Baikal, Lake (see also Trans-Baikal

Railway) 110,113,120,122

Balaclava Railway 44

Baku (see also Trans-Caucasus Railway)
224

Balu 44, 50, 57, 99, 104

Baltic Railway 65, 76, 80, 144'

Banditry 133, 189

Banks (see Financing)

Baranov Commission 69, 80, 81, 95

Baskunchak Railway 61, 79, 148

Battery trains 223

Belgium 43, 54, 92

Blagoveshchensk 108, 115

Bologoye 54, 61, 62

Borodin, A 96

Boxer Rebellion 114

Brakes 223, 249

Branch lines (src also Feeder lines) 104

Brest 61, 65, 103, 104

Bridges 32, 63, 111, 112, 114, 115,
118, 127, 195, 200, 202

Britain 45, 49. 54, 62, 91, 92

L

Brusilov, Gen, 172

Bryansk Works 93, 159, 223, 277

Canadian Pacific Railway 107, 123,
124

Canals (see Waterway transport)

Capacity, line (see also Traffic density)
87, 1'18, 131, 142, 151, 169, 231,
238, 296

Cartels 146, 157, 174, 175

Caucasus (see also Trans-Caucasus and
Vladikavkaz railways) 45, 61, 140,
244

Central Siberia Railway 246

Charter of Soviet Railways 263

Chelyabinsk 86, 109. 116, 120

Chelyabinsk ‘Break’ 86, 116

Cherepanovs, the 21

Chevkin 46, 48

Children’s railways 269

Chinese Eastern Railway (can)

114, 124, 136, 143, 170, 175, 198

Chiu 114

Civil War 177, 195, 196

Climate 22,51,53,88,113

Coal (see Locomotive fuel)

Coal traffic 78,87, 131,138,146, 172,
173, 179, 204, 218, 224, 226, 238,
246, 259, 263, 287, 295, 296, 298

Collegia (see Workers' control)

Communist Party 190, 203, 230, 274

Communist Saturdays 194

Competition 83, 84

Construction (see also Engineering,
Government, Mileage) 175, 195,
220, 242, 302

ConUiners 233, 294

Co-ordination of transport 18, 264,
281

Corruption 42, 43, 46, 71, 72, 165

Costs, construction 40, 43, 45, 49,
104, 116, 124

Costs, operating 81, 89, 134, 262, 298

Couplings 56, 156, 207, 249

Crampton locomotives 55

Credit Mobilier 40, 49

Crimean War 48, 49

Czech revolt 197

Danzig 61, 104

Del'vig, A. 45, 75
Demurrage 263

Department for Railway Affairs 85,
145

Derviz, von 43, 67, 70	*

Diesel traction (see also Locomotives)

224, 235, 267, 273

Discrimination (see Jews, Poles, Slavo-
phils)

Dolgintsevo 140

Donetz Basin (Donbas, see also Coal
traffic) 247

Donetz Railway 61, 79, 83, 86, 131,
154, 251, 252

Double-tracking 116, 119, 231, 247

Duma 115, 129, 166

Dunaburg (Dvinsk) 40, 43, 81

Dvinsk (see Dunaburg 1

Dynamo Works 278

Efficiency (see also Operations, Profit-
ability, Workers) 87, 130, 159,
207, 230, 268

Ekaterinburg (лее also Sverdlovsk)
61, 108, 116, 140, 195

Ekaterininskaya Railway (Catherine
Railway, Ekaterinin Railway) 61,
79, 86, 144

Electrification (rrr also Locomotives)
223, 247, 267, 273

Elizavetgrad (now Kirovograd) 50,
74, 99, 104

Engineering (see also Bridges, Loco-
motives, Track) 51, 63, 112, 113,
115, 118, 124, 126

Engineers, supply of 32, 47, 51

Fairlie locomotives 95

Fastov Railway 61, 67

Feeder lines 62, 78, 252, 292, 305

Fergana 127

Ferries, railway 111, 113, 120, 299

Financing (set also Government) 29,
39, 41, 42, 43, 46. 47,64-70, 75, 81,
129, 142, 178, 215, 216, 241, 258

Finland 50, 278

France 40, 49, 50, 54, 55, 92

Freight crises 173, 177, 229

Freight traffic (see also Coal, Grain,

Oil, Timber traffic) 34,78,86, 116,
128, 130, 138, 176, 178, 199, 203,
226, 231, 238, 286, 298, 306

Frolov brothers 20

Frunze 221

Gakkel, Prof. 225

Gauge 24, 25, $(), 241, 305

General Charter of Russian Railways
82

Germany 51, 55, 92, 95, 223, 224,
225, 274, 277, 278

Gerstner, Von 22, 27, 31

Gorkii (see Nizhnii Novgorod)

Government guarantee 25, 40, 43,
46, 80, 99, 103

Government ownership and control
(see also Planning) 25, 29, 39, 40,
43-5, 48. 49. 56, 62, 63, 74-7,
83-5, 115, 143, 182, 190, 213, 254

Gradients 34, 54, 55, 94. 118, 119

Graevo 103, 104

Grain traffic 18. 26. 35. 43. 61. 64.
78, 79, 84, 86, 117. 138, 140, 141,
172, 179, 203, 226, 259, 263, 271,
286

Great War 171

Grushevskaya Railway 45, 50

Gryazi 62,77

Horse traction 20, 22, 170

Horse transport 18, 112, 141, 172,
292

Hughes, J. 91

Hungary 278, 279

Industry (see also Cartels, Location of
industry) 24, 32, 39, 47, 56, 73,
91, 117, 127, 252, 276

Interchange between railways 56,
85, 87, 232

International Sleeping Car Company
(see Sleeping cars)

Inspectorate, railway 52

Irkutsk 110, 113

Ivashchenko Committee 141

Japan (see also Russo-Japanese War)
198, 244

Jews 103, 163

Kaganovich, L. 230, 275

Kalinin (see Tver)

Kalinin Works 278

Kaliningrad (see Koenigsberg)

Kaluga Works 274, 278

Kankrin, E. 23, 24, 27, 28, 29

Karaganda Railway 221, 244

Kazan (see also Moscow-Kazan Rail-
way) 18, 22

Khabarovsk 110, 111, 115
Kharbin 114

Kharkov 40, 50, 61, 76, 89

Kharkov Coal Committee 87, 132

Kharkov Works 93, 158, 277

Khilkov 118

'Khozraschet' (see Accounting)

Kiev 44, 61, 65. 74, 80, 96. 103. 104

Kiev Works 105

Kirov (see Vvatka)

Kleinmikhel,’P. 29. 33, 46, 52

Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad) 61, 84,
104

Kolomna 43, 93

Kolomna Works 93, 95, 96, 98, 274,
277

Kovrov Works 98

Kozlov (Michurinsk) 43, 50, 67, 70,
76

Kraft, N. 29. 32

Krasnoyarsk Works 277

Kulomzin, A. 72, 110, 120

Kulunda Railway 183

Kursk 40, 50

Kursk-Kharkov-Azov Railway (later
Kursk-Kharkov-Sevastopol Railway.
See Southern Railway)

Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbas) 227, 238,
2+4

Labour (see Trade Unions, Wages,
Workers)

Length of haul 145, 204, 227, 256,
294

Lenin, V. 177, 179, 190, 209, 225

Leningrad (see also St. Petersburg)
239

Llbau (Libava, now Llepaya) -to, -Ю,
61, 65, 71, 84

Libau Railway 40, 65, 71, 73

Location of industry 227, 238, 260

Locomotive building 32, 54, 55, 57,
93, 152, 158, 175, 193, 222, 277

Locomotive design 94, 104, 119, 153,
248, 279

Locomotive fuel 23, 28, 97, 98, 135,

154, 189, 190, 192, 204, 209, 238,
276, 280

Locomotive policy 95. 153, 221, 275,
277

Locomotive stock 57, 98, 104, 190,
192, 221, 237, 279

Locomotive utilization 193, 207, 211,
230, 233, 236, 272

Locomotives, diesel 225, 274, 278,
280

Locomotives, early 21, 25, 52

Locomotives, electric 278, 280

Lugansk (Voroshilovgrad) Works
277

Lvov (Lemlierg) 170

Magnitogorsk 244

Main Company 40, 48, 49, 69, 74,
83,91,95

Maintenance 174, 177, 193, 200, 211,
252

Mallet locomotives 119

Maltsev Works 93, 96, 159, 278

Management 41, 42, 75, 82, 131,
173, 182, 213, 230, 234, 250, 253,
315

Maiming, locomotive 101, 271

Martial law 188, 212, 240

Medals, railway 240

Medical services 106

Melnikov, P. 29, 32, 49, 50, 71

Mileage 50, 59, 77. 104, 134, 140,
141, 176, 177, 178, 220, 237, 242,
252, 304

Military traffic (see also Strategic rail-
ways) 22. 23, 25, 50, 101, 116,
178, 179, 190, 239

Ministry (formerly Directorate) of
Ways and Communications (mps,
see also nkps) 52, 56, 59, 63, 66,
82, 96, 97, 145

Mobilization 167, 171

Moscow Belt Railway 140, 239, 246,
252

Moscow-Brest Railway 61, 85, 90,
151

Moscow-Kazan Kallway T7, 7в, 5Э,
134, 143, 153, 163, 194, 195, 224

Moscow-Kiev-Voronezh Railway 77,
143, 189

Moscow-Kursk Railway 50, 57, 63,
74, 79, 90, 131, 144'

Moscow-Nizhnii Novgorod Railway
(later incorporated in Moscow
Kursk Railway) 40, 42, 50, 51,
55, 61, 90

Moscow Railway 252

Moscow-Ryazan Railway (see also
Ryazan-Uralsk Railway) 43, 48,
50, 57, 69, 70, 79, 232, 252

Moscow-Vindava-Rybinsk Railway
77, 134, 143

Moscow-Yaroslavl-Archangel Rail-
way 45, 50, 55, 57, 61, 62, 73,
77, 90, 98, 142, 144, 172, 175
Muraviev, Count 24, 108

Murmansk Railway 173, 273

Narrow gauge railways 48,’ 62, 90,
142, 170, 195, 220, 242, 258, 305

Nationalization (see Government)

Neopikhanov, A. 220

New Economic Policy 199, 215

Nevskii (Neva) Works 73, 93, 277

Nikolaev (Black Sea port) 61,76,144

Nikolaev Railway (Nikolaevskaya,

Nicholas, Nikolai or St Petersburg-
Moscow Railway. See also October
Railway) 27, 46, 50. 52. 54. 61,
69, 74, 79, 80, 88, 89, 91, 92, 95,
132, 134, 135, 145, 150, 166, 170,
192

Nizhnii Novgorod (now Gorkii. See
also Moscow-Nizhnii Novgorod
Railway) 22, 40, 42

nkps (or mps. See also Ministry of
Wavs and Communications) 183,
185, 187, 213, 216, 250, 253, 299

Nortliem Railway 144, 189

North Western Railway 144, 145

Novgorod 28, 30, 62

Novocherkassk Works 277

Novonikolaevsk (Novosibirsk) 127

Novosibirsk (see also Novonikolaevsk)
244, 247, 273, 284

October Railway (see also Nikolaev
Railway) 208, 224, 252, 266

Oil traffic 78. 138, 205, 226, 286, 291,
295

Operation 86. 129. 189, 205, 228, 241

Opposition to railways 23, 27, 28,
45, 63, 115

Oranienbaum (now Lomonosov)
Oranienbaum Railway 50, 58, 90, 152

Orenburg Railway 61, 67, 89

Passenger classes 25, 35, 41, 58, 90,
139, 148, 151, 180, 208, 264

Passenger fares (see Tariffs)

Passenger services (ire Train services)

Passenger traffic 24, 34, 79, 116, 139,
176, 205, 228, 299, 307

Passenger travel, conditions of 36,
120, 180, 264, 267

Pechora Railway 245, 252, 296

Pensions 106, 161

Peterhof Railway 39, 50

Peto, Sir M. 44

Petrov Report 118

Pipelines (see Oil)

Planning 38, 58ж,66, 109, 122, 124,
131, 132, 167, 174, 175, 191. 206,
219, 229, 253, 257. 282, 317

Poland (see also Warsaw-Vienna Rail-
way) 45, 50. 61, 78. 143, 277

Poles' 103, 162

Polessian Railway 61

Police, railway 33, 52, 115, 162

Polyakov, L. 70, 91

Posiet, K. 109

Productivity (see Workers)

Profitability 24, 35. 47. 48, 72. 77,
80, 104, 123, 129, 183, 147, 148,
176, 192, 258, 260, 265

Promoters (see also Derviz, Gerstner,
Peto, Polyakov) 67, 70, 99

Pskov 57, 62

Pullman 105

Purge 235

Railway Committee 39, 50

Railway Department 30, k>, 82

Railway Fund 69, 74, 87

Railway troops 170

Railway union 162, 165, 184, 187,

188

Receipts (see Profitability)

Revel (see Tallin)

Revolution, 1905 136, 163

Revolution, 1917 177

Riga Works 279

Road transport 19, 26, 35, 291, 297,
298, 299

Rolling stock 56, 98, 105, 120, 122,
123, 156, 158, 169, 179, 192, 200.
222, 249, 277, 279

Russian Steamship and Trading Com-
pany 99, 103

Russo-Japanese War 125, 170

Ryazan-Uralsk Railway 67, 70, 77,
86, 143, 154, 155, 189, 271

Safety (see Accidents)

St Petersburg (see Leningrad)

St Petersburg-Moscow Railway (see
Nikolaev Railway)

St Petersburg-Warsaw Railway 40,
42, 50, 52, .55, 57, 93, 95, 144, 154,
169, 170

Samara (now Kuibyshev) 18, 61, 109

Saratov 43, 46, 67, 76, 77

Schools, railway 106, 115, 123, 269

Sea transport 20, 99, 103, 291, 298

Second World War 237
Semircchensk Railway 182

Sergiev Posad (see Zagorsk)

Shchukin, Prof. 15+

Siberia (we also Trans-Siberian Rail-
way) 18, 86, 246

Signalling (see Train control)

Slavophils 50

Sleeping cars 150, 151, 156, 209, 250

Smolensk Railway 145

Socialist Competition 236

Sormovo Works (at Gorkii) 93, 154,
277

South Eastern Railway 77, 86, 131,
136, 143, 195

Southern Railway (formerly Kursk-
Kharkov-Azov Railway) 81, 144,
251

South Sakhalin Railway 258

South Siberian Railway 127, 246

Speed (see Train services)

Stakhanovism 231, 235, 236

Stalingrad (Volgograd, see Tsaritsyn)

Standardization 56, 95, 98

Stations 34, 46, 63

Statistics 9, 192, 205

Steamships, early 18

Strategic railways 45, 61, 65, 115,
125, 126, 141'

Strikes 89, 162

Strauss, Johann 24

Suburban railways 39, 50, 58, 79, 90,

139, 149, 152, 155, 209, 228, 265,
268, 273

Suez Canal 99

Sverdlovsk (we also Ekaterinburg)
244, 273

Sweden 223

Tallin (Revel) 84

Tambov 67,76

Tariffs 23, 35, 36, 41, 58, 82, 83-6,

90, 117, 123, 131, 132, 144, 145,
215, 216, 258, 287, 293, 300

Tashkent Railway 127, 133, 136

Tbilisi (see Tiflis)

Tbilisi Works 278

Telegraph 25

Theft (see also Corruption) 212

Tickets (see Corruption, Tariffs)

Tiflis (Tbilisi) 45, 50, 61, 89, 245

Timber traffic 62, 78, 138, 204, 226,
286

Tol' 23, 27

Track 20, 32, 34, 56, 63, 91, 96,
118, 155, 192, 200, 201, 247

Trade unions (see Railway Union)

Traffic density 139, 176, 178, 207,
228, 243, 284

Train control 231,248

Train services 28, 36, 57, 89, 105,
121, 150, 208, 229, 266, 314

Trans-Baikal Railway 145, 252

Trans-Caspian Railway (Central Asian

Railway. See also Ashkhabad Railway)
61, 125, 136, 144, 170

Trans-Caucasus Railway 45, 50, 61,
94. 145, 153, 164, 208, 224, 273

Trans-Siberian Railway 107, 136,139,
144, 153, 155, 163, 175, 189, 196,
209, 247, 266, 273, 276, 297

Trotsky, L. 188, 196

Tsar Alexander 1 20

Tsar Alexander II 25, 29, 48, 62,
83, 102

Tsar Alexander III 109. 110

Tsar Nicholas 1 23, 25, 29, 30, 31, 34

Tsar Nicholas II 110, 118

Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad) 61, 77

Tsarskoye Selo (now Pushkin)

Tsarskoye Selo Railway 22, 50, 52,
58, 83, 143, 164, 223

Turkestan-Siberia Railway 124, 141,
243, 266

Turkish War (1877) 75, 81, 86, 101,
102, 103, 170

Tver (now Kalinin) 26, 35

Tyumen 61,107,108,116,140

Ulan Ude Works 277

Urals 108, 139, 221, 238, 244, 273

Urals-Kuznetsk Combine 227, 244,
2*9

Urals Railway 61, 67, 76, 95

Ussuri Railway 110, 111,115, 119,143

Valdai Hills 28, 54

Ventspils (see Vindava)

Vindava (Ventspils) 77

Vistula Railway 67

Vitte, S. 85, 109, 125

Vladikavkaz (now Ordzhonikidze)

Vladikavkaz Railway (later North
Caucasus Railway) 61, 62, 77, 85,
97, 143, 154, 164, 252

Vladivostok 108, 109, 114, 244, 266

Volga-Don Railway 45, 50

Volgograd (see Tsaritsyn)

Voroshilovgrad (see laigansk)

Votkinsk Works 93, 158, 278

Vyatka (Kirov) 140, 144
Wages 28. 89, 99, 185, 161, 193,
210, 268

Warsaw-Vienna Railway 25, 57, 78,
79, 80, 135, 144

Water supply 112, 126, 275

Waterway transport 17, 26, 284,
297, 298

Weight of trains 132, 206, 233

Western Railway 145

Whistler, J. 31

Women workers 162, 269

Workers (see also Manning, Socialist
Competition, Stakhanovism, Strikes,
Women workers. Wages, Working
conditions) 32, 44, 47, 88, 99, 106,
111, 112, 137, 194, 210, 223, 239,
жч

Working conditions (see also Railway
Union, Strike») 32, 53, 54, 89,
115, 125, 159, 160, 170, 188, 190,
211

Workshops (see Maintenance)

Yaroslavl (see Moscow-Yaroslavl-
Archangel Railway)

Zagorsk (Sergiev Posad. See Moscow-

Yaroslavl- Archangel Railway)

Zaporozhe (Alexandrovsk) 140, 298

Zemstvos 66, 132, 174

Zhmerinka 63, 74, 102

Zhuravskii, D. 32

Zmeinogorsk 20
GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

London: 40 Museum Street, W.C.l

Auckland: 24 Wyndham Street

Bombay: IS Graham Road, Ballard Estate, Bombay 1

Bridgetown: P.O. Box 222

Buenos Aires: Escritorio 454-459, Florida 165

Calcutta: 17 Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta 13
Cape Town: 68, Shortmarket Street

Hong Kong: 44 Mody Road, Kowloon

Ibadan: P.O. Box 62

Karachi: Karachi Chambers, McLeod Road

Madras: Mohan Mansions, 38c Mount Road, Madras 6
Mexico: Villaiongin 32-10, Piso, Mexico 5, D.F.

Nairobi: P.O. Box 4536

New Delhi: 13-14 Asaf AH Road, New Delhi 1

Sao Paulo: Avenida 9 De Julho 1138-Ap. 51

Singapore: 36c Prinsep Street, Singapore 7
Sydney, NSW. Bradbury House, 55 York Street
Tokyo: 10 Kanda-Ogawamachi, 3-Chome, Chiyoda-Ku

Toronto: 91 Wellington Street West, Toronto 1
О. S. NOCK

CONTINENTAL MAIN LINES

In this book, O. S. Nock, writing from an experience of continental
travel extending back nearly thirty years, tells of some of tlie
routes most frequently used by British travellers through France,
Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Italy and Austria. He discusses
the trains of today, their locomotives, carriages and working in
comparison with those of former years, with many a vivid flashback
to the turn of the century; to steam days on the alpine routes, to a
nightmare run from Tarascon to Nimes, and to the days when
travellers to Switzerland were glad enough of a swill under a tap
on the open platform at Basle to wash off the effects of a long night
journey.

In taking us along the famous routes the author discusses
signalling, and operation, in addition to locomotive practice, and
he has more than a casual eye for the magnificent scenery that is tlie
main reason for some of the stupendous feats of civil engineering
he describes.

Demy 8vo

42s. net

GEORGE BEHREND

GRAND EUROPEAN EXPRESSES

The trains de luxe of the International Sleeping Car and European
Express Trains Company, from the Orient Express of the ’eighties to
the ‘Car Sleepers’ of the nineteen-sixties, are presented in this book
with some of the immense variety of locomotives that hauled them
across the Continent. Full details are given of the complex organiza-
tion needed to run and sustain them, to ensure that sleeping cars
with bedding and conductors and dining cars with food and waiters
are always in tlie right place at the right time. Tlie era of the
Wagons-Lits Palace Hotel, when travelling, was largely confined
to the nobility, politicians, their agents (sinister or beautiful),
well-to-do tourists and businessmen, forms the historical background
of this book ; an era that has inspired many novelists and writers
of crime fiction.

Something of this romantic Edwardian tradition still permeates
tlie atmosphere of the carpeted corridors in even the most modern
all-steel wagons-lits car of today.

Demy 8vo	35s. net

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD

GRAND EUROPEAN EXPRESSES

The Story of the Wagons-Lits

GEORGE BEHREND

Demy 8vo	33s. net

The trains de luxe of the International Sleeping Car and European Express Trains
Company, from the Orient Express of the ’eighties to the ‘Car Sleepers’ of the
nineteen-sixties, are presented in this book with some of the immense variety of
locomotives that hauled them across the Continent.

INLAND WATERWAYS OF EUROPE

ROBERT CALVERT

Demy 8vo	•	40s. net

This is both a practical guide book and a contribution to the literature of travel.
Its pages are packed with detailed information concerning the navigable rivers
and canals of Europe from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, and from
the shores of Holland to the Greek peninsula. But having been written out of
long personal experience, it also reflects the pleasures and emotions of past
journeys.

RAILS THROUGH THE CLAY

ALAN A. JACKSON, DESMOND F. CROOMF

Demy 8vo	45s. net

London's deep-level tube railway system is unique. Here, for the first time, is a
detailed historical and descriptive account, not only of its engineering and techni-
cal evolution, but also of the social, political and financial influences and back-
ground.

THE FLYING SCOTSMAN

1862—1962

HAMILTON ELLIS

Crown 8vo	6s. net

Hamilton Ell io, who hao known the fumouj train oincc he wad in ohwsl knivkvi-
bockers, writes of it with loving knowledge.

CONTINENTAL MAIN LINES

O. S. NOCK

Demy 8vo	42s. net

This title brings to mind some of the world’s most famous trains: the Mistral,
the Orient Express, the Rheingold, the Blue Train. In this book O. S. Nock,
writing from an experience of continental travel extending back nearly thirty
years, tells of some of the routes most frequently used by British travellers
through France, Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Italy and Austria. He discusses
the trains of today, their locomotives, carriages and working in comparison with
those of former years, with many a vivid flashback to the turn of the century;
to steam days on the alpine routes, to a nightmare run from Tarascon to Nimes,
and to the days when travellers to Switzerland were glad enough of a swill under
a tap on the open platform at Basle to wash off the effects of a long night journey.

In taking us along these famous routes the author discusses signalling, and
operation, in addition to locomotive practice, and he has more than a casual eye
for the magnificent scenery that is the main reason for some of the stupendous
feats of civil engineering he describes. The book is magnificently illustrated with
100 reproductions of photographs, interesting diagrams and a coloured frontis-
piece.